The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare © John M. Gates the College Of
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The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare © John M. Gates The College of Wooster Wooster, Ohio TABLE OF CONTENTS • Acknowledgments • Chapter One--Writing the History of Controversial Events PART I--THE PHILIPPINES • Chapter Two--Indians and "Insurrectos" • Chapter Three--The Pacification of the Philippines • Chapter Four--Progressives in Uniform PART II--VIETNAM • Chapter Five--The Philippines and Vietnam • Chapter Six--Careerists in Uniform • Chapter Seven--Vietnam: The Debate Goes On • Chapter Eight--People's War in Vietnam PART III--UNDERSTANDING IRREGULAR WARFARE • Chapter Nine--The Changing Face of Revolutionary Warfare • Chapter Ten--Understanding Terrorism PART IV--MODERN WARFARE AND SELF-DECEPTION • Chapter Eleven--The Continuing Problem of Conceptual Confusion • Chapter Twelve--The Ultimate Deception ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am indebted to a number of people and institutions for the support that made the completion of this project possible. The creative thinking and work of Travis Vinters and Maria Domoto, both of the English faculty of Obirin College, gave impetus to the fellowship that funded a 1986 trip to Japan and provided the motivation for a series of lectures that helped me see the inherent connections between many of the essays that form the core of this book. While in Japan the kind attention of Masa Adachi, also of the Obirin English faculty, helped to make my stay enjoyable and as trouble free as possible. Over the years, generous financial support from The College of Wooster and frequent sabbatical leaves have enabled me to accumulate source material and provided the opportunity needed to put that material in perspective. Also of value was a small research grant from the United States Army's Military History Institute that allowed me to spend two weeks in 1989 at its library and archives in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. A book bringing together many different projects done over a span of two decades has obviously been influenced by a number of people, either directly or through their published work. The list, even if I could develop it accurately, would be far too long to include here. Many librarians, archivists, editors, authors, referees, colleagues, and friends have helped over the years--some anonymously and a few (unintentionally I am sure) by the motivational inspiration of what I perceived to be their unconvincing but no less provocative conclusions. The courteous and efficient service provided by the excellent staff at the archives of the US Military History Institute was so outstanding, however, that it merits special recognition. Special recognition is also due to the following editors, publishers, and organizations for their kind permission to allow me to use material published previously: Asian Studies and its publisher, the Asian Center of the University of the Philippines, for "The Philippines and Vietnam: Another False Analogy," 10 (1972), 64-76 (see Chapter Five--The Philippines and Vietnam). Cambridge University Press for "Toward a History of Revolution," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 28 (1986), 535-544 (see Chapter Nine--The Changing Face of Revolutionary Warfare). Military Review, published by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, for "'Low Intensity Conflict' and 'Military Operations Short of War': The Humpty Dumpty Approach to the Development of Doctrine," 68 (May 1988), 59-63 (see sections of Chapter Eleven--The Continuing Problem of Conceptual Confusion). Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College for "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the Late-19th Century," 10 (1980), 32-45 (see Chapter Four--Progressives in Uniform); "Indians and Insurrectos: The U.S. Army's Experience with Insurgency," 13 (1983), 59-68 (see Chapter Two--Indians and "Insurrectos"); and "Vietnam: The Debate Goes On," 14 (1984), 15-25 (see Chapter Seven--Vietnam: The Debate Goes On). The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs for "The Future of War," New Zealand International Review, 20 (May/June 1995), 2-5 (see sections of Chapter Twelve--The Ultimate Deception). The Society for Military History for ""People's War in Vietnam," The Journal of Military History, 54 (1990), 325-344 (see Chapter Eight--People's War in Vietnam). The United States Air Force Academy for "The Pacification of the Philippines," in Joe E. Dixon, ed., The American Military in the Far East: Proceedings of the 9th Military History Symposium, U.S. Air Force Academy (Washington: GPO, 1982), 79-91 & 261-264 (see Chapter Three--The Pacification of the Philippines). The VMI Foundation, Inc. for "American Military Leadership in the Vietnam War," in Henry Bausum, ed., Military Leadership and Command: The John Biggs Cincinnati Lectures, 1987 (Lexington, VA: The VMI Foundation, Inc., 1987), 185-209 (see Chapter Six--Careerists in Uniform). For the neophyte computer user, putting a book on the web is not an easy task, and this project would have been impossible were it not for the efforts of Phil Harriman, The College of Wooster's Director of Academic Computing, and three members of his staff: Ben Adair, Chris Olszewski, and Kim Strollo. Were it not for their efforts, you would not be reading this. Finally, Priscilla, Linda, and Nancy, my wife and daughters, helped to make the difficulties of authorship bearable and provided immeasurable moral support. I give my sincere thanks to all who contributed to this work, and hold none responsible for the outcome. CHAPTER ONE WRITING THE HISTORY OF CONTROVERSIAL EVENTS War is fascinating as well as appalling, and despite my abhorrence of the violence and destruction that is the essence of warfare I have been studying it in one context or another virtually my entire adult life. In the course of that study, I developed an interest in irregular warfare, particularly in the context of revolution. This work brings together in one place some of the results of the teaching, research, and writing I have done in the field over more than thirty years. In 1986 I had the opportunity to give a series of six lectures at Obirin College in suburban Tokyo. Those lectures and the published papers and research on which the lectures were based provide the core of this work. Some editing has been done on the previously published essays for stylistic reasons or to avoid repetition. Footnotes and a few textual references have also been added to draw the reader's attention to relevant works of particular merit published after the research for each essay was completed. In addition, a few alterations resulted from shifts in my own interpretive views over time. Finally, I have included a short introduction before many of the essays to provide some insight into the circumstances in which each was originally written or published. The underlying theme of these collected essays is the changing nature of contemporary warfare and, in particular, the significant changes evident in revolutionary war. The focus is a contrast between two American wars. In the first, which began in the Philippines in 1899, a small army of American professionals, augmented by volunteers and Filipino auxiliaries, defeated the forces of the Philippine Revolution under Emilio Aguinaldo. In the second, the starting point of which can still be debated, a much larger American military force of immense power fought against communist revolutionaries in Indochina, with the greatest period of American involvement coming in the late 1960s. These two case studies, and the contrasts between them, form the basis for a critique of a number of conclusions that have become ingrained in American thinking about past and present military affairs. Many of the lectures and articles contained in this work were originally aimed at one of two very different audiences. I wrote some with my professional colleagues in history and the social sciences in mind; I hoped that others would be read by individuals within and outside of the military who might at some point be responsible for decision making within the arena of foreign and military affairs. From as early as I can remember, I have viewed history as an applied study, in which the adoption or rejection of the conclusions and interpretations of historians can have significant consequences for institutions and the people who direct them. What one concludes about the past, sometimes even the terms one uses to describe it, can help or hinder people in their attempts to define and deal with the problems of the present. To ignore the relevant, applied dimension of history in favor of more antiquarian interests may well be safer for the scholars involved, but at times it may also represent scholarly behavior that borders on the socially irresponsible.[1] The U. S. Army has a long history of fighting against irregulars in a variety of situations and places. In the course of the 19th century, for example, it engaged a variety of Indian groups from Florida to the Pacific coast, as well as Mexican guerrillas, Confederate raiders, and Filipino revolutionaries. In virtually every case the army was successful, although at no time did the army's combined experience in operations against irregulars lead to the development of either doctrine or any less formal codification of the lessons learned. Nevertheless, although each campaign seemed to begin and end in virtual isolation from the army's previous experience, the army dealt successfully with each irregular enemy to accomplish whatever mission had been set for it. By the end of the century many of the members of the army's officer corps seemed particularly well prepared to engage in the difficult task of pacifying the Philippines. This late-19th century experience of the army is the point of focus for Part I of the study which follows (Chapters 2-4). In Vietnam, over a half century later, a very different army with a very different officer corps fought a campaign that proved even more frustrating than that in the Philippines.