The Role of Reasoning and Persuasion in the Legal Process

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Role of Reasoning and Persuasion in the Legal Process The Role of Reasoning and Persuasion in the Legal Process Richard R. Orsinger [email protected] http://www.orsinger.com McCurley, Orsinger, McCurley, Nelson & Downing, L.L.P. San Antonio Office: 1717 Tower Life Building San Antonio, Texas 78205 (210) 225-5567 http://www.orsinger.com and Dallas Office: 5950 Sherry Lane, Suite 800 Dallas, Texas 75225 (214) 273-2400 24th Annual Advanced Civil Appellate Practice Course September 2-3, 2010 Four Seasons Hotel Austin, Texas © 2010 Richard R. Orsinger All Rights Reserved Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION. .................................................... -1- II. USEFULNESS OF THE TOPIC. ......................................... -1- III. THE IMPORTANCE OF INTUITION. .................................... -2- IV. THE COMMON LAW.................................................. -3- V. LEGAL REASONING (OVERVIEW). .................................... -7- A. FORMAL LOGIC................................................ -8- 1. Deductive Logic ........................................... -8- 2. Inductive Logic ........................................... -9- 3. Reasoning With Probabilities ................................ -9- 4. Reasoning by Analogy ..................................... -10- B. INFORMAL LOGIC. ........................................... -10- C. A RULE-ORIENTED APPROACH................................. -11- D. MODERN ARGUMENT THEORIES............................... -11- VI. FORMAL LOGIC..................................................... -12- A. ARISTOTLE. .................................................. -12- B. STATEMENTS, PROPOSITIONS, AND ARGUMENTS. .............. -13- C. TRUTH, VALIDITY, AND SOUNDNESS. .......................... -13- 1. True and False............................................ -13- 2. Valid and Invalid. ........................................ -14- 3. Sound and Unsound. ...................................... -14- 4. Application to Statements, Propositions, and Arguments. ......... -14- VII. DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. ................................................ -15- A. DEFINING CONCEPTS ESSENTIAL TO ARISTOTLE’S DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. ...................................................... -16- 1. Statements............................................... -16- 2. Affirmation, Denial, and Contradiction. ....................... -16- 3. All; None; and Some. ...................................... -16- 4. Principles, Rules, and Symbols............................... -16- 5. Three Fundamental Principles of Logic. ....................... -17- B. THE SYLLOGISM.............................................. -17- 1. The Simple Syllogism...................................... -17- 2. Polysyllogism............................................ -20- 3. Enthymeme.............................................. -20- 4. Sorites.................................................. -21- 5. When Premises are Inconsistent.............................. -22- 6. The Hypothetical Syllogism. ................................ -23- a. The Conditional Syllogism............................ -23- b. The Conjunctive Syllogism. .......................... -23- c. The Disjunctive Syllogism............................ -23- 7. Quantifiers and Distribution................................. -23- 8. The Rules of Opposition ................................... -24- 9. Rules for Syllogisms....................................... -25- 10. Fallacies of Syllogistic Logic................................ -26- a. The Fallacy of Four Terms............................ -26- b. The Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle Term. ........... -26- -i- c. The Fallacy of Illicit Process of the Major or Illicit Minor Term. ................................................. -27- d. The Fallacy of Negative Premises. ..................... -27- e. The Fallacy of Drawing Affirmative Conclusions From a Negative Premise........................................... -27- f. The Existential Fallacy............................... -27- g. Belief Bias......................................... -27- 11. Translating Natural Language Arguments to Syllogisms. .......... -28- 12. Viewing Legal Disputes as Syllogisms. ....................... -28- C. IMPLICATION................................................. -28- 1. The Validity and Soundness of Implications. ................... -29- 2. The Five Forms of Conditional Propositions .................... -29- 3. The Material Implication. .................................. -29- 4. Modus Ponens (Affirming the Antecedent). .................... -30- 5. Modus Tollens (Denying the Consequent). ..................... -30- 6. “Not-P or Q.”............................................ -31- 7. Affirming the Consequent................................... -31- 8. Conditional Propositions Can Be Sorites. ...................... -31- 9. Attacking a Conditional Proposition. .......................... -32- 10. Disproving a Material Implication............................ -32- 11. Biconditional............................................ -32- 12. Conjunctive Conditional Propositions. ........................ -32- 13. Disjunctive Conditional Propositions. ......................... -32- 14. Other Conditionals. ....................................... -33- a. Indicative Conditionals............................... -33- b. Subjunctive Conditionals. ............................ -33- c. Counterfactual Conditionals. .......................... -34- 15. The Dilemma............................................ -35- 16. Degrees of Conditionals.................................... -35- 17. Disproving Other Conditionals............................... -36- 18. Legal Presumptions........................................ -36- D. EULER CIRCLES. ............................................. -36- E. TRUTH TABLES............................................... -37- F. LOGICAL CONNECTORS. ...................................... -39- 1. Logical Negation.......................................... -39- 2. Logical Conjunction....................................... -39- 3. Logical Disjunction........................................ -40- 4. Material Implication....................................... -42- 5. Material Equivalence. ..................................... -43- 6. Material Nonequivalence. .................................. -44- 7. Alternative Denial......................................... -44- 8. Joint Denial.............................................. -44- G. SYMBOLIC LOGIC............................................. -45- H. TAUTOLOGIES AND SELF-CONTRADICTIONS. .................. -45- I. AXIOMS...................................................... -46- J. CONSTRUCTING DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS IN PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC. .................................................................. -46- -ii- 1. Direct Deductive Arguments. ............................... -46- a. Rules of Inference................................... -46- b. Rules of Replacement ............................... -48- c. Logic Arguments................................... -49- 2. Conditional Proof......................................... -49- 3. Indirect Proof. ........................................... -49- K. FALLACIES OF DEDUCTION.................................... -49- 1. The Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent. ..................... -50- 2. False Dichotomy.......................................... -51- 3. Inconsistency. ........................................... -51- 4. Non Sequitur ............................................ -51- 5. Slippery Slope............................................ -51- 6. Begging the Question...................................... -52- 7. Circular Reasoning ....................................... -52- 8. Changing the Premises..................................... -52- L. PARADOXES. ................................................. -53- 1. The Sorites Paradox. ...................................... -53- 2. The Liar Paradox. ........................................ -53- 3. Eubulides’s Paradox. ...................................... -54- 4. Socrates’ Paradox. ........................................ -54- 5. Smasandache Paradox. ..................................... -54- 6. The Catalog Paradox...................................... -54- 7. The Omnipotent God Paradox. .............................. -54- 8. The Surprise Test Paradox. ................................. -54- 9. The Grandfather Paradox. .................................. -55- 10. The Envelope Paradox. .................................... -55- 11. Orsinger’s Paradox. ....................................... -56- 12. A Famous Scientific Paradox. ............................... -56- 13. A Famous Political Paradox. ................................ -56- 14. Avoiding “All” or “None.” ................................. -58- M. THE IMPORTANCE OF RELEVANCE. ............................ -58- N. THE PROBLEMS OF CONDITIONALS. ........................... -59- 1. Problems with the Material Conditional........................ -59- 2. Problems With the Indicative Conditional...................... -60- 3. Problems With Subjunctive Conditionals....................... -60- 4. Problems With Counterfactual Conditionals. ................... -61- O. “SOME” and “ALL.”............................................ -61- P. PROBABILITIES............................................... -61- Q. TRANSLATING ENGLISH TO DEDUCTIVE LOGIC................. -62- 1. Negation. ............................................... -62- 2. Logical Conjunction....................................... -62- 3. Logical Disjunction.......................................
Recommended publications
  • Conjunction Fallacy' Revisited: How Intelligent Inferences Look Like Reasoning Errors
    Journal of Behavioral Decision Making J. Behav. Dec. Making, 12: 275±305 (1999) The `Conjunction Fallacy' Revisited: How Intelligent Inferences Look Like Reasoning Errors RALPH HERTWIG* and GERD GIGERENZER Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany ABSTRACT Findings in recent research on the `conjunction fallacy' have been taken as evid- ence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content-blind Ð in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires following the con- junction rule of probability theory. But content-blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and pragmatic inferences. In a series of studies, we ®rst show that people infer nonmathematical meanings of the polysemous term `probability' in the classic Linda conjunction problem. We then demonstrate that one can design contexts in which people infer mathematical meanings of the term and are therefore more likely to conform to the conjunction rule. Finally, we report evidence that the term `frequency' narrows the spectrum of possible interpreta- tions of `probability' down to its mathematical meanings, and that this fact Ð rather than the presence or absence of `extensional cues' Ð accounts for the low proportion of violations of the conjunction rule when people are asked for frequency judgments. We conclude that a failure to recognize the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic inference can lead rational responses to be misclassi®ed as fallacies. Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. KEY WORDS conjunction fallacy; probabalistic thinking; frequentistic thinking; probability People's apparent failures to reason probabilistically in experimental contexts have raised serious concerns about our ability to reason rationally in real-world environments.
    [Show full text]
  • A Task-Based Taxonomy of Cognitive Biases for Information Visualization
    A Task-based Taxonomy of Cognitive Biases for Information Visualization Evanthia Dimara, Steven Franconeri, Catherine Plaisant, Anastasia Bezerianos, and Pierre Dragicevic Three kinds of limitations The Computer The Display 2 Three kinds of limitations The Computer The Display The Human 3 Three kinds of limitations: humans • Human vision ️ has limitations • Human reasoning 易 has limitations The Human 4 ️Perceptual bias Magnitude estimation 5 ️Perceptual bias Magnitude estimation Color perception 6 易 Cognitive bias Behaviors when humans consistently behave irrationally Pohl’s criteria distilled: • Are predictable and consistent • People are unaware they’re doing them • Are not misunderstandings 7 Ambiguity effect, Anchoring or focalism, Anthropocentric thinking, Anthropomorphism or personification, Attentional bias, Attribute substitution, Automation bias, Availability heuristic, Availability cascade, Backfire effect, Bandwagon effect, Base rate fallacy or Base rate neglect, Belief bias, Ben Franklin effect, Berkson's paradox, Bias blind spot, Choice-supportive bias, Clustering illusion, Compassion fade, Confirmation bias, Congruence bias, Conjunction fallacy, Conservatism (belief revision), Continued influence effect, Contrast effect, Courtesy bias, Curse of knowledge, Declinism, Decoy effect, Default effect, Denomination effect, Disposition effect, Distinction bias, Dread aversion, Dunning–Kruger effect, Duration neglect, Empathy gap, End-of-history illusion, Endowment effect, Exaggerated expectation, Experimenter's or expectation bias,
    [Show full text]
  • Passions & Prejudice : the Constitution and Same-Sex Marriage
    City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works Student Theses Baruch College 1-1-2012 Passions & prejudice : the constitution and same-sex marriage James Meyers Baruch College How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/bb_etds/43 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] PASSIONS & PREJUDICE: THE CONSTITUTION AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE By James Meyers Submitted to the Committee on Undergraduate Honors at Baruch College of the City University of New York in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Science with Honors. Submitted Fall 2012 Approved by the Department of Political Science _________________________ Dr. Thomas Halper Mentor and Faculty Sponsor _________________________ _______________________ Dr. Benedetto Fontana Dr. Randolph Trumbach Committee Member Committee Member TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT: . 3 Part I INTRODUCTION: Folk Devils and Moral History . 4 CHAPTER 1: The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty . 19 CHAPTER 2: In Pursuit of Judicial Restraint . 28 CHAPTER 3: Inevitable Evolution & Epistemology . 49 Part II CHAPTER 4: Passions and Prejudice . 61 CHAPTER 5: The Geometry of Law . 76 CHAPTER 6: Arguments . .87 CONCLUSION: The Subjection of Gays and Lesbians . 105 BIBLIOGRAPHY: . 110 2 ABSTRACT Viscerally divisive sociopolitical issues with clear boundaries often raise questions of constitutional legality. Unfortunately, the Constitution does not offer guidance on a preferred method of interpretation, and so legal scholars and Supreme Court justices alike have yet to reach a consensus.
    [Show full text]
  • Constantinos Georgiou Athanasopoulos
    Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 1 Constantinos Georgiou Athanasopoulos Supervisor Mary Haight Title The Metaphysics of Intentionality: A Study of Intentionality focused on Sartre's and Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind and Language. Submission for PhD Department of Philosophy University of Glasgow JULY 1995 ProQuest Number: 13818785 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 13818785 Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 GLASGOW UKVERSITT LIBRARY Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 2 ABSTRACT With this Thesis an attempt is made at charting the area of the Metaphysics of Intentionality, based mainly on the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. A Philosophical Analysis and an Evaluation o f Sartre’s Arguments are provided, and Sartre’s Theory of Intentionality is supported by recent commentaries on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Sartre’s Theory of Intentionality is proposed, with few improvements by the author, as the only modem theory of the mind that can oppose effectively the advance of AI and physicalist reductivist attempts in Philosophy of Mind and Language. Discussion includes Sartre’s critique of Husserl, the relation of Sartre’s Theory of Intentionality to Realism, its applicability in the Theory of the Emotions, and recent theories of Intentionality such as Mohanty’s, Aquilla’s, Searle’s, and Harney’s.
    [Show full text]
  • Informal Fallacies 2
    Ashford University - Ed Tech | Informal_Fallacies_2 JUSTIN Hi, everybody. This is going to be a continuation of the informal logical fallacy HARRISON: discussion. The next one we're going to be talking about is the relativist fallacy. This is a common one that you see. Even in intellectual circles, you see really smart people falling into this fallacy. Well, I guess you can be consistent, but it's very hard to be consistent. The relativist fallacy occurs when you say that, for example, different cultures have different beliefs so what's right in one culture or what's right for one group is right and good. And then something that's opposite in another group is considered right and good. And those two things are right and good for both cultures or groups or whatever it might be. Well, there are different types of relativism, but cultural relativism would say things like, well, we can't judge other cultures because their actions are right based on their own definitions of what is right. And our definitions of what is right and wrong are different. Therefore, what they believe is right is right and what we believe is right is right. And hopefully you can see the problem with this is that-- let's say that we're confronting a culture that subjugates women. And in that culture, it is right or morally acceptable to gang rape a woman, which is actually-- this happens in the world-- when she's been accused of some crime-- often a crime that she didn't commit, but she's just been accused of it.
    [Show full text]
  • 35 Fallacies
    THIRTY-TWO COMMON FALLACIES EXPLAINED L. VAN WARREN Introduction If you watch TV, engage in debate, logic, or politics you have encountered the fallacies of: Bandwagon – "Everybody is doing it". Ad Hominum – "Attack the person instead of the argument". Celebrity – "The person is famous, it must be true". If you have studied how magicians ply their trade, you may be familiar with: Sleight - The use of dexterity or cunning, esp. to deceive. Feint - Make a deceptive or distracting movement. Misdirection - To direct wrongly. Deception - To cause to believe what is not true; mislead. Fallacious systems of reasoning pervade marketing, advertising and sales. "Get Rich Quick", phone card & real estate scams, pyramid schemes, chain letters, the list goes on. Because fallacy is common, you might want to recognize them. There is no world as vulnerable to fallacy as the religious world. Because there is no direct measure of whether a statement is factual, best practices of reasoning are replaced be replaced by "logical drift". Those who are political or religious should be aware of their vulnerability to, and exportation of, fallacy. The film, "Roshomon", by the Japanese director Akira Kurisawa, is an excellent study in fallacy. List of Fallacies BLACK-AND-WHITE Classifying a middle point between extremes as one of the extremes. Example: "You are either a conservative or a liberal" AD BACULUM Using force to gain acceptance of the argument. Example: "Convert or Perish" AD HOMINEM Attacking the person instead of their argument. Example: "John is inferior, he has blue eyes" AD IGNORANTIAM Arguing something is true because it hasn't been proven false.
    [Show full text]
  • The Acquisition of Scientific Knowledge Via Critical Thinking: a Philosophical Approach to Science Education
    Forum on Public Policy The Acquisition of Scientific Knowledge via Critical Thinking: A Philosophical Approach to Science Education Dr. Isidoro Talavera, Philosophy Professor and Lead Faculty, Department of Humanities & Communication Arts, Franklin University, Ohio, USA. Abstract There is a gap between the facts learned in a science course and the higher-cognitive skills of analysis and evaluation necessary for students to secure scientific knowledge and scientific habits of mind. Teaching science is not just about how we do science (i.e., focusing on just accumulating undigested facts and scientific definitions and procedures), but why (i.e., focusing on helping students learn to think scientifically). So although select subject matter is important, the largest single contributor to understanding the nature and practice of science is not the factual content of the scientific discipline, but rather the ability of students to think, reason, and communicate critically about that content. This is achieved by a science education that helps students directly by encouraging them to analyze and evaluate all kinds of phenomena, scientific, pseudoscientific, and other. Accordingly, the focus of this treatise is on critical thinking as it may be applied to scientific claims to introduce the major themes, processes, and methods common to all scientific disciplines so that the student may develop an understanding about the nature and practice of science and develop an appreciation for the process by which we gain scientific knowledge. Furthermore, this philosophical approach to science education highlights the acquisition of scientific knowledge via critical thinking to foment a skeptical attitude in our students so that they do not relinquish their mental capacity to engage the world critically and ethically as informed and responsibly involved citizens.1 I.
    [Show full text]
  • Informal Logic Examples and Exercises
    Contents Section 1 Quotation Marks: Direct Quotes, Scare Quotes, Use/Mention Quotes 1 Introduction 1 Instructions 5 Exercises 7 Section 2 Meaning and Definition 13 Introduction 13 Instructions 17 Exercises 19 Section 3 Ambiguity, Homophony, Vagueness, Generality 23 Introduction 23 Instructions 27 Exercises 29 Section 4 Connotation and Assertive Content 35 Introduction 35 Instructions 37 Exercises 39 Section 5 Simple and Compound Sentences 45 Introduction 45 Instructions 49 Exercises 51 vi Contents Section 6 Arguments; Simple and Serial Argument Forms 61 Introduction 61 Instructions 65 Exercises 67 Section 7 Convergent, Divergent, and Linked Argument Forms 81 Introduction 81 Instructions 85 Exercises 87 Section 8 Unstated Premises and Conclusions; Extraneous Material 95 Introduction 95 Instructions 99 Exercises 10 1 Section 9 Complex Arguments 115 Introduction 115 Instructions 121 Exercises 123 Section 10 Argument Strengths 145 Introduction 145 Instructions 149 Exercises 151 Section 11 Valid Deductive Arguments: Propositional Logic 159 Introduction 159 Instructions 165 Exercises 167 Section 12 Valid Deductive Arguments: Quantificational Logic 179 Introduction 179 Instructions 187 Exercises 189 Contents vii Section 13 Fallacies One 199 Argument from Authority Two Wrongs Make a Right Irrelevant Reason Argument from Ignorance Ambiguous Argument Slippery Slope Argument from Force Introduction 199 Instructions for Sections 13-16 203 Exercises 205 Section 14 Fallacies Two 213 Ad Hominem Argument Provincialism Tokenism Hasty Conclusion Questionable
    [Show full text]
  • Learning to Spot Common Fallacies
    LEARNING TO SPOT COMMON FALLACIES We intend this article to be a resource that you will return to when the fallacies discussed in it come up throughout the course. Do not feel that you need to read or master the entire article now. We’ve discussed some of the deep-seated psychological obstacles to effective logical and critical thinking in the videos. This article sets out some more common ways in which arguments can go awry. The defects or fallacies presented here tend to be more straightforward than psychological obstacles posed by reasoning heuristics and biases. They should, therefore, be easier to spot and combat. You will see though, that they are very common: keep an eye out for them in your local paper, online, or in arguments or discussions with friends or colleagues. One reason they’re common is that they can be quite effective! But if we offer or are convinced by a fallacious argument we will not be acting as good logical and critical thinkers. Species of Fallacious Arguments The common fallacies are usefully divided into three categories: Fallacies of Relevance, Fallacies of Unacceptable Premises, and Formal Fallacies. Fallacies of Relevance Fallacies of relevance offer reasons to believe a claim or conclusion that, on examination, turn out to not in fact to be reasons to do any such thing. 1. The ‘Who are you to talk?’, or ‘You Too’, or Tu Quoque Fallacy1 Description: Rejecting an argument because the person advancing it fails to practice what he or she preaches. Example: Doctor: You should quit smoking. It’s a serious health risk.
    [Show full text]
  • The Fallacy of Composition and Meta-Argumentation"
    CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Scholarship at UWindsor University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 10 May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM Commentary on: Maurice Finocchiaro's "The fallacy of composition and meta-argumentation" Michel Dufour Sorbonne-Nouvelle, Institut de la Communication et des Médias Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive Part of the Philosophy Commons Dufour, Michel, "Commentary on: Maurice Finocchiaro's "The fallacy of composition and meta- argumentation"" (2013). OSSA Conference Archive. 49. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/49 This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Commentary on: Maurice Finocchiaro’s “The fallacy of composition and meta-argumentation” MICHEL DUFOUR Department «Institut de la Communication et des Médias» Sorbonne-Nouvelle 13 rue Santeuil 75231 Paris Cedex 05 France [email protected] 1. INTRODUCTION In his paper on the fallacy of composition, Maurice Finocchiaro puts forward several important theses about this fallacy. He also uses it to illustrate his view that fallacies should be studied in light of the notion of meta-argumentation at the core of his recent book (Finocchiaro, 2013). First, he expresses his puzzlement. Some authors have claimed that this fallacy is quite common (this is the ubiquity thesis) but it seems to have been neglected by scholars.
    [Show full text]
  • Emergent Properties of Terrorist Networks, Percolation and Social Narrative
    Emergent Properties of Terrorist Networks, Percolation and Social Narrative Maurice Passman Adaptive Risk Technology, Ltd. London, UK [email protected] Philip V. Fellman American Military University Charles Town, WV [email protected] Abstract In this paper, we have initiated an attempt to develop and understand the driving mechanisms that underlies fourth-generation warfare (4GW). We have undertaken this from a perspective of endeavoring to understand the drivers of these events (i.e. the 'Physics') from a Complexity perspective by using a threshold-type percolation model. We propose to integrate this strategic level model with tactical level Big Data, behavioral, statistical projections via a ‘fractal’ operational level model and to construct a hierarchical framework that allows dynamic prediction. Our initial study concentrates on this strategic level, i.e. a percolation model. Our main conclusion from this initial study is that extremist terrorist events are not solely driven by the size of a supporting population within a socio-geographical location but rather a combination of ideological factors that also depends upon the involvement of the host population. This involvement, through the social, political and psychological fabric of society, not only contributes to the active participation of terrorists within society but also directly contributes to and increases the likelihood of the occurrence of terrorist events. Our calculations demonstrate the links between Islamic extremist terrorist events, the ideologies within the Muslim and non-Muslim population that facilitates these terrorist events (such as Anti-Zionism) and anti- Semitic occurrences of violence against the Jewish population. In a future paper, we hope to extend the work undertaken to construct a predictive model and extend our calculations to other forms of terrorism such as Right Wing fundamentalist terrorist events within the USA.
    [Show full text]
  • 10 Fallacies and Examples Pdf
    10 fallacies and examples pdf Continue A: It is imperative that we promote adequate means to prevent degradation that would jeopardize the project. Man B: Do you think that just because you use big words makes you sound smart? Shut up, loser; You don't know what you're talking about. #2: Ad Populum: Ad Populum tries to prove the argument as correct simply because many people believe it is. Example: 80% of people are in favor of the death penalty, so the death penalty is moral. #3. Appeal to the body: In this erroneous argument, the author argues that his argument is correct because someone known or powerful supports it. Example: We need to change the age of drinking because Einstein believed that 18 was the right age of drinking. #4. Begging question: This happens when the author's premise and conclusion say the same thing. Example: Fashion magazines do not harm women's self-esteem because women's trust is not damaged after reading the magazine. #5. False dichotomy: This misconception is based on the assumption that there are only two possible solutions, so refuting one decision means that another solution should be used. It ignores other alternative solutions. Example: If you want better public schools, you should raise taxes. If you don't want to raise taxes, you can't have the best schools #6. Hasty Generalization: Hasty Generalization occurs when the initiator uses too small a sample size to support a broad generalization. Example: Sally couldn't find any cute clothes in the boutique and couldn't Maura, so there are no cute clothes in the boutique.
    [Show full text]