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Home , Aesthetics, Kendall Walton, Timothy Binkley

Aesthetics—What? Why? and Wherefore?

It is a very great honor to address my friends and of quantum physics are younger. But colleagues as president of the American Society these are clearly subcategories of traditional, well- for , an organization that plays a unique established areas of philosophy— and phi- role in a field that is, at once, a major traditional losophy of science—and they inherit much of their branch of philosophy and also central to disci- identity and of purpose from their parents. plines often regarded as remote from philosophy, Aesthetics is not so fortunate. It is related in vari- as well as depending crucially on their contribu- ous important ways to , , tions. philosophy of , — I follow the lead of one of my distinguished indeed it overlaps all of them—but these older predecessors in this office, Peter Kivy, who used relatives are at best aunts and uncles to aesthetics, the occasion of his own presidential address twelve not parents. Aesthetics must figure out for itself years ago to step back and reflect on the state of what exactly it is. the discipline and the of aesthetics.1 Two kinds of issues about the field need to be addressed: What is distinctive about this branch i. what is aesthetics? of philosophy, in contrast to others? And what is philosophy? Under the first heading, we will ask Aesthetics is a strange field, in some ways a con- what aesthetics is the philosophy of , what domain fused one. Yet, among the issues it is charged with it is charged with investigating. The second issue treating are some of the most fascinating and pro- concerns what kind of investigation of that domain found ones that philosophy has to offer. aesthetics is to undertake, what it is to investigate I take aesthetics to be largely a branch of phi- things philosophically. losophy, although with absolutely crucial links to disciplines. Philosophy as I understand it is i. In his Presidential Address for the central divi- not the private preserve of professional philoso- sion of the American Philosophical Association, phers. historians, theorists, and liter- Allan Gibbard referred to the question of how to ary scholars frequently engage in philosophy, as live as the “grand basic question” of ethics.2 He do psychologists, cognitive scientists, and linguists. may have had in mind something like this: Most And many informal reflections outside of aca- of ethics, most of what now and over the ages is demic contexts are philosophical in character. thought of as belonging to that discipline, has some As an institutionally recognized branch of phi- more or less direct connection with how we are to losophy, aesthetics is very young. At a mere two- live our lives. Ethical do much more and-a-half centuries, in a family whose elders are than attempt to answer this question. They aim to more like twenty-five, it does not qualify for a explain and clarify it, they argue about whether it midlife identity crisis. Its confusion is that of an can be answered, and whether answers are “objec- adolescent trying to find itself, wondering what to tive” or “subjective,” and they examine how peo- do when it grows up, and, indeed, whether there ple do in go about trying to answer it. But it is is a place for it in the adult world. Aesthetics is fair to say that ethics is loosely organized around not the baby of the clan; business ethics and the the question of how to live. This question fixes the

The Journal of Aesthetics and 65:2 Spring 2007 148 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism identity of the field, marks its rough outlines, and marked out within the Aesthetics World. Danto, gives it a structure. A can get her or in his words, “regard[s] the matter of furnishing his bearings from anywhere within ethics by ascer- answers to ...questions [such as what taining in which direction this question lies. it makes that Brillo boxes, etc. should be artworks Specifying the matter of ethics by iden- and not mere real things] the central issue in the tifying its GBQ has the advantage of locating its philosophy of art.”4 But this question does not play center, as well as its rough boundaries. In fact, once a role in the field as a whole comparable to that of we specify the center, we might prefer thinking of “How shall we live?” in ethics. it as not having boundaries at all. We can regard “What is art?” is a troubled and seriously con- various particular philosophical issues simply as tested question, as we all know. Troubled ques- more or less in the province of ethics, as they re- tions are music to philosophers’ ears, grist for their late more or less directly to the GBQ. mills. The “What is art?” industry certainly is hum- Epistemology, another ancient branch of phi- ming along. But the question is problematic in losophy, is similarly organized around the ques- ways that make it ill-suited to define the identity of tion of what we know or what we can know. The a major field of philosophy. It is not at all clear that grand basic question of metaphysics is something these words—“What is art?”—express anything like: What is there? Notice that all three of these like a single question, to which competing answers GBQs are ordinary, everyday questions, ones that are given, or whether philosophers proposing an- are likely to bother any reflective person with- swers are even engaged in the same debate. Intro- out prompting from professional or self-styled ductory textbooks and encyclopedia articles com- philosophers. Even a person who is not reflective monly recount a rather bizarre historical sequence enough ever to ask, “How, in general, should one of proposed answers (usually understanding the live one’s life?” will certainly ask specifications of question to be asking for a of the word this question, “What shall I do now?” Ethics, epis- ‘art,’ although it does not have to be understood temology, and metaphysics grow naturally out of this way). The story goes something like this—with everyday concerns, out of the “ condition.” variations, of course: The Greeks defined ‘art’ in What is the grand basic question of aesthetics? terms of (, ), it is As a purported species of “ ” along- said. Then followed formalist , and def- side ethics, one might expect aesthetics to be or- initions in terms of expression, and of communi- ganized around a normative question correspond- cation; after that came claims that what makes art ing to How to live—perhaps: What to like. This art is its institutional status or its historical role, question has indeed exercised some aestheticians. or its place in a symbol system with certain syn- The “Standard of ” that was af- tactic and semantic properties, or an interpretive ter can be understood as a way of deciding what theory.5 we are to like. As Hume put it, such a standard The sheer variety of proposed definitions would afford a decision “confirming one senti- should give us pause. One cannot help wonder- ment, and condemning another.”3 Some version ing whether there is any sense in which they are of this question—what to like—might come fairly attempts to capture the same concept or clarify close to qualifying as the GBQ of institutionalized the same cultural practices, or address the same aesthetics in its very early days. But it certainly issue. The historical progression, as commonly re- does not now. Although aestheticians continue to counted, is hardly a dialectical one with each at- discuss it and issues concerning aesthetic or artis- tempt taking what might be right about previous tic value, a glance at the pages of The Journal of ones and improving on them, or else explaining Aesthetics and Art Criticism reveals how much else and accounting for why the previous ones might they have on their minds, how much of what they have seemed right and how they missed out. This is think about has no particular connection to these not like the progression of definitions of “knowl- matters. It would be a serious distortion, now, to edge,” for instance. Each attempt to define ‘art’ characterize aesthetics as a species of . starts anew, and comes up with something not just Ethics is at most a half-sibling of aesthetics. different from previous definitions but seemingly If pushed to name a GBQ for their field, some unrelated to them. (I am oversimplifying here.) aestheticians will cite “What is art?” This may Whatever the explanation for the curiously jagged be the GBQ of the territory has shape of this history, “What is Art?” will scarcely Walton Aesthetics—What? Why? and Wherefore? 149 serve as a stable center for a discipline. We should in the way that ethics does if it were centered on expect a field recognizing this as its GBQ to be the question, “What is Art?” rather confused. The inescapable conclusion is that aesthetics In any case, glancing again at recent issues of simply does not have a grand basic question. No The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,itis question or cluster of related questions organizes clear that this does not function as the GBQ of aes- our field in the way that “How to live” orga- thetics as it is currently practiced. Much of what nizes ethics. Georges Santayana implied as much occupies the attention of aestheticians has little if in 1904, when he remarked, in an article in the anything to do with any question one might ask Philosophical Review: “[T]he word ‘aesthetics’ is by means of the words, ‘What is art?’ Do readers nothing but a loose term lately applied in academic of literary works empathize with characters? How circles to everything that has to do with works of do formal devices affect readers’ emotional re- art or with the sense of . ... the group of sponses? What makes for “” in ? activities we can call aesthetic is a motley one, cre- In or film? Is linear perspective “natu- ated by certain historic and literary accidents.”6 ral” or “conventional”? What are the mechanisms This suggests that the identity of the field is fixed whereby documentary films alter our beliefs, when by marking its boundaries, rather than by identify- they do? In what circumstances are photographs ing its center. ( has a similar better sources of evidence than pictures of other structure, its domain the sciences, broadly kinds? Was right to be concerned about in- construed, which it investigates philosophically. I sidious moral effects of mimetic ? Do fic- do not think philosophy of science has a grand ba- tional characters exist? To what extent might a sic question. Notice that philosophers of science modern performance of baroque music on period are not overly preoccupied with the question of instruments recreate the sounds or the how ‘science’ is to be defined; they have lots of of an eighteenth-century performance? These are other interesting things to think about.) The idea is all immensely fascinating issues. But all can be that the boundaries of aesthetics coincide with the pursued, and usually are, without worrying about boundaries of the and of beauty. Rather than whether or why the works in question qualify as including absolutely everything having to do with art. art or beauty, however, we might focus on - One final contrast between the GBQ of ethics sophical matters. And some will prefer to substi- and “What is art?”: I mentioned that “How to tute the aesthetic for beauty, perhaps in order to live?” is a query that arises naturally, inevitably, in include sublimity along with beauty. ordinary human life. “What is art?” is not, except So aesthetics is the philosophy of art and beauty, in rather limited circumstances. Artists, gallery or the philosophy of art and the aesthetic. This owners, museum curators, critics, and the art pub- sounds comfortingly familiar. It recognizes that lic in 1960s and 1970s New York certainly could we are interested in all manner of issues hav- not avoid it, and it comes up in other contexts as ing to do with , music, theater, literature, well, but it is irrelevant at best in most of most peo- film, and anything else that counts as art, not just ple’s thinking about . Reflective film buffs what makes them art or what works of art have or music lovers or theater junkies or art connois- in common—as well as whatever might be philo- seurs may want to figure out why a joke is funny, sophically interesting about anything that is aes- why and in what way a short story or a musical per- thetic or beautiful. formance moves them, what they might learn from This conception of the field, this specification of a documentary and how. But they will surely find its boundaries, is hostage to the vagaries of judg- the question of what counts as art much less press- ments about the extension of the terms ‘art’ and ing than these, if it occurs to them at all, certainly ‘aesthetic,’ vagaries that are certainly not limited far less pressing than most of us find the question to fuzziness around the edges. Think of the severe of how to live. Moreover, it is arguable that no restrictions Leo Tolstoyand put on what one before the eighteenth century was able even is to count as art—vastly different restrictions in to formulate this question and that it cannot be the two cases—just a few years before the vast expressed in some non-Western languages. Aes- expansion of the class, in the eyes of some artists thetics would not grow out of everyday concerns and critics, to include ’s , 150 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

John Cage’s 4’33”, Andy Warhol’s Brillo Boxes— have enjoyed, I expect that some of you will dis- some even regarding these as paradigmatic in- agree, attributing to me paradoxes that Russell stances of art! might approve. How things are and what it is to Moreover, aesthetics understood in the spirit leave them that way is not an obvious or straight- of Santayana suffers something of a split person- forward matter, nor is it clear what should count ality. There is what is often called nonaesthetic as paradoxical. In any case, I would like to make art (Dadaism, the 1960s avant-garde).7 And the the aesthetics world safe for Russellian modes of aesthetic includes much outside the realm of art— philosophizing as well as Wittgensteinian ones. We not just natural beauty, but also aesthetic qualities need both. And we need to know when one or the in mathematical proofs, scientific , chess other is appropriate, when it is reasonable to in- games, even baseball games and military cam- sist on “leaving things as they are,” and when we paigns, and metaphors used in science or politics should welcome paradoxical-seeming conclusions. as well as in poetry. The test for inclusion within I am especially interested in two related ques- the boundaries of the field of aesthetics appears tions about the philosophical enterprise. First, to be disjunctive: candidates must either involve whether and in what sense philosophy is an a priori works of art in some way, or have something to do discipline, as it is often said to be, in contrast to the with the aesthetic (or beauty). empirical sciences. We philosophers, aestheticians Aesthetics, then, seems hardly to be a unified included, do spend much of our lives lolling around field of inquiry. What is wrong with not being uni- in armchairs. Many have urged us to pay attention fied? Nothing, unless an illusion of unity or an un- to empirical psychology and cognitive science, as founded that there must be such well as less formal empirical observations. There distorts the investigations occurring under this has not been enough discussion, especially among name. Unfortunately, that sometimes happens. aestheticians, of how and why we should, however. Does philosophy aspire to be an empirical science itself, or to contribute to scientific investigations? ii. philosophy as theory construction Is it just science under a different name? If there is something distinctive about the philosophical en- What is philosophy? Supposing that we know, terprise, as opposed to empirical ones, what is it? more or less, what domain aesthetics is assigned And how, then, might the empirical sciences be to investigate, what kind of investigation is it to relevant to it? undertake? The second question about philosophy that in- Wittgenstein remarked, famously, that philos- terests me now is what role intuitions, or intu- ophy “leaves everything as it is.”8 This con- itive judgments, what are sometimes misleadingly trasts dramatically with an observation his teacher, called “pretheoretical” intuitions, do or should , made in his “Lectures on Logi- have in philosophical investigations. We will have cal ”: “The point of philosophy is to start to think about what intuitions are, and how they with something so simple as not to seem worth might be related to their close or distant cousins: stating, and to end with something so paradoxical “,”“what we—the person in the that no one will believe it.”9 (I am sure Russell street—ordinarily say,” and introspective reports. meant that if has done his or her Intuitions deserve respect. But what kind of job well, the “paradoxes” he or she ends up with respect? It is often assumed that philosophical are ones we should believe, and will believe if we claims that conflict with intuitions bear a special take the arguments for them seriously.) burden of proof, that counterintuitiveness or un- Wittgenstein’s claim would appear to fit some intuitiveness inevitably counts against a theory, philosophical projects fairly well; others seem even if it is not necessarily fatal. Some philoso- more in line with Russell’s. I regard most of my phers speak of “plain ” (or what “plainly” own work as, in this respect, more Wittgensteinian or “clearly” is or is not the case), which there- in spirit than Russellian, that is, as mostly “leaving fore are not to be questioned, yet not infrequently things as they are.” I do not exclude what I have these seem anything but plain to others.10 Some go written about Charles and the Green Slime, or to great lengths to make their philosophical con- my contention that photographs are transparent. clusions accord with what they consider to be or- Judging from the incredulous stares these claims dinary intuitions—taking very seriously the idea Walton Aesthetics—What? Why? and Wherefore? 151 that philosophy leaves everything as it is. Yet they to be distinguished from the data on which they often need to convince other philosophers that are based and that they are supposed to explain, these are “our” intuitions! To the extent that this is and are subject to confirmation or disconfirmation controversial, we have to be wary of appeals to in- by the data. (What counts as data for a given the- tuition in support of philosophical conclusions. ory may be, however, understood in terms Do empirical scientists have a similar obliga- of lower-level theories.) (2) Data underdetermine tion to respect intuition? Is it desirable as far as theory, that is, different theories may accommo- possible that scientists’ results accord with intu- date the same data. So choosing among compet- ition? Certainly, intuition or common sense does ing theories is not always a matter of discovering and ought to play a role in the generation of hy- evidence that supports one and conflicts with an- potheses to be tested, but when it comes to con- other; must be made on the basis of sim- clusions, should scientists not follow the evidence plicity or or perspicuousness or explana- wherever it leads? If philosophers are required to tory power—whatever exactly these amount to. I take intuitions more seriously than this, to treat will not try to say what they do amount to, ex- them as more authoritative than scientists do, we cept to observe that (3) theories involve, or con- need to ask again why and how philosophers ought sist partly in, a taxonomy, a representation of sim- to pay attention to science. ilarities and differences among items described by “Analytic” philosophers have commonly char- the data. Understanding things consists, in part at acterized their endeavor as conceptual . least, of noticing, appreciating, similarities and dif- I count myself among those who prefer to un- ferences. A change in one’s theory usually involves derstand philosophy as mainly a matter of the- recognizing or emphasizing new similarities and ory construction. What philosophers do, on this differences. These three observations are boringly conception, is pretty much what scientists do af- obvious, I hope, and too vague to be controversial. ter the data are in: organizing the data in a per- Theory construction is not the exclusive spicuous manner, devising conceptual structures, province of scientists, philosophers, and other spe- constructing theories, to clarify and explain the cialists. We all do it all the time. The conceptual data.11 I think that this conception of philosophy schemes embedded in natural languages amount applies better than the conceptual analysis one to to theories, folk theories, which have evolved over much historical philosophy, from Plato through centuries or millennia and continue to change, un- Kant, to the “system building” typical of some dergoing revision as struggle to under- philosophers in the continental tradition, and, in- stand their world, and as their world changes. If deed, to much philosophizing by those who claim philosophy is theory construction and theory con- to be engaged in conceptual analysis. Not every- struction is such a widespread activity, is there any- thing philosophers do is happily regarded as the- thing special or distinctive about the philosophical ory construction, however. Normative and applied enterprise? Do philosophers construct theories of ethics are not; I take theories to be purported ac- a special kind, philosophical ones, differing - counts of how things are, not of how things should damentally from scientific theories and the vari- be. The same goes for “normative aesthetics,” I ous folk theories? I don’t think so. Nor do I think should think, although the line between normative philosophers are concerned with a special subject aesthetics and (shall we call it?) meta-aesthetics matter, about which they construct theories. Ad- is even fuzzier than that between normative and herents of the conceptual analysis view of philos- meta-ethics. ophy might say that philosophers are especially I should say right off that I understand ‘the- or uniquely interested in our concepts. But why ory’ as a count noun, not a mass noun. Theory is should the investigation of our concepts not be a not a kind of glop that one spreads over a subject job for empirical psychology? matter—probably obscuring it—in a process some What is (somewhat) distinctive about philos- call theorizing the subject matter. My is in ophy is the role philosophers play in the con- particular theories, designed to explain and help struction of theories. They specialize in devising us understand a body of data. theories, or choosing among alternative theories, I will say as little as I possibly can about what after the data are in, as I mentioned. Given a theories are, hoping to avoid unnecessary entan- body of data already available, they reflect on how glements. Let us just observe that: (1) theories are best to organize or interpret it. They also propose 152 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism hypotheses when the evidence available is insuffi- nate of the English word ‘beauty,’ we should be cient or when it is unclear what evidence would be suspicious.15 relevant; they suggest theories that might or might Nevertheless, there is a body of very ordinary not turn out to be right. The data philosophers or- , gleaned from everyone’s everyday ex- ganize include, or should include, results of scien- perience of the world, which seems pretty secure, tific experimentation and observation. Like hye- and that constitutes a large part of the data that nas feeding on carrion, philosophers appropriate philosophers’ theories are designed to illuminate. data collected by others. But they traditionally I sometimes mention the experience of scratching have concentrated on devising theories to explain on a blackboard when I want to disabuse people of much that is common knowledge, everyday facts the idea that taste, or what people like, is a radically of which all of us are aware (or think we are), al- conventional matter, that our likes and dislikes are though we may need to be reminded of them, or all “learned” responses. It seems obvious to me— what is or seems to be open to introspection. (If famous last words—that cringing at the sound of you are concerned that this does not give philoso- scratching on a blackboard is about as hardwired phers a very substantial or significant role, think as any response is. How do I know? Well, I am con- of Kant’s first Critique.) vinced, and I am convinced that others will agree. Hume took it to be obvious to everyone that Maybe I shouldn’tbe. “there is a great variety of Taste,” and evident Something of an a priori—or quasi-a priori— upon reflection that there is even more variety character of the philosophical enterprise is now ev- than there seems to be, when you subtract merely ident. Rather than running or doing verbal agreement.12 Hume expected his readers to surveys or recording observations, philosophers agree, without leaving their armchairs, that Mil- typically reflect on what all or most of us already ton is better than Ogilby.13 Clive Bell purported know. This they do in armchairs. Armchairs are to direct our attention to a kind of experience he fine, also, for collecting data by reminding our- thought “sensitive” people are or can be aware selves of what we already know, and for reading up of, which he took as data for his (rather minimal) on the data scientists and other researchers gather. theory construction.14 The theories philosophers construct are empirical Some empirical facts that can serve as data for in the sense that they are based on and aim to ex- theory construction are perfectly obvious but only plain empirical data, but constructing them once when someone points them out. One example: in the data are in requires no additional empirical in- low light conditions, when it is nearly dark, we see vestigation. Deciding which of several competing in black and white, or rather in shades of gray; we theories best explains a given body of data, or a see shapes and contrasts of illumination, but not body of possible or hypothetical data—deciding hues. This fact of experience, obvious once we no- this on the basis of simplicity or elegance or per- tice it, might help us to understand the experience spicuousness or explanatory power—would seem of black-and-white pictures: photographs, draw- to be about as a priori a task as there is. And so ings, prints. One might have expected that black- is judging how well a particular theory explains a and-white photographs inevitably depict things as body of data. poorly illuminated. This is certainly not so. But it does seem to me that black-and-white pictures, in contrast to full-color ones, tend not to depict iii. folk theories brightly illuminated scenes very vividly. What seems to be common knowledge, every- Folk theories embedded in our language are also day facts about which philosophers spin theo- attempts to understand facts, organize data, that ries, are sometimes just mistakes. What are taken are common knowledge. Since we philosophers as data in one philosophical discussion may, in are in this business as well, we should pay at- another, be part of a controversial theory with vi- tention. Folk theories are likely to have evolved able competitors, or worse. And “common knowl- because they have some merit, and most have edge,”“plain truths,” often evaporate embarrass- served well for many purposes. This is one ingly when they are empirically tested. When an philosophers should respect “intuitions” (“com- aesthetician declares, from an armchair, that ev- mon sense,”“what we ordinarily say”), for these ery language has a word for beauty, or a cog- are no doubt reflections of folk theories. Walton Aesthetics—What? Why? and Wherefore? 153

Concepts of art are part of an evolving folk the- gin with conceptual analysis, to look carefully at ory that takes a wide variety of activities, interests, the candidate theories folk wisdom provides. They , and objects as data. It is generally are not gospel, but they merit the kind of respect accepted that the “modern” concept of art took we accord testimony from a source that has some shape in the eighteenth century in Europe.16 That credibility. was not the beginning of art, of course. The an- Credible testimony can be wrong, and all theo- cients created and appreciated art, and so did and ries are subject to revision. Conceptual analysis do people in various non-Western cultures who ar- reveals plausible candidate theories worthy of guably lack our concept. The concept is not part consideration, but it also puts us in a position of a social or institutional framework required for to evaluate them, to think about how they might the production and appreciation of art, not all art be improved, even to consider wholesale replace- anyway, but a tool for making sense of the arts and ments. their institutional settings; it is part of a folk theory Who are we to second-guess centuries or mil- for understanding them. lennia of conceptual development, some will ask. Some will regard the jelling of the concept in New evidence may demand new or revised the- eighteenth-century Europe as a significant con- ories, to be sure. But insofar as we philosophers ceptual breakthrough, an improvement in our are working with the same data available to the folk theories. We are better able to understand folk, with what is common knowledge, should we the nature and functions of painting, poetry, not limit ourselves to clarifying and articulating music, and , one might suppose— folk theories, and then just accept them? Is it not Greek monuments, Gothic cathedrals, Japanese presumptuous to imagine that we can do better? haiku, Javanese shadow puppet theater, Chinese This is one way of defending Wittgenstein’s plea to scroll painting, Yoruban , the creations “leave things as they are” and to avoid Russellian of Proust, Picasso, and Beethoven—we are better paradox mongering. able to understand them now that we comprehend One answer is that what counts as a good the- them all to be instances of art. The classification ory, or a theory that is better than others, often itself, simply seeing all these things as similar or depends on one’s purposes. A theory serving culi- as serving similar ends, may appear to constitute nary purposes and a biological theory will classify a significant advance in understanding. Recogniz- plants and parts of plants differently. The purposes ing this similarity does not, of course, prevent us of philosophers and those of the folk might not co- from recognizing enormous differences among the incide, so folk-wise theories may not be best from species of the genus. a philosopher’s point of view. What matters to the Aestheticians may seek to clarify and deepen folk is, probably, the effectiveness of theories in the understanding provided by our folk theory by guiding action. Philosophers are likely to be more spelling out what the various works of art have interested in achieving understanding for its own in common, what it is that qualifies them as art sake. The folk concept of fiction (as opposed to in the “modern” sense, by offering a definition of nonfiction) serves a practical purpose, insofar as ‘art’ that captures this folk concept. This is concep- people largely agree on its application. It enables tual analysis, I take it, the project of clarifying and us to find books in libraries and bookstores and articulating concepts that constitute folk theories. catalogues. But it does not do well at all in helping (Some recent research suggests that our ordinary us to understand the nature of the books it classi- concepts, those that make up folk theories, may be fies; it is a mess. It embodies confusions between in prototype form, rather than the form of neces- notions of and falsity, intended or aimed for sary and sufficient conditions.17 If this is right, then or purported truth and falsity, assertion, informa- necessary and sufficient condition definitions of- tiveness, intended informativeness, inducement to fered by the conceptual analyst will be a kind of imagine, or prescriptions to imagine, and so on.18 translation of the folk concepts. Such translations A second answer to the challenge that it is pre- may have certain advantages, akin to those of in- sumptuous for philosophers to try to improve on formation in digital as opposed to analogue form.) folk theories concerns the manner in which folk The philosopher who aims to construct the best theories develop. theory or theories possible for understanding and Biological works bit by bit, re- explaining a body of data is well advised to be- peatedly making local modifications in existing 154 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism structures to accommodate new conditions or find outrageous Goodman’s insistence that a sin- needs or circumstances. (This does not mean that gle wrong note disqualifies a musical performance the pace of evolution is always slow.) It does not as a performance of a given musical work. Intu- start from scratch, designing from the ground up itions are affronted if we suppose that he is at- the ideally efficient and economical and successful tempting to articulate the folk concept. Yes, it is solution to a given of problems and interests. plainly false that a performance cannot contain a The results, after many millennia of trial and error, single wrong note, given the folk concept of per- are incredibly successful, but they are never ide- formance. But Goodman does not claim other- ally efficient. Organisms are burdened with vesti- wise. He contends that the ordinary, folk concept gial organs and processes (for example, the human of musical performance is incoherent—he may be appendix) and awkward , which waste en- right, although he did not do any serious concep- ergy or resources, and sometimes break down and tual analysis—and he replaces it with another one. cause problems. What is wrong with this? He could have made The development of folk theories proceeds by his proposal seem innocuous simply by introduc- bit-by-bit modifications as well, to accommodate ing new terminology, a technical notion of letter- new or newly noticed data, additions to our stock perfect performance, on which it is analytic that of common knowledge or newly noticed relations a letter-perfect performance cannot tolerate a sin- among the data, and new purposes; perhaps also to gle wrong note, and substituted this new notion for take advantage of increased brain power or leisure the folk one.20 I do not buy Goodman’s proposal for reflection or new conceptual tools such as lan- even so, for I will mention shortly. guage or the printing press. The theories that result Much has been said about the viability of the are remarkably effective, especially in guiding ac- folk concept or concepts of art. I am inclined to tion in the real world, but they, too, are unlikely regard its development—not so much perhaps its to be ideally elegant or economical. Philosophers initial appearance in the eighteenth century as the are in a position, sometimes, to construct theories form or forms it has taken since then—less as a more nearly from the ground up, and can eliminate conceptual breakthrough in our understanding of vestigial gears and pulleys and other awkwardness. paintings, sculpture, music, and architecture, than So philosophers may have good reason to revise as a puzzling turn in the evolution of our folk theo- or replace folk theories, even without introducing ries that calls for historical or sociological explana- new data. tion. I will not defend this claim now, but it cannot Efficiency, economy, and simplicity are often be ruled out without a hearing.21 instrumentally valuable in biological organisms. They minimize what might go wrong (although i. So much for the case—a pretty obvious one— redundancies are sometimes desirable at the ex- for not being easily satisfied leaving things as they pense of economy). Fixes or backup systems can are, for regarding folk theories and folk concepts evolve to repair damage or compensate for insuf- with a skeptical eye, and being prepared to accept ficiencies, but these are also subject to failure, and something that seems paradoxical at first. This is may require more energy or strength or size or not the whole story. brain capacity. The same is true of folk theories, Folk theories and folk concepts are sometimes insofar as their function is to guide action and to objects of philosophers’ investigations, part of the help the folk survive. But efficiency, economy, and data on which philosophers’ theories are based. simplicity are intrinsic values of theories insofar This is so when philosophers examine cultural as they serve, not primarily to guide action, but practices and institutions and the thoughts and to foster understanding. And it is understanding, I activities of the folk who participate in them, assume (whatever that is), that the philosophical for in participating the folk deploy their theories aesthetician is mainly interested in. and concepts. Aesthetics investigates the experi- is notorious for trashing folk ences and attitudes and activities of human be- theories and replacing them with his own. In the ings and their cultural institutions, not just painted preface to Languages of Art he writes: “the reader canvases, sounds emanating from sound-making must be prepared to find his convictions and his devices, and inscriptions of words on the pages common sense—that repository of ancient error— of books. So part of the job of aestheticians is often outraged by what he finds here.”19 Many to get a clear picture of the actual folk theories Walton Aesthetics—What? Why? and Wherefore? 155 and concepts that our experiences and attitudes we may prefer to attribute to the folk a better the- and activities involve. This is conceptual analysis ory rather than a worse one. If so, we will need more or less for its own sake, not just to uncover to think about what would be the best theory, of candidate theories for consideration and evalua- whatever the folk theory is a theory of, in order to tion in competition with other theories. decide what the folk theory is. But this does not There need be no presumption that the folk the- entail any obligation to accept the folk theory. ories we examine are any good, or that intuitive or Let us return to Goodman’s “outrageous” pro- common-sense judgments reflecting them are true posal about musical performances. I have argued or plausible or illuminating. But we need to get (very approximately) that the experience of mu- them right, however confused or awkward or inel- sic involves hearing sounds not just as sounds, but egant or burdened by vestigialities they may be. If as a rendition of a given piece.23 Something like we are to understand the thoughts and actions of the folk notion of a musical work, whatever its the folk, we must characterize accurately the the- inadequacies, informs listeners’ auditory experi- ories and concepts with which they are working, ences. Wrong notes sound like wrong notes, not all warts included. like correct notes in a different piece. In hearing We have distinguished two very different roles them as wrong, we have to be hearing the per- that intuitive or common-sense judgments reflec- formance as a performance of one piece rather tive of folk theories and concepts may have in than another—and this, of course, in the folk sense the philosophical enterprise. They will be treated of “performance of,” not Goodman’s. To under- as hypotheses, candidates for acceptance by the stand listeners’ experiences, then, we need to take philosopher but subject to rejection or modifica- into account the folk notion of musical perfor- tion, when the philosopher is interested in explain- mances. The problem with Goodman’s theory is ing the same body of data that the folk theory aims that it completely abandons this folk notion, and to explain. When what the philosopher is inter- the concept with which he replaces it does nothing ested in understanding includes the folk and their to illuminate listeners’ experiences. theories and concepts, the fact that the folk have such and such intuitions constitutes data itself that ii. Conceptual analysis—investigating our folk the philosopher’s theory must accommodate.22 theories and concepts—is a matter of construct- Some think it is acceptable or desirable for ing theories about them, theories about our folk philosophers to clean up ordinary (folk) concepts theories. This is true whether our interest is in the around the edges, to refine them in certain ways, folk theories themselves and their role in the folks’ removing confusions or messiness, while resisting lives, or in the folk theories as candidates for eval- any large modifications or replacements. This at- uation. titude does not make much sense. If our project is No one supposes that folk theories and con- one of investigating folk concepts, we should not cepts, one’s own theories and concepts, are be cleaning them up; doing so amounts to falsify- straightforwardly open to introspection. The usual ing the data with which we are working (although, procedure is to ask ourselves “what we would say” like rounding off statistical data, the falsification in various actual or hypothetical circumstances, does not always matter much). If, on the other and piece together from the answers definitions, hand, our project is to understand what a folk the- which supposedly correspond to our folk concepts. ory aims to understand, to find the best theory we Even if we get it right—about what we would can, possibly in competition with it, we must not say when—extracting the appropriate definitions decide in advance to rule out major revisions of it is anything but mechanical or simple. It is heavy- or replacement of it with another. duty theory construction involving to There is plenty of room for confusion between the best explanation from a big variety of data. these two ways of treating intuitive and common- We construct a theory about what our own folk sense judgments and the folk theories they re- concepts and folk theories are. We must decide flect, and there has been a lot of confusion in when to regard a word as having different the literature—especially, it seems to me, in philo- in its various applications, hence presumably cor- sophical work billed as “conceptual analysis.” A responding to more than one concept, for instance. principle of charity may play a role in investiga- We must decide when we folk use words in a non- tions of folk concepts. Other things being equal, serious or nonliteral manner, or in pretense or 156 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism with tongue in cheek—when we are applying a art. Moreover, the theories to which these notions predicate to something that does not really fall belong are subject to revision.27 under the corresponding concept. None of this Those who think it is counterintuitive that we can be simply read off from what we would say see through photographs presumably mean that when. given the ordinary, folk notion of “see,” this is not Frank Sibley argues that, although “common so. They are on spongy ground even on this point. sense” has it that the Mona Lisa is a painting—that And my transparency claim is not a claim about our existing notion of works of visual art like the the folk notion of seeing. Mona Lisa is such that they are paintings, physical objects—our “practices” indicate equally strongly that the Mona Lisa is an appearance type. Either iv. aesthetics and theory construction our inherited (folk) concept of visual artworks is confused, he claims, or we actually have two of In his presidential address, Peter Kivy recom- them.24 What he means by “common sense” is the mended a moratorium on “theorizing in the grand received theory about our folk concept of works of manner.” He proposed focusing on differences visual art (a folk theory about a folk theory). This rather than similarities, and advised aestheticians common-sense theory is mistaken, Sibley thinks, to acquire knowledge of and expertise in partic- and needs to be replaced by a better one, a bet- ular arts. “[P]rogress in the philosophy of art in ter theory about the nature of our folk concept the immediate future is to be made not by the- of works of visual art. And this better theory has orizing in the grand manner,” he said, “but by it that the folk concept is seriously confused. We careful and imaginative philosophical scrutiny of may or may not agree with Sibley about this par- the individual arts and their individual problems.” ticular case, but we must agree that “[c]ertainly “We can no longer hover above our subject matter the common-sense view even about common con- like Gods from machines, bestowing theory upon cepts is often na¨ıve, superficial, and wide of the a practice in and sometimes even boastful mark.”25 ignorance of what takes place in the dirt and mess I cannot resist mentioning one other example. Is of the workshop.”28 the folk concept of “seeing” such that when I look Something is out of kilter here. Certainly, we at a photograph of a person I am seeing the per- aestheticians should mix it up with the dirt and son? When Salmon Rushdie, speaking of the film mess of the workshop, pay close attention to the The Wizard of Oz, remarked: “I found myself star- particular arts, indeed to particular works of art ing at an old color photograph of the Scarecrow, and particular experiences of them, as well as cre- the Tin Man and Dorothy, posing in a forest set, ative activities like telling stories and playing the surrounded by autumn leaves; and realized that I oboe. All this is exactly what we are seeking to was not looking at the [movie] stars at all, but at understand. And yes, we should be sensitive to their stunt doubles, their stand-ins.”26 Did he mean differences, differences among the arts and also this literally, that he really was seeing the stunt differences between instances of a given art. But doubles via the photograph, or was he speaking why must we choose between attending to partic- in pretense, with tongue in cheek? The answer is ulars and developing grand theories? Why would anything but obvious. And do not look to Rushdie we want to choose, or even to move one of them for an authoritative introspective report. Neither temporarily to a back burner? Theories are sup- the difference between literal and nonliteral uses posed to illuminate particulars, to explain and help of language, nor that between single and multiple us understand the data on which they are based. senses of words, is straightforwardly open to in- That is what theories are for, what good ones do. trospection. For one thing, the ordinary speaker Moreover, the illumination good theories achieve, need have no concept of these distinctions, even if grand ones included, consists in bringing out dif- he or she is perfectly fluent in the language. The ferences no less than similarities. If we want to in- notion of literalness and that of different senses of vestigate particulars, we had better be constructing words belong to fairly technical theories about our theories about them. language, theories one need not master in order to Kivy is concerned specifically with just one sort use the language—any more than one must have of grand theory. He “quarrel[s] with the task ... a concept of art in order to make and appreciate of stating what it is to be ‘art.’”29 I quarrel with Walton Aesthetics—What? Why? and Wherefore? 157 it also. Discussions of what art is do, too often, generis—about which we can say only that each is hover far above and out of sight of the fascinating as it is. (Think of the “peculiar experience” that particulars of what goes on in concert halls, jazz Clive Bell thought works of art provoke in “sensi- clubs, museums, and the spaces of street theater tive observers,” or the experience of seeing in if we performances and public sculpture. But it is not do no more than point to it.) One does not explain so much the distance of “What is art?” from these anything by declaring that it is just different; that particulars as its direction from them that inhibits is simply declaring defeat. We cannot be certain the view. The grandeur of the theorizing is not the that there always will be more to say than this, and problem. In fact, the bigger the theory, the more we should be ever wary of artificially forcing unco- grand it is, other things being equal, the better it operative data into a larger theoretical structure. will explain the particulars on which it is based. But surprising similarities that help make sense of The trouble is with this theory, or theories of this differences, grander theories than we expect, are kind—theories focusing on what it is to be art— not infrequently to be discovered. not with grand theorizing as such. Aestheticians As so often happens, we can learn from fictional have, much of the time, been talking up the wrong characters. Consider Ireneo Funes, who resides in theory. As long as we think of our field as aesthet- Jorge Luis Borges’s story “Funes the Memorias.” ics, it will be easy to suppose that the only space After being thrown by a horse and paralyzed, Fu- our theories have to expand in is that of some pre- nes had an incredible capacity to perceive and re- conceived realm of art and/or the aesthetic, and member details. “The present was almost intoler- that a sufficiently grand theory will be one that able in its richness and sharpness, as were his most tells us what art or the aesthetic is and asserts gen- distant and trivial memories.”“Lying on his back eralizations about this realm. Once we realize that on his cot in the shadows, [he] could imagine every theories can expand in different directions, we will crevice and every molding in the sharply defined not have to assume that the only alternative to this houses surrounding him.” But, Borges’s narrator kind of grand theorizing is simply to stare hard at observes: the particulars, or to devise small-scale theories concerning particular arts. He was ... almost incapable of ideas of a general, Pla- Grand theories do point to similarities. tonic sort. Not only was it difficult for him to comprehend Grandeur consists in including lots of things un- that the generic symbol dog embraces so many unlike in- der a single umbrella, highlighting what is in com- dividuals of diverse size and form; it bothered him that mon among a wide array of instances. But not- the dog at three fourteen (seen from the side) should ing similarities is often the key to understanding have the same name as the dog at three fifteen (seen differences. And some differences are not appar- from the front). His own face in the mirror, his own ent except against the background of similarities. hands, surprised him every time he saw them. ... He Once we recognize the effect of gravity on both was the solitary and lucid spectator of a multiform, in- falling apples and circling planets, we can explain stantaneous and almost intolerably precise world. their very different motions by noting the oper- I suspect ...that he was not very capable of thought. To ation of centrifugal force in one case but not the think is to forget differences, generalize, make abstrac- other. Sometimes we can understand what appears tions. In the teeming world of Funes, there were only to be a qualitative difference as a difference of - details, almost immediate in their presence. ... Ireneo gree, along one or more dimensions. The various Funes died in 1889, of congestion of the lungs.30 hues are not just different from one another, but are arranged along a spectrum. Timbres, tone col- i. Let us look at some of the specific differences ors, amount to differences in the relative strength that Kivy highlights. He distinguishes (absolute) of various overtones. Some qualitative differences music sharply from the “contentful” arts, such as are not reducible to, but results of, quantitative dif- painting and literature. “[T]heorizing about abso- ferences. The different viscosities of ice, steam, and lute music in the grand manner, with a view to liquid water are due to differences in the degree providing it a place in Kristeller’s ‘Modern Sys- of kinetic energy of their molecules. tem of the Arts,’ is a futile enterprise,” he says. What is unsatisfying is to end up with just a “Absolute music is what it is; and what it is is very lot of unexplained differences—sui generis partic- different, in crucial respects, from the visual and ulars, or narrow kinds of things regarded as sui literary arts.”31 158 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

He does connect music with decorative vi- Much to the contrary, recognizing the commonal- sual designs, however, as did ity highlights many differences, big and small, and also, characterizing music as “an art of pure provides vast resources for understanding them. sonic .”32 I think there is something to this We can now distinguish between different kinds comparison, but it is not easy to say what. Kivy of make-believe, different varieties of imaginings thinks both are nonrepresentational; there is no and imaginative experiences (de re, de dicto, de aboutness about either of them. But this nega- se, differences of vivacity, explicitness, deliberate- tive observation does not do much to account for ness), different purposes for which we imagine or the similarity, even if it is right. There is also no engage in make-believe, different (real) objects aboutness about most rocks and trees and mugs of imagined about, different rules or conventions or beer; at least I expect that Kivy would agree. Mu- inducements to imagine this or that. Paintings are sic and visual designs are very different, also. One distinguished from novels primarily by the fact especially striking difference is evident in the fact that they and other pictures are props in visual that people tap their feet to music, and sometimes games of make-believe. to it, but not to decorative visual designs, not It turned out, much to my surprise, that much even to moving ones, screen savers, for instance.33 music counts as representational in my sense. But hugely important and enormously salient dif- Rather than hanging on for dear life to the sup- ferences can coexist with equally important and posed “plain truth” that (absolute) music does not salient similarities. belong with painting and literature, we ought to Apparently, Kivy recognizes a similarity be- acknowledge what commonalities there are, and tween the visual and the literary arts, both being then look to understand the differences. Music “contentful.” But he emphasizes differences in- qualifies because (very roughly) of the richly imag- stead. “[T]he experience of reading a novel is so inative nature of musical experiences—when, for different from that of seeing a representational instance, we hear one musical idea or grow- painting, or attending a dramatic representation, ing out of another, or interrupting or interfering that it is in a deep way false and misleading to put with another, or one preparing the way for an- both kinds of thing in the same category, [and] call other. Listening to a cantabile passage on the pi- it ‘representation.’”34 ano or violin, we are likely to imagine (implic- What we call the category is not the issue, of itly) hearing a human voice. Certainly, there are course. Kivy uses the term ‘representation’ more differences—more fundamental differences than narrowly than some do, corresponding approx- those between experiences of literary works and imately to what I call depictive representation. visual . They are, to a large extent, dif- What is at issue is whether it is theoretically il- ferences in the kinds of imaginings in which appre- luminating to recognize a broad category includ- ciators engage and how they are involved in their ing novels and stories as well as representational overall experiences, differences that would not be paintings and theatrical performances, with vari- apparent if we just declare music to be what it is, ous species and subspecies. Again, that paintings without recognizing the similarities.35 and novels, or our experiences of them, are hugely My motivation in recognizing the broad cat- different does not mean that they are not also egory of representations is not to validate an hugely and importantly similar. eighteenth-century folk conception of art, defined As you may know,I recognize a very broad cate- in terms of mimesis, or a twentieth-century one, gory of “representations,” comprising novels and or to shoehorn music in with the other arts. I do representational paintings and theatrical perfor- not claim that make-believe or fiction is involved mances and much else besides (though not every- in all the arts, and certainly not that it is always thing Kivy would describe as contentful). All rep- or ever what is most important. Make-believe, resentations, in my sense, involve, in a certain way, in various forms, occurs just as importantly and an imaginative activity that I call make-believe; extensively outside the arts as inside. I and oth- all possess the function of serving as props in ers have made various suggestions about where games of make-believe. Intuitively, we can think it is to be found. Some of them are controversial of them as establishing fictional worlds.Idonot but many are not. Make-believe (or a close rel- for a minute deny or ignore or deemphasize the ative) has been positively identified or strongly differences among the members of this large class. suspected in scientific and philosophical thought Walton Aesthetics—What? Why? and Wherefore? 159 experiments, in metaphor, irony, and quotation, in these cultures and their folk theories or the empathic experiences and simulation as a means complicated historical development of con- of understanding other people, and in counterfac- cepts of art. So we need to represent as ac- tual reasoning, not to mention children’s games. curately as possible the character of the folk One example that has not been much discussed is concepts. It may be helpful to think ourselves sports. It will not come as much of a surprise that into the state of mind of one who accepts a folk an element of make-believe is to be found in the theory, to regard the theory from the inside, realm of sports. What is especially interesting and and we may find ourselves “speaking with the illuminating, it seems to me, are differences: the vulgar.” It may be helpful to empathize with differences between, for instance, the experiences the folk, in order to understand them. But this of sports fans and those of theatergoers, once cer- does not require us to endorse the folk theory. tain similarities are noted. But this is a topic for Any endorsement must be based on the the- another occasion.36 ory’s merits. Empathizing with the folk should There is nothing especially artistic or aesthetic not be at all difficult, since the philosophers about make-believe or fiction or representation, and the folk are often the very same people. It as such. If representation in my broad sense were is my own folk theory with which I shall em- to shoehorn music into the class of fine arts, it pathize. But the ease with which I empathize would shoehorn in a lot more as well. can encourage unwitting, inappropriate en- would be delighted, but many of us would not. dorsement, or make it seem, even to myself, There is no reason why the investigation of fiction that I endorse something on which I intend to should be a job especially for aesthetics. The the- reserve judgment. ory I propose is not a grand , but a 3. My final methodological recommendation theory that straddles most any way of construing looks back to our earlier observations about the art/nonart boundary. the peculiarities of the subject matter of the discipline of aesthetics, the domain it is as- signed to investigate. We should not allow the v. conclusion concept of art, or the fact that we bill our- selves as “philosophers of art,” to determine You may or may not be disposed favorably toward the scope of our investigation. We should not my theory of representation, either as a whole or in allow it either to restrict artificially the data any of its details. My main interest here is method- we take into account in constructing a the- ological. The methodological morals of my obser- ory, or to trick us into including data that do vations can be summed up as advice that we not not belong. We must not suppose that the tra- take the folk concept of art too seriously in our en- ditional boundaries of the field of aesthetics, deavor to make sense of stories, paintings, music, defined partly by the folk notion of art, will architecture, sculpture, and so forth, and the roles demarcate a body of data on which we can fo- they play in our lives. This advice has three parts. cus productively, a body of data we can expect a single theory to explain. Such suppositions 1. First, we should not take this folk concept or are dangerous, and the apparent arbitrariness any particular refinement of it automatically of the boundaries, as well as the absence of as a pillar of a theory we expect to endorse. a grand basic question, should make us espe- We should treat the folk theory it belongs to cially wary. as just one candidate to be considered among others. My advice is to start from the ground up, with 2. We must recognize that people in various cul- careful attention to works of art that interest us tures have and use one or another concept of and to whatever else turns out, on examination, art, that it is an element in some folk theo- to bear significant similarities to any of them, and ries (although we must take care not to at- let our theories develop as they will. We should go tribute concepts of art to folk who do not for grandeur when we can, when the data we come possess them). The philosophical theories we up with and theoretical considerations support it. construct will have to accommodate this fact, But the shape our theory or theories take in the insofar as we are interested in understanding end, as well as their size, what they end up being 160 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism theories of, must not be decided in advance. 8. “Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual Choices of subject matter are not theoretically use of language; it can in the end only describe it. ...It leaves neutral; they amount to guesses about what everything as it is.” , Philosophical In- vestigations, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1958), § 124. shaped theory will be viable, guesses that may or 9. Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atom- may not turn out to be right. The scope of an in- ism,” in and Knowledge, ed. Robert Charles Marsh vestigation must not be dictated by the boundaries (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956), p. 193. of our, or anyone’s, folk concept of art (or any 10. A couple of random examples: Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (In- folk concept of the aesthetic), or by the traditional dianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1968), p. 245; Kivy, “Differences,” shape or size of an academic discipline. p. 127. If the theory we come up with does not exactly 11. Data gathering and theory construction are not count as a theory of aesthetics, or a theory that sharply separate in practice, of course, nor does the first fits comfortably within the discipline of aesthet- always precede the second. A budding theory makes predic- tions, indicating where to look for further data. ics, fine. What matters is whether it successfully 12. “The great variety of Taste, as well as of opinion, illuminates Gothic cathedrals or which prevails in the world, is too obvious not to have fallen or medieval plainsong or Javanese shadow puppet under every one’s observation.” Hume, “Of the Standard of theater or film documentaries or Chinese scroll Taste,” p. 226. 13. Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” pp. 226–227, 230– painting or Monet’s Water Lillies or Tolstoy’s War 231. and Peace or poetry slams or jazz improvisation 14. Clive Bell, Art (New York: Putnam,Capricorn, [1914] or political campaigns or baseball games or magic 1958). shows or circus acts or sales demonstrations— 15. “Beauty is a distinctive and a timeless concept. The what matters is whether it successfully illuminates term itself has cognates in every language, and in every lan- guage it plays a role in pretheoretical informal talk.” Mary some combination of these and/or anything else Mothersill, “Beauty and the Critic’s Judgment: Remapping we might be interested in—the more of them the Aesthetics,” in The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics, ed. Peter better. Kivy (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), p. 157. It’s that darn concept of art that has made it so 16. Paul Oskar Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts,” in his Thought and the Arts (Princeton hard to understand art—and lots of other things University Press, 1990). 37 as well. 17. Compare William Ramsey, “Prototypes and Concep- tual Analysis,” in Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of KENDALL WALTON Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, ed. Michael DePaul and William Ramsey (Lanham: Rowman & Little- field, 1998), pp. 161–178; Stephen Laurence and Eric Mar- Department of Philosophy golis, “Concepts and Cognitive Science,” in Concepts: Core Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 Readings, ed. Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence (MIT Press, 1999), pp. 1–81; Eleanor Rosch and Carolyn B. Mervis, internet: [email protected] “Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories,” in Rethinking Intuition,pp.17–44. 1. Peter Kivy, “Differences,” The Journal of Aesthetics 18. Compare Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: and Art Criticism 51 (1993): 123–132. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts (Harvard 2. Allan Gibbard, “The Reasons of a Living Being,” University Press, 1990), ch. 2. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 19. Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach Association 76 (2002): 49-60, see p. 54. ‘The grand basic ques- to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1968), tion’ will hereafter be ‘GBQ.’ p. xii. 3. David Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” in Essays 20. In redefining ‘performance of,’ rather than coining Moral, Political and Literary, rev. ed., ed. Eugene F. Miller a new term Goodman is following the usual procedure (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1986), p. 229. whereby the folk mark changes in their theories. Think of 4. Arthur Danto, “Moving Pictures,” Quarterly Review the change that occurred when people “realized” that there of Film Studies 2 (1979): 1-24, see p. 7. are mental “diseases” as well as physical ones. 5. See, for example, Annette Barnes, “Definition of 21. See my review of George Dickie’s Art and the Aes- Art,” in Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, vol. 1 (Oxford Uni- thetic: An Institutional Analysis,inPhilosophical Review 86 versity Press, 1998), pp. 511–513. Also Kivy, “Differences,” (1977): 97–101; and my review of the Encyclopedia of Aes- p. 126. thetics, “Is ‘What Is Art?’ Really the Question?” Times Lit- 6. , “What Is Aesthetics?” Encyclo- erary Supplement, September 29, 2000: 8–9. pedia of Aesthetics (1904). Reprinted in Obiter Scripta: Lec- 22. Compare Alison Gopnick and Eric Schwitzgebel’s tures, Essays and Reviews, ed. Justus Buchler and Benjamin discussion of “intuitions as hypotheses” and “intuitions as Schwartz (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936), p. 32. evidence.”“Whose Concepts Are They, Anyway?: The Role 7. , “Piece: Contra Aesthetics,” The of Philosophical Intuition in Empirical Psychology,” in Re- Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 35 (1977): 265–277. thinking Intuition,pp.78–81. Walton Aesthetics—What? Why? and Wherefore? 161

23. Kendall Walton, “The Presentation and Portrayal of 29. Peter Kivy, of Arts: An Essay in Dif- Sound Patterns,” in Human : Language, Duty, and ferences (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 1. See also Value, ed. Jonathan Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik, and C. C. W. Kivy, “Differences,” p. 128. Taylor (Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 237–257. 30. In Jorge Luis Borges, “Funes the Memorias,” in 24. Frank Sibley, “Why the Mona Lisa May Not be a Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, ed. Don- Painting,” in Approach to Aesthetics: Collected Papers on ald A. Yates and James E. Irby; trans. James E Irby (New Aesthetics, ed. John Benson, Betty Redfern, and Jeremy York: New Directions, 1964), pp. 65, 66. Roxbee Cox (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 256–272. 31. Kivy, “Differences,” p. 128. 25. Sibley, “Why the Mona Lisa May Not be a Painting,” 32. Peter Kivy, “Is Music an Art?” The Journal of Phi- p. 256. losophy 88 (1991): 544-554, see p. 553. 26. Salmon Rushdie, Wizard of Oz (London: British Film 33. Compare my “What Is Abstract About the Art of Institute, 1992), p. 45. Music?” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46 27. For similar reasons I find Peter Van Inwagen’s “main (1988): 351–364. objection” to my theory concerning the ontological status of 34. Kivy, “Differences,” p. 131. fictional entities—that it just “doesn’t seem to be true” that 35. Compare my “What Is Abstract about the Art of Mu- speakers who utter certain sentences apparently referring to sic?” and my “Listening with Imagination: Is Music Repre- fictional characters are “engaged in any sort of pretense”— sentational?” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 to be hardly an objection at all. Van Inwagen, “, (1994): 47–61. Ontological Commitment, and Fictional Entities,” in The 36. See my “‘It’s Only a Game!’: Sports as Fiction,” in In Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, ed. Michael J. Loux and Other Shoes (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 37. This is a revised version of my 2004 Presidential Ad- 137. dress for the American Society for Aesthetics. Special thanks 28. Peter Kivy, “Differences,” pp. 128, 131. to Jamie Tappenden and Jessica Wilson.