Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
THE BOLOGNA CENTER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONALAFFAIRS Publishedat theBologna Center TheJohnsHopkinsUniversi1y PaulH. Nitre Schoolof Advan cedInternational Studies The Bologna Center Journal oflntemational Affairswas created by a group ofstu dents at the Bologna, Italy campusof the Johns Hopkins University School of Ad vanced International Studies. Thegoal of theBologna Center Journalis to provide a forumfor scholarly discourse andacademic discussion about current issues and new ideas ofinterest to the internationalaffairs community. Theeditorial staff is committed to serving the students and facultyof the Bologna Center as well as thelarger aca demic communityof whichJohn Hopkins is a part. Published at: The Bologna Center ViaBelmeloro 11 40126 Bologna BO Italy Fax: 39-051-228505 Phone: 39-051-232185 Email: [email protected] Printed by: Baiesi snc ViaBroccaindosso, 2b 40125 Bologna BO Italy The opinions expressed herein aresolely andexplicitly those ofthe authorsand do not reflectthe views ofthe Journal staffor theBologna Center. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ON l�TERDEPENDENCE 9 KENNETH WALTZ SAME BED, SAME DREAMS? 17 ALFRED VAN STADEN CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT 31 DOROTHEE HEISENBERG Dm�s EUROPEAN "UNCOMMON" FOREIGN POLICY HAVE A FUTURE? 49 ELISABETTA BRIGHI Is THERE A EUROPEAN INDENTITY? 63 RAIN EENSAAR SPAIN AND MOROCCO: A STORY OF TENSION AND RECONCILIATION 73 JOSEP TORRES CAN MuLn-CoMMUNAL DEMOCRACIES WoRK? 95 !ANNIS CARRAS A NOTE ON THE PEOPLE AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 111 JEAN-CLAUDE CHESNAIS RISE OF THE AUSTRIAN RIGHT: EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 117 PATRICK McCARTHY, PETER JANKOWJTSCH, PETER SICHROVSKY J6RG HAIDER: A DISCUSSION ON RHETORIC 127 RICHARD WIMMER Dear Readers, It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to thethird edition of the Journal oflntemational Affairs. Like the EuropeanUnion, though on a smaller scale, the Bologna Center Journaloflntemational Affairsendured self-critique, expansion and fundamentalalterations this year. It is not unexpected, then, thatthis year's J oumal theme, "Redefining Europe," reflectsits ownprocess of redefinition. The thirdyear of anyendeavor is the most critical,as Dr. Heisenberg points out in her article, "Critical Reflectionson European Union Expansion." In pre senting you with the third edition of the Journal,I invite you to consider as thor oughly and reflectively about the dynamicprocess of Europeanevolution as the authors herewithin have. Consider the collection of different approaches to the challenges of enlargingand transforming asuch beast as Europe,weigh thisyear's events in Austria and Spain, ask yourself how theUnited States fitsinto the pic ture,and you will findyourself in the shoes of scholarsof InternationalAffairs at SAIS. You will also findmore questionsthan answers within the pages of thethird edition, as the table of contents bears testament. Indeed, how canEurope, still unsure of the extent of its borders andresponsibilities, inspire more confidence thancaution in its leaders? As the Journalseeks to render theeconomic, political, andsocial transformationof Europe in the twenty-firstcentury into literature, it, like Europe, also seeks to survive. May thetwo complement each otherin years to come. Rachel Schneller Editor-in-Chief In October, 1999, the Bologna Center and the International Relations Pro gram of the University of Bologna, Forli, organized a special lecture series on "Realist Theory and International Relations," which was delivered by Professor Kenneth Waltz. What follows is an edited transcript ofhis second lecture, "On Interdependence. " While this was his first visit to the Bologna Center, Professor Waltz is no stranger to SAIS; as a young OberliY,l College student, he spent time at the School when it was still in its Florida Avenue location. Professor Waltz, presently adjunct professor at Columbia Univer sity,is one of the most distinguished theorists of international relations theory and author ofthe classic book, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analy sis. - Dr. Thomas Row, SAIS, Bologna Center ()NINTERDEPENDENCE BY KENNETHALTZ w The spread of democracy is not enough to create a state of peace in the world; nor is interdependence, thepropulsive power ofthe profit motive, or opti mism in the future. NormanAngell exemplified the sense of interdependence beforeWorld War I in his book, The Greatlllusion1, in which he showed war would not occur where it would not pay. And, of course, not long afterward, World War I occurred. The theory of complex interdependence, a furthertightening of the eco nomic screw, is strengthenedby the globalization of the 1990' s. Successive in creases in interdependence suggest that the more countrieslock themselves to gether economically, the costlier it will be to fighta war, and the less we expect warsto occur. This is plausible; if states see warsas costly, they areless likely to fightthem. Thequestion is not whetheror not interdependence tends in thisdirec tion, but rather, how strong theeffect of interdependence actually is. First, I want to raise the question of what the effects of interdependence are. They are ambiguous. There are some good effects. The wider the area across which trade is conducted and the higher the volume of trade, the more people benefitfrom thedivision oflabor andexperience increased economic well 9 beill1?;. However, there are also negative effects. In WarBefore Civilization2, Lawrence Keeley concludes that as tribes began to trade goods with each other, incidents of warbegan to occur more frequently. Ever since Plato, utopias have been set in isolation fromother peoples. Island civilizations allowed people to develop uniquequalities, uncontaminatedby others. The lack of interaction with others prevented conflictand violenc e. Interaction may lead to complete integration andpenetration, transform ing anarchyinto hierarchy. In thiscase, integration alsorules out internationalwar. It is the gray areabetween isolation andintegration where world interdependence plays a role, where people fromdifferent states have contact with one anotherbut are not integrated and are not united undera reliable authority. Second, we must address theeffects of theinequalities of nations on inter dependence. There is the tendency to talk about interdependence across the globe as though we are all of one piece. This obscuresthe factthat states with differingcapabilities andlevels of resourcesfare differently in the world. Interde pendence is a euphemism used to disguise dependence. I recall one of my stu dents asking me, "Why do American officialsand professors always talk about interdependence? We Frenchmen know that you do not depend on us, we de pend on you." Why indeed? In a 1970 article, "The Myth ofNational Interde pendence3 ,"I described interdependence as anAmerican ideology that disguises the factthat there arehigh degrees of dependence on the partof some countries. Itis politically convenientfor the least dependent or the most independent country to describe everythingas "interdependence." The climaxof the issue of interdependence is theconcept of asymmetrical interdependence, the factthat some states arestrong andsome are weak. This differenceis well illustratedin Susan Strange's book, The Retreatof theState: The Diffusionof Power in theWorld Economv4. She points out that, internationally, the authorityof governmentstends to be transferredto the market.However, she also points out that the authority of governmentstends to overrule thecaution of the markets. It may be that the authority of governmentstends to slip away into the handsof financiersand traders, but when states noticethe marketusurping the authorityof their governments, thepolitically and eco nomicallystrong states try to recapture it. Third, interdependence is a weakforce, not a strong force. Two illustra- 10 tionsare the most conclusive. First, the variousparts of the Soviet Union were not interdependent; theywere integrated. Allviable countriesare fairly closely inte grated, andthe Soviet Union was especially integrateddue to thestate planning that created theunion. The costliness of breaking apartis supposed to makefor a kind of cohesive peacefulness, andyet the Soviet Union split apart,even at a greatcost. Extensiveeconomic integration created withthe goal of Communism in ' mind could not hold thecountry together. Another example is Yugoslavia. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was done at great cost to thewell being of the people in that area. Interdependence andintegration proved to be weakforces in the faceof religious commitmentand ethnicdifferences; even securityinterests were sacrificed. Under some circum stances, integration and interdependencecannot hold anentity together. On InternationalInstitutions and Interdependence I takeNATO asmy exampleof aninstitution thatbrings the meaning, the force, theeffect, andthe usefulness of theconcept ofinternational institutions into question. NATO has not only survived,but has flourished and expanded. Ithas done so in spite of realists saying at the end of the Cold Warthat the years of NATO were numbered. I expected, as anyrealist wouldexpect, that upon win ningthe victory, the alliancewould fallapart. Itis a cliche of history,a theoretical warrant, thatwinning kills alliances. The balanceof power theorysays thatif thereis a dominantstate or group of states, other states begin to counterbalancethem by forminga coalition. This happened twiceduring theNapoleonic era. In World WarI andII, thecoalitions that won thewars fell apart on themorrow