Kenya's 2007 Post Election Violence

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Kenya's 2007 Post Election Violence Syracuse University SURFACE Dissertations - ALL SURFACE January 2015 Marginalization and Democracy: Kenya's 2007 Post Election Violence Hamdi Ibrahim Tartarini Syracuse University Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Tartarini, Hamdi Ibrahim, "Marginalization and Democracy: Kenya's 2007 Post Election Violence" (2015). Dissertations - ALL. 348. https://surface.syr.edu/etd/348 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ABSTRACT Until recently, Kenya was considered an icon, a bastion of political stability and economic growth in East Africa and Africa in general. Forty-four years after gaining independence, and fifteen years since the beginning of multiparty democracy, the ruling elite touted this exceptionalism to conceal the historical grievances of marginalized communities. Given this background, the electoral violence experienced between December 2007 and March 2008 came as a surprise to many. Much scholarship on the topic focuses on the immediate triggers such as voting irregularities rather than the underlying conditions that existed prior to the violence. In this study, I attempt to identify the root causes of the electoral violence in Kenya by focusing on two main areas of historical marginalization: class and ethnic marginalization. The Kenyan crisis helps show some lessons for pan-African world. Marginalization and Democracy: Kenya’s 2007 Post Election Violence By Hamdi Ibrahim Tartarini M.A., Syracuse University 2015 Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Masters of Art in Pan-African Studies in the Graduate School of Syracuse University August 2015 ©Copyright 2015 Hamdi Ibrahim Tartarini Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the love, support, friendship, and guidance of many people. First, I would like to thank God for providing me with the physical, mental and spiritual wellbeing to pursue this Master’s program. I also want to thank my parents, especially my mum, Shamsa, for her support and interest in my work throughout my research. This thesis is dedicated to her. My uncle, Professor Mohamed Mukhtar, and my cousins Subeida Hajji and Anna Krannichfeldt also deserve a big thanks for their friendship and encouragement. Without them my first year in graduate school would have been much harder. Most of all, I want to thank my advisor and Committee Chair, Professor S.N. Sangmpam. He provided me with ample support, encouragement, and intellectual guidance throughout this research. In fact, he proof-read my work more times than one can bear. Yet, he remained patient, attentive, and continued to steer my work in the right direction. Honestly speaking, I would not have completed this thesis in a timely and comprehensive fashion without his expertise. Next, I would like to thank my committee members: Dr. Mĩcere Gĩthae Mũgo, Dr. Martin Shanguhyia and Dr. Kwame Dixon for always listening and offering tremendous guidance and mentorship wherever they could. Mwalimu Mũgo was particularly keen to inquire about my work progress, which in turn provided me with encouragement. More importantly, her input in helping me find potential interviewees for the project boosted the overall quality of this research. Dr. Shanguhyia was also instrumental in my work as he provided books and alternative sources that strengthened my theoretical framework and empirical analysis. I thank him particularly for suggesting the book by Charles Hornsby, which proved to be vital. Last but not least, Dr. Dixon also supported iv my academic endeavors by offering to divide some of the TA workload, such as grading and teaching. He also gave me some leeway to focus on my research whenever I requested his permission. I would also like to thank Dr. Horace Campbell for suggesting this topic. His mentorship has proven to be critical to the success of this project. This research was made possible thanks to the generous support of the African-American Studies Department. I thank the department for its valuable mentorship and funding for the summer externship. I also thank Ajajielle Brown for her administrative assistance and the staff members for their support. I would like also to thank all my colleagues who provided the moral support throughout the two-year program. Outside the department, I would like to thank the General Student Organization (GSO) for providing me with external funding to cover my travelling expenses to Kenya. My fieldwork in Kenya would not have been possible without the support of the staff members at the Kenya National Archive, Kenya Human Rights Commission, the Library at Nairobi University, and Kenyatta University. Similarly, I was able to collect more data from my interactions with various professors at United States International University-Africa, where I met Moses Onyango, Macharia Munene and Kisemei Mutisya. I would like to extend my gratitude to all the interviewees from various walks of life (politicians, professors, political analyst and even the ordinary mwanainchi). I would also like to thank all the wonderful people who helped me along the way, and whose friendship and support made it possible to remain sane during my time in Syracuse: Rashid, Mike, Ornela. v Definitions of Terms • Mwakenya: a political publication by University lecturers termed “subversive” by the state in mid 1980s. • Waki Report (2008) Republic of Kenya: the popular name for Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence. It was set up by the Coalition Government to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the Kenyan post-election violence. • Coalition Government: an arrangement of power-sharing between two Kenyan political parties, PNU (headed by President Kibaki) and ODM (headed by Raila Odinga), leading to what Kenyans see as a ‘hybrid’ type of government. • The Ndungu Report (2004) Republic of Kenya: a commission set up by the Kibaki regime to investigate patterns of corruption and unfair allocations of land. • Historical injustices: unresolved grievances in Kenya dating back to the colonial times and the period immediately after independence. • Akiwumi Report (1999) Republic of Kenya: the report of the judicial commission appointed by the Moi regime to inquire into the ethnic clashes in Kenya. • Jeshi la Mzee: an informal security outfit of party youth that was maintained by the ruling party, KANU, in the 90s, and whose main role was to harass the opposition, the civil society groups and anyone else they viewed as being anti-Moi. • PEV: acronym for Post-Election Violence vi MAP OF KENYA Source: International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°137, 21 February 20 vii Table of Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................ iv ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. i 1.4.1 Electoral Violence Defined ......................................................................12 1.4.2 Conceptual Framework ............................................................................13 1.7 Chapter Outline ..........................................................................................34 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS ...................................................................................................35 2.1 Democratization and Institutionalism ............................................................35 2.2 Ethnicity .........................................................................................................42 2.3 Class Analysis ................................................................................................55 CHAPTER 3: ROOTS OF MARGINALIZATION: LAND, ETHNICITY AND CLASS FORMATION ................................................................................73 3.1 State and Class Formation ..............................................................................74 3.2 Ethnic-Politicization .......................................................................................85 3.3 Land Question as the Matrix of Political Conflict .......................................105 CHAPTER 4: MARGINALIZATION AND ELECTORAL VIOLENCE ....109 4.2 The making of a crisis ..................................................................................113 4.3 Electoral Fraud .............................................................................................121 4.4 The role of DIGITAL Revolution ................................................................128 4.5 Electoral Violence: A Description ...............................................................131 4.6 The Role of Transition Institutions ..............................................................135 4.8 State Power, Class and Violence .................................................................154 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PAN-AFRICANISM .............165 APPENDIX ..........................................................................................................178 REFERENCE ......................................................................................................179 viii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 The Problem This thesis is about the 2007 electoral violence in Kenya. Kenya
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