THE BOLOGNA CENTER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONALAFFAIRS

Publishedat theBologna Center TheJohnsHopkinsUniversi1y PaulH. Nitre Schoolof Advan cedInternational Studies

The Bologna Center Journal oflntemational Affairswas created by a group ofstu­ dents at the Bologna, Italy campusof the Johns Hopkins University School of Ad­ vanced International Studies. Thegoal of theBologna Center Journalis to provide a forumfor scholarly discourse andacademic discussion about current issues and new ideas ofinterest to the internationalaffairs community. Theeditorial staff is committed to serving the students and facultyof the Bologna Center as well as thelarger aca­ demic communityof whichJohn Hopkins is a part.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

ON l�TERDEPENDENCE 9 KENNETH WALTZ

SAME BED, SAME DREAMS? 17 ALFRED VAN STADEN

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT 31 DOROTHEE HEISENBERG

Dm�s EUROPEAN "UNCOMMON" FOREIGN POLICY HAVE A FUTURE? 49 ELISABETTA BRIGHI

Is THERE A EUROPEAN INDENTITY? 63 RAIN EENSAAR

SPAIN AND MOROCCO: A STORY OF TENSION AND RECONCILIATION 73 JOSEP TORRES

CAN MuLn-CoMMUNAL DEMOCRACIES WoRK? 95 !ANNIS CARRAS

A NOTE ON THE PEOPLE AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 111 JEAN-CLAUDE CHESNAIS

RISE OF THE AUSTRIAN RIGHT: EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 117 PATRICK McCARTHY, PETER JANKOWJTSCH, PETER SICHROVSKY

J6RG HAIDER: A DISCUSSION ON RHETORIC 127 RICHARD WIMMER

Dear Readers,

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to thethird edition of the Journal oflntemational Affairs. Like the EuropeanUnion, though on a smaller scale, the Bologna Center Journaloflntemational Affairsendured self-critique, expansion and fundamentalalterations this year. It is not unexpected, then, thatthis year's J oumal theme, "Redefining Europe," reflectsits ownprocess of redefinition.

The thirdyear of anyendeavor is the most critical,as Dr. Heisenberg points out in her article, "Critical Reflectionson European Union Expansion." In pre­ senting you with the third edition of the Journal,I invite you to consider as thor­ oughly and reflectively about the dynamicprocess of Europeanevolution as the authors herewithin have. Consider the collection of different approaches to the challenges of enlargingand transforming asuch beast as Europe,weigh thisyear's events in Austria and Spain, ask yourself how theUnited States fitsinto the pic­ ture,and you will findyourself in the shoes of scholarsof InternationalAffairs at SAIS.

You will also findmore questionsthan answers within the pages of thethird edition, as the table of contents bears testament. Indeed, how canEurope, still unsure of the extent of its borders andresponsibilities, inspire more confidence thancaution in its leaders? As the Journalseeks to render theeconomic, political, andsocial transformationof Europe in the twenty-firstcentury into literature, it, like Europe, also seeks to survive. May thetwo complement each otherin years to come.

Rachel Schneller Editor-in-Chief

In October, 1999, the Bologna Center and the International Relations Pro­ gram of the University of Bologna, Forli, organized a special lecture series on "Realist Theory and International Relations," which was delivered by Professor Kenneth Waltz. What follows is an edited transcript ofhis second lecture, "On Interdependence. " While this was his first visit to the Bologna Center, Professor Waltz is no stranger to SAIS; as a young OberliY,l College student, he spent time at the School when it was still in its Florida Avenue location. Professor Waltz, presently adjunct professor at Columbia Univer­ sity,is one of the most distinguished theorists of international relations theory and author ofthe classic book, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analy­ sis. - Dr. Thomas Row, SAIS, Bologna Center

()NINTERDEPENDENCE

BY KENNETHALTZ w

The spread of democracy is not enough to create a state of peace in the world; nor is interdependence, thepropulsive power ofthe profit motive, or opti­ mism in the future. NormanAngell exemplified the sense of interdependence beforeWorld War I in his book, The Greatlllusion1, in which he showed war would not occur where it would not pay. And, of course, not long afterward, World War I occurred.

The theory of complex interdependence, a furthertightening of the eco­ nomic screw, is strengthenedby the globalization of the 1990' s. Successive in­ creases in interdependence suggest that the more countrieslock themselves to­ gether economically, the costlier it will be to fighta war, and the less we expect warsto occur. This is plausible; if states see warsas costly, they areless likely to fightthem. Thequestion is not whetheror not interdependence tends in thisdirec­ tion, but rather, how strong theeffect of interdependence actually is.

First, I want to raise the question of what the effects of interdependence are. They are ambiguous. There are some good effects. The wider the area across which trade is conducted and the higher the volume of trade, the more people benefitfrom thedivision oflabor andexperience increased economic well

9 beill1?;. However, there are also negative effects. In WarBefore Civilization2, Lawrence Keeley concludes that as tribes began to trade goods with each other, incidents of warbegan to occur more frequently. Ever since Plato, utopias have been set in isolation fromother peoples. Island civilizations allowed people to develop uniquequalities, uncontaminatedby others. The lack of interaction with others prevented conflictand violenc e.

Interaction may lead to complete integration andpenetration, transform­ ing anarchyinto hierarchy. In thiscase, integration alsorules out internationalwar. It is the gray areabetween isolation andintegration where world interdependence plays a role, where people fromdifferent states have contact with one anotherbut are not integrated and are not united undera reliable authority.

Second, we must address theeffects of theinequalities of nations on inter­ dependence. There is the tendency to talk about interdependence across the globe as though we are all of one piece. This obscuresthe factthat states with differingcapabilities andlevels of resourcesfare differently in the world. Interde­ pendence is a euphemism used to disguise dependence. I recall one of my stu­ dents asking me, "Why do American officialsand professors always talk about interdependence? We Frenchmen know that you do not depend on us, we de­ pend on you." Why indeed? In a 1970 article, "The Myth ofNational Interde­ pendence3 ,"I described interdependence as anAmerican ideology that disguises the factthat there arehigh degrees of dependence on the partof some countries. Itis politically convenientfor the least dependent or the most independent country to describe everythingas "interdependence."

The climaxof the issue of interdependence is theconcept of asymmetrical interdependence, the factthat some states arestrong andsome are weak. This differenceis well illustratedin Susan Strange's book, The Retreatof theState: The Diffusionof Power in theWorld Economv4. She points out that, internationally, the authorityof governmentstends to be transferredto the market.However, she also points out that the authority of governmentstends to overrule thecaution of the markets. It may be that the authority of governmentstends to slip away into the handsof financiersand traders, but when states noticethe marketusurping the authorityof their governments, thepolitically and eco nomicallystrong states try to recapture it.

Third, interdependence is a weakforce, not a strong force. Two illustra-

10 tionsare the most conclusive. First, the variousparts of the Soviet Union were not interdependent; theywere integrated. Allviable countriesare fairly closely inte­ grated, andthe Soviet Union was especially integrateddue to thestate planning that created theunion. The costliness of breaking apartis supposed to makefor a kind of cohesive peacefulness, andyet the Soviet Union split apart,even at a greatcost. Extensiveeconomic integration created withthe goal of Communism in ' mind could not hold thecountry together.

Another example is Yugoslavia. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was done at great cost to thewell being of the people in that area. Interdependence andintegration proved to be weakforces in the faceof religious commitmentand ethnicdifferences; even securityinterests were sacrificed. Under some circum­ stances, integration and interdependencecannot hold anentity together.

On InternationalInstitutions and Interdependence

I takeNATO asmy exampleof aninstitution thatbrings the meaning, the force, theeffect, andthe usefulness of theconcept ofinternational institutions into question. NATO has not only survived,but has flourished and expanded. Ithas done so in spite of realists saying at the end of the Cold Warthat the years of NATO were numbered. I expected, as anyrealist wouldexpect, that upon win­ ningthe victory, the alliancewould fallapart. Itis a cliche of history,a theoretical warrant, thatwinning kills alliances.

The balanceof power theorysays thatif thereis a dominantstate or group of states, other states begin to counterbalancethem by forminga coalition. This happened twiceduring theNapoleonic era. In World WarI andII, thecoalitions that won thewars fell apart on themorrow of thevictory. So it was not strangeto predict that afterthe Cold War,NA TO would dwindleand disappear.

Althoughthe nearlythree thousandbureaucrats of NATO would like the organizationto continue, thisis not anexplanation for the continuation ofNATO. NATO is a treaty entered into by states, and it is states that have to agree and decide to keep the institutions, not thebureaucrats. Yet NATO not only survives, it expands. On the surface, it would seem to call a realist perspective into ques­ tion, but I do not think it does. States establish andsustain institutionsbecause theythink those institutionswill serve their purposes. NATO was established because one state, and a set of states associated with that state, thought that it

11 would serve theirpurposes.

So why did NATO expand in spite of a lack of enthusiasm on the partof European states? NATO is expanding forone reason andone reason only- be­ cause the United States wantsit to expand. The institution does not form the interesti one state, or a smallgroup ofstates, decides what happensto the institu.:. tion. These states decide whetheror not institutionswill be established, whether or not theywill continue, whetheror not theywill be changed, andwhether or not they expand. NATO expanded because theUnited States thought, perhapsmis­ takenly,that the expansion ofNATO would serveAmerican interests.

The United States wants NATO to survive andflourish because it is not otherwisedirectly involved in Europeaneconomic institutions. America's only way of continuingits influenceand control in Europe is throughmilitary means. The flourishingofNATO is America's intended way of maintainingits grip on European foreign andmilitary policies. Think of another institutionnow forty yearsold, theWestern European Union. The WesternEuropean Union has been looking fora role forthe last fortyyears and has not foundone. Whenit seemed to be moving toward developing a role for itself afterthe Cold War, the Bush administration made it clearit did not wanta separatedistinct decision-making entitywithin Europe.

My fourthpoint concerns thebalance of power. Itdoesn't look as though a balanceof power is in process. Instead of developing autonomy in relation to theUnited States, Europeis simply complyingwith it,much as it did throughthose many yearsof theCold War. Why? Balance of power theory would lead one to expect a move by Europe to establish a greater degree of autonomy. Brent Scowcroftin "Geopolitical Vertigo andthe U.S. Rule5" hassaid that the balance of power applies only to certainspecial periods of history. We arenow out of one of thosespecial periods of history, andthe balance of power is obsolete.

State leaders have discovered they don't have to play the balance of power politics game. They have knownfor hundreds of years thatit is a costly gameto play, but only recently have they learned thatthereis no obligation to play it. If enough leaders of enough important states refusingto play, thenthat kind of politics becomes obsolete. Theend ofthe Cold War, supposedly, hastransformed internationalpolitics.

12 MichaelMastanduno in International Security6 wrote thatwe cango on andon fora greatmany years.with t he UnitedStates as thedominant world power without other states reacting, an anomaly in internationalpolitics indeed. It is problematic how long United States hegemony would have to go on bef9rereal­ ists would cave in andsay they were wrong. Mastanduno, however, does con­ clude thateventually po wer willbalance power.

I would like to look at the question from another angle. Balances of power do not form quickly. For example, a balance of power against Hitler did not form until 1941-1942; years after the warhad begun, and after the United States had entered the waron the side of the Allies. States only balancewhen theymust. Balancesare difficult to formand costly. States areoften temptedto jump on thebandwagon and appease instead offighting a war. Going against a countrythat looks like it may be thewinn er will costa lot ofarms, effort,and lives.

Secondly, earlier great warsleft enough major powers standingto pro­ vide thematerials for formingan ew balanceof power. In a bipolarworld, if one of the countriesrepresenting one of the poles disappears, by definitionthere is only one great power left. If that one great power is going to be balanced, it requires some other country liftingitself to thelevel ofthat one great power. It is extremely difficultfor two or more countriesto come togetherto balance a great power in a nuclear world because, as Charlesde Gaulle said, nuclearweapons don't add up. A nuclear powerthat allies itselfwith another nuclear power at the

· strategiclevel does not become strategicallystronger.

On The European Union

TheEuropean Union hasno intentionor capabilityofbalancing the United States because it does not have thecapability to makeforeign and militarypolicy. Some thinkit is moving in thatdirection, but no one thinksit hasarri ved. Balanc­ ing is not inevitable. The outstanding present day case is the Western Hemi­ sphere. North America has dominated South America forseemingly forever, illustratingthe point thatbalances do not always form.

Therehas to be a recognizable European militaryand foreign policy forit to emerge as a great power, which does not now exist. Statements from the European Unionby a variety ofpeople have indicated over andover again that Europeanforeign policy is a policy madeby consensus. If a foreignpolicy is made

13 by consensus, it is a lowest common denominator policy. Thereis not much one cando witha foreign policy unlessit is backedwith military capabilities. Unless Europeanforces develop there canbe no European militarypolicy andno Euro­ peanforeign policy.

If Europe does achieve a political unitythat comprehends foreign and defensepolicy aswell as economic, legal,and social policy , it will thenbe capable of acting. If this does occur, Europe would emerge very quickly as one of the great powers of theworld along withthe United States. Europe haseverything it needs to be a greatpower in the worldexcept effectivepolitical uni ty. That's allit lacks. But that'sa big lack.

On The Balance of Power

But a balanceof power is forming;it is formingin East Asia right before our eyes. It is a balanceof power being built up andcreated by the actions of two obvious countries:the People's Republic of Chinaand Japan,and it is formingjust the way balance of power theory would lead one to expect. The preponderant power scares the other power. China could not now engage in warfare with Japanand expect to win. Chinese policy now is a very steady, very purposeful pouringof resources into themilitary. Sincethe 1950' s it has been deemed con­ stitutionalfor the Japanese to havedefense forces. It was alsodeemed constitu­ tional forthe Japanese to have nuclearweapons as defensiveforces. Japanis one of thecountries capable of deciding when it willhave nuclear weapons,as some of its leaders have said.

The United States cannot stop the formation of a counter to its own power. However, the United States canmake it happ,en more quickly or more slowly. If the United States behaves in a way that bears out its 1992 Defense Departmentpl anning document,in which it is said thatthe policy of theUnited States will beto prevent otherindustrial countries fromchallenging it in anyway, thenothers will react againstthe United States andform a balanceagainst it.

At this point, the United States has virtuallyno vital interest thatcan be militarilythreatened in the foreseeablefuture by anyother state or combinationof states. This means that the United States does not haveto reactwhen something happens in theworld. We did not have to respond to the Iraqiinvasion of Kuwait or to thesituation in theBalkans . TheUnite d States in its foreignpolicy acts on its ownwhim; it is not requiredto get involved. Thisis not a comfortable situationfor 14 othercountries that wonder ifthe United States will continue toprotect them.

According to CharlesKegley, formerpresident of theInternational Stud­ ies Association, ifthe world once againbecomes a multi-polarworld, realistswill have been proved correct. Theworld is slowly becoming multi-polar. Itis occur­ ringslowly because balancesof pow er generallyform slowly, andbecause thereis a gap betweenthe United States and the next possible competitor. TheUnited States hasa tremendouscapability, built up over time. It hasa largegross domes­ tic product andis able to maintaina tremendous militaryforce while spending a relatively small percentage ofits gross domestic product on defense. This means thatthe process ofdeveloping a counterbalanceto theUnited States willbe diffi­ cult andvery long. In the end thebalance may be restored by Western Europe, China, or by Japan.

On The International Political Structure

After World War II, the United States wantedto bring its troops home anddid so very quickly,a clearindication thatthe United Statesintended to main­ tainforeign involvement onlyfor as long as necessary. Having withdrawnAmeri­ can forces, America sent them back to Europe in response to the threat of the Soviet Union. Once the United States beganintervening, it foundit extremely difficult to stop. Now the United States is in a situation in which it wants to maintainits deep involvement but may findit increasinglydifficult to do so. The ·questionis: willother states want American involvement or willthey want to begin to develop and maintaina greater autonomy? Whereas before America wanted to get out andhad to stayin, now it wantsto stay in. Yet thetime may come when it will have to get out, to do less for other countries and let them do more for themselves.

Notes: 1 A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage,London: Heinemann,1910. 2 New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1996. 3 In CharlesP. Kindleberger (Ed.), TheInternational Comoration, Cambridge,MA: MITPress,1970,205-223. 4 New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1996. 5 ("America Can't Afford to Turn Inward,") New Perspectives Quarterly: NPQ, Vol 9,No. 3(Summer 1992). 6 "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy Afterthe Cold War,"International Security, Vol. 21 No.4 (Spring1997), 49-88.

15

SAME BED, SAMEDREAMS? EUROPE'S SEARCH FOR AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY BY ALFREDVAN STADEN 1 In the early 1980's, Andre Fontaine wrote a book entitled Un seul lit pour dew:reves1 • In this book, the former director of Le Monde argued that both East andWest had embraced the quest fordetente as the primaryobjective in their policies towardseach otherbut, at thesame time, held quite differentviews on the content of their mutual relationship. Why am Irecalling this? Because the question arises whether the countries of Western Europe are experiencing the samedreams when they sleep in thecommon roomof theEuropean Union, with theirthoughts lingering on Europe'sidentity, securityand defense. Most observ­ ers would agree that, until very recently, the answerwas boundto be negative. Indeed, EU member states were inclined to perceive European interests quite differently,their preoccupations with security priorities turned out to be verymuch circumscribed by geographical proximity, and theirpolitical aspirations werenot identical. Thus,for instance, Franceto tried enhancethe geopolitical dimension of theEuro pean Union to servethe wider goal of creatinga multipolar world with less influenceby the UnitedStates (repeatedly described by the French foreign minister HubertV edrineas the hyperpuissance americaine) in Europe. Further­ more, Britainwas anxious preserveto the transatlantic linkage and to protect the cohesion ofNATO whileGermany, caughtin conflicting bureaucratic views, took a position inbetween thosecountries. Finally,the four neutral and non-allied EU members plus Den.ll1ark, favoringa civilianEurope, wantedto keep the security profile of the EU relatively low opposingby the inclusion of securityguarantees, as sp€ci:fiedbyArticleSofthemodifiedBrussels Treaty. Not surprisingly, fewoffi­ cialattempts, if any, have beenmade to defineEuropean identity in clearpolitical terms. Consequently, the notion of the European Securityand Defense Identity (ESDI) was oftendescribed very loosely as just a more visible European pres­ ence inNATO.

H()wever,thisrat�erpessimistic picturehas been overtaken of late by new devefopments�fresultmgin�aconvergence of nationalviews as well as fresh initiative� iitl{entcra�hieve�closer:security anddefense cooperation amongEU member states/Jrrthisregard, the Kosovo war of 1999 acted as a catalyst, creatingasenseofurgencyin Europe. Indeed, Europeans were pressed to take

17 some formaldecisions to translate theireconomic weight intomilitary clout. Dur- ing the war,they foundthemselves embarrassed by the level of their military de­ pendence on theUnited States. The US had to fly the lion's share of the risky missions in NATO's air campaignand to footby far thebiggest bill. This caused a "never- again" mood, not oPJy among leading Americanpolitician s, but alsoin political circles on the Europeanside of the Atlantic. Europeancountries recog­ nized the need for building a militarycapacity of their ownto deal with those internationalcri ses that touch upon Europeaninterests but not necessarilyon Americanones.

In this article,I willfurther discuss the underlying reasons forthe Euro­ peancountries to seek closer cooperation on securityand defense. Then I will briefly analyzewhy, to date, little progress has been made in achieving thisgoal. Next,recent developments at theofficial level giving cause forcautious optimism areaddressed. And, finally,some ideas will be put forwardabout practical steps that must be taken.

Forces underlying security and defense cooperation

In explaining the drive towardscloser Europeansecurity and defense co­ operation, it is useful to distinguish between "push" and "pull" factors. The first derive fromthe dynamicsof the integration process as a whole. According to functionalistlogic, successfulcooperation in one policy fieldgenerates forces that move towardscooperation in adjacent policy fields. Ithas been anarticle of faith, however, thatbeneficial spillover effectsand virtuous circles of one step leading to anotheronly takeplace in thefield of low politics withhighly interdependent social andeconomic sectors. High politics (foreign policy and defense)was supposed to be separatedby a wide gulf fromwelfare politics2 • However, the successful establishmentof the Economic andMonetary Union increasedpressures to build a full-fledgedpolitical union. In view of the manycross-linkages betweeneco­ nomicand security problems it was increasingly difficultto maintainthat the Euro­ peanUnion could remaina halfwayhouse. Theargument was leveled thatthere is no point in developing a commoncurr ency if Europe is incapable of guaranteeing peace, securityand freedom forits citizens. The occurrence of severe interna­ tionalcrises (such as in the Middle East) might damage theeconomic interests of Europeand consequently underminethe confidence in theEuro in financialmar­ kets. Europe's failureto effectively respondto thesecrises w as believed to weaken its politicalcredibility and diplomatic authority. Itwa s beyond comprehension that

18 thelargest trading block in the world, witha total income slightly more thanthe US, remained a military basket case. Therefore,it was concluded, Europemust be able to provide effectivemilitary intervention should theneed arise.

The "pull" factors are related to changesin the externalenvironment. Germanunification, being the immediate blessing of the end ofthe Cold War, triggeredthe "deepening" of Europeanintegration as a meansof anchonnga more powerfulGe rmany to theEuropean institutions. Thisentailed replacing the former EuropeanPolitical Cooperation with a Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy (CFSP), as set out in the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty stated that the CFSP "shallinclude all questions related to thesecurity of the European Union, including the eventual framingof a commonsecurity policy, which might in time leadto a common defense3 ." The Western European Union (WEU) was defined as "an integralpart of thedevelopment ofthe European Union," and itwas stipulatedthat this organization, upon the request of the EuropeanUnion, will elaborate and implement decisions andactions of theUnion "which will have defenseimplica­ tions4 ." A second relevantdevelopment was the decision of theUS to withdraw many ofits troopsfrom Western Europe and thegrowing American reluctance to commit ground forcesto operations in Europe, accompaniedby numerouscalls on Europeansto shouldera bigger partof thecommon defenseburden. Washing­ ton refusedto accepta division oflabourin theAlliance accordingto which Eu­ rope was to take responsibility for"soft power" issues like foreign aid and hu­ manitarianassistance, while onlythe US wasin thebusiness of"hardpower'' with

· the use offorce. It becameincreasingly clearthat Europe could not remain allied to theUS because of its weaknessand addiction to Americanprotection, to bor­

row thewell-known phrase from Stanley Hof:fmann5• If it was to carry military weight in thenew strategicenvironment, Europe had no otherchoice butto dimin­ ish its militarydepende �ce on theUnited States.

A Europe which provesto be unableand unwilling to takecare of its own securityinterests is moredamaging to thetransatlantic relationship in thelong run thana broad-shouldered Europe demandingto be taken seriously in American calculations. American isolationism feedson continuous complaintsabout Eu­ rope's fa ilure to put its own house in order. In a country with strong NATO credentialslike theNetherlands, a clearrecognition of the fact that there need not be a contradiction between being a good European and a good Atlanticist has grown.

19 Europe's Failures in the 1990

Why has Europe'srecord on internationalcrisis management been that poor in spite of high expectationsraised by theconclusion of theMaastricht Treaty?

Thereare three familiar explanation s6 • There arethose who put theblame on the institutionalshortcomings of theCFSP enterprise,i.e., therule of unanimityin the Council'sdecisions, theweak position of theCommission, andthe rotating presi­ dency of the EU councils. But I doubt whether a better-equipped foreign policy machinery, however important,would have made a substantialdifference in EU' s capacity to solve problems in, forinstance, the Balkans, the Gulf and Central Africa

Other observers attributeEurope's impotence to thelack of military ca­ pabilities (such as command andcontrol systems, strategic intelligence andsur­ veillance,and strategic lift capabilities) thatare requiredto project militarypower on troublespotsat Europe's rim. Thispoint, of course, is well taken. On theother hand,it is beggingthe questionof whythe nationsofEurope, while togetherspending almost two thirds of what the US does on defense,are, for instance,hardly able to deliver 10% of the transportable defense capability forprompt long rangeaction. Nor does thetotal size of Europeandefense expenditure give anyjustification for the aforementionedfact that the US share in the air strikes against Yugoslavia duringthe Kosovo campaignwas reportedly about 80%. There is a terriblemis­ match betweendefense inputs and defenseoutputs in Europeancountries. The reasons arenot difficultto identify: obsoleteCold Warplanning with strong em­ phasis on territorialdefense towards major thrustsin CentralEurope and national duplications of costly militaryinfrastructure .

Thethird explanationis even more familiarthan the othertwo, namelythe lack of politicalwill. I believe that this apparently self-evidentconcept is blatantly superficialand not very helpfulin finding theright answer. Itis truethat govern­ ments aresometimes reluctant to take action because they consider therisks of military intervention too high relative to their interests. But thereare also occa­ sions in which governmentsare ready to takeaction but cannot agree on a com­ mon approach because their perceptions of the interests at stake differsignifi­ cantly. This has repeatedly been thecase in the European context. In addition, thelarger European countries, particularlyFr anceand Britain, find it difficultto pool sovereignty on defensesince they still believe theyhave militaryoptions of their own. Thereis alsothe relevance of the theoreticalargument wielded by neo-

20 realists(like Joseph Grieco7) about considerations of national power as a major impedimentto internationalcooperation. Also in settingswhere allcountries con­ cernedhave somethingto winby joiningtheir forces, they may feel inhibitedto do so because other countriescould gain even more throughcoope ration. Given the strictlyintergovernmental nature of anyconceivable formof Europeandefense, participatingcountries have reasonto askabout thedistribution of relative gains. Whichcountries will be brought into positions of leadership andenjoy extrapres­ tige? Which countries,by contrast, have to accept a place in the backseat?

It is interestingto look at thereasons forthe quite differentresults in mon­ etaryintegration on theone handand defense cooperation on theother. Why did the EMU turnout to be successful andthe CFSP not? Is it because international security and defense strike at the heartof national sovereignty or, to put it in another way,because it is touching on national identity? Perhaps. But giving up one's national currency is not a smallmatter in termsof sovereignty andidentity either. There may be other reasons to be taken into account. Influential, transnational interest groups have lobbied forthe EMU; there is only a weak constituencyin European societies making the case fordefense cooperation. This situationmight change if the ongoing mergersbetween nationaldefense industries lead to one big Europeanplayer. Anotherconsideration to be takeninto account lies inthe win-win situation that theEMU represented. Indeed, therewas some­ thing to win for all interested countries. Germany'spartners were able to gain access to Germanmonetary policies (which,for a long time, defacto dictated the policies of most WesternEuropean countries), whereas Germany could reward itselfby makingits enhancedpolitical weight acceptable to its partners.

Recent developments

Now what have been theofficial events, as referredto, giving cause for cautious optimism? Three developments areworth being singled out. Thefirst concernsthe evolution ofNATO andthe adoption by theAlliance of theconcept ofCombined JointTask Forces (CJTF). At NATO's summit in Berlin in 1996, the US agreed, when it chose not to become involved in anoperation to be con­ ducted in Europe,to approve ofNATO' s supportfor European operations under the political authorityof WEU bymaking NATO assets available to European inmind that allies8 • Oneshould bear there are two differentinterpretations of the phrase"NATO assets," namely,a restrictedand a more extensive one. Strictly speaking,the expression refersto the13,000 personnelserving in NATO military

21 headquarters, in specialized unitslike theNATO Air Defense GroundEnviron­ ment System(NADGE) and i n theAirborne Early W arning andControl (A WACS) aircraftsassigned to SACEUR. But, more extensively,"NATO assets" arealso commonly taken to cover particularUS militarycapabilities like strategicintelli­ gence,strategic lift, theatrereco nnaissance, andco mmunicationsthat the US could provide to European operations in the event of its deciding not to take partin these operations. NATO's new Strategic Concept, adopted at theAlli ance 50th anniversarysumm it at Washington (April 1999), reaffirmed theBerlin decision. Thedocument airs the view that"the Alliance fully supports thedevelopment of theEuropean Securityand Defense Identitywithin the Alliance by makingavail­ able assets and capabilities forWEU-led operations9 ." It was understood that assistance to European allies would take place on a case by case base and by consensus.

Thesecond development arisesfrom the entering into forceof theTreaty of Amsterdam(May 1999). Thetreaty contains some new provisionson security and defense. The Union's common defense policy was given substance by in­ cluding theso-called Petersberg tasks into thetreaty text. Thesetasks, which had been agreed upon by the members of the WEU in June 1992, consisted of"hu­ manitarianand rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forcesin crisismanagement, including peace making." I note that"peacemaking" was ac­ tually meantto be"peace enforcement10 ." Also, the treatyclarified the Union's relationship withthe latter organisation. TheWEU was considered"an integral part of the development of the Union, providing the Union with access to an operational capability." Accordingly, theUnion was obliged to"foster closer in­ stitutionalrelations withthe WEU with a view to thepossibility of theintegration of theWEU into the Union11." The wording embodied a compromisebetween the French andBritish positions. Francewanted to place theWEU in theposition of militaryarm of theEU, whilst theUK looked at theWEU fromthe perspective of developing a European pillar inside NATO.

The most important new development, however, occurred in October 1998, with the reversal of long-standing British reluctanceto support defense cooperation in the framework of theEuropean Union. TheDecember 1998 joint declaration of the British Prime Minister Blair andthe French President Jacques Chirac (in cohabitation with Prime Minister Lionel Jospin) in St.Malo was par­ ticularlysignificant. Thetwo sides agreed that"the U nion must have thecapacity forautonom ous action, backed up by credible militaryforces"12 • What made this

22 declarationreally important was thatit leftopen thepossibility of Europeanmili­ tary action takenoutside theframework of the AtlanticAlliance , that is to say withoutuse ofNATO assets. Probably, thereappraisal of theBritish position was the result of theBritish governmentbeing very anxiousto move to the center of Europeanpolitics andassume a leading role in theEU. Because of its self-exclu­ sion fromboth "Euro land" and "Schengen land," internationalsecurity and defense ' was theobvious choice forBritain to enhanceits Europeanprofile.

TheCologne EuropeanCouncil of June1999 endorsed the idea of creat­ ing "a capacityfor autonomous action"as statedin theBritish-French declaration. Furthermore, the Council decided to develop more effectivemilitary capabilities andto establish new political andmilitary structures. Italso called for a transferof functions from the WesternEuropean Union to the EU, paving the way fora merger betweenthe two organizations13• It was believed thatthe European coun­ tries had crossed therubicon by explicitly mentioningthe possibility of EU-led operations with recourseto NATO assets andcapabilities andwithout their use. Thelatter optionmeant military operations without involvement of theUnited States. Also the subsequent Helsinki Summit,1 1-12 December 1999, was described as a "historic breakthrough." In the Finnishcapital, European leaders decided to benchmarktheir ambitionson commonsecurity and defense in concrete military targets. Theyagreed that member states, cooperating voluntaryin EU-led opera­ tions, must be able, by 2003, to deploy within60 days andsustain for at least one yearmili tary forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons (full corps level with 15

· brigades) capable of executing the full range of Petersberg tasks14• However ambitiousthis goal,in contrast withthe public impression that was created, the Helsinkiagreement did not entailthe establishment of a fullyintegrated, permanent army. Europeancountries interested in participating in EU-led militaryoperations were calledon to earmarknational unitsthat could serve as modules or building blocks forad hoc militaryformations. Thecreation of a standingmilitary force is still a long shot.

EU member states recognized theneed to develop militarycapabilities (especially mobile headquarters)that are suited to crisismanagement operations. In this respect, apartfrom financial considerations, the European countries are facinga very difficulttask: how canthey solve thedilemma of achievingreal au­ tonomy on the one handand avoid unnecessaryduplication with NATO capa­ bilities on the other? And how canthe goal of Europeanautonomy be reconciled withthe preservation of politicalcohesion in theAlliance? AllEuropean countries,

23 France included, have subscribed to theview thatthe development of anautono- mous Europeandefense capability should not collide withNATO interests. But manyAmericans are concerned about permitting an EU caucus toemerge within NATO. They fearthat the process of developing a consensus will shift from NATO to the EU, and that the Europeanswill then present theUS (andfor that matterCanada, Norway, Iceland andTurkey) with a commonposition that is not open to negotiation. Thisis thefear of gattisation ofNATO, rooted in America's badmemories of Europe's behavior in the predecessor ofWTO. ·

In a major speech inLondon(September 1999), Strobe Talbott(theU.S. deputy Secretaryof State) recalledthe image of long-standingUS ambivalenceto Europe'smilitary ambitions. To be sure,he reiterated Americansupport forthe furtherdevelopment of theESDI. However, he madeit clearthat the Americans do not wantto see an ESDI ''that comes into being firstwithin NATO but then growsout ofNATO andfinally grows away fromNATO, sincethat would lead to anESDI thatinitially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NAT015 • " Obviously, if theEU states adopted such a ''take it or leave it" pos­ ture, their relations with otherNATO allies would rapidly deteriorate. Such a development is not inevitable, though. Itis, as I see it, withinthe power of theEU members to ensurethat NATO meetings remain venues forbuilding consensus andcommon purpose. Afterall, it is in thelong-term interest of Europeancoun­ triesnot to antagonizethe Americans. So I agree withFran9ois Heisburg' s con­ clusion: "A shiftingof theburden togetherwith agreater European.role can prob­ ably be managedwithout destabilising theEuropean-American relationship16."

Several suggestions have been made to acceleratethe process of Euro­ peansecurity and defense co-operation17• One of these is to set Maastricht-like convergencecriteria for reforming the armies and defenseindustries of EU coun­ triesto improve theirmilitary capabilities. Thus, for example,the French Presi­ dent, in his annual address to France's ambassadors in August 1999, spoke of . "de veritables criteres de convergences auxquels devront obeir ceux qui entendent partager ces responsabilites en matiere de securite et de politique etrangere communes18 . " Important yardsticks would be the restructuring of militarybudgets in order to allocate more money fortraining and investments, and a clear commitment to building considerably more professional and readily deployable militaryforces. However temptingthe application of EMU-likecrite­ riaof convergenceto the fieldof militaryaff airs,one shouldbe awareof important differencesbetween the two domains. First, it is difficultto setpurely quantitative

24 criteriafor all relevant dimensions of militarystrength. Thus,for example, qualita­ tive technologicaland organizational factors may prevailover large quantitiesof outdated weapons19 • Second, it is rather easy to exclude free riders from the fruitsof monetaryintegration (transaction costs etc.) butit is much morediffi cult to deprive themof thebenefits of militarycooperation, i.e., thecreat ion of security andstability mainlyin Europe's periphery. Thisconsideration raisesthe question ofwhat mightbe theincentives for particular countries to try to meet thecriteri a of convergence in thefirst place.

Anothersuggestion would be thecreation of aEuropean defense industry and to take a Europe-firstapproach to militaryprocurement. The ambition of pursuingindependent an EU militaryrole logicallyimplies a determinationto main­ tainan independent European defenseindq.stry. But is Europe able, one might ask, to keep up withthe Revolution in MilitaryAff airs(RMA)? Itis widelyheld thatthe US is so faradvanced in themilitary app licationof informationtechnology thateveryone else is out of thegame. On theother hand, one could arguethat the RMAp roved less revolutionaryin Kosovo than,many had assumed as faras its impactin destroying Serbian capabilities. What'smore, Europe's high-tech record withmilitary aircraft, Airbus and the Ariane, gives no cause fordeep pessimism. Nonetheless, European countries aretrailing far behind theUS in termsof pro­ gramsfor advanced military research related to high technology. To prevent any widening of the gap in thisrespect, the creation of a special Europeanfund for militaryresearch and development deservesserious consideration.

Above all, Europeanmilitariesenhance must their capacity for projecting and sustaining power. Indeed, it is essential to get more deployable troopsper Euro,not by duplicating thecommand structures and headquarters ofNATO but by removingthe wasteful dupl ications amongthe armedforces ofEuropean. coun­ tries. Building"common force elements," based on theidea of pooling national resources, could add toEurope's military strength. Obviouscandidates for such schemes are strategicair and sea liftcapabilities, refueling aircraft, communication facilitiesand IT systemsfor logistical support.

Conclusion

Will the European Union, in the new millennium, be ready to conduct Kosovo-likemilitary operations without the active involvement of theUnited States? Are theEuropean countries now about to sharenot only thesame bed butalso the

25 samedreams, to use the metaphor fromthe beginning of thisessay? Or, by con­ trast,will more demonstrationsof European mpi otence, however agonising and exasperating, be requiredto bring about arealbreakthrough? Afterall, thelearn ­ ing curve of European integration has proven very long as far as security and defenseare concerned. Some scepticsb elieve theambition of developing a com­ mon Europeansecurity and defense policy to be fundamentallyincompatible with thevery idea of GreatPower politics. Thus,for example, the British scholarBarry Buzan has argued that European citizens today do not put much trust in their governmentsand are no longer preparedto die fortheir countries. Individualism anda consumer ethic aresupposed to have transformed Western European citi­ zens into lethargicfree-riders, looking mostly in vainto anillusory "international community20." But, asfar as this argumentholds water, it is strikingto note thata

similarobservation has alsobeen madeabout public attitudes in theUnited States21 •

I am inclined to takean agnostic view. As the saying goes,the proof of thepudding is in the eating. Inother words: the will of the European countriesto pulltheir military forces together mustbe tested in thenext internationalcrisis. For Europe to pass this test, at least two prior conditions have to be met. First, Europeangovernments must succeedin transformingtheir traditional defense forces into modem, rapidly deployable intervention units, theimportance of which has already been emphasized. One of the main tasks the governmentsare likely to face is to recruit enough youth willingto volunteer formilitary missions outside their home territories. Of the European countries that already maintain profes­ sional armies,the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium arecurr ently struggling with manpowerproblems. Should Europeangovernments fail to finda satisfactory solution forthese problems, thegoal set by theHelsinki Summit to field,if neces­ sary, the equivalent of an army corps that is able to respond rapidly to trouble spots on Europe's flanksor fartheraway, willmost certainlynot be attained.

Second, the question of political leadership has to be dealt with. This question has been neglected in discussions to date. Unlike NATO, theEuropean Union lacks amongits ranksa member state that is powerfulenough to perform criticalleadership tasks in crisis situationsor otherserious contingencies. Itmay be argued thatover the yearsthe Franco-Germancoalition ("axis") has served as a substitute for leadership. But in the realm of security and defense Germany remains a relatively weakplayer as it is still reluctantabout projecting military power beyond its borders, whereas the militarycontribution of Great Britainis essential to anyEuropean scheme fordefense cooperation. Besides, theFranco-

26 German coalition has lost, for various reasons, much of its appeal andpolitical vitality. One mightthink of thepossibility of entrusting largerthe European nations withprimary responsibility for the political guidance of militaryoperations. How­ ever, the creation of a so-called directoire of these nations (UK, France, Ger­ many andperhaps Italy) is most likely to arouse resentment andfeelings of marginalizationon thepart of thesmaller European nations. Theexclusion of the smaller member states fromthe makingof importantpolitical andmilitary deci­ sions would enhancethe likelihood of theirbecoming freeriders.

How to strikea balance between the need formilitary effectiveness on the one handand thelegitimacy of politicaldecisions guidingmilitary actions on the other? Thisproblem canonly be managedin close consultationamong all coun­ tries (largeand small) that are willing to makesubstantial contributions to any particularmilitary operation and to accept a fairshare in therisks involved. After all, as recent experiencehas shown, someof thesmaller member states did supply more troops andmilitary capabilities forpeace operations in the Balkans than member states thatlike to be considered "large." The guiding principle should be "no taxationwithout representation" but as much, "no representationwithout taxa­ tion."

Dr. Alfred van Staden is Director of the Netherlands Institute of Interna­ tional Relations, "Clingendael" (TheHague) and professor of international relations at Leiden University.

Notes 1 Full title: Un seul lit pour deux reves. Histoire de la detente 1962-1981. Paris: Fayard, 1981. 2 See Alfred van Staden, "After Maastricht: Explaining the Movement towards a Common EuropeanDefense Policy," Walter Carlsnaesand Steve Smith (eds), Euro­ pean Foreign Policy. TheEC and Changing Perspective in Europe. London: Sage Publications,1994. 142-148. 3 Treatyon the European Union, Title V, Article J4(1). 4 Treatyon the European Union, Title V, Article J4(2). 5 Stanley Hoffmann,"Europe's IdentityCrisis Revisited," Daedalus Vol. 123, No. 2 (1994), 9-10. 6 JanZielonka offers as manyas five different explanations. See his book Explaining Euro-Paralysis. WhyEurope is Unable to Act in International Politics. New York: St. Martin'sPress, 1998. 7 See his book Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and the Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade. Ithaca,NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1990.

27 8 The Final Communique ofthe Ministerial Meeting ofthe North Atlantic Council, Berlin, June 3, 1996, (paragraph 7) states that NATO support to WEU operations will include "identification, within the Alliance, of the types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets, as well as, in order to prepare for WEU-led operations, separable but not separate HQ's, HQ elements and command positions, that would be required to command and conduct WEU-led operations and which could be made available, subject to decision by the NAC." Thecommit­ ment of US assets to facilitateEuropean-led operations was reportedly confirmed by several US and NATO participantsin theBerlin ministerial. See forthe latter Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch-Laine and Charles Grant, "Building a European Defense Capability," Survival,Vol. 41, No.1(Spring 1999), 39(note 14). 9 The Alliance's Strategic Concept. Approved by the Heads of State and Govern­ ment participatingin the meeting ofthe North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., April 23-24, 1999, paragraph 18. 10 See on this Willem van Eekelen, Debating European Security. The Hague: Sdu Publishers/Brussels:Centre for European Policy Studies, 1998. 127. 11 See Alfred van Staden" Mission Impossible? Europe's role in diplomacy and internationalsecurity," Willem J.M. van Genugten a.o. (eds), Realism andMoralism in International Relations. Essays in Honor of Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau. The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999. 65-66. 12 Declaration on European Defense, UK-French Summit, Saint-Malo, December 3-4, 1998, paragraph2. 13 Declaration of the European Council on the Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defense, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999, paragraphs 1 and 5. 14 Conclusions of the European Council held in Helsinki on Decemberll-12, I 999, Annex IV. The Council also decided to establish new permanent political and militarybodies: (1) a standing Political and Security Committeewhich will be com­ posed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level, (2) the Military Committee composed of the national Chiefsof Defense, represented by their mili­ tarydelegates and (3) the Military Staffwhich, within the Council structures, is due to provide military expertise and support to the Common European Security and Defense Policy,. including theconduct ofEU-led militarycrisis management opera­ tions. 15 Strobe Talbott, "Transatlantic Ties," Newsweek(October 18, 1999), 34. 16 Frani;ois Heisburg, "American Hegemony? Perceptions of the US Abroad," Survival,Vol. 41, No.4(Winter 1999-2000), 14. 17 See for instance the chapters written by Antonio Missiroli and Stephan De Spiegeleire in Mathias Jopp & HannaOjanen (eds.),European SecurityI ntegration: Implications for Non-Alignment andAlliance. Helsinki: Finnish Instituteof Interna­ tional Affairs/ Bonn: Institut fiir Europaische Politik/ WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1999. 18 For an elaboration of this idea see FranVois Heisburg, "L'Europe de la Defense dansl' AllianceAtlantique," Politiqu e Etrangere, 2199 ( ete 1999), 219-232 .. 19 See for this argument Gianni Bonvicini, "European Defense:Beyond Functional Convergence. Procedures and Institutions," The International Spectator, Vol. XXXIV,No. 3(September 1999), 27. 28 20 Quoted by Peter van Ham andPrzemyslaw Grudzinski, "Affluenceand Influ ence. The Conceptual Basis of Europe's New Politics," The National Interest (Winter 1999/2000), 84. 21 See, forinstance, M ichael Mandelbaum,"Learn ing to be Warless," Survival, Vol. 41,No.2(Summer1999), 151.

29

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON EU ENLARGEMENT1 BY DOROTHEEHEISENBERG

Introduction

In Copenhagen on June 22, 1993 the European Union (EU)2 made a momentous decision, theimportance of whichseems to have been unappreciated at the time. By formallyco mmittingthemselves to allowingup to thirteennew Centraland East Europeancountries (CEEC' s) to become members of theunion eventually,the EU hadtake n a dramaticstep in irreversiblychanging the institu­ tional structures andcharacter of the EU itself. Surprisingly, this monumental changeof policy was hardlydiscussed in the two-day EuropeanCouncil meeting, was not highlightedby themedia coveringthe summ it, and did not even merit the firstitem on thecommunique of thesumm it. Instead,buried near the bottom of the communiquewas theparagraph that:

TheEuropean Council today agreed thatthe associated countries in central andeastern Europe that so desire shall become mem­ bers of theEuropean Union. Accession will takeplace as soon as an associated countryis able to assumethe obligations of mem­ bership by satisfyingthe economic andpolitical conditions re­ quired.3

Althoughthe acceptance was conditionalon political andeconomic fac­ tors, thefact remains that after the Copenhagen Summ it in 1993, thediscussion of enlargementbecame a question of how andwhen, andnot if.

Since the Copenhagen Summit, theEU developed anorganizing frame­ work detailingthe order in which to admit thecountries (Agenda2000, theLux­ embourgSumm it declarationsin December 1997, andthe Helsinki Summitdecla­ rations inDecember 1999), theframework to rationalizethe :financial structure of the EU's programs(Agenda 2000 andthe Essen andCologne Summitsin March andJune 1999) andan intergovernmental conference (IGC) andtreaty revision to changethe EU' s institutional structures(Amsterdam Treaty and the curre nt IGC). However, despite these manyatt empts to facilitateadmission, little substantive progress has been made to achieve thatpromise to date.

31 There is little doubt thata sigiiificantportion of thelack of progresson the EU's partmay be attributedto changesin Member States'prefere nces regarding theultimate desirability of thisenlargement. Although the Member States justify the lackof progress in argumentsabout theinadequate preparation of theCEEC' s at this time, there is primarilya reluctanceto changethe institutions of theEU in such a radical way as would be necessitated by the addition of 13 or more new states. The current state of the enlargementquestion is that threeelements need to be achieved beforethe actualenlargement is completed: 1) theCEEC's must reform their domestic institutions andeconomies to conform to the acquis communautaire, 2) the EU must reformits institutions,and 3) theEU must ra­ tionalize thefinancing of theEU andits major aid programs. Most of theEU' s focushas beenon theinsuffi cientprogress made on thefirst element by theCEEC' s; however, theMember States have a record of failingto reach an agreement on the second andthird points, and in the long run, these may be the more important elements of discussion.

This article addressesthat question of theEU' s institutionalreform and structuralintegrity. Specifically, it reflectscritically on thecommitment to admitan indeterminatenumber of new members at Copenhagen. At issue is therisk that enlargement, no matterhow morally justified,will undermine the forty-five year old structuralstability of the EU. Should the Member States renege on their promise of membership forthe CEEC' sin order to preserve theEU?

The EU is a unique set of institutionscobbled togetherwithout a planfor futuredevelopment or coherent institutional design. Thepath of institutionalde­ velopment has been incrementalevolution ratherthan conscious design, andthe conflictsbetween existing EU Member States oftenreflect this development. Changingthe structuresin a fundamentalway, andadding thirteennew members (irrespectiveof theireconomic level of development) poses therisk of a complete breakdownof thewhole institutionalframework. This essay addressessome of the risks forthe EU.

A Brief History of Enlargement

The Treaty of Rome incorporated an open door policy towardsother countriesat thesigning of theE uropeanUnion documentsin 1957. The primary motivation at thetime was to give Britaina chanceto change its mind andjoin the EU later.There was limited discussion of which countrieswould or would not be

32 in the union, and the inclusive stance taken by the Member States reflects an internationalcontext of otherstates (most importantly Britain)declining entry rather than clamoringfor entry. Moreover, the limits of what was "Europe" were well established withinthe Cold Warcontext, and therewere thusa limited numberof potentialcandidates.

The first enlargement (Britain, Ireland, Denmarkand Norway in 1973) reinforcedthis perception of the EU: Norway negotiated accession but failedto join afterthe required referendumfailed, andBritain essentially renegotiated entry after it had been accepted in 1973. This enlargement showed that economic motivations to join theEU predominated political ones. TheEU had been more successful thanEFTA, andthe exclusion froma successfulregime was difficult.By 1973, the EU had already acquired a critical mass thatmade it economically attractive.

The second enlargement(Greecein 1981, Spain andPortugal in 1986) demonstratedthat the EU had become a stampof approval forpost-dictatorship regimes. EU accession stood for political motivation to modernize, to eschew marketprotectionism, to remaindemocratic and to join European,indeed interna­ tional,society. From theEU' s perspective, theadmission of thesecountries repre­ sented a loweringof theadmissions standardsset by theexisting Member States. Political reasons to join trumpedeconomic fitness, setting the precedent forthe current accession talks. Moreover, the Mediterraneanenlargement changed the characterof theEU voting, to makebloc voting(core-periphery, rich-poor, and northern-southern)more prevalenton various issues.

Thethird enlargement(Sweden, Finland, Austria andNorway in 1995) was a recognitionof two trends: theend of theCold War,which permitted previ­ ously neutralstates to join thedecidedly political EU, andthe economic non-viability of EFTA in its remnantconfiguration. Again, Norway's accession failedin the referendumphase, but theother states joined afterconforming their legislation to theextensive EU framework.

Two pointsregarding these accessions arenotable: first, the populations of theexisting Member States in theearly enlargements were not asked to ratify the increasein theunion membership; all of thedecision-making on enlargingthe EU was done by thegovernment elites. Although indirectdemocracy is legitimate practice andthe preferred decision-making method in Europe, it has also served

33 as alightning rod forcriticisms of the EU bureaucracy'sdemocratic deficit. The increasingdivisions betweenmass public andelite opinion on theissue of enlarge­ ment would indicatethat perhaps thesetypes of sensitiveissues shouldbe handled in a more democratically participatoryfashion. As the EU hasbecom e more and more federaland interdependent over time, it may be appropriate to have Mem­ ber State citizens makethe decision of which otherstates should have the rights andresponsibilities of EU membership.

Second, there is an ad hoc quality to the decision-making process re­ gardingwhich states should join theunion that increasinglyis out of synch withthe statureof the EU internationally. Specifically,there has not been an organized effortto define"Europe" and its boundaries4• Withoutknowing what "not Eu­ rope5" is, it is difficultto define"Europe" and "European values." This is evident in theidentity search now being conducted by theexisting Member States6 • As the EU became an irresistibleattraction in Europe,there was more demand for accession; however, the EU continuedto behave institutionallyas thoughit were a smallcustoms union,indifferent to the sizeof theunion.

The Proposed Enlargement

The proposed enlargementto include theCEEC' s reflectsthe history of admitting anycountries that want to join. A chronology (see Table 1) of themile­ stone EU decisions concerningthe CEEC's shows thatthere was never a serious discussion of whetherthese countriesshould be offered admission. Instead, the EU Members acted on the basis of assumptions that were deemed obvious or politically correct. The desirabilityof theCEEC's ultimately joining theEU was considered self-evident, andthe EU bureaucracy operated on the basis of that assumption. Moreover, duringthe critical firstthree years (November 1989-June 1993), the EU Members were distractedby thenegotiation andratification of the MaastrichtTreaty, the beginningsof theYugoslav wars, andthe EMS crises, and thusenlargement did not receive the attentionit required7 •

34 Table One: MILESTONES ON THEWAY TO ENLARGEMENT

December 1989 EU creates thePHARE program of aid foreconomic restructuringfor Poland and Hungary, later expandedto 12 countries. April 1990 Dublin EuropeanCouncil requests a negotiatingman­ date to create Association Agreementswith tlle CEEC's December 1991 FirstAssociation Agreements signed withCzechoslova­ kia, Hungary and Poland. June1992 Commission presents its Report "The Challengeof Enlargement"to theLisbon EuropeanCouncil. June 1993 Copenhagen European Council formallycommits the EU to enlargement. December 1995 MadridEuropean Council states thatnegotiations would begin after 1996 IGC. June 1997 Amsterdam Treatysigned withoutsuffi cient EU institu­ tionalreform to makeaccession without anotherI GC possible. July 1997 Commissionpublishes Agenda 2000, detailingthe issues theEU will negotiate withapplicant countries. December 1997 LuxembourgEuropean Council announcesan "acces­ sion process" would be launched in March 1998, and divides theapplicants into threegroups. June 1999 CologneEuropean Council fails to significantlyreform EU financialarr angements. December 1999 Helsinki European Council announcesthat the 13 applicantstates Aareparticipating in theaccession process on anequal footing, thereby eliminating the threegroupings created at Luxembourg. February2000 A new I GC on reformof EU institutions is opened.

Soon afterthe fall of theBerlin Wall, the EU actedto approvefinancial aid to Poland and Hungary (PHARE) which was later expanded to twelve other CEEC' s. Two years later, in December 1991, the first Association (Europe) Agreements were signed withCzechoslovakia, Hungaryand Poland. The Asso­ ciation Agreements aretrade agreements that statethat the associated CEEC will,

35 over a ten yearperiod following the s igningof theAssociation Agreement, liberal­ ize trade withthe EU. Essentially,the Europe Agreements were to lay thefounda­ tion fora free trade zone between the CEEC' s and the EU. In this period, the associated CEEC would foregogiving state aidsand liberalize competition in its market. In return, the EU would grant access to the European market.

There were three significant exceptions to the freetrade area that was being created, alladvantaging the EU: textiles, steeland agricultural goods. Thus, threesectors in which the CEEC' s had a comparative advantage were deliber­ ately excluded fromthe agreements. It isn't hardto understandwhy they contin­ ued to lobby forfull membership.

Six monthslater, theCommission presented its report, "TheChallenge of Enlargement,"to theLisbon EuropeanCouncil, in whichit stronglyrecommended that the CEEC' s be admitted into the EU.

What is striking about the variousaccounts of thisperiod is the extent to which theMember States acted as though enlargement were a foregoneconclu­ sion that could not be debated. The uncertaintyof the post-Cold Wartransition period forcedthe EU to act uncharacteristicallyquickly on such a question of monumental importanceto theEU itself. Moreover, thelack of Treatyguidance as to what countries could legitimately be excluded, combined with the guilt of WesternEuropeans for seeming, in the words of Lech Walesa8, to put a "silver curtain" in place of the "iron curtain,"made a frankdebate over enlargement impossible. Thecritical June 1993 decision at the.Copenhagen European Council to formally offeraccession seems to have been made withoutany real discussion of the long-termimplicationsfor the EU:

The most important proposal was ... that 'the EuropeanCouncil should confirmin a clearpolitical message, its commitment to membership of theUnion for Europe Agreementsignatories when they are able to satisfy the conditions required.' This was the great achievement of Copenhagen. Interestingly, it was hardly discussed by theMember Statesand certainly not disputed in the manyhours of discussion andnegotiation leading up to theSum­ mit. The explanationof thisshow of unanimityis difficult, given that probably a majority of countrieswere not totally in favorof accession, at least in the nearterm.9

36 Once theCopenhagen Summ it hadfonnally offered admission, thedie was cast, andthe tenns of the debate about accession moved to the question of how best to incorporate the CEEC's into the union. It is unclear, however, if this response is still themost appropriate forthe circumstancesten yearsafter the end of theCold War. TheCEEC' s arepolitically stabilized, andtheir economies are, to differentdegrees, stabilizingaround a market-orientedsyst em. The urgencyto admitthe CEEC' s to shore up their democratic credentialsis gone, andthe toll on theEU' s institutions of admittingso manystates is becoming more apparent. Is it possible to changestrategic direction at thisdate?

Objections to the Enlargement

The most commonly heard objections to the impendingenlargement of theEU arethat the CEEC' s areconsiderably poorer andmore agrarian thaneven thepoorest of theEU' s current members, placing a significantstrain on the existing aid programs of theEU. This critique implies thatif theEU waitssufficiently long forthese countriesto achieve EU minimum standards, therewill be fewproblems withthe admissions process. Much of thefonnal EU debate has, in fact,revolved aroundthe issue of timing theaccessions to ensurethe CEEC' s meet theset con­ ditions. Economic conditionalityhas become themost significantfactor slowing theaccession forthe individual countries.

A less benign version of thesame criterion arises at themass public level. Rightwing populistmovements likethe Freedom Partyin Austria have capitalized on thefear that theimpoverished natureof the CEEC's threatensthe curr ent EU population'sliving standards,and therefore should be opposed on thosegrounds. These"GDP per capita" concerns,although important, miss criticalaspects of the debate about the EU polity. The decision to admit significantlymore members may underminethe fundamental stability of theEU thatthe world has come to take forgranted. Moreover,raising questions about the financial condition of theCEEC' s thatare to be allowedinto theEU risks "personalizing"a debate about theEU that should go forwardeven if these countrieshad no interest in admission. Funda­ mental questions about the futurepath of the EU have been avoided because of theirpolitical divisiveness. Yet the enlargementprocess simply begs fora consen­ sus on these questions. TheEU historicallyhas avoided these questionsby "backing into" manydecisions andthen presenting its citizens witha de factodecision.

In order to strip away the arguments having to do with the economic

37 statusof thesecountries, and to focusattention on theEU institutionaldebate, let us assume that theEU is considering admitting fifteen Norways into theUnion, meaningsmall, rich, EU budget net-contributingcountrie s thatshare a common conception of thewelfare state andecological policy. Would thispose a problem forthe EU, or would it be as uncomplicated10 as thelast enlargementin 1995?

The sheer numberof candidatesensures that anyaccession agreement must includeEU Treatyreform thatrationalizes the number of institutionalvoters on policy. Essentially,the exercise now beforethe curr ent IntergovernmentalCon­ ference(IGC) involves red ucing thenumber of veto points in thedecision-making process in order to prevent gridlock in EU institutions.There areseveral ways 11 to do thisbut essentially this would be achieved throughtwo means: either by enlarging the scope of qualifiedmajority voting (QMV) to areasthat are now covered by unanimityvoting, or by reducing, andin some cases, eliminating,the number of votes that each countryhas in the variousEU institutions. The EU Member States have wrestledwith these alternatives for several yearsnow and forperhaps obvious reasons, have not reached a consensus on the appropriate solution. The 1996 IGC hadas its primary goalto makethe institutions of theEU compatible withenlargement, a task it fellsadly short of, necessitating another IGC to accomplish. The new IGC12 has as its mandate, "[to] examine the size andcomposition of the Commission,the weighting of votes in theCouncil and the possible extension of qualifiedmajority voting inthe Council. .. 13 "

There aredemocratic, structuraland historical reasons why these solu­ tions areproblematic. The democratic objections to theproposals canbe sum­ marizedby sayingthat they change the existing character of theEU withoutpopu­ larassent. Although thereis considerable dispute about how to characterizethe presentEU institutionalframework with its quirkyanomalies, the most widely held conception is one of confederalism ratherthan centralized federalism. Thus, de­ spite anincrease in QMV over time and even issue areas,the Member States continue to hold a veto over almostall non-economic decisions made by theEU (primarilythose in thesecond andthird pillars of theMaastricht Treaty). It is this fundamentalretention of sovereignty thatthe new institutionalarran gements are likely to change,and with it, thecharacter of theEU itself. ManyMember States arehesitant to takesuch a dramaticstep.

A furtherdemocratic critiqueof these solutionsis thatthey fundamentally J changethe dynamicbetwee n largeand small countries. One of theessential char-

38 acteristics of EU voting is that the smaller countries areover-represented in EU institutionson themeasure of votesper capita (see Table 2). Moreover,the blockin g minority of 26 out of 87 votes in the Council at present can be a coalition of 5 small states, comprising as littleas 12% of theEU population. While this over­ represention of smallstate voter power may seem unjust(and is thus the targetof Commission reformproposals), it serves to mitigate a largestate bias thatexists de facto in theEU due to the inherent intergovernmentaln ature. Most of theEU initiatives arelarge-country sponsored, or at the very least approved by thelarge countries14, andthe Council votingover-representation of thesmall countries may in factbe a usefulantidote to the''tyranny of the majority" problem in Europe. By changingthe composition of the EU from"5 largeand 10 small"to ''7 largeand 21 small" andchanging the voting structuresto either represent accurately(or not representat all)the voting populations inthe small countries, the EU risksalienat­ ing the small countrycitizen thatto date has been able to makehis preferences heard. It is perhaps thishistorical compromise thathas made the EU so politically stable.

Thestructural arguments against EU enlargementcome frominternational relations researchon empires of thepast. At issue is the absolute size of theEU, andwhether it is politically feasibleto create a stable unionof thatsize. Table3 shows theexisting population of theEU-15 in relationto theten most populous countries of the world, as well as where theEU-28 population would fit in. A suitableanalogy to EU expansionmight be blowingup a balloon:it is amathemati:. calcertainty that the balloon will burst if airis continuallyadded, butno one knows exactly at what moment it will burst. The EU is attemptingto create a political system formore thanhalf a billion people; theonly other two examples of thisare China andIndia. Does thisindicate that the EU canonly enlarge by becomingless democratic andmore centralized or by acceptingpolitical chaosand gridlock? Is it empirically possiblefor a democratic unionof thissize be stable?

39 1 +>- Table 2: EU Institutions Vote Distribution 0 Actual Votes compared to Votes Reweighted by Population

% of EU Votes in Council Seats in Parliament #of EU Commissioners

Country Population Now Reweighted 2 Now Reweighted Now Reweighted

Germany 22,0 10 19 99 136 2 4 Britain 15,7 10 14 87 98 2 3 France 15,6 10 14 87 98 2 3 Italy 15,4 10 14 87 96 2 3 Spai n 10,5 8 9 64 66 2 2 Netherlands 4,1 5 4 31 26 1 1 Greece 2,8 5 2 25 18 1 1 Belgium 2,7 5 2 25 17 1 1 Portugal 2,7 5 2 25 17 1 1 Sweden 2,4 4 2 22 15 1 1 Denmark 1,4 3 1 16 9 1 0 Finland 1,4 3 1 16 9 1 0 Ireland 1,0 3 1 15 6 1 0 Luxembourg 0,1 2 0 6 1 1 0

3 Total 100 87 626 20

1 Source: The Economist, February 1, 1997.

2 Reweighted by population.

3 62 votes are needed for a qualified majority, making 26 votes a blocking minority. Table 3: Countries Ranked by Population: 1998 Rank15

Country Population(in millions) China 1,236.915 India 984.004 EU-28 544.979 EU-15 374.584 United States 270.290 Indonesia 212.942 Brazil 169.807 Russia 146.861 Pakistan 135.135 Japan 125.932 Bangladesh 125.105 Nigeria 110.532

Applicant countries and their population (in millions):

Poland 38.607 Romania 22.485 Czech Republic 10.286 Hungary 10.116 Bulgaria 8.243 ·Slovakia 5.392 Lithuania 3.697 Latvia 2.441 Slovenia 1.986 Estonia 1.443 Cyprus 0.753 Malta 0.378

Tmkey 64.568

TotalEU applicants 170.395

TotalEU-28 544.979

41 Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers presents the cycle of empire-building and empire-disintegration that hinges on the empire over-extendingits reach, engendering bothnationalis t opposition andincreasing economic costs that weakenthe core. Is this an apt characterizationof the EU? On theone hand,the pressure for extend ing theEU comes fromthe outside rather thanfrom the EU itself,and thus one would expect less nationalistresistance. On theother hand, nation alistp ressurescan arise both from the elite-mass divergence in the accession countries,as well as from the disenfranchisedpopulations within the EU that had to give up their veto rights in order to makeaccession possible. Thusa nationalist,in thiscase anti-EU,protest could be mobilized fromthe newly democratic andindependent populations thatdo not wantto relinquish theirnewly regainedsovereignty. A divergence between political elites andmass opinion on thedesirability of joiningthe EU has already formedin several of the CEEC's16•

Alternatively, therecould be organizedresistance from the EU population which objects to thechanging structure of theEU. The primarylegitimization of the EU' s planswill be throughthe EuropeanParliament's assent procedureand through parliamentaryratification by most of theMember States. Given a grow­ ing divergence between mass andelite opinions about enlargementin the EU, popularopposition to enlargementmay not be reflectedin theparliamentary proc­ ess. At present thereare no mainstreampolitical parties that aretaking an anti­ enlargementposition in any of the EU Member States17 • However, this could changein the yearsbefore the accession preparationsare finalized.

From an economic point of view, the enlargement requires the EU to fundamentallychange several of the programs that have evolved as significant federalizing measures,like the CommonAgricultural Policy andthe Structural Funds. These programs have served as identity anchors forthe EU since the 1960s (in the case of the CAP), and the EU faces the choice of dramatically cuttingor eliminatingthem, or overextendingitself financiallyto accommodatethe CEEC' s. Obviously, thereare several Member States thatwould welcome these cuts, but it would be a mistake tounderestimate the degree of support forthese programswithin the Member States.

A fmalpoint about structuralstability concerns the European Central Bank and its monetarypolicy making. At present there are already concernsthat the number of votes in thegov erningcouncil (11) could outweigh thoseof theexecu­ tive council ( 6) and thereforeadd a regional bias to the monetary policy of the

42 EU18• The addition of up to seventeen additional members of the Governing Councilwould exacerbate thistendency, and potentially destroycoherent mon­ etarypolicymaking in theECB. Structuralchanges to theECB institutional:frame­ work arenot even contemplated at this date, given that the EU accession must

necessarily precedenegotiations of EMU membership19 • However, structural revisions would requireunanimity voting on new treatyamendments, which would be extremelydifficult with twenty-eight members. Financialmarket fuicertainty about institutionalchanges at theECB could leadto financialcrises beforethe EU could act coherently.

The above discussionof theabsolute size of theEU highlightsthe critical question that fewEU bureaucrats seem to be asking: can an EU-28 be as politi­ callystable as theEU-15 has been? Itis imperativeto keep thestability criterion as themost important one,ov erriding considerations offairness, mutual economic gain, and political advantage. Thecurr ent political climate in Brussels is thatit is too late to exclude theCEEC' s fromfull membership, andthus the only objective is to findthe proper methodfor incorporating them. However, if theinstitutional reformsincrease theinstability of theEU, or cause theinstitutions to fail,it willbe difficultif not impossible tosalvage the existing benefits ofEuropean cooperation. Would it not be betterto findalternative solutions?

Creative Alternatives to Membership?

In the EU it has been difficult to thinkcreatively about the futureof the institutions becausemany ideas areimmedi atelydiscarded as fragmentingthe un­ ion, or disadvantagingnew or existing members. Among theideas thathave peri­ odically been floated by variousgroups are"two speed Europe,""hard-core Eu­ rope," ''variablegeometry" and "Europe a la carte." Thesediscussions have been motivated not by the demands of enlargingthe union, but to accommodate the differingpreferences of theexisting Member States toward furtherfederalization. These proposals have in common a desire to differentiateMember States,on the basis of theirpreferences toward further integration, evidenc e thateven withinthe existing Member States there arethose that would want more economic than politicalunion.

A common criticism of these plans is that any movement towardthese alternative conceptions of the EU (not all countries in every program) opens Pandora's box, makingthe EU ungovernableand fiscally infeasible. Aside from

43 thefact that this box has already been opened, withthe EMU opt-outs forBritain and Denmark and the Schengen acquis, it is unclear that it would be more ii destabilizing(in light of theincre asing membership) tohave different"grades" of 'I 11 EU membership thanto insist on incorporating theCEEC' s into aninstitutional !, framework built forsix members. Essentially, the EU would redefinethe very ·1 :: r concept of"membership." 1: I� I I,; i! Would prospective members consider joining a revised EU which does not contain theexisting benefits forevery member? This is exactly thescenatjo being negotiated at the moment. It is clear that fromthe CAP to the Structural Funds, thefinancial benefits of joining theEU will be significantlymodified or eliminated beforethe CEEC's can join. Althoughthe changes to the EU's fi­ nanceswere supposed to be completed at theCologne Summitin June 1999, the lackof consensus on thiscontentious issue delayed theinevitable reforms. How­ ever, beforethe CEEC' s join, it is certainthat many of the financialarr angements thatwould have benefitedthem will be altered or eliminated.

Thereis virtualunanimity among observers thatCEEC enthusiasmfor EU membershipis motivated by politicaland identity questions rather than economic cost/benefit calculations. Thisis partly due to thefact that some of theeconomic benefitsof accessionhave alreadybeen obtainedby virtueof theEuropean Agree­ ments. More importantly, however, is the fact that theeconomic calculus of the benefits of membership is indeterminate. There aresignificant costs as well as benefits, andit is virtuallyimpossible tomake a definitivejudgement as to what the net cost or benefitwill be for each country20• Moreover, as stated above, it is impossible tocalculate the financial benefits of theCAP or.Structural funds,since these programsare likely to be radically changed before accession.

Some of the economic benefitshave already accrued to theCEEC' s by virtueof the Accession Agreements. The CEEC' s have been forcedto conform theirdomestic institutions to be compatiblewith the EU' s acquis communautaire, therebyincreasing transparency, accountabilityand competition in theseecono­ mies. It is a fact that the CEEC' s have been disadvantagedeconomically by the exceptions the EU imposed on the freetrade certain sectors, but the remedy for thiscost is rathersimple (if politicallydifficult for the EU ). As aninterim step, the protection of certainEU marketsshould be eliminatedin order forthe CEEC' s to get a more accurate picture of the benefitsand costs of membership.

44 Securityconcerns are also unlikelyto be thechief motivation to join the EU. Aftermore thanten yearsof politicalstability in most CEEC's, thesecurity andpolitical stability concernswhich prom ptedthe initial rush toadmit them into theEU no longer seem as pressing as they did in 1993. Moreover, theongoing NATO enlargementnegotiations would seem to be a better forumto discuss se­ curityconcerns than within the EU.

By default, therefore, the elite consensus thatexists in the CEEC's that EU membership is desirable is based on political andidentity factors. These f�torsare hardly insignificant motivators, but they do allow theopportunity to changethe entire structureof theEU in waysthat allow "membership" to be more broadly defined. If new members comprised the sole constituents in this new association, therewould be a dangerof class differences. Therefore,there should also be the opportunity forexisting members of the EU to changetheir status as well. This would be highly complicated, andthe entire process of institutional redesign andfinancing would necessarily needto be extremely transparentin or­ der to avoid the suggestion thatthe EU was trying to cheat theCEEC' s out of a previously made bargain. However, these typesof difficultdecisions need to be made sooner rather than later in order to preserve the stability of the EU as a whole.

Enlargementof the EU to the CEEC's is a project fraught with serious di:(ficulties. Contraryto conventional wisdom, it is theEU institutionalissues that

· aremore problematicthan the economic issuesthat are often offered as proof that theenlargement process should slow down. EU institutionaland financial issues have been discussed formore thanseven yearsin variousCommission and inter­ governmentalforums, but theyremain extremely divisive. Thisapparent disagree­ ment reflects fundamentallydifferent conceptions of theEU' s purpose andchar­ acter amongexisting member states. Thesediff erences areunlikely to be papered over in thecoming yearsdespite thepressure of the impending enlargement. Thus there aretwo paths the EU could take: one is to renege on its commitment to membership forthe CEEC' s, or at least to stall as long as possible andhope that the internalpolitical preferencesof the individual CEEC's changeto reject full membership. Thisappears to be thede factostrategy of theMember Statesat the moment. The second, andperhaps more honest, path would be to spend two yearscompletely redesigningthe EU tomake it compatiblewith diff erentfederal­ ist preferencesand enlargement. Itis perhaps a utopian view thatagreement for such a radical change could be won :from the Member States, the Commission

45 and the Parliament,but it is a debate that willbe necessaryat some point in the nearfuture.

Dorothee Heisenberg, Ph.D., Yale University, is Assistant Professor of European Studies at The Johns Hop/dns University-SAIS.

Bibliography

De Grauwe, Paul, Hans Dewachter andYunus Aksoy (1999). "TheEuropean CentralBanlc Decision Rules andMacroeconomic Perfo rmance," CEPR Dis­ cussion Paper 2067.

European Central Bank. Monthly Bulletin (2000).

EuropeanCommission. "TheFinal Reportof theReflection Group on theLong­ TermImplications ofEU Enlargement:the Nature of the New Border," 2000. On line athttp://www.iue.it/RSC/pdf7Fina1Report.pdf

Fierke,Karin and AntjeWiener. "Co nstructingInstitutional futerests: EU andNATO Enlargement,"Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1999).

Grabbe, Heather andKirsty Hughes. "Centraland East EuropeanViews on EU Enlargement:Political Debate andPublic Opinion," inKaren Henderson, ed. Back to Europe:Central andEastern Europe and the European Union Lon­ don: UCL Press, 1999.

Hughes,Kirsty. "The1996 IntergovernmentalConference andEU Enlargement," International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 1 (1996).

Mayhew, Alan. Recreating Europe:The European Union's Policy TowardsCen­ tral and EasternEurope. Cambridge:Cambridg e University Press, 1998.

Moravcsik, Andrew. The Choice for Europe. Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press, 1999.

46 Smith, Martinand Graham Timmins. "The EuropeanUnion andNATO Enlarge­ ment Debates inComparative Perspective: A Case of IncrementalLinkage?" West European Politics, Vol .22, No. 3 (1999).

Notes 1 The author would like to thank Cesar Munoz for his able research1assistance. 2 Throughout the essay, the name "European Union" will be used rather than "European Community", though this did not become the official appellationuntil November 1,1993, when the Treaty on European Union entered into force. 3 Financial Times, June 23,1993. 4 The Treaty of Rome was silent on the issue of enlargement. The 1972 Act of Accession spelled out the new states' acceptance of the original Treaties, the legislative acts and the declarations or resolutions of the Council, andany interna­ tional agreements or conventions entered into at that time. Each subsequent en­ largement had a similarAct of Accession passed by the Council. Article 49 (exArt. 0) of theTreaty on European Union codifiedand clarified theaccession procedure. "Any European State [emphasis added] may apply to become a Member of the Union. Itshall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament,which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members. The conditions of admission andthe adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded which such admission entails shall be the subject of an agreement be­ tween the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submit­ ted forratification by all the contractingStates in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements." 5 The only country that European statesmen have ever classified as "not Euro­ pean" is Russia. 6 See EuropeanCommission, 1999. 7Smith andTimmins,1999. 8 lbid.,25. 9Mayhew,1998,27. 10 Even in the 1995 enlargement,there was considerable conflict about how the votes would be reallocated, andBritain and Spain threatened to obstruct the acces­ sion if their proposals for a blocking minority were not accepted. 11 The Cologne Summit declaration enumerated several options to change the institutions, including changing the size andcomposition of theCommission; weight­ ing of votes in the Council (re-weighting, introduction of a dual majority and thresh­ old for qualified-majority decision-making), and the possible extension of qualified-majority voting in the Council. 12 At the time of this writing, thenew JGC,which opened on February14, 2000, has not made public its solutions to the institutional problems. Commission President Prodi,in opening theIGC, tried to prevent a reoccurrence of the lack of political will in reforming the institutions by saying, "we must not think - even for a moment -

47 that this is just the beginning of reform and that there will no doubt be other institutional reforms after this one. Look at the decisions on the enlargement proc­ ess taken at Helsinki and look at the timetable beforeus. I see no room fora second IGC. We cannot countenance any leftovers from Nice [the December 2000 Euro­ pean Council meeting closing the IGC]" For a full text of the speech, see http:// europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/speeches/index.htm 13 Commission of the European Communities, "Conclusions of the Presidencyj HelsinkiEurope anCounci l Meeting." BulletinEU 12-1999. 14Moravcsik,1999. 15 Source: World Bank and Eurostat, 1999. 16 See Grabbe andHughes, 1999. 17 It is an open question as to whether it is possible to build a mainstream party platform on opposition to enlargement. The formal invitation given at the Copen­ hagen Summit may make it impossible to deny membership, and thus any scepti­ cism of enlargement has been focused on the appropriate economic situation (the when, not if, question). If, however, a new EU "variable geometry" proposal could be found, it would be more likely to give mainstream parties a way to voice their objections in a manner that is not xenophobic or right-extremist. 18 See, forexample, de Grauwe, Dewachter and Aksoy, 1999. 19 EuropeanCentral Bank, 2000. 20 This has not stopped policymakers or academics from trying to quantify the costs and benefits. For a good overview, see Mayhew, 1998.

48 DOES EUROPEAN "UNCOMMON" FOREIGN POLICY HAVE A FUTURE?1 BY ELISABETTABRIGID

More thanten years have passed since the end of the Cold War,and yet thestructure and nature of thenewly borninternational system remainsfar from defined. Or rather, its only stable feature appearsto be thatof instability. Since 1989, relations amongstates have been shapedby a highdegree of fluidity,uncer­ tainty and precariousnessthat few observers had foreseen.

In thisnew andless predictable internationalcontext, Europe has hitherto forfeitedopportunities to redefineits role in the world arena. No longer thebone of contention between the two worlds of democracy andcommunism, Europe seemed well prepared to launch a decisive phase of integration in foreignand securitypolicies at thebeg inningof the1 990' s. However, it took only a fewyears to prove Europeanfederalists, who believed that the hourof theUnited States of Europehad finallycome, wrong once again. TheCommon Foreign andSecurity Policy(CFSP)2 isa policywithout a clearperspecti ve, inspite of recent integrationist proposals.

The purposeof thispaper is to investigate thecurr ent stalemate in Euro­ peanforeign policy andidentify relevant dimensions ofEuropeanexternal security

· policy. Onlyif internaland external dynamics affectingthe European continent aretaken into consideration can reasonable expectations about thefuture of the CFSP be formulated. Referencingintegration and international relations theory sheds light on thecrucial causes-of thecurrent Europeanstalemate and separates significant:from marginal issues.

Europe and the World: Some PreliminaryConsiderations

Thecharacterization of thenew internationalsystem as increasingly unsta ­ ble will not surprise those familiarwith the neorealist approach to international politics. As earlyas 1979, KennethWaltz argued thatbipolar international sys­ tems are morestable than multipolarsystems3 • Since 1989, theeruption of local, limited, yet disruptivecrises at the periphery of the Westernworld, the push to regionaliz.einternational politics, theprecariousness and the ever-changing nature of relationsamong states, andthe reemergence of domestic politics as a powerful sourceof influenceon foreignpolicy4 all point in thesame direction. ·

49 The new internationalsystem appears to have lost the mechanical and automatic adjustmentmechanism that bipo larism provided. Withoutits compel­ ling imperatives, uncertaintiesarise every time a crisis eruptsconcerning responsi­ bility for the costs of intervention. The United States no longer has a systemic compulsion to intervene in every Europeancrisi s in order to preserve its leader­ ship andnot lose groundagainst the Soviet Union. TheWestern world mustface . the consequences of selective US engagement and enhanced systemic unpredictability.

If we followthe reasoning of most alliancetheorists5 , thissituation should result in a powerfulincentive forEurope to finally integrate its member states' foreignpolicies. In fact,as the threat from the Soviet Union disappears, a de­ creasing level of cohesion in the Western camp was predicted to follow. This would certainlybe themost powerfulargrunent for the affirm ationofEurope as an autonomous internationalpower. Unfortunately,this argrunent is not borneout by reality. Europeanforeign policy integration is deprived of momentum. Other powerfulincentives are at work, running counter to integrationisttendencies. These forces, which come fromboth the internal European context andits externalenvi­ ronment, will be considered in the next pages.

The InternalEuropean Context

In theproliferation of acronymsinvented to definethe American andEu­ ropeaneffort to create a common European foreign policy, the concept of the EuropeanSecurity and Defense Identity (ESDI) was particularlyrelevant because it stated the purpose of European military cooperation andindirectly offered the best possible definitionof what Europe has not yet acquired: a common Euro­ peansecurity and defense identity.

Whyhave allefforts in the last decadefailed? To answerthis question, it is useful to comparethe two main theoreticalapproaches thathave been used thus farto explainthe dynamics of European integrationand apply themto thestudy of · cooperationin foreignand security aff airs.

First, neofunctionalismhas repeatedly stressedthe concept of"spillover," themechanism thattransmits incentives forintegratio n from one areato another andinduces greater numbers of transnationalactors to supportthe cause of inte­ gration. In thisprocess, supranationalinstitutions have a key role since theyboth

50 lead the effortsof transnational actors who wantto integrate andvisualize the futureintegrated community. Thus, ifintegration has success in one area,the

process ofleamingwill initiatefurther integration, producing a virtuouscircle6 •

Neofunctionalism seems ill-suited to explainEuropean cooperation in the domain of foreignpolicy, since none ofthe assumptions of this theoretical ap­ proach seem to hold. No spillover effecthas occurredin the last decade. Even now that theEMU has been launched, it is unlikelyt hat a positive spillover will takeplace andincrease thechances forcooperation in military issues,especially as long as theEuro experiences significant weakness. Moreover, ifthe launch of theEuro took approximately fivedecades, how long ·willESDI take?

Current CFSP provisions do not allow much intervention by European institutionsapart from the European Council and the Council ofMinistersof the EC, theinstituti ons thathave traditionally represented the different national inter­ ests of European states. The European Commission, the European Parliament and a fortiori the European Court of Justice play a marginal role; these very institutions could provide a vision of European integration and arecapable of creating a Europeanidentity. However, they remain at theperiphery ofinstitu­ tional procedures,deprived of anyreal power.

Furthermore,the very natureof thepolicy seems to be a negative rather thanpositive a element for thesuccessful application of theneofunctionalist para­ . digm. Theareas of foreignand security policies are typicallycharacterized by the absence of transnational actors andelites. Even theidentification of common needs, anothercentral starting point fora neofunctionalintegration, seems remote.

Withthose criticisms in mind, it is easy to see thepoints ofstrength in the second theoretical approach, that of intergovernmentalism7• The central as­ sumption ofthis theory is thatstates, not transnationalactors, arethe subjects of theprocess of integration. States engage in bargainingprocesses inwhich they aimto maximizenational interests definedthrough domestic politics, not through security or power. Any step forwardor backwardin the process ofintegration depends on the degree ofconvergence or divergence thatnational interests have at thatparticular stage of the process, andthus relies on the will ofstates to con­ tinue or haltcooperation.

51 This approach interprets European integration as a long series of cel­ ebrated intergovernmentalbargains that have resulted in lowest common denomi­ nator agreements among states andallowed only as much integration as states have been willing to concede. Integration, then,has nothingto do witha vision of Europe,but is rather a pragmatic approach towardfacing theissue of closer co­ operation amongneighboring states. Whereas neofunctionalismemphasizes the potential harmony of interests amongstates, intergovernrnentalism stresses the conflictof interests8 .

Therecent unfoldingof events favorsthe intergovemmentalism interpreta­ tion. Integration seems to proceed only when states allow it, andthe institutions that areinvolved in thedecision makingprocess of CFSP areonly those thatkeep an eye on states' interests.

For example, GreatBritain has been traditionally the least enthusiastic state as faras theintegration of Europeanforeign policy is concerned. Untila few months ago, it stronglyopposed anyadvance in this process, blocking the exten­ sion of qualifiedmajority voting (QMV)from implementation measuresto crucial politicalmatters, denying anystrengthening of therole of theEuropean Commis­ sion or Parliamentin thesecond pillar,that of theCFSP, andopposing thegradual merger of theWEU (WesternEuropean Union, the military armof theEuropean Union) into theEU. On a scaleof differentlevels of propensity to integrate their foreignpolicy, Great Britainscored thelowest, whereas states such as Germany and Italy scored highest9 •

Upon what did this particular stance depend? Historically, Britain in­ vested little in the creation of EPC and CFSP, preferringNATO to a common Europeanforeign and security policy. Drawingon itslong traditionof independent foreign policy, Britain often acted as if it did not need Europeanlegitimization or "cover" forits foreignpolicy.

Thesituation in otherstates was quite different. Germanyand Italy, tµough ever faithfulto theAtlantic alliance, have never hidden theirfederalist aspirations and always supported any program, planor declarationthat enhanced European cooperation in foreign policy. Their commitmentto this cause has been undis­ puted, andthis can be understoodby taking theirinternati onalconcern s into con­ sideration. Fiftyyears on the frontline of the conflictbetween thefree world and communism, these two countries arecu rrentlyalso the most exposed to the new

52 threats fromthe periphery, bordering as they do on the "arcofinstability" that stretchesfrom the Balkans to North Africa10•

It is thus no surprise thatthe treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam re­ flecteda lackof convergence andopted forprovisions able to satisfyall positions, ending up with a compromise oflittle practical or operational meaning. Every treatyhas been put to a crucial test; Maastrichthad formerYugoslavia andAm­ sterdam had Kosovo. In both cases Europe, as a distinctive and autonomous actor offoreign policy, fai led.

Since theend oflast year, however, thepositions of European states have changed. Great Britain has demonstratedits willingness to advance in defense cooperation, withthe objective ofdeveloping Europe's autonomous military ca­ pabilities11. This reversalwas codifiedin the Saint Malomeeting ofDecember 1998, in theCologne meeting of June 1999 andfinally in the Helsinki meeting of December 1999, where allcountries decided to move forwardin theprogressive merger of the WEU into the EU, agreed on the creation of several European militarybodies12 andsanctioned the appointment of thefirst High Representative of CFSP, Javier Solana.

Withthe reversal of theBritish position,new intergovernmentalbargains were struck, andthe results that followedwere those already mentioned. Once again,European supranational institutions played no relevantrole; rather,the states themselves decided to move forward in theprocess of integration. Only when national interestssufficiently converged did thestates decide to proceed withfur­ therintegration.

Why then has the British position changed? As emphasized by intergovernmentalisttheory, domestic politics played a consistent rolein redefining British "national interests." In this regard, theelection ofTony Blairin 1997 and thevictory of the Labour Party contributed to alteringthe British position on many Europeanissues. Theinternational position of GreatBritain may alsohave changed; NATO now appearsless viable andc annotbe trustedto solve "European"crises.

More importantly, arethese new developments ofa decisive nature and have theyimproved the frameworkof an effective Europeanforeign policy? It could be arguedthat these development s arenothin g but the European response to the emergency of Kosovo andthat they willnot last. Even ifthey do, a very

53 important puzzle remainsto be solved. Startingfrom the end ofthe process and buildingup militarycapabiliti es does not precludethe logical beginning of the process ofintegration Thesenew military provisionsdo not clarifywhat the ultimate source ofpolitical authorityfor such a defense policy is, nor what the role of the CFSP should be. Militarycapabiliti es arevaluab le only so long as political capabilities aresufficiently strong. Whereas theresee ms to be some progress in thefirst area, the second areais approaching a new stalemate. Simply increasing militaryper­ sonnel or assets is unlikelyper se to help build a Europeanpolitical identity.

Thus, the CFSP amounts to little untilit incorporatesthe possibility of getting a state do what otherwise it would not have done. The key reform re­ quired is theextension of QMV to crucial strategic andpolitical affairs, since this would meanthe end ofthe possibility of states invokinga nationalveto everytime they perceive a threatto nationalsovereignty. Unless thishappens, the European Union willlose political credibilitywhile gainingmilitary capability.

Arenation al interests sufficiently convergent on reform? Not yet, as the newest bargainsall demonstrate. Great Britain andFrance not only decided to move forwardin endowing the EU withmilitary capabilities but alsoemphasized their willingnessto adhereto intergovernmentalmethods when makingpolitical decisions. Will thereever be sufficientconvergence? Theintergovernmentalist approach assumesnot, because governmentsare not interested in combining their foreign anddefense policies and creating a linkagewith other areas. This pro­ nouncedand pro longed divergence amongthe national interests ofEuropean mem­ ber states appears to be a very powerful determinant of the present failure of CFSP. The theoretical approach that best explains past European cooperation paintsa dim picture ofitsfuture.

The ExternalEuropean Environment

Internaldivergences alone, however, arenot theonly determinantsof the fa ilure ofCFSP; anotherimportant aspect concernsexternal relations artd in par­ ticular,troubled transatlantic relations.

As mentioned earlier, thecollapse ofbipolarism reopened thequestion of theinternal balance of the transatlantic alliance . Now thatthe leadership ofthe US is no longer questioned, andin theabsence ofa threatto the internationalsecurity of the Westernworld, an increase in the divergence ofallied interests is likely to

54 take place. Are Europe andthe US drifting apart? In the past ten years both actors have succeeded brilliantlyin makingthese diverg ences seem of littleimpor­ tance, andthe new concept ofESDI was the cornerstone of the strategy of re­ newed cooperation.

The US attitude towardsthe crea tion of a EuropeanDefense and Security Identityhas passed throughseveral phases in thisdecade. At firstthe concept of "partnershipinleadership" was invented to reassure Germany and the rest of Europe about theircontinued saliency in thetransatlantic alliance, andthe label of ESDI was coined to give support and legitimization to Europeanattempts in the area of defense. Then, fromthe mid-1990's until1998, the US switched to a position of benignneglect, postponingthe decision about responsibilityand lead­ ership in Europeansecurity. In 1999, however, as the acceleration ofthe debate about Europeanmilitary capabilities gained momentum, theUS finallypublicized precise conditionsfor the present andfuture process. Secretaryof State Madeleine Albright's "3 D's13 "are quite straightforward: no duplication of US military as­ sets, no decouplingof theUS fromEurope, andno discrimination againstnon-EU NATO members.

Ambivalence is likely to become thekey feature·oftheUS attitudeto­ wards the CFSP. On one hand,the United Stateswants a strongerEurope since a weakcontinent is of no strategic value, but on theother hand, the military and politicalleadership of the US should by no meansbe questioned. Thispolicy of squaringthe circle is not sustainable, especially as Europeanassertivenes s inthe areaof military aff airspersists.

The Helsinki provisions of December 1999 may havesown the seedsof futureconfrontation. Thecreation ofa Politicaland Security Co nnnittee,aMili­ tarySt aff, aMilitary Co mmittee anda RapidDeployment Force seenisClose to the concept of "duplication," not just of assets, but of bodies of command. . If these tendencies areconfirmed, the transatlanticlink might be severelyimpaired. However, the gap betweenEuropean and American military capabilities is still wide, andit would takeEuropean states decades ofinconceivably highdefense spending to fillit, if they ever decide to do so. For the time being, European assertivenessis a remote threatto US military primacy,but the political meaning of such developmentsshould not be underestimated;

55 The US is facedwith a strategicdilemm a in Europeand simply "deciding not to decide" is no answer. Should the US preserve its influence in Europe or should itengage in agradual political retrenchm ent,sparing the American economy huge costs and avoiding dangerousoverextension andembarras sing "selective engagements?" Eitherway, the futureof thetransatlantic link depends on its deci­ sion.

Thehegemonic stability theory explains the"capabi lity-expectationsgap14 ," theapparent inconsistency between the current difficultyin building the ESDI as opposed to thehigh expectations forit at thebeg inningof thedecade. Coopera­ tion proved less easy than expected because thecontext in which it took place changedsignificantly. Bipolarism turnedout not to be anobstacle to European cooperation; on thecontrary, American hegemony over Europeduring the Cold

Warfacilitated and fostered prolonged intra-Europeancooperation15 • As long as the US performed the basicfunctions of assuring a constantdefense against the Soviet threat andpermanently installing troopson Europeansoil, European states cooperated with each other. Once the US no longer performed these functions, benign cooperation beganto be replaced by much less dependable "normal" in­ ter-state relations among European states, a context characterizedas much by conflictas by cooperation.

The constantand unquestioned US presence in Europe solved theperen­ nial problem of balance of power withinthe continent fordecades. Now that the presence of the US in Europe becomes more and more uncertain, old rivalries inevitably reappear. Thus,cooperation underthe new internationalcontext may actually be less likely thanunder bipolarism. This should not be taken to ex­ tremes16; theresort to war amongEuropean states is still unlikelyto occur. How­ ever, European states will be less likely to accept measures that do not yield immediaterelative gains in terms of power andinfluence, and they will be less willing to act on the basis of purereciprocity.

Thisargument may be refutedby the mitigating factorof interdependence. Afterall, Europeanstates are cl osely linkedby economic, culturaland social inter­ dependence, and this has always diminished the chancesof extreme conflict. However, thethesis that economic interdependence andcooperation canspill over to high politics areasis a functionalisttenet whose validity has been ques­ tioned even by neo-functionalists17• Secondly, economic interdependence might

56 not be a sufficiently "mitigating"factor when defenseand military issues are in­ sertedinto thepicture; interdependence cannotnullify a securitycompetition.

Therefore, the predictions thatfollow from these considerations arenot very promising about thechances of having a realESDI created in thenear future, if ever. This is theresult of the neorealist approach. In fact, this approach has proved to be very usefulin explaining thepattern of Europeancooperation in the Cold Warera, andits general validity seems to hold even in the post Cold War world as well.

Conclusions

The futureof Europeanforeign and defensepolicy looks very uncertain. Even with new developments, it is still to be seen whetherthese measures area temporaryacceleration due to the emergency in Kosovo or whether they are a

truecatalyst for change18 •

Europeanefforts to build its ownESDI have been hamperedby two sets of obstacles, one coming from its internaldimension, the othercoming fromits externalenvironment. First, a pronounced and prolonged divergence of major European member states to integrate foreign andsecurity policies has been a source of disunity and stalemate. This factor, coupled with the reality of intergovernmentalism,has broughtabout theparalysis that has characterized CFSP since 1991, the yearof its inauguration.

As forthe second set of causes, the internationalposition of thecontinent does not appear to favor the creation of a true ESDI in the near future. Even though Europe has a strong incentive to increase its profilein the transatlantic alliancenow thatbipolarism has collapsed, these incentives arepowerfully coun­ tered by the change in thecontext of intra-Europeanstate relations.

The chances fora complete ESDI andCFSP in the near future arevery ! low. Thisdoes not imply thatthe process of cooperation willstop or recede, but I ratherthat it will remain:fragmented and ineffective for years, or untilthe sudden I rise of an external threatforces cooperation amongEuropean states. In thepost Cold Warinternational system, we canreasonably expect thatthreats to security I will be less concentrated thanbefore. Thus, even this beneficial scenario fora I commonEuropean policy paradoxicallyrenders it even less likely. l 57 Elisabetta Brighi obtained her BA degree in International Relations at the University ofBologna, Italy, with honours. She is currently studying international relations at Johns Hopkins University-SAIS Bologna Center.

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Art, RobertJ., "Why Western Europe Needs The United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1(1996), 1-51.

Aybet, Gulnar. Thedynamics ofEuropean SecurityCooperation. London: Mac Millan,1997.

Carlsnaes, Walterand Smith, Steve,European ForeignPolicy. London: SAGE Publications,1994.

Duffield, John S. WorldPower Forsaken, Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1998.

Gordon, Philip H. A Certain Idea of France: French SecurityPolicy andthe GaullistHeritage.Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1993.

--, France,Ge rmany, andthe Western Allian ce. Boulder, CO: WestviewPress, 1995. --, "Europe's Uncommon ForeignPolicy," International Security,Vol. 22, No. 3 (1997/8), 74-100.

Haftendom, Helga, ed. America andEurope in an Era ofChange.Boulder, CO: WestviewPress,1993.

Hanrieder, Wolfram. Germany,America and Europe, New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1989.

58 Hill,C.,"The Capability-ExpectationsG ap, or ConceptualizingEurope's Interna­ tional Role," Journal ofCom mon Market Studies, Vol. 31,No. 3(1993), 305-328.

--, ed., The actors in Europe'sForeign Pol icy, London: Routledge, 1996.

Hoffman, Stanley andKeohane, Robert 0. eds. AfterThe Cold W'!-f: Interna­ tionalInstitutions and State Strategiesin Europe. Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Holland,Martin. Common Foreign and Security Policy: therecord andreforms. London:Pinter Publications, 1997.

Jopp, Mathias,ed. EuropeanSecurity Integration, Implications for Non- Alingments andAlliances. Helsinki: TheFinnish Instituteoflnternational Affairs, 1999.

Maull, HansW., "Declin de I' influence, declin des ambitions: lapolitiqueetrangere de l'Allemagne au crepuscule de l' ere Kohl," Politique Etrangere, Vol. 61,No. 1 (1996), 23-36.

Maury, JeanPaul. La construction europenne,la scuritet la defense.Paris: PUF, 1997.

Mearsheimer,John, "Backto theFuture: Instabilityin Europe aftertheCold War," International Security, Vol. 15,No. 1(1990),5-51.

Missiroli,Antonio, "DifesaAtlantica,Sicurezza Europea: l"'iniziativa"brit annica e il futurodellaPESC," Europa, Europe, Vol. 8, No. 1-2 (1999),85-94.

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---,The Social Choice forEurope, Boulder, CO: WestviewPress, 1998.

0hrgaard,Jacob, "Lessthan Supranational, More thanIntergovernmental: Euro­ peanPolitical Cooperation andthe Dynamics of IntergovernmentalInte­ gration," Millenium: Journal ofInternational Studies, Vol. 26,No. 1 (1997), 1-29.

59 Regelsberger, Elfriede, ed., The Foreign Policy of the EuropeanUnion: Form EPC to CFSP and Beyond. Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 1997.

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Snyder, GlennH. AlliancePolitics. Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 1998.

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Notes 1 The labeling ofCFSP as an"uncommon" European Foreign Policy is from Philip H. Gordon,"European Uncommon Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol.22 No 3(1997/1998), 74-100. 2 Maastricht, 1991: " ... the ultimate phase of Europeancooperation in the realm of foreign and security affairs." 3 KennethN. Waltz,Theory oflnternational Politics. Reading, PA: Addison Wesley Press, 1979. 4 Domestic politics has in many cases regained the attention of the political class and the public. Manifestations of this tendency were the corruption scandal of ManiPulite in Italy, the political crisis of the CDU in Germany, whichis now occu­ pying the German political agenda, and the rise of J. Haider in Austria, which has stirred a huge public debate. 5 See, one forall, Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, Ithaca,NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. 6 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. London, 1958, and L. Lindeberg, The Political Dynamicsof European Economic Integration. Stanford,1963. For a recent restatement of neofunctionalist arguments, see Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz, "European Integration and Supranational Governance,"Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 4No. 3 (1997), 133-160. 7 A seminal article was written by Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferencesand Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," Journal of Common MarketStudies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1993), 473-524. Recently, Andrew Moravcsik has studied the whole history of European integration according to his theoretical

60 framework in Andrew Moravcsik, The Social Choice for Europe. Boulder, CO: Westview,1998. 8 For a debate on neofunctionalism vs. intergovernmentalism,see Jackob 0hrgaard, ''Less than Supranational More than Intergorvernmental: European Political Coop­ eration and the Dynamics oflntergovernmental Integration," Millenium: Journal ofInternational Studies, Vol. 2 No. 1(1997), 45-70; and Philip H. Gordon, op. c it. 9 For a research focused on the different levels of propensity to integrate into CFSP, see E. Brighi, "La Politica Estera e di Sicurezza in Euorpa: unn ipotesi sulla propensione all'integrazione," Quaderno di Scienza della Politica, Vol. IX. No.1 (2000), 61-105. 10 For a view of British, Germanic, French and Italian traditions in foreign policy with respect to European security (NATO, EPC/CFSP especially) see: Robert 0. Keohane, ed., Afterthe Cold War: InternationalInstitutions andState Strategiesin Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993; and Christopher Hill, David Allen, ed., The actors in EuropeanForeign Policy. London: Routledge, 1996. 11 For an assessment of the British reversal, see: A. Missiroli, "DifensaAtlantica, Sicurezza Europea: l' iniziativa britannicae il futuro della PESC," Europa Europe, Vol. 8 No. 1-2 (1999), 85-94; S. De Spiegeleire, "TheEuropean Security andDefense Identity and NATO: Berlin and Beyond" and A. Missiroli, "Towards a European Defense Security and Defense Identity? Record-State of Play-Prospects," in M. Jopp and H. Ojanen, European Security Integration, Implications for Non-Align­ ments andAlliances. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute oflnternationalAffairs, 1999. 12 During thelast Helsinki meeting (December 10-12, 1999), it was agreed to pro­ gressively establish a Policy andSecurity Committee, a Military Committee and a Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate and supervise European defense cooperation. Presently, these bodies have only consultative functions. In addition, the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force of about 60,000 troops has been considered as another aspect of the project, to be put into practice in a few years. 13 See De Spregeleine, "The EuropeanSecurity and Defense Identity and NATO: Berlin and Beyond," op.cit. 14 Christopher Hill, "TheCapability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's InternationalRole," Journal a/Common MarketStudies, Vol. 31. No. 3 (1993), 305- 328. 15 Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111 No. 1 (1996), 1-39. K. Waltz explained Euro­ pean cooperation in terms of a positive by-product of bipolarism, see K. Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, op. cit. 16 Extremepositions were epitomized by thearticle of John Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future: Instability in Europe afterthe Cold War,"International Security, Vol. 15 No. 1(1990), 5-56. 17 Ithas been argued that different issue-areas have different spillover potentials: see, for instance,G. Aybet, TheDynamics of EuropeanSecurity Cooperation, 1945- 1991. London: MacMillan,1997. 18 A. Missiroli, "Towards a European Defense Security and Defense Identity? Record-State of Play-Prospects," op. cit.

61

CAN EUROPEAN IDENTITY COMPETE WITH NATIONAL IDENTITY? BY RAIN EENSAAR

This articleaims to point out a recent polemic, theburning issue of the legitimacyof theEuropean identity as opposed to existingnational identities. The concept is highlycontentious, partlybecause thereis a question of whetheror not Europeanidentity is compatible withthe maintenance of national or regional identities. It has been recently arguedthat if thereis a Europeanidentity, it may conflictwith national identities1 • First,the articleidentifies the difficulties of finding a concise definitionof"Europe" or "European." Second, it exploresthe necessity of ritual,myth and symbolin theprocess of forgingan identity. Third,it describes the latest instnunentsof unity, namely, the Euro andthe concept of European citizenship. Fourth,it provides two examples,of where the"other" has played a major role in changingidentities over time.

In order to grasp the peculiarityof the concept of European identity, it is essentialto understandwhat is meantby "Europe" or "European." Such a task is far from straightforwardsince despite, or perhaps because of, popularusage, thereis no consensus on theterm's actual meaning. Is it a termthat has as many definitionsas people definingit? Is it a geographical term? If so, where is the easternborder of Europe? If it includes Turkey2, does it also include Russia? If definedgeographically, European countries are still diff erentculturally, linguisti­ callyand religiously. Infact, SamuelHuntington has proposed thatsince the ideo­ logicaldivision of Europehas disappeared, a new division hasemerged: the cul­ turaldivision of Europebetween Western Christianityand Orthodox Christianity, replacingthe Iron Curtainof ideology withthe Velvet Curtainof religion3 •

Does being Europeanmean possessing membership in theEU? TheEU hasgone throughseveral enlargements; does it meanthat new members became European, butwere not before? Were Norwegiansabout to become Europeans while theywere standing by the ballot boxes in 1973 and 1994?

Is European just the mix of its various national identities? Anthony D. Smith asks: "If"Europe"and "European" signify something more thanthe sum total of the populations and cultures that happen to inhabit a conventionally demarcatedgeographical space, what exactlyare those characteristics and qualities

63 thatdistinguish Europe fromanything or anyoneelse?"4 • Further, he rightly argues that proposed geographical centers of Europe such as in Burgundy, along the RhineRiver, Berlin, Prague, Budapest, and Vilnius,are all "historicalclaims, not geographical 'facts"'5•

Perhaps it would be better to leave Europe undefined. In the end, the question of who is or is not Europeanmay provoke more dilemmas thansolutions. As with the camel: thepractical approach is not to defineit, but to describe it6•

Accordingto Durkheim and severalother scholars, ritual, myth and symbol play the key role in producing and maintaining solidarity amongmembers of a community7• If so, then what is the European myth? What is theEuropean memory?

Lene Hansen and Michael C. Williams argue in their recent essay on legitimacy andthe crisis of the EU that:

... the entire argument concerning the mythic necessity of the EU hinges on an opposition between myth and rationalism that simply cannot be sustained, for the opposition between rationality and an historical, mythic culture of identity repre­ sents one of the most powerful and defining myths of the modem world-that of modernityas a whole8•

Theremight be some truthto this, but theEuropean dilemma is moreover a choice between historicalmyths and memories on one hand, anda patchwork ofdecisions about creating a culturebased on political will and economic interest, so often subject to change, on the other.

Europe, lacking a solid and unifying myth from the past, has instead proposed a mythfor the future. Sincethe onset of theorganizations thatwe today call the EU, it has been looking forward and denying the past. The myth of a common futurehas been emphasizedto thedetriment of working on theproblems of thepast. Even HelmutKohl hasstated that"Germany is my Fatherland,Europe is my future''9.

The problem thatthe EU had (andin factstill has) to solve is that shared memories, traditions, myths, symbols and values possess different meaningsin differentEuropean nation-states. For example,Anthony Smithargues thatsuch events "as theCrusades, theRenaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment

64 affected some areas, peoples and states more than others, and few hardly at In all"10 • Slllll,all communities have participated in atleast some European traditions andheritages to some degree, but at times theywere allieswith one anotherand at other times were bitter enemies. If there is something we cancall a European experience, it will come into being over a long time-span and as a product of particularhistorical circumstances, oftenanticipated andunintentional. What experiences arecommon to all Europeansand in whatway do theydiffer from the experiences of non-Europeans?

As seen above, all communitiesshare both a sense of present identityand a past. Historical revision, in thecase of theEU was a naturalrequirement. Norman Davies writes thatthe first stage in forginga commonEuropean identity seeks to root out thehistorical misinformation and misunderstandings that proliferated in all European countries. The second stage is to build a consensus on the positive content of a new "Eurohistory"that at best made senseonly to theoriginal "six"11 •

One project thatreceived supportfrom the European Commission (initi­ ated in 1989-91) was labeled "AnAdventure in Understanding." Itwas planned in threestages: a 500-page surveyof Europeanhistory, a 10-parttelevision series and a school textbookto be published simultaneouslyin all eight languagesof the EC12 • Itsauthors made it clearthat their aim was toreplace history written according to theethos of thesovereign nation-state andtheir nationalistic instincts. defined It Europeas theterritory of themember states of theEC, with Scandinavia,Austria and Switzerlandthrown in. However, thetiming was unfortunatesince it reached the market at the very time when its geographical frame had just collapsed. Therefore,the project washighly criticized; it was called"Half-truths about halfof Europe"and" ... Soviet-bloc historiography"13•

So farnational educational systems, particularly the British system, 14 decide what to teach and are determined by national, not European,priorities. Most school historytextbooks arenational in content andintent. Until thereis European standardization of the public education system, there is not much hope for

"Eurohistory," in spiteof suggestions to move forward in thisissue15 •

TheEU has, despite itsshort existence, alreadymade attemptsto introduce popular myths and symbols. In 1984, the European Council set up an ad hoc committee,chaired by PietroAdonnino, remembered forits recommendationson the cultural and social aspects of the People's Europeand on the symbols of

65 politics such as the Communityemblem , flag, passport and anthem. Common passports andEuropean frontiers might help to create an element of perceived commonidentity for those who travelbeyond theEuropean frontiers and for those who seek to enter them. But how many Europeansaccept them as symbols of theirnew identity?

In any case, in a recent opinion pol116 people were asked how they describe themselves andgiven fourchoices. The answerswere the following: 45%, by nationality only; 40%, by nationalityand European; 6%, by European andnationality; and5%, by Europeanonly. Thus,there is little evidence yet that there exists Europeandemos. Clearly,as Smith points out,

. When it comes to theritual and ceremony of collective identification, there is no Europeanequivalent of nationalor religious community. Thereis no Europeananalogue to Bastille or ArmisticeDay, no Europeanceremony forthe fallen in thebattle, no Europeanshrine ofkings or saints.17

Yet Paul Howe suggests thatstrengthening a Europeanidentity requires building the foundation for a European political community by introducing "communitybinding measures" like common passports, Europeancitizenship and stronger political institutions at theEuropean level. Moreover, Howe points out that thisdevelopment of political structuresidentity and creates the conditionsfor the development of cultural underpinnings. "Slowly but surely beliefs about community will start to adjust to the political and legal infrastructure if that infrastructureprotects a prosperous andpeaceful comm unity"18 •

One of thelatest great leaps towardsEuropean identity has been theintro­ duction of thenew currency. Currency conversion is almostentirely an economic project,but it is alsointended to be a symbolof European identity. OlafHillenburger states in anofficial publication of the EU that thiswas one of the reasons why it was called theEuro. Another advantage of thisname was that it is short andit can be writtenin the same way in all Europeanlanguages 19 •

Anotherattempt to forgethe European identity has been theintroduction of theconcept ofEuropean citizenship, which entered into forceon theNovember 1, 1993, when every citizen of a member state of theEU became also a citizen of ° theEU2 . However, despite the significanceof thed evelopment, mostcitizens still identifythemselves by theirnationality. Why?

66 Perhaps there is some truth in the argument that the public is more concernedwith practical matters: income, price stability,better working condi­ tions, cleanerair, more recreational facilities, anddoes not carewhether these amenitiesare providedby theirnational government or by Brussels as long as they areavailable. EU citiz.enshipdoes not addsignificantly more rights to the member state's citizens thanthey alreadyenjoyed undertheir nationalcitiz.enship21 •

In fact, EU citizenshipis symbolicand hasthe same effect on individuals as if thetreaty had referredto themas citizens of theirmember states instead of citizens of theEU. Citizenshipin theEU does not yet embody duties towardsthe EU, although unspecified duties are mentioned in the Treaty's definition of citizenship22 • Furthermore,the Treaty of Amsterdam made it clear, adding to article 8(1 ), that "[c ]itizenship of the Union shall complement andnot replace nationalcitizenship;" the competition betweenEuropean and national citizenship will continue. Perhaps thecitizenship of the EU needs time to settle; yet it is unlikely that, without substantialdifferences between national andEuropean citizenship, it willhave anyreal impact in theforeseeable future.

Despite strongarguments suggesting that citizenship does not necessarily adhere to thesovereign state, Brubaker argues that:

Those who herald the emerging post-national age are too hasty in con­ demning thenation state tothe dustbin of history. Theyunderestimate the resilience, as well as therichness andcomplexity, of aninstitutional and normativetradition that for better or worse appearsto have lifein it yet.23

Consider also Raymond Aron, who wrote25 yearsago that "[t]here areno such animals as 'European Citizens'. There are only French, German or Italian citi­ zens24."

In general, people decide who theyare by reference to who andwhat they arenot; it is thesame with identities. They areoften forged through opposition to theidentities of other communities. Thus, the question arises, what is Europe's other? A decade ago, the possible other of the ideological Cold �arera ceased to exist. At present, there is no clearanswer to the proposed question. Perhaps theUnited States has become theother against whom theEU measures itself

67 The British have experienced a similarprocess, though it took place at least two centuries earlier and in a different setting. Since the Act of Union in 1707 that joined Scotland to Englandand Wales, thethorny march towards the one andonly Britishn ational identitybegan. It canbe argued thatthe march is not finished; instead, there are signs suggesting that theBritish areon a circle-road. Being an"invented nation," Welshness, Scotishnessand Englishness have remained powerfulidentities. Moreover, as so manyof thecomponents of Britishness have faded, therehave been predictable calls fora revivalof other, older loyalties- a returnto Englishness, or Scotishness, or Welshness.

Linda Colley concludes in her fascinating book about the Britons that Protestantism (and its resistanceto Catholicism) as a religion now has a limited influenceon Britishculture. Warswith the states of continentalEurope have in all likelihood come to an end, andthe British no longer feelthe samecompulsion to remainunited in theface of theenemy fromwithout. Andcrucially, both commercial supremacy andimperial hegemony have been lost25 • Theessential cements have largelyceased to function. TheBritish no longer have nor believe in a distinctand privilegedidentity. It is arguedthat any attempt to fostera Europeanidentity among citizensof themember-states will have negative implicationsfor national identities. Yet thereis no obvious reason whythe question of identificationshould be conceived as a zero-sumgame. On the contrary, it might have a positive effect, because the searchfor identity is sometimes a wish for thereass urance of existing identity. The caseoflreland confirms the latterpossibility.

Before Ireland joined the European Community in 1972, many Irish genuinely fearedthat membership in a centralizingEuropean organization would meanthe end of theirfragile, threatened nationalculture. Surrender of sovereignty ineconomic matterswould, it wasfeared, lead to thesurr ender of nationalidentity, the end of their particularnational characteristics, and of their ability to protect their ownculture. That Irelandmay in fact have greater control over its destiny inside rather than outside the Community pervaded, however, with Ireland's continuedinformal dependence on Britain. Therewas anoverwhelming Irish vote in favorof EU membership: 83% voted yes26•

Almost 25 years of membership have supported the latter views. The Irish see that theirlimited surrenderof sopereignty hasgiven theirsmall country rights which they previously did not have, the right to participatein decisions affecting them,and access to marketspreviously not open to them. In thecase of

68 Ireland, membershipinto theEU andgreater prosperity have enabled it to spend more on education, cultureand theprotection of nationalheritage. Wider contacts withother European cultures haveled it toa deeper appreciationofits ownlanguage,

music and literature27 •

As seen above, theconcept of Europeanidentity is runningaground, both theoretically aswell as practically. Themain obstacle seems to be thefact that it is developed in theframework and terminology usually identified with nation-states. Hitherto, the people it attempts to unifyshow little enthusiasmfor assuming a Europeanidentity in place of theirnational identity.

Itmight be arguedthat the concept ofEuropean identity, whatever it might be in reality, has instead strengthenednational or regionalidentities, providing French, Germans,and other members of EU countrieswith thenecessary other of being considered Europeaninstead. At the same time, it is also a popular tool of Euro-pessimistswho cultivate uncertaintyabout theissue to theirown ends.

If a Europeanidentity emerges, perhaps withthe help of numerousEU initiatives,it mustcompete withexisting national identities. Anessel}tial prerequisite forthe European identityis the criticalrereading of thecommon andsepara te past of allEuropean nations. Otherwiseit will not be possible to create a new, widely spread andaccepted identity. Thepossibility and merits of multi-layeridentities should not be disregarded, as in thecase of theUnited Kingdom. However, the respective Europeanprocess will be gradual andtime-consuming.

In sum,whether the Europeanidentity project has anysuccess or strength to compete withits nationalequivalent, deeply rootedin thepast, is not clear. The outcome is important because it reflectsthe current conflictsamong European states andpeoples. Nevertheless,it mustalso be kept in mindthat different people have theirown constructionsof identity, theirown sense of what theyare. Which thesiswill be flawedin thelong run, however, remainsto be seen.

Rain Eensaar obtained his Bachelor ofArts in Public Administration, Uni­ versity of Tartu, Estonia, in 1996. He also has an advanced degree with distinctionsfrom the Universityof Sussex in European Studies. Currently, he is a European Studies scholar at The Univeristyof Johns Hopkins-SAIS Bo­ logna Center.

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Smith, A.D., "National identity andthe idea ofEuropeanunity," International Affairs. Vol.68, No.1 (Jan. 1992): 55-76.

Treaty of Amsterdam,.

70 Notes 1 Anthony D. Smith, "National identity and the idea of European unity," Interna­ tional affairs,Vol.68, No.I (Jan.1992), 56. 2 Application of Turkish EU membership has not been turned down because of Article O of the establishing treaties, thatallows anyEuropean state to join theEU. 3 Elizabeth H. Prodromou,"Paradigms, power, andidentity: rediscovering Ortho­ doxy andregionalizing Europe," Euro ean Journal ofPolit ical Research, Vol.30, p · ' No.2(Sept. 1996),128-129. 4Smith,68. 5 ibid.,69. 6 Norman Davies,"Euro pe: A History",Oxford University Press,1996, 46. 7 David I. Ketzer,"Ritual, Politics and Power", Yale University Press,1988, 61. 8 Lene Hansenand Michael C. Williams,"The Myths ofEurope:Legitimacy, Com­ munity and the 'Crisis' of the EU," Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.37_,- No.2(June 1999),240. 9 Paul Howe, "A Community ofEuropeans: The Requisite Underpinnings," Jour­ nal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol.33,No.1 (Jan. 1995), 31. 10Smith, 70. 11Davies,43. 12 TheEuropean Community that has become the European Union. 13Davies, 43 -44. 14 On national historiography andteaching see Davies, 3 2-3 6. 15 Onthe latest proposal,see Luigi Berlinguer,"Ora Construiamoi Cittadini Europei," La Repubblica(Jan. 72000), 15. 16 Figuresfrom Eurobarameter Report Number48, March 1998. 17Smith,73. 18Howe,37-42. 19 OlafHillenbrand, "The euro'',Europe fromA to Z, http://euro.eu.int', (1996), 103. 20 Treaty on EuropeanUnion. 21 The right to vote and stand in local and European elections may be considered an important principle, although most of the member states allowed this before (Denmark,Ireland, Netherlands, etc.). 22 One could argue that obedience to the treaties is an all encompassing duty of a citizen of the EU. 23 Richard Brubaker, "Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany," HarvardUniversity Press: 1996. 189. 24 Elizabeth Meehan, "Citizenship and the EuropeanCommunity," SAGE Publi­ cations, 1993, 172. 25 Linda Colley, "Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837," Hartford,CT: Yale University Press1992. 372-374. 26 BertrandLaffan,"Sover eignty and Nationalldentity," in Ireland and EC Mem­ bership Evaluated,London: PrinterPublishers, 1991.188. 27Paul Keatinge (ed.), "Ireland and EC Membership Evaluated',Lo ndon: Printer Publishers, 1991. 270-276.

71

SPAIN AND MOROCCO:

A STORY OF TENSION AND RECONCILIATION BY JosEP ToRREs

Introduction

Before Spain'sentry into theEuropean Co mmunity,during a long period of officialinternational isolation, Spaindominated Morocco whileignoring closer countries like Portugal. It was often said that the only army the Spanisharmy could defeat was theMoroccan army. Thiscomment demonstratesthe disparag­ ing attitude Spain adopted against Morocco due to indifferenceand ignorance about the country, its people andits culture. To visitors, it seemed Moroccan women did all the work while the men watched the world pass by. These were the stereotypes Spaniardshad towardMorocco: a landof poverty andunderde­ velopment. Theimplication of thestereotypes was that if the Spaniards could not compete with theiradvanced European neighbours of the North, at least they could feelsuperior to theirMoorish neighboursto theSouth

Once Spainb ecame :finnlyanchored in theEuropean Union and in NATO, relations between Morocco and Spain were normalized. Morocco is now of great importanceto Spain, andthe pastrelationship of disdainand ignorancehas largely cometo anend1 • Problems certainly remain; tradetensions arisebecause of thecompetitiveness ofMoroccan agricultural produce andits largefishing in­ dustry. However, most policy issuesare resolved by EU policies for theMediter­ raneanregion. Outside the politicalarena, at the level of the Spanish population, Morocco is popularwith Spanishtourists. Culturaldifferences are now taken for grantedand accepted without excessive criticism. Thisis no meanachievement. However, the presence of Moroccanimmigrants in Spainresults in present-day conflict. Hundredsof Moroccanshave triedto cross the straitof Gibraltar2, and at least 400 people have drownedtrying to get to Spanishshores3 since 1998. For those who manage to makeit to Spain, Cataloniais a main destination.

The present-day Muslim and Moroccan communities areidentified and described herein withthe object of reducing culturaltensions andracism. Begin­ ning withthe historical backgroundand social context in which Moroccanimmi ­ gration into Catalonia takes place, the article proceeds to an overvievyof the policy response of the Generalitat de Catalunya,the autonomo us governmentof

73 Catalonia, in light of the increasing presence of Moroccanimmigrants in Catalo­ nia. Theresponses andreactions of Catalansociety lead to a recommendation for a model of integrationfor Muslim Moroccanimmigrants.

Moroccan Immigrants in Catalonia

Withthe modernizationof the Spanisheconomy andthe re-industrialisa­ tion of Catalonia after the Spanish civil war, Spain changed from an exporter of economic immigrants to Northern Europe in the 1950' sand 1960' s, to an im­ porter of immigrants4• This is a new social phenomenon for Spanish society,and one that has already sparked debate. At an average 1.7% of the Spanish workforce5, it is still quite low in comparison to the5% of theEU. However, the officialrate of unemployment in Spain is thehighest of the EU member states at 16%.

Over the past yearsin Catalonia, the presence of Muslims and Moroc­ cansin the cities andvillages of Catalonia andthe BalearicIslands is more and more visible, their participation in the workforceof some sectors is on the in­ crease, andtheir contributionto societyhas risen substantially. What effectswill immigrationhave on the local Catalanlanguage and culture? What model should be followed for theintegration in thereceiving societyof the new immigrants from Morocco?

The Origin of Moroccan Immigrants and Their Destination, Catalonia

Two regions provide most ofthe Moroccan immigrantsin Catalonia: the northernand Mediterraneanregions ofRifand Jebala. This is according to the data collected in 19916 out of 16,000 cases of regularised residence permits. Emigrants fromRif are also foundin Holland, Belgium and Germany;a more direct linkto Spain exists in thecase of Jabala.

Ofthe Moroccanresidents inCatalonia, 38.5% come fromthe Rif region (5.9% from the Al-Hoceima region and 32.6% fromNador) and 32.7% come fromJebala (8.5% from Tangiers,2.8% fromTetuan, 16.7% fromLarr aix and 4. 7% fromXauen. The more southernthe Moroccanregion and the lesser the past Spanish colonialinfluence, the less the numberof immigrantsfrom thesere­ gions. Only 7.4% come fromthe oriental region (provincesof Oujadaand Figuig), 6.6% were born in the central regions (Taza, 2.8% and Fes, 1.7%), and 8.5%

74 come fromthe Atlantic regions (Kenitra, Rabat, 4% come fromCasablanca, Ben Slimane, Settat, El-Jadida, Safiand Essao uira). Only 1 % comes fromMarr aqueix, the great capital of the South. Almost half of the Moroccans in Catalonia come fromthe provinces ofNador andLarr aix. This provincial disequilibriumresults frompast unequal Spanish colonisation in Morocco. NorthernMorocco used to be almost completely colonised by the Spanish;Northern Moroccan populations are predominantly Berber speaking. Therefore, the immigrantsto Spain from Morocco tend to be primarilyfrom Northern Morocco andspeak Berber.

As to gender patternsin the origin of the Moroccanresidents, it is inter­ esting to point out that46.9% of themen thatimmigrate to Catalonia do it directly from their aduars (traditionalMoroccan settlements) of origin, while only 15. 7% of women do. This is partlydue to constraints placed on Moroccan women on travellingoutside their homes. Withthese constraints, women cannotemigrate unlessthey follow their husbands. There is, however, direct emigrationof women fromurban settings: 58.3% in contrast to20.7% ofthe men ofthe same origin. Of Moroccanwomen immigrantsin Catalonia,26% come fromLarr aix. Only among women ofRiforigin is a majorityfrom the rural medium7 • The largestpercentage of Moroccan women is foundin the Barcelonaarea, at 41 %. Male immigrants predominantlyoriginate in areaswhere theyare engaged in agriculturallabor. There is a differentpattern of migration for both the place of origin andthe place of residence in Catalonia. Thecharacteristic profile for the Moroccanimmigrant is thatof a youngsingle male.

Cataloniahas undergone various waves of immigrations throughout its history. Immigrantscame from northern,central and southern Spainin the1960's and1970' s. To a largeextent, these economic immigrantsadapted and integrated themselvesinto Catalan society. Integrating into Catalan society entails a certain amountof conscious efforton the partof anyimmigrant, as it would in any other circumstanceofimmigration. Immigrantsto Catalonia facethe challenge of ac­ quiringCatalan language proficiency and culture; thelack of a wish to integrateon thepart of the immigrant can lead to isolation and auto-exclusion. Spaniardswho resettledin Catalonia learnedthe Catalan language to differentdegrees offluency, but most understandspoken Catalan. Their children areschooled in Catalan and become proficientin both Catalan and Spanish by the end of secondaryeduca­ tion. The latest influx of immigrants is made up of groups of people who do not have the sameease in adapting to Catalansociety. Differencesin language,cul­ ture, andreligion, plus the unstable job market makesintegration today a much

75 more complex process thanit was thirty ago.years To thislinguistic variety and its effectson adapting to Catalan society, a section is devoted later8 •

Sociological Profile and Data forthe Moroccan Immigrants9

Moroccansare the largest group among foreign 'non-EU' residents and immigrantsto Catalonia. Moroccanimmigration to Cataloniastarted in the1 %0' s, andincreasing numbers ofindividuals have immigrated to Catalonia since the 1970' s. The influxof Moroccan immigrantsrose steadilysince themid-1 980' s. At the end of 1995 the number of Moroccans with residence permitswas 3 5 ,368, which amountsto 35% ofthe total offoreign immigrants in Catalonia TheMoroc­ cans are themain group ofimmigrants in all fourCatalan provinces. Thebulk of them reside in Barcelona ( 69 .5% ), and the rest are divided between Girona, the northernprovince (17.5% ); Tarragona, the southernprovince (8.9%); andLleida, the Westernprovince ( 4.1 %).

As to demographic characteristics, the age pyramidis concentrated on the segments with the greatest access to the job market. There is a majority between the ages of30 and 49 (43%), and of those between 16 and 29 years (37%). The presence ofa second generation is still very much reduced; only 12% oflegal residents in Spain originating fromMorocco are under 16 yearsold. Gender distributionshows thatthere is a clearpreponderance of men in all theage groups (79% men, 21% women).

Moroccan immigration to Catalonia is made up of a majority ofsingle male adults (8,200 between age 15 and49), but thereis an increasing numberof women (1,200). There are an indeterminate number ofmarried people whose familiesremain in Morocco. Familygroupings include those who have been re­ siding in Catalonia forone or two decades andthose who arerecent immigrants. Data show that there is already a second generation of Moroccans, a considerable partof whom were bornin Catalonia.This second generation hasan impact on thepresent-day school system. In theacademic year199 5- 1996 there were 5,267 Moroccan pupils in the state schools: 69.3% in the primary schools and22.4% in the pre-primary centres. Only 7.8% went on to secondary school and almost always to professionaltraining ( Formaci6Professional).

Insertion into thelabour market takes place in very specific sectors. The majority works in construction (35%) or in services (31 %); thereis anotherim-

76 portant group in agriculture (19%) and the rest in industry (14% ). This general profileis modifiedin each of the Catalanprovinces; in Lleida and Tarragona there is predominanceof agricultural workers, andin Barcelona andGirona, construc­ tion andservices predominate.

Most Moroccanworkers receive a salary from an employer. Those who are autonomous workers or are self-employed take home jobs related to the textile industry, or go aroundto countryfairs as vendors of goods and produce. They also work in the lumberindustry or in constructionby sub-contracts.

As forwomen, there is less employment outside the home (9%). Those who do work outside the home areusually unmarried and work as maids, in the tourism/hotelindustry (21 % ) or in the textileindustry (10% ).

Anoverall analysisof theprofessional categories occupied by Moroccan immigrantsdemonstrates that there is a strongpolarization towards the lower ech­ elons of the job spectrum. Almost all of the Moroccan immigrant labor forceis concentrated in unskilledjobs. These jobs are subject to strong restrictions and downturnsin case of abrupt variations of the economic cycle.

The duration of work permits is an indicator of the juridical stability of Moroccan immigrantsin the job market. Of Moroccan residentsin Catalonia, 92% had work permitsfor one year, and only 8% (around1, 500 workers) were authorised to work for 5 years10.

Job stability allows immigrantsto bring theirfamilies to Spain. In some families, certainmembers remain in Morocco. For example, eldest sons move to Spainonly if there is a possibility foremployment. Portions of salariesearned in Spain aresent to familymembers leftin Morocco. These incomes areone of the most importantsources of revenue for Morocco11•

Access to housing is frequentlyprecarious for immigrantsand their fami­ lies. There is a differencebetween those who live in the city andthose who live in the country. In the firstcase, most of the immigrantslive in rented flatsor stayin inexpensive hotels immediatelyupon arrival. Immigrantsare usually housed in quarters of cities with the lowest rent costs. Racist attitudesoflandlords lead to the exploitation of tenantsor denial of rental. In rural areas, immigrantsare fre­ quently forcedto live in isolated houses in the countryside provided by the em-

77 ploying farm. Otherimmigrants occupy abandonedhouses or premises insqualid conditions. In some municipalities, groupings of houses andslums have already appeared. This is the case in Viladecansand Olesa de Montserrat.

TheMoroccan positionin thelabour marketthreatens to paralyse them in a perpetualsituatio n of instability andisolat ion. Despite the present strengthof the Spanisheconomy, there is no easy short-termsolution to the problems of racism and job andhousing discrimination. Most immigrants haveeven fewerprospects to returnto in their home countries.

Moroccans in Catalonia: Community, Identity and Religion12

Thelink between community,identity and religion is importantin Muslim society. Prevalent inCatalonia is the customaryMuslim importation of cultural habits and close religious observanceoflslamic law. The growmg presence of Muslim communities in Cataloniais becoming more andmore visible andasser­ tive. This new phenomenon is takingplace conc urrently withthe secularizationof Catalansociety andWestern society ingeneral. Spainis anaconfessional country where religious differenceis accepted. AlthoughCatalan society remains largely Catholicin culture, theworking calendarand public holidays, religion has on the whole receded to the personal andprivate sphere. The growing presence of de­ voutMuslim communitiesin a modernizingsociety hasspecial implications.

In November 1992, thestrong presence of theIslamic community in Spain was recognised by the Chamberof Deputies withthe passing of the Cooperation Agreement between the Islamic Commission in Spain and the Spanish State. Throughthis law, theIslamic Commissionguarantees and supervises religious prac­ tices, religious spaces andstructural organisationsrelated to Muslim residents in Spain. Theapplication of theCooperation Agreement hassuffered due to internal disagreements in theMuslim community; no single religious authority has been appointed to act as its representative. There has been a lack of legal recognition and inscription ofMuslim associations. This is also the case in local mosques located in rented flatsor houses withoutadequate facilities. Problems occur inthe legaland religious recognition ofMoroccan imams andin the organisation of daily religious observanceof the Muslim laws. For example, the preparation of food under Coraniclaw, themeat hala/13 , demandsthat Muslims may eat meat only fromspecially butchered animals. Finally, unresolvedlegal issues persist concern­ ing the organisation of Ramadan and the religious education of the children of Muslim immigrants. 78 A special reference must be made to the role of mosques. Mosques are crucial to thepractice of theMuslim religion andt he education of children. They also :functionas a privileged identity nexus-locus forthe larger community of be­ lievers, the umma. Oratories, which serve as small community mosques, have proliferated in Catalonia. The management and spiritual guidance of the imams associated witheach mosque is crucialfor the maintenance ofMuslim identity and religion inlight of immigrantdisplace ment fromtheir home society. The imams speakalmost exclusively Arabic14 ; this leads to their fromthe outside society, discouragestheir integration into thehost societyand limits theirability to resolve community problems in adapting to Catalansociety. The evaluationof the role of the imams or theirtraining, whether it should be thecivil/religious authorities in the country of origin or thatof Europeancountries, is unresolved.

Anotherquestion concerningthe immigrants' religious practices is thatof spaces in thelocal cemeteries forMuslims. Between 1983 and 1995, 316 deaths of Moroccancitizens were certifiedin Barcelona. Repatriationof corpsesused to be common practice, but became too costly forfamilies. Negotiations with the local authorities areunderway to allocate Muslims cemeteries so that Muslim funerary ritescan be carried out accordingly15 •

Trade and Muslim Religious Observance: The Halal Meat Markets in Catalonia.

· Religious laws andfood habits area :fundamentalissue inthe cultural ac­ culturation of MoroccanMuslims into Catalansociety. Halal (licit or allowed) meat is meat sacrificedaccording to theMuslim law. Islamic presencein Catalo­ nia has been accompanied by the ever more frequent inauguration of butcher shops run by Muslims in which halal meat is sold. Halal premises must abide by the samelaws andhygiene regulations as the rest of Catalan butcher shops. In­ creasing demandfor halal meat by established Muslim communitieshas created a network of production andcommercialisation forit. The proliferationof halal meat brought thefirst business initiatives by local Muslim communities,and the health authoritiesof the Europeancountries are keen on regulating thisemerging market. Substantial commercial interests areat stakein theproduction, distribu­ tion and marketingof halal meat in the migratory context. Identity issues are central because all meat consumed in the home countryis halal. Halal premises appeared in Barcelona even beforemany oratories did. Moroccans run the ma-

79 jority of halal establishments. Sensitiveto this demand, Catalanslaughterhouses have takenon Muslim butchersto carryout the ritual andsatisfy demand. There are no reports so far of animalrig hts activists in Catalonia opposed to this prac­ tice. The market in halal meat in Ciutat Vella de Barcelona, where most halal butchers areconcentrated, is already showing signs of saturation. Some shops have gone out of business. Many halal butchers have expanded into grocery stores where manyother products aresold untilla te at night,making them attrac­ tive to non-Muslim markets. In the period of Ramadan andin the id al-kabir, or Feast of the Lamb,s ales increase substantially.

The Role of Cultural and Religious Associations

Thereis an alleged lack of organisationin culturaland religious Moroccan associations. The lack of civil society in Morocco has been blamed for this16• Localadministrations and the Generalitat have problems findinga valid interlocu­ tor for the discussions of issues between the two communities. In spite of this, seventy-eightcultural associations exist in Catalonia,as shownby the Register of Associations of the Justice Ministry of the Generali tat updated July 20, 199817•

To taketwo short examples of what these associations do, the sociocul­ turalAssociation, "Ibn Batuta,"was foundedin 1994 by immigrantsof Moroccan originto guide theirfellow countrymen in theirdifficult adaptation to immigration. The association now has 2,000 official members andserves 4,000. Most mem­ bers are Moroccans,but thereare also Algerians,Tunisians, Gambiansand Sen­ egalese. Sixtypercent of the members are less thanthirty yearsold. Theassocia­ tion inaugurated new premises in the Raval quarter, one of the Arab barris of Barcelona18, in January 2000. It offersclasses in Catalan, Spanish andArabic afterschool andworking hours. It alsoprovides juridicalcounselling, information about job opportunities,help forwomen immigrants, andtutoring forschoolchil­ dren. It also organizes outside sports tournaments. The new building contains a small room for prayer anda kitchen. Plans forfuture development include a li­ brary. The association also provides religious guidanceand education forhome­ less Moroccan "street children"19. The President of the association, Mohamid Caib says:

The firstgeneration of immigrants have no problems of identity. They wantto have rightsto housing andlegal immigration documentation. They do not relate much to Catalansociety. The second generation, however, has anidentity problem20 •

80 Anotherassociation is theCentre Abdelkrim21 , namedafter theRifleader thatsymboljsed theanti-French and Spanishcolonial fight of the Moroccans in the early1900' s. Thisassociation organizes cultural activities and university exchanges betweenCatalan, Moroccan and Eg yptianUnivers ities, most ofthem for Catalan students withan interest in NorthAfrica. A greatmany of the members arepoliti­ cal exiles andrefugees that escap ed from politicalrepression by KingHassan II. The president ofthe association, SolimanEl Morabet, took refugein Barcelonain 1975 where he studiedand graduated in economics.

The Project of a Great Mosque in Barcelona

The Great Mosque of Barcelona has been one of the most important recent issues forthe Muslim communityin Catalonia.After the proliferation of ad hoc mosques andoratories forprayer in apartments,garages or cellarswhich do not have appropriate facilitiesto accommodatelarge numbers of people, a great Mosque commensuratewith theMuslim presence in Catalonianow seems a cer­ taintyin Barcelona, as inother European capitals. Negotiations, albeitat anem­ bryonicstag e22, have been opened in Barcelonabetween theGeneralitat and its CatalanInstitut for the Mediterranean and the Barcelona municipality with a rep­ resentative ofthe Saudi Embassy. KingFahd and Saudi Arabia areadvocates of the enterpriseand will give the economic support withno outstandingbudget constraints. The CatalanIslamic Federation is, however, against a Saudi contri­ bution to the Mosque in fear of a monopoly and does not accept the Saudi representative as the only interlocutor. The two directors ofthe previously men­ tioned Muslim associations oppose Saudi controlof the funding. The public ad­ ministration'sposition is to support a Mosque togetherwith a multiculturalcenter to be used by both societies in order to bridge the gap between Catalan and Muslim communities. The model ofthe Arab Institute ofParis hasbeen rejected. Thequestion ofwhether the Barcelona municipalitywill grantor facilitatea build­ ing site (ofbetween 12,000 and 20,000 squaremeters) is still unresolved. The Mosque would have a capacity of 50,000, and would serve Moroccanswho work in Barcelonaand the surrounding area. It has been suggested that thesur­ rounding area ofthe Mosque be devoted to a Muslim cemetery .

Buildinga mosque servesthe aim of pr eparingBarcelona for the Forum of Cultures2004, a cultural andpoliti cal projectfor which it is crucialto have tem­ ples of the fourprinciple religions ofthe wo rld (Christianity,Judaism, Islam and Buddhism).

81 The reaction of the Catholic Church to theconstruction plan has been prompt, reactiveand negative. The archbishopof Barcelona,Ricard Maria Carles states, "It would be elemental that foreach mosque which is opened in Spain, Franceor Germany,a Catholiccentre couldbe opened in Muslim nations, where

" it is totally forbidden. The situationis not balanced andshould be reciprocal23 • Lettersto theeditor of La Vanguardiahave alsoshown opposition to theMosque.

Public Policies for Immigration: The Interdepartmental Immigration Plan of the Generalitat de Catalunya.

Past policies of the administration addressed the problems anddisloca­ tion of theimm igrantpopulation at alllevels of society24 • Visas, work permitsand border controlfall under the jurisdiction of Madridauthorities. Once inside Cata­ lonia, most of thesocial, educationaland health services are run by the Generalitat.

On the 28thof September of 1993, theGenerali tat approved theInterde­ partmental ImmigrationPlan (PII). Theapproval of theplan entailed the beginning of a coordinated globalpolicy forthe promotion of theintegration of foreignimmi­ grantsin Catalonia.

The PII has the followinggoals:

• Promotinga globalpolicy of integrationfor imm igrants.

• Establishing andcarry ing out a series of projects for resourcesand services aimedat the fullpersonal and social development of immigrants.

• Promotingthe participation of immigrantsin thenational construction of Cata­ lonia, takinginto accounttheir contribution to the national andlocal identity andthe collective heritage therein.

• Promotinginformation and awareness about immigrationin Cataloniaamong the general populationand professionals.

ThePII distinguishesbetween:

• an assimilation position inwhich the unity of thenational communityof the countryof reception is exclusive anddenies any diff erences withinfrom those coming fromoutside 82 • a segregation model in which thereare diff erencesand inequalities in rights andopportunities of certain members of collectives in respect to others25

• anintercultural model of immigrationinte grationwhich includes a moreactive concept of interaction, interconnection, exchangeof culturesand the balance of rights and duties betweenthe localpopulation andthe immigrant contin- ' gent.

Thislast model is theone Cataloniadesires in relationto the growing iriunigra­ tionpopulation. This integration model findsa point of balancebetween the en­ dogenous and exogenous attitudes ofthe reception society. If a societyis too endogenous it rolls backon itself anddoes not open up to externalinfluences. If, a societyis too exogenous andporous, the localpopulation may feelthat its soci­ ety's characteristicsand personality are threatened.

The model of integration intended by the Generalitat escapes the two ex­ tremes;Catalan identity is to be preservedand strengthened while accepting inter­ action with other cultural expressions as a formof enrichment, andtherefore, respecting thesociocultural rights of theimmigrant. This model ofintegration is alsocontrary to attitudesthat would reject ormar ginaliz.ethe most underprivileged sectors ofimmigration. In a framework of respect fordifferences, it is intended thatimmi grationpolicy lays emphasison anequality of rightsand obligations. To acceptdifference, it is necessaryto understandthe realities andbackground from

· which theimmigrants come, asconceived in thePII.

Catalan, Spanish, Arabic and Berber: A LinguisticModel oflntegration

Catalanis the''vehicular'' language of the education systemand the instru­ ment forachieving linguistic and cultural immersion in Catalansociety and culture. Theaim of secondary education is that studentsall are perfectly proficient in Catalan and Spanish,and this aim is largelyachieved.

As shownabove, the majority of Moroccan immigrants comes from areas 6 Berber-speaking 2 • Following Ouakrim's study, it canbe stated thatBerber is mainlya spoken language, not written,although it has anold alphabet. A sub­ stantialpart of the Moro ccanpopulation is not proficientin Arabic,even thoughit is one ofthe official languages of Morocco. Berbers fromrural areas are schooled in Arabicor French,never in Berber. A movementof linguisticand ethnic recov-

83 ery to grant prestige to Berber is underway in the Berber regions of Morocco.

ManyMoroccan imm igrantsin Cataloniaspeak the Berber language. This is reflectedin thelanguage they speak to theirchildren. Ouakrim's study case of schools inCiutat Vella de Barcelonashows that thecross- fertilisation between thefour languages dep ends on theorigin of thefamilies and the degree of integra­ tion of the children. The studywas done on thebasis of 94 children; 64 hadbeen bornin Morocco and29 in Catalonia. In thecase of the schoolchildren of Ciutat Vella, the arabophonesamong the parentsof thechildren predominated 2-to-1. Thiscan be explainedby thefact that Berbers may become arabophonesthrough schooling, choice or changeof previous residence in Morocco. The schoolchil­ dren in the study showed a clearpreference in almost all cases forSpanish; 84% preferit fororal communication because they see it as thelanguage predominating inthe environment of CiutatVella becauseof new or formerSpanish immigration there.They also perceive that Spanish is thelanguage promoting theirintegration in thequarter. Theyare not hostile to learningCatalan, though, because theyare awareof its importanceat school (71 % express theirdesire to receive theclasses in both Catalanand Spanish). As to the choice betweenArabic andBerber they prefer by farArabic ( 66% as against 26% ).

Thestudy concludes that Spanishoccupies a centralrole in the socialisation of thechildren of Moroccanorigin. This is explained by thesociolinguistic situation in Ciutat Vella; thiscann ot necessarilybe extrapolated to othertowns or villages where concentrationsof Moroccansof mainlyBerber languageoccur. Teaching the mothertongue, Arabic or Berber, to childrenwould allow them to maintain theirculture of origin andcommunicate with their parents. In fact,Ouakrim com­ plains that the Moroccanconsulate is not promoting this idea well enough. In addition, the children's knowledge of Spanishor Catalanand the ability to learn quickly gives thema privileged position in theirfamily if theparents still have an imperfectmastery of thelanguage; children serve animportant function as transla­ tors and intermediaries between theirparents and Catalan society .

Thereis a differentpredominance of Catalanand Berber in otherareas of Catalonia outside Barcelona. For example, an attempt by theMoroccan consu­ late to carryout Arabic lessons ended in failurein the Osona school. Theteacher sent by theConsulate spoke Arabicand Spanish, whereas theMoroccan children understoodand spoke Catalanand Berber27 , and thus no communication could occurbetween them.

84 Theissue whetherthe Generalitat should try to maintain thelanguage and theculture of origin is controversial. In January2000, theEducation department began introducing Islamic Culturein theCatalan schools as required. At present there are7 ,422 schoolchildren fromthe Maghreb. Arabic language classes had been in past yearson offerwith little success28• The Education departmenthas published anArabic-Catalan dictionary, of which445 copies have been distrib­ uted in associationsand government offices frequented by Muslim immlgrants. A visualArab-Catalan dictionary has been published forschoolchildren, and2000 copies have been distributed29 •

One of theharshest critics of thispolicy of Arabizationof theMoroccans in Catalonia carried out in the schools is by AlfonsQuinta, a journalistand law­ yer-10 . He accusesthe Generalitat of a lack of historical consciousness by contrib­ uting to thepersecution and oppression of theBerber languageand culturewith the policy of only promoting theArabic language. He also condemns thealign­ ment of the Generalitatwith the officialpolicies of the Moroccan Consulate. If two-thirds of Moroccansand 40% of Algerians,according to the data he gives, are Amazigh, commonly known as Berbers, and if of the alleged 80,000 Maghrebiansin Catalonia 65,000 areImazighen, how canthe Generalitat deny this reality? If Catalanshad to sufferthe persecution of theirown language, how can they forget this so easily and help in the stamping out of another valuable language andculture? Quintapoints out thatin Holland,Belgium andGermany theschoolchildren of Moroccanorigin canreceive complementarytuition in the Berber language. Thatis themodel to followand not the impositionof animagined Arabic standardalien to theirculture (sic).

Thebiggest problem the Generalitatfaces, however,as regardsits policy ofschooling Moroccanand Maghrebian children, is thatof segregation. Ghettos alreadyexist in some quarters,and some parentsof Catalanschoolchildren with­ drawtheir children fromschool because they feelthe presence of Moroccanchil­ drendetract from the quality of teaching. Also theMoroccan children arethought to be a bad influenceon theirchildren. Some Muslim parents, moreover, do not permittheir daughters to have physicaltraining in theschool as one of theirsub­ jects31.

Thequestio n of Catalannationalism andimm igration is also commented on by Salvador Cardus, a sociologist andwell-known Catalannationalist. He raises concerns thatthe Generalitat willnot have thesuffi cient resources andpo-

85 liticalwill to "Catalaniz.e" the growingnumber of immigrants32• In no way should immigrants contribute to a Spanishreappropriation of Catalonia. Cardusrecalls thatwith the help of the Francoistregime exclusively supportingCastilian, many Spanish-speakingimmigrants of the1960- 70 period only weaklyintegrated into Catalancultur e andsociety . Manynever learnedCatalan and do not speakit to date. It is imperativefor the survivalof Catalonianimmigrants be brought into Catalan culture, and the Catalan language is again the key to integration. The policy of theGeneralitat tends in thisdirection, in spiteof thecurr ent factthat many immigrants in Barcelonado not speakCatalan.

Relative Success and Racist Incidents in Tcrrassa, July 1999

Despite the fact that information campaigns have been addressedto the local population in order to addressissues concerning immigration, some racist incidents againstMaghrebians haverecently takenplace in Catalonia.These inci­ dents haveattracted much public attention andconcern. ThePU had alreadybeen awareof potentialfor conflict.

Some data from the PII report was found to represent obstacles to the inter-culturalmodel espoused by theGeneralitat; for example,29% of thecitizens ofBarcelona would not set up a business withMaghrebians, and18% wou 1 d not like to have Muslim neighbours.Negative attitudesagainst Arabs areto be found mainly in working classes which compete forthe same scarce resources as the immigrants, or when foreignworkers demandequal rightswith the autochthonous Catalans. Approximately halfof Moroccans in Catalonia (48.1 %) declarehaving experienced discrimination33 •

In July 1999, violent incidents broke out in the Catalancity ofTerrassa (thereare 3000 Muslims in Terrassa, ofwhich2220 areMoroccan), in the quar­ ter of Ca'n Anglada. Theincident seems to have startedat the exit of a disco and resulted in several days of aggressions against Maghrebians, their shops and mosques34• The concentration ofMaghrebiansin Ca'n Anglada (1 in 5 residents isMaghrebian), the poor livingconditions, deficientschooling, anddrug problems seem to have exacerbated the problem35 •

The reaction fromMuslim associations to theproblems of violence and integration hasbeen varied. TheMuslim congress held in Terrassa inNovember 1999, pointed out thatdespite racist incidents, Spainis a pioneer in opening up to

86 othercultures. Theexplanation given forthe outburst of violence wassome extra­ neouscontagion coming from other sources36 • Thecongress remindedthe public thatthe Islamic community wants to participate in theCatalan and Spanish com­ munity but thatit alsowants to preserveits own identity.

Manycomments on theoutbursts of violence andthe problems of integra­ ' tion come from SolimanEl Morabet, thepresident ofthe Abdelkrim centre. He sees the incidents in Terrassaas thefirst of a series that will grow progressively worse unlesstough measures aretaken by the administration. The incidents in Terrassa had been predictedtwo years ago by Moroccans, but neitherthe Terrassa municipalitynor theGeneralitat reactedat thattime.

There is no political will to solve these problems, I amcritical of all the political parties and the politicians. They put aside the problems of a people that do not interest them because they don 't have a vote. The immigrantsare only defendedwhen problems breakout andthere are TV cameras. The immigrantshave so many limitations and shortages that only by public help theywill manageto come forward. The majorityof Maghrebianshave a total lack ofknowledge oflocal customs, habits and laws. We have to teach them our cultural rules before demanding that theyabide by them. InTerrassa there were never problems with thefirst immigrants. The problem now is their children; having been bornand raised here theyfeel they areCatalan but theydo not findsuccess anddo not integrate. Why ifl am Catalan-even though my name is Said or Mohamed-I don't have the same opportunities? In isolated cases vio­ lence canbe a way ofrebelling againstfrustration and marginalization. 37

In addition, thewriter TaharBen Jellounasserts that

"the Spaniardshave not been preparedto receive foreignworkers. Given Spanishcolonial links with Morocco andthe problem of Ceuta and Melilla, a great lack of understanding and mistrust takes place. And curiously enough Moroccans love Spaniards andSpain. Spain easily closes its eyes to its past, thatof a countryof emigrants. Spain is not a racistsociety but it has racist elements. 38

87 Conclusions: Second-Generation Moroccans or Catalans of Muslim Origin?

The presence of immigrants from the Maghreb, mainly from Morocco, hasbecome anever stronger realityin Spanishand Catalansociety. Without con­ stitutingan avalanche of immigrants,there is a constant flowof immigrantspouring into Catalonia from Morocco. Moroccans arealready the biggest group among foreignworkers livingin Catalonia. Immigrants,in spiteof job marketinstability, havebeen gaining self-confidence, organised themselves into associations,brought over their familiesand chosen Catalonia as their landof residence andwork. If theyonce were unnoticedby mainstreamCatalan society, now the Moroccanand Muslim presence is expressedthrough shops of halal meat, mosques, and claim­ ing public space forreligious celebrations. If this development continues, new formsof Muslim culturemay come about witha specific Catalan brand.

Cooperation agreements between theSpanish state and Muslim federa.. tions and between the Spanish state and the Moroccan kingdom remain undevelopped. Anapplication of these cooperation agreements could enhance the legal statusand organizationallife of theMor occanand Muslim communitiesin Catalonia.

Thereis still,however, a considerablelack of coordinationwithin Muslim associationsand a divisionof leadership.The future construction of a GreatMosque inBarcelona could eitherhelp pullefforts together or bringabout more dissension, dependingon whetherthis venture goes aheadexclusively underthe management of Saudicapital andinfluence.

The Catalanmodel of immigrationis one basedon theintercultural model of active interaction betweenthe receivingand the immigrant community. This interaction is, however, contingent on theacceptance of theCatalan language as necessaryfor the acquisitionof Catalanidentity and the existence of Catalonia. Considerableefforts are made by thepublic administrationto favour integration of immigrantsthrough Catalan the language as a means of gainingsocial and profes­ sional promotion. Theimmigration interdepartmental plan and schooling in the Catalanstate schools, whereCatalan is thedominant language are the tools through which second generation Moroccans canbecome Catalancitizens of Muslim ori­ gin. It is thesociolinguistic reality, however, thatin manyquarters ofBar�elona, Spanishis thedominant language of socialization. Itis questionableto teach Ara-

88 bic to the Moroccan pupils as a way of recovering their parents' culture and identity when manyof themcome :fromBerber regions.

Racist incidents have taken place in 1999, breaking the harmonyof a relatively peacefulcohabitation betweenthe two communities. More forcefulac­ tion has to be carried out by the public administrationin allareas of so9ial policy andawareness raising so thatthese unfortunate actions may not happen againin thefuture.

Immigrantintegration in Catalansociety will only happen smoothlyand completely when Catalansociety recognises thatthe continuous presence of new Catalansof Muslim andMoroccan origin is a valuable contributionto its cultural andpolitical identity. Thenew citizensmust be recognizedand given fullrights and dutiesas whole participantsin society. Itseems likely thatsocialization dynamics in schools will turnthe children of Moroccanparents and those already bornon Cataloniansoil into fullmembers ofCatalan society, once theybecome bilingualin Catalanand Spanish.

Post-Script

In Januaryand February 2000, violent andracist incidents against Mo­ roccanlaborers took place in SouthernSpain. Theevents in"El Ejido,"Almeria, Andalucia capturedthe attention of Europeand broughtshame to the Spanish population. These were incidents of an unprecedented violent naturein Spain. The incidents seem to have startedafter the death of a local girl allegedly at the handsof a Moroccan. Locals thenexacted revenge handsagainst Moroccansat large. Three days of attacks occurred whichbrought about havoc in theplanta­ tions where thelaborers worked, damagedtheir property, and promoted violence between Spaniardsand immigrants. Strikesand fearensued. Negotiations and intervention by thepolice andgovernment brought about peace to thearea after a week. Large-scaleinvestment in housing andinfrastructure is now goingto be undertakenin thearea39 •

Theseincidents show how sensitive the immigrationissue may becomein Spain inthe future. It remains to be seen how the absolute majoritywon by the Popular Party(Center-Ri ght Party)of Premier Jose MariaAznar on March 12, 2000 willtreat the subject of immigrationand whether or notthey willbe able to avoid futureincidents ofthe same nature. Already, laws (Ley de Extranjeria)are

89 on the table, which would makepenalties forillegal immigrationattempts more severe, as desired by the PopularParty.

Josep Maria TorresI Balaguer, Bachelor ofArts in Linguistics and English literature, Autonomous Universityof Barcelona , 1992, and in European Stud­ ies, Hull University, 1997; currently a European Studies scholar at The Johns Hopkins University-SAISBologna Center.

Bibliography Ajuntamentde Santa Coloma de Gramenet. La Poblaci6n Marroguide Santa Coloma de Gramenet:Condiciones de Vida y Trabajo, 1994.

Comissions Obreres de Catalunya, SeminariImmigraci6. Integraci6 i Llenguaa Barcelona, Barcelona1997.

Collectivo IOE, Marroguinsa Catalunya,Institut Catala de la Mediterranea,Bar­ celona, 1994.

Diputaci6 de Barcelona,Segon lnfonnesobre Immigraci6,Treball Social, 1997.

Generalitat de Catalunya,Entre el Sud i el Nord: Els TreballadorsImmigrants Estrangersa Catalunya, Barcelona, 1995.

Generalitatde Catalunya,Pla Interdepartmentald 'Immigraci6,Benestar Social, 1994.

Generalitatde Catalunya,lnforme sobre el Desenvolupamentdel PPL 1993-1998.

Garcia, Sira, A CaraDescoberta: Ser Marroguinai Viure a Catalunya, Barcelona: Columna, 1995.

"Jomadessobre les Dones Immigrades,"Les Dones ImmigradesDesafien la Seva lnvisibilitat , Ajuntamentde Barcelona,1994.

L6pez, Bernabe(ed.), Atlasde lalmmigraci6nMagebri en Espafia,Madrid UAM, 1996.

90 ,. Losad� Teres� 'L 'Islam,identitat cultural', en Els TreballadorsAfricans a Catalunya,Debats de l' Aula Provern;a.1990.

Moreras, Jordi, Musulmanesen Barcelona,Espacios y DinamicasIdenti tarias, Barcelona1999.

Narbona,Luis Miguel, Marroquies enViladecans, Ajuntament de Viladecans, 1993.

Ouakrim, Omar, La Realitat Sociolinguistica dels Immigrants Magebrins a Catalunya,Institut de Sociolingilistic� Barcelon�1994.

Roque, Dolors, Dona i Emigraci6, ICM Barcelon� 1998.

Sole, Carlota. Trabajadores Extranjerosen Catalufia:Integraci6n o Racismo?, Centrode Investigaciones Sociol6gicas, Madrid,1991.

Websites of Catalanand Spanish Newspapers: http//www.lavanguardia.es,http// www.elpais.es, http//www.avui.es, http//www.elperiodico.es, http// www.el-mundo.es

Notes

1 It is customary for Spanishprime ministersin the new democratic period after the Franco dictatorship to carry out their firstofficial visit abroad to Morocco as a sign of the importance attributed to bilateral relations between thetwo countries. 2 For comments about the nature ofthe emigration,see "Why do the Maghrebians emigrate?" El Pais, October 31, 1999. Another view on the subject it is given by A TIME,Association ofthe Moroccan Workers andImmigrants in Spain� "Theonly way to finish the pateras traffic is to invest politico and economically inthe coun­ tries oforigin." La Vanguardia, July 27, 1999. 3 La Vanguardia, Barcelona,July 27, 1999, 23. 4According to one of the latest United Nations reports (El Pais, Sociedad section, Jan.7, 2000), Spain will need 12 million immigrantsfrom the year 2000 until 2050 ifit wants to maintain its current labor force, at a rate of240,000 migrants every year, while the Spanish government intends to allow in only 30,000. Spain is becoming one of the nation-states with the most aging population. Eighty percent of Span­ iardsbelieve that an 'invasion' of immigrants frompoor countrieswill undoubtedly take place over the coming years (http//www.elpais.es: Survey for El Pais, Jan. 2, 2000). Another view about thesubject ofimmigr ation and theofficial employment policies can be obtained in FerranCardenal, "Immigraci6 i Politiques d' ocupaci6,"

91 El Peri6dico, Nov. 24, 1999. 5 Data fromthe IOE collective report,"Aproximaci6n alModelo MigratorioEspanol," as appearedin La Vanguardia, Nov. 26, 1999, 16. 6 Detailed analysis to be foundin Marroguinsa Catalunya, 129. 7 Dolors Roca, "Dona i emigraci6," ICM, 1998. "Jomades sobre les dones immigrades," 1994, Ajuntament de Barcelona. Las Presencias de la immigraci6n femenina: un recorrido por Filipinas, Gambiay Marruecos, Barna-lcaria,Barce 1 ona, 1999. An article dealing with the break-up of the patriarchal family structure in Northern-African because of emigration can be found in "Las Hijas rebeldes del Islam," (The Rebel daugthersoflslam) EI Pais,Dec. 8 1999. In thearticle it is argued that the patrilineal, endogamic and communitarian featuresof Arab society, such as arranged marriages, are threatened in the urban areas of Morocco by women who gain access to education and to jobs outside the home. 8 For a detailed analysis of the linguistic and cultural diversity in Morocco, see "Unitat I Diversitat al Marroc," Marroguinsa Catalunya, Chapter 2. 9All statistics are taken from the Official Catalan Government Statistics: http// www.gencat.es/benestar.immigra. 10 The conclusions from a recent study by the Autonomous University of Barce­ lona about levels of discrimination the immigrantssuffer in termsof salary,promo­ tions, extra-hours and general work conditions can be found in El Pais, Nov. 19, 1999,6. 11 See Les Transferencies dels ImmigrantsMarroguins cap al Marroc, ICM, Barce­ lona, 1997. 12 An up-to-date study on the subject ofMuslims in Spain and more specifical1 y in Catalonia is found in Jordi Moreras, Musulmanes en Barcelona- espacios y dinamicascomunitarias. Barcelona, 1999. 13 Coran, 2168. Blood may not be consumed by Muslims; therefore, it is necessary to bleed animals as much as possible prior to consumption. The slicing of the jugular vein with one cut while pronouncing the name of God is part of the cer­ emony. 14 Moreras, 206. 15 Demands fora Muslim cemetery and an improvement in the facilities allocated to the growing Muslim community exist also in Mallorca. Diari de Ba/ears, Dec. 21, 1999, 15. "The Muslim Community wants a reserved space in the cemetery. The Muslim association Benteyeb asks foreconomic support fromthe municipality." 16 Moreras, 282 andfollowing. 17 Some of these organizations may no longer exist. For a complete list and com­ ment on their legal status, see Moreras, 341 and following. 18 All information about the Ibn Batuta association is gathered from http// www.elperiodico.es: El Peri6dico de Catalunya,Jan. 12, 2000. 19 The problem of the estimated 300 street boys roaming the Barcelona streets is handled inAvui, Nov. 29, 1999. 24. Forty percent of the boys from Moroccan origin are over 18 years old. 20 Personal interview, Barcelona,Dec. 20, 1999. 21 Information compiled fromLa Vanguardia, July 30, 1999. 4. 22 Information collected from El Peri6dico de Catalunya, January 9, 2000 and

92 Januaryl2,2000. For a discussion of the implications of the possible models of a location of the GreatMosque, seeMoreras, 299 and following. 23 http//www.el-mundo.es:El Mundo,Dec. 24, 1998. Statement andreactions men­ tioned in Moreras, 302. 24 The original text of the plan was published by the Departament de Social, Generalitat de Catalunya,1994. The report on thePlan for the years 1993-1998 can be found in http://www.gencat.es/benestar/ immigra/balanc. 25 The report identifieswith the concept of multiculturalism,implying theexistence of compact segments of population representing different socio-cultural concep­ tions that hold no mutual relations. 26 For the case study, refer to Omar Ouakrim, "La realitat Sociolingilistica dels immigrantsMagebrins a Catalunya," Barcelona, Institut de Sociolingilistica:1994. 27 II Informesobre immigraci6. and Treball Social, Diputaci6 Barcelona, Serveis Socials, 1997, 669. The articles also point out that many collectives andMoroccan associations oppose the courses set up by the Consulate so that they can avoid officialcontrol of theiractivities. 28 Information about the finalintroduction ofMuslimculture fromAvui,Nov. 18, 1999, 20. In a conversation with two officialsof the GeneralitatonDec. 23, 1999, they commented that many parentspreferred their children to learnEnglish so as to advance their career possibilities in Western society. 29El Pais,December 9, 1999. 30 "An Anti-nationalist Education Department,"Avui, Aug. 31, 1999. 31ABC,Nov. 28, 1999,4. ,32Avui,July30,1999, 15. 33"EsBarcelonauna ciudad racista?" La VeudelCarrer, Barcelona, Sept/Oct 1999. 6. The conclusion is that the ethnic group suffering the greater level of racism or conflict is the gypsies, the rest being remarkablylow. A survey inEl Mundo,Dec. 21, 1999. 33, shows that 57% of university students believe that greater intakesof immigrants have to be stopped. Almost half consider themselves a 'bit racist ' and 15% would expel Arabs and Gypsies from Spain. 34La Vanguardia,Nov. 7, 1999. 3 5 Other conflicts in Spain againstMoroccan workers are reportedin Almeria; La Vanguardia, Sept. 27, 1999, 45.; and in Fuerteventura,El Peri6dico, Nov. 10, 1999. 36ElPafs,Nov. 7,1999,4. 37 La Vanguardia, July 30, 1999. See also Carles Senti, "Marroquins a l 'Emporda," Avui, Sept. 5, 1999, 4. On the basis of the failureof theFrench model of integration of Algerians into French society, the writer argues, it is not advisable that Catalans should try and integrate the Maghrebians. 38La Vanguardia, November 25, 1999. 39 El Pais, March29, 2000.

93

CAN MULTI-COMMUNAL DEMOCRACIES WORK? BY lANNIS CARRAS

Introduction: Mill and Acton on the nation state

Where thesentiment of nationality exists in anyforce, there is a prime faciecase for unitingall the members of thenationality under the same government, anda governmentto themselvesapart ... Itis in general a necessarycondition of freeinstitutions, thatthe boundariesof governmentsshould coincide in themain withthose ofnationalities. - John StuartMilP

Thatintolerance of socialfreedom which is naturalto absolutism is sure to finda correctivein thenational diversities, which no otherforce could so efficientlyprovide. Thecoexistence of several nations underthe same State is a test, as well as the best security of its freedom.It is also one of thechief instruments of civilization;and, as such, it is in thenatural andprovidential order, andindicates a state of greater advancement than thenational unity which is theideal of modem liberalism. -Lord Acton2

ThoughJohn StuartMill andLord Acton were bothmembers of parliament forthe Liberal Party, they were unusualparliamentarians. Mill firststood as a parliamentarycandidate for Westminster in 1865. The historianLord Acton represented hisShopshire constituency from1859 to1865. Betweenthem, Acton in "Nationality" andMill in "Considerations on Representative Government," grappled with the question of the advantagesand problems associated with the nationalor multi-communalstate3 •

Acton and Mill underline a dilemma that is very much with us today. In 1991-2, the European Union was divided over an appropriate response to the growingcrisis in Yugoslavia Theprinciple of nationalsel f-determinationtriumphed; Croatia then Bosnia-Herzegovina were recognized as independent states. To paraphraseMill, the sentiment of Croatian, Serbian, andperhaps even Bosnian nationality, existed in force so there was a prime facie case for separating the members of each nationality, grantingeach a governmentto themselves apart.

95 Thoughthey may have disagreed over thedetails of separation, regional leaders

seemed to agree on theprinciple of nationalself-determination4 •

It would be a mistake to belittle Mill's arguments.The nation-state is an astoundinglysuccessful ande ffectiveorganizing principle precisely because it draws on sentiments of belonging, unity andfellowship. Judging theAustro-Hungarian, Russianand Ottoman Empires of his day, andno doubt drawing on the twenty yearsfrom 1836 to 1856 when he hadcharge of theBritish East India Company's relationswith the Indian states, Mill's claim that free institutions are nearlyimpossible to maintain in a country made up of differentnationalities is reasonable. The formerYugoslavia, for example,was not a freestate.

But Lord Acton too was perceptive:

By makingthe state and the nation commensurate with each other theory, in it reduces practicallyto a subject condition allother nationalities that may be withinthe boundary... theinferior races areexterminated or reduced to servitude, or outlawed or put in a condition of dependence.5

Thecreation of a nation state unconstrainedby externalforces or internalchecks andbalances undermines symbiosis. Wherepopulations are mixed, fearful minorities have every reason to resist. The results areby now well documented:

You abolished our government, annihilatedour laws, suppressed our authorities, took away our lands, turnedus out of our houses, denied us

therights of men, made us outcasts andoutlaws in ourown land6 •

The actions of Serbs andCroats in Yugoslavia proved no exception.

This then is the dilemma leftfor us by Mill and Acton. Is it possible to create a freeand democratic multi-communal state thatenjoy� theloyalty of its citizens? In other words, is it possible to create multi-communaldemocracies?

This articleattempts to provide the necessaryframework for an answer. The first section discusses how democracy combined with nationalism under­ mines multicommunal states. Nevertheless, an understanding of the basis of democracy provides guidance for thecreation of theinstitutions thatmay help a multi-communalstate work. Inthe second section,the mechanismsand institutions

96 of multi-communaldemocracies aretouched upon, using therelatively short-lived experience of multi.communaldemocracy in Lebanonas anexample. Finally, an electoralsystem fora multi-communalBosnia-Herzegovina is proposed in light of Lebanon. Though thereis no longerth e possibilityofa multi-communalYugoslavia, a multi-communalBosnia-Herzego vina may still be resuscitated.

' Thisdiscussion is relevantfor many countries in Europe andbeyond: Northern Ireland,FYR Macedonia, Georgia and Sri Lankato namebut a few. It aims to revealsome of theparticular difficulties facedby multi-communal democracies andto point towards possible solutions.

Democracy and the Multi-Communal State

To understandthe effectdemocracy hason multi-communalstates, it is first necessaryto ask what makesdemocracy differentfrom other forms of government. The term is derived from demos, meaning people and kratos, power, thus democracy meansthe ruleof thepeople. But theword is not enough;on a surface level, therule of thepeople has certaindistinguishing features, while on a deeper level it is justifiedby a set of political ideals.

Untilthis century, democracy's minimum distinguishing feature was universal adultmale suffrage, which led to universaladult suffrage when the votewas extended to women7 • A furtherdistinguishing feature is thatthe vote should be genuinely free,resulting in significantchanges in a democraticcountry's political scene from timeto time.

Turningto the ideological frameworkthat underpinsdemocratic govern­ ment, an examinationof one of the earlierjustifications of the democratic state provesuseful:

Theconstitution is called a democracy because ruleis not by thefew but by themajo rity.In privatedisputes allare equal before the law ... freedom is the hallmarkof our public life, andas regardsthe pursuits of daily life, we do not frown on our neighbor ifhe does as he please... -Pericles8

As Pericles explains,the rule of thepeople was justifiedby libertyand equality. In theancient world, liberty was also a crucialconstitutional con cept associated withpolitical parti cipation in thepublic sphere andpersonal freedom in the private

97 sphere9 • Equality could meannatural equality or thedemocratic argument that

anycitizen's opinion was equallyvalid if not equally correct10 • It is beyond the

11 • scope of thisessay to discuss the implicationsof liberty andequality in detail What mattershere is thatdemocra cy is both a process and an ideology justified by a set of principles.

Thedemocratic processmay, however, undermineand weaken the ideology. As de Tocqueville put it: "Habits formin freedomthat may one day become fatal to freedom12." Constitutions therefore restrict the unadulterated power of the majority, which is the democratic process, in order to ensurea democratic end. Such anend reinforcesthe logicaland ideological basis fordemocracy.

The situation in multi-communal states should by now be evident. When there is a fixedmajority anda fixedminority, democratic processes will usually dominate democratic ends or principles. The result will be tyranny rather than democracy as the majority always imposes its will on the distinct minority. Democracy may be justifiedon groundsof libertyand equality, but the minority population is bothless free and less equalthan the dominant group. Furthermore, the state will be unstable, resulting fromfearful and resentfulminorities sharing resources andliving space withthe majority group unwillingto shareits power.

The introduction of democracy in multi-communal states by and large confirmsthis analysis. futhe former Yugosla via, eachcommunity's fears ofbecoming a politicalminority, and therefore less thanfree and less thanequal in a democratic state manipulated by a hostile majority, was exploited by power-hungry It politicians13 • followsthat democratization was itself partof theproc ess thatled to warin the formerYugoslavia.

However, thisdivision of democracyinto processesand ideological principles alsosuggests a solution formulti- communalstates. If normaldemocratic processes, such as "one person, one vote," underminethe ideology thatjustifies democratic government, it might be possible to redesign those processes. The experiment withmulti-communal democracy in Leba.Q.onbetween 1943 andthe mid-1 970' s permitsan investigation into the mechanismsand instituti onsthat were designed to ensurethat democratic processesdid not result in an unjust distributionof power.

98 Mechanisms and Institutions: The Case of Lebanon

The history of Lebanon during the last century is complicated; the international setting continually influenced the interaction between different communitiesin thecountry itself14 • The aim here is not to outline Lebanon's modernhistory, andstill less to commenton outside interventions thatstrength- ' ened or weakened the Lebanese state, but to point to the country's internal complexityand to discuss the mechanismsand institutions created to allow the countryto function.

Lebanonis a fragmentedcountry. Althoughall Lebanese speak: Arabic, it is divided on religious lines between Christians and Muslims. The Christians are themselves divided between Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and an arrayof otherminority groups including Nestorians, Jaco bites, severalArmenian sects, Assyriansand Chaldians. TheMuslims in tumare divided among the Sunn is, the Shiites andthe Druze.

The proportion of each of these groups is the subject of considerable controversy as the last governmentcensus was takenin 1932 during the French Mandate. In 1932 the Christians were 51.3% of the population. Of these, the Maronites were 28.8%, the Greek Orthodox9.8%, the Greek Catholics 5.9% andother Christians6.8%. Of the48.8% who were Muslim, 22.4% were Sunni, 19.6% Shiite, and6.8%Druze15•

Since 1932, only estimates can be made of the size of the different communities. Nevertheless,it is clearthat emigration and lower birthrates have reduced theChristian proportion of thepopulation fromslightly over half to well under 40%. Incontrast, theShiites havebecome thelargest community in Lebanon withabout a thirdof thepopulation16 •

Lebanesedemography is then extraordinarilycomplex. In the absence of an externalpower such as France,Syria or Israel controllingLebanon by force, theneed fora constitutionthat balances the interests of thevarious communities is evident. Thesystem created forthis purpose in Lebanonwas confessionalism. Its aimwas to ensure anequitable distribution of power betweenLebanon's religious communities. Inparticular, no communitywas to be excludedfrom the democratic process. Therest of thissection will discuss the structure, successes and failures of confessionalism.

99 Theorigins of confessionalismare to be foundin theperiod when Lebanon formed partof theOttoman Empire. By 1864, MountLebanon had been divided into seven districts, each of them sending representatives to the council in a confessional ratio. For example, the mixed areaof Jazzinsent one Maronite, one Druzeand on e Muslimand so on. The councilors were chosen by theheads of the religious denominationsrather than elected. When theFrench were awarded the Mandateof Syria and Lebanon in 1920, the seeds forconfessional democracy had already been sown17•

TheFrench enlargedthe original area of MountLebanon, including theBiqa plain as well as the cities of Sidon, Tyre andTripoli in the expanded state18• A Constitutionfor the new Lebanon was created underthe auspices of the French Mandateand came into forcein 1926. It largelycorresponded to thewishes of theBeirut bourgeoisie as verifiedin anofficial poll of theirpreferei1ces19 • Thetext of theconstitution was drawn up mainlyby thewriter Michel Chihaat thehead of a StatutoryCommission.

The 1926 Constitutionserved with a fewmodifications as the base forpolitical authorityin Lebanonafter the declaration of independencefrom France in 194 320 • In 194 3, anunwritten National Pact betweenMaronite and Sunni leaderscompleted theprocess of developing a separatepolitical identity. ThisPact must be considered an integral partof theconstitution21 • How then did the Lebaneseconstitution work?

Executive authoritywas vested withinthe President of theRepublic who wasalways a Maronite, as agreed in theNational Pact. ThePresident was elected by the Chamberof Deputies forone six yearterm and was eligible forreelection onlyafter a period of sixyears outof office. ThePresident appointed thecountry's ministers andPrime Minister andcould alsodismiss any of them.

According to theterms of theNational Pact, thePrime Ministerwas always a Sunni Muslim. Theministers were als0 appointed on a confessional basis. In practice, thecabinet was extremelyimportant; it was only by including allregions andall denominations in thecabinet thatthegovernment could be sure its authority would prevail even in the most remote, clannish andfeudal regions of Lebanon. As a result, the cabinet containedits own opposition withinit.22 The head of the armedforces was always a Maronite andhis deputy always a Droze.

100 Legislativeauthority was vested in the Chamberof Deputies, electedevery four years. As in Ottoman times, each electoral districtwas appointedseats on a confessional basis. According to theNational Pact, theChamber always had to include anumberof deputiesdivisible by eleven, so thatthere would be six deputies belonging to Christiancommunities for every fivedeputies belonging to Muslim communities. If anelectoral districtwere to elect fourcouncilors, two Maronites, a Druze anda Sunnifor exam ple, therewould be three separate competitions in thatdistrict, one foreach of the communitiesto be elected. Each voter voted in all thecompetitions, whether the candidatewas :fromhis owncommunity or not. A voter inthe above districtwould thereforevote threetimes. Similarly, theDruze deputywould have to appealto all communitiesin the electoral districtin order to win. Electorallists could be formedin thesemulti-member constituencies so that candidatescampaigning forthe samevotes, but not standingagainst one another, couldmaximize their strength23 •

The Lebaneseelectoral system was one of themost successfulfeatures of the confessional state. It ensuredthat those elected to positions of power in the Chamberof Deputies had to appeal to the members of other communities apart :from theirown. Inthese circumstances, politicians seeking election hadno interest in alienating other communities. On the contrary,the votes of other minorities were essentialfor each politician's politicalsurvival. Elections were :frequently fiercelycompetitive and huge sumswere spent toensure victory. On average, the elected candidatewon about 60% of the votes24•

However, in several aspects theLebanese electoral system failed. As there were no parliamentary groups based on religion in the Chamberof Deputies, its members could not adequately representtheir communities. As a result,specifically confessionalproblems were not sufficiently debated withinthe Chamber.

Furthermore, the whole electoral process was skewed by the power and prestige of the local clan leaders, or zuama (singularzaim ). These clan leaders were particularly strong in the Maronite, Shiite andDruze communitiesand :frequentlyexercised greaterpower thanthe gov ernment in theirown constituencies. A zaim' s task was to provide patronage forhis clients and constituents, create zaim. jobs, andsettle disputes25 • Electoral success wasof great importancefor a

Itlegitimize d his position and offered furtheropportunities for patronage26 •

101 The power of thezuama meantthat real political parties did not exist in the LebaneseChamber of Deputies, except as temporary groupings of individuals. Furthermore, theabsence of political partiesand the lackof a set programfor the deputies meant that though the Chamber of Deputies was supposed to be the

legislature,in practice it was not able tolegislate27 • Those seekingpolitical reform turnedto partiesoutside the parliamentarysystem, such as the Maronite Kataib, which could maintainits ideological puritywithout the compromises requiredby participationin the Chamber of Deputies.

As a result, the Council of Ministers becamea substitutefor the Chamber of Deputies. The need forfull regional andcommunal representation made the Councilof Ministers in effecta smallerversion of theChamber of Deputies. The Council of Ministers also had the advantage of secrecy, allowing debate on communalquestions. The dominance of theCmmcil of Ministersalso strengthened theMaronite President, who appointed all ministers, including thePihne Minister. Since thePresident was not directly elected himself, he did not have to appeal to the Lebanese electorate.

Intheory, the Lebanesesystem was parliamentary; forall practical purposes, it was a presidential system. Such a system benefited the Maronites more than anyoneelse by ensuring thepresident would come fromtheir community. However, as thedemographic balance in Lebanonshifted, resentment from other communities grew, especially from the Shiites. The weakness ofthe Chamber of Deputies increasingly broughtpolitical changes taking place outside the democratic system into thespotlight. To survive, theconfessional system in Lebanonhad to reform, but reformwas prevented throughthe power of thezuama . The system continued largely unchangeduntil a new influxof Palestinian refugees in 1967 divided the countiy. ThePalestinians had no legalvoice inthe Lebanese confessionalist system. With.manyMaronites feeling threatened, Lebanon and theLebanese confessionalist system were on the verge of the abyss28•

By the standards of the Middle East, the Lebaneseconfessional system worked well whileit lasted. Electionswere' freely contested. Governmentpositions changed hands in an orderly manner. There was freedom of the press and expression. Economic development in Lebanonduring this period was greater thanin neighboringcountries, though thegap between rich andpoor widened.

102 In addition, surveys seem to show thatdespite, or perhaps because of, the bloodshed of recent years, the majority of Lebanese believe confessional democracy is the only way to put their country togetheragain. 29 For example, 80% of respondents in a trade union survey of 1982 supported the view that political decisions must be made only withthe cooperation andagreement of all major religious communities.30 The Document ofNationalUnderstanding, which concluded theTaif negotiations inOctober 1989 andmarked the begirining of the end of theLebanese civil war, implicitly endorsed theNational Pact with its emphasis on confessionalismand inter-communal cooperation31 •

On the other hand, subsequent events have been a harsh judge of the

Lebanese confessional system32 • Though the electoral system succeeded in sideliningnationalism in the Chamberof Deputies, it did not succeed in creating a strongand efficient state. Time and again, externalevents showed thelimitations of theLebanese modus vivendi. Theco nstraintsof theLebanese system prevented theresolution of politicalpressures withnegative long-termresults. Inthe end, the inability of the Lebaneseconfessionalist system to reformitself in light of the inadequacy of its constitutional structures, changingdemography, and growing economic inequality proved to be a largepart of its failure.

The Lessons of Lebanon and Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina

TheLebanese confessionalist model is usefulfor discussing the constitu­ tionsof othermulti-communal states, bothin termsof its successes andits failures. It would be foolishto pretend that the experience of Lebaneseconfessionalist democracy could be easily transferred to othercountries. Nevertheless, certain observations may shed new light on the problem of multi-communalstates.

First, confessionalist democracy was the only viable democratic model for Lebanon. TheLebanese system may havebeen deficientor insufficiently flexible in its detail, but no other democratic system could ensure thecollaboration and hence equalityof Lebanon'smany minorities. Communalismalters the processes of democracy in order to achieve greater freedom and equality for all the communitiesin a state.

Second, thoughthe number of minority groupsin Lebanon meant the nation state was not a viable alternative, evenin Lebanonthe creation of a multi-communal state was by no means easy.

103 Third, certain features of the Lebanese Constitution may encourage cooperation in other multi-communalstates. Cross-voting forexample, where one communitycontributes to the election anotherof community's delegates, ensured thatelected Lebanese leadershad no incentiveto stirup civil strife. However, any system of cross-voting applied elsewhere should not hinder thecreation of political parties.

Fourth, certainfeatures of theLebanese Constitution should be avoided in othermulti-communal states. For examplea directlyelected President combined withan appropriate electoral system would forcethe head of state to appeal to all communitiesin a country.

Finally, Lebanon showsthat the constitutions of multi-communalstates must allowsufficient flexibilityfor equitable reform. Thepossibility of demographic changemust be takeninto account. Multi-communalstates must be efficientand effective states; otherwise, democratic structuresbecome subservient to other factors, as was the case in Lebanon.

Bosnia-Herzegovinaresembles Lebanonin some respects. In both Bosnia and in Lebanon, forexample, a group thatperceived itself to be the dominant majorityin a regionfelt threatened by demographic andpolitical change. InBosnia, the Serb proportion of the populationfellfrom42.8%in 196 1 to31.4% in 1991, while the Muslim population increased from25. 6% to 43.7% over the same period33 • Bosnia, however, did not have the same tradition of communalism as Mount Lebanon; the shiftin the Bosnianpopulation resulted in aneven greater politicalshift with the introduction of democracy.

Furthermore, thelarge number of minorities in Lebanoncompared to Bosnia makesachieving a balanceof power thereeasier. Prima facie,the institutions for a multi-communaldemocracy aremore easily created in Lebanon.

Though othercomparisons and contrasts could be found, it is importantto end withan analysis of solutions thatcould strengthen a multi-communalstate like Bosnia. Thatsuch solutions arerequired is beyond question. Bosnia's economy is held hostageby politicalstrife and the inadequacies of thecountry's constitution34 • Whetherthe necessary will can be found is anothermatter. Thisessay willconfine itself to the questionof elections to thelegislature.

104 One of thepersistent problems emerging in contemporaryse mi-partitioned Bosnia is the unpopularity of politicians who try to buiid bridges with other communities. The solution, drawing on the analysis of democracy in multi­ communalstates, is to acceptthat citizens must be listed as belongingto one group or another andrequire them to vote,not justin the election of theirown community's representatives, but in that of all the others as well. This is an extension of the '

Lebaneseconfessionalist electoral system35 •

In Bosnia, seats in the legislature could be apportioned according to the relative populationsof thethree communities. However, each community would have a certain percentage in the other communities' elections, the actual votes cast being scaled down. Bosnian Serbs would have 33% of the seats in the federal parliament,but would also have 20% of thevotes forBosnian Muslim seats and20% of thevotes forBosnian Croat seats. SimilarlyBosnian Muslims would have 43 % of theseats inthe federal parliament, but would alsohave 20% of thevotes forBosnian Serb seats in parliament.This "Cross-Determination" can be combined witha partylist proportionalelectoral system36 •

This system, unlikethe Lebanese system, would not prevent partiesfrom developing. A BosnianSerb politicianmay chose toignore Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat votes, but a BosnianSerb politicianwho chose to campaignfor inter-communal harmonywould have aninbuilt advantage because 40% of the vote forBosnian Serb representatives would not be cast by Bosnian Serbs. The numbersare not important,but theprinciple of confessionalism most definitely is37 . Reformof theBosnian electoral system wouldbe animportant step towards thecreation of a multi-communal Bosnianstate38 •

Conclusion

Canmulti-communal democracies work? Creating theinstitutions for multi-communaldemocracies is a difficultprocess, requiring an understanding of democracy and anappreciation of thehistorical successes andfailures of multi­ communalstates. Establishing institutions is thefirst towards step developing attitudes that allow multi-communaldemocracies to work.

Thepreference for the preservation of multi-communalsocieties where they exist is both practical, moral andaesthetic. Practical, because in anincreasingly interconnected world,division into national-states makes little sense;moral, because

105 dividing causes immeasurablehardship; andaesthetic, because diversityin human communitiesis bothexciting and admirable.

Lord Acton claimed multi-communal states were "one of the chief instrumentsof civilization" andpart of "the naturaland providential order," and perhaps he was right. But in theend, it is humanbein gs who live in multi-communal states;whether they can live together peacefullyaccording to Acton's "providential order" depends, in part, on them39 •

Iannis Carras obtained a Bachelor of Arts in history and philosophy with Ancient Greek and Latin at Oxford University He is a Russian and East European scholar at The Johns Hopkins University-SAIS Bologna Center.

Bibliography Binder, L.edit. Politics in Lebanon,passim, 1966.

Bongerel, X. "Dansles Balkans, dix annees d' erreurs et d'arr iere pensees," Le Monde Diplomatique, September, 1999.

Carras, C. "A Way Forwardfor Multi-Communal States: To Bind Up the Wounds of Cyprus," Friends of Cyprus Report (FOC), No. 37. (Spring1994).

Cobban, H. TheMakingofModemLebanon,1985.

Deeb,M."Lebanon: Prospects forNational Reconciliation in themid- 1980's," The Middle East Journal (MEJ), Vol. 38 (1984).

Editorial,FOC, No. 34(Autumn1992)/FOC, No. 34(Autumn1994)/ FOC, No. 38 (Autumn1995).

Gilgorov, V. "Notes on theStability Pact," The Vienna Institute for InternationalEconomic Studies, 1999.

Gilmour,D. Lebanon: The Fractured Country.Ch. 3,1983.

Hanf,T. "Homo Oeconomicus- Homo Communitaris:Crosscutting Loyalties in a Deeply DividedSociety: TheCase of TradeUnions in Lebanon,"in Ethnic-

106 ityPl uralism, andthe State inthe Middle East. EsmanM. andRabinovich I. edits., 1988.

Harik, J. "Perceptions of Community and State Among Lebanon's DruzeYouth,"MEJ, Vol. 47 (1993). Harris, W. "TheCrisis of Democracy in 2ot1tCentury Syria andLebanon" in Challengesto Democracy in theMiddle East 1997.

Hess C. /BodmanH. "Confessionalism andF eudalityin Lebanese Politics,"MEJ, Vol. 8 (1954).

Hottinger, A. "Zuamaand Parties in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958,"MEJ, Vol.15 (1961).

Hudson, M. "The Electoral Process andPolitical Development in Lebanon,"MEJ, Vol. 20 (1966).

Hurewitz,J. "LebaneseDemocracy inits InternationalSettin g,"ME!, Vol. 17 (1963).

Khalidi,W. "Lebanon: Yesterdayand Tomorrow,"MEJ, Vol. 43 (1989).

Kumar, R. Divide andFall? Bosnia in the Annalsof Partition. 1999.

Norton, A."Lebanon After Taif: Is theCivil WarOver?"MEJ, Vol. 45 (1991).

Rondot,P. "ThePolitical Institutions of LebaneseDemocracy. " in Politics in Lebanon,Binder L. edit. 1966.

Salem, E. "Cabinet Politics in Lebanon,"MEI, Vol. 21 (1967).

Salem,E. "Lebanon'sPolitical Maze: TheSearch for Peace in a TurbulentLand," MEJ, Vol. 33 (1979).

Sirriyeh,H. "Lebanon:Dimensions of Conflict," Adelphi Papers.Vol. 243(Autumn1989).

Suleiman,M. "Crisis andRevolution in Lebanon," MEI, Vol. 26 (1972).

107 Notes

1 John StuartMill. Considerations on Representative Government.Ch.XVI. 1861. 2 LordActon. Nationality.1862. 3 Multi-communal or multi-ethnic is used throughout the essay rather that multi­ national, because a state may be multi-communal long beforethe different commu­ nities visualize themselves as a nation with a right to their own state. 4 WarrenZimmerman in "The Last Ambassador," Foreign Affairs (March/April), 1995.AlsoR.Kumar,1997. 5 Lord Acton, ibid. 6 A Cherokee Indian in the 1840s speaking to white Americans about the earlier forcedexpulsion ofhis people fromGeorgia in: Ronald Wright, Stolen Continents, TheIndian Story. John Murray: 1992, 294. 7 Initially both in antiquity and in modem times excluding slaves. The vote was firstextended to women in SouthAustralia in 1894. 8 Pericles' funeraloration in Thucydides,Pelopennsian War. Book II. Thucydides makes clear these arenot Pericles' exact words. 9 So liberty 'aeaoeanf3a• (elephtheria) was not praised by those favouring oligar­ chies andmonarchies. The anti-democraticphilosophers Plato and Aristotle reject it as a mistaken ideal. Plato.Republic. 557B ff.and Aristotle. Politics. 131Oa26 ff. 10 For Athenian democracy among others: H. Hansen. "Was Athens a Democ­ racy?" Historisk-filosofiskeMeddelelser, 59. 11 Note thedifferences between positiveand negative conceptions ofliberty.Note also that liberty and equality are by no means necessarily two sides of the same coin - democracy does not attempt to reconcile these principles in a perfect but in an imperfect way. Nevertheless nearlyall justificationsof democracy as the termis understood today stress similar features. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Ch. 6. Also R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, where democracy is definedas theequal consideration of interests. 12 A. de Tocqueville. Democracy in America. Vol. 1Ch. 14. 13 Note C. Bennet. "Voting for Fear" in Transitions for thesame process inBosnia- Herzegovina today. 14 J.Hurewitz, 1963; W.Harr is, 1997. 15 "Fiches du monde arabe," 1699, Sept.20, 1980. 16H.Cobban,1985. 17 G. Hess andH.Bodman, 1954 p 14ff;H.Cobban, 1985. 18 The enlargement vastly decreased the Maronite proportion of the population. 19 P. Rondot, 1996, 130 ff. A report on the poll was written by the Lebanese statesman Chebl Damous. Associations oflawyers, doctors, municipal councillors and so on were asked about the futureconstitution of the state. So forexample this group supported confessionalist representation in parliamentby a majority of 121 to 11. Theextension of thesame to public officersand ministerial appointments was supported by only 100 with 32 against. 20 P. Rondot, 1966. 140 ff.The modificationsinclude theelimination ofthe Senate, the tenure of the President extended to six years and the repeal of clauses relating to the rights of the French Mandate. 21 Apartfrom its constitutional arrangements,under the pact the Maronitesagreed 108 to accept independence and to relinquish their dependence on France.The Sunnis also accepted independence and abandoned the idea of complete Arab unity. Salem E, 1979. 22 E. Salem, 1967,498ff. 23 P. Rondot, 1966. M. Hudson, 1966. C. Hess. andH. Bodman,1954. 24 M. Hudson, 1966. 25D.Gilmour,1983. 26 Note also A. Hottinger,1961 131 ff.: to be a deputy gives the zaim the consecra­ tion of modernity. 27 D. Gilmour, 1983; for example,during the years between 1950 and 1966 the Chamber ofDeputies had not rejected one of the 384 bills put before it. 28 There were serious attempts at reformby Hemi Pharaon in 1947, again in 1952 andfinally with President Shihab from19 5 8 to 1964 who concentrated on regional development. None were successfulin the medium term. H. Cobban,1985, Ch. 4. 29 J.Halik, 1993. 30T. Hanf, 1988. Note that 1982 was seven bitter years into the Lebanese civil war. Note also M. Deeb on the elaboration of Muslim positions in 1983. 31 A. Norton, 1991. Members of the last elected Lebaneseparliament of 1972 met under the auspices of the Arab League inTaif in Saudi Arabia. Apartfrom changes to correct the pro-Maronite imbalance of the Lebanese Constitution the Taif Ac­ cord formalised Lebanon's "special" relationship with Syria. In fact though the trappingsof confessionalismhave been preserved, the reality is Syriandomination. See W. Harris, 1997. 32 H. Cobban,1985. W. Harris, 1997.H. Sirriyeh, 1989. Note externalfactors played a crucial part in the demise of the Lebanese state. 33 S. Woodward,Balkan Tragedy.Table 2.2 34 V. Gligorov,1999. 35 This is not the same as the proposal made by Beslagec, Mayor ofTusla, which was rejected by the OSCE. The electoral system described was proposed by the Greek Cypriot National Council in 1989 forPresidential elections as partof a future Cyprus settlement. 36 Friends ofCyprus Reports. 199211994/ 1995. 3 7 C. Carras, BriefingPaper: "Visions of Europe". 38 Reform of the electoral system canonly be a small part of any solution. But if it helps elect politicians who canbuild bridges between the differentcommunities it could prove to be a firststep towardsreconciling the peoples of Bosnia as a whole. 39 My thanks to Gisela Nauk for advice and discussion on these issues.

109

A NOTE ON THE PEOPLE AND WEALTH OF NATIONS

AT THE DAWN OF THE 21 ST CENTURY

BY JEAN-CLAUDE CHESNAIS

Introduction In the1960' s, just afterthe era ofAfrican independence, mdst develop­ ment economists agreed thatthe futureof Asia would be bleakwhile thedestiny of Africa wouldbe great. Themain rationalewas the following:Africa was seen as a new continent ofemerging promises withtremendous reservoirs ofnatural re­ sources,in a context oflow population densityand long-awaited political inde­ pendence. Asia, namelyIndia, was perceived asthe continent underthe threat of massive famine. The green revolution in India andthe mismanagement in Africa have changedthe deal.

Thepresent reality contradicts what was once theconventional wisdom. Ifwe consider theplanet worldwide, we find anunprecedented gap between the distributionof people andthe distribution of income. Themessage is clear:peace, democracy andsocial cohesion, humanorganisation in other words, are more importantthan natural resources in theshaping of economic destiny.

Today, as yesterday andtomorrow, the vast majorityof people (threeout offive) live in Asia. Theproduction ofgoods andservices, however, is more than ever concentratedin the marketeconomies of the European sphere on bothsides ofthe Atlantic. At theconclusion of the20th century,only one big Asiancountry, Japan, has been able to reach the European level, thanks to a stubborneffort beginningin 1868 (the Meiji era) andlasting more thanone century.

The West

NAFTA, EU-15 and Japan, or the "Triad"

Two big commercial blocs dominate theworld economy: NAFTA and the European Union (EU-15), witha similardemographic weight (about 1/16 of the planet foreach) andrepresenting 57% ofthe totalworld product (30% forNorth Americaand 27% forWestern Europe). These two groups ofnations generate thebulk of global incom e, while theirpopulation is only 780 million out ofa world figureof 6 billion people. Ifwe convert the correspondingvalue of the contribu-

111 ti on to the world income expressed in dollars at prevailing exchange rates into internationaldollar s(! >thatwould buy the sameamount of goods andservices in a country'sdomesti c marketas $1 wouldbuy in theUnited States(purchasing power parity method), the difference is not so clear-cut. This whole geographic area, aftercorrecting international price erentials,diff remains largely predominant with a · total share of 44% of world GDP.

Thethird pole of wealth is the EastAsian region whose marketeconomies are dominated by Japan. Withonly 9 .5% of thepopulation of the world,this pole is the source of 19% of world GDP (14% aftercorrection for price distortions). The JapaneseGNP, calculated at Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) in order to rectifythe excep tionally high level of prices in Japan,represents nearly 8% of the world GDP comparedto a population of only 2%. The rankingof the Japanese GNP per capita is striking; with a value of $24,400 USD per head, out of 215 countries,it is number eight. Thisplaces it amongfiscal paradises lik e Liechten­ stein, Luxembourg,Switzerland, Bermuda, Cayman Islands (between $26,000 and$30,000 per capita), the innovating United States ($29,000) and oil-rich Norway ($24,260). Very fewother Asiancountries rank among the top ten, and of those which do (Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan),all are offshoots of China and closely related to the Japanese economy. lriother words, they are smallinsular economies witha correspondingtotal population of33 million inhab­ itants and a GNP per capita of between $25,000 and $30,000 (USD-1997). SouthKorea lags farbehind, rankingat 52°d witha per capita income of $ l 3,430 (USD-1997).

Thus,considered as a whole, with only 22.6% of world population, these three poles comprise a Triad that is the source of 78% of the monetary income and58.5% of world income calculated in terms of PPP.

112 Table 1: Population and Economy of the World, 1998-2000

Region Population 2000 GDP GDP/PPP % Millions % Billion dollars Billion dollars (3) 1998 1999

NAFTA 406 6.8 8835 8454 24.6 us 275 7825 7043 20.5 Canada 31 608 626 1.8 Mexico 100 402 785 2.3

E U-15 375 6.3 8091 6826 19.9 Germany 82 2100 1530 4.4 France 59 1390 1166 3.4 Italy 58 1145 1067 3.1 UK 59 1286 1110 3.2

Far East 595 9.5 5750 4810 14.0 Japan 127 4189 2515 7.3 Indonesia 214 202 630 1.8

Russia 145 2.4 450 671 1.9

China 1276 21.0 (470) (2200) (6.4)

India 1018 16.5 394 1471 4.3

Latin America (1) 419 6.9 1830 2300 6.7

North Africa/ Middle East 315 4.8 680 1140 3.3

Sub-Saharan Africa 640 10.5 350 581 1.7

Others (2) 870 15.3 2760 5939 17.3 World Total 6020 100.0 29610 34385 100.0

(\) Excluding Mexico (2) Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indochina, Burma, Turkey, Australia, FSU-bar Russia, Switzerland (3) The GDP is an estimate calculated at Purchasing Power Parities under a given set of prices; the value is provisional; only gross order of magnitudes have a meaning. Sources: World Bank Atlas, 1999. Washington, D. C.: 1999; provisional estimates of growth rates for 1998 (from the World Bank as well), andUnited Nations, World Population Prospects (1998), New York, 1999.

113 The Rest

1. The Former Soviet Union

The formerSoviet Union (FSU) consistently falsifiedits economic ac­ countsduring the communist period in order to give theworld the illusion of being a superpowerand threatening the United States. Russia, which is themain com­ ponent of the FSU andincludes half of its total population, shows a very low monetaryproduct: only 1.5% of theworld total,or nine times less thanJapan and 17 times lessthan theUnited States. Inspite of its huge naturalresources deposits (gas, oil, gold, diamonds),the Russian Federation shows a lower performance thanthe Netherlands,where the population is ten times smaller. Even aftercor­ rection forprice distortions, the Russian economy is a marginalshare of world GDP. With a shareof 1.9%, it is close to thelevel oflndonesia or Sub-Saharan Africa andfar fromthe biggest economies of the EuropeanUnion (Germany, France, Italy andthe UK each have 3-4% or world GDP). Mexico's GDP per capita measuredat PPP in international dollarsis 90% higher than Russia's per capita income. As a basis forcomparison, let us mention thevalues forJapan and the United States: $24,400 and $29,080 respectively. Hence, the real per capita income of theRussian population is seven times smallerthan the American and six times smaller than the Japanese. This is a tremendous gap that illustrates the extentof the misinformation propagated under Communist rule andthe collapse of the RussianGDP after 1989. The highest rankingof the formerSoviet bloc, the Czech Republic, is still farfrom economic success at number63 anda GNP of $10,380 (USD-1997) per capita.

2. China and India

Thetwo demographicgiants of Asia (Chinaand India) exhibitcontrasting results, but here it is importantto be cautious. Thereis clearreliability in Indian accountssince India adheres tofull transparency and respect of internationalnorms in thecomputation of national accountstatistics. Thisis not thecase withChinese figures. A closer look at Chinese data exhibits anomalies, inconsistencies and bias, similar to those of the Soviet case. In anycase, the share of the Indian economy (calculated in PPP's of world income at 4.3%) is more thandouble that of Russia.

India, in 1999, has just crossed the threshold of one billion people; its

114 GDP measuredat PPP' sis similarto thatof individualWestern European econo­ mies such as thatof France,Italy, or theUK. India no longer hides its ambitions as a potential superpower; this is demonstratedby its nuclear andaerospace ca­ pacities. India's advantagesare usually underestimated,while thereverse is true of China. India deserves more consideration. Consider its mastery of high tech­ nology,the number and quality of its emerging elite,and the 2 million studentswho get university degreeseach year. Most Indiansspeak fluent Englishand thus can be involved directly in business andscienc e. India hasa long-standingpluralistic democracy, a high degree of internationalopenness, successful population con­ trol, andthe emergence of a large middle class eager to modernise andadopt Westernlifestyles.

3. South America

SouthAmerica is in thefourth position, ratherfar fromthe three poles of NAFTA,the European Union, and the Far East capitalist economies. Its share of the world economy is 6. 7%, or 3 .5 times higher thanRussia's share. In spite of benefitingfrom oil endowmentand a small population, the countriesofNorth Africaand the Middle East have a GDP only half of thatof Latin America, which hasno such valuable naturalresource deposited andhas a highpopulation growth rate. With a real GDP per capita of about $5,500 USD, Latin America stands betweenthe more developed andless developed countries,but farahead oflndia andChina (at$15 00 and$2000 per capita), andespecially aheadof Sub-Saha- . ranA:frica(at less than$1000USD).

4. Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-SaharanAfrica is fartherbehind thanever. With a totalpopulation similar to that of the marketzone of the FarEast, about 600 million people, it shows a much lower economic performance. If we put aside the economies of SouthAfrica, Zimbabwe, andNamibia, which are better organizedand richer, the inequality is even more striking; thecorresponding mean individual income ratio

exceeds 10 to 1 in favorof the Far East2 • Whatis most significant is that India exhibits a standardof living thatis 50% higher thanthat of Sub-SaharanAfrica.

Sincethe collapse of Communism, Africa hascompletely been marginaliz:ed. Everyevil has fallenon it. India, the traditionalsymbol of misery, hastried to erase its backwardness with impressive growth rates of 5 or 6% annually since the

115 second liberalization programlaunched in 1990. Internationaldifferences arethus increasing. Therate oftechnological progress is one reason behind thisdifferenti­ ating economic landscape. Mismanagement,as shownby the example of Sub­ SaharanAfrica, is anotherfactor.

The pictureis clear: theeconomic planetis divided between theWest and the rest. The present divide is too cle ar-cutto be politically bearablein the long run. Manycountries of the "West" facemassive depopulation, especiallyin Eu­ rope andJapan, andwill experience an economic slowdown, whilenew countries withhigh potentialcould emerge. China has unclearbut deep weaknesses, among which are its closed economy, its lack ofinfrastructure andof freedom, theab­ sence of democracy, and a huge degree of social inequalities, hence a strong potential forpolitical unrest. India, which is conventionally viewed with pessi­ mism, is likely to become Number 2, althoughstill farbehind the US, by the year 2020-2030.

Jean-Claude Chesnais, Ph.D. in Demographics (Paris: Sorbonne) and Eco­ nomics (Paris: Institut d'Etudes Politiques), is a.visiting professor at The Johns Hopkins University-SAIS Bologna Center and a Senior Research Fel­ low at the Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques (!NED) in Paris.

Notes

1 Prices tend to differ widely fromcountry to country, namely for services. Present economies are predominantly post-industrial, hence service economies. The physi­ cal output needs to be weighted by indexes other than local prices. This limits the impact of price distortions. The adoption of a common set of prices is not new; it began inthe 1950s by seminal papers ofKRAVIS (OECD). 2 This means that the average African person has a standard of living ten times smaller than the average inhabitant of the Far East.

116 RISE OF THE AUSTRIAN RIGHT: EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS lNIBODUCTIONBY PROFESSOR PATRICK McCARTHY PETER J ANKOWITSCH PETER SICHROVSKY

Dr. Patrick McCarthy is resident Professor ofEuropean Studies at The Johns Hopkins University-SAISBologna Center

The formationof a governmentin Austria thatrepresents a coalition of the People's Party and Jorg Haider's Freedom Party has provoked a boycott of Austria by its EU partnersand worldwide publicity. Themost usefulservice that aninstitution likethe Bologna Center canoffer is to debate theissues in a manner as calm andimpartial as possible, without pretending that we enjoy a God-given insight or objectivity. So we invited representatives of theSocialist Party andof theFreedom Party who brieflypresented theirpoints of view andthen answered manyand varied questions fromthe students. Thedebate was lively but remained withinthe confines of academic discourse. It seemed to me, as I listened to the speakers,that they each seized on one partof the centralproblem. This was andis that Austria needs a changeof government because the Socialists andthe People's Partyhave been in power too long and have created what one canonly call a corporatiststate, where politics plays too great a role at the expense both of the marketand of civil society. But The Free­ dom Party'sability to cut back this corporatist state is weakened by the illegiti- macy of its leader. In turnthis illegitimacy has two causes: Haider's views on immigration go beyond what is at present deemed acceptable inWestern Europe (Britishers may remember that Enoch Powell ruined his careerfor the same reason). Secondly, Haider's occasional allusions to the Nazipast arethe signof anAustrian failure to confront truthfullyits rolein theyears between theAnschluss and the 1945 defeat. Thisis not anexclusively Austrian failure: Francewas just as reluctantto faceup to the reality that large numbers of Frenchmen were involved in collaboration and anti-Semitism. But one simply cannot be ambiguousabout Auschwitz. Ironically the Freedom Partywill probably be unable to undertake its task of reducing the role of politicians because all its energy willbe taken up defending one particularpolitician.

117 Mr. Peter Jankowitsch is a former Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs in Austria. He was also Ambassador ofAus tria to the United Nations and his country'sfirst representative to the UNSecurity Council, as well as Chair of the UN General Assembly. Elected to the Austrian Parliament, he returned to diplomacy as the Austrian Ambassador to the OECD in Paris.

Mr. Peter Jankowitsch:

Letme begin by looking at thebe ginningof theyear, the new millennium, when most Europeandemocracies sailed ratherpeacefully into thenew century. Austria, on the other hand, was greeted by a hailstormof criticism andabuse, violent attackson its past, on its present, andby a sudden chillingofrelations with some ofits closest partnersand associates in Europe, namely theother fourteen members of theEuropean Union.

What happened to make Austria a country avoided not only by many Westernpoliticians, statesmen, but alsoby artistsand writers, intellectuals, pro­ fessorsand even tourists? If a country'simage abroad changesthis rapidly, and there is no doubt that Austria's image has been severely damaged, a simple an­ swer willnot suffice.

Manyof thesimplest answersto thisquestion are being sold on themedia market. Some perceived sinister maneuveringsby thepower hWlgry"Eurocrats" of Brussels in theostracism of Austria. Theyfeared that Brusselswas trying, by imposing sanctionson one of thesmallest and newest members ofthe union,to changeAustria's direction andcoerce it to select a differenttype of government. Otherssuspected the invisible handof the SocialistInternational was insulted by thefact that one ofits member partieshad lost a governmentposition it had held for decades. Still others suggested that it was the Home Front, including the President ofAustria himself, who hadbetrayed thenew government by encourag­ ing thecurr ent PortuguesePresidency andother leaders ofthe European Union to enact sanctions against Austria, including a freeze in bilateral relations between Austriaand theother fourteen members ofthe Union. None of theseanswers, of course,carry the slightest credibility.

Thepolitical spectrum of thosein Europe, andthe Westernworld in gen­ eral, who criticize Austriais much broaderthan that of the SocialistInternational. Such people as President Chirac ofPrance, Prime Minister Aznarof Spain, and

118 theForeign Minister ofBelgium, who areoften on theforefront in criticizing Aus­ tria, hardly qualifyfor membership in the Socialist International. No Austrian politician, including the President, could commandsuch influenceand power in Europe as to enact so quickly the sanctions that the fourteen members of the EuropeanUnion imposed when they decided to show utter displeasure with the politicalsitu ation inAustria.

In order to cause such a strong and lasting reaction, the reasons must be deeper and wider andhave much to do with internal developments in Austria. There have been reactions not only in the member countries of the European Union, but also all over the West: the United States, Canada,and Israel- which was the only countrythat immediately withdrewits ambassador fromVi enna.

The reason must be that today, to the chagrin of many Austrians, many people in theWest feelthat Austria is drifting away thefrom European mainstream and moving into new andlargely uncharted waters. Such isolation engenders reactions as violent as the ones we have seen. This shouldn'tbe surprisingto anyonewho remembers theworld's reaction to the election ofKurt Waldheim to the presidency ofAustria. That a mannot seen to be fitfor the highest officein a Western democracyshould be elected by a majorityof Austrianswas a firstex­ ampleof the type of fallingout thatI mentioned andthat people now see.

ManyAustrians still failto understandhow a new governmentcan create such a furor, when on the surface, nothing could be more natural than such a change of government. Two political partieswho together commanda sizable majorityin parliament conclude a governmentpact and aresworn in by the presi­ dent in strictcompliance with the constitution. Whythen such a reception in the outside world andamong a growingnumber of Austrians? Whyare Austrians feelingmore andmore uncomfortable, not only due to internationalreactions, but also because of what they see happening in Austria?

One reason is thegenesis of this government. It is truethat when Austri­ ansvoted for a new Parliamenton October 3 oflast year, they wantedchange of a deep andpermanent nature. They thereforestrengthened the two parties who areseen to be themost vocal in opposition, the Freedom Partyof Jorg Haider and the Green party, which was led by Professor AlexanderVan der Bellen.

119 The two partiesthat had since then formeda government coalition, the Social Democrats andthe Austrian People's Partyof ChristianDemocrats, lost a considerable number of votes, so much so thatthe Austrian People's Partylanded in thirdplace in theelectoral spectrumand was for the firsttime ever in Austrian postwarparliamentary history overtaken by the Freedom Party. To judge by opinionpolls takenafter the election, however, thisvote, althoughexpressing deep displeasurewith many particularities of Austria'spolitical system, was not a vote fora new coalition, but rather fora new type of government; fora new, more transparentgovernment.

A vast majority polled still expressed a strong preference forthe head of the Social Democrats, Mr. Victor Klima, to remain Chancellor, as well as fora continuationof the present government fonnula Thiscoalition had given thecountry anundeniably unprecedented measure of prosperity,low unemployment, domes­ tic andinternational security, and much international prestige, includinga success­ fulfirst presidency of the EU. Even those who had strengthened Haider's Free­ dom Partyseemed to preferhim and his followersas a vocal and vigilantopposi­ tion rather thanas a government party. For this reason, manyvoters seemed to disregard qualitiesof Mr. Haider' s party andits leaders that had raised interna­ tional criticismand concern.

Reacting to theevident wish of Austria'svoters thatthe Christian Demo­ crats andSocial Democrats should try to come together as a coalition, the two government partnersstarted long andprotracted negotiations. These negotiations were complicated by the factthat the Austrian People's Party,shocked by its bad election results, decided to go into opposition andrefuse to negotiate altogether. Had it remainedin thisposition, it would have created a deep crisisin Austria, as theSocial Democratic Party was knownto have refusedany government partici­ pation with a Freedom Partyled by Jorg Haider.

Eventually,the Austrian People's Partyconsented to negotiateanew gov­ ernmentwith the Social Democrats. Thesenegotiations took a fullthree months, from late October into late January. In these negotiations, theSocial Democrats made wide-rangingand considerable concessions anda comprehensive govern­ ment programwas established, which included manyreforms. Duringthe nego­ tiations,the Social Democrats were underthe continuous threat of being dropped by the AustrianPeople's Party, which then planned to forma coalition with the Freedom Party. Theywent a long way to makea governmentwithout the Free­ dom Partypossible. 120 When thesenegotiation s were completed andduly approved by the re­ spective party bodies, Mr. Schlissel, the leader of the AustrianPeople's Party, made a surprisingabout-tum and asked theSocial Democrats to abandonthe key portfolioin the government, that of Minister of Finance, andhave a reluctanttrade unionist sign a governmentpact that would have been very difficult forthe trade unionists to accept. Schlisselwas long suspected by public opinion to have done everythingpossible to makenegotiations failin order to turnto theFreedom Party, which had for weeks held out the prospective of making him rather than Mr. Klima Chancellorof Austria. When theleader of theSocial Democrats, who had negotiated forthree monthsand made enormousconcessions, refusedthese de­ mands,negotiations were broken off. Aftera finalshort episode in which Klima triedto forma SocialDemocratic minority government, theleader of the Austrian People's Party, Schlissel, rapidly concluded a dealwith JOrg Haider.

This genesis shows one thing: even domestically thepath to this govern­ ment was all but straightforward andclear, more the result of clever tactics and shrewd maneuveringthan of a clearmandate by the voters. Had indeed thePeo­ ple's Party andthe Freedom Party campaigned openly and honestly that they wanted to forma governmenttogether, theresult of this election may have been quite different. It is for this reason that many people in Austria now are to be found in thestreets, accusing the new government of being certainly legal but perhaps not legitimate in a strictlydemocratic sense.

Thesecond serious question thisgovernment has to faceis its international acceptability. Here againthere should have been fewsurprises for those familiar withpublic opinion inEurope. For manyyears, thepolitical style of the leader of the Freedom Party has raised eyebrows in Europe andmuch of the Western world. Thetype of politicalweaponry chosen by Mr. Haider has isolated himand hispolitical friends from every mainstreamparty in Europe.

The reasons why the Freedom Party is seen today by most observers to be on thefar right of thepolitical spectrum are manifold. They tohave do withthe factthat the leader of theParty and manyof his faithfulhave time andagain failed to show the type of distance from the darkest pages of Europe'sa nd Austria's history thatmarks all other democratic parties. Apologies came, but they came late andwere considered half-hearted.

The policies the Freedom Party proclaims vis a vis immigrantsand for-

121 eigners cause reserve in the West andin theEU. Whilethey may have brought votes in Vienna districts,they have foundmuch less acceptanceoutside Austria. Thesame applies to the foreignpolicies proclaimedby the Freedom Party. Reso­ lutely pro-Europeor pro-EU (or ratherEC) beforeRaider's ascent to partylead­ ership, theFreedom Partyturned into themost anti-Europeparty shortly before Austria's accession to the EU. In the referendum that confirmed Austrian EU membership by a 2/3 majority, Haider campaignedagainst membership, as he later campaigned against the Euro. Until his party joined the government,he opposed enlargement of theEU to the East and clamoredfor reduced Austrian contributionsto theEU.

It is difficultto finda label forso strangea political animal as theFPO of JOrg Haider. It is very easy to call it neo-fascistor neo-nazi,but these termsare not appropriate. Populist may be more fitting a label, but even here I hesitate. Haiderhimself is certainlya revolutionaryof the right, untiringlyfighting the system thathas always rejected him. Althoughhe has gained limited access to theAus­ triansystem, he continues to be rejected by theinternational system. What comes after the destruction of the system? The question arisesas to what new system Haider would put in place of the one he wishes to destroy. Social tensions are certainly goingto rise andthe institutions of socialpartnership will no longer func­ tion as before. Thesame will be truefor the political climate; it willnever be as it was before. Thelong-standing cooperation between Social Democrats andChris­ tianDemocrats, a typeof consensus bornin the Naziconcentration camps where both of these parties were thrown, is a thing of the past andwill be replaced by other alliancesmore to theleft.

Even more difficultwill be Austria'ssituation inEurope and in theWest in general. A countryfirmly anchored inEuropean institutionsand European beliefs is now forcedto operate in a venomous climate of suspicion. Sanctions against Austriaput severe limitations on the government, but they also concernmany ordinarypeople. Thereis now a kind of ill-advised race forinventing new sanc­ tions againstAustria. Thesesanctions hit ordinarypeople andnot the government forwhich theywere originallyintended. Austriais being observed by thefourteen countriesof Europe,and Austrians have to proclaim every day that theyrespect humanrights and fundamental freedoms. Itis a highlyunsatisfactory and undigni­ fiedstate of affairs. Help andsympathy from our friends abroad willassist us a great deal; sanctionswill not.

122 Mr. Peter Sichrovsky is an internationaljournalist and author. He is a mem­ ber of the Freiheitliche Partei bsterreichs (Freedom Party) and has been a member of the European Parliament since 1996.

Mr. Peter Sichrovsky:

We have heard a very dramatic description of the disaster situation of Austrianswithin thecountry andabroad. I will give you a few examples of this drama. For example,the last time I was in Brussels, my taxidriver stated thathe was not accepting anyAustrian guests anymore. We triedto book a restaurantin theevening for a groupof Austriansand the restaurantsaid "We do not serveany foodto Nazis." We received thesame reaction fromother groups and from hotels in Franceand Belgium. Suddenly an anti-fascist collective behavior has come over WesternEurope and finallyrecognized Austriansas the"pure devils of Eu­ rope." We have a group of assistantswho work forus in the European Parlia­ ment. They are young studentsand are learningFrench. Their French teachers canceledtheir lessons because theysaid that theydo not teach Nazisanymore. A student exchangewas canceledwith Austrian schools. Today I heard that in a riding competition in Grenoble, one of the Austrianswas uninvited. I asked the councilof Grenobleif the horse was stillinvited. I amstill waiting for the answer to thisquery.

This situation may be analyzedon two levels. We can argueon a very rational, logicallevel and say thatthis is not fair. Thisbehavior is directed against a governmentthat has been elected. I see it in a differentway than.Mr. Jankowitsch. For instance,he didn't tell you thatthe Socialistchancellor, .Mr. Klima, offeredthe Freedom Partythree positions in his governmentif we would support his govern­ ment. Then aftertwo or three years, when everything has calmed down, they wouldform a coalition withus. When we refused, allof the difficultiesbegan. So there isa differentexplanation for this, but I don't wantto argueagainst everything Mr. Jankowitsch said. A lot has happened and a lot will happen in thefuture; it was not easy to end a government in Austria that had more or less governed Austria since thewar. There had been a Socialist chancellorin Austria forforty years.

In Austria, we had a kind of democracy in which it was impossible to get anythingwithout being a member of one of the two parties. WhenI was 19 years old and tried to move out of my parents' house, I went to the local community

123 center to get an apartment andthey asked me whether I was Socialist or Con­ servative. When I said I wasjust 19 years old and wanted an apartment, they informedme thatI had to be in one party or theother, otherwiseI could not get an apartment. I wanted to work as a teacher before I finished my studies, so I went to the localschool in thear ea, again the samequestion, whetherI was Socialist or Conservative. When I said I wasn't a member of either, I was refuseda job.

Not one positionin a bankin Austria, in therailway system, or in thepost officewas available withoutmembership in one of thetwo parties. Austriais the only democracyin Western societyin which allof the high-rankingpositions in the bankingsystem, industry,telecommunications, were divided betweenthe parties. The whole society was divided. It taught you as a young studentthat no career was possible if you didn'tjoin one of the parties very early. This is one of the reasons so manyintelligent Austriansleft the country.

I can give you a few examples where I disagree with the propaganda directed againstthe Freedom Party. First, regardingimmigration, I amconstantly confrontedwith the belief thatthe Freedom Partyonly wins elections because it is anti-foreignand racist. We asked the Freedom Partysupporters afterthe last election why theyvoted forthe Freedom Partyand immigration was onlythe fifth most importantissue. Their priorities were anti-corruption, change of the system, anti-socialism, andliberalization of themarket system. Immigration was totally unimportantas a motivation. TheViennese Freedom Partywas heavilycriticized afterthe election, having been the most aggressiveon theissue of immigration.

In another poll, we found out that among the age group between 25-3 5, the Freedom party was the number one party of all the voters. We were the numberone partyamong all professional women. Thisis not theparty of theold Nazis.It is not so simple to answerthe Austrian problem. Thepolls have changed. Thelast polls showed thatthe Austrian population definitelysupports thisgovern­ ment. Over fiftypercent saidthat this government should be given a chance. It is not thatfewer and fewer peopletrust this government. It is exactly the opposite. More andmore people want this governmentto work forsome time to findout if it functions,or if it doesn't function. Thisis a very normaldevelopment in democ­ racy.

Why is Europe today, and also part of the Western world, so deeply concernedabout anextreme right development in Austriaand also deeply hurtby

124 ,, any comment about theSecond World War and the Holocaust, specificallyre- garding Austria? We have to be very open about our past. We have to accept that our governmentsin the past created a deep misunderstandingover the last forty-fiveyears and also anger internationally by not accepting ourresponsibility concerningthe Second World War.Incidentally, there never wasa Freedom Party in thesegovernments, and never a Freedom Partymember as a chancellor. There was only a coalition fora short time. Ninetypercent of the chancellorswere So­ cialist, andfor a shorttime Conservativechancellors.

It was the Socialist party who, after the War and deep into the 1950' s, used an election poster that said, "Who Once Voted National andSocialist Can Today Vote fortheSocialists." I remember alsoa slogan whenAdolfSchaerf,the AustrianSocialist president was elected: "Who Once Voted forAdolf CanDo It Again." The Socialistsalso denied anykind of payment to the returningAustrian Jewish population. It was a long fightfor the Jewish population who cameback to Austriato get a littlebit back fromthe Austrian government.

Austriacontinuously talkedabout how it was a victimof thewar, how we never really took responsibility. This is one of the reasons why other European countries arevery sensitive about Austriatoday. Thereis anotherlevel thathas nothing to do with Austria. I tried to explain this and it is not easy to explain. About ten years ago I wrote a book called Born Guilty. It was a book with interviewsof childrenwho camefrom Nazi families. Thechildren, who hadbeen bornafter the war, talkedabout their relationship withtheir parents. In a strange way, theAustrian war generation never feltguilty about what happened inthe war andnever accepted its responsibility. Thosewho had participatedin thewar tried to stop history andstart anew after the war. The result was exactly the opposite. By denying their responsibility for what theydid, they passed the guilt on to the next generations. Today, the second andthird generations afterthe war, young people, aremuch more sensitive andin a way feelguiltier thantheir ownparents andgrandparents.

We have a veryspecific sensitivity, almosta post-Holocaust sensitivityin Europe and throughout the world that forcesus, and I think this is the biggest mistakeof the Freedom Party, to be extremely sensitive when it comes to state­ ments anddescriptions of the Holocaust andthe Second World War. This is a development we underestimated as the Freedom Party and also as Austrians, including the Socialistsand the conservatives.

125

JoRG HAIDER: A DiscussioN oN RHEToRic BY RICHARD WIMMER

JOrg Raider's Freedom Party won 28.7 per cent of the vote at the last parliamentary election in Austria on October 3, 1999. The internationalpress condemnedthe rise of thefar right in Austria1 andrepeated once againwhat has been said about Jorg Haider over thelast ten years:that he is a right wingextrem­ ist, thathe leadsa partywhich stirs xenophobic feelingsin thepopulation, andthat he has not distanced himself fromAustria's National Socialist past. He hasbeen calleda Nazimore thanonce when travellingabroad forpress conferences. Dur­ ing a visit to London afterthe election he was surprisedby a large group of anti­ Nazi activists who yelled theslogan, "Nazi Out."

For those who have not followedthe debate over Jorg Haider since 1986, when he took over as chairman of the Freedom Party in what some called a putsch, things are as simple as mentioned above. However, one discrepancy seems very conspicuous. Theinternational analysis broadly speakingseems to be lagging behindthe Austrian analysis of the phenomenon Jorg Haider2. He has dominated Austrianpolitics for fourteen years andhas been an inexhaustible source forthe writings of political analysts3 • There is no doubt that the majority of the AustrianHaider-specialists argues in a less simplistic tone anddoes not thinkof him as a smallreincarnation of AdolfHitler.

One of the most interesting and often-mentionedaspects of the Haider phenomenon is hisuse of inflammatory rhetoric. Itshould be noted thatHaider' s verbal outpouringsand deliberations on, or rather misinterpretationsof, history are so numerous that I can only quote some of the most polarizing and most commonlyknown. Itmust be noted thatit is difficultto translatethese phrases or words appropriately into English because Haider andother partyofficials, cov­ ertly, maybe even unconsciously,resort to a typeofNazi rhetoric no longer used in today's "denazified" German language. Furthermore,Freedom Partypoliti­ ciansuse what could be termed" coded" language.The languageitself is not ex­ plicitlyanti- immigrationist,anti-femini st, or anti-intellectualbut themessage is clear to anyone who is receptive to those codes. It also must be mentioned that jour­ nalistsand commentators focus especially carefully on Haider's rhetoric. Words andphrases sai d by Haiderarouse attention althoughpoliticians from other parties may have utteredthe same phrases unnoticed before.

127 Anyone who has ever followeda discussion with Haider or other repre­ sentatives of the Freedom Partywill notice thatit is very hardto approach their method of argumentation. First, they deny any charges against them. Second, they twist the argument by saying that their words were taken out of context, therebyaccusing theiropponents of unfairdebating methods. Onlyif thereis no way out do theyuse theapology argument: "Yes, thiswas saidand it is not defen­ sible. But in the stressfullife of a twenty-fourhour politician thingsmight have been said over the last twenty years. We apologize. But do you keep records of what the others have said over the last twenty years?"

Most of the high-rankingpoliticians of theFreedom Partyunderwent pro­ fessionalmedia training,studying theguidelines of theso-called neo-linguistical school. Therefore it is difficultto win an argumentagainst them unlessyou are armedwith evidence or anattorney in acourt of law. The followingare a selection of some of Haider' s more controversialstatements on a varietyof topics.

Straflager4 When Jorg Haiderwas interviewed by theAustrian news magazinePro.ft!, he spoke not of concentration campsor death campsduring World WarII but of "Straflager"which, literally translated,means disciplinary or punishment camps. Historiansknow thatthere were a varietyof camps duringWorld WarII, andnot all of them were used as exterminationcamps. However, froma post warper­ spective none of these campsqualifies as somethinglike a prison where convicts served a sentence delivered by a legitimate courtof law. Once again it must be said that thiswas an attempt at reinterpretinghistory. Jorg Haider studied history and is a well-educated man; he knew perfectly well what he was saying. He implied thatthe millions of people who wereimprisoned and eventually died in the concentration campswere criminalswho deserved to be deported there.

Hitler, Stalin, and Churchill5 In a recent interview fora local Viennese newspaper, Haider equated Hit­ ler, Stalin andChurchill as brutal mass murderers. Of course, in several other interviews he acknowledges thatthe Holocaust was theworst crime committed against humanityand that the Nazi re gime bears responsibilityfor that. He would argue that the bombing of the civilian population of Dresden in 1945 was not necessaryfor the achievement of thedefeat ofNaziG ermany. But whenequating Stalin andChurchill with Hitler he also wantsto exculpate the Germans(and his family) by saying thatothers were equally bad. 128 Blacks6 "It's really a problem with black people. Even when they have a majority theydon't get their act together. It's a hopeless case," Haider said duringa televi­ sion interview on March 1, 1995. This is one out of a series of racist remarksby a Freedom Partym ember regardingblack people. Duringthe last campaign for the general election, the local branch of the Freedom Party plastered the walls ( with posters denouncing black immigrantsin general as drug dealers who ruin Austria'schildren.

Intellectuals7

Intellectuality forHaider is almost a swearword. For him it describes the despicable leftovers of the" '68 generation." It is synonymous for moral and spiritualbankruptcy. He often describes (leftwing) intellectualsas "champagne glassMarxists."

Women8

In his"visionary" book, Die Freiheit, die ich meine." in which he contem­ plates a progressive society, Haider tells thereader about the role of women he envisages in thatsociety: "The feminist illusion of women's self-realizationas pro­ fessionals andmothers has proved to be a fatalerror ... The ideology whichpro­ fesses that only a professionalwoman is to be takenseriously has violated many women andhas been at thesame time veryharmful to societyas a whole because thejob of a housewifeis equallydemanding." Haider' s proposed policies towards women arevery conservative, to say theleast. Duringthe last election campaign, he promised to pay each mother a check worth $450 per child; this measure would supposedly allow women to stay at home with their children instead of working part-time. The reactionof women's rights movements and other parties was fierce because they feared that this would keep women out of the labor marketaltogether. Labor marketreinsertion is very difficultfor people who have not worked for along time. They argued thatthe money would be betterinvested in childcareinstitutions.

Based on a brief glanceat his comments, the question arises of whether Haider is a Nazi. At first glance the answer might be obvious9• He has not distancedhimself credibly fromthe Nazi past. He has madedisturbing revisionist remarksabout theN ational Socialist past. He belittlesNazi crimes and speaks of the members of the Waffen-SS as decent folks. Therefore, he is a Nazi. In my

129 opinion however, this explanationoversimplifies the situation and falls short of explaining his personality andhis appeal to themasses.

Although Austria has not gone through the same intensive form of Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, or addressing the issues of the past, as Germany has, it cansafely be said that there is only a tiny number ofN azisleft in Austria. Now that Haider's party has become the second largest political forcein the country,he hasincreasingly distancedhimself fromthe National Socialist era. He knows thatelections arewon in themiddle andthat he would deter manyvoters if he professedan ideology thatmerely constitutes a programfor a negligible minor- ify.

There is no doubt that Jorg Raider's Freedom Party must be carefully analyzed today. Austriahas sufferedfrom international isolati on ever since his party was able to forma government withthe Conservatives in February2000. The fourteenother members of the EuropeanUnion reduced bilateral relations with Austria. The Belgian foreign minister Michel Louissaid it was immoral to spend holidays in Austria as long as Haider's Freedom partyis in government. Israel called back its ambassador fromAustria. The U.S. governmentrecalled its ambassadorfor special consultations.

There is no denying that Haider's ideology canbe described as right-wing populism andthat his partysometimes standsfor xenophobic policies. But thereis also a long way between xenophobia or anti-immigrationpolicies andNational Socialism. The question still remains: why has Jorg Haiderbecome so popularin Austria? Basing an answer on a general condemnation of him and his party as "Nazi" does not provide ananswer or even anintellectual discussion.

Richard Wimmer, Master ofLaw at the University of Vienna, 1997, is a student in international relations at The Johns Hopkins University-SAIS Bologna Center.

130 Bibliography

"Is FacismResurgent?" The Economist, Oct. 9-15, 1999. 37-40.

"Zwei Mann,ein Wort," Die Suddeutsche Zeitung, Magazin,No. 50 I (1999).

Scharsach,Hans-Henning. Raider's Kampf. Vienna: Orac, 1992.

Zochling, Christa.Haider - Licht undSchatten einer Karriere. Vienna:

Molden, 1999.

Thurnher, Armin.Das Trauma,einLeben Osterreichische

Einzelheiten,Vi enna: Zsolnay,1999.

Haider,Jorg. Die Freiheit die ichmeine.Frankfurt/Main:Ullstein, 1993.

"Haider gibtGas," Profil,No. 43 (1991).

Klenk,Florian and Weissensteiner, Nina, "Ein, ah,Dealer," Der Falter,

No. 45 (1999): 8-9.

Menasse, Robert, "Osterreich in derNacht," Der Falter, No. 44 (1999): 10-11.

131 Notes

1 See, forexample, "IsFascism Resurgent?" The Economist (October 9-15, 1999): 37-40. 2 For instance, theweekly supplement, SZ Magazin No. SO, 1999, directly compared Jorg Haider withAdolf Hitler. 3 Hans-HenningScharsach, Haider's Kampf, 1991; Christa ZOchling, Haider - Licht undSchatten einer Karriere, 1999; Armin Thurnher, Das Trauma, ein Leben, 1999. 4Profi/No. 43, 1991. 5Der Falter No. 45, 1999. 6Haider inZeit im Bildll, March 1, 1995. 7Jorg Raider's aversion against intellectuals is so pervasive that he at least once during every interview utters a condescending remark.For examplein Stiddeutsche ZeitungNo.50, 1999. 8Haider, Die Freiheit, die ich meine. 211-213. 9During the firstweeks ofFebruary 2000, he was directly compared with Hitler in French and Belgian newspapers.

132

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