Emergency Response Preparedness Review (July-Dec 2016) updated 29 October 2016
Afghanistan ERP Review: January to June 2018 Conflict Displacement and Afghan Returnees in the North Eastern Region
INTRODUCTION The purpose of the Emergency Response Preparedness (ERP) review is to identify priority humanitarian risks in the country, determine our level of preparedness to respond, and identify gaps in the response system that need to be addressed. It is intended to be a practical review that asks and answers a set of critical operational questions. The aim is to optimize the speed and volume of critical assistance that can be delivered immediately after the onset of a humanitarian emergency. The content of the review is aligned with the IASC ERP guidance.
FRAMEWORK The first stage of this review involves the collation and desk review of the available information (carried-out by OCHA). The second stage involves a regional HRT-led workshop to achieve the following: 1) Define the capacity of the humanitarian system and resources (e.g. partners, stocks, warehouse capacity); 2) Agree on the severity of the risks at the sub-regional level. The national risk register for July-December 2016 identified conflict displacement and refugee/undocumented returnees as the highest ranked risks; as returnees are not likely to affect all regions, HRTs should also identify any other region-specific risks to review. 3) Identify the gaps within the existing humanitarian response system; and 4) Define and initiate the required preparedness actions. The workshop is to be conducted in two steps as defined by this template. The number of workshop participants should not exceed twelve humanitarian partners. The constituents should represent the clusters, NGOs, government, and ICRC-ARCS, and be the key focal points for operational planning. Step One – Risk & Capacity Analysis: The main objective is a provincial level analysis of priority risks, followed by a high-level capacity assessment of the regional team’s capacity to respond to identified risks and anticipated humanitarian need. The goal is to draw upon the expert knowledge of the group to assess the risks and response capacity through a simple rating system. As a first step, review the tables on Page 2 with pre- populated caseload trends; estimate the projected caseloads for the July-December 2016 period based on trend analysis and the HRT’s estimation based on the local context. Next, assign a ranking of the likelihood, impact and risk for each province using the Risk Core Card (Page 3). Then list the districts that are more susceptible to the risk and of greatest concern based on the current context (e.g. increased conflict), and estimate where and how many displaced people will go. Finally, refer to the 3Ws and stockpile list to assess if the response capacity and available stocks are adequate to respond to the expected caseload. Step Two – Key Messages & Actions: Using the analysis from Step One, the key outputs of Step Two are the top-line messages about the risks, issues and gaps in the existing response system, and the outstanding preparedness actions that are required to address those gaps. These messages should specific and concise. The preparedness actions should identify who is responsible and specify the date by which the action needs to be completed. The early warning activities and triggers are “distress signals” observed at the field level. If a trigger is reached, what needs to be done? Sector focal points for response are to be updated.
CHECKLIST The following preparedness items should be reviewed and updated prior to the workshop: Who does What Where (3W) of operational presence and operational capacity; Emergency stocks reported by the number of beneficiaries that can be assisted; Access mapping of humanitarian community’s ability to asses and respond in each district; Contact list of all humanitarian partners with reference to functional groups, such as clusters, HRTs, OCTs.
REFERENCE TO MAPS, DATA & TRENDS Afghanistan (National) Inter-Agency Risk Register for January to June 2018 (document). Displacement trends of conflict induced displacement by province (table) and district (table). Dashboard of conflict induced displacement from Jan-August 2016 (PDF) and interactive online map (link). Population by province and district for 2016-2018 (table).
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Step One RISK 1 – CONFLICT DISPLACEMENT
Scenario 1) Steady Displacement – The projected displacement caseload occurs steadily over the 6 month period. Province Displaced Projected Likelihood Impact Risk Districts of Concern Estimated # Estimated # Where will they Response Availability in 2017 Displacement (of (on people) Severity (list top districts for Jan - people displaced people displaced likely go? capacity of stocks (# of people) occurrence) Jun only) (Specify DAC or (Adequate or (Adequate or Jan to Jun 2018 Score 1-5 (Likelihood x within district outside of province) Inadequate) Inadequate) Score 1-5 Impact) district Badakhshan 19,600 4 3 12 Jurm, Tagab, 5,600 14,000 Baharak, Adequate Adequate Warduj, Yamgan, Kishim, Raghistan, Zebak, Fayzabad , Yaftal ha, Argo, Eshkasheim, Arghanckhow , Shighnan, Khash , Faizabad , Jurm, Taloqan Kohistan, Yawan, Kran wa Minjan,,Baharak Baghlan 56,000 5 4 20 Dahana I Ghuri, 28,000 28,000 Kunduz city, inadequate inadequate Dande Shahabudin, Puli Khumri Darde Ghori, district, and Baghlani Jadid and Mazar-e-Sharif Burka, Tala wa city, Barfak, Nahrin neighbouring districts villages, DAC. Kunduz 161,000 5 4 20 Qalay I Zal, Chahar 105,000 56,000 Taluqan city, Inadequate Inadequate Dara, Dashte Archi, Puli Khumri, Khanabad and Kabul and Imam Sahib, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz center and within the villages (Telawka, province Buze Qandari, Hazrat Sultan), Aliabad districts Takhar 17,150 61000 4 3 6 Darqad, Khwaja 33,000 28,000 Neighbouring adequate Inadequate Ghar, Dashti Qala, districts, village Ishkamish Yangi Qala , Khowaja Bahawodin, Total 297,600 171,600 126,000
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Scenario 2) Rapid Displacement – The estimated maximum displacement caseload occurs rapidly over a one month period (e.g. Kunduz, Sept 2015, April, August and Oct 2016). Province Displaced Estimated Max. Likelihood Impact Risk Districts of Estimated # Estimated # Where will they likely Response Availability in 2017 Displacement (of (on people) Severity Concern people people go? (Specify DAC or capacity of stocks (# of people) (Urban centre occurrence) Score 1-5 (Likelihood x (list top DAC or displaced displaced province) (Adequate or (Adequate or provincial capitals for Inadequate) Inadequate) failure) Score 1-5 Impact) within outside of Jan-Jun only) DAC/capital DAC/capital Badakhshan 28,000 2 4 4 Baharak, Khash, 7,000 21,000 Baharak district of Adequate Adequate Raghistan, Badakhshan and Fayzabad city Baghlan 1,744 21,000 2 5 10 Burka, Tala Wa 15,050 5,950 Puli Khumri district, Inadequate Inadequate Barfak, surrounding villages, Baghlani Jadid Kunduz city, Takhar (Eshkamesh – Naiman) and Mazar city Kunduz 43,711 79,100 3 5 15 Dashti-Archi, Qala 33,600 45,500 Taloqan, Inadequate Inadequate Zal, Chardarah, Khawajaghar, Khanabad, Kunduz city, Emamsahib Aliabad, neighbouring districts and villages Takhar 35,906 27,300 4 3 12 Darqad , Yangi 16,800 10,500 Taloqan city Inadequate Inadequate Qala, and Khawaja Ghar Total 155,400 72,450 82,950
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RISK 2 – REFUGEE AND UNDOCUMENTED RETURNEES
Province Refugee Undocumented Projected Projected Likelihood Impact Risk Districts of Response Availability of Returnees 2017 Returnees 2017 Refugee Undocumented (of occurrence) (on people) Severity Return capacity services / stocks (# of people) (# of people) (Where are they (Can the districts (Adequate or Returnees Returnees Score 1-5 Score 1-5 (Likelihood x likely to settle?) support their return; Inadequate) Jan to Jun 2018 Jan to Jun 2018 Impact) shelter, food, health, (Ref. Jan-Aug 2016) (Ref. Jan-Aug 2016) education?) (Adequate or Inadequate) Badakhshan - 3 4 12 Fayzabad city Adequate Adequate Baghlan - 4 5 20 Puli Khumri Inadequate Inadequate Kunduz - 4 5 20 Kunduz City Inadequate Inadequate Takhar - 3 4 12 Taluqan Fairly adequate Fairly Adequate Total -
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Risk Score Card
Methodology: Each province is assigned a rating for impact and likelihood, which is then used to determine the risk severity. The severity rating is the multiplication of the impact risk rating and the likelihood risk rating, enabling a possible risk severity score of 1 to 25.
Impact Likelihood Negligible (1): Minimal impact (negligible loss of life, Very Unlikely (1): A remote chance of an event occurring morbidity, loss of livelihoods, violation of human rights, in the current year, from 0-5%. e.g. Seasonal hazards that etc.) on the overall population and existing have happened once or less in the last twenty years beneficiaries. The anticipated response could be met through the capacity of the existing district humanitarian system. Minor (2): Minor impact (minimal loss of life, morbidity, Unlikely (2): The event has a low chance of arising in the loss of livelihoods, violation of human rights, etc.) on current year, from 5 to 15% e.g. Seasonal hazards that the overall population and existing beneficiaries. The have happened one to three times in the last twenty anticipated response could be met through the years. capacity of the existing provincial humanitarian system. Moderate (3): Moderate impact (moderate loss of life, Moderately Likely (3): The event has a viable chance of morbidity, loss of livelihoods, violation of human rights, arising in the current year, from 15-30%. E.g. Seasonal etc.) on the overall population and existing hazards that have happened two or three times in the last beneficiaries. The anticipated response could be met ten years, or once or twice in the last five years. through the capacity of the existing regional humanitarian system. Severe (4): Severe impact (substantial loss of life, Likely (4): The event has a significant chance of arising morbidity, loss of livelihoods, violation of human rights, in the current year, from 30-50%. E.g. Seasonal hazards etc.) on the overall population and existing that happen every second or third year, e.g. two times in beneficiaries. The anticipated response could be met the last five years. through the capacity of the existing national humanitarian system. Major (5): Major impact (extreme loss of life, Very Likely (5): The event has a positive chance of morbidity, loss of livelihoods, violation of human rights, arising, over 50% e.g. Seasonal hazards that have etc.) on the overall population and existing happened three or more times in the last five years, or beneficiaries. The anticipated response exceeds the five or more coping capacity of the existing national humanitarian system.
Severity Score: Low (1 to 7) | Medium (8 to 14) | High (15 to 25)
5: Major 5 10 15 20 25
4: Severe 4 8 12 16 20
3: Moderate 3 6 9 12 15 Impact 2: Minor 2 4 6 8 10
1: Negligible 1 2 3 4 5
1: Very Likely 2: Unlikely 3: Moderately 4: Likely 5: Very Likely
Likely
Likelihood
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Step Two
TOP LINE MESSAGES Summary of the top line messages emerging from the review of the risks and operational capacity. The ANDSF will start a new and comprehensive military operation (Nasrat); The civilians will likely displace to the villages, as the operation starts from the urban area under Nasrat military operation; Parliamentary and Presidential election will increase political instability that will result in more conflict and civilians’ displacement; The parties to the conflict (Pro-government forces and the NSAGs) will be trying Risk Outlook to gain more territorial control so to gain more power for peace talks (negotiations); What is the major, The Government plans to officially open up the new district government offices priority risk in your region in Kunduz province. Hence, this may trigger severe conflict with the NSAGs who to prepare for this over the control of these areas; period? Where? Massive displacement from Kunduz to Taluqan is unlikely. As majority of locals Expected impact and in Kunduz during the conflicts, would prefer to stay in their places of origin so, need? not to miss the plantation and harvest; The pro-government and the NSAGs might confront over control of districts bordering Tajikestan (Darqad, Dasht-e-Qala, Chahab, Khwajaghar) in Takhar province. In particular, the local armed forces and the NSAGs may fight to control the narcotic trafficking business in Takhar province; The local armed forces and the NSAGs will continue fighting over control of Lapis and Gold mines in Keran wa Menjan and Raghestan (Bikaadar and Kaalar areas) districts of Badakhshan province. Access: Roads between Mazar-Kunduz-Takhar is contested. However, currently the humanitarians can deliver their stocks through this highway. Particularly, the NSAGs are able to block the road between Takhar and Kunduz in Khanabad district anytime; Prompt access to assess the needs and respond to the vulnerable IDPs in the rural and remote areas is very unlikely, as access negotiation takes time. Hence, the humanitarians have to proactively identify the inaccessible areas and start the access negotiation before the actual displacement; Gaps & Issues Response Capacity: The response capacity is inadequate in Kunduz and Baghlan, while it is adequate in Takhar and Badakhshan provinces; What are the priority gaps or issues in your No adequate stock of food and NFI are available in Kunduz and Baghlan region, relating to your provinces. The humanitarian supplies are provided through Mazar main stocks. response capacity, access, emergency Emergency Stocks & Logistics: stocks or logistics? No adequate food and NFI stocks are available in both Kunduz and Baghlan provinces; The NSAGs can block the highway leading to Kunduz province when they want; Kunduz and Baghlan provinces receive humanitarian supplies mainly from Mazar main stocks; As the roads leading to Kunduz is frequently contested, then the availability of stocks for at least 1,000 families are highly recommended in Kunduz city; The food stocks for Takhar and Badakhshan provinces are replenished by Kabul stocks. The NFI stock for these provinces are provided either by Mazar or Kabul stocks. Hence, prepositioning adequate food and NFI stock in Takhar and Badakhshan provinces are recommended. Regional / Provincial level: Preparedness Enhanced coordination and partnership with stakeholders; Actions Update 3Ws and contact list as well as regular access mapping;
Monitor triggers and likelihood of incidents; What are the top actions Mobilization of food and NFI stock for Kunduz, Taluqan, Fayzabad and Puli you can take in the region/province to Khumri; Initiate CivMil engagement in Kunduz to advocate for humanitarian space; P a g e | 6 Emergency Response Preparedness Review (July-Dec 2016) updated 29 October 2016
prepare for the identified Activate Emergency preparedness checklist for Kunduz and Puli Khumri in risks? case of impending crisis. National level: What preparedness support do you require Donor engagement, advocacy and enhanced inter-cluster coordination from the national level? mechanisms. Prompt stock replenishment in case of stock shortages. Increase use of cash based programming for response to limit reliance on burdensome pre-positioning and transportation of supplies Access Advisory Group (AAG) to support High-Level UN engagement with parties to conflict. Increased unified Government policy directives and enhanced working relations between DoRR, ANDMA and other line ministries.
EARLY WARNING ACTIVITIES & TRIGGERS If the situation deteriorates, what are the early warning triggers/indicators for increasing preparedness? Be very specific about triggers/thresholds that indicate a decline in situation, and specific actions to take. Early Warning Activity & Trigger Additional preparedness actions to be initiated Escalation/intensification in conflict coupled with Alerting the coordination forums such as calling Ad- military operations, political impasse/disputes, multiple hoc PDMC (Government), Ad-hoc HRT and Ad-hoc illegal check points and collapse of districts to NSAGs. OCTs (Humanitarian Organizations) Access negotiation, Monitoring the situation regularly, Monitor trends and activated OCHA preparedness Monitoring stocks and stock replenishment checklist particularly for Kunduz and Puli Khumri. Sudden surge in refugee returnees from Pakistan, and Cross-regional sharing of information. Monitor “undocumented Afghan” from Iran and Pakistan in the trends from data provided through IOM and OCHA North-eastern provinces. updates of returnees and share with humanitarian actors to guide in response planning
SECTOR FOCAL POINTS FOR RESPONSE Refer to the Field Coordination Mechanism (Focal Points) map. Have any of the cluster/sector leads for emergencies changed? If yes, record the changes below. Sector Name Organization Mobile Email ES&NFI M.Dawood Salimi UNHCR 0791 990 121 [email protected] ES&NFI Gul Karim Hasrat NRC 0749 662 132 - [email protected] 0700 599 216 FSAC Najeebullah WFP 0706 004 601 [email protected] Rahmani Health Dr.Zahir Fazil UNICEF 0798507384 [email protected] Health Abdul Nazar WHO 0799 211 083 [email protected] Ahmadi Nutrition Dr.Zahir Fazil UNICEF 0798507384 [email protected] Nutrition Dr. Abdul Salam OHPM 0796 428 080 - [email protected] Rasooly 0749 930 721 Protection M.Dawood Salimi UNHCR 0791 990 121 [email protected] Protection Menhajuddin UNICEF 0798 507 380- [email protected] Hamed 0799 204 905 WASH Dr.Zahir Fazil UNICEF 0798507384 [email protected] WASH Engineer Dadullah DACAAR 079 340 7902 [email protected]
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