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The Libet Experiment and Its Implications for Conscious Will The The Libet experiment and its implications for conscious will implications for conscious will Peter G.H. Clarke Peter G.H. Clarke Summary Summary A famous experiment of Benjamin Libet and his colleagues has been interpreted as showing that our brains initiateA famous voluntary experiment movements of Benjamin before Libetwe are and aware his colleaguesof having decidedhas been to interpretedmove, and asthat showing this calls that into our question brains theinitiate efficacy voluntary of our movements wills. These before claims we arehave aware been ofcontested having decidedby many to neuroscientistsmove, and that andthis philosophers.calls into question This paperthe efficacy provides of anour introduction wills. These to claimsthe controversy. have been contested by many neuroscientists and philosophers. This paper provides an introduction to the controversy. The neurophysiological experiments of Benjamin Libet and his collaborators in the 1980s1 have been interpreted by the authors About the Author The neurophysiological experiments of Benjamin Libet and his Dr Peter Clarke was an associate professor at andcollaborators many others in the as 1980sshowing1 have that been our interpreted brains initiate by the conscious authors theAbout University the Author of Lausanne, Switzerland, until Dr Peter Clarke was an associate professor at voluntaryand many movementsothers as showing as well asthat the our will brains to move initiate before conscious we are 2012. He taught anatomy and neuroscience and consciously aware of the will to move. I shall refer to this claim didthe Universityresearch on of theLausanne, mechanisms Switzerland, of neuronal until voluntary movements as well as the will to move before we are 2012. He taught anatomy and neuroscience and asconsciously the Libet aware claim of for the brev willity. to Itmove. is controversial, I shall refer tobut this if claimvalid death. His main focus is now on the would have important implications for our understanding of how philosophicaldid research onimp thelications mechanisms of neuroscience. of neuronal He as the Libet claim for brevity. It is controversial, but if valid death. His main focus is now on the the mind relates to the brain and for the role of conscious will in is an associate editor of Science and Christian would have important implications for our understanding of how Beliefphilosophical and is a impmemberlications of The of neuroscience.Faraday Institute He the mindperformance relates toof the voluntary brain and actions. for the Before role of going conscious into willdetails in is an associate editor of Science and Christian about the Libet experiment, I must first provide some information Advisory Board. He is the author of Dieu, the performance of voluntary actions. Before going into details l’hommeBelief and et is le a cerveau member (Croire of The Pocket,Faraday 2012). Institute about the mind-brain relationship and the neurophysiology of about the Libet experiment, I must first provide some information Advisory Board. He is the author of Dieu, l’homme et le cerveau (Croire Pocket, 2012). voluntaryabout the movement.mind-brain relationship and the neurophysiology of We will have nothing to do with the fantastic suggestion, that voluntary movement. what the supersensitive ‘reactors’ in the cortex react to, is the The mindmind-brain-brain relationship and the Libet claim We will have nothing to do with the fantastic suggestion, that initiative of a virtually disembodied soul. To what, then, are It is generally accepted that the electrical activity of our brains what the supersensitive ‘reactors’ in the cortex react to, is the The mind-brain relationship and the Libet claim we to say that they do react? What else, than to the motions of underlies our conscious thought, including our decision making. initiative of a virtually disembodied soul. To what, then, are It is generally accepted that the electrical activity of our brains the embodied soul, that is to say, other motions in the same How a physical thing, the brain, can be the basis of consciousness we to say that they3 do react? What else, than to the motions of underlies our conscious thought, including our decision making. nervous system? is a subject of debate that has given rise to many different the embodied soul, that is to say, other motions in the same How a physical thing, the brain, can be the basis of consciousness 3 philosophical positions, but these can be grouped in two main nervous system? is a subject of debate that has given rise to many different For these reasons, with a few exceptions,4 most modern categories:philosophical dualism positions, and monism.but these can be grouped in two main So great was the influence of Descartes on western philosophersFor andthese neuroscientists, reasons, with awhether few exceptions, theist or 4atheist,most modern accept categories: dualism and monism. some form of monism, but this does not have to involve eliminative philosophySo that, great from was the the late influence seventeenth of Descartes century untilon westernaround philosophers and neuroscientists, whether theist or atheist, accept 1950 or so, most westerners accepted some form of interactive materialismsome form of that monism, reject sbut mind this asdoes illusory. not have Many to involve theists, eliminative agnostics philosophy that, from the late seventeenth century until around and atheists adopt more moderate monist positions such as two- dualism,1950 or so,involving most westerners an immaterial accepted soul actingsome onform a material of interactive brabrain.in. materialism that rejects mind as illusory. Many theists, agnostics Since then this view has lost favour, for a variety of reasons, aspectand atheists monism adopt, according more moderate to which monist our subjective, positions firstsuch-personal, as two- dualism, involving an immaterial soul acting on a material brain. account of our inner life and neuroscience’s objective, third- includingSince then the this arguments view has of lost philosophers favour, for such a varietyas Ryle, of Place reasons, and aspect monism, according to which our subjective, first-personal, Feigl. In addition, atheistic materialists rejected it because it personal account of our brain’s activity refer to complementary including the arguments of philosophers such as Ryle, Place and account of our inner life5 and neuroscience’s objective, third- invokes a nonmaterial entity, but so did most Christian aspectspersonal of account a single of entity. our brain’s An alternative activity referview tois complementarythe mind-brain Feigl. In addition, atheistic materialists rejected it because it identity theory, according to5 which the mind and the brain’s activity acinvokesademics, a becausenonmaterial advances entity, in thebut analysis so did of biblicalmost Christian texts in aspects of a single entity. An alternative view is the mind-brain the mid twentieth century and since tended to support a monistic areidentity considered theory, toaccording be the sameto which entity, the notmind two and aspects the brain’s of the activity same academics, because advances in the analysis2 of biblical texts in conception of man, not a dualistic one. This realisation was not entity.are considered I prefer to two be -aspectthe same monism entity, becausenot two aspectsmind-brain of the identity same the mid twentieth century and since tended to support a monistic seems to me linguistically problematic, but the two formulations entirelyconception revolutionary, of man, not because a dualistic there one. had2 Thisalways realisation been a monistwas notic entity. I prefer two-aspect monism because mind-brain identity strand in Christian thought due to the influence of Thomas makeseems identical to me linguistically predictions at problematic, the level of brainbut thefunction. two formulations entirely revolutionary, because there had always been a monistic A striking aspect of the Libet claim is that it goes against Aquinas.strand in Thus,Christian during thought his Gifford due Lecturesto the influence in 1956- 57,of AnglicanThomas make identical predictions at the level of brain function. theologian Austin Farrer criticised the dualistic views of the main Aversions striking of aspect both dualismof the Libet and claimmonism. is that Cartesian it goes dualismagainst Aquinas. Thus, during his Gifford Lectures in 1956-57, Anglican predicts that mind events should precede brain events, since the neurobiologisttheologian Austin (and Farrerfuture criticisedNobel prize the-winner) dualistic John views Eccles, of the main versions of both dualism and monism. Cartesian dualism writing: nonphysicalpredicts that mind mind (or events soul etc.)should is considered precede brain to be events,the real sincesource the of neurobiologist (and future Nobel prize-winner) John Eccles, our decisions. TwoTwo-aspect-aspect monism and mindmind-brain-brain identity theory writing: nonphysical mind (or soul etc.) is considered to be the real source of bothour decisions. predict that Two-aspect mind and monism brain eventsand mind-brain should be identity synchronous theory, both predict that mind and brain events should be synchronous, 1 3 Libet, B., Gleason, C.A., Wright, E.W. & Pearl, D.K. ‘Time of conscious Farrer, A. The Freedom of the Will, London: A & C Black (1958), p. 87. intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). 4 Goetz, S. and Taliaferro, C. A Brief History of the Soul, Chichester, UK: Wiley- 1 Libet, B., Gleason, C.A., Wright, E.W. & Pearl, D.K. ‘Time of conscious 3 Farrer, A. The Freedom of the Will, London: A & C Black (1958), p. 87. The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act’, Brain (1983)106: 623- Blackwell4 (2011). 5 642.intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). Nagel,Goetz, S.T. andThe Taliaferro, View From C. Nowhere A Brief History, Oxford: of theOxford Soul ,UniversityChichester, Press UK: (1986),Wiley- 2The Green, unconscious J.B. Body, initiation Soul and of aHuman freely voluntaryLife: The act’,Nature Brain of Humanity(1983)106: in 623 the- chap.Blackwell 3, p. (2011). 28; Jeeves, M. & Brown, W.S. Neuroscience, Psychology and 642.
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