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RESET AND MATCH ■ DIGITAL DIPLOMACY ■ MEMORIES OF A-100
AFSA ANNUAL REPORT INSIDE
$3.50 / MARCH 2010 OREIGN ERVICE FJ O U R N A L STHE MAGAZINE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROFESSIONALS
IRAQ & ITS NEIGHBORS New Challenges As the U.S. Shifts Focus C1-C4_FSJ_0310_COV:proof 2/15/10 2:25 PM Page C2 01-15_FSJ_0310_FRO:first 2/18/10 3:12 PM Page 1 01-15_FSJ_0310_FRO:first 2/18/10 3:12 PM Page 2 01-15_FSJ_0310_FRO:first 2/18/10 3:12 PM Page 3
OREIGN ERVICE FJ O U R N A L S CONTENTS March 2010 Volume 87, No. 3
F OCUS ON Iraq & Its Neighbors
IRAQ, IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES / 16 The route to direct talks between Washington and Tehran could run through Baghdad. By Selig S. Harrison
ACHIEVING CLOSURE ON IRAQ’S PREWAR WMD / 23 Understanding why it turned out Saddam Hussein had no WMD provides insights useful in other situations. By Charles A. Duelfer
Cover and inside illustrations THE U.S. AND TURKEY: BACK FROM THE BRINK / 30 by Laszlo Kubinyi American, Iraqi and Turkish policymakers should continue to focus on promoting dialogue and making common cause. PRESIDENT’S VIEWS / 5 By Ross Wilson Exploring the New Frontiers of THE MIDDLE EAST: FORKS IN THE WAY FORWARD / 37 Diplomacy and Development The stakes for getting U.S. policy right in the Middle East are higher than ever. By Susan R. Johnson Here is an overview of the problems and opportunities. By Chas W. Freeman Jr. SPEAKING OUT / 13 A Real Reset Button for U.S.-Russian Relations By Thompson Buchanan F EATURE
REFLECTIONS / 84 DIPLOMACY REBOOTED: MAKING DIGITAL STATECRAFT A REALITY / 43 A-100, Past and Present The State Department is now in a position to build novel By Steven Alan Honley applications to support the mission of diplomacy. By Chris Bronk LETTERS / 7 CYBERNOTES / 9 AFSA NEWS BOOKS / 68 2009 ANNUAL REPORT: WORKING FOR A STRONGER AFSA / 49 IN MEMORY / 71 MARKETPLACE / 78 YEAR IN REVIEW / 51 INDEX TO CONSTITUENCY SUMMARIES / 57 ADVERTISERS / 82 CLASSIFIEDS / 65
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A time of service…a time of need OREIGN ERVICE FJ O U R N A L S
Help for Seniors May Editor STEVEN ALAN HONLEY Senior Editor Be Just a Phone Call Away— SUSAN B. MAITRA Associate Editor The Senior Living Foundation may be SHAWN DORMAN able to help you or someone you know. AFSA News Editor Some examples of assistance are: FRANCESCA KELLY Ad & Circulation Manager ED MILTENBERGER N Home Health Care Art Director N Adult Day Care & Respite Care CARYN SUKO SMITH Advertising Intern N Prescription Drug Copayments JOSERELDA BOON N Transportation to Medical Appointments EDITORIAL BOARD N Durable Medical Equipment TED WILKINSON Chairman For more information, please contact the MAY G. BAPTISTA SENIOR LIVING FOUNDATION JOSEPH BRUNS OF THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE STEPHEN W. B UCK JULIE GIANELLONI CONNOR 1716 N Street, NW N Washington, DC 20036-2902 JEFF GIAUQUE Phone: (202) 887-8170 N Fax: (202) 872-9320 MARY E. GLANTZ E-Mail: [email protected] N Web Site: www.SLFoundation.org D. IAN HOPPER SPONSORED BY THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION GEORGE JONES LYNN W. R OCHE RIMA J. VYDMANTAS
THE MAGAZINE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROFESSIONALS Foreign Service Journal (ISSN 0146-3543), 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037-2990 is published monthly with a combined July-August issue by the American Foreign Service Associa- tion (AFSA), a private, nonprofit organization. Material appearing herein represents the opin- ions of the writers and does not necessarily rep- resent the views of the Journal, the Editorial Board or AFSA. Writer queries and submissions are invited, preferably by e-mail. Journal sub- scription: AFSA members – $13 included in an- nual dues; others – $40. For foreign surface mail, add $18 per year; foreign airmail, $36 per year. Periodical postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices. Indexed by Public Affairs Information Services (PAIS). The Journal is not responsible for unsolicited manuscripts, photos or illustrations. Advertising inquiries are invited. The appearance of advertisements herein does not imply the endorsement of the services or goods offered. TELEPHONE: (202) 338-4045 FAX: (202) 338-8244 or (202) 338-6820 E-MAIL: [email protected] WEB: www.afsa.org; www.fsjournal.org © American Foreign Service Association, 2010. Printed in the U.S.A. Send address changes to: AFSA Attn: Address Change 2101 E Street N.W. Washington DC 20037-2990 Printed on 50-percent recycled paper, of which 10 percent is post-consumer waste.
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PRESIDENT’S VIEWS Exploring the New Frontiers of Diplomacy and Development BY SUSAN R. JOHNSON
The conventional diplomat dress the professional devel- tional State and USAID positions, both is fast becoming an endan- opment and training require- to carry out core diplomatic functions gered species, one that may be ments for diplomats and and to provide a training float. Attention teetering on the brink of irrel- development officials. is now rightly turning to the equally im- evance. It has become almost Old-style diplomacy, with portant related issue in which we all have trite to talk about the new its venerable conventions and a stake: updated and expanded profes- technologies, new players, structural rigidities, continues sional development and training for our new issues and the increas- to have some role in execut- Foreign Service across the board. ingly blurred lines between foreign and ing formal, state-to-state business, but AFSA supports and will participate in domestic policies — or whether today’s its space is narrowing and its impor- a new AAD study titled “Foreign Affairs foreign ministries and assistance agen- tance diminishing. To paraphrase a Leadership in the 21st Century: Recali- cies are relics of the past or the engines point Daryl Copeland makes eloquently brating the Diplomatic Profession.” We for a renaissance of diplomacy and de- in his book, Guerrilla Diplomacy, the plan to contribute to the development of velopment. new frontiers of diplomacy and devel- this study in several ways: by acting as a The forces for change are real; so is opment lie primarily in understanding conduit to our members to keep you in- the need for radical reform of Foreign and managing the effects of the colos- formed about the issues that the study Service structures, culture, recruitment, sal forces collectively known as global- addresses; by seeking your input and training and professionalization. Yet ization. perspectives on what sort of training and while the debate over how best to rein- Yet paradoxically, all too often that professional development you think is vent the Foreign Service to meet the phenomenon generates insecurity, splin- needed, and how and when it should be needs of the 21st century has generated ters politics and deepens cultural di- provided; and by working to see that the a slew of articles, studies and books, vides. What was once fixed and pre- study considers what the new require- today’s active-duty diplomats have been dictable is becoming diffuse and dy- ments are and what general training and relegated to the margins of the discus- namic. The business of diplomacy is professional development principles sion. done less and less in banquet halls, re- apply across the Foreign Service. If foreign affairs professionals want ceptions and closed meeting rooms and The world we knew is gone. The new to be part of the process of developing more and more in barrios, villages, cafés world is increasingly complex and dy- the right blueprint, we must engage in it and chatrooms. namic, and is coming at us fast. Is recali- seriously. We can start by answering the Foreign Service recruitment is now brating the diplomatic profession enough, question: What are the new and emerg- finally on a fast upswing as we play or do we need to be reinventing it? ing requirements for effective diplo- catchup for years of below-attrition hir- If you would like to participate in the macy and development? Only through ing. AFSA is proud to have actively sup- ongoing discussion of this issue and con- an open, inclusive discussion of those ported the development of the “Foreign tribute to AFSA’s participation in the requirements can we intelligently ad- Affairs Budget of the Future,” a blue-rib- AAD study on foreign affairs leadership bon panel report issued in October 2008 in the 21st century, please contact me at Susan R. Johnson is the president of the by the American Academy of Diplo- [email protected]. All comments and American Foreign Service Association. macy. It documents the need for addi- suggestions are welcome. ■
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LETTERS
The Sky’s Not Falling conclusion is reiterated in the January other developed countries where life Regarding AFSA’s objection to the FSJ, AFSA believes the sky is falling. expectancy is higher than ours and Senate’s proposed excise tax on high- This is based on a faulty assumption health costs a fraction of ours. If we’re cost health plans (“Priorities and Sur- that premiums will immediately begin as exceptional a nation as our politi- veys,” January AFSA News Retiree VP increasing at a projected 8-percent an- cians constantly proclaim, then surely column), I wonder if it polled its mem- nual rate. In fact, the thresholds are ad- we can find some way to provide bership to find a substantial majority justed upward by only 3 percent health care for all at less than $21,000 against the proposed excise tax. If so, I beginning in 2014. per family or $8,000 per individual. regret having missed the opportunity to Using the OPM figures, I calculate I would very much like the Govern- register my own opinion, for I am ap- that it will not be until 2019 that the an- ing Board to justify its lobbying objec- parently out of sync with my fellow nual cost of the average national single tive, both in terms of verifying that it AFSA members. plan reaches $8,000, by which time the was consistent with member prefer- If it did not consult the member- threshold will have risen to $10,400. ence and in terms of factual foundation. ship, then I find it unacceptable that And the cost of the average family plan This is close to a membership-deciding the AFSA Governing Board decided to won’t hit $21,000 until 2022, when the situation for me. A Journal subscrip- join other unions in putting its narrow, threshold will have risen to $29,900. tion is much cheaper than annual dues. parochial interests ahead of what I re- But if those assumptions are sus- Brent Schaeffer gard as the greater national goal of ex- tained through 2022, health costs will FSO, retired tending health coverage to all. constitute more than 31 percent of our Gaborone, Botswana and And believe me, those interests are economy. Do we not believe — do we Hendersonville, N.C. very narrow. After spending some time not consider it an absolute national pri- on the Office of Personnel Manage- ority if we are to remain economically Better Times for Public Affairs ment Web site (www.opm.gov), I found competitive — that we must succeed in I thought that Alexis Ludwig’s De- that fewer than 1 percent of the nearly slowing, if not reversing, the growth of cember Speaking Out column, “Restore 500 available family plans (matching health costs relative to the rest of the State’s Office of Public Communica- my personal circumstances) would cur- economy? tions,” was spot on. It certainly brought rently be subject to the excise tax. And Apart from the apparently very back memories of better times for pub- for the 17 national plans that AFSA shaky factual basis upon which AFSA lic affairs: Upon returning from an members are most likely to find suit- justifies its opposition to excise taxes, overseas assignment back in the 1970s able, the average total premium (gov- I’m particularly dismayed that it would and 1980s, one could contact the Bu- ernment plus individual contributions) want to obstruct this very viable way to reau of Public Affairs and volunteer for in 2010 is $5,277 for singles and $11,950 finance the extension of health care to speaking engagements and interviews for families. These figures are well all Americans — even if it hits a small with the media. below the excise tax thresholds of handful of us in the pocketbook. Because Seattle was my home leave $8,000 and $21,000 that would go into Many of us have spent the greater address, I volunteered for venues in effect in 2013, if the legislation is passed. part of our careers living in countries Washington, Idaho and Oregon. Wheth- Judging by the column in the No- where no one goes bankrupt as a result er it was a Kiwanis dinner, a radio call-in vember 2009 Retiree Newsletter, whose of medical mishaps, some of us in show or a newspaper interview, my au-
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L ETTERS You Are Our Eyes & Ears! dience always seemed interested in my was an even greater difference in our experiences at posts where I had ranks: John was head of a very large and served. More importantly, however, on active CIA station, while I was a green Dear Readers: many occasions the people I met in the third secretary on my first assignment Pacific Northwest would remark that with State. Somehow those differences In order to produce a high- quality product, the FSJ depends they were pleased to discover that one did not matter. John and his wife imme- on the revenue it earns from of their own was a member of the For- diately befriended us and included us in advertising. You can help eign Service. They had always heard their family’s many adventures. We re- with this. that only the sons and daughters of the mained close friends until his death. Please let us know the names East Coast elite were in the Service. At John’s request, mourners ended of companies that have provided In recent years, the managers of his funeral service with a lively rendi- good service to you — a hotel, State’s public affairs program appear to tion of the British World War II song, insurance company, auto have developed the attitude that it’s “Wish Me Luck as You Wave Me dealership, or other concern. A referral from our readers okay for the Foreign Service to present Goodbye.” That was a classy exit for a is the best entrée! America’s policies to the world, but its very classy public servant, and a won- members should be kept away from the derful person. Ed Miltenberger American public. That may be why James A.Williams Advertising & Circulation Manager there is no budget to do public affairs FE-MC, retired Tel: (202) 944-5507 E-mail: [email protected] the old-fashioned way. Arlington, Va. David Reuther FSO, retired USAID Needs Fairfax, Va. Language Training, Too Thank you for the December Pres- Remembering John Leavitt ident’s Views column addressing For- I would like to inform readers of the eign Service readiness, especially the death of John H. Leavitt, a colleague language shortfall. and friend to many of us in the Foreign I am a new FSO with USAID and Service community. have noticed that many USAID posi- John died on Dec. 31 in New Hamp- tions are not language-designated. I shire at the age of 91. We knew him agree with AFSA President Susan John- mainly from his 15 years of service at son that language proficiency is critical U.S. embassies in Tehran, Athens, An- to the success of every Foreign Service The Foreign Service Journal kara and Tel Aviv during the 1950s, member, since we all share some level welcomes brief, focused letters 1960s and 1970s. Whether at a country of diplomatic duty and representation. from readers. (In general, 200 team meeting, on the tennis court, at a For example, I am a technical officer diplomatic reception or at the bridge who can expect to interact with govern- to 400 words is a good target.) table, John was a formidable partner ment officials and folks in civil society. All submissions are subject to and opponent. He was also an excellent I encourage AFSA to support the editing, and reflect the opinions friend. creation of more language-designated of the writers, not necessarily My wife, Anne, and I met John positions for USAID (accompanied by the views of the Journal, the Ed- more than 40 years ago while serving in language training at FSI), in addition to itorial Board or AFSA. Ankara. There was a great difference what the association is already support- in our respective ages: John had been a ing for the State Department. Please send your letters to: Royal Air Force bomber pilot — his Palak Shah [email protected]. targets included the battleship Tirpitz FSO, USAID and the Eagle’s Nest in Berchtesgaden Foreign Service Institute — while I was still in diapers. There Arlington, Va. ■
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CYBERNOTES
A Thoughtful Survey ranked nearly 400 organizations. • Brookings Institution (top think- In the University of Pennsylvania’s “Policymakers in the legislative and tank in the world) latest “Global Go-to Think-Tank Rank- executive branches of government • Fraser Institute (Canada and ings,” released Jan. 28, the Brookings throughout the developed and devel- Mexico) Institution came in first among more oping world face the common problem • Chatham House (Western Eu- than 6,300 think-tanks evaluated world- of bringing expert knowledge to bear rope) wide. The annual report, which began on governmental decision-making,” • Carnegie Moscow Center (East- in 2006, places London-based Chat- says McGann. “I am confident that the ern and Central Europe) ham House first among think-tanks international experts group and peer • Fundación Getulio Vargas (Latin outside the U.S. nomination and selection process that America) James G. McGann, assistant direc- was constituted for this study has en- • Carnegie Middle East Center tor of the university’s International Re- abled us to create the most authorita- (Middle East) lations Program and director of the tive list of high-performance think- • South African Institute of Inter- university’s Think-Tanks and Civil So- tanks in the world.” national Affairs (Southern Africa) ciety Program, compiled the results Here is a sampling of the leading • Japan Institute of International from a global survey of 300 scholars think-tanks for 2009 in various cate- Affairs (Asia) and experts. The panel nominated and gories: A copy of the full report is available for download at www.ony.unu.edu/.
50 Years Ago... U.S. Iran Policy: Think Twice ne may cite three reasons why the conduct of foreign rela- In early February, on the eve of the Otions has never been and is not today generally regarded in 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revo- the United States, at least, as a genuine profession. The first is lution, some voices urging caution and that throughout the greater part of our history foreign relations an alternate point of view were heard has, in contrast to the experience of most nations in the world, above the din of rocket-launchings and been essentially of secondary importance to the national interest. Secondly, opposition demonstrations in Iran and our professional Foreign Service, developing under the shadow of this strong the drumbeat of Western advocates of traditional attitude, has had to struggle against a built-in inferiority complex. “regime change” and tough, new sanc- We have instinctively felt that we were trying to corner the market on some- tions against Tehran in Washington. thing that any Tom, Dick or Harry could do. This apologetic attitude has been The Program on International Pol- aggravated by the third factor: the difficulty of describing clearly the profes- icy Attitudes at the University of Mary- sional nature of the profession. The conduct of foreign relations cannot be land issued the results of a study that reduced to algebraic formulae or scientifically classifiable symptoms and shattered several widely held myths. remedies. PIPA sought to address the hypotheses —– From “Is the Foreign Service a Profession?” by James K. Penfield, that Iranian President Mahmoud Ah- FSJ, March 1960. madinejad did not win the June 12 election and that the Iranian people
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C YBERNOTES
book, Reset: Iran, Turkey and Amer- Site of the Month: A New Online Center for ica’s Future, due out in early June, he Foreign Policy Discussion challenges the popular belief that it’s in On Feb. 1, WorldAffairsDaily.org, a project of the World Affairs journal, debuted our best interest to cultivate a weak, if as an online center for discussion of foreign policy. As James Denton, publisher and not destabilized Iran. editor of the online division, puts it, this is “a genuinely international site that allows Like Turkey, he argues, Iran shares any English-language reader to understand more fully the often unsettling events and long-term strategic interests as well as complex issues that dominate the world’s headlines and debates.” a democratic impulse with the U.S. On a daily basis, this attractive and accessible site presents a selection of official Moreover, Kinzer points out, as a Shi- statements, news stories and think-tank reports from around the world. Thus, on any ite nation, Iran has a deep-seated aver- given day, readers will be able to see how a particular story is reported and com- sion toward radical Sunni movements mented upon in, for example, the Washington Post, France 24, Al-Jazeera, RIA like the Taliban. Novesti, the Islamic Republic News Agency, “Frontline,” Afghanistan’s Quqnoos Web In his widely acclaimed 2003 polit- site and other media. “We know there is a global community,” says Denton. “Our ical study, All the Shah’s Men: An idea is to allow everyone to hear the conversations taking place in its various neigh- American Coup and the Roots of Mid- borhoods.” dle East Terror, Kinzer argued that the In addition to selections from the bimonthly World Affairs journal, the site show- anti-American rage that consumes cases American bloggers from across the political spectrum, as well as influential Iranian leaders was incited 50 years mainstream and dissident voices from Europe, the Middle East, Russia and else- ago when the CIA destroyed the na- where. The aim is to facilitate frank, real-time conversations among opinion-makers tion’s first — and so far, only — exper- at home and abroad about the ideas and events that define our era. “If we succeed,” iment with liberal democracy after less says Denton, “when our viewers go to www.worldaffairsdaily.org, they will be look- than a decade. ing at a rough draft of history.” Democracy will flower again in World Affairs, the journal, is published in partnership with the American Peace Iran, Kinzer told the Inquirer, if only Society. Issued intermittently since its founding in 1937, the publication was re- “the U.S. can resist the temptation to launched in a new format in 2008. intervene and can allow events to take their own course.” perceive their government as illegiti- that the Iranian public is in a pre-rev- mate. It also explored the assumption olutionary state of mind,” says Steven Google v. China: Tough Love? that the opposition represents a move- Kull, director of PIPA. A new row over Internet censorship ment favoring a substantially different The complete report is available on- in China erupted in mid-January with posture toward the United States. line at www.worldpublicopinion. Google, Inc.’s announcement that it The PIPA study analyzed multiple org/pipa/. planned to stop censoring searches on polls of the Iranian public from differ- Another view of the situation in its Google.cn network, and was con- ent sources conducted during the Tehran not often heard in the U.S. sidering leaving China altogether if the three months following the June elec- comes from veteran New York Times problem could not be resolved. tion, including one poll conducted foreign correspondent, historian and Only one of several disputes that by WorldPublicOpinion.org, which is Northwestern University professor have recently raised the temperature managed by PIPA. Stephen Kinzer, who told a Philadel- of Sino-American relations, this one The study did not prove that there phia audience in late January that has pushed the twin issues of cyberse- were no election irregularities; but nei- America’s ideal ally in the Middle East curity and Internet freedom back up to ther did it support the belief that a ma- is not Jordan or a “new-and-improved” the top of the U.S. foreign policy jority rejected Ahmadinejad. It also Iraq — and certainly not Saudi Arabia agenda. found little evidence to support the — but Iran. In her Jan. 21 address on “Internet other assumptions. “Our analysis sug- Kinzer was interviewed by the Freedom,” Secretary of State Hillary gests that it would not be prudent to Philadelphia Inquirer (www.philly. Clinton reiterated the Obama admin- base U.S. policy on the assumption com/inquirer/magazine). In his new istration’s determination to “strengthen
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C YBERNOTES
ust as steel can be used to build hospitals or machine guns, or nuclear Jpower can either energize a city or destroy it, modern information networks and the technologies they support can be harnessed for good or for ill. The same networks that help organize movements for freedom also enable al-Qaida to spew hatred and incite violence against the innocent. And technologies with the potential to open up access to government and promote transparency can also be hijacked by governments to crush dissent and deny human rights. — Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, speaking on Internet freedom at The Newseum, Washington, D.C., Jan. 21, www.state.gov/secretary/rm/ 2010/01/135519.htm
global cybersecurity” and outlined a (“Technology Companies’ Business strategy for working with repressive Practices in Internet-restricting Coun- regimes on the topic (www.state.gov). tries”); and one by the House Foreign Clinton referred to the president’s ap- Affairs Committee (“The Google pointment of a cyberspace policy coor- Predicament: Transforming U.S. Cy- dinator, and the ongoing work of the berspace Policy to Advance Democracy, State Department’s Global Internet Security and Trade”). Freedom Task Force, established in Earlier, with an endorsement from 2006, as well as initiatives at the United House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Rep. Nations and in other multilateral fora Chris Smith, R-N.J., called on Jan 14 for to put cybersecurity on the world’s lawmakers to take up his “Global On- agenda. line Freedom Act” — legislation that National Intelligence Director Eric has been stalled in Congress for several Blair underlined the pervasive threat years. to critical computerized infrastructure Meanwhile, Google has joined the in testimony to the Senate Select Com- National Security Agency in efforts to mittee on Intelligence in early Febru- further analyze the cyberattacks from ary, emphasizing that both government within China aimed at gaining access and private industry networks are al- to the Gmail accounts of human rights ready “under persistent and subtle as- activists that prompted the latest sault.” Among unclassified sources, standoff with Beijing. The company the Center for Strategic and Interna- is attempting to negotiate a resolution tional Studies’ running compilation of to the impasse as the stakes in China cyberattack incidents, “Cyber Events are large and complex. Beijing’s re- Since 2006,” is an eye-opener (www. treat in October on its “Green Dam” csis.org). plan for mandatory built-in surveil- To examine the issues, no less than lance on all PCs sold in the country three sets of hearings have been sched- gives hope for progress (see “Story uled: one by the Congressional-Execu- Not Available in China;” November tive Commission on China, which Cybernotes). ■ monitors human rights and the devel- opment of commercial law in the PRC; This edition of Cybernotes was com- one by the Senate Judiciary Subcom- piled by Senior Editor Susan Brady mittee on Human Rights and the Law Maitra.
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SPEAKING OUT A Real Reset Button for U.S.-Russian Relations
BY THOMPSON BUCHANAN
n March 6, 2009, Secretary dance with Article 5 of the NATO of State Hillary Rodham It is imperative to Treaty. It also encourages the leader- OClinton presented Russian devise a formula to ship of those nations to overestimate Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov with a insulate the Near the support they can expect from the token of her commitment to improv- West for their own domestic agendas. ing relations: a “reset” button. Al- Abroad from a We may be sure that if Moscow though the word engraved on the gift, damaging rivalry perceives any state on its border to be “peregruzka,” actually means “over- between Moscow closely allied with the West, it will do charge” or “overload” (depending on and NATO. what it can to destabilize that state — the context), Lavrov gamely pressed and it is in a much better position to the button alongside Clinton. do so than we are to defend it. We are Just four months later, however, not dealing with the prostrate, rela- Vice President Joe Biden used a tively cooperative Russia led by Boris speech to the Georgian Parliament to age control, reassuring Russia that the Yeltsin, but a bitter, much stronger proclaim a U.S. commitment to bring- United States still regards it as a great power that feels the West took advan- ing both Georgia and Ukraine into the power and is not trying to use the tage of its weakness during the 1990s North Atlantic Treaty Organization. newly independent states of the to extract concessions, without offer- In so doing, he may have intended to “Near Abroad” to contain it. But if ing anything tangible in return. And it blunt attacks from Republicans by this is some “good cop, bad cop” strat- is fiercely determined to defend what mimicking earlier denunciations of egy for dealing with Moscow, it un- it sees as its national security interests the “Evil Empire,” such as those for- derestimates their intelligence and in the Near Abroad. mer Vice President Richard Cheney their visceral toughness. Speaking as With this in mind, the Obama ad- and former President Ronald Reagan a diplomat who spent nine years in ministration’s declarations and actions routinely delivered. Moscow, both before and after the should explicitly reassure Moscow But while such rhetoric still res- collapse of communism, I can attest that: onates with much of the American to the folly of assuming that we will • We are as concerned as Russia is public, it does not serve our larger na- get our way on these issues just be- about the prospect of instability in the tional interests. At a minimum, the cause we’re the last superpower region. vice president reinforced the skepti- standing. • The only interest Americans cism of nationalist Russians that have in the Near Abroad is in pro- America sincerely wants closer ties. The Near Abroad and NATO moting genuine sovereignty and pros- He also complicated the task of our Words have consequences. Our perity. negotiators on a variety of critical is- pledge to help Georgia and Ukraine • It is in Russia’s own interest to do sues by inducing Moscow to wonder bring their military forces up to speed everything it can to demonstrate that who really speaks for the Obama ad- to qualify for NATO membership im- it wants to turn over a new leaf in re- ministration. plies a commitment of support in the lations with its neighbors. Sec. Clinton performed deft dam- event of conflict with Russia in accor- • We want Moscow to play a major
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S PEAKING O UT
role in ensuring peace and stability withdraw its support for NATO ex- along its borders, and in helping us pansion into Georgia and Ukraine, address major problems throughout Regrettably, Russia particularly in light of its decision to the world. abandon plans to install missile de- The issue is not whether we sup- still believes that the fense systems in Central Europe. But port the sovereignty of these newly we should at least stop talking about independent states. Of course we only real security it and leave it to the Europeans to do. But let us identify the wisest make clear that the idea is a non- ways to protect both their interests lies in dominating starter. and ours. At an appropriate moment in on- its neighbors. going talks over some related issue Some Progress on like the Conventional Armed Forces Resetting Relations in Europe Treaty, perhaps our envoys A number of positive steps have could informally float the idea of neu- been taken by both sides to “reset” re- tralizing the Near Abroad as an area lations, although each side’s under- there has been some talk of broader of competition, with a clear under- standing of what that means is rather cooperation there. standing that this would mean non-in- different. For some Russians, at least, More discouraging, while the at- terference by either side in the it means that the Americans should mosphere for arms control negotia- domestic politics of the region. accept Moscow’s positions on a whole tions has been positive, the two sides Of course, we would need to per- range of issues. And that is certainly remain stymied by technical issues re- suade Tbilisi and Kyiv that their secu- not what we mean by the term. lated to maintaining a balance of rity would be best protected by an A first positive step was President power — a consideration that has al- understanding between Moscow and Barack Obama’s decision to rethink ways bedeviled these talks. Washington. Toward that end, Geor- the policy of missile defense installa- gia, Ukraine and Russia should be en- tions in Eastern Europe, one that Setting Realistic Priorities couraged to discuss their overall lacked logic in the eyes of our NATO Regrettably, Moscow shows no economic relations, which are in so allies and many Americans. In- signs of abandoning its traditional be- many ways complementary and have evitably, the Central Europeans ac- lief that the only real security lies in been historically profitable. cused us of giving in to Moscow, and domination of its neighbors. But that As the dominant power in the re- the U.S. political opposition quickly only makes it more imperative for us gion, Moscow should take the initia- labeled the administration “soft on na- to devise a formula to insulate the tive in pursuit of better relations, tional security.” But the decision con- border states from a damaging rivalry removing obstacles it has imposed in tributed to the relative success of the between Russia and NATO. areas like the import of Georgian U.S.-Russia summit in July 2009, and Formal arrangements that ad- wine and vegetables. Concessions are to Moscow’s more positive attitude dressed the problem of conflicting also needed on the part of both since then. territorial interests in the past — like Gazprom and Kyiv regarding the tran- On the issue of Iran, President Austrian neutrality, or the old Rapacki sit of oil and gas through Ukraine. Dmitry Medvedev has appeared Plan for Central Europe — are proba- In addition, the U.S. should pro- more forthcoming than Prime Minis- bly non-starters. But we should at least vide targeted foreign assistance. The ter Vladimir Putin, accepting at least try to come to some understanding aim of these steps would be to the possibility that sanctions may be with Moscow that the Near Abroad is demonstrate that there are concrete necessary if Tehran continues to move not a sphere of influence for any single benefits to be gained from Russo- ahead with its nuclear program. state, but a showcase for joint concern American cooperation in the region. Moscow is also allowing U.S. troops and mutual restraint. On the issues of Abkhazia and and supplies to transit Russia in sup- It would be politically suicidal for South Ossetia, we need to encourage port of the war in Afghanistan, and the Obama administration to formally Tbilisi to recognize that it would re-
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quire war to impose Georgian rule a dead-end and dangerous policy in over the separate ethnic populations the Near Abroad. ■ of the two enclaves, which already ex- The U.S. should pelled local Georgians. Moreover, Thompson Buchanan was a Foreign any effort to invade these territories give priority to Service officer from 1955 to 1981, serv- would provide Russia with a pretext ing as deputy chief of mission in Bu- for destroying Georgia. improving relations with rundi, Gabon and Norway, among The realistic hope is that, over time, other assignments. His Russian ex- there can be a slow revival of com- Moscow over sticking pertise dates from 1948, when he merce and dialogue among Abkhazia, worked for the Office of Intelligence South Ossetia and Tbilisi, possibly lead- with a dead-end, Research at State. He later served ing to some form of federation in the three tours in Russia, including assign- future. But this will only happen when dangerous policy. ments as political counselor and consul Moscow decides that peace in the re- general in Leningrad. In post-commu- gion serves its larger interests. nist Russia, he interviewed refugees for Critics of the administration will the Immigration and Naturalization undoubtedly complain that America Service and worked on aid projects. As will lose face if it backs away from the terms of the greater U.S. national in- a member of DACOR and the Cosmos commitment to support NATO mem- terest, it is more important to improve Club, he has sponsored numerous lec- bership for Tbilisi and Kyiv. But in relations with Russia than to insist on tures on Russia and Central Asia.
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IRAQ, IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES Laszlo Kubinyi
THE ROUTE TO DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND TEHRAN COULD RUN THROUGH BAGHDAD.
BY SELIG S. HARRISON
he 2003 American invasion of Iraq aroused both anxiety and hope in Iran. The advent of U.S. military forces and bases on its western border posed a potential threat to its security. At the same time, the destruction of the Sunni-dominated Saddam Hussein dictatorship stirred expectations that the Shiite majority in Iraq would comeT into its own, at last, after five centuries of Sunni minority rule, and that Iraq would tilt toward Iran after U.S. forces left.
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Seven years later, the Obama ad- For nearly five centuries, treaty that defined the boundary ministration remains committed to between Safavid Persia and the ad- the withdrawal of all U.S. forces Iran has been hoping Sunni vancing Ottoman Turks, who push- from Iraq by the end of 2011. How- ed Persia out of what was to be- ever, major uncertainties remain minority rule would end come the modern state of Iraq. concerning our future role there As Richard D. Frye observes in and how it will affect Iran. in Iraq, allowing Tehran The Golden Age of Persia, “The sep- Two key emerging issues have aration of eastern and western Iran special importance in Iranian eyes. to regain some of its is evident, and throughout Iran’s One is whether the U.S. Air Force history the western part of the land will be able to continue using the old influence. has been frequently more closely bases it has developed in Iraq to de- connected with the lowlands of ploy long-range bombers capable of Mesopotamia than with the rest of striking Iran. The other is whether the United States will the plateau to the east of the central deserts.” continue to tolerate the political dominance of Tehran-ori- Before 1639, Persia had extensive influence in Mesopo- ented Shiite political forces in Iraq, as it has done since the tamia through local Shiite principalities. The Shia religious 2005 elections, or will work, instead, with Saudi Arabia to universe embraced parts of both Persia and Mesopotamia, contain Iranian influence in Baghdad. Washington’s posi- and the Shia faithful commuted between religious centers tion on these little-discussed issues could well prove to be on both sides, just as they do today. (An estimated four of critical importance in its ongoing effort to negotiate a million Iranians visited Karbala and Najaf in Iraq last year modus vivendi with Iran. and some two million Iraqis visited Qom in Iran.) After The centrality of Iraq in Iranian attitudes toward the 1639, the Turks and, later, the British installed a succes- United States was underlined to me repeatedly during sion of Sunni puppet regimes in Iraq. Then came Saddam three visits to Tehran in 2007 and 2008. On one of these Hussein’s Sunni dictatorship and his invasion of Iran in trips, I attended a four-hour seminar with 15 Iranian spe- 1980, launched with U.S. help and encouragement. cialists on Iraq from different government agencies, What Vaezi’s reference to 1639 meant was that for arranged at my request. nearly five centuries, Iran has been hoping the day would “You know, we’ve been waiting for this moment since come when Sunni minority rule would end in Baghdad, 1639,” commented Mahmoud Vaezi, a former deputy for- and Tehran would get back some of its old influence. eign minister who now directs the Center for Strategic Re- search, a think-tank affiliated with the Expediency Coun- In Friendly Hands? cil, a government body headed by former President Ali During the Foreign Ministry seminar, S.A. Niknam, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. I didn’t know what had hap- who had been chargé d’affaires in the Iranian embassy in pened in 1639, but soon learned that it was the year in Baghdad for five years during the Iran-Iraq War, ex- which the Treaty of Qasr-i-Shirin was signed. This was the claimed: “How can you accuse us of ‘interfering’ in Iraq? You have come from 6,000 miles away with 160,000 sol- Selig S. Harrison visited Iran in June 2007 and in Febru- diers. We are an immediate neighbor with a 1,000-mile ary and June 2008. As South Asia bureau chief of the border and intimate historical, religious and economic ties Washington Post and, later, as a senior associate of the going back centuries. You helped Saddam against us in a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he did re- war that cost us more than 300,000 lives, so naturally we search there before the 1979 revolution and authored a want to be sure that Iraq is in friendly hands.” study of its ethnic tensions, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: By a “friendly” Iraq, Iran means one dominated by its Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (CEIP, 1980), Shiite co-religionists, who make up about 62 percent of as well as four other books on Asian affairs and U.S.-Asian the population. Thus, Tehran was delighted when the relations. He is a senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson United States, prodded by United Nations mediator International Center and director of the Asia Program at Lakhdar Brahimi and Iraq’s pre-eminent Shiite cleric, the Center for International Policy. Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani, bowed to demands
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for elections in 2005 on terms that Tehran has carefully avoided could lead to a rebirth of al-Qaida assured the victory of the Shiite ma- activity in Iraq. And in Iranian eyes, jority. committing to any single the Sunni Awakening has aroused Then and now, Iran has carefully deep suspicion that Washington is avoided committing fully to any fac- faction in Iraq’s internal pursuing a conscious “divide and tion in Iraq’s internal Shiite power rule” strategy designed to build up struggles. The Ministry of Intelli- Shiite power struggles. a Sunni counterweight to Shiite gence and Security, also known as power. VEVAK, and other Iranian intelli- The death of Supreme Council gence agencies have assisted militias maintained by both leader al-Hakim on Aug. 26, 2009, accentuated a power the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the vehicle of the struggle within the Shiite leadership that could affect the Shiite mercantile and middle classes, and Moqtada al- stability of the Baghdad government, but it is not likely to Sadr’s urban populist movement. They have also worked weaken Iran’s political clout in Baghdad. Iran orchestrated closely with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s smaller the creation of a new Shiite coalition at a meeting last Au- Daawa Party, and have gradually increased their influence gust that united the ISCI, al-Sadr’s forces and the Tanzim- in the internal security agencies of his ISCI-linked regime. al-Iraq branch of Daawa in the new United Iraqi Alliance. Soon after its 2003 invasion, the United States spon- sored the creation of the National Intelligence Service, “A Disgraceful Pact” headed by a longtime anti-Saddam CIA ally, Mohammed Al-Maliki, like many other Shiite political leaders of his Shahwani, a Sunni. Al-Maliki countered by installing an generation, spent the Iran-Iraq War years (1980-1988) in Iran-trained VEVAK protégé, Sheerwan al-Waeli, as head exile in Iran and has longstanding ties with VEVAK. Ini- of the Ministry of National Security, and succeeded in re- tially, he had Tehran’s blessing when he became prime min- placing Shahwani with his own man in August 2009. ister, but relations suffered during the protracted struggle Iranian concerns about the direction of U.S. policy have with the Bush administration in 2007 and 2008 over the focused on the so-called “Sunni Awakening” that the terms of the security agreement under which the United George W. Bush administration promoted after the 2005 States has pledged to withdraw all of its combat forces. parliamentary elections. This amounted to the employment When a draft U.S.-Iraq accord without a withdrawal of some 91,000 mercenaries in Sunni militias under U.S. timetable was signed on March 17, 2008, it remained a control in a program aimed at improving security that cost well-kept secret until nationalist critics within al-Maliki’s an estimated $150 million per year at its peak. Each fighter inner circle leaked it to Iranian diplomats and to the Iraqi was nominally paid $300 a month. But as Steven Simon media. The reaction in Tehran was explosive. On May 11, points out in his article in the May/June 2008 Foreign Af- 2008, Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the hardline daily fairs, the Sunni tribal sheiks involved took “as much as 20 newspaper Kayhan, attacked the agreement in a vitriolic percent of every payment to a former insurgent,” which signed editorial titled “Iraq on the Edge.” He handed a meant that “commanding 200 fighters could be worth over copy to me during an hourlong interview this past June. a hundred thousand dollars a year for a tribal chief.” “If you want to know what has been happening,” he Because the Sunni militias posed a direct challenge to said, “I suggest you read this.” Shariatmadari is the “Per- the predominantly Shiite army that al-Maliki was building sonal Representative of the Supreme Leader,” Ayatollah up, ISCI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim complained that Ali Khamenei, and is seen as his media spokesman. “weapons should be in the hands of the government only, “How is it,” the editorial asked, “that the Maliki govern- and the government alone should decide who gets them. ment took the first steps toward signing such a disgraceful The alternative will be perpetual civil war.” pact in the first place?” The United States, it said, is using Pressure from al-Maliki eventually led to the termina- the treaty to “sow the seeds of discord” between al-Maliki tion of the program in return for promises that the demo- and his coalition partner, al-Hakim, so that “the U.S. can bilized fighters would be absorbed into his army. But this put pro-American individuals in charge. It is amazing that has yet to happen on any significant scale. In Baghdad, al-Maliki failed to see such a conspiracy coming.” In a clear the principal legacy of the program is Sunni outrage that warning to the prime minister, the editorial added that if
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the treaty is implemented, Iraqis What remains missing And on Nov. 18, 2008, after hag- would replace his government with gling over seven drafts, a final ver- “another Islamist government.” from the U.S. posture is a sion of the agreement was adopted, Al-Maliki was summoned to providing for the full withdrawal of Tehran for a three-day dressing- readiness to acknowledge U.S. combat forces by Dec. 31, down (June 7-9, 2008) that led to his 2011. To cover its retreat, the announcement, on June 13 in Am- that Tehran, too, has White House maintained that the man, that negotiations with the success of the “surge” policy had United States had reached “a dead security concerns. enabled Iraq to stand on its own, re- end and a deadlock.” Informants in leasing pent-up nationalist opposi- government-affiliated think-tanks tion to the presence of foreign told me that he had had “difficult” meetings, as one put it, soldiers. This, in turn, had supposedly compelled al-Ma- with Khamenei and with the Revolutionary Guard gener- liki to insist on a withdrawal timetable so that his oppo- als who oversee Iraqi policy. Soon thereafter, Iranian news- nents could not use nationalism against him in the papers reported, al-Maliki’s defense minister signed a forthcoming elections. But what this explanation omitted mutual security accord with his Iranian counterpart. It has was the crucial role that Iran had played in al-Maliki’s con- never been made public. version. The deadlock between Baghdad and Washington Alireza Sheikhattar, who was first deputy foreign min- ended when the Bush administration agreed that the pro- ister when I visited Tehran in June 2008, told me that Iran jected security agreement would have a “time horizon.” would not allow the continued operation of U.S. air bases
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that could make Iraq “a platform for The principal legacy of the bases two squadrons of F-16 fighter- harming the security of Iran and bombers, each capable of carrying 24 other neighbors. Why should the U.S. surge in Iraq is Sunni tons of bombs. Balad has also been a U.S. have air bases in Iraq?” Bagh- launching pad for Qatar-based B-1 dad can take care of its own defense, outrage that could lead bombers and Predator unmanned he said, “and the Iraqis should have a espionage surveillance aircraft. real air force of their own. Why are to a rebirth of al-Qaida Spread out over 15 square miles, they prohibited from having more Balad was second only to Heathrow than token aircraft and related facili- activity there. Airport in London in the volume of ties, even for civil aviation? They are its air traffic at the height of the war not poor. They can purchase fighters in Iraq. The expansion and mod- and have their own aircraft for both internal and external ernization of the base has been steadily proceeding, with security.” $87 million allocated to new construction in the fiscal 2007 budget and $58.3 million more in 2008. This has included Addressing Security Concerns hardening its two 11,000-foot runways, which will now be Wouldn’t this pose a potential security threat to Iran? serviceable until 2014, and installing the latest lighting Not if Iraq has a sovereign, democratic government, technology for night operations. “We’re good now for as Sheikhattar said. “There is an absolute majority in favor of long as we need to run it,” the Chief Air Force Engineer Iran” now that the Shiite government is in control, he as- there, Lt. Col. Scott Hoover, told Associated Press corre- sured me. spondent Charles J. Hanley. “Ten years?” Hanley asked. Iraq is now seeking to buy 108 aircraft through 2011, in- “I’d say so,” he replied. cluding 36 late-model F-16 fighter-bombers from the The master plan for Balad’s expansion has served as a United States. So far the Pentagon has not made a deci- model for three other air bases near the Iranian border: sion on the F-16s, but it has agreed to sell 24 U.S. attack Al-Asad, where $76 million in new construction is under helicopters and six C-130 transport planes to Baghdad. way, Tallil and Al Kut. As if in reply to Sheikhattar, Admiral William J. Fallon, While denying that the United States wants “perma- the former commander of the U.S. Central Command, em- nent bases,” Defense Department officials acknowledge phasized in a July 20, 2008, New York Times article that that they hope for “long-term access.” And Articles 5, 6 “control of Iraqi airspace” would be an “important compo- and 7 of the security accord explicitly envisage a substan- nent of the security agreement that would require clear- tial U.S. presence and pre-positioned equipment and headed negotiations.” The final draft of the agreement gave weaponry. Iran, for its part, will no doubt be carefully “surveillance and control over Iraqi air space” to Baghdad. monitoring the type of long-range aircraft and surveillance At the same time, Article 9, Section 2 of the accord capabilities that turn up at the bases along its borders and permits U.S. aircraft “to overfly and conduct airborne re- whether they are deployed there on a regular basis. fueling;” Articles 5 and 6 envisage the continued U.S. op- The Iranians I met were reconciled to the continued eration of bases by allowing U.S. forces the “access and use” presence of U.S. military personnel for training purposes of “some necessary facilities” after the withdrawal of com- following the withdrawal of combat forces, and even to bat forces; and Article 7 envisages the pre-positioning of U.S. participation in operations against al-Qaida and other equipment under U.S. control. The provision for airborne Sunni extremist groups. But the future of the air bases will refueling was a major focus of contention in the negotia- clearly be highly contentious and could well affect the tions on the accord, because it is viewed in Tehran as giv- Obama administration’s diplomatic effort to rule out an ing the U.S. Air Force unrestricted operational latitude that Iranian nuclear weapons capability. could be used for bombing or surveillance missions in Iran. Sheikhattar, now the Iranian ambassador to Germany, Mutual Interests points in particular to the giant Balad Air Base north of What has been missing so far in the U.S. posture is a Baghdad, just 74 miles away from the Iranian border and readiness to acknowledge that Tehran, too, has security 429 miles from Tehran, where the U.S. Air Force currently concerns. This is especially clear in terms of the nuclear
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issue. It was a promise of security Shared opposition to any has already sought to distance itself guarantees that led to Tehran’s will- from the active support for “regime ingness to suspend all uranium en- breakup of Iraq could provide change” reflected in its predeces- richment in November 2004, at the sor’s overt democracy promotion start of talks with the European a basis for U.S.-Iranian and its covert support of disaffected Union on a permanent ban. And it ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, was the Bush administration’s un- cooperation in Baghdad. Iranian leaders have continued to willingness to join in such guaran- warn against U.S. support for a “Vel- tees that led to the breakdown of vet Revolution” amid the unrest that the talks and the resumption of enrichment. has followed the contested June 2009 elections. And it con- The language of the joint declaration that launched the tinues to accuse the United States of supporting Kurdish negotiations was unambiguous. “A mutually acceptable separatists as well as Jundullah, a Baluch separatist move- agreement,” it said, would not only provide “objective guar- ment. antees” that Iran’s nuclear program is “exclusively for Speaking at Bijar in Iranian Kurdistan on May 12, 2009, peaceful purposes” but would “equally provide firm com- Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared that mitments on security issues.” “unfortunately, across our borders, our western borders … In addition to security guarantees relating specifically to money, arms and organization are being used by the Amer- military issues, Iran would be likely to seek broader guar- icans in fighting the Islamic Republic’s system.” Many jour- antees in future negotiations ruling out U.S. support for nalists have long reported that Mossad, the Israeli overthrow of its government. The Obama administration intelligence agency, gives arms to Pejak, an Iranian Kur-
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dish separatist group. And New Tehran does not want Saddam Hussein. Iraq will now be, Yorker reporter Jon Lee Anderson willy-nilly, closer to Iran than to any interviewed a senior Kurdish official Iraqi Kurds to break away other external power, and it would in 2008 who said that Pejak operates be self-defeating for the United out of bases in Iraqi Kurdistan with and link up with Kurds States to fly in the face of this reality “covert U.S. support” to conduct by aligning with Sunni interests in raids in Iran. in Iran and Turkey. Baghdad. Precisely because Tehran fears To be sure, the United States Kurdish separatism, Iran shares the does have a moral obligation to do goal of a unified Iraq with the United States. It does not what it can to minimize persecution of Sunnis. But there is want to see the Iraqi Kurds break away and link up with the no escaping the hard reality that they will now have to ad- Kurds in Iran and Turkey. just to Shia dominance, just as the Shias did for so long This shared opposition to the balkanization of Iraq and a under Sunni rule. mutual interest in promoting its economic stability provide Ray Takeyh, a leading Iran scholar who has advised the the basis for U.S.-Iranian cooperation in Baghdad — but Obama administration, puts it well. “The door to walk into only if Washington is sensitive to Iranian security concerns a larger negotiation between the United States and Iran and recognizes that Tehran views the maintenance of a would be through Iraq,” he said, “where there is some co- “friendly” regime in Iraq as essential to its security. incidence of interests. But you can’t do that if your declared George W. Bush sharply limited U.S. options when he policy is to prevent a country next door from having any in- ended five centuries of minority Sunni rule by deposing fluence in the country that is right there.” ■
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ACHIEVING CLOSURE ON IRAQ’S PREWAR WMD Laszlo Kubinyi
UNDERSTANDING WHY IT TURNED OUT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD NO WMD PROVIDES INSIGHTS USEFUL IN OTHER SITUATIONS.
BY CHARLES A. DUELFER
even years after the United States removed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein from power, a wide range of accepted “truths” persist concerning whether Baghdad actually possessed weapons of mass destruction. Many of these are wrong; others are partially accurate, but represent little more than “bumper-sticker” characterization of a pivotal,S but quite complicated, issue. In some ways, current misunderstandings about Iraq’s WMD are as off the mark as the prewar assumptions, but in different ways.
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Many factors contribute to these We now know that there Unintended Consequences persistent fallacies. Misconceptions When international inspections and miscalculations evolve from were no militarily significant began in 1991, following the war to mindsets and biases that grow over liberate Kuwait, neither Saddam time — on all sides and for numer- WMD stocks in Iraq when Hussein nor anyone else had a clear ous reasons. idea of what to expect. The U.N. Se- For example, Saddam himself de- U.S. forces occupied curity Council’s resolution ending the liberately projected alternative views war (UNSCR 687) linked the lifting of reality to keep his enemies (internal Baghdad in April 2003. of sanctions to Iraq’s compliance with and external) confused, remaining WMD disarmament, as verified by ambiguous about his (lack of) WMD teams from the U.N. Special Com- to keep Tehran off-balance. In his experience, WMD had mission and the International Atomic Energy Agency. been extremely useful. It had helped save him during the Saddam reasonably assumed that these inspectors war with Iran in the 1980s and — as he saw it — deterred would make some visits to Iraq and, in a fashion similar to the United States from taking him out in 1991. previous IAEA inspectors, certify the absence of weapons Saddam Hussein’s leadership style also instilled uncer- of mass destruction. The process would then end. Other tainty and fear among his minions concerning what they governments had similar expectations, reflecting the fact should do or report, especially regarding WMD. So he that policymakers in Washington and other capitals had knew that he could not trust the reports of his own people. taken a short-term view in crafting the resolutions. And if Saddam had doubts about what was going on in In the wake of the surprisingly swift, low-cost victory, Iraq, how could outside analysts make accurate judgments Washington’s priority was to lock in the success and limit founded on facts rather than expectations? Baghdad’s ability to re-emerge as an aggressive power. For the record: There were no militarily significant There was also an unspoken belief that Saddam’s regime stocks of chemical or biological agents (much less nuclear would soon fall due to internal instability, fueled by popu- weapons-related development programs) in Iraq when lar anger over the nation’s military defeat. No one fore- U.S. forces occupied Baghdad in April 2003. The country saw that the sanctions would be the root and branch of did have limited numbers of prohibited long-range ballis- ongoing international conflict for over a decade. tic missiles, however, giving Saddam the option of deploy- The parallel with the punitive terms the Treaty of Ver- ing WMD when circumstances permitted. sailles imposed on Germany following World War I — and This “absence of WMD” is, however, only one point on their consequences — went unrecognized or ignored. In- the long curve of the Saddam regime’s behavior. It is an deed, even sophisticated international policy analysts still important point, to be sure (especially for politicians), but miss the fact that the U.N. Iraq resolution constituted co- it does not convey the regime’s internal dynamics, nor its ercive disarmament, not an arms control accord. intentions for the future. And it certainly ignores impor- Following the letter of the law, UNSCOM inspectors tant matters of context. demanded that Iraq give up something it adamantly did not want to yield. Just as Germany had sought to thwart Charles A. Duelfer was the deputy executive chairman, the Allied inspectors monitoring its disarmament, Saddam, and then acting chairman, of the United Nations Special we later learned, set as his highest priority the removal of Commission on Iraq from 1993 until its termination in sanctions, and at the lowest cost in terms of compliance 2000. He was in the country from April to August 2003 and prestige. He therefore tested the process from the and later headed the Iraq Survey Group throughout 2004, start, giving inspection teams minimal access and only producing the Comprehensive Report on Iraq WMD turning over the most obvious Scud missiles and chemical (known as the “Duelfer Report”) for the Director of Cen- weapons. In fact, just weeks after the inspections began, tral Intelligence. He now consults on a range of intelligence Baghdad blatantly denied inspectors access to locations and security management topics with Omnis, Inc., and is known to contain weapons materials. the author of Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq In response, the Security Council held emergency (Public Affairs, 2009). meetings but could only agree to send the heads of the
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IAEA and UNSCOM to Baghdad to After 9/11, flate these tyrants, raising them to our discuss the issue. Gifted with an ex- level, every time a president publicly quisite talent for the use of power, Saddam was too slow to denounces them.) Saddam correctly concluded that he And until 1998, Saddam and other could block inspections at a low cost understand that the world Iraqis clung to the belief that a soften- — certainly nothing that would threat- ing of relations with Washington was en his regime. This early lesson set the had changed. possible. After all, during the 1980s tone for years of growing friction with the United States had stayed relatively inspectors. The worst that would hap- close to Baghdad as it fought against pen if he blocked or delayed inspectors for an hour or two the common threat Tehran posed — even as Baghdad while a site was “cleansed,” a favorite Iraqi tactic, was a con- used chemical munitions against the Iranians (and the tinuation of sanctions and very limited military strikes. Kurds inside Iraq). Throughout the 1990s, senior Iraqis Secure in that knowledge, Saddam worked to maneu- repeatedly asked me what it would take to re-engage with ver his way out of sanctions while conceding the least Washington. They requested that I convey to the White amount of access to the inspectors. The dogged persist- House their willingness to do almost anything — cooper- ence of UNSCOM and IAEA teams over the years even- ate against fundamentalists, help in the Middle East peace tually resulted in Iraq largely being disarmed of WMD — process — if only Washington would talk to Baghdad. In but no one outside Iraq was convinced of this. Indeed, the words of one official, Baghdad could be “the best U.S. analysts came to assume that the regime always dis- friend of the United States in the region, bar none.” sembled — and that it did so precisely because it had There was never a direct response. Publicly, our posi- something to hide: WMD. tion was consistent: Baghdad had to comply with all U.N. resolutions, and then relations could improve. At the same The Problem of Sanctions time, there were regular statements that the U.S. favored Gradually, Saddam also realized that the Security regime change and had no expectation that Saddam would Council (most particularly, the U.S.) would not act to lift comply with the U.N. resolutions. sanctions, no matter how much he did to comply with its Saddam did not know if these were just words, or more. terms. This, of course, touched on the basic fallacy in the To his highly honed sense of power and influence, it West’s approach: No one really believed that if sanctions seemed inevitable that the U.S. and Iraq would reconcile. were lifted, Saddam would continue to comply with the dis- The two nations’ interests were congruent. Both were sec- armament goals. Moreover, it was highly improbable, once ular governments. Moreover, Iraq was the bulwark against oil and commerce began flowing freely, that the Council the radicals in Iran. And as the most powerful Arab coun- would ever agree to reinstate sanctions. Saddam was astute try, with great resources including skillful engineers and in giving out oil contracts and too many Council members industrious people, Iraq was far more important than the would have too great a stake in continuing the flow. tribes running the Gulf sheikdoms. Until 1998, Saddam I discussed this dynamic candidly with many senior calculated that Washington would eventually “get over” regime officials, both before and after the 2003 Iraq War. the invasion of Kuwait and resume close ties. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz deftly used it to drive a Regime officials never grasped that it would be politi- wedge between Security Council members. Russia, cal suicide for an American leader to open a dialogue with France and China were inclined to relieve constraints on Saddam, no matter what the terms. Nor did they fully un- Saddam, while the U.S. and Britain remained determined derstand the uproar over Monica Lewinsky; to them it was to contain him. inconceivable that a relationship with an intern could hob- Still, Saddam Hussein never lost sight of the fact that ble a superpower. But once Baghdad realized how badly Washington was the major player. It was obvious that he the Clinton administration had been weakened, it pressed derived prestige from being the only leader to stand up the UNSCOM inspection issue to a conclusion. and confront the last superpower. Less obvious was his Based on the judgment that inspectors could not func- view that he would also attain such status by being allied tion under the conditions Baghdad had imposed, the with Washington. (A general note: We unnecessarily in- United States — supported only by the United Kingdom
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— conducted four days of bombing in December 1998. But Saddam was too slow to understand that the world had The UNSCOM inspectors left and never returned, and the changed. After all, he had no connection with the perpe- Security Council was mightily divided. trators or with al-Qaida generally, so he did not foresee As Tariq Aziz later told me, Iraq had a choice of sanc- that the U.S. would treat him as an equivalent emerging tions with inspectors or sanctions without them. No one threat that had to be dealt with once and for all. should have been surprised when it chose the latter. Only after President George W. Bush gave his 2002 State of the Union address denouncing Iraq as a member A Fateful Year of the “Axis of Evil” did Saddam begin to appreciate the By the time President George W. Bush took office in gravity of his position. But he was still unwilling to accept 2001, a decade after his father’s smashing military victory a resumption of inspections (without an explicit commit- over Iraq, it was clear that the sanctions regime was crum- ment by the Security Council to lift sanctions), and his ob- bling. One of the first tasks of Secretary of State Colin stinacy provided evidence to those concerned about the Powell was to address this situation, which he did by pro- possibility that Iraq had begun rebuilding WMD as soon posing to the U.N. Security Council a radically reconfig- as U.N. inspectors had left Iraq three years earlier. ured sanctions program dubbed “smart sanctions.” (Tariq Ultimately, this was his fatal mistake. Had Saddam Aziz smugly dismissed them as “stupid sanctions.”) freely accepted the return of inspectors in 2002 rather than Up to this point, there had been a presumption that continuing to defy the Security Council, it is highly likely most exports to Iraq should be denied. Now there would that the momentum for invasion would have dissipated. be a list of prohibited items, while all other requests would Saddam followed this course against the advice of both normally be approved. This shift was intended, in part, to Tariq Aziz and Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, who under- lessen the effect of sanctions on the Iraqi people — but its stood the post-9/11 diplomatic climate. main goal was to retain support for any constraints on Sad- However, Saddam knew the status of his WMD pro- dam from Russia, France and other Security Council mem- grams and felt that the U.S. must know it, as well. And bers. In the pre-9/11 world, this was considered to be the having received assurances from Russia and France that best way to accomplish that goal. they would block any U.S. proposal that the United Na- Even so, by that summer Saddam Hussein appeared to tions take military action, he may have anticipated that the be on the verge of shedding U.N. sanctions — his highest Security Council would finally make a concrete promise priority — at a low cost in prestige and power. Interna- to lift sanctions if inspectors found nothing within some tional commerce was returning to life, and its oil produc- defined period of time. tion was rising. At meetings of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Iraqi delegation was The Coefficient of WMD the center of attention, with traders eagerly anticipating the To understand why it turned out that there were no full and unfettered return of Iraqi oil to the market. Sad- weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003 is to under- dam shrewdly doled out favors and oil contracts to build an stand something that may be useful in other circum- international constituency. “If you wanted to be a friend of stances. It may also convey knowledge about where Iraq when sanctions were formally dropped, then you bet- Saddam and his regime were headed. ter be a friend of Iraq now” was an effective tactic, espe- Why did Saddam use weapons of mass destruction in cially when combined with a moral argument that the certain situations and not in others? What were the un- sanctions were killing thousands of innocent Iraqis. derlying dynamics? The goal I set for the investigation of American control of substantial Iraqi airspace through Iraqi WMD programs in 2004 was to understand all the the “no-fly” zones (patrolled at great expense and risk) was factors involved, not just to discover the status of WMD a matter of extreme annoyance, but it posed no immediate inventories in 2003. threat. Saddam had a very long time horizon uncon- It is the difference between algebra and calculus. What strained by the business, election or news cycles that com- equation was Saddam Hussein attempting to solve for press Washington’s thinking, and his perspective extended which the coefficient of WMD was zero at certain points far beyond that of American politicians. and greater than zero at other times? What were the fac- That calculation was not far off the mark — until 9/11. tors and constants that comprised this equation? And
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could the West have figured out how The 2003 war had nothing tions on the ground. While U.N. in- to affect Iraqi calculations? spectors may not have believed Sad- Certainly we knew in the fall of to do with intelligence dam was compliant, they certainly 2002 that Saddam was not complying knew that it would be extremely hard with the U.N. Security Council reso- failures about Iraq’s WMD to prove he was not. And at the lutions aimed at containing his United Nations, process can be an regime. He had not allowed inspec- programs; it stemmed from end in itself, becoming an endless en- tions for almost four years and was deavor that never comes to resolution. actively working on ballistic missiles errors of judgment in Among intelligence analysts, the (with assistance from Russian techni- predominant hypothesis was that in cians, we learned after the war). It using intelligence. the absence of inspections during the was clear that Iraq was importing con- previous years, Saddam would have ventional military equipment from been crazy not to rebuild his weapons. suppliers willing to violate U.N. sanctions. The result was an extraordinary focus on WMD assessments In post-9/11 Washington, Iraq was a problem to be and extremely limited supporting intelligence. (I would ob- solved, not managed. The Bush administration tried to ad- serve that the data supporting assessments about current dress it through the United Nations — but only because it Iranian nuclear efforts dwarf the tidbits underlying the es- believed there was no way Saddam could (or would) com- timates of Iraqi nuclear activity made in 2002.) ply with the U.N. resolutions. However, those who made When the Iraq Survey Group completed its analysis of that argument did not have much experience with inspec- the regime and its relationship to weapons programs in
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2004, it was clear Saddam had anticipated that, once he re- Operating in the Dark turned to more normal relations with the rest of the world, The combative interactions between U.N. weapons he would be able to rebuild his arsenal, including WMD. inspectors and Iraqi officials throughout the 1990s largely But before the war, the picture was complicated and nu- established the mindsets and biases that led to misappre- anced. We had no analogue in Washington for Saddam’s hensions and miscalculations on both sides in 2000-2003. thinking or the internal operations of his regime. For U.S. Once Baghdad was rid of all international inspectors in politicians, ignorant of the Baghdad mindset, it was impos- 1998, Washington lost virtually all knowledge of what was sible to have anything more than a cartoon image of Sad- going on inside Iraq. The relatively detailed data UN- dam Hussein. SCOM had generated suddenly vanished, leaving the U.S. Even many intelligence analysts found it difficult to with no independent sources. fathom Baghdad, given the few opportunities to interact Our intelligence analysts nonetheless were obliged with Iraqis inside Iraq. As an intelligence analyst, how can to make their best guesses about Iraq’s WMD program. you see or collect data about something for which you have Based on previous experience with Saddam’s behavior no word or concept? and their caution about underestimating his military Likewise, Saddam had vast misperceptions about Wash- might (as the West did prior to the 1991 war), there was ington. Among them, he and his government assumed that an altogether natural tendency to presume Baghdad the last superpower must be well-informed. Baghdad would reconstitute WMD in the absence of any inspec- made critical decisions in 1998 concerning inspectors under tors — and be able to conceal such efforts under the the assumption that the United States knew Iraq had elim- cover of the renewed trade between Iraq and the out- inated its WMD systems. side world that was flourishing under the U.N. Oil-for-
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Food program. establish relations in ministries of Saddam’s government Iraqi leaders had informed UNSCOM that their pos- were blocked. The refusal to use such knowledge and as- session and use of weapons of mass destruction were vital sessments led to monumental blunders such as de-Baathi- in the war against Iran in the 1980s. Later, they believed fication and the decision to disband the Iraqi Army. that the prospect of encountering WMD had deterred Indeed, the White House refused to undertake even lim- U.S. troops from driving all the way to Baghdad in 1991. ited covert activities aimed at facilitating carefully limited Aware of this, Iraq analysts back in Washington figured immediate changes to the very top levels. Instead, it Saddam would be missing a trick if he did not rebuild his opted for the wholesale destruction of the existing appa- WMD stockpiles. They were right about the plan, but ratus of government. not the timing. Saddam was going to wait until after the In my opinion, the bulk of the resulting postwar chaos sanctions were lifted. in Iraq was avoidable. While Saddam Hussein was a prob- In conclusion, let me offer one more observation. It is lem that had to be addressed one way or another, the true that our intelligence assessments concerning Iraqi tragedy was that it did not need to be done so badly. This WMD were largely wrong and mistakenly flaunted in the costly miscalculation did not derive from mistakes about prewar political environment. However, our intelligence Iraq WMD inventories, but from ignoring readily avail- about the internal dynamics of Iraq and how the nation able evidence about the internal dynamics of Iraq. On was held together was largely correct. these points, the intelligence community (and some old The real problem is that the Bush administration re- hands in State) had far better knowledge. Yet for reasons fused to tap those perspectives when it made major deci- best known to themselves, political leaders chose not to sions about postwar governance. Prewar actions to act on this intelligence. ■
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THE U.S. AND TURKEY: BACK FROM THE BRINK Laszlo Kubinyi
AMERICAN, IRAQI AND TURKISH POLICYMAKERS SHOULD CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON PROMOTING DIALOGUE AND MAKING COMMON CAUSE.
BY ROSS WILSON
elations between Turkey and the United States foundered between 2003 and 2007 over various issues, the most important of which was Iraq. Disagreement over the U.S.-led invasion diminished Ankara’s standing in Washington, produced Turkish public antipathy toward American policy in the region and, most importantly,R undermined our governments’ ability to cooperate on Iraq and other issues. Getting the nexus of Turkey-Iraq issues right was job number-one for U.S. Mission Turkey between 2005 and 2008.
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Diplomacy and policy changes in Disagreements about Iraq In addition, an economic aid both capitals successfully transformed package that would have sped re- perceptions of the Iraq problem and provoked the worst covery from Turkey’s 2001 financial put U.S.-Turkish relations back on crisis died, as did talk about a possi- track. Given the challenges that lie downturn in U.S.-Turkish ble Qualified Industrial Zone trade ahead, American, Iraqi and Turkish preference arrangement. policymakers should continue to relations since the 1974 Other events reinforced the neg- focus on dialogue, achieving common atives. cause, and addressing specific issues Cyprus crisis. • On July 4, 2003, U.S. forces of concern. detained and “hooded” a Turkish Special Forces contingent in Suley- Three Problems maniye. (Turkey has had many hundreds of troops sta- Disagreement about Iraq provoked the worst down- tioned in northern Iraq since the 1990s, and it still does.) turn in U.S.-Turkish relations since the 1974 crisis over The details of the incident remain obscure. Whatever Cyprus. The issue had several components: the events of the cause and despite U.S. apologies, Turks saw it as a 2003 and their legacy, Turks’ negative view of U.S. oper- national humiliation. The chief of the Turkish General ations and tactics and, especially, the presence in north- Staff declared a “crisis of confidence” with the United ern Iraq of terrorists from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party States. The act of revenge for Suleymaniye that opened (known in English as the PKK). A significant ethnic mi- the viciously anti-American film “Valley of the Wolves: nority in Turkey, the Kurds have fought for decades to Iraq” helped make it one of the most popular movies ever maintain their cultural heritage and gain basic civil rights. produced in Turkey. In the late 1970s, the PKK launched an armed rebellion • Sensationalist media coverage turned the Novem- against Aukara for an independent Kurdish state. ber 2004 U.S. military operation to regain control of Fal- As is well known, the Turkish Parliament failed on lujah into a horror story full of civilian casualties caused March 1, 2003, to pass a government-backed measure by our reported use of white phosphorus. Turkish Prime that would have allowed the U.S. Army 4th Infantry Di- Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called the victims “mar- vision and other forces to enter Turkey and then invade tyrs,” and one of his party’s parliamentarians denounced Iraq from the south. The lack of support and disruption the operation as “genocide.” A similar operation in 2005 to U.S. plans were big setbacks for U.S.-Turkish relations. at Tal Afar, home to a large number of ethnic kinsmen, High-level consultations, especially among senior de- the Turcomen, produced even more lurid headlines. fense officials, dried up. Secretary of Defense Donald • Whether the picture was of Abu Ghraib or mosques Rumsfeld did not visit Ankara during his remaining bombed, whether the United States was responsible or three-and-one-half years in office. Our bilateral High- not, everything in Iraq seemed to reflect badly on us, our Level Defense Group virtually ceased to function and in- role in the region and our relations with Turkey. teractions among our militaries shriveled, reflecting estrangement as well as the exigencies of war. (U.S. use The PKK of Incirlik Air Base was a key survivor as our security re- The most intractable component of our problems with lationship turned downhill. Along with arrangements to Turkey over Iraq was the PKK. After the 1999 capture ship non-lethal supplies by ground across Turkey, it has and rendition to Turkey of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, remained an important link to U.S. forces in Iraq and the group declared a ceasefire in its campaign. Attacks Afghanistan.) did not entirely stop, but calm returned to Turkey’s south- east, and the state of emergency there ended. The PKK Ross Wilson was U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan from 2000 then regrouped at its northern Iraq camps just below the to 2003 and to Turkey from 2005 to 2008. A career Foreign border and at Qandil Mountain, 100 kilometers to the Service officer, he also served in Moscow, Prague, Mel- south. Larger-scale terrorism resumed in 2005. bourne and Washington, D.C. He retired in 2008 and is a Whenever the PKK’s northern Iraq presence got too visiting lecturer at The George Washington University. irritating in the 1990s, Turkish troops had entered Iraq to
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hit it — without objection from Sad- President George W. Bush’s Diplomacy and Decision dam Hussein. After the U.S. inva- It seemed obvious in 2005 that sion, however, cross-border action Nov. 5, 2007, meeting with getting the Iraq problem in U.S.- was no longer possible. Washington Turkish relations fixed was essen- thought this might unhinge the Iraqi Turkish Prime Minister tial. Iraq was our nation’s top Kurds, potentially unsettle the most foreign policy priority. We needed stable part of the country, and per- Recep Tayyip Erdogan Turkey’s help and cooperation haps have other unintended conse- there, as well as an end to the Iraq- quences. And U.S. officials respon- proved to be a turning point. related enmity that was degrading sible for Iraq policy had more im- a decades-old alliance and under- mediate concerns than 3,500-odd mining our work on terrorism, en- fighters located in remote border regions who, whatever ergy, Iran and other issues. So we increased our their other sins, did not target Iraqis or Americans. consultations with Ankara on Iraq, made common cause But as terrorist attacks in Turkey mounted, claiming on several of those issues, and addressed specific prob- hundreds of lives, Turks increasingly blamed the PKK’s lems, especially the PKK. Policy changes in both Wash- de facto sanctuary in northern Iraq. They demanded ington and Ankara were essential. that either we or the Iraqis act, or that Turkish forces be Dialogue: Much of diplomacy consists of talking with allowed to do so. U.S. acquiescence to Israel’s July 2006 and listening to others, so expanding our consultations cross-border invasion of Lebanon to fight Hezbollah ac- with Turkey on Iraq was an obvious — and relatively easy centuated these demands, especially when it was fol- — point of departure. lowed in August by at least 13 bomb attacks in Istanbul • Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s coordinator and other urban centers. Many Turks concluded that for Iraq, Ambassador David Satterfield, became a fre- we and the Iraqi Kurds tacitly — or perhaps even ac- quent visitor to Ankara, and both he and his predecessor, tively — supported the PKK. Seizures from captured Ambassador James Jeffrey (now ambassador to Turkey), fighters of U.S.-origin small arms (provided to Iraq for as well as senior National Security Council staff respon- security forces there) seemed to confirm this. sible for Iraq, made plenty of time available for Turkish Our embrace of the Kurdistan Regional Govern- visitors to Washington. ment and calls by reputable figures outside the Bush • Multinational Force-Iraq Commanding Generals administration to divide Iraq along ethnic lines added David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno initiated regular the specter of Kurdistan to Turks’ angst. It seemed to meetings with the Turkish deputy chiefs of the General some that our goals for Iraq included an independent Staff, Generals Ergin Saygun and Hasan Igsiz. Kurdistan that might even take in a chunk of Turkey’s • U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad (later southeast as a reward for the Iraqi Kurds’ support in Ryan Crocker) visited Turkey, as well, and they and em- deposing Saddam Hussein in 2003 — and retribution bassy staff met often with the Turkish ambassador to Iraq for Turkey’s lack thereof. (first Ünal Çeviköz, then Derya Kanbay). In May 2007, a suicide bomber in Ankara targeted • Embassy Ankara staff were frequent guests of Turk- Turkey’s military commander. More attacks followed, ish Foreign Ministry Iraq Coordinators Ambassadors and matters came to a head when PKK attacks over Oguz Çelikkol and Murat Özçelik, briefing them on de- three out of four consecutive weekends in September velopments, identifying upcoming issues and soliciting and October 2007 claimed dozens of casualties near the Turkish views. border in southeast Turkey. No democratically elected • Iraq usually headed the agenda when Sec. Rice and government could allow such violence to go unan- Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas swered, and Turkey’s parliament passed a measure on Burns (later William Burns) met with their counterparts. Oct. 17 authorizing a cross-border operation. This was the And the “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue” initia- picture when Prime Minister Erdogan arrived in Wash- tive launched by Sec. Rice and Foreign Minister Abdul- ington to meet President George W. Bush on Nov. 5 of lah Gül in 2006 put Iraq in the middle of a compre- that year. hensive dialogue about the region.
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• Vice President Richard Che- The most intractable and Iran. Turkey hosted the second ney, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Expanded Neighbors ministerial in General Peter Pace (later Admiral component of our Iraq November 2007. Michael Mullin), National Security Addressing the PKK Issue: These Advisor Stephen Hadley, and NATO problems with Turkey during necessary steps only marginally im- Supreme Allied Commander Gen- proved the atmosphere with Turkey, eral James Jones (later Bantz Crad- this period was the PKK. however, for the PKK problem re- dock) played key roles, as well. mained a chronic and growing ache. Common Cause: We also identi- We tried several initiatives. A fied and pursued areas where we could cooperate. For- 2004-2005 effort to conduct trilateral diplomacy with eign Minister Gül and Ambassador Khalilzad teamed up in Turkey and Iraq on the PKK wasn’t taken seriously in Bagh- December 2005 to cajole a public commitment from Sunni dad, and its lack of results disillusioned Ankara. State De- leaders (including Tariq al-Hashemi, later an Iraqi vice partment Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism Frank president) to abandon their boycott and join Iraqi politics. Urbancic led an effort to engage authorities in Europe on We consulted on further efforts in 2006 and 2007 to draw the PKK terrorist and criminal networks there that funded other disaffected Sunni groups into the political process. its operations in northern Iraq and elsewhere. In support of Sec. Rice’s interest in broadening our regional Though the Turks initially viewed this as window dress- engagement on Iraq, Gül strongly backed efforts to stand ing, the results achieved in several European capitals up an Expanded Neighbors of Iraq forum in 2007 — help- eventually convinced them the effort had merit. Sec. ing to secure, among other things, the participation of Syria Rice named retired U.S. Army General Joseph Ralston as
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a special representative to focus on Turkey counseled the There were hiccups, to be sure. the problem of the PKK presence Almost as soon as the smoke in northern Iraq. Ralston’s stature Iraqis during their 2008 cleared from the first Turkish as a former NATO commander im- strikes in December, officials re- pressed Turkish leaders, but they negotiations of a status-of- sponsible for Iraq policy — wor- never believed the United States ried, for good reason, about the had changed its policy against ki- forces agreement with us and additional strain such actions put netic action on the PKK problem. on the Iraqi political system — said They were right, but the Ralston tried to help on Kirkuk and the Turks had made their point and mission did defuse tensions for a should stop. This did not reflect period and helped to catalyze a election law issues. the president’s undertaking to change in Washington’s thinking. Prime Minister Erdogan, but The key action came from Pres. throughout the months that fol- Bush. At his meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan on lowed, concerns were expressed at all levels that Turkey’s Nov. 5, 2007, the president did three things. First, he actions posed too much risk to our overall effort in Iraq. publicly declared the PKK to be “an enemy of the United Hard work by U.S. officials in Iraq helped maintain calm. States, of Turkey and of Iraq.” These words replaced for- A Turkish land incursion that began on Feb. 21, 2008, mulations about the problem that were more or less ar- against PKK bases a few kilometers south of the border dent depending on one’s proximity to Ankara, but were produced more strain. It lasted a week. never effective as rhetoric or policy. Second, he agreed From roughly this point forward, Turkey-Iraq relations with Erdogan that Turkey could conduct limited opera- and American dealings with Ankara on Iraq began to im- tions against PKK border encampments in northern Iraq. prove. On March 7, 2008, Turkey hosted Iraqi President And third, he undertook to provide U.S. intelligence sup- Jalal Talabani in Ankara — a long-encouraged and long- port for those efforts. sought visit that hadn’t been possible earlier. (That Tala- bani made the trip then seemed to indicate that he, too, A Turning Point saw this as exactly the time for Turkey to chart a new re- Generals James Cartwright, the JCS vice chairman, lationship with Iraq and Iraqi Kurds.) In July, Tayyip Er- Petraeus and Craddock visited Ankara days after the dogan made the first visit to Baghdad by a Turkish prime White House meeting to show we were serious and to dis- minister in 18 years, and he and Iraqi Prime Minister cuss the practicalities. Details were worked out by the Nouri al-Maliki energized efforts to normalize political, commander of U.S. Mission Turkey’s Office of Defense trade and other ties and to support the Iraqi government. Cooperation, Air Force Major General Eric Rosborg (in Turkey counseled the Iraqis during their 2008 negoti- consultation with MNF-I and the U.S. European Com- ations of a status-of-forces agreement with Washington mand), and counterparts at the Turkish General Staff. and tried to help on Kirkuk and election law issues. Doors Deconfliction arrangements were made to prevent unin- opened for military exchanges and training. Later, tended fire on friendly elements in northern Iraq, and a Turkey’s Iraq Coordinator Murat Özçelik initiated a dia- small center was established to facilitate the real-time logue with senior Kurdistan Regional Government offi- sharing of actionable intelligence. cials. (This process got a boost when Turkish Foreign Turkey carried out its first cross-border artillery attack Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met with KRG President on PKK encampments on Dec. 1, 2007, followed by air Masud Barzani in Erbil in 2009.) U.S.-Turkish relations strikes at Qandil Mountain and bases close to the border improved, including in the security arena. on Dec. 16-17. A relentless effort took place in the What accounts for this shift? Our change of policy to months that followed. By the summer of 2008, the PKK’s allow counterstrikes against the PKK in northern Iraq was safe haven in northern Iraq was no more. Its training and a key factor. Turkish authorities, now visibly protecting logistical capabilities had been significantly degraded, and their citizens, felt politically able to upgrade their en- developments in Turkey-Iraq and Turkey-Iraqi Kurd re- gagement with Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds. Our consulta- lations were isolating it politically, as well. tions had an effect, too, in helping Ankara look past
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immediate issues to the eventual The eventual drawdown U.S.-Turkish relations, it is worth drawdown of U.S. forces and influ- noting that Pres. Bush’s change of ence in Iraq, which posed a prob- of U.S. forces in Iraq poses policy on the PKK also helped, at lem — and an opportunity — for least indirectly, to unlock a new ap- Turkey. a problem — and an proach to Turkey’s internal Kurdish Various developments helped issues in 2008-2009. The govern- the Turks reconcile themselves to opportunity — for Turkey. ment’s effort has been tentative and the prospect of an autonomous Iraqi encountered setbacks, but hope- Kurdish entity in the north. Parallel fully will succeed in drawing more efforts by U.S. diplomats may have helped KRG leaders Kurds into the mainstream. see that cultivating cooperation with Ankara could be im- portant, perhaps vital, to their longer-term interests given Looking Forward other problems they faced. Mutual trade and investment Potential problems lie ahead in Iraq, in Turkey-Iraq interests furthered such thinking. A final factor may have relations and in our own dealings with Turkey on Iraq. been concern about Iranian ambitions in Iraq and region- • One issue is the U.S. redeployment out of Iraq. ally. While having no interest in confrontation with Iran, Transiting material through Turkey en route to Europe Turkish officials wanted to project more moderate and sta- and the United States would save money and time. bility-oriented influences that would, inter alia, bolster the • Elections and the formation of a new Iraqi govern- role of Turkey and like-minded countries in the region. ment in 2010 will be difficult. Al-Qaida is still very active, Although this article focuses on the problem of Iraq in even as problems in Kirkuk remain unresolved. Violent
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and centripetal forces lie, at best, just Washington should ates and work with the military. below the surface. We and Iraq should continue to • Turkish-Iraqi border patrol and sustain the dialogue about cooperate with Turkey as its forces go military contacts remain inadequate, after terrorists in remote border areas, especially with the Peshmerga in the Iraq with Turkey in and U.S. officials in Ankara, Baghdad north. The continued presence of and Erbil must do everything they hundreds of Turkish troops in north- 2010 and 2011. can to ensure that the newly re-estab- ern Iraq could be a point of conflict — lished U.S.-Turkey-Iraq trilateral or an opportunity for constructive en- forum on the PKK produces results. gagement on both sides. Other ways to help include: encouraging trade and in- • The PKK may stage its own flashpoint. It has no in- vestment in border areas, through the kind of preferential terest in promoting comity between Ankara and Baghdad trade arrangements proposed in 2008 for Afghanistan and or between Turks and Iraqi Kurds, or in the success of Pakistan; facilitating Iraqi natural gas exports to Turkey and Ankara’s initiatives to address popular grievances among through it to Europe; and conditioning multilateral assis- Turkish Kurds — any or all of which would further isolate tance on Iraqi steps to integrate economically with Turkey it and undermine its interests. and other neighbors. The United States should keep up a sustained conver- Iraq and Turkey can have a good future together, sation about Iraq with Turkey in 2010 and 2011. We should though that is by no means inevitable. Constructive ef- encourage Ankara’s continued engagement across the Iraqi forts on all sides will contribute greatly to the chances of political spectrum, especially its efforts to bolster moder- success. ■
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THE MIDDLE EAST: FORKS IN THE WAY FORWARD Laszlo Kubinyi
THE STAKES FOR GETTING U.S. POLICY RIGHT IN THE REGION ARE HIGHER THAN EVER. HERE IS AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES.
BY CHAS W. F REEMAN JR.
hen you look back, some years can be seen as having inflected history, moving men and events along paths they would otherwise not have taken. 2001 — the year of 9/11 — was such a time. 2009 shaped up as another,W not just for the decisions that were made but for those that were not. The second President Bush bequeathed his successor a set of thoroughly broken policies in the Middle East and the near-total estrangement of the United States from former allies and friends in the Arab and Muslim worlds. President
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Barack Obama responded with What began as a conflict action to a core American policy. rhetorical “change we” — or at least It has also left our country unable five Norwegians — “can believe in.” between Jewish colonists and to analyze the very real threat to our In his speech in Cairo last June, he domestic tranquility that intermit- clearly signaled that he recognizes indigenous Arabs has become tent terrorist attacks represent. By the imperative of solving the Israel- leaving such incidents unexplained, Palestine conflict and repairing a worldwide struggle and disconnecting them from the American relations with Arabs and trends and events in the Middle Muslims if the U.S. is to enjoy peace between Jews, Muslims and East that helped inspire them, we abroad and tranquility at home. have imposed a mental block on Still, in the Middle East and else- their respective allies. ourselves that has distorted our where the Obama administration threat perceptions and greatly ham- has made only minimal changes to pered the development of a realistic longstanding American policies that are conspicuous fail- national security strategy. ures. The short-term stakes in getting these policies right So it is necessary to begin by recapitulating the obvious. are large. The long-term stakes are vastly larger. The 9/11 assault on the United States was carried out by Muslim extremists, motivated in large measure by their re- A Large National Blind Spot sentment of U.S. support for Israel and its actions. The When U.S. interrogators asked Khalid Sheikh Mo- need to avenge 9/11 and deter a repetition of it led directly hammed, the confessed mastermind of the 9/11 atrocities, to the American invasion of Afghanistan. The so-called why al-Qaida had done the terrible things it did that day, he “global war on terrorism” that this invasion inaugurated gave a straightforward answer. He said that the purpose provided a spurious but politically sufficient justification for was to focus “the American people ... on the atrocities that the occupation of Iraq in 2003. America is committing by supporting Israel against the Our labeling of Hamas as a “terrorist organization” in- Palestinian people and America’s self-serving foreign policy spired the joint U.S.-Israeli effort to reject and overturn the that corrupts Arab governments and leads to further ex- results of the 2006 elections in the occupied territories, ploitation of the Arab Muslim people.” In Osama bin even though these elections were universally judged to be Laden’s annual “address to the American people” on Sept. free and fair. A similar view of Hezbollah caused the U.S. 11, 2009, he reiterated: “We have demonstrated and stated to encourage Israel in its savage mauling of Lebanon and to many times, for more than two-and-a-half-decades, that the protect it from the huge international backlash against its cause of our disagreement with you is your support to your more recent assault on Arab civilians in Gaza. Israeli allies who occupy our land of Palestine.” Determination to avoid another 9/11 remains the strate- There is nothing at all ambiguous or unclear about these gic rationale for the ongoing war in Afghanistan and adja- explanations of 9/11 by its planners and perpetrators. Few cent areas of Pakistan. Meanwhile, the insolent cruelties of abroad dispute their essential validity. Yet here in America, the West Bank occupation and the siege of Gaza continue they remain completely unreported outside the Internet. to inflame Arab and Muslim opinion. Any public reference to U.S. backing for Israel as a griev- Taken together, these developments have caused a ance that motivated the atrocities in New York and Wash- growing number of Arabs and Muslims to perceive a broad ington eight years ago is vigorously disputed and American crusade to humiliate them and their religion. suppressed as politically incorrect. This has created a large Their estrangement from the U.S. and other non-Islamic national blind spot to the seriousness of Arab Muslim re- societies has deepened. Al-Qaida has discredited itself through its excesses, but Islamic extremism has continued Chas W. Freeman Jr. is a retired FSO and former ambas- to metastasize. In Gaza, for example, political forces far sador to Saudi Arabia. He is currently president of the more fanatical than Hamas are beginning to emerge from Middle East Policy Council. This article is based on Amb. massive suffering. What began as a conflict between Jew- Freeman’s remarks to the National Council on U.S.–Arab ish colonists and indigenous Arabs has become a worldwide Relations in Washington, D.C., on Oct. 16, 2009. struggle between Jews, Muslims and their respective allies.
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As Israel’s sole protector, the The Obama administration An Israeli Cabinet-directed as- United States has become the target sassination campaign has long work- of sustained asymmetric warfare by is unwilling, at least for now, ed to ensure that “there is no one to terrorists who espouse extremist talk to” on the Palestinian side. With Muslim agendas. Governments al- to put pressure on Israel. a little help from their Israeli con- lied with the United States or de- querors and us Americans, surviving pendent on it — especially those in Palestinian politicians remain hope- Arab and Muslim countries — are targets, too. The threat lessly divided. Israel has not presented a proposal for peace we Americans now face derives less from al-Qaida than it to the Palestinians. Sadly, if it now did so, there would be does from widening Muslim rage at continuing humiliation no one with the authority to accept on behalf of the Pales- and injustice. tinian people. The United States, meanwhile, is seeking to ease Pales- A Central Strategic Task tinian suffering in ways that improve the political standing A just and durable peace in the Holy Land that secures of collaborators with the Israeli occupation authorities. Will the state of Israel should be an end in itself for the United Palestinian leaders emerge who are willing to take what- States. But the fact that the conflict there enrages and rad- ever they can get from Israel and who are able, somehow, icalizes the Islamic body politic worldwide should make the to call off the resistance to it? That seems to be the hope, achievement of such a peace an inescapable, central task if not the plan. It is not, of course, the trend. of United States strategy. This is why it was right for Pres. The Obama administration is unwilling, at least for now, Obama to take time last June to deliver a message of rec- to put pressure on Israel. Instead, it has fallen back on the onciliation to Arabs and Muslims in Cairo. Despite all the use of diplomacy as psychotherapy for Israel’s political other urgent tasks, he focused on resolving the Israeli- pathologies. It is trying to induce better behavior by ar- Palestinian conflict. He has repeatedly expressed deter- ranging Arab gestures that appease Israeli apprehensions mination to stabilize Israel’s relations with its Arab neigh- and signal acceptance of the Jewish state in their midst even bors through a “two-state” solution. The administration’s before its borders are fixed, or the status of both its captive initial efforts have, however, met with contemptuous re- Arab population and those who fled to the refugee camps jection from Israel, feckless dithering from the Palestinians in neighboring countries is resolved. and skepticism from other Arabs. This should not surprise American diplomats see these gestures as down pay- us, even if it seems to have surpised our president. ments on the normalization of relations with Israel that the The current government of Israel rejects trading land Arab League proposed at Beirut in 2002 in the so-called for peace. It sees itself as on the verge of achieving a level “Arab Peace Initiative.” But the Arabs premised their will- of colonization of Palestinian Arab land that will make any- ingness to accept Israel on its reaching an acceptable agree- thing resembling a Palestinian state physically impossible. ment with the Palestinians. With Israel now neither doing In the exclusively Jewish state of Israel that its leading fig- nor promising anything that might lead to an acceptable ures envisage, only Jews will be full citizens. Some Arabs status for the Palestinians, the Arabs see no reason to ap- will have limited rights, but most will live in an archipelago pease it. Nor do they any longer feel obligated by friend- of checkpoint-ringed ghettos. They will be free, should ship to accommodate what they judge to be ill-considered they wish, to call these ghettos a “state;” but once they leave American requests. Palestine, Israel will not allow them to return. Given this Israeli vision, the American attempt to Two Dreadful Ironies arrange a settlement freeze so that negotiations can create Adding poignancy to the impasse are two dreadful a Palestinian state is, from the Israeli government point of ironies. The state of Israel was established to provide the view, at best an unwelcome distraction and at worst a hos- world’s Jews with a homeland in which they might safely tile act. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu does not fear enjoy the pursuit of happiness free from continuing perse- pressure from the U.S. to change course. He is confident cution by Gentiles. But the Jewish state has become the that his American lobby will arrange for Congress to punish most dangerous place on the planet for Jews to live. And the president if he tries to punish Israel for its intransigence. with anti-Semitism now universally rejected in its tradi-
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tional Christian heartland, Israel’s ac- Peace with the Palestinians istence with the Palestinians and tions and policies have become the other Arabs would, however, lead to primary significant stimulus to anti- would enable Israel for the immediate political crises in both Is- Jewish animus there and elsewhere. rael and the United States. The ad- Meanwhile, the replacement of first time to be accepted ministration speaks with determina- Zionist idealism, humanism and sec- tion, but is it really prepared to risk ularism with the cynicism, racism by 340 million Arabs and this? and religiosity of contemporary Is- Peace with the Palestinians raeli politics has precipitated a 1.2 billion non-Arab Muslims would enable Israel for the first time mounting moral crisis and loss of to be accepted by 340 million Arabs confidence among many committed as a legitimate part of and 1.2 billion non-Arab Muslims as to the Jewish state. a legitimate part of the Middle East. Although some settlers continue the Middle East. It would thereby end the conflict in to arrive, one-fifth of Israelis now re- the Holy Land. The key to deradi- side abroad. Jewish emigration is ac- calization of the Arab and Muslim celerating. Meanwhile, the Arab population of Israel and worlds, and to ending their violent backlash against the the occupied territories continues to grow, as does the size West, it is also the prerequisite for the restoration of peace of the Palestinian diaspora. By 2015, barring mass deporta- within the realm of Islam. tion, half the people in Israel and the occupied territories The alternative is the current Israeli government’s effort will be Arabs. Thereafter, Jews will be a declining minority. to impose a Jewish-dominated state dotted with little Arab The international community — including, I daresay, most ghettos. This is a “success” that Israelis would almost cer- of the Jewish diaspora — does not accept the settler propo- tainly come to regret bitterly. Would a state seen by the sitions that Jews can and should by divine right entrench world as embodying racism and religious bigotry retain the their rule over the Arabs of the Holy Land, or define them support of the Jewish diaspora? Would the United States as morally inconvenient and deport them. An antiapartheid- continue indefinitely to guarantee its security? The safety style campaign of ostracism, boycott and disinvestment of such an Israel and its citizens would depend on the so- against this version of a Jewish state has already begun. far undemonstrated ability of intimidation, ruthlessly sus- In combination, current trends portend the perpetua- tained, to grind Arab resistance into acquiescence. Cairo tion of violent struggle by the Palestinians against their Is- and Amman would have to be kept within a Camp David raeli overlords, even as the Jewish state is isolated from framework that Egyptians and Jordanians, if allowed to without and corrodes from within. These trends lead to es- vote, would even now overwhelmingly repudiate. calating antagonism between the United States and the Israel’s right to exist as a state in the Middle East would Arab and Muslim worlds. Given the self-identification of almost certainly be reviewed in intermittent tests of arms, many Jews with the state of Israel, these trends also risk a conducted — as in the case of the Crusader kingdoms in rebirth of anti-Semitism and a spillover of violence to the Palestine — over decades, if not centuries. Israel would Jewish diaspora. have to sustain military hegemony in perpetuity over larger, ever more populous and ever more modernized Arab and Peace — Or the Alternative Muslim neighbors. If these conditions were not met, as So where does this leave the Obama administration’s they almost certainly could not be, this unilaterally imposed peace project? In Israel’s own estimation and that of the re- outcome would be an invitation to protracted Arab and gion, the Jewish state is at a turning point. Time is running Muslim struggle against Israel and its supporters abroad. out on the prospects for peaceful engagement between it, It is hard to see this as a formula that leads to anything the Palestinians, other Arabs and non-Arab Muslims. No but eventual disaster for Israel and its foreign backers, now peace is conceivable without the full use of American moral essentially limited to the United States. Israel’s nuclear doc- and economic leverage to bring Israel to the negotiating trine — based as it is on an amalgam of Armageddon with table. A decision by Washington to compel Israel to make the heroic suicide at Masada — seems to recognize this. On the choices necessary to achieve mutually respectful coex- the whole, for sensible people in Israel and for Americans,
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the peaceful emergence of a viable The best thing the sion of civilian control of the military Palestinian state in the occupied ter- — delegating its formulation to the ritories and Gaza looks like a much United States could do for generals. It did not follow through. better bet than self-isolation. It ended up adopting yet another In the meantime, the region Iraq now is to engage military-proposed campaign plan. presents other challenges — even if This one features a pacification ef- none of them has the transformative Baghdad’s neighbors. fort extending over as much as an- potential of a peace or continued other decade. But al-Qaida has warfare in the Holy Land. Let me relocated to Pakistan from Afghani- now turn briefly to these. stan. Neither the Taliban leadership nor anyone else in Afghanistan seems to want it to come back. Iraq and Related Challenges The proposed pacification campaign is called a “strat- It is good that the end of the American misadventure in egy,” but it is not. It strains to find a military way to trans- Iraq is in sight. But its termination is not likely to repair form Afghanistan, even though its authors — who are very the injury it did to the standing of the United States in ei- smart soldiers — recognize there is none. We are still look- ther the international or Muslim communities. The “surge” ing for a strategy backed by force. In the meantime, we averted disaster; the withdrawal may yet bring it. The post- continue the use of force as a very inadequate substitute occupation order in Iraq is unlikely to emerge smoothly or for strategy. without further stressing regional stability. In the land be- tween the two rivers, the United States will leave behind a Iranian Gains battleground of grievances. The Kurdish and Sunni Arab This brings me, at last, to Iran. Tehran had nothing to minorities, among others, must likely undergo still more do with the assault on America on 9/11, but no nation has suffering before things settle down. There will be no har- benefited more from the American reaction to it than the vest of good will from the carnage in Iraq. Islamic Republic. Its revolution seemed to be flickering The same seems likely to be true of our eight-year in- out when 9/11 happened. In short order, its greatest tervention in Afghanistan. We began it with simple and enemy, the United States, then eliminated its other ene- straightforward goals — the apprehension of al-Qaida and mies in both Kabul and Baghdad and embarked on a mili- the chastisement of its Afghan hosts. But these goals have tary rampage through the Islamic world that estranged been buried in a barrage of competing ideological and spe- Americans from our traditional allies there. But wait! It cial-interest objectives. The result is combat in a political gets even better from the Iranian point of view. vacuum — a war whose only apparent theme is now West- In Afghanistan, the Iranians have been able to sit on the ern hostility to militant Islam. This has destabilized Pak- sidelines and watch us exhaust ourselves in inconclusive istan and nurtured a particularly virulent form of terrorism warfare. In Iraq, Iran is the dominant foreign influence in there and in the Pakistani diaspora. It has spurred a recent the country’s newly sectarian politics. (Of course, no one surge in financial contributions to the Taliban as an appar- can say whether Baghdad will continue its de facto alliance ently heroic resistance to infidel trespasses on Islam. with Tehran after the United States withdraws.) Israel and What then to do about Afghanistan, where everyone ad- the United States brushed aside efforts by Damascus to di- mits the most likely outcome is now failure? If you ask a re- lute its longstanding dependence on Tehran, thus cement- ligious scholar or ideologue, you will hear a sermon. From ing rather than eroding Iran’s influence in Syria. an economist, expect a development scheme. Ask a non- The 2006 Israeli savaging of Lebanon drove Iran’s client governmental organization, and prepare to receive a pro- movement, Hezbollah, onto the commanding heights of gram proposal. Ask a general what must be done, and you Lebanese politics. This reduced Tehran’s need to go through will get a crisp salute and the best campaign plan military Damascus to affect events in Lebanon or to reach northern science can devise. People come up with the solutions they Israel. Meanwhile, Israeli and American efforts to ostracize know how to put together. and overthrow the elected Hamas government in Palestine The Obama administration briefly showed signs that it left it nowhere to go but into the arms of Iran. Assertively was taking charge of policy rather than — in a strange eva- Shiite Iran has, for the first time, acquired the Sunni Arab
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following it had long sought. Current In Afghanistan, the not in the game. They will not step American policy seems clueless about forward to take the lead in addressing how to reverse these Iranian gains. Iranians have been able to the disputes of which I have been Meanwhile, Tehran seems on track speaking. Hence the need for contin- to acquire the ability to field its own sit on the sidelines and uing American leadership. deterrent to the threats of nuclear at- tack Iranians have serially heard from watch us exhaust ourselves Iraq and the Region Saddam’s Iraq, successive Israeli gov- So what is to be done? In the case ernments and George W. Bush’s in inconclusive warfare. of Israel and Palestine, a failure to de- America. David Ben-Gurion wrote cide is, in fact, a fateful decision. The the book on how to build a clandes- avoidance of choice risks future tine nuclear weapons capability. He skillfully appeased tragedy for America, as well as for Israel and the Arabs. President John F. Kennedy’s passion for nonproliferation The best thing the United States could do for Iraq now even as his government subverted and circumvented it. is to engage Baghdad’s neighbors. All should share our in- The ayatollahs have read and absorbed the Israeli playbook, terest in supporting non-violent Iraqi solutions to Iraqi minus — one hopes — the bit about Masada. Israelis, bet- problems. We need to work with Turkey and Arab allies to ter than anyone, know how this script ends — not in a war enlist Syria, Iran and others in this task and hold them to it. that secures their nuclear monopoly in the region. It is time In the region as a whole, the American effort to build a to start thinking about how to mitigate the undeniable dan- coalition of opposition to Iran has failed. We must now join gers of an Iranian, as well as an Israeli, nuclear arsenal. our allies and friends in offering those who have come to I must not close without a brief mention of the long- depend on Tehran alternatives to doing so. Iran is a proud standing Arab friends of the United States and the West in country that will not surrender to threats. Its people re- the Persian Gulf and Red Sea regions. Despite welcome main obsessed with the affront they believe we pose to their new activism on the part of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the national identity, independence and honor among nations. countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have to a great Without a parallel normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations, extent been bystanders as a strange combination of Ameri- there is no hope of resolving the nuclear issue in a way that can diplomatic default and military activism has dismantled mitigates its menace. Pres. Obama’s several messages to the regional order that once protected them. Iraq no longer the Iranian people have opened a path to respectful Iran- balances Iran. The United States no longer constrains Is- ian-American dialogue that might lead to this. We must rael, which has never behaved more belligerently. Iran has persist in inviting Tehran to walk this path with us. acquired unprecedented prestige and influence among Finally, in Afghanistan, we continue to lack a compre- Arabs and Muslims. The next stage of nuclear proliferation hensive strategy. We must leverage religious and tribal re- is upon the region. For the first time ever, Shiism dominates alities rather than seeking to overturn them. Our objective the politics of Arab states traditionally ruled by Sunnis. Is- should be to consolidate the exclusion of al-Qaida from lamist terrorism menaces Egyptian and Gulf Arab domestic Afghan territory. To do this, we must work with Pakistan tranquility, as well as that of the West. The United States, and in partnership with friendly Arab and Muslim countries, once attentive to Arab security and other concerns, is now not at cross-purposes with them; and we must support, not obsessed with its own issues and objectives in the region. undercut, the Pashtun tribes. This, not a Western military The Persian Gulf Arabs have the financial resources but presence on Afghan soil, is how we helped Afghans expel neither the institutions nor the will to mount the unified the Soviets from their homeland. This, ratified by a recon- effort needed to cope with these challenges. They are vened loya jirga and supported with generous economic as- adrift, not sailing to a new strategic strong point. The drift sistance, is how we can keep al-Qaida out of Afghanistan is taking them away from their traditional reliance on while we work to expel it from Pakistan. America and toward new partners. These are mainly the Pres. Obama’s message to the world’s Muslims in Cairo so-called BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India and last June illuminated a different way forward than the road China, plus South Africa. But Egypt and the Gulf Arab we appear to be on. We can yet take that path. It is time to states seem destined to remain on the strategic sidelines, do so. ■
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DIPLOMACY REBOOTED: MAKING DIGITAL STATECRAFT A REALITY
THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS NOW IN A POSITION TO BUILD NOVEL APPLICATIONS TO SUPPORT THE MISSION OF DIPLOMACY.
BY CHRIS BRONK
ncredibly heartening is the news that at the close ployee and deploying OpenNet Plus, not only inside the Harry of this decade, the State Department’s top leader- S Truman Building but also in the hundreds of missions ship is once again taking a serious look at the role of around the globe. Admirably, the project was completed in information technology in the mission of diplomacy. roughly 18 months and deepened linkages between Main But the challenges will be very different than 10 State and overseas posts, as well as digitally connecting the de- years ago, when making the department a “wired” partment to the world. organization involved the deployment of digital in- Fernando Burbano, State’s first chief information officer, frastructure — mostly computer and networking hardware. prepared the foundation for what the late USIA-hand Wilson IThe new thrust of digitized diplomacy will primarily involve Dizard Jr. had begun to illuminate in his Meganet (Westview software, which will likely stand at odds with State’s current Press, 1998) and fleshed out in Digital Diplomacy — U.S. For- processes and culture. eign Policy in the Information Age (Praeger, 2001). As Dizard New applications and structures are now changing the face opined, “Digital diplomacy issues and techniques have had to of IT. Cloud and mobile computing, browser-based applica- be shoehorned into a policymaking system run by officials who tions, weblogs and social media will change the way almost all were initially uninterested in and often suspicious of the sub- information workers (including diplomats) do their jobs, and ject.” Nonetheless, Sec. Powell recognized that foreign affairs may challenge the method by which the entire department would have to go digital, and ordered that the infrastructure functions. for making that transition be constructed at breakneck speed. State is now connected, but must take stock and determine Thanks to this executive interest, Burbano got the Internet the best avenues for building on the digital foundation con- onto the department’s desktops, and did it quickly. structed nearly a decade ago. The most significant change in State is now in a position to build novel applications to sup- diplomacy since the advent of the telegram is at hand. port the mission of diplomacy. It does so in interesting times. After a few years of post–Internet bubble reflection, the pace Opening the Net of change and development in the IT sector is once again surg- Wiring State was a project given highest priority by former ing. While some technologies will fall into what IT consul- Secretary of State Colin Powell, who doggedly pursued the tancy Gartner, Inc., labels “the trough of disillusionment,” goal of getting Internet computers on the desktop of each em- many will thrive, becoming de facto standards for organiza- tional communications and productivity. The department will A Foreign Service officer from 2002 to 2006, Chris Bronk is a need to make wise bets on what standards it can accept and fellow at Rice University’s James A. Baker III Institute for Pub- which ones it should ignore. lic Policy. He also teaches in Rice’s computer science depart- In doing so, its leadership must stay focused on the infor- ment. He served in the State Department Office of eDiplo- mation piece of IT, adopting technologies that more effectively macy, where he participated in the development of Diplopedia. accommodate the complexity of international affairs and man-
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age the “information tsunami” that mation. IT facilitates political and eco- flows through the organization daily, nomic reporting, is key to visa adjudica- threatening to swamp those charged The most significant tion, and delivers new media for public with crafting our nation’s foreign policy. diplomacy. Nearly a decade later, the change in diplomacy since words of former Director General of IT and the Mission the Foreign Service and Under Secre- of Diplomacy the advent of the telegram tary of State for Political Affairs Marc We live at a time when half the Grossman at the Net Diplomacy con- planet is able to log on to a communi- is likely at hand. ference in 2001 remain true: “Vital to cations medium where there are al- our ability to achieve [our diplomatic] most no barriers to international ex- goals will be an ability to create and, if change of information — the Internet. we are lucky, lead a diplomacy for the This connectivity, of course, has al- 21st century. The ability to manage and ready changed the practice of diplo- nical breakthroughs. master information technology will be macy. For nearly a century we relied Diplomacy is harder to categorize in vital if we are to succeed.” upon trusted envoys to serve the na- a spreadsheet or win-loss columns. We So how well has State done at meet- tional interest in distant foreign capi- know that diplomacy is an information- ing Grossman’s mandate? I would tals, employing the telegraph to stay in intensive business, but we have not en- argue that it has achieved what most touch with the mother country, usually tirely figured out how to apply tech- government organizations have, in via the briefest of messages. Today, nology to meet the mission of statecraft, roughly the same period of time. It has communications may flow from a an area populated by an ever-increas- implemented an IT strategic plan, with BlackBerry to Berlin, Bamako or ing number of actors, many of whom the emphasis on the capital T. That has Baghdad instantaneously. are not states. brought a rise in data traffic and the Yet though the department is con- need for larger digital “pipes” connect- nected, wired and wirelessly, by fiber Getting the Balance Right ing Washington to the world. and satellite, its official communication Today, IT is the State Department’s Day-to-day expectations of big “T,” channel remains the same telegraphi- electronic nervous system. Where it which falls under the auspices of the cally-based cable format that George was once viewed as a career-enhancing deputy chief information officer for Kennan used to send his prescient skill to learn how paper moved around operations, are straightforward, but analysis from Moscow in 1946. E-mail the department, it is probably more daunting: keep the networks up and has replaced the telegraph, of course; useful today to understand where the running 24/7, year-round; make sure no but the organizational process built bits flow. E-mail is the overwhelmingly data are lost or corrupted; and strive for around it has yet to leave the building. dominant form of communication, increased efficiency and declining cost. For all the discussion of technology, ul- likely making up more than half of the The other side of IT in the mission timately its adoption and use are largely digital traffic across the department’s of diplomacy is the big “I,” or informa- dependent upon how well it fits an or- network. Entrusted with delivery and tion. As hard as IRM’s operations job ganization’s process. storage of the bits is State’s IT organ, may be, the information or knowledge Organizational change rarely comes the Bureau of Information Resource piece requires not only an eye for effi- easily, and is often prompted by crisis. Management, which runs the enter- ciency, but a vision for the future of In industry, if companies fail to inno- prise network that delivers cables and diplomacy. “Will Twitter be a good vate or adapt, they soon decline and e-mail, accesses Web pages and com- public diplomacy tool?” “Can blogs fade away, but government is different. pletes telephone calls. IRM is the supplement cables?” “Is e-mail over- Without a balance sheet by which to physical apparatus of the department’s loading desk officers?” These are just measure effectiveness, identifying met- digital nervous system, its intercon- some of the many questions to be con- rics to evaluate the performance of an nected system of links and nodes. But sidered. agency can prove elusive. there’s a lot of IT at State that’s not in An organization can spend all the At the IRS or U.S. Postal Service, IRM; perhaps as much as half of the money in the world on hardware, but benchmarking efficiency can be as department’s $1.2 billion IT budget re- without ideas on how to adopt and har- straightforward as counting tax returns sides in other bureaus. ness game-changing technologies to or pieces of mail. And at NASA and the Across the department, information distill a more useful information pic- National Institutes of Health, success technology is employed to transmit, ture or manage relationships, that in- can be identified by scientific or tech- process, digest and disseminate infor- vestment will produce scant returns.
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As a key component of the nation’s “soft power,” diplomacy will need to harness the potential of big “I” tech- nologies if Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s vision of “smart power” is to be realized. We know there is no reason for U.S. diplomats not to be the best-informed on the planet. The challenge is in finding new applications, ways of working and skill sets to do that. For the department, the information resources available must not only facilitate communica- tion, but intense and rapid learning.
Getting the Size Right In computing, government has been present from the beginning. In 1946, the same year that Kennan trans- mitted his famous “Long Telegram,” the University of Pennsylvania built ENIAC, the world’s first true digital computer, for the United States Army. For every large mainframe that IBM or the Digital Equipment Corp. de- signed, Uncle Sam could be counted on as a major customer. From the 1950s through the 1980s, the U.S. gov- ernment bought big systems, usually composed of large computing cores connected to large numbers of “dumb” terminals. State was no different than the De- partment of Defense or the Federal Aviation Administration in seeing merit in automation. It rolled out the Foreign Affairs Information Manage- ment Effort, the first of many infor- mation management plans, in 1964. FAIME was an interagency effort, aimed at modernizing “the flow and handling of information within and among the Department of State, the Agency for International Develop- ment, the United States Information Agency, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.” Though well intended, it died quietly a few years later. After significant investment in Wang hardware and software, the department eventually made its way to the same
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Windows-based personal computers send and receive the day’s cable traffic. just about everyone else in America was All department employees should see buying in the 1990s. This did not mean SMART will probably be their responsibilities and capabilities that State’s big-project mindset had change due to the continuing march of been relegated to the dustbin, however. the last big IT project of progress, if they haven’t already. If this Indeed, for most of the past decade, means that each FS member should be IRM has put considerable effort into its kind undertaken at the a blogger for the department at one SMART — the Department of State’s point or another, so much the better. Messaging and Archive Retrieval Tool- department, and the last While State has made significant set. strides in the adoption of IT to perform SMART represents an increasingly to cater to the networked the mission of diplomacy, they are obsolescent orthodoxy of computer-dri- modest in comparison with the invest- ven productivity designed around ap- personal computer. ment the Pentagon has made in apply- plications on each user’s PC and ing information technology to its servers. When complete, SMART will missions under the “Revolution in Mil- probably be the last big IT project of its itary Affairs” banner. An IT-driven kind to be undertaken at the depart- overhaul of diplomacy will require still ment, and probably the last one to bly still want computers and monitors greater investment, outreach and ac- cater to the networked personal com- back at the office, the expectation is ceptance of culture change. puter, as well. that wherever they go, their data will On that last point, the stark reality Three “Cs” conspire against such go with them. As anyone who has set- remains that the transition at State future projects: collaboration software, tled a trivia debate with an iPhone can from a Cold War posture to one able cybersecurity concerns and, finally, the tell you, we are moving toward a time to cope with the multilayered contem- potential of the computing cloud. Col- of device-based augmented cognition porary international system is incom- laboration software is a necessity for (and distraction). In this environment, plete. The department will need to work with other agencies, nongovern- tools that quickly connect users to valu- look more closely at multilateral diplo- mental organizations, industry and ac- able information with minimal sorting macy and the value of “intermestic” re- ademia, but it is confounded by many and sifting are desirable. Users want lations, where allegiance to country is barriers to use, such as large on-com- programs that will tell them what they on a relatively low rung. puter software downloads or license may want to read or watch based on To tackle this, a bulking-up of the costs. The vehicle for collaboration is prior-usage behavior and interests — department’s big “I,” little “t” compo- the Internet browser, not something which Amazon is already doing with its nents is needed. A revitalized infor- that comes in a box. Cybersecurity, for customer data. For the desk officer or mation skunkworks built on the model its part, will require more robust net- press attaché, wouldn’t it be nice to of IRM’s Office of eDiplomacy — work controls, increased simplicity and have machines doing some of the read- preferably reporting high up the ad- limited functionality in which the ing and flagging before messages hit ministrative chain, perhaps directly to browser replaces many client pro- the inbox? the Deputy Secretary of State — grams on each desktop PC. would send an important message on The third “C” — the “cloud” — is a An Information Plan efforts to infuse innovation into the label for always-on networked re- News of the creation of innovation practice of diplomacy. In addition, the sources, from spreadsheets and word adviser positions at State is heartening, department’s CIO needs to become a processors to storage and e-mail. as well. It is already working with so- true chief, not just the person at the Cloud computing — what we thought cial media — Facebook, Twitter and helm of IRM. of a few years back as “service-oriented YouTube — and strategies for engag- Finally, career tracks that reward architecture” — will exert a powerful ing in many-to-many dialogue with for- IT-savvy generalists and recruitment force on government IT. It is back to eign publics, revolutionizing the busi- efforts designed to draw more technical the future, with massive server farms, ness of public diplomacy. and engineering graduates into the the the new mainframes of the day, sup- Also vital is adoption of this tech- department ought to be considered. porting Web-connected smartphones, nology by the department’s entire work Tempering any vision for IT at BlackBerrys and, the latest rage, net- force. IT is no longer simply the do- State, we must recognize that science books, as well as desktops and laptops. main of the embassy communicator, and technology have a somewhat tar- While State employees will proba- toiling in some vault somewhere to nished history there. James E. Webb,
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We must recognize that science and technology have a somewhat tarnished history at State.
who served as under secretary of State under Dean Acheson, devoted consid- erable effort to allocating additional re- sources to science and technology in diplomacy. But those pursuits took a back seat to the Cold War. Outmaneu- vered by Paul Nitze, Webb abandoned this work and stepped down, eventually becoming President John F. Kennedy’s pick to lead NASA through the run-up to the Apollo moon landings. Now we are again at a pivotal point for diplomacy. The leaders of State and Defense recognize that soft power, en- gagement and options other than force are all vital to the U.S. position in the world. Sec. Clinton is not only firmly engaged in the business of diplomacy but attentive to the needs of the de- partment. She has, in the words of David Rothkopf, “defined a role for herself in the Obamaverse: often bad cop to his good cop, spine stiffener when it comes to tough adversaries and nurturer of new strategies.” The department’s IT leaders should do everything possible to see that ad- vances in State’s digital domain get a prominent place under the “new strate- gies” heading. To meet its most important strategic goals — on global warming, the con- tinuing economic crisis, nonprolifera- tion and a host of regional issues — the department will require a practical, pragmatic digital strategy of the sort that Barack Obama employed to win the presidency. ■
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AFSA American Foreign Service Association ANNUAL REPORT Working for a Stronger AFSA 2009 BY SUSAN R. JOHNSON, PRESIDENT
he past year marked the 85th anniver- when management and labor complaints with the AFSA sary of AFSA’s creation as a profes- work together, across all FS Elections Committee, which Tsional association. Overall, it was an agencies, to improve policies determined that violations had eventful year. AFSA’s longstanding effort and promote equity for all. occurred, but lacked the to close the overseas pay gap for entry and The project to renovate resources to determine whether mid-level Foreign Service employees, ener- AFSA’s long-neglected head- the violations affected the out- getically pursued by former AFSA Presidents quarters was successfully com- come of the election. The Tony Holmes and John Naland, State Vice pleted and the displaced pro- committee certified the results President Steve Kashkett and AFSA pro- fessional staff moved back last of the election and advised the
fessional staff, finally met with at least tem- spring. The modernized AUSTIN TRACY complainants that they had the porary success, supported by Secretary of office space now offers new facilities to right to file a complaint with the Depart- State Hillary Rodham Clinton. With the expand outreach, build alliances, improve ment of Labor. Several did so. help of key members of Congress, this operations and better serve and support our AFSA is working with the Department inequity should be eliminated by 2011 members and their families. Our upgrad- of Labor to clarify and streamline our elec- through three successive pay increases. State ed building provides a strong foundation tion procedures. and USAID implemented the pay-gap fix for bringing our Web site and IT infra- The Governing Board held a strategic immediately and were soon joined by FAS structure into line with the times — a planning retreat in early November and and FCS. IBB needed extra “encourage- Governing Board priority. AFSA’s former identified four overarching goals, with key ment” but the issue is largely resolved there, legislative director, Ian Houston, whose ded- deliverables under each: (1) securing as well. icated work on the overseas comparability resources, improving operations and pro- This success demonstrates how the inter- pay issue contributed directly to our suc- tecting benefits; (2) increasing cooperation ests of the Foreign Service are best served cess, was selected as our new executive direc- with management and presence in policy tor and is working to improve development; (3) improving the image and internal structure and opera- outreach of the Foreign Service; and (4) tions. improving internal AFSA organization. For The 2009 AFSA Governing details, refer to the January issue of AFSA Board elections were strongly News. contested and highlighted the AFSA is reaching out to management pressing need for reform of our across all five Foreign Service agencies. At election procedures — partic- the State Department we are talking to the ularly as they relate to candi- Office of Policy Planning about how to dates’ means of communica- revive the Open Forum and encourage pro- tion with voters. Voters elect- ductive use of the Dissent Channel. With ed a mix of the two competing the Human Resources Bureau, we have slates, and the new Governing stressed the value of AFSA participation in MICHAEL LAIACONA Board quickly came together to important processes such as the Quadren- AFSA State VP Steve Kashkett (right) officially welcomes Secretary Clinton on her first day at the State Department, Jan. 22, 2009, work for the interests of AFSA nial Diplomacy and Development Review while AFSA President John Naland (left) and audio technician Travis and the Foreign Service. and Secretary Clinton’s Diplomacy 3.0 pro- Lightfoot look on. Several candidates filed gram. Beyond the foreign affairs agencies,
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AFSA is also seeking a more institutionalized role in the preparation of studies and reports such as “A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future,” the joint American Academy of Diplomacy- Stimson Center study that paved the way to increased resources for the five foreign affairs A Message from agencies, and the Academy of American Diplomacy’s proposed analysis of the training and professional development needed by the Foreign Service of the 21st century. Executive Director Demand for the services of AFSA’s grievance attorneys has grown steadily in recent years Ian Houston and we continue to seek constructive engagement with management. Key committees in the House and Senate invited AFSA to testify in hearings concern- ing Government Accountability Office reports, addressing issues such as mid-level staffing he AFSA Annual Report keeps gaps and up-stretches, especially in hard-to-fill posts; deficiencies in language capability and you, our “shareholders,” informed training capacity; the exponential growth in requirements for diplomatic security; and gaps Tof our overall activities, mem- in benefits for civilian federal employees deployed in conflict zones. Testimony is posted bership trends and financial health. Our on our Web site (www.afsa.org). intent is to spotlight key matters of inter- 2010 promises to be a year of opportunities. Your Governing Board is committed to est to you. strengthening AFSA’s capacity, seeking more productive cooperation with management in 2009 marked the return of AFSA all five of our agencies and fostering a culture of excellence, teamwork and professionalism. We want to make our Foreign Service the effective agent of U.S. international leadership staff, at long last, to the freshly renovat- that our nation requires, by working to make it better supported, more respected and a more ed headquarters. Soon after, AFSA said satisfying career choice. Please let us hear from you during this coming year. Engaged mem- farewell to an excellent Governing bers make AFSA’s voice stronger. ❏ Board under the leadership of John Naland, and we welcomed a newly elect- ed and vibrant board under the direc- tion of Susan Johnson. Life in the Throughout the changes, our lead- ership (both the former and the new) Foreign and the AFSA staff remained extraor- Service dinarily dedicated to serving our unique BY BRIAN AGGELER membership. This spirit of commitment and volunteerism extends to the many standing committees of AFSA, as well. As always, we are very grateful for our members’ support on many levels, and the staff looks forward to serving you in 2010. Please feel free to contact me at [email protected] anytime. ❏
AFSA HEADQUARTERS: Staff: Governing Board: Executive Director Ian Houston: [email protected] (202) 338-4045; Fax: (202) 338-6820 PRESIDENT: Susan R. Johnson Business Department STATE DEPARTMENT AFSA OFFICE: Controller Kalpna Srimal: [email protected] STATE VP: Daniel Hirsch (202) 647-8160; Fax: (202) 647-0265 Assistant Controller Cory Nishi: [email protected] USAID VP: Francisco Zamora Labor Management USAID AFSA OFFICE: FAS VP: Henry Schmick (202) 712-1941; Fax: (202) 216-3710 General Counsel Sharon Papp: [email protected] FCS VP: Keith Curtis FCS AFSA OFFICE: Deputy General Counsel Zlatana Badrich: [email protected] Labor Management Specialist James Yorke: [email protected] RETIREE VP: Robert Houdek (202) 482-9088; Fax: (202) 482-9087 Senior Staff Attorney Neera Parikh: [email protected] SECRETARY: F.A. “Tex” Harris AFSA WEB SITE: www.afsa.org Staff Attorney Michael Willats: [email protected] FSJ: [email protected] Office Manager Christine Warren: [email protected] TREASURER: Andrew Winter PRESIDENT: [email protected] USAID Senior Labor Management Adviser Douglas Broome: [email protected] STATE REPS: Carleton Bulkin, Jorge Delfin, STATE VP: [email protected] USAID Staff Assistant Patrick Bradley: [email protected] Mary Glantz, Les Hickman, Joyce Namde, RETIREE VP: [email protected] Member Services USAID VP: [email protected] Member Services Director Janet Hedrick: [email protected] Julia Stewart, Mike Unglesbee, Sharon White, FAS VP: [email protected] Member Services Representative Michael Laiacona: [email protected] Teresa Yata FCS VP: [email protected] Administrative Assistant and Office Manager Ana Lopez: [email protected] USAID REPS: Michael Henning, Glenn Rogers Communications, Marketing and Outreach Retiree Counseling & Legislation Coordinator Bonnie Brown: [email protected] FCS REP: Rebecca Balogh AFSA News Director of Communications Thomas Switzer: [email protected] FAS REP: Melinda Sallyards Editor Francesca Kelly: [email protected] Legislative Director Casey Frary: [email protected] IBB REP: Al Pessin (202) 338-4045, ext. 516; Executive Assistant to the President Austin Tracy: [email protected] Fax: (202) 338-8244 Scholarship Director Lori Dec: [email protected] RETIREE REPS: On the Web: Scholarship Program Assistant Jonathan Crawford: [email protected] Janice Bay, Robert (Bill) Farrand, How to Contact Us: to Contact How Exploritas Administrator Bernard Alter: [email protected] David Passage, Molly Williamson www.afsa.org/fsj and www.fsjournal.org Marketing & Outreach Manager Asgeir Sigfusson: [email protected] Special Awards & Outreach Coordinator Perri Green: [email protected]
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