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The Cognitive Campaign: Strategic and Intelligence Perspectives Yossi Kuperwasser and David Siman-Tov, Editors Memorandum Intelligence in Theory and in Practice The Institute for the Research of 197 Issue No. 4, October 2019 the Methodology of Intelligence The Cognitive Campaign: Strategic and Intelligence Perspectives Yossi Kuperwasser and David Siman-Tov, Editors Institute for National Security Studies The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), incorporating the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, was founded in 2006. The purpose of the Institute for National Security Studies is first, to conduct basic research that meets the highest academic standards on matters related to Israel’s national security as well as Middle East regional and international security affairs. Second, the Institute aims to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of issues that are – or should be – at the top of Israel’s national security agenda. INSS seeks to address Israeli decision makers and policymakers, the defense establishment, public opinion makers, the academic community in Israel and abroad, and the general public. INSS publishes research that it deems worthy of public attention, while it maintains a strict policy of non-partisanship. The opinions expressed in this publication are the authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, boards, research staff, or the organizations and individuals that support its research. The Institute for the Research of the Methodology of Intelligence The Institute for the Research of the Methodology of Intelligence (IRMI) at the Israeli Intelligence Community Commemoration and Heritage Center was established in 2016. Its goal is to serve as a space for developing and discussing intelligence methodologies for the Israeli Intelligence Community and to help connect it to the relevant methodological discourse in other intelligence communities, in academia, and in the private and public sectors. IRMI research and other activities are based primarily on the vast experience of practitioners, those who are active within the Israeli Intelligence Community and its veterans, as well as on professional research in academia and research centers worldwide. In IRMI’s view, methodology is a critical component of the intelligence practicum, and the convergence between theory and operation is essential for developing knowledge needed for on-going development of the intelligence profession. This is why practitioners are best fit to develop the theory of intelligence whose implementation feeds the development of further relevant knowledge. The Cognitive Campaign: Strategic and Intelligence Perspectives Yossi Kuperwasser and David Siman-Tov, Editors Memorandum No. 197 October 2019 The Institute for the Research of the Methodology of Intelligence המערכה על התודעה: היבטים אסטרטגיים ומודיעיניים עורכים: יוסי קופרוסר ודודי סימן טוב Institute for National Security Studies (a public benefit company) 40 Haim Levanon Street POB 39950 Ramat Aviv Tel Aviv 6997556 Israel E-mail: [email protected] http://www.inss.org.il Graphic design: Michal Semo Kovetz and Yael Bieber, TAU Graphic Design Studio Cover photos: • Television screens, by Wags05 at English Wikipedia, https://commons. wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=43906515 • Courtroom, iStock 876701606 • Mark Zuckerberg at F8, May 1, 2018, by Anthony Quintano, CC BY 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=72122387 • Nuclear explosion, iStock 955124060 • Tahrir Square, Cairo, February 11, 2011, by Jonathan Rashad, Flickr, CC BY 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index. php?curid=13535760 • Russian President Vladimir Putin, Shutterstock, ID:10187259g • Donald Trump presidential inauguration, Washington, January 20, 2107, by White House photographer, Official White House Facebook page, reprinted at https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/ index.php?curid=55185771 • Businesspeople: Shutterstock, ID: 409001227 Printing: Digiprint Zahav Ltd., Tel Aviv © All rights reserved. October 2019 ISBN: 978-965-92750-3-8 Contents Preface 7 The Cognitive War as an Element of National Security: Based on Personal Experience 13 Moshe Ya’alon Part I Theoretical and Conceptual Dimensions Influencing Public Opinion 25 Haim Assa Disinformation Campaigns and Influence on Cognition: Implications for State Policy 37 David Siman-Tov Beyond the Web: Diplomacy, Cognition, and Influence 51 Haim Waxman and Daniel Cohen Defending against Influence Operations: The Challenges Facing Liberal Democracies 61 Gabi Siboni and Pnina Shuker Part II Cognitive Warfare: Intelligence and Cyber Cognitive Intelligence: The Theoretical Aspect 77 Kobi Michael and Yossi Kuperwasser Subjective Truth as a Challenge for Intelligence in the “Campaign between Wars” 91 Colonel A and Major A Influence Operations in Cyber: Characteristics and Insights 99 Deganit Paikowsky and Eviatar Matania Part III Global Dimensions Russia as an Information Superpower 115 Vera Michlin-Shapir, David Siman-Tov, and Nufar Shaashua Iran’s Information Warfare 135 Itay Haiminis Part IV Israel and the Cognitive Campaign Cognition: Combining Soft Power and Hard Power 151 Udi Dekel and Lia Moran-Gilad When the Intelligence Officer and the Public Diplomat Meet 165 Yarden Vatikay and Colonel O Consciousness as Leverage: The Israeli Campaign regarding the Iranian Nuclear Program 175 Ronen Dangoor The Threat of the Delegitimization of the State of Israel: Case Study of the Management of a Cognitive Campaign 199 Shahar Eilam and Shira Patael Mindset and Social Resilience in Security Emergencies in Israel 213 Meir Elran, Carmit Padan, and Aya Dolev Preface In the information era, the cognitive campaign has become a central element of national security in struggles between adversaries. This volume, published jointly by the Institute for the Research of the Methodology of Intelligence (IRMI) at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC) and the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), aims to expand knowledge and understanding of the cognitive campaign, with an emphasis on intelligence methodology in this campaign. The cognitive campaign is not new, and it is an inseparable aspect of every strategic and military conflict. In recent years, this struggle has played a much more important role than in past conflicts; at times it takes place without a direct military context and is not even led by military bodies. The cognitive campaign is a continuous campaign; thus, its prominence is greater in the period between wars (as a part of the “campaign between wars”). It is important to distinguish between cognition and the cognitive campaign. Cognition is the set of insights that an individual or individuals have regarding the surrounding reality and the way they want to shape it, derived from the set of the values and beliefs through which they examine and interpret their environment and work to confront its inherent challenges, and even to change it. In contrast, the cognitive campaign involves the actions and tools that entities that are part of a certain campaign framework use to influence the cognition of target audiences or to prevent influence on them. The purpose of the cognitive campaign is to cause target audiences to adopt the perception of reality held by the side wielding the effort, so that it can more easily advance the strategic and/or operational objectives that it sees as critical. The cognitive campaign can be negative, that is, prevent the development of undesirable cognitive states, or positive, with an attempt to produce the desired cognition. Along with the use of force, the various tools and methods of operation in the cognitive campaign include designated tools, some of The Cognitive Campaign: Strategic and Intelligence Perspectives 7 Yossi Kuperwasser and David Siman-Tov, Editors 8 I The Cognitive Campaign: Strategic and Intelligence Perspectives which are familiar and traditional, such as military psychological warfare (deception, leaflets), spokespeople, diplomacy, and influence via mass media tools (written journalism and television), while others are novel and derive from the digital world, including the social media. Every use of force in a military context, and likewise every political process, includes a cognitive dimension. Furthermore, the use of force or a political process sometimes takes place in order to achieve an objective in the cognitive campaign, while other times the cognitive component is complementary. Therefore, we must distinguish between actions that aim specifically to influence cognition, and actions that have a different purpose and aim to influence cognition indirectly, and to assess in advance the different kinds of influence in the decision making process. For example, messages relayed through the media aim to influence a certain audience directly. On the other hand, a war that aims to defeat an armed organization that is active in an urban area will also influence the cognition of the population living in that area, even if that is not the war’s specific mission. Many elements take part in the cognitive campaign and operate vis- à-vis a variety of target audiences, while they themselves are subject to influence. As a result, the campaign requires deep familiarity with the basic cognition of the target audiences, which derives from their culture, beliefs, and values, as well as with their situational cognition in relation to concrete events, and with the ways it is possible to help shape the cognition of these target audiences.
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