8: Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power

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Chapter 8 Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power

Photo credit: OTA staff Buttons and bumperstickers from the controversy about nuclear power Contents

Page Introduction: Public Opinion and Its Impact on Nuclear Power ...... 21 1 Actors in the Nuclear Power Debate ...... 214 The impact of Public Opinion on Nuclear Power ...... 215 The Experts’ View ...... 217 The Controversy Over Safety Studies ...... 218 The lmpact of Risk Assessments on Public Opinion ...... 220 Factors Influencing the Public’s View on Nuclear Safety ...... 221 Perceptions of Risk and Benefit ...... 221 Psychological Factors ...... 222 Values and Knowledge ...... 226 Which is More Important? ...... 226 Values ...... 227 The Role of the Media...... 231 The Extent of Media Coverage of Nuclear Power ...... 231 The Content of Media Coverage ...... 232 What Would lt Take To Increase Public Acceptance of Nuclear Power ...... 234 Enhance Nuclear Advantages...... 234 Reduce Concerns Over Nuclear Accidents...... 236 Minimize Linkage Between Nuclear Power and Weapons ...... 239 Case Study 1–Maine Yankee: Economics as the Key to Public Support ...... 240 Case Study 2–Diablo Canyon: Environmentalism and Industry Credibility ...... 242 Case Study 3–Public Perception of lmproved Management ...... 244 Chapter 8 References ...... 245

Tables

Table No. Page 31. History of Statewide Referendum Votes Dealing With Nuclear Powerplants ...... 212 32. Major National Groups Influencing Public Opinion For and Against Nuclear Power 215 33. State Laws and Regulations Restricting Construction of Nuclear Powerplants ...... 216

Figures

Figure No. Page 39. Trends in Public Opinion on Nuclear Power ...... 211 40. Relationship Between Judged Frequency and the Actual Number of Deaths per Year for 41 Causes of Death ...... 223 41. Expert and Lay Judgments of Risk Plotted Against Technical Estimates of Annual Fatalities ...... 224 Chapter 8 Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power

INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC OPINION AND ITS IMPACT ON NUCLEAR POWER Public attitudes toward nuclear power have Polls taken between 1976 and 1979 indicated become increasingly negative over the past two that slightly over half of the American public decades, with the most recent polls indicating favored continued construction of nuclear plants that a slight majority of Americans opposes fur- in the United States in general, while about 28 ther construction of reactors. During the 1950’s, percent were opposed and 18 percent unsure. nuclear power was still in the early states of de- The accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) in April velopment, and pollsters did not even bother to 1979 had a sudden and dramatic impact on these survey the public on the issue. In the early 1960’s, attitudes. As shown in figure 39, the percentage a few scattered protests against local plants gained of people who had been in favor of or uncertain national attention, but opinion polls indicated about continued construction of reactors de- that less than a quarter of the public opposed nu- creased immediately following the accident while clear power (41 ). From Earth Day in 1970 through the number opposed increased (57). In subse- the mid-1970’s, opposition levels averaged 25 to quent months, there was some return to previous- 30 percent, indicating that substantial majorities ly held opinions, but opposition levels remained of the public favored further nuclear develop- much higher than they had been. National polls ment. However, by 1976, anti-nuclear referen- taken since mid-1 982 indicate a continued slow da appeared on ballots in eight States. erosion in support for nuclear power. About a

Figure 39.—Trends in Public Opinion on Nuclear Power ,100

0 I 1 i I I t I I I I 0 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Year of survey

Question asked: “Do you favor or oppose the construction of more nuclear powerplants?” SOURCE Cambridge Reports, Inc.

211 212 ● Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty third of the public now supports construction of looks to nuclear power as one solution to the Na- new plants in general, while over so percent are tion’s long-term energy problems. In a recent opposed (6, 10, 18). The accident at TMI appears survey, the majority of respondents believed that to have accelerated a trend of even greater op- most U.S. energy needs would be supplied pri- position to construction of new plants near to marily by nuclear” and solar over the next two where those polled live. By the end of 1981, a decades, and over a third of those polled ex- large majority of those polled opposed construc- pected nuclear power to provide most of the Na- tion of new plants in or near their communities. tion’s energy after the year 2000 (14). The ma- When compared with other energy options, in- jority of Americans favor neither a halt to all new cluding offshore oil drilling and coal plants, construction nor a permanent shutdown of all op- nuclear is now the least favored alternative. erating reactors. Opinion polls on this question have been verified by State ballot initiatives. As Despite the trend of declining support, the pub shown in table 31, most of the nuclear moratori- Iic’s overall current attitude toward nuclear um initiatives, and all referenda that would have power can best be described as ambivalent. For shut down operating plants were defeated in example, a 1983 poll indicates that about 40 per- 1976, 1980, and 1982. However, more of these cent of the public thinks currently operating reac- initiatives have been approved in recent years, tors are “mainly safe” while slightly over half and many restrictions on nuclear waste disposal think they are dangerous and 5 percent are “not have been passed, reflecting public doubts about sure.” There is some evidence that the public the technology.

Table 31.—History of Statewide Referendum Votes Dealing With Nuclear Powerplants

Year State Proposal Outcome Vote. split 1976 Arizona Would halt new construction Defeated 30-70 % California and reduce operations until Defeated 33-66% Colorado safety systems were found Defeated 29-71 % Montana effective, liability ceilings Defeated 42-58% Oregon lifted, and waste disposal was Defeated 42-58% Ohio demonstrated Defeated 32-68% Washington Defeated 33-67% 1978 Montana Same as ’76 referenda Approved 60-40% 1980 Maine Would shut down Maine Yankee Defeated 41 -59% Missouri Would prevent Callaway plants Defeated 39-61% from operating until safety systems were found effective, liability ceilings were lifted, and waste disposal was available Oregon Prohibits new construction until Approved 52-48% waste disposal is available and voters approve in a statewide referendum 1981 Washington Prohibits issuance of new bonds Approved 56-44% needed to complete WPPSS Unit 3 1982 Idaho Prohibits legislation limiting Approved 60-40% nuclear power unless approved by voters in a referendum Maine Would phase out Maine Yankee Defeated 44-56% over 5 years Massachusetts Prohibits new construction and Approved 66-33% waste disposal unless certain conditions, including voter approval in a referendum. are met Total restrictive referenda placed on ballots: 14 Total approved: 4 SOURCES: Atomic Industrial Forum, State Codes. Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power ● 213

The public’s ambivalent attitude toward nucle- the safe shutdown of the reactor while downplay- ar power is due to a variety of factors including ing the failure of the Emergency Core Cooling Sys- the ongoing debate among experts over reactor tem— misrepresented the nearness of a disaster safety, individual perceptions of the likelihood of and ignored the lack of foresight which the acci- a catastrophic reactor accident, changing per- dent demonstrated. sonal values, and media coverage of the technology. Underlying all of these factors is increas- While these earlier accidents had an adverse ing doubt about the technical capabilities and the impact on popular support for nuclear technol- credibility of both the nuclear industry and its ogy, it was not until 1979 that a single accident governmental regulators. As discussed in chapter had a direct, measurable impact on public opin- 5, weak utility management has led to poor op- ion as reflected in national opinion polls. That erating performance at some reactors as well as spring, poor maintenance, faulty equipment, and skyrocketing costs and quality-assurance prob- operator errors led to a loss of coolant and par- lems at other plants under construction. These tial destruction of the core at the TMI Unit 2 reac- problems have led to accidents at operating re- tor located in Pennsylvania. Radioactive water actors, causing great public concern. spilled onto the floor of an auxiliary building, releasing a small amount of radioactivity to the As early as 1966, when large majorities of the environment, although the total radiation dose public supported nuclear power, a design error received by the population in the vicinity was far caused blockage of coolant, leading to melting less than their annual exposure to natural and of a small part of the core at Detroit Edison’s Fer- medical radiation (31 ). On March 30, Governor mi breeder reactor (3). Although no radioactivity Thornburgh advised pregnant women and pre- was released, and the event received relatively school children to leave the area within a 5-mile little publicity at that time, nuclear critics and radius of TMI. This advisory was not lifted until some members of the public became concerned. April 9. Conflicting statements from authorities They pointed to a University of Michigan study combined with obvious confusion at the reactor conducted prior to construction of the plant, site before and during the evacuation shook which indicated that if the plant had been larger public confidence in the nuclear industry and and had been operating at full design power for State and Federal officials. Following the accident, at least a year, a complete breach of containment majority support for nuclear power was lost, a combined with the worst possible weather condi- trend that continues today. Local opposition to tions might have led to as many as 60,000 deaths some reactors around the country also increased (26). Nearly a decade later, public discussion of after the accident, while local attitudes toward the accident increased in response to the 1975 other reactors remained favorable (see Case publication of the book, We Almost Lost Detroit Studies at the end of this chapter). (25). Opinion polls taken after the accident at TMI In 1975, a fire started by a worker using a can- indicated that at least half of those polled thought dle to test for air leaks spread through the elec- more such accidents were likely. Since that time, trical system of the Tennessee Valley Authority’s other incidents, such as the rupture of steam gen- (TVA’s) Browns Ferry plant in Alabama. The fire erator tubes at Rochester Gas & Electric’s Ginna caused some loss of core coolant in one unit of nuclear plant in January 1982, have occurred at the plant, and disabled the reactor’s safety sys- operating reactors. There is some evidence that tems (1 1). Because of confusion about how to put the public views these incidents, along with the it out, the fire burned out of control for 7 hours TMI accident, as precursors to a catastrophic ac- before being extinguished. Again there was no cident that might kill thousands (67). loss of life and no release of radiation, but the incident was reported in the national media, in- The handling of reactor safety issues by the creasing public fears of an accident. Critics felt nuclear industry and the NRC has led many peo- that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) ple to the conclusion that both have seriously news release on the event—which emphasized underestimated safety problems. For example,

25-450 0 - 84 - 15 : QL 3 214 . Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty opinion polls indicate that a majority of the public percentages of respondents were also extremely believed government officials understated the pro- or anti-nuclear. Thus, it appears that different dangers at TMI (57). In addition, since 1973 the groups among the public vary in the strength of nuclear industry has argued that the possibility their beliefs about nuclear power. of failure of reactor emergency shutdown systems During the 1970’s, critics of nuclear power and is negligible. Because of industry opposition, the their associated public interest groups became NRC delayed regulations requiring extra equip- increasingly well-organized at the national level. ment to avoid an accident in the event of such As shown in table 32, today all of the major na- a failure. However, it was exactly this type of fail- tional environmental groups are critical of at least ure that occurred not once, but twice within 4 some aspects of the U.S. nuclear program (33). days at Public Service Gas& Electric’s Salem, N. J., In addition to these environmental groups with plant in February 1983 (38). (See ch. 5.) broad agendas, several organizations, such as the The importance of public opinion to further de- Union of Concerned Scientists and the Critical velopment of nuclear power has been recognized Mass Energy Project of Ralph Nader’s Public Citi- by government and industry but is still little zen, Inc., focus primarily on nuclear power. understood (12,75). This chapter attempts to add Overall, about 1 million Americans belong to en- to the limited understanding of public percep- vironmental and energy groups critical of nuclear tions and to identify changes in the management power. Total annual expenditures for lobbying, of nuclear power that might make it more accept- public education, and other activities related able to the public. The analysis is limited to public directly to nuclear energy are estimated to be perceptions of operating nuclear reactors and about $4 million (33). In addition, these groups those under construction. An April 1983 OTA rely heavily on volunteer labor and donated re- stud y, Managing Commercial High-Level Radio- sources. active Waste, deals with public attitudes toward Partially in response to the publicity attracted transportation and disposal of spent fuel and nu- by nuclear critics, proponents of nuclear tech- clear waste in greater depth. nology have also formed advocacy groups, as shown in table 32. Most of the groups supporting the technology are trade and professional associa- Actors in the Nuclear Power Debate tions, although there are some broad-based pub- As discussed in chapter 1, there area number lic interest groups in this category as well. In total, of groups in the United States with sometimes about 300,000 individuals belong to professional conflicting interests in nuclear power. The ap- societies and public interest groups that directly parent contradictions in public attitudes toward or indirectly support nuclear energy develop- the technology are explained at least partially by ment. Some groups in this category, such as the the fact that there is not a single homogeneous American Nuclear Society and the Atomic indus- “general public” in this country. Opinion polls trial Forum, focus primarily on nuclear power, which survey the “general public” may fail to while others such as the Edison Electric Institute reveal the intensity of individual opinions. For are utility trade associations with broad agendas example, the phrasing of the question most fre- that include advocacy of nuclear power among quently asked to gage national public opinion— many other issues. In response to the accident “In general, do you favor or oppose the building at TMI, nuclear advocates stepped up their public of more nuclear power plants in the United education efforts through the creation of the States?” –leaves little room for people who are Committee for Energy Awareness (CEA). Current uncertain or have no opinion. When the ques- plans call for expenditure of about $27 million tion was rephrased in two surveys taken shortly in 1983 for CEA, a major increase over previous after the TMI accident, over a third of the re- expenditures of about $6.5 million by all groups spondents were uncertain or neutral (45). A na- combined (42). tional poll taken in 1978 indicated that about a Nuclear advocates and critics, including the third of respondents were neutral; however, large staffs of public interest groups, are knowledgeable Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power . 215

Table 32.-Major National Groups Influencing Public Opinion For and Against Nuclear Power

Groups supporting nuclear power Groups opposing some aspects of nuclear power Category 1: Large organizations with a focus on nuclear Category 1: Groups with a focus on nuclear energy targeting a broad audience. energy and alternatives to it. — U.S. Committee for Energy Awareness — Union of Concerned Scientists — Atomic Industrial Forum — Critical Mass Energy Project of Public — American Nuclear Society Citizen, Inc. Category 2: Lobbying organizations with a primary or secondary — Nuclear Information and Resource focus on nuclear energy. Service — Americans for Nuclear Energy — Safe Energy Communications Council — American Nuclear Energy Council Category 2: Large environmental groups that — Americans for Energy Independence participate in lobbying and public criticism of Category 3: Trade and professional associations that support nuclear energy. commercial nuclear energy. — Sierra Club — Edison Electric Institute — National Audubon Society — American Public Power Association — Natural Resources Defense Council — National Rural Electric Cooperative Association — Friends of the Earth — Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers — Environmental Policy Center — American Association of Engineering Societies — Environmental Defense Fund — Health Physics Society — Environmental Action, Inc. — Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy Category 4: Industry research organizations indirectly influencing public opinion. — Electric Power Research Institute — Institute for Nuclear Power Operations — Nuclear Safety Analysis Center

SOURCES Terry Lash, “Survey of Major National Groups Influencing Public Opinion Against Nuclear Power, ” Office of Technology Assessment contractor report, April 1983, M & D Mills, “Activities of GrOUpS Which Influence Public Opinion in Favor of Nuclear Power, ” Off Ice of Technology Assessment contractor report, May 1983 about nuclear power and much more committed The Impact of Public Opinion to their beliefs than the general public. They act on Nuclear Power on these beliefs both in seeking to influence Public concerns about reactor safety, nuclear nuclear power policies at the State and Federal waste disposal, and rising construction costs have level and in attempting to convince the public had a particularly notable impact on State policies of their point of view. affecting nuclear power. As discussed in chapter The nuclear establishment sometimes blames 6, State Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) must nuclear critics for the growth of public opposi- grant a license certifying the need for power prior tion to nuclear power. However, to some extent to construction of any type of new powerplant. these individuals simply are reflecting the con- Because PUCs have veto power over new plants, cern of the wider public which has grown in based on economic and financial criteria, State response to reactor accidents and the increasing laws essentially can halt further development of financial problems of the utility industry. In ad- nuclear power. While critics and advocates have dition, the success or failure of both advocates been involved in voter-initiated referenda restrict- and critics depends in part on public response ing further licensing of nuclear plants, it is ulti- to their arguments. A 1983 opinion poll indicates mately the voters of the State (the “general pub- that Ralph Nader, a leading environmentalist, is lic”) who decide whether or not to approve these considered very believable on energy matters (9). restrictions. Table 31 provides a history of State Electric utility trade associations are considered votes on nuclear energy referenda. Overall, the somewhat less believable, and nuclear industry trend appears to reflect accurately the trends associations have much lower credibility among shown in public opinion polls, declining from a poll respondents. Thus, it appears that the public large margin of suppt for nuclear power in 1976 may be more willing to listen to and accept the to an ambivalent position today. While all seven arguments of nuclear critics than those of advo- restrictive proposals were defeated in 1976, cates. voters in Oregon and Massachusetts approved 216 . Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty

initiatives limiting new reactor construction in tion. A complete list of State laws and regulations 1980 and 1982. (including those enacted by voter referenda) affecting nuclear power is given in table 33. Be- In California, State legislators approved a law cause of these laws and regulations, utilities in restricting nuclear power development in 1976 10 States cannot obtain State licensing of pro- to head off a more stringent Statewide referen- posed nuclear reactors until certain conditions, dum with similar provisions that was then turned such as a clear demonstration of high-level waste down only a few months later. The law passed disposal, are met. by the legislature was upheld by the U.S. Su- preme Court in April 1983. Other State legisla- Even in those States where nuclear power de- tures and a few PUCs have limited further con- velopment is not limited by law or regulation, struction of nuclear plants by legislation or regula- State politics can influence utility decisions about

Table 33.—State Laws and Regulations Restricting Construction of Nuclear Powerplants

Year State Type of action approved Citation Provisions California Law-by 1976 Cal Pub Res Code, No licensing of new plants until Federal Govern- Iegislaturea Sees. 25524.1- ment approves a demonstrated high-level 25524.2 waste disposal technology and fuel rod reprocessing technology is available. Connect i cut Law-by 1979 H-5096, approved No licensing of a fifth plant until Federal legislature June 18 Government approves a demonstrated high- Ievel waste disposal technology. Law-by 1983 H.B. 5237 Limits construction costs of Millstone 3 to legislature rate-payers to $3.5 billion. Kentucky Resolution-by 1982 HR-85, Declares the State’s intention to prohibit legislature adopted March 26 construction of plants. Maine Law-by 1977 Me Rev Stat Ann, No licensing of new plants until Federal legislature Tit 10, Sees. 251- Government demonstrates high-level waste 256 (West 1980) disposal and a majority of voters approve in a referendum vote. Maryland Law-by 1981 Ann Code Md, No licensing of new generators of nonmedical legislature Health-Environ- low-level waste until Federal Government mental, Tit 8, demonstrates waste disposal or an interstate Sec. 402 compact is in effect. Massachusetts Law-by 1982 Question 3, No licensing of new plants or nonmedical referendum Approved Nov. 2 low-level radioactive waste disposal sites until (Chap. 503, Acts a Federally approved storage facility is of 1982) operating, and other conditions, including voter approval, have been met. Montana Law-by 1978 Mt Code Ann, No licensing of new plants until all liability referendum Tit 75, Sees. limits for an accident are waived, a bond is 20-201, 20-1203 posted against decommissioning costs, and other conditions, including voter approval, are met. Oregon Law-by 1980 Measure No. 7, No licensing of new plants until Federal referendum Approval Nov. 4 Government provides high-level waste disposal and a majority of voters approve in a referendum. Vermont Law-by 1975 Vt. Stat Ann, No licensing of new plants without General legislature 1970, V.8, Tit 30, Assembly approval. Sec. 248c Wisconsin Regulation-by 1978 Dkt No 05-EP-1, No licensing of new plants without progress Public Service Wis Pub Serv on waste disposal, fuel supply, decom- Commission Comm, Aug. 17 missioning, and other economic issues. Washington Law-by 1981 Chap. 80.52, Rev. No issuance of bonds for major new energy referendum Code of facilities (including nuclear plants) without Washington voter approval. aon Apr. ZI, 1983, the Us. Supreme Court upheld the COnSI iIUIiOditY Of this law SOURCES: Atomic Industrial Forum, State Codes, NRC Office of State Programs. Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power ● 217 nuclear plants. Whether Public Utility Commis- control technology into new and existing plants. sioners are directly elected or appointed by an Negative public perceptions may also affect the elected Governor, they are sensitive to State pol- availability of financing for new nuclear plants. itics and broad public opinion. Public concerns The financial problems caused by the accident about nuclear power may lead Utility Commis- at TMI discouraged some investors and brokers sioners to disallow rate increases needed to from investing in utilities with nuclear plants finance completion of plants under construction underway, driving up the cost of capital for those or to simply deny a license entirely. Public op- utilities. Finally, negative public attitudes affect position at the local level, too, can discourage nuclear power’s future in less tangible ways: The utilities from implementing planned nuclear most gifted young engineers and technicians may plants. For example, Portland General Electric in choose other specializations, gradually reducing Oregon canceled its planned Pebble Springs reac- the quality of nuclear industry personnel. And, util- tor in 1982 following a lengthy siting controver- ities simply may not choose nuclear plants if they sy that made the project less economically attrac- perceive them as bad for overall public relations. tive. The approval of a State referendum in 1980 The future of nuclear power in the United banning licensing of new plants until waste dis- States is very uncertain due to a variety of eco- posal technology was available contributed to the nomic, financial, and regulatory factors outlined utility’s decision. in other chapters of this report. Both parties to Over the past few years, public concern about the nuclear debate are bringing these factors be- reactor safety in reaction to the accident at TMI fore the broader public. Some may argue that the has encouraged additional NRC safety studies and issues are too complicated for the general public new regulatory requirements, increasing nuclear to contend with. However, as Thomas Jefferson power costs and making it less attractive to util- said, “When the people are well informed, they ities. (A more detailed analysis of the costs of reg- can be trusted with their own government. ” ulatory requirements is included in ch. 6.) This None of the conditions seen by utilities as a re- trend is partially a continuation of increasing quirement for a revival of the nuclear industry– public concern about environmental quality that regulatory stability, rate restructuring, and began in the late 1960’s. Translated into laws and political support-can be met without greater regulations, those concerns drove up the price public acceptance. Thus, unless public opinion of both nuclear and coal-fired powerplants as util- toward nuclear power changes, the future pros- ities were required to incorporate more pollution pects for the nuclear industry will remain bleak.

THE EXPERTS’ VIEW

In contrast to the public, most “opinion particularly supportive of nuclear power. Seventy- leaders,” particularly energy experts, support fur- four percent of scientists viewed the benefits of ther development of nuclear power. This support nuclear power as greater than risks, compared is revealed both in opinion polls and in technical with only 55 percent of the rest of the public. studies of the risks of nuclear power. A March 1982 poll of Congress found 76 percent of mem- In a recent study, a random sample of scien- bers supported expanded use of nuclear power tists was asked about nuclear power (62). Of (50. In a survey conducted for Connecticut Mu- those polled, 53 percent said development tual Life Insurance Co. in 1980, leaders in religion, should proceed rapidly, 36 percent said develop- business, the military, government, science, edu- ment should proceed slowly, and 10 percent cation, and law perceived the benefits of nuclear would halt development or dismantle plants. power as greater than the risks (19). Among the When a second group of scientists with particular categories of leaders surveyed, scientists were expertise in energy issues was given the same 218 ● Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty

choices, 70 percent favored proceeding rapidly The Controversy Over Safety Studies and 25 percent favored proceeding slowly with the technology. This second sample included ap- The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) com- proximately equal numbers of scientists from 71 pleted its first major study of the consequences disciplines, ranging from air pollution to energy of a reactor accident involving release of radio- policy to thermodynamics. About 10 percent of activity in 1957. Commonly known as WASH- those polled in this group worked in disciplines 740, the study was based on a very small (by directly related to nuclear energy, so that the today’s standards) 165-megawatt (MW) hypo- results might be somewhat biased. Support thetical reactor. In the worst case, an accident among both groups of scientists was found to at such a plant was estimated to kill 3,400 peo- result from concern about the energy crisis and ple (5). While the study itself did not become a the belief that nuclear power can make a major source of public controversy, its findings contrib- contribution to national energy needs over the uted to concern about the impacts of an accident. next 20 years. Like scientists, a majority of engi- In 1964, AEC initiated a new study to update neers continued to support nuclear power after WASH-740 based on a larger, 1,000-MW reactor. the accident at Three Mile Island (69). The study team found that a worst-case accident Of course, not all opinion leaders are in favor could kill as many as 45,000 people but was un- of the current U.S. program of nuclear develop- able to quantify the probability of such an acci- ment. Leaders of the environmental movement dent. Rather than publish these disturbing find- have played a major role in the debate about ings, AEC chose to convey the results to Congress reactor safety and prominent scientists are found in a short letter. Nuclear critics were very dis- on both sides of the debate. A few critics of turbed by this action, which they viewed as an nuclear power have come from the NRC and the attempt to keep the facts away from the public nuclear industry, including three nuclear (22). In recent years, awareness of AEC’s handl- engineers who left General Electric in order to ing of this early safety study has added to public demonstrate their concerns about safety in 1976. skepticism about the credibility of both that agen- However, the majority of those with the greatest cy and its successor, the NRC. expertise in nuclear energy support its further In 1974, AEC published the first draft of the Re- development. actor Safety Study, also known as WASH-1400 Analysis of public opinion polls indicates that or the Rasmussen report. A panel of scientists people’s acceptance or rejection of nuclear organized by the American Physical Society (APS) power is more influenced by their view of reac- found much to criticize in this report. The panel tor safety than by any other issue (57). As dis- noted that AEC’s fatality estimates had considered cussed above, accidents and events at operating only deaths during the first 24 hours after an ac- plants have greatly increased public concern cident, although radioactive cesium released in about the possibility of a catastrophic accident. an accident would remain so for decades, expos- Partially in response to that concern, technical ing large populations to adverse effects. The most experts have conducted a number of studies of serious forms of illness resulting from a reactor the likelihood and consequences of such an ac- accident, the APS reviewers argued, would be cident. However, rather than reassuring the pub- forms of cancer that would not show up until lic about nuclear safety, these studies appear to years after the accident. Other APS reviewers have had the opposite effect. By painting a pic- found fault with the Rasmussen report’s methods ture of the possible consequences of an accident, used to predict the performance of emergency the studies have contributed to people’s view of cooling systems (23). the technology as exceptionally risky, and the On October 30, 1975, the NRC, which had as- debate within the scientific community about the sumed the regulatory functions of the former study methodologies and findings has increased AEC, released the final version of WASH-1400. public uncertainty. Again, there was an extensive, widely publicized Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power ● 219 debate over the document. The Union of Con- troversy that continued for several weeks. This cerned Scientists released a 150-page report cri- analysis, known as the Sandia Siting Study, was tiquing the study, and in June 1976, the House initiated to determine the sensitivity of the con- Subcommittee on Energy and Environment held sequences of reactor accidents to local site char- hearings on the validity of the study’s findings acteristics (2). While the Sandia team did not (71). As a result of these hearings, NRC agreed study accident probabilities in depth, they esti- to have a review group examine the validity of mated the probability of a “Group 1“ or (worst- the study’s conclusions. case) accident involving a core meltdown, failure of all safety systems, and a large radioactive re- Three years later, in September 1978, the release, at 1 in 100,000 reactor years. The conse- view group concluded that although the Reac- quences of this and other less severe hypothetical tor Safety Study represented a substantial advance accidents were estimated for 91 U.S. reactor sites over previous studies and its methodology was using local weather and population data and as- basically sound, the actual accident probability suming a standard 1, 120-MW reactor. At the cur- estimates were more uncertain than had been rent site of the Salem, N. J., reactor on the Dela- assumed in the report (35). The panel also was ware River under the most adverse weather con- critical of the executive summary, which failed to ditions and assuming no evacuation of the local reflect all of the study findings. The following population, a Group 1 accident at the hypotheti- January, the NRC accepted the conclusions of the cal reactor was estimated to cause 102,000 review panel. In a carefully worded statement, “early” deaths within a year of the accident. If the agency withdrew its endorsement of the nu- the hypothetical reactor were located at Bu- merical estimates contained in the executive sum- chanan, N. Y., where the Indian Point plant now mary, said that the report’s previous peer review stands, a Group 1 accident under the worst-case within the scientific community had been “inad- weather conditions (the accident would be fol- equate,” and agreed with the panel that the dis- lowed by a rainout of the radioactive plume onto aster probabilities should not be used uncritical- a population center) might cause $314 billion in ly (47). property damage, according to the study esti- Two studies published in 1982 continued the mates. debate over the validity of accident probability estimates included in the Rasmussen report. The Although the Sandia report itself did not include first, conducted by Science Applications, Inc. estimates of the “worst-case” accident conse- (SAI) for the NRC, was based on the actual op- quences, background information containing the erating history of U.S. reactors during the 1969-79 estimates and a copy of the draft report were period. By examining the frequency of precur- leaked to the press on November 1, 1982. Media sors that could lead to an accident involving core accounts that day highlighted the high death and damage or meltdown, SAI estimated that the property damage estimates, while downplaying probability of such an accident during the pre- that part of the analysis which indicated that con- TMI decade was much greater than suggested by sequences of this severity had only a 0.0002- the Rasmussen report (43). In response, the In- percent chance of occurring before 2000 (51). stitute for Nuclear Power Operations (lNPO—a Some accounts suggested that the worst-case nuclear industry safety research group) published consequences had the same probability as the a report arguing that SAI’s probability estimates Group 1 or worst-case accident, which was esti- were about 30 times too high, and that the ac- mated to have a 2-percent chance of occurring tual probability of a core-damaging accident was before the end of the century. closer to the 1 in 20,000 reactor years estimated That same day, the NRC held a press confer- in the Rasmussen report (28). This controversy ence to clarify the purpose and findings of the has not yet been resolved. study, and on November 2, Sandia National Lab- While debate over the SAI report was limited oratory issued a statement saying that wire serv- to a small community of safety experts, a more ice accounts “seriously misinterpret the conse- recent study aroused a widespread public con- quences of nuclear power reactor accidents. The 220 . Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty

probability of a very severe nuclear power reac- sequently, increasing polarization (41 ). Both crit- tor accident is many thousands of times lower ics and supporters of the study focused on the than stated in these accounts” (63). The nuclear methodology and quality of data. The debate industry took out full-page ads in major national over the study continues today, with critics argu- papers to try to counteract the story. At the same ing that NRC’s 1979 statement was a “rejection time, however, nuclear critics emphasized that of the report’s basic conclusion,” “repudiating the Sandia draft report itself had excluded the the central finding of the Rasmussen report” (23). worst-case consequence data and argued that Meanwhile, INPO challenges the methodology “the NRC is once again feeding selective data to and data of SAI’s more recent safety study, argu- the public on the theory that they know best what ing that the Rasmussen report’s probability esti- information the public should have” (73). While mates are still valid. nuclear advocates argued that the report’s findings on accident consequences had been great- Although the general public is uncertain about ly overstated by the press, critics charged that nuclear power, most people have more faith in data were used incorrectly in developing those scientific “experts” than in any other source on estimates. Examining the same information on ac- nuclear power questions (20,39,57). Because of cident probabilities at individual plants used by this faith, public disputes among scientists and the Sandia team, the Union of Concerned Scien- other energy experts, as in the case of the Ras- tists found that the likelihood of an accident in- mussen report, have a particularly negative im- volving a release of radioactivity might be much pact on public acceptance of nuclear power. greater than assumed in the Sandia report (65). Rather than attempting to follow the debate and This debate, too, has not been resolved. sort out the facts for themselves, many people simply conclude that nuclear technology has not The Impact of Risk Assessments yet been perfected. in other words, if the “ex- on Public Opinion perts” cannot agree on whether or not nuclear power is safe, the average citizen is likely to The release of the Rasmussen report raised par- assume it is probably unsafe. In Austria, the ticular concerns about nuclear power for some government attempted to resolve the growing people because of the public disagreements controversy over nuclear power by structuring among the “experts” that resulted. In June 1976 a series of public debates among scientists with hearings held by the House Interior Committee, opposing views. Rather than reassuring the pub- scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of lic, the debate led to increased public skepticism Technology and Princeton and Stanford Univer- and ultimately to a national referendum that sities, as well as a high-level official of the En- killed that country’s commercial nuclear vironmental Protection Agency, testified about program. the methodological weaknesses and limitations of the report. Thus, as Princeton physicist Frank If public debates about nuclear safety studies Von Hippel pointed out at the hearings, “Instead have only fueled the fires of controversy and of dampening the fires of controversy, the pub- added to public skepticism, what can be done lication of the Rasmussen report has had the ef- to make nuclear power more acceptable to the fect of adding fuel to them” (71). public? In order to answer that question, we need a better understanding of the public’s per- The controversy over the Rasmussen report, ceptions of nuclear power. In particular, it will like the rest of the nuclear debate, contains many be useful to compare the public’s view of the risks elements of “disputes among experts” as of nuclear energy with the risks estimated by most characterized by sociologist Alan Mazur: argu- nuclear experts. For example, if public percep- ing past one another instead of responding to tions of risk were based on misinformation, im- what the opposing expert has actually stated; re- proved public education programs might be an jecting data that develop the opponent’s case; appropriate response. However, this does not ap- interpreting ambiguous data differently; and, con- pear to be the case. Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power ● 221

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PUBLIC’S VIEW OF NUCLEAR SAFETY Perceptions of Risk and Benefit of activities in 1978 and 1979. Nuclear power was judged to be more risky than most of the other Studies of risk perception reveal a gap between activities and technologies, including drunk driv- lay people’s judgment of nuclear hazards and the ing, transporting chlorine by freight train, and risks estimated by technical risk assessments. In working as a big-city policeman (74). a 1979 study by Decision Research two small groups of informed people in Eugene, Oreg. (col- Several factors appear to enter into people’s lege students and members of the League of views of nuclear power as particularly risky. First, Women Voters) were asked to compare the ben- respondents in both the Netherlands and Oregon efits and risks of a variety of activities, ranging were concerned about the size of a potential ac- from smoking to vaccinations to swimming. The cident and the lack of individual control in pre- benefits of nuclear power were viewed as negli- venting an accident. In the Oregon study, nuclear gible, and the risks were judged to be almost as risks also were seen as “unknown to the public great as motor vehicle accidents, which claim and to science” and as particularly severe and about 50,000 lives each year (68). dreaded. Both the Oregon study and opinion surveys show that about 40 percent of the American Although the two groups estimated that the public believe that a nuclear plant can explode number of deaths from nuclear power in an av- like an atomic bomb, even though such an ex- erage year would be fewer than the number of plosion is physically impossible. Familiarity also deaths from any of the other activities or tech- played a role in people’s judgments. In the Ore- nologies, they used a very high multiplying fac- gon study, nuclear risks were perceived as greater tor to indicate how many deaths would occur in because they were unfamiliar. Another factor en- a “particularly disastrous” year. Almost 40 per- tering into risk perceptions was people’s difficulty cent of the respondents estimated more than in assessing the probability of a reactor accident. 10,000 fatalities would occur within 1 year, and more than 25 percent guessed there would be People’s opinions about nuclear power and 100,000 fatalities. Many of the respondents ex- other “hazardous” activities and technologies are pected such a disaster within their lifetimes, while not determined by perceptions of risk alone. The the Sandia study suggests that there is only one perceived benefits offered by a technology must U.S. reactor site–Salem, N.J.–at which an acci- be weighed against the perceived risk in deter- dent might cause as many as 100,000 “early” fa- mining how acceptable the technology is. Most talities and estimates that these consequences activities, including development of nuclear pow- have only a 10-6 or 0.000001 chance of occur- er, are undertaken initially in order to achieve ring at that site. That analysis suggests that the benefits, not avoid losses, and for many activities average American (who does not live near that the expected benefits far outweigh the potential site) has an even lower probability of being killed losses. within a year of a reactor accident. In general, in the case of nuclear power, perceptions of it appears that public perceptions of the possi- benefit may have played an important role in the ble consequences of an accident correspond trend of public opinion. During the 1950’s and somewhat with the findings of the most recent 1960’s, when electricity demand was growing technical studies, but that the probability of such rapidly, the development of nuclear energy was consequences is greatly overestimated. promoted as a means to meet future demand and Data from the Netherlands confirm the public’s there was little apparent opposition to the tech- perception of nuclear power as uniquely hazard- nology. As electricity demand slowed in the ous. Over 700 adults of varying ages, living at 1970’s and 1980’s some people may have seen varying distances from industrial activities were nuclear power as less vital to economic growth, asked to judge the “riskiness” of a wide range so that concerns about risk became more prom i- 222 . Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty nent in their assessments of the technology. of nuclear power. instead, they argue, people re- Analysis of recent survey data indicates that act to nuclear energy on a purely emotional basis. judgments of “beneficiality” currently have a For example, psychiatrist Robert DuPont argues strong influence on Americans’ acceptance of that public concern about nuclear power is a nuclear power. After safety, the second most im- “phobia” resulting from irrational psychological portant factor in support for nuclear power ap- factors (1 7). Geographer Roger Kasperson cites pears to be the belief that nuclear powerplants frequently voiced concerns about genetic dam- are necessary to reduce American reliance on age and cancer as evidence of the “emotional foreign oil (57). roots” of opposition to nuclear power, and psychiatrists Philip Pahner and Roger Lifton have In both the Netherlands and the United States, suggested that fears of radiation from nuclear people living near to nuclear plants have been weapons have been “displaced” or “extended” more receptive to the technology. However, to nuclear power (30,36,55). while the Netherlands study appeared to indicate a resigned acceptance of the risks of nuclear Although there can be little doubt that emotion- power, some surveys in the United States indicate al factors enter into the public’s assessment of that those living nearby are more aware of the nuclear energy, further analysis of the public’s benefits. For example, a majority of people liv- view of risk indicates that the reasoning behind ing near Portland General Electric’s (PGE’s) Tro- these opinions is more rational than first appears. jan Nuclear Station continued to approve of the First, while people may be inaccurate in their as- plant following the accident at TMI in 1979, while sessments of the probability of a catastrophic customers throughout the entire PGE service ter- nuclear accident, they do not appear to overesti- ritory were ambivalent (7). The primary reason mate the seriousness of such a catastrophe. Both cited for local support of the plant was that it pro- proponents and opponents of the technology duced needed power. Similarly, residents of the have an equally negative view of the deaths, ill- town closest to Maine Yankee nuclear station, nesses and environmental damage that would re- who benefit from the jobs and taxes provided by sult from a reactor accident (66). People who are the plant, continued to support the reactor concerned about nuclear safety do not view a through two statewide referendum votes in 1980 radiation-induced death from a nuclear plant ac- and 1982 which would have shut the plant down. cident as significantly worse than a death from Defeat of the two referendum votes appears to other causes, and they do not perceive genetic be based primarily on the perception of Maine effects or other non-fatal consequences of such voters that Maine Yankee provides needed low- an accident as worse than death. The central area cost electricity (see Case Studies). of disagreement between the experts and the concerned public lies in the area of greatest Despite these favorable local attitudes toward uncertainty even among the experts: the prob- some nuclear plants, opinion polls at other plants ability and impacts of a major accident (21). show that local support shifted to majority opposition following the accident at Three Mile Island Secondly, lay people appear to rely on some- (24). Analysis of survey data at one host commu- what logical internal “rules of thumb” in assess- nity suggests that Federal safety standards are now ing the magnitude of various risks. As shown in seen as being too weak. It appears that national figures 40 and 41 people’s assessments of the risks events which increase perceived risk can offset associated with various diseases and technologies local perceptions of benefit. correlate fairly well with statistical estimates of the risks. While the relative riskiness of the vari- Psychological Factors ous activities was judged somewhat accurately, respondents in the Decision Research study tended The apparent gap between technical studies of to overestimate the risks of low-frequency events. nuclear power risks and people’s perceptions of According to the research team, this error results those risks has led some observers to suggest that from people’s assumption that an event is likely there is little thought involved in the public’s view to recur in the future if past instances are easy Ch. 8–Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power • 223

Figure 40.— Relationship Between Judged Frequency and the Actual Number of Deaths per Year for 41 Causes of Death

disease I I I I

I 1

1 u 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000 Estimated number of deaths per year

NOTE Respondents were told that about 50,000 people per year die from motor vehicle accidents. If judged and actual frequencies were equal, the data would fall on the straight line. The points and the curve fitted to them represent the averaged responses of a large number of lay people. While people were approximately accurate, their judgments were systematically distorted. To give an idea of the degree of agreement among subjects, vertical bars are drawn to depict the 25th and 75th percentile of individual judgment for botulism, diabetes, and all accidents. Fifty percent of all judgments fall between these limits. The range of responses for the other 37 causes of death was similar.

SOURCE: SIovic, et at. (68). Reproduced by permission of P. Slovic.

to recall. Moreover, the “availability” of an event These findings help explain the increased pub- in people’s memories may be distorted by a re- lic opposition to nuclear power reported in opin- cent disaster or vivid film. Because life is too short ion polls over the past decade. Nuclear power’s to actually experience all the hazards shown in historic connections with the vivid, imaginable figures 40 and 41, people tend to focus on dangers of nuclear war lead people to associate dramatic and well-publicized risks and hence to the technology with catastrophe. Accidents such overestimate their probability of occurrence (68). as the fire at Browns Ferry and the near-meltdown 224 ● Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty

Figure 41 .—Expert and Lay Judgments of Risk Plotted Against Technical Estimates of Annual Fatalities

I I I I I

Technical estimate of number of deaths per year NOTE: Each point represents the average responses of the participants. The broken lines are the straight lines that best fit the points. If judged and technically estimated frequencies were equal, the data would fall on the solid line. The experts’ risk judgments are seen to be more closely asociated with technical estimates of annual fatality rates than are the lay judgments. SOURCE: Slovic, et al., (68). Reproduced by permission of P. Slovic.

Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power ● 225

Photo credit: William J. Lanouette In May 1979, 2 months following the Three Mile Island accident, there was a demonstration of about 200,000 people on the U.S. Capitol Grounds. Speakers urged the U.S. Congress to curtail further nuclear construction at TMI have added to the image of disaster in peo- ly calculated estimates of annual fatalities asso- ple’s minds. The publicity surrounding these ciated with various risky technologies and activ- events, movies and books such as “The China ities (21 ). However, while the experts knew more Syndrome” and We A/most Lost Detroit, and the facts, their risk assessments also were found to estimates of deaths in various safety studies have be greatly influenced by personal judgment. further enhanced the “availability” of nuclear Thus, expert studies also are subject to errors, in- power hazards in people’s minds, creating a false cluding overconfidence in results and failure to “memory” of a disaster that has never occurred consider the ways in which humans can affect at a commercial nuclear reactor. Public educa- technological systems. This latter problem was tion about nuclear safety systems, by identifying demonstrated clearly during the TMI accident, the various hazards those systems are designed which was caused in part by human error. to guard against, may only serve to increase the Because technical experts, like the general pub perceived risks of the technology. Iic, face limitations in evaluating the risks posed The Decision Research analysts also compared by nuclear power, it appears that there may be lay judgments of risks with the judgments of na- no single right approach to managing the tech- tionally known professionals in risk assessment nology. instead, it is most appropriate to involve (see fig. 41). The judgments of experts were much the public in order to bring more perspectives closer than those of the lay people to statistical- and knowledge to bear on the problem. There 226 ● Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty are at least two other reasons for involving the important step in reducing public fears of nuclear public in decisions about nuclear energy. First, power is improved management of operating re- without public cooperation, in the form of politi- actors to eliminate or greatly reduce accidents cal support, observance of safety rules, and rea- and other operating difficulties. Even though ac- sonable use of the court system, nuclear power cidents at commercial reactors in the United cannot be managed effectively. Second, as a States have never caused a civilian death, the democracy, we cannot ignore the beliefs and public views both accidents and less serious desires of our society’s members (2 I). events at operating reactors as precursors to a catastrophe. An accident with disastrous conse- While public perspectives already are reflected quences already is viewed as being much more to some extent in NRC decisions, further efforts likely than technical studies and experts project, could be made to involve the public. More re- and any continuation of accidents or operating search could be conducted to define and quanti- problems will tend to confirm that perception. fy public opinion, and dialog with nuclear critics Approaches to increasing public acceptance are could be expanded with more attention paid to discussed in the conclusion of this chapter. the substance of their concerns. Perhaps the most

VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE Which is More Important? tionship between knowledge about nuclear power and support for the technology among the gen- Some analysts of public opinion have argued eral public. These findings supported a “selec- that basic values—those things that people view tive perception” hypothesis in which those as most morally desirable—play a relatively small strongly favoring or strongly opposing nuclear role in influencing people’s attitudes toward nu- energy selected and used information to bolster clear power. For example, Mazur has argued that their arguments. Attitudes toward nuclear power most of the general public, unlike energy activists, among all respondents were influenced heavily do not “embed their positions for or against a by preexisting political beliefs and values (58). technology in a larger ideological framework of These results could help to explain why the ac- social and political beliefs” (41). In addition, cident at TMI appeared to have little impact on nuclear advocates sometimes suggest that it is some people’s opinions about safety. For those primarily a lack of knowledge which leads peo- who already were firmly convinced that nuclear ple to oppose nuclear energy, and that better ed- power was safe, the accident confirmed the ef- ucation programs would increase public accept- fectiveness of safety systems. For those who were ance (1 3,42). However, as discussed below, the skeptical, it reinforced uncertainties. available evidence calls both arguments into question. A recent analysis of national survey data provides additional evidence that people’s values Although energy experts who are very knowl- and general orientations may be stronger deter- edgeable about nuclear power generally support minants of nuclear power attitudes than specific the technology, studies of the effects of slightly knowledge about energy or nuclear power issues. increased knowledge on attitudes among the In this study, sociologist Robert Mitchell tested broader public have yielded mixed conclusions. the strength of the correlation between various Two studies found greater support for nuclear “irrational” factors—such as belief that a nuclear power among more knowledgeable persons, but plant can explode–and people’s assessments of another found the opposite, and several studies reactor safety. While the analysis showed that the have found no significant relationship (46). For public was generally misinformed about energy example, a 1979 survey conducted just prior to issues, this lack of knowledge appeared to have the TM I accident revealed only a very weak rela- little effect on attitudes toward nuclear safety and Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power Ž 227 hence on overall attitudes toward nuclear power. enthusiasm is reflected in the current computer When Mitchell went onto test the correlation be- boom and in the emergence of a flood of science tween values and attitudes toward reactor safe- magazines such as Omni, Discover, Science 83, ty, he found a much stronger relationship. Envi- and Technology as well as new television pro- ronmentalism was associated closely with con- grams including “Cosmos,” “Life on Earth,” and cern about nuclear safety among women, while “Nova,” and the reliance on high technology by skepticism about whether the future benefits of both major political parties. However, this sup- scientific research would outweigh the resulting port is tempered by a growing concern about the problems appeared to have a strong influence on unwanted byproducts of science, including accel- men’s concerns about reactor safety (46). Several erating social change, the threat of nuclear war, other studies also indicate that values have played and environmental pollution. The National Opin- an important role in both the growth of the anti- ion Research Center recently compared a nation- nuclear movement and continued support for al poll of adult attitudes toward science taken in nuclear power (8,27,32). 1979 with a similar survey conducted in 1957. They found that, over the 20-year period, an Values increasing number of survey respondents believed that “science makes life change too fast” A value has been defined as “an enduring or “breaks down people’s ideas of right and belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state wrong.” The percentage of respondents who be- of existence is personally or socially preferred” lieved that the benefits of science outweigh the (61). While all people share the same values to harms declined from 88 percent in 1957 to 70 some degree, each individual places different pri- percent in 1979 (46). This curious duality of at- orities on different values. This ordering of the titudes may help to explain the public’s ambiva- absolute values we are taught as children leads lent attitude toward nuclear power. While ac- to the development of an integrated set of beliefs, ceptance of the technology has declined, the rate or value system. Because values have their origins of change has been slow, and votes on referenda in culture and society, changes in societal expec- have demonstrated that Americans are unwilling tations can, over time, lead to changes in an in- to forego the nuclear option entirely. dividual’s value system. One of the most undesired products of modern During the 1960’s and 1970’s, the emergence science is the threat of nuclear war. Because of of new social movements both reflected and en- the technological and institutional links between couraged changes in the priority some Americans nuclear power and nuclear weapons, opposition placed on different values. Values that appeared to buildup of nuclear weapons leads some peo- to become more prominent to many people in- ple also to oppose development of civilian nu- cluded equality of all people, environmental clear energy. AEC, which developed and tested beauty, and world peace. Critics of nuclear pow- weapons after World War II, was the original pro- er (and, to a lesser extent, proponents) were suc- moter of commercial nuclear power. In the late cessful in attracting broader public support by ap- 1950’s and early 1960’s, growing public concern pealing to these emerging values, and by linking about radioactive fallout from AEC’s atomic their organizing efforts with the related peace, bomb testing provided a context for increasing feminist, and environmental movements. Until fears about the possibility of radioactive releases a convincing case is made that nuclear power is from nuclear powerplants. Some prominent sci- at least as consistent with these values as other entists spoke out against both nuclear power and energy sources, it will have difficulty gaining ac- nuclear weapons, and links developed between ceptance with those who place a high priority on groups opposing the arms race and nuclear pow- these values. er (48). However, after the United States and the Overall, Americans are very supportive of sci- Soviet Union signed the Nuclear Test Ban Trea- ence and technology, viewing them as the best ty in 1963, concerns about both nuclear fallout routes to economic progress (39). The public’s and nuclear power temporarily subsided. 228 . Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty

Since the mid-1970’s, rapid international de- most Americans continue to strongly support en- velopment of nuclear power and growing global vironmental laws despite recessions and an in- tensions have led to increasing concern about the creasing skepticism about the need for govern- possible proliferation of nuclear weapons from ment regulation of business (4). nuclear power technologies. Organizers in the The role of the environmental movement in co- peace movement and nuclear critics have built alescing and leading the criticism of nuclear on this concern in an attempt to renew the early power has been well-documented. The first na- linkages between the two movements. Case stud- tional anti-nuclear coalition (National Interveners, ies of the Maine Yankee and Diablo Canyon nu- formed in 1972) was composed of local environ- clear plants indicate that concern about nuclear mental action groups (40). By 1976, consumer weapons contributed to opposition to these advocate Ralph Nader, who later became allied plants during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s (see with the environmental movement “stood as the Case Studies). titular head of opposition to nuclear energy” (30). Today, a single Federal agency–the Depart- Today, all of the major national environmental ment of Energy—still is responsible for research groups are opposed to at least some aspects of and development of both nuclear weapons and the current path of nuclear power development commercial nuclear power. in addition, some pri- in the United States. While some of the groups vate firms are involved in both nuclear energy do not have an official policy opposing nuclear and nuclear weapons. These connections en- power, their staffs stay in close communication, courage a linkage in people’s minds between the and there is substantial cooperation and support peaceful and destructive uses of nuclear energy. on nuclear energy issues (33). A list of these Due to growing concern about the rapid buildup groups is shown in table 32. of nuclear weapons, some groups critical of nu- Both sides of the nuclear debate have em- clear energy are shifting resources toward weap- phasized environmental concerns to influence ons issues. However, most local groups and na- public opinion. in the late 1960’s and early tional organizations continue their efforts to im- 1 970’s, opponents of local nuclear plants most prove the safety of nuclear power as they expand frequently pointed to specific environmental im- their focus to include nuclear weapons. The pacts, such as thermal pollution, low-level radia- linkages between environmental and energy tion, or disruption of a rural lifestyle as reasons groups and anti-nuclear weapons groups may for their opposition. During that same period, strengthen the environmental groups and help nuclear proponents increasingly emphasized the them maintain their criticism of commercial air-quality benefits of nuclear power when com- nuclear power (33). pared with coal (41 ). Today, environmentalist op- On the pronuclear side of the debate, orga- ponents of nuclear power are more concerned nizers have emphasized the importance of nucle- about broad, generic issues such as waste dis- ar power to national energy independence which posal, plant safety, weapons proliferation, and “a is in turn linked with national security. Analysis set of troublesome value questions about high of 10 years of public opinion polls indicates that technology, growth, and civilization” (30). This a view of nuclear power as an abundant Ameri- evolution of concerns is demonstrated in two can resource which could reduce foreign oil de- case studies of local opposition to nuclear plants. pendence is a very important factor in favoring In these cases, environmentalists at first did not continued development of nuclear power (57). oppose the local nuclear plant because it offered environmental benefits when compared with a One of the most important values to affect coal plant. However, those positions were later opinions on nuclear power is environmentalism. reversed (see Case Studies). A 1972 poll by Louis Harris&Associates indicated that many Americans believed that the greatest Along with environmentalism, people’s general problem created by science and technology was orientations toward economic growth appear to pollution (46). Polls taken in 1981 indicate that influence their attitudes about nuclear power. In Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power ● 229

1971, political scientist Ronald Inglehart identified However, even among those who most strongly a shift in the value systems of many Americans supported resource utilization, so percent in- away from a “materialist” emphasis on physical dicated that no more nuclear powerplants should sustenance and safety and toward “post-materi- be built. alist” priorities of belonging, self-expression, and Views about “appropriate technology” as de- the quality of life. At that time, he hypothesized fined by the British economist, E. F. Schumacher, that this shift could be attributed to the unprece- may also affect attitudes toward nuclear energy. dented levels of economic and physical security Most members of mainstream environmental that prevailed during the 1950’s and 1960’s. groups share this view, which endorses tech- Based on analysis of more recent surveys, lngle- nologies that are inexpensive, suitable for small- hart argued in 1981 that, despite economic un- scale application, and compatible with people’s certainty and deterioration of East-West detente, need for creativity (44,64). In 1976, Amory Lovins post-materialist values are still important to many brought nuclear energy into the middle of this Americans. And, he says, those who place a high technology debate with publication of his article, priority on post-materialist values “form the core “Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken” in of the opposition to nuclear power” (27). Foreign Affairs magazine. In that article, Lovins argued that America’s energy needs could be met Like Inglehart, psychologist David Buss and his by the “soft energy path” of conservation, renew- colleagues have observed two conflicting value able energy and other appropriate technologies, systems or “worldviews” among Americans (71). and rejected nuclear energy as unneeded, cen- Using in-depth interviews with a random sample tralizing, and environmentally destructive (37). of adults from the San Francisco area, they iden- These concerns were found important in the local tified “Worldview A“ which favors development opposition to one case study plant (see Case of nuclear power as an important component of Studies). Residents of that rural area at first ob- a high-growth, high-technology, free enterprise jected to the plant on the basis that its electricity society, and “Worldview B“ which includes con- was not needed locally, and that the locality cern about the risks of nuclear power along with should not have to bear the impacts of plant con- an emphasis on a leveling off of material and tech- struction when it would not reap the benefits. nological growth, human self-realization, and par- Later objections were based on the contention ticipatory decisionmaking. that the electricity produced would not be needed anywhere in the surrounding three States. While different priorities within Americans’ value systems appear to influence attitudes toward Advocates of the appropriate technology phi- nuclear power, it is important to recognize that losophy fear that increased use of nuclear power the public is not completely polarized. lnglehart will lead to a loss of civil liberties and individual noted that “post-materialist” values can only be freedom, and decreased world stability due to given priority when basic human needs are met, weapons proliferation. The extent to which these making both priorities essential to individuals and views have been accepted by the American pub- to American society (27). An extensive national lic is difficult to ascertain. National opinion polls survey of attitudes toward growth conducted in showing that the majority of Americans prefer 1982 indicates that the public may be develop- solar energy to all other energy sources and view ing a new perspective that includes both a desire nuclear power as the least-favored energy option to ensure opportunities for development and con- would appear to reflect such values (57). A re- cerns about environmental quality (60). In this cent survey conducted in the State of Washington survey, few respondents could be classified as shows that large majorities there share Lovins’ totally favoring either resource preservation or view that it is possible to have both economic resource utilization, and the majority appeared growth and energy conservation (54). In addition, to be quite balanced in their views on economic many people, even those skeptical of renewable growth. Those who leaned toward resource pres- energy, share Lovins’ distrust of large centralized ervation were more opposed to nuclear power organizations (utilities and the government) that than those who favored resource utilization. promote nuclear energy.

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Another shift in American value systems that This growing skepticism about industry and may help to account for increased opposition to government was reinforced by the accident at nuclear power is a growing distrust of institutions Three Mile Island. Post-TMl polls indicate that less and their leaders in both the public and private than half of the public were satisfied with the way sectors. The Vietnam War and the Watergate in- the accident was handled by Pennsylvania State vestigation contributed to growing public cyni- officials and the NRC, and Americans were even cism about the Federal Government during the less pleased with the utility (General Public Util- 1960’s and 1970’s. By 1980, an extensive survey ities) and the plant designer (57). One observer of Americans revealed a dramatic gap between has described public reaction to the accident as the public and leaders in both government and “essentially a crisis in confidence over institu- industry on questions of politics, morality, and tions” (30). A feeling that the nuclear utility was the family. Religious values were found to be of being dishonest helped spark the first referendum profound importance to the majority of Ameri- to shut down Maine Yankee, and events at Diablo cans, and respondents indicated that they placed Canyon led to nationwide doubts about the credi- a greater emphasis than before on the moral bility of the nuclear industry (see Case Studies). aspects of public issues and leadership (59). A final societal change that has been closely Some early supporters of nuclear power, in- intertwined with negative attitudes toward nucle- cluding prominent environmentalists, felt bear power is the growth of the women’s move- trayed by the nuclear establishment when new ment. Public opinion polls over the past 20 years information about the uncertainties of the tech- have shown a strong correlation between gender nology became known. The nuclear industry’s and attitudes toward nuclear power: Women early denials of the possibility of accidents, and are consistently more opposed (41). While the the Government’s handling of safety studies have strength of this correlation is well-known, the contributed to the critics’ and broader public’s reasons for it are not clear. Environmental values skepticism. Some critics have expanded their ac- and having young children have been linked with tivities from examination of technical safety issues women’s opposition to nuclear power (46). Soci- to include critiquing the nuclear regulatory proc- ologist Dorothy Nelkin argues that women’s dis- ess, and groups that formerly were concerned pri- trust of nuclear power cannot be attributed to a marily with “watch dogging’ Federal agencies greater aversion to risk in general. Instead, Nel- have entered the nuclear debate. These activities, kin’s analysis of women’s magazines and the fem- and Daniel Ford’s recent book, The Cult of the inist press suggests that women’s opposition be- Atom, which focuses primarily on regulatory gins with the specific risk of cancer in the event “misdeeds” in the early nuclear program, may of a major radioactive release from a reactor. per- contribute to the public’s disillusionment with sonal value priorities, including some women’s government in general and the NRC in particular. view of themselves as nurturers or “caretakers of life, ” also lead them to oppose what they view The American public’s growing concern with as a life-threatening technology (49). leadership applies to business as well as government. Americans increasingly are skeptical of the These connections have helped to bring nu- ability of both the public and private sectors to clear power as an issue into the mainstream of produce quality work. According to Loyola Uni- the women’s movement. Women’s magazines versity professor of business ethics Thomas Don- ranging from Redbook to Ladies Home Journal aldson, survey data indicate that, despite an im- to Ms. have questioned nuclear safety, and the proving corporate record, the public has become national Young Women’s Christian Association increasingly disappointed with corporate ethics (YWCA) took a public stand against nuclear pow- over the past 20 years. Corporations now are er in 1979. The League of Women Voters has de- viewed as “part of the overall social fabric that veloped a national policy favoring only limited relates to our quality of life,” not merely as pro- construction of new reactors, and the League’s viders of goods and services (1 5). local affiliates have taken even stronger anti- Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power . 231

nuclear stands. In 1980, the National Organiza- orities could change again in the future. In addition for Women (NOW) recommended a resolution to values, knowledge about accidents at nu- tion opposing the “use of nuclear power in favor clear plants has played a major role in shaping of safer energy methods” (49). public attitudes. In the future, new information on improved management of nuclear power While changing value priorities appear to have could lead to a reversal of the current trend of contributed to increasing public concern about increasing opposition to the technology. nuclear power over the past 20 years, those pri-

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA Both the amount and type of news coverage early 1960’s, most coverage was still positive, but have played an important role in shaping public a few protests against local plants—particularly attitudes toward nuclear power. As noted pre- the large demonstration at a proposed nuclear viously, people tend to overestimate the prob- plant site on Bodega Bay, Calif., in 1963–re- ability of certain hazards, including nuclear ceived national publicity. During the mid-1 960’s, powerplant accidents, in part because these there was a decrease in both the number of peri- hazards are discussed frequently in the media. odical articles on nuclear power and in public opposition as measured in opinion polls. This de- The Extent of Media Coverage cline reflected a shift in public concern and media of Nuclear Power attention away from nuclear issues and toward civil rights and other domestic issues. Beginning The most detailed analysis of print media cov- in 1968, magazine articles on nuclear power in- erage of nuclear power currently available is creased to cover local plant siting disputes. Print based on the number of articles on the subject media coverage rose even higher in 1969, and indexed in the yearly Readers’ Guide to Period- opinion polls showed a similar peak of opposi- ical Literature. In this study, sociologist Al Ian tion the following year. Mazur compared trends in media attention with From 1974 to 1976, anti-nuclear activism and trends in public opinion as revealed by national media coverage again increased, with a great deal opinion surveys, numbers of plant interventions, of national publicity given to the 1976 California and size of protests. This analysis suggested the referendum. After 1976, both negative public following three hypotheses (41): opinion and media coverage fell off, then rose 1. The greater the national concern over a ma- slightly in 1978 and early 1979 and finally rose jor issue that is complementary to a partic- massively following the accident at TMI in the ular protest movement, the more easily re- spring of 1979. Trends throughout 1979 appeared sources can be mobilized for the movement, to confirm the linkage between media coverage and therefore the greater the activity of and public opinion: Public opposition rose sharp- protesters. ly immediately following the accident, subsided 2. As the activity of protesters increases, mass within 2 months as media attention diminished, media coverage of the controversy increases. and then increased slightly during October and 3. As mass media coverage of the controversy November, coinciding with media coverage of increases, the general public’s opposition the final Kemeny Commission report (41). to the technology increases. Mazur argues that opposition to a technology At the time of the first citizen intervention such as nuclear power will snowball with in- against a nuclear plant in 1956, there was a great creased media coverage, whether that coverage deal of positive mass media coverage of president is positive or negative (40). The fluoridation con- Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program. In the troversy of the 1950’s and 1960’s, like the cur-

rent nuclear power debate, involved complex Analysis of the extent of television news scientific judgments and pitted the “established coverage of nuclear power has been much more order” against advocates of local self-control. limited than analysis of print media coverage. During this period of public debate, persons ex- Television nightly newscasts made relatively lit- posed to both positive and negative arguments tle mention of nuclear power over the decade about fluoridation were more likely to oppose the preceding the accident at TMI. Within the overall practice than persons who had heard neither ar- low level of reporting, the trends were somewhat gument, and communities where there had been similar to those in the print media: Coverage in- heated debate were most likely to defeat fluorida- creased in 1970, and then dropped off again un- tion in a referendum. The prominence given to til 1976, with greater coverage between 1976 and disputes between technical experts over the risks 1979 (70). of a technology appears to create uncertainty in people’s minds, which in turn raises concern and The Content of Media Coverage opposition, regardless of the facts under discussion. If this is true, the media play a key role in Just as there can be little doubt that media encouraging public opposition by giving exten- coverage influences public opinions toward nu- sive coverage to the experts’ disputes. clear power, there also is little doubt that jour- Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power Ž 233 nalists, like most Americans, are ambivalent ing opposing views, these stories may have over- about this technology. In a 1980 survey, similar simplified complex issues and failed to convey percentages of media personnel and the public the prevailing consensus among scientists and (about 55 percent) viewed the benefits of nuclear energy experts. Psychiatrist Robert DuPont, after power as greater than the risks, while other “lead- viewing the same 10 years of television stories ership groups” were much more supportive of used in this analysis, suggested that fear, especial- nuclear energy (59). In another study, attitudes ly of nuclear accidents, was the underlying motif toward nuclear power were measured on a scale in all of the stories (16). Another study of 6 years ranging from -9 to +9, with a higher score in- of television news stories about various energy dicating greater support for nuclear power. While sources found that the risks and problems of nu- scientists were quite supportive of the technology clear power were emphasized, coal was given with an average score of 3.34, science journalists neutral treatment, and solar power was treated were much more skeptical, with an average score euphorically (56). of 1.30, and journalists reporting on general issues While these studies suggest that television cov- for major national newspapers were slightly less erage of nuclear power emphasizes the risks of supportive of nuclear power than science journal- the technology, there is no evidence that media ists, with an average score of 1.16 (62). personnel deliberately bias their coverage of Following the accident at TMI, the Kemeny nuclear power due to personal convictions. The Commission found that the public’s right to in- Kemeny Commission found that overall coverage formation had been poorly served. Confusion of the TMI accident was balanced although at and uncertainty among the sources of informa- times confused and inaccurate. One of the big- tion combined with a lack of technical under- gest factors in inaccurate reporting at TMI was standing by the media personnel were identified found to be the lack of reliable information avail- as contributing to the problem. Many of the re- able to the media. For example, national reports porters “did not have sufficient scientific and that the hydrogen bubble inside the reactor could technical background to understand thoroughly explode within 2 days were an accurate reflec- what they heard.” As a result of these difficulties tion of the views of NRC’s Washington office. in reporting on emergencies, the commission rec- Reporters, trusting these views and wanting to ommended that all major media outlets hire and “scoop” other reporters, tended to disregard the train nuclear energy specialists and that reporters onsite NRC officials who argued that the bubble educate themselves about the uncertainties and could not possibly explode. However, overall, probabilities expressed by various sources of in- the Commission found a larger proportion of re- formation (31). assuring than alarming statements in both television and newspaper reporting of the accident. The media’s need for balance in coverage of many issues, including nuclear power may lead Media coverage of nuclear power maybe influ- to understatement of the scientific consensus that enced by the fact that journalists are trained to the technology is acceptably safe. Media person- be skeptical of news sources, including the nu- nel are expected to bring various viewpoints be- clear establishment. Informed critics have been fore the public, and in the case of a controver- successful in publicizing many cases in which the sial technology such as nuclear power, this gen- nuclear industry, the Department of Energy, and erally means quoting both an advocate and a crit- the NRC have not been completely open about ic in any given story. One analysis of television safety problems. For example, during the first 2 news coverage showed that over the decade prior days of the accident at Three Mile Island, Metro- to Three Mile Island, most news stories dealing politan Edison withheld information on the situa- with nuclear power began and ended with “neu- tion from State and Federal officials as well as the tral” statements (70). However, among the “out- news media (72). According to the Kemeny Com- side experts” appearing most frequently in the mission, the utility’s handling of information dur- stories, 7 out of 10 were critics of nuclear power. ing this period “resulted in the loss of its credibili- Thus, while meeting the requirement of present- ty as an information source” (31). Experiences 234 ● Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty such as this have led reporters to be particularly industry focuses on crashes. Because the public skeptical of nuclear industry sources and look to is unlikely to view a single plane crash as an in- the critics for the other side of any given story. dication that the entire airline industry is unsafe, the airline industry is confident that all airplanes Proponents of nuclear power are likely to view will not be grounded. With no such assurances media treatment of nuclear plant safety issues as for nuclear power, the nuclear industry may view biased because of the inherent complexity of coverage of accidents as a threat to its survival. those issues. It is important that problems such as construction errors, skyrocketing costs, and Finally, it is important to note that journalists operating difficulties be reported to the public. did not create the nuclear controversy. During However, since few people (including reporters) periods of greatest public concern, their cover- understand nuclear technology well, problems age of nuclear power has increased, which in turn may appear more threatening than they actually has contributed to still greater public uncertain- are. Considerable expertise is needed to sift the ty. If the media are more critical of nuclear power facts and accurately interpret them to the public. now than they were in the 1950’s, they may be By comparison, the media are not considered reflecting public opinion as well as influencing it. anti-airplane, even though most coverage of that

WHAT WOULD IT TAKE TO INCREASE PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER? It is unlikely that utility executives will order because of the present lack of trust in government any new reactors as long as they believe that a and industry. There are some extremists on both majority of their customers oppose nuclear sides of the nuclear controversy whose opinions energy. However, a societal consensus on the will not change, regardless of the evidence placed necessity for and benefits of the technology may before them. Even more moderate citizens, who be very difficult or impossible to attain. The pre- are willing to change their opinion on the basis vious analysis indicated that the general public of new evidence, are influenced strongly by pre- and the staffs of some public interest groups are existing attitudes and values so that they may concerned about the possibility of a catastrophic “filter out” or wrongly interpret new evidence. reactor accident. They perceive that the technol- Finally, for the majority of the public, new infor- ogy offers few or no benefits compared to these mation on improvements in utility management risks. In addition, many Americans’ personal val- of nuclear power will be viewed skeptically unless ues contribute to their skepticism of the tech- presented in a manner that arouses trust and in- nology and its managers. These value conflicts terest. However, while better communications may prevent a total resolution of the current con- are needed, the first and most important step is troversy. However, attitudes might change either to make concrete improvements responding to as a result of external events (e.g., another oil em- public concerns. bargo or new research findings on the environmental impacts of coal burning) or because of improvements made internally by government and Enhance Nuclear Advantages the nuclear industry. External events cannot be Research conducted in the United States and controlled, but it is up to the nuclear establish- the Netherlands suggests that people’s judgment ment to demonstrate the safety and economic at- of a technology or activity is influenced as much tractiveness of nuclear power. by their assessment of its potential benefits as by Assuming that major improvements were made their view of its risks. There are at least three in management of nuclear power, it would still potential benefits of nuclear power that could be be difficult to communicate them to the public perceived by the public: 1) its contribution to na-

Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power ● 235

Photo credit: William J. Lanouette Protectors’ tent at a demonstration against the Seabrook nuclear plant in May 1977 tional energy and electricity supply, 2) its poten- Under some conditions, nuclear electricity can tial cost advantage relative to other energy op- be cheaper than its major competitor: electrici- tions, and 3) the fact that safely operated nuclear ty from coal combustion. Standardized plant de- plants produce no fossil air pollution. signs, increased predictability in the licensing It is difficult for many Americans to see a need process, and improved management of operating for nuclear powerplants at a time when electricity reactors all could help to realize the technology’s economic potential. New rate regulation systems demand has slowed. While this slow growth is expected to continue over the next several years, also could be used to reduce the initial costs of new powerplants of some kind still will be new nuclear and coal powerplants to the con- needed in the years ahead. Regions experienc- sumer. Assuming all of these changes took place and nuclear electricity did indeed offer long-term ing rapid economic and population growth will cost advantages, public opposition to new plants need new capacity sooner than others. Plans could be developed at a regional level to evaluate in hearings before State PUCs very likely would be reduced. the alternatives to meet demand growth. The planning process itself could become a vehicle However, coal is not the only alternative to for public participation, and any long-term cost nuclear power in meeting national energy needs. advantages of nuclear power could be most clear- Conservation, oil shale, and renewable energy ly demonstrated to the public this way. resources all can be used to match energy sup- 236 ● Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty ply and demand but widespread application of mation, and a number of organizations are in- these technologies could be expensive. In Maine, volved in public awareness campaigns. public rejection of a 1982 referendum to shut down Maine Yankee was based in part on recog- Reduce Concerns Over nition that conservation and renewable energy Nuclear Accidents could not quickly make up for the inexpensive nuclear power lost by the shutdown (see Case While increased awareness of nuclear power’s Studies). benefits might decrease concerns about risk, one of the most favorable things that could happen Paradoxically, accelerated R&D on these alter- to the nuclear industry over the next 10 years natives might enhance the image of nuclear pow- would be an increasing output of nuclear elec- er and could confirm that they may never be tricity along with an absence of events causing widely competitive. As part of accelerated R&D bad publicity. Presently, both TMI-type accidents on alternative energy sources, the environmen- and incidents such as the failure of the safety con- tal costs and benefits of each source should be trol system at the Salem, N. J., plant are viewed examined. Environmental groups currently are by the public as precursors to a catastrophe. among the leading critics of nuclear power. These Given the slow rate at which public support for groups also are very concerned about the adverse nuclear power has declined, an extended period impacts of coal combustion and other energy of quiet, trouble-free operations could have very sources, and are monitoring research into those positive impacts on public attitudes. Chapter 5 impacts. If this research indicated that acid rain identifies a number of approaches to improved was a more serious problem than presently per- utility management of nuclear power, which, if ceived or that carbon dioxide buildup would re- implemented, could help to assure that neither sult in near-term climatic changes, some environ- major accidents nor precursors take place. mentalists might become less negative about nu- While a period of uneventful operation of nuclear relative to coal. This shift, in turn, could clear plants is necessary to restore public con- change attitudes among the broader public. fidence, it probably is not sufficient. Maine Yankee has had very high reliability but State Public relations or educational programs are voters have twice come close to shutting it down unlikely to increase public awareness of nuclear (see Case Studies). In addition, critics probably power’s potential benefits until those benefits are would remain skeptical. It would be important apparent. This might result either from events out- to demonstrate to them that the period of quiet side the industry’s control which decrease avail- operation was a result of real improvements and ability of alternative energy sources (e.g., an oil the beginning of a new trend, rather than just disruption) or from improvements in manage- luck. However, given the present level of distrust ment of the technology. Without such actions, between interveners, the NRC, and the nuclear public relations programs such as the current industry, it might be very difficult to do this. Committee for Energy Awareness campaign may have little impact, and possibly even a detrimen- Several steps could be taken to improve com- tal effect on public opinion. The response to this munications between the nuclear community campaign from critics may increase public uncer- and public interest groups critical of nuclear tainty and skepticism. Even programs viewed as power. An effort might be made to identify the unbiased by all sides, such as the League of concerns of particular groups and respond to the Women Voters Education Fund’s (LWVEF) “Nu- substance of those concerns. For example, some clear Energy Education Program” carried out in groups currently are concerned about insurance. 1980 and 1981, may do little to increase public A compromise on this issue might not decrease acceptance until the costs of new nuclear pow- the groups’ fundamental criticism of nuclear safe- erplants are better controlled (34). Nevertheless, ty, but it could improve the climate and allow the low level of public understanding of nuclear further negotiations to take place. If the current technology does indicate a need for more infor- heated debate could become a reasoned ongo- Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power ● 237

ing dialog, the public might be less likely to view so unlikely as to be “impossible.” As a result, the technology as unsafe. As discussed previous- when the accident did happen, it greatly reduced ly, the prominence and stridency of the debate the credibility of the regulators and the industry. currently increases public uncertainty and en- The nuclear establishment should acknowledge courages opposition. that both operating events and more serious accidents can occur, attempt to educate the public As part of this effort, the Federal Government about the difference between the two, and dem- could actively encourage involvement of respon- onstrate its preparedness to deal with accidents. sible interveners in both regulatory proceedings For example, TVA immediately reports to the and long-range planning efforts through funding media any event that could be considered news- and other support. In Ontario, Canada, the inde- worthy. This very open approach increases the pendent Porter Commission funded knowledge- utility’s credibility with both the media and the able nuclear critics to conduct studies and par- public. Another positive example is offered by ticipate in extensive hearings as part of its long- a Midwestern utility that encountered quality-as- term electricity planning. In the Commission’s surance problems during construction. Once the interim report, health problems caused by im- company had greatly increased its construction proper disposal of uranium mine tailings were management capabilities, it launched a public re- identified, and environmental groups were ac- lations effort to educate the public about the knowledged for bringing the issue to the public’s problems and the steps it had taken to overcome attention. Similarly, based on testimony from them. These efforts appear to have increased leading critics, the commission found that the local trust in the utility. (See Case Studies.) probability of a loss of coolant accident causing a meltdown at Ontario Hydro’s heavy water reac- Two approaches to siting policy might help tors was much greater than the Canadian nuclear alleviate the public’s safety concerns. Both re- industry had claimed. Because the Commission spond to the public’s opposition to construction not only sought critics’ concerns but also ac- of new plants near where they live. First, as knowledged and responded to them, the process discussed earlier, some people living near nuclear had the effect of moderating some groups’ anti- plants tend to view them as less risky than peo- nuclear positions (see vol. II). ple who are less familiar with the technology. Previous U.S. efforts to involve government, in- While some polls show increasing opposition to dustry, and environmentalists in dialog or “en- nearby plants since the accident at Three Mile vironmental mediation” provide another model Island, support for other plants has remained for improved communication. Nonprofit organi- high. This fact has led Alvin Weinberg and others zations such as the Conservation Foundation in to promote a “confined siting” policy, under Washington, D. C., as well as several private firms which most new reactors would be added to ex- have brought all three parties together to discuss isting sites, rather than creating new sites. This topics such as radioactive waste disposal and approach has been used successfully in Canada chemical waste management. By careful staff (see vol. Ii) and is supported by some U.S. en- preparation and beginning the discussions with vironmental groups. It is most attractive in the a common objective (e.g., safe disposal of toxic East, where high population density makes re- wastes), these forums have succeeded in devel- mote siting infeasible. oping preliminary agreements on Federal and in- The second approach to dealing with local op- dustry policy. position to new construction is to site new reac- Nuclear regulators and the industry can in- tors at remote locations. This approach could increase their credibility with both interveners and corporate “confined siting, ” with new reactors the public by emphasizing candor in their public clustered at existing remote sites. Alternatively, information programs. Prior to the accident at new sites in remote areas could be identified. In Three Mile Island, the nuclear establishment either case, public opposition to such plants created the impression that such an accident was could be expected to be much less than opposi-

238 • Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty

tion to new plants in densely populated areas. of the size of the plant construction program as Opinion polls show that the majority of the public a guarantee of Federal support for nuclear energy. favors remote siting of reactors, and the poten- However, if this definition of size were viewed tial impacts of a major accident would be re- as an absolute limit on the program, rather than duced greatly by this approach. However, the a target to be reached, the public might view it costs of transferring the power to load centers as an indication of Government skepticism of nu- would be much greater, and construction in re- clear power. A less drastic alternative would be mote areas might lead to adverse “boomtown” to limit the rate of growth in total nuclear capacity effects on nearby communities. by limiting the number of new construction per- mits granted in any one year. Current demand Public fears of a nuclear accident also might projections indicate that rapid growth of nuclear be reduced by controlling the rate of new plant power is unlikely for many years, but a limit might construction. Nuclear critics, fearing the impacts provide reassurance to those who feel the only of potential accidents and the possibility of a cen- choices are to eliminate the option now or for- tralized, undemocratic “nuclear state,” base their ever risk an uncontrolled resurgence. opposition in part on the rapid scaling up in size and number of reactors in the 1960’s and 1970’s After years of debate, Sweden passed a referen- and on the industry’s early projections of a “plu- dum in 1980 calling for completion of the 12 tonium economy.” These concerns might dimin- nuclear-generating units then under construction ish if the nuclear program were bounded. Some or planned, with a phaseout after 25 years (the within the nuclear industry also favor a definition expected lifetime of the plants). While this com- Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power ● 239

promise might seem to offer little future for Minimize Linkage Between nuclear power, it did allow construction of six Nuclear Power and Weapons new nuclear plants, with the result that over half the country’s electricity is now nuclear. In the Another issue that should be addressed in pol- United States, a compromise under which regu- icy decisions about nuclear power is the connec- lators and nuclear critics agreed to encourage tion between weapons development and civilian completion and operation of units currently nuclear energy. Given the level of national con- under construction or planned might be prefer- cern over the arms race, public acceptance of able to the current impasse, especially in terms nuclear power cannot be expected to increase of financial return to investors. It has been sug- substantially until the two nuclear technologies gested that Americans might reach consensus on are separated in people’s minds. This report has a 150-gigawatt nuclear program (29). Similarly, not analyzed the impact of policies that might the advocacy arm of the League of Women Vot- minimize the linkages between nuclear weapons ers has adopted a national policy calling for a con- and power, but the effect on public opinion could tinuation of nuclear power in its current percent- be positive. For example, one action that might age of national energy supply. As energy and increase public acceptance by reducing the per- electricity demand grow in the future, this policy ceived linkages would be to remove nuclear would allow some growth in the nuclear pro- weapons development from the jurisdiction of gram. Any such compromise or cap would have the Department of Energy. Another step would to allow for adjustments as nuclear and com- be to legislate a ban on commercial fuel reproc- peting technologies are improved and economics essing. Many critics are more concerned about change. In addition, regional differences in the reprocessing than about reactors because plutoni- United States might make a State-by-State ap- um separated from the spent fuel might be stolen proach more feasible than a national referendum and used to construct a bomb or to threaten the as in Sweden. public. A legislated moratorium on reprocessing might have greater impact on these concerns While all of the approaches discussed above than the executive orders imposed by Presidents might decrease public concerns about current Ford and Carter that were later revoked by Presi- reactors, it is possible that public skepticism about dent Reagan. Such a ban might be especially ef- the technology is so great that these changes fective if imposed in conjunction with limits on would have little impact. In this case, other reac- the total growth of the program, as discussed tor concepts with inherent safety features might above. In addition, it might be best to keep in- be considered. Several alternatives, such as the dustry and military waste disposal strictly high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR), the separate, although some public interest groups heavy water reactor (HWR), and an improved support joint disposal, because it encourages ac- light water reactor (the PIUS reactor) are dis- tion on military waste that has been allowed to cussed in chapter 4. A substantial federally accumulate for 40 years (53). funded R&D effort on one or more of these alternatives might meet with public acceptance, par- Policy makers also could take action to reduce ticularly if demand for power picks up over the the possibility of weapons proliferation through next two decades. The inherent safety features careful management of international nuclear of the chosen design might appeal to the general power development. A previous OTA analysis public and the choice of design could be used identified weaknesses in the existing international as a vehicle for much greater involvement of nu- nonproliferation regime (52). Recognizing the im- clear critics. By bringing critics into the R&D pro- pact these weaknesses have on public percep- gram and addressing their specific concerns, con- tions of nuclear power, Alvin Weinberg has sensus might be reached on an acceptable design argued, “We must strengthen the Nonprolifera- for future reactors. tion Treaty (NPT) regime and take the next steps, 240 ● Nuclear Power in an Age of l.uncertainty which involve both a reduction in nuclear arma- supportive of civilian nuclear power, reaches an ments and a strengthening of the sanctions that audience who might otherwise reject nuclear can be imposed on those who would violate the power along with weapons (48). NPT” (75). In conclusion, current public attitudes toward The link between nuclear weapons and nuclear nuclear power pose complex problems for the power also might be reduced in people’s minds nuclear industry and policy makers. However, if more proponents of nuclear power who op- technical and institutional steps could be taken pose the continued buildup of nuclear weapons that might lead the public to view nuclear power stated their beliefs publicly. For example, Hans as an important and attractive energy source in Bethe, a prominent nuclear physicist who has the years ahead. Constructive leadership and been active in the arms control movement and imagination will be required to start this process. Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power ● 241

tefthe Referendum Committee, a business COW ~ erencjum proposed to shut down Maine Yankee sultant and Cl@ setup the Committee tO Saw .“ #t&r 5 yews, in order toabw tirnefor a smooth Maine Yankee {CSMY), raising over $800,W0.* !ramitkmtotisewationand renewable energy The funds were wed for advertisetnents, , .~*ces. CWY a~in launched a counter-carn- speakers, mdadirectmailc krnpaignemphasig- ~ p#@. ~W t~ economic advarlta~ of the fi~c~e.a. , - pbnLCSMYpr@ectedthatrf @acingMakwYa* . ~ !ii”bbvember 19$2, Maine voters again chose ‘ fgWep Maine Yankee operating, though by a kee with oil-fired &#k4ywouid add 30 pe~~ ‘ ~ cent to the ave~ residemia} customef”s bf~~+ , , .-nq~r -n {56 to 44 percent). Economics , . ..’ , -r@ the key factor in the vote. An inde- Th4? fU?f&@dlW’n C&&lit@ emphasized thm - .- -nt analysis by the Governor’s Energy Of- issueskl its@mJ?a”@n: thema@tude@apot#r& ; . ~:hadfound that ektricity prices would in- tkd. ac@(fqtK and its d@a&@tg effect on IW ~ ~ “:, i-by Igto’%i peroent if Maine Yankee were coast ofktaine; the impact ofradioactivew@S” - - ~ , #J&&J*, - a cmmtef-study by the ref- ori future generations; and the concept of k~” - ‘~.-*mWee, ‘ ~OSt VOtefs were con- franchi- in _ people have the ti@’t&ite@ensive cdl-fired generation would sibilityto make thfdrown value judgmen&a% : “ j :“ &f~~@@. M addition, the referendum com- ukar pQVVW ati OthW 155s that affect their ‘ : .: -Wtrcredibility on heakh and safety issues live. With \eSS than $IW,(X!(J tb ctim*@ ., ,, w+u~ M ~ U.S. Centers for Di$ease Control relied heavily cm the fairness doctrine to 43btqIq , ‘ the claim that leukemia rates media coverage of their views, . . *’”@@er dwt normal around Maine Yankee. . . ,. Fdowing a large Wter turnout, fheti@n- - “‘ .@!$ic at@udes towad the Maine Yankee @m c~mk k3st, by41 t~ S9 /J@ciXJt, Cl@- “ ~ ,’.; , . &!? $kMGr In many respects to national at- servers ori al! sid~ a#@d M ecOnOml C$ ~~ - .,. ~ ‘: . ~ ~ti~~ @f Wka$sett, which benefits been thq def%!ing fact~” ig $he vm. Wg Ulk ‘ r-nl= a~w ~avesW- end of~he a p#o@&r ‘ ; ,. Environmentalism, tOO, # the &lnivdmity qf”hdaine #t-0’O?W * W* ‘:. ‘ ‘ .~ *.*- hfkw!nce on concerns about the M IOWW? .* * 49@W@4!, :m ~ @@. ~w & the leaders of the referendum enW.& &@3@t* , ~mbI ‘-’; m~~ne- ~u= ~~e *@s th~ t~ *r@5e*~’r@ $T&kfi! ~flf~~ti”;””’ “ ‘ - ~; -, rqmtcharaa=.~mems about nuclear lost MaR’ieYa@eepo&@r. FroqMhenort,thqt@!$ $ : ~.= instrumental irl mobilizing opposition erendum fmrmnittee hadtrouble mfo@@n@@ ~ . ~@ee, and the nuclear weapons campai n q’ health and @@y issues &&f 4JtP, ~ : helped attract v~e~ mately Lt. : . . Another issue that M aGW@kiemxi ch-the debate was the The &@e turnout and VOt~ $@t in thi$ t!)t)ji “ - polls taken after the caRapai@n @ncol# that -e ~~e, I?eferw!ldl!m committee* @y u Ya* for eco~ic rea. &wvn because they disliked ula#’ 1962. - . .$ , - . . r, this same Yankee in- ‘~~~ to keeP the ~lant,

ik?f”~fi economic necessity, was@mfkkd * ttw m- ~. [page omitted] This page was originally printed on a dark gray background. The scanned version of the page was almost entirely black and not usable. Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power Ž 243

cidence of a massive public protest based in part on concerns about earthquake-stance and an apparent industry failure to provide that resist- ance appeared to many people to vindicate the - Nuclear protectors. In addition, PG&E’s handling of the @@3!k {Mew Writ: Merrill event may have contributed to doubts about the R@wswwI at Diablo nuclear industry’s credibility. When an inde- pendent study confirmed the quality-assurance ~~;”;uv, ‘< ~ , - : ‘ “ ~ problems with the seismic restraints, a PG&E 6. ‘~bhfamh Fomi@ht- spokesman dismissed the finding as being"a *, 0ct*22*T%#?~ *;*: ~ ~ certain informality" in the utility’s “seismic sent- 7. Mmmtaih W4#-!l @#kfte, *ioeconorn- ice contracts.” Canyon ““pgi:qi$ Npcp@?@tifY-- Public reaction to Diablo Canyon has reflected .*$!@~:; . . k , national trends in several respects. Early COn- , 8. !!wQI%% Mkt and vonf.oewenfeldt, Paula, “The cerns about specific environmental impacts and :## at OiabkD Canyon,’V The Nation, Oct. 8, support among some environmentalists gave way to broader concerns about seismic risk, 9., U.S. brqpwss, House of Representatives, Sub- need for power, and, ultimately, the compe- ccMnMwe on Energy and Environment, Oversight tence and credibility of the utility. Conflicting #4b#9#g w O’abfo Canyon Nwkar Generating Mant @ne W, 1977. scientific studies of seismic risk appear to have 14). W. Qwwess, House of Representatives, Sub- increased public skepticism about the plant, and W-on Etwrgy ml Environment, Overs@ht the accident at Three Mile Island caused a sharp Hm@ng on NRC Operating Licensing Process, increase in local opposition. Mr. 9, 1981. II. ~;$.-tingress, Subcommittee on Energy ad Study References Case 2 Environment, Owersight Hearing on Quality 1. “A Seismological Shoot-out at Diablo Canyon,’t A.5&@t1i;+fitcleW-*wefplan~ C“struction, Science, vol. 214, Oct. 30, 1981. . t . 2. ‘(Diablo Canyon: Encore on Design QA,’r The Enetgy Daily, Apr. 25, 1983.

Photo credit: Pacific Gas & Electric Demonstrations and court actions called attention to issues of seismic design at Diablo Canyon [page omitted] This page was originally printed on a dark gray background. The scanned version of the page was almost entirely black and not usable. Ch. 8—Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power ● 245

CHAPTER 8 REFERENCES

1. “A Fresh Portrait of the Anti-Nuclear Movement,” 16. DuPont, Robert, “Nuclear Phobia–Phobic Think- Groundswe//, vol. 5, No. 4, July/August 1982. ing About Nuclear Power” (Washington, D. C.: 2. Aldrich, David, et al., Sandia National Labora- The Media Institute, 1980). tories, Technical Guidance for Siting Criteria De- 17. DuPont, Robert, “The Nuclear Power Phobia,” velopment, NUREG/CR-2239 (Washington, D. C.: Business Week, September 1981. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December, 18. “Energy-guzzling: Most Consumers Are Cured,” 1982). Harris poll reported in Business Week, Apr. 4, 3. Alexanderson, E. P., Fermi-7: New Age for Nuc/ear 1983, Power (La Grange Park, Ill.: The American Nuclear 19. “Expert Knowledge,” Public Opinion, vol. 4., No. Society, 1979). 6, October/November 1981. 4. Anthony, Richard, “Trends in Public Opinion on 20 Firebaugh, Morris, “Public Education and Atti- the Environment, ” Environment, vol. 24, No. 4, tudes,” An Acceptable Future Nuclear Energy Sys- May 1982. tem, M. W. Firebaugh and M. J. Ohanian (eds.) 5. Atomic Energy Commission, Theoretic/ Possibil- (Oak Ridge, Term.: Institute for Energy Analysis, ities and Consequences of Major Accidents in 1980). Large Nuclear Power Plants, WASH-740 (Wash- 21. Fischhoff, Baruch, et al., “Lay Foibles and Expert ington, D. C,: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Fables in Judgments About Risk,” Progress in Re- 1 957). source Management and Environmental Planning, 6. Barbash, Fred, and Benjamin, Milton R., “States VOI. 3, 1981. Can Curb A-Plants,” Washington Post, Apr. 21, 22. Ford, Daniel, “The Cult of the Atom-l, ” The New 1983. Yorker, Oct. 25, 1982. 7. Beardsley & Haslacher, Inc., Nuc/ear Attitudes 23. Ford, Daniel, “The Cult of the Atom-l I,” The New After the Three Mi/e /s/and Accident (Portland, Yorker, Nov. 1, 1982. Oreg.: Pacific Gas & Electric, May 1979). 24. Freudenburg, William, and Baxter, Rodney, “Pub- 8. Buss, David M., et al., “Perceptions of Techno- lic Attitudes Toward Local Nuclear Power Plants: logical Risks and Their Management,” paper pre- A Reassessment,” paper presented at the 1983 an- sented at the Symposium on Environmental Haz- nual meetings of the American Sociological Asso- ard and People at Risk, 20th International Con- ciation, Detroit, Aug. 31 -Sept. 4, 1983. gress of Applied Psychology, Edinburgh, July 26, 25. Fuller, John G., We A/most Lost Detroit (New 1982. York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1975). 9. Cambridge Reports, Inc., American Attitudes 26, Gomberg, H. J., et al., “Report on the Possible Ef- Toward Energy Issues and the Electric Utility in- fects on the Surrounding Population of an As- dustry (Washington, D. C.: Edison Electric Institute, sumed Release of Fission Products From a 1983). 300-MW Nuclear Reactor Located at Lagoona 10. Cambridge Reports, Inc., 1982 Polls conducted for Beach,” APDA-120 (Atomic Power Development the U.S. Committee for Energy Awareness (unpub- Associates, 1957). lished). 27. inglehart, Ronald, “Post-Materialism in an En- 11. Comey, David, “The Incident at Brown’s Ferry,” vironment of Insecurity, ” American Po/itica/ Not Man Apart, September 1975. Science Review, vol. 75, No. 4, December 1981. 12. Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Sys- 28, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Review of tems, National Research Council, Energy in Tran- NRC Report: “Precursors to Potential Severe Core sition 1985-2070 (Washington, D. C.: National Damage Accidents: 1969-1979: A Status Repott, ” Academy of Sciences, 1979). NUREG/CR-2497 (Atlanta, Ga.: INPO, 1982), p, 13. Delcoigne, Georges, “Education and Public Ac- 21. ceptance of Nuclear Power Plants, ” Nuc/ear Safe- 29. Kasperson, J. X., et ai., “Institutional Responses ty, vol. 20, No. 6, November/December 1979. to Three Mile Island, ” Bu//etin of the Atomic Sci- 14. “Despite Nuclear Power’s Problems, The Public entists, vol. 35, No. 10, December 1979. is Convinced,” Nucleonics Week, May 5, 1983. 30. Kasperson, Roger, et al., “Public Opposition to 15. Donaldson, Thomas, “Ethically, ‘Society Expects Nuclear Energy: Retrospect and Prospect,” More From a Corporation’, ” U.S. News & Wor/d Science, Technology, and Human Values, vol. 5, Report, Sept. 6, 1982. No. 31, spring 1980.

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