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Tilburg University Desert, Luck, and Justice Brouwer, Huub Tilburg University Desert, Luck, and Justice Brouwer, Huub Publication date: 2020 Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Brouwer, H. (2020). Desert, Luck, and Justice. [s.n.]. 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Download date: 27. sep. 2021 Desert, Luck, and Justice Desert, Luck, and Justice Huub Brouwer Huub Brouwer Desert, Luck, and Justice Cover image: Marja Brouwer-Hollemans Correctie van de Nederlandse vlag ISBN: 978-90-830376-2-2 Cover design and layout by: Proefschriftenprinten.nl – The Netherlands Printed by: Print Service Ede - Ede, The Netherlands © Huub Brouwer, 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission in writing from the proprietor(s). Desert, Luck, and Justice Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan Tilburg University op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. K. Sijtsma, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties aangewezen commissie in de Aula van de Universiteit op dinsdag 7 januari 2020 om 16.00 uur door Huybert Martijn Brouwer, geboren te Gouda, Nederland. Promotiecommissie Promotores: Prof. Dr. M.M.S.K. Sie Prof. Dr. M.S. Olsaretti Copromotor: Dr. B. Engelen Overige commissieleden: Prof. Dr. G.W. Dubbink Dr. A. Gheaus Prof. Dr. J. Moriarty Prof. Dr. I.A.M. Robeyns 4 To ‘MoPo’ 5 Table of contents PROMOTIECOMMISSIE ......................................................................................................................... 4 PREFACE .................................................................................................................................................. 9 AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS ................................................................................................................ 19 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 21 1. DESERT IN A FACTORY AND A BURNING HOUSE ......................................................................................... 22 2. THREE RECEIVED WISDOMS ......................................................................................................................... 25 3. RESISTING GENERALIZED DESERT SKEPTICISM ............................................................................................ 30 4. LOOKING AHEAD ........................................................................................................................................... 37 CHAPTER 2: DEFENDING ASYMMETRIES OF DESERT ................................................................... 41 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 41 2. IDENTIFYING ASYMMETRIES OF DESERT ...................................................................................................... 43 3. PREVIOUS DEFENSES..................................................................................................................................... 49 4. DEFENDING STRONGER ASYMMETRIES OF DESERT .................................................................................... 53 5. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................. 59 CHAPTER 3: WHEN, IF EVER, IS DESERT FORWARD-LOOKING? ................................................. 61 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 61 2. RESISTING CHALLENGES TO FELDMAN’S ARGUMENT FOR FORWARD-LOOKING DESERT ....................... 63 3. ADDITIONAL OBJECTS FOR WHICH DESERT IS SOMETIMES FORWARD-LOOKING .................................... 69 4. RETAINING TIME-SENSITIVITY...................................................................................................................... 74 5. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................. 76 CHAPTER 4: WHY NOT BE A DESERTIST? THREE ARGUMENTS FOR DESERT AND AGAINST LUCK EGALITARIANISM ..................................................................................................................... 79 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 79 2. LUCK EGALITARIANISM AND DESERTISM: GENERAL PRINCIPLES .............................................................. 80 3. THREE THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS, THREE DIFFERENCES............................................................................... 85 4. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................. 96 CHAPTER 5: CAN DESERT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF STAKES? A REPLY TO OLSARETTI ......... 98 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 98 2. WHAT IS A DESERT-BASED PRINCIPLE OF STAKES? .................................................................................... 99 3. WHAT SHOULD A PRINCIPLE OF STAKES DO? ........................................................................................... 100 4. CONCLUSION: RESEARCHING PLAUSIBLE PRINCIPLES OF STAKES .......................................................... 103 6 CHAPTER 6: EARNING TOO MUCH. THE CASE FOR MAXIMUM INCOMES ............................104 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 104 2. THE MAXIMUM INCOME ............................................................................................................................ 105 3. RAWLSIAN EGALITARIANISM ..................................................................................................................... 107 4. UTILITARIANISM ......................................................................................................................................... 111 5. DESERTISM .................................................................................................................................................. 118 6. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................... 123 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION – OPEN QUESTIONS ..........................................................................126 7.1. A COMPENSATORY DESERT ARGUMENT FOR UNEQUAL PAY .............................................................. 126 7.2. PROPERTY-OWNING DEMOCRACY AND DESERT................................................................................... 127 7.3. HUMAN INTUITION ABOUT JUSTICE: DESERTIST OR LUCK EGALITARIAN? ......................................... 128 7.4. DESERT, LUCK, AND LIBERAL NEUTRALITY ............................................................................................ 130 CHAPTER SUMMARIES ....................................................................................................................147 SAMENVATTING ...............................................................................................................................150 RESUME ..............................................................................................................................................154 7 Preface Preface At PhD defenses, guests will, almost invariably, when given the printed PhD, first turn to the preface and read the acknowledgements in it. You have probably done the same. Perhaps this is even the only part of the PhD you will read. That would be completely fine with me: this book would not have existed without the help of all the people I am about to thank profusely in this rather lengthy preface. The preface is, in part, so long because I also (i) explain the cover, (ii) thank the people who got me interested in desert and justice, and only then (iii) move on to the actual acknowledgements. I must confess that I had a hard time finishing the preface, the very last bit of the PhD I still had to write. I not only run the risk of forgetting to thank people whom I really should have thanked, but every word I write brings me closer to a moment I dread: the moment
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