Table of Contents

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Table of Contents MALAWI COUNTRY READER TABLE OF CONTENTS Edward Warren Holmes 1963-1966 Consul, Blantyre, Nyasaland Pierre Shostal 1967-1969 Political Officer, Lilongwe James P. Thurber, Jr. 1969-1971 Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Blantyre John A. Buche 1970-1972 Deputy Chief of Mission, Blantyre Herman J. Rossi III 1970-1972 Economic Officer, Blantyre William C. Burdett 1970-1974 Ambassador, Malawi Robert A. Stevenson 1974-1978 Ambassador, Malawi Gilbert H. Sheinbaum 1976-1978 Deputy Chief of Mission, Lilongwe Harold E. Horan 1979-1980 Ambassador, Malawi Stedman Howard 1981-1984 Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Lilongwe Robert J. Kott 1981-1984 Deputy Chief of Mission, Lilongwe Dennis C. Jett 1986-1989 Deputy Chief of Mission, Lilongwe Michael Pistor 1991-1994 Ambassador, Malawi A. Ellen Shippy 1998-2000 Ambassador, Malawi EDWARD WARREN HOLMES Consul Blantyre, Nyasaland (1963-1966) Edward Warren Holmes was born in Beverly, Massachusetts in 1923. He received a bachelor's degree from Brown University in 1945 and a master's degree in international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1946. Mr. Holmes joined the Foreign Service in 1946. He served in Nicaragua, Venezuela, Israel, South Africa, Ethiopia, Malawi, Ghana, and Washington, DC. Mr. Holmes was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993. 1 Q: You left [Ethiopia] in 1963 and went right to another African country. HOLMES: That's right, direct transfer to Blantyre. Q: In Malawi. HOLMES: Well, it was then Nyasaland. Q: It was still part of the federation, where... HOLMES: Still part of the federation, which I have mentioned before. Q: Where you had already predicted its fall. Did anybody say, well, here we are, still, or something like that? HOLMES: Well, not really. I got to Blantyre, and the British governor was still there; it was still a colony (technically a protectorate, but it's about the same, really). But it was very, very clear that independence was coming. And it came within six months or so after my arrival. Q: What were you doing there? HOLMES: Well, I was a consul. You see, this was under the old structure. I was technically assigned to Salisbury, because this was rapidly changing. The British didn't like the idea of our having separate consulates in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland because that would indicate we thought the place was going to become independent. They wanted us to be in Salisbury, which was the capital of the federation. So technically I was assigned to Salisbury, but on detached duty to Blantyre. It was a fig leaf. By then, the fig leaf was very thin, although technically I was assigned to Salisbury (detailed to Blantyre). But that didn't last long, because, as I say, when I arrived it was very clear, within a very short time, although the date hadn't been set, but it was clear that there was going to be independence. There had been serious riots in Blantyre. The British troops had fired and forty-five people were killed... [static] but once they... the whole federal structure of government, the civil service and so forth, ended. Q: What were you doing, preparing for an embassy? HOLMES: Yes, preparing for an embassy. But while I was there, I was consul in charge, it was called, at the consulate. Q: Did you find yourself... advisor... HOLMES: We had good relations with Dr. Banda. We had good relations with the British. But... I was preparing for an embassy, basically. At some point it was raised to a consulate general... queen, which had never been... And then, within, I think, ... or ten months or some date after 2 independence came... Prince Philip came down... the British flag came down at midnight... up... and I became... Q: ... HOLMES: Not really... moral support. There was... I think he wanted moral support. He didn't ask for it... well, of course, he was... he was not in a position to ask... I met with him frequently, he came to my house on occasion... other times I'd talk to him on the phone... He wanted moral support. Q: ... United States... HOLMES: No, he never... He, of course, trained in the United States... lived in... many years. He was very... In a sense, he was called back as a figurehead by the young... But he took over; he was not a figurehead. He was a very strong... Now... There was an attempted revolt by the young Turks, and he put it down forcefully. He was not... shortly after... while I was still there, it happened. Q: ... HOLMES: No, I don't recall... He felt that we were in favor of what he was doing... moral support. We had to walk a little bit of a tightrope. After all, the British are our... allies... too strongly. I had very good relations with the governor... around the country... preparing... transition took place, although... He was... Q: ... HOLMES: ... Oh, well, that was one of those curious situations. Blantyre is and was a major city... commercial. It's still small; the whole place is small, everything's small. But Zomba was up in the highlands, and that was the British colonial capital, and that was about one hour's drive from Blantyre. Actually, I lived in Blantyre, but went to Zomba for talks with the governor. The governor lived there, as did the British administration. But Dr. Banda lived in Blantyre. So, I don't know what to say. As I say, I was assigned to Salisbury... to Blantyre, although he capital was in Zomba... PIERRE SHOSTAL Political Officer Lilongwe (1967-1969) Pierre Shostal was born in Paris in 1937. He graduated from Yale in 1956 and from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1958. His postings include Leopoldville, Kinshasa, Brussels, Lilongwe, Moscow, Kigali, Hamburg and Frankfurt. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 16, 1997. 3 Q: What were you doing in Malawi? SHOSTAL: I was Political Officer at the Embassy there. Q: Could you explain both where Malawi is and what the situation was at that time? SHOSTAL: Malawi is in southeastern Africa, just north of Mozambique and just west of Tanzania. In other words, it's a landlocked country. To its west is Zambia. So, that sort of gives you the location. It's a rather small country, quite poor, dominated by one of the great East African lakes, Lake Nyasa. The time that I was there was a period of geographic isolation and also political isolation for Malawi. What do I mean by that? Well, first of all, the geographic isolation was reinforced by the war that was going on then in northern Mozambique, the anti- colonial war being waged in Mozambique. Also, that sense of isolation was further reinforced by the Rhodesian sanctions that were going on at that time. The international community had imposed economic sanctions to try and bring the self-proclaimed Government of Rhodesia to heel. Where that affected Malawi was that a lot of the traffic and transportation links southward ran through Rhodesia, so the combination of those factors, the Mozambique Civil War and the Rhodesian sanctions, which for example made it possible for us to travel to Rhodesia. During my tour in Malawi, that sense of isolation was reinforced by a political decision by the President of Malawi, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa. This made Banda the odd-man out of black Africa. Q: When you talk about Banda, you could put it in two parts: one, before you went there and when you got there, how did you view him? SHOSTAL: Well, Banda was and actually is still alive and is now a very old man in prison, a really unique character. He was an African nationalist, in some respects one of the founding fathers of African nationalism, but he was also highly conservative and pragmatic, unlike the man who had been his mentor when both of them were in exile in the '40s and '50s in England, Kwame Nkrumah. When Banda returned to Africa from England, where he'd practiced medicine, in 1963 to become the first President of Malawi, he had very little patience for the kind of economic Marxism that people like in Nkrumah and other African nationalists at that time had. The result was that, although he copied some of their political ideas, for example one party rule, of people like Nkrumah, he gave them a very conservative cast that led him pretty quickly to part company with what was then called the Pan-African movement. Banda also realized that he had an opportunity for overcoming a certain amount of economic isolation through establishing relations with South Africa. South Africa was very eager to have a black African country recognize it and Banda got substantial economic benefits in terms of trade and assistance from South Africa. In particular, South Africa was able to realize Banda's dream of building a national capital in his own home geographic area in Central Malawi. So, it was a rather interesting period to watch from that viewpoint, although rather far removed from the central stage of world affairs. Q: What was your feeling at the time, the Embassy's and your's, of Banda? 4 SHOSTAL: Well, there was quite a split. On the whole, the leadership of our Embassy, the Ambassador and DCM were really quite favorable to Banda's ideas. Both of them were personally rather conservative people. Q: Who were they? SHOSTAL: The Ambassador was Marshall Jones who had been in EAP and Bill Barnsdale was the DCM. Barnsdale had really been an Italian hand up until that point.
Recommended publications
  • Malawi Homeless People's Federation & Centre for Community
    Malawi Homeless People’s Federation & Centre for Community Organisation and Development REPORT ON PREPATORY WORKS FOR UPFI PROJECTS IN MALAWI JULY 2009 INTRODUCTION The Urban Poor Fund International in November 2008, supported the CCODE and the Malawi Homeless People’s Federation to help build their capacity so as to fully manage and implement future projects. The funds provided were used to build the systems starting with activities at the group to the National Level. In March 2009, supplementary funds to the tune of $10,000 were provided from UPFI to finalise the capacity building programmes. This report is a progress report following on the report last submitted in January 2009. PROGRESS TO DATE Mchenga Fund System The system is currently being tested with small loans being provided to groups and to date the repayment procedures are being followed through and the repayment rates have improved immensely. Trainings for groups that are managing loans were carried out and currently the results of such trainings are already bearing fruit as groups are now able to report timely both to the CCODE office and to their respective districts and regions. One of the recommendations from the Urban Poor Fund International learning programme in Zimbabwe was that the hub would send a follow up team to learn and also evaluate some of the systems used by the Malawian Federation. The visit was undertaken and the outcome was very positive from the Zimbabwean team as they also experienced the preparedness of the Malawian Federation to undertake large scale capital projects again. Districts have started approving and implementing small projects using the systems which have been developed.
    [Show full text]
  • Advancing Women Leaders in Africa
    GLOBAL WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP INITIATIVE ADVANCING WOMEN LEADERS IN AFRICA A Policy Toolkit from Her Excellency Dr. Joyce Banda Former President of Malawi The Women in Public Service Project 1 WILSON CENTER Mission Gwen K. Young, The Wilson Center, chartered by Congress as the official memorial to President Director Woodrow Wilson, is the nation’s key non-partisan policy forum for tackling global Marie A. Principe, issues through independent research and open dialogue to inform actionable Program Associate ideas for the policy community. Ellysse Dick, Research: Who We Are Communications Assistant The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is the official memorial to our nation’s 28th president. More than just a collection of marble pillars and Special thanks to Elizabeth famous quotes, the Center is “a living memorial,” a gathering place for some of Grossman for providing the best and brightest scholars and experts from around the world. Their work is research, writing and ed- the centerpiece of our activity and informs the nation’s public policy debates with iting support for this publi- nonpartisan and relevant research and information. cation, and to Ellysse Dick and the Wilson Center Reason: What We Do design team for the design and layout. At the Wilson Center, preeminent scholars and experts research topics of national and international relevance. In the spirit of President Wilson, we build a bridge between the worlds of academia and public policy, to inform and develop solutions to the nation’s problems and challenges. Democracy is built on the About the notion of an informed and active citizenry.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 the African Dimension to the Anti-Federation Struggle, C.1950-53
    ‘It has united us far more closely than any other question would have accomplished’.1 The African Dimension to the Anti-Federation Struggle, c.1950-53 The documentary record of African opposition to the C[entral] A[frican] F[ederation] has been the subject renewed historiographical interest in recent years.2 This paper seeks to contribute to the existing debate in three principle ways. Firstly, it will be shown that opposition to the scheme was fatally undermined by the pursuit of two very distinct strands of N[yasaland] A[frican] C[ongress] and A[frican] N[ational] C[ongress] political activism. This dissimilar political discourse produced contradictions that resulted in the bypassing African objections. In the third instance, the paper will go a step further, suggesting that the two respective anti-Federation campaigns not only undermined Congress efforts to stop federation, but laid the path for future discord in the national dispensation then materialising. In 1988, John Darwin wrote that ‘with its telescope clapped firmly to its ear, London declared that [African] opposition [to Federation] could be neither seen nor heard’.3 The well-worn historiographical path points to the fact that African opposition was effectively ignored on the basis that ‘partnership’ between white settlers and black Africans in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland offered a strong rationale for the CAF. The requisite benefits arising would see the promotion of African economic opportunities, the placation of settler politicians seeking to reduce the influence of the Colonial Office and the preservation of British influence in the region.4 The utility of ‘partnership’ was in its ambiguity.
    [Show full text]
  • Addressing Food Security in Africa Via Multiple Livelihood Strategies of Women Farmers Christina H
    Food Policy 26 (2001) 177–207 www.elsevier.com/locate/foodpol Addressing food security in Africa via multiple livelihood strategies of women farmers Christina H. Gladwin a,*, Anne M. Thomson b, Jennifer S. Peterson c, Andrea S. Anderson d a Food and Resource Economics Department, Box 110240 IFAS, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611, USA b 66 Causewayhead Road, Stirling FK9 5EZ, UK c Africare, Niamey, Niger d Santa Fe Community College, Gainesville, FL, USA Received 17 November 1997; received in revised form 14 September 2000; accepted 5 December 2000 Abstract Because food insecurity is primarily a problem of low household incomes and poverty, and not just inadequate food production, projects and programs for food insecure African farmers which aim at increasing production of subsistence crops may be ineffective. Instead, govern- ment should look for ways to improve returns to farmers’ resources in a broader context, which may include expanded opportunities for non-farm microenterprises and agricultural labor. This has been the conventional wisdom since the writings of Amartya Sen. Still unclear, however, are the implications of his thinking for the roles of African women farmers who are tradition- ally the food-crop producers in Africa and are often food insecure. Immediate expansion of income-earning activities such as cash cropping and non-farm microenterprises may not be possible for women in male headed households in many African societies where cash income is seen as part of the male domain. In addition, women farmers may need a long adjustment period to diversify their income sources fully because most African countries are at the early stages of structural transformation.
    [Show full text]
  • LETTER to G20, IMF, WORLD BANK, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS and NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
    LETTER TO G20, IMF, WORLD BANK, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS and NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS We write to call for urgent action to address the global education emergency triggered by Covid-19. With over 1 billion children still out of school because of the lockdown, there is now a real and present danger that the public health crisis will create a COVID generation who lose out on schooling and whose opportunities are permanently damaged. While the more fortunate have had access to alternatives, the world’s poorest children have been locked out of learning, denied internet access, and with the loss of free school meals - once a lifeline for 300 million boys and girls – hunger has grown. An immediate concern, as we bring the lockdown to an end, is the fate of an estimated 30 million children who according to UNESCO may never return to school. For these, the world’s least advantaged children, education is often the only escape from poverty - a route that is in danger of closing. Many of these children are adolescent girls for whom being in school is the best defence against forced marriage and the best hope for a life of expanded opportunity. Many more are young children who risk being forced into exploitative and dangerous labour. And because education is linked to progress in virtually every area of human development – from child survival to maternal health, gender equality, job creation and inclusive economic growth – the education emergency will undermine the prospects for achieving all our 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and potentially set back progress on gender equity by years.
    [Show full text]
  • British Decolonisation in Africa, 1957-1965
    MIL UN P H L I) I G I A B L E I' AST THE WIND OF CHANGE': BRITISH DECOLONISATION IN AFRICA, 1957-1965 Carl Peter Watts estimates the importance of the different reasons for British withdrawal. Introduction nlike other empires in history - such as the Roman, Byzan- U tine, Ottoman, or Habsburg - the collapse of the British Empire was remarkably rapid. This was espe- cially true of the British Empire in Af- rica, which was largely dismantled in the years 1957-1965. Historians continue to disagree on the importance of metropoli- tan, colonial and international causes of this withdrawal. This article will argue that colonial nationalism and an increas- ingly hostile international environment contributed to the timing of indepen- dence in British Africa, but these influ- ences must also be understood against a background of changing metropolitan circumstances and the deliberate cal- culations of British pohcy-makers. This causal interlock will be demonstrated in relation to several episodes of decolo- nisation between 1957 and 1965, in- cluding the Gold Goast in West Africa, the East African territories of Tangan- yika, Uganda, and Kenya, and the col- lapse of the Gentral African Federation. Colonial Nationalism Historians like D. A. Low have empha- sised that without pressure from nation- alism Britain would have been more reluctant to quit its African colonies. According to this view, without colo- nial resistance neither the impact of international politics nor the process of domestic reassessment would have been enough to undermine British imperial power. African nationalism was stimu- lated by the Second World War, which Above: This poster from the Second World War emphasised the unity of Britain and required Britain to tighten control over the Commonwealth-Empire.
    [Show full text]
  • Dr. Chakwera Profile Final.Pdf
    Republic of Malawi President of the Republic of Malawi Profile DR. LAZARUS MCCARTHY CHAKWERA Dr. Lazarus McCarthy Chakwera is the current President of Malawi. He was sworn into office on June 28, 2020 at Malawi Square at Bingu International Convention Centre, Lilongwe. Before joining frontline politics, Chakwera was President of the Malawi Assemblies of God from 1989 until he resigned on May 14, 2013 to contest in the 2014 General Elections as a presidential candidate for the Malawi Congress party. That presidential election was marred by irregularities forcing the Electoral Commission to petition the High Court for permission to conduct a manual audit of the ballots. Though Chakwera was supportive of the audit, his rival, Arthur Peter Mutharika of Democratic Progressive Party took an injunction to stop it forcing the Commission to announce the results. Mutharika was declared winner by 8.6 percent margin. Following the declaration, Chakwera announced that he would not challenge the results to give Mutharika a chance to prove himself in the highest office. In the meantime, Chakwera won a parliamentary seat and became the Leader of Opposition in the National Assembly. He served as Leader of Opposition in the National Assembly until February 2019 when he submitted his nomination papers to the Electoral Commission for the second time to run for presidential election in the May 21, 2019 elections. The elections were highly contested and marred by irregularities. The Commission used widespread correction fluid on results sheets. Despite complaints and accusations about the irregularities, the Commission declared Mutharika winner by a margin of 3.1 percent.
    [Show full text]
  • Politics, Democracy and Governance in Independent
    POLITICS, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN INDEPENDENT MALAWI: The dichotomy between promises and reality Art of Larisa: Mask from Malawi By WEBSTER SIAME KAMEME A Dissertation submitted to The University of Birmingham in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY Centre of West African Studies School of History and Cultures College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham January 2011 1 POLITICS, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN INDEPENDENT MALAWI: The dichotomy between promises and reality MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY Dissertation By WEBSTER SIAME KAMEME 2 Table of Contents Table of Contents ……………………………………………………….. 3-6 Acronyms ……………………………………………………………….. 7 Dedication ……………………………………………………………….. 8 Acknowledgements ……………………………………………….. 8 Abstract ……………………………………………………………….. 9 Chapter 1: Introductory ……………………………………………….. 10 1.0 Introduction ……………………………………………………….. 10 1.1 Background information ……………………………………….. 11 1.2 Objectives and Scope of Research ……………………….. 15 1.3 Conclusion ……………………………………………………….. 16 Chapter 2: Review of Literature ……………………………………….. 17 2.0 Introduction ……………………………………………………….. 17 2.1 The Politics of Democracy in Contemporary Malawi ……….. 17 2.2 Parliamentary Politics and Accountability ……………….. 19 2.2.1 Legitimisation ……………………………………….. 19 2.2.2 Political Accountability ……………………………….. 20 2.2.3 Abuse of Political Power ……………………………….. 21 2.3 Parliamentary Democracy ……………………………………….. 22 2.3.1 The will of the people ……………………………….. 23 2.3.2 Authority of Government ……………………………….. 24 2.4 Critical issues of governance in Malawi Parliament ……….. 25 2.4.1 Accountability of Parliament and its Members ……….. 27 2.4.2 The importance of transparency ……………………….. 29 2.4.3 Parliament and the rule of law ……………………….. 30 2.4.4 Participatory Democracy ……………………………….. 31 2.4.5 Consensus ……………………………………………….. 33 2.4.6 A responsive Parliament ……………………………….. 34 2.5 The dichotomy between regime and state ……………….
    [Show full text]
  • Meaning of Umunthu
    MEANING OF UMUNTHU COMMUNITY SPIRIT FOR THE BUILDING OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE SOCIO –POLITICAL SITUATION OF MALAWI submitted by Mennas Vincent Mukaka for the Academic Degree of Doctor of Theology at the Karl-Franzens University of Graz Institute/Department of Catholic Theology under the Supervision of Prof. Dr. Leopold Neuhold (1. Supervisor) Prof. DDr. Reinhold Easterbauer (2. Supervisor) © 2015 Mennas Vincent Mukaka iii DECLARATION I DECLARE THAT THIS DISSERTATION IS MY OWN WORK AND ALL THE SOURCES HAVE BEEN QUOTED AND ACKNOWLEDGED BY MEANS OF COMPLETE REFERENCES AND NO PART OF THE DISSERTATION HAS BEEN SUBMITTED FOR ANY OTHER DEGREE. Mennas Vincent Mukaka…………………………………………….. Date:…………………………………………… Place:………………………………………….. iv ACKNOWLEGEMENT “I am because you are, since you are therefore I am”. This thesis is achieved with the assistance of others without whom it could not have been accomplished. There are many people who have contributed to this work and I cannot manage to mention all of them, but all should know and feel that I greatly appreciate their contribution. I would like to acknowledge my deep indebtedness and thanks to the following people in particular: Dr Leopold Neuhold, my doctorate father, and DDr Reinhold Esterbauer, my second supervisor. I have benefited, at different stages of the project, from their contributions and friendly guidance. They are crucially responsible for the actions which led to the completion of this thesis. In addition, this work could not have been completed without the support offered by the Comboni Missionaries of the German Speaking Province (DSP). In particular I thank Mag. Fr. Joseph Altenburger, once my formator in Innsbruck, the then Provincial Superior of the German speaking Province who accepted that I do my studies in Graz.
    [Show full text]
  • Causes of Civil War Duration: Mozambique and Angola by the Method of Difference
    研究論文 ARTICLE Causes of Civil War Duration: Mozambique and Angola by the Method of Difference Kayo NAKAZAWA Forum of International Development Studies. 48―5(Mar. 2018) Causes of Civil War Duration: Mozambique and Angola by the Method of Difference Kayo NAKAZAWA* Abstract This research empirically examines the causes of the civil war duration gap between the civil wars of Mozambique and Angola by the method of difference. Mozambique and Angola are comparable cases, so they are best-fit cases for this method. The research proposes external state intervention, state capacity, weapons industry, UN Trust Fund, and type of natural resources as tentative independent variables. This research explores causality between each independent variable and dependent variable by process tracing on qualitative scales and employs a combination of area studies and statistical analysis to reinforce each tentative independent variable. The historical discourse also covers the internal validity problem of small-N studies by process tracing. This research concludes that UN Trust Fund and type of natural resources are both genuine variables to determine 10 years of civil war duration gap between the two states. The results of the analysis are applicable to Mozambique and Angola from 1975 to 2002 and show limited generalization. Keywords : Mozambique, Angola, Civil War Duration, Method of Difference, Process Tracing 1. Introduction Mozambique and Angola, which are part of Lusophone Africa, are located in southern Africa. They share similarities in terms of historical, social, political, and economic dimensions that they do not have in common with other Lusophone states. Moreover, both states have experienced long civil wars. However, there is a duration gap between the civil wars of these two states.
    [Show full text]
  • Stephen A. Emerson. the Battle for Mozambique: the Frelimo-Renamo Struggle (1977-1992)
    Stephen A. Emerson. The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle (1977-1992). West Midlands: Helion and Company Limited, 2014. 288 pp. $35.00, paper, ISBN 978-1-909384-92-7. Reviewed by Michel Cahen Published on H-Luso-Africa (January, 2015) Commissioned by Philip J. Havik (Instituto de Higiene e Medicina Tropical (IHMT)) The British historian Malyn Newitt wrote the And the guns would remain silent” (p. 34). It ap‐ following about The Battle for Mozambique: pears that he does not address the 2013-14 crisis. “Steve Emerson has written the most comprehen‐ Of course, a fully developed “new” civil war did sive account of the civil war in Mozambique that not materialize in Mozambique during these two has yet been attempted,”, and he underlines his years, but local violent skirmishes probably led to statement by explaining that “Emerson’s account several hundred deaths. Renamo was, surprising‐ is largely a military history” (p. 1). If one accepts ly, able to swiftly recover an armed wing, which that a war’s history may merely be the story of a could not be, twenty-one years later, the mere mo‐ battle, Newitt’s observation is correct and can be bilization of some veteran guerrilla soldiers reinforced when he stresses that one of the quali‐ equipped with rusty Kalashnikovs. Indeed, cur‐ ties of the book is the extensive use of interviews rently some Renamo fghters appear to be young with former participants, as well as the sheer men. On October 15, 2014, political competition number of facts, some of them “told” for the frst between Frelimo and Renamo—and the Movi‐ time.
    [Show full text]
  • Operation Bwezani”: the Army, Political Change, and Dr
    Nordic Journal of African Studies 13(2): 146–163 (2004) “OPERATION BWEZANI”: THE ARMY, POLITICAL CHANGE, AND DR. BANDA’S HEGEMONY IN MALAWI REUBEN CHIRAMBO University of Malawi, Malawi ABSTRACT When the Malawi Army violently disarmed the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), a paramilitary wing of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), in Operation Bwezani at the height of the political transition in December 1993, their action was hailed as marking a turning point in Malawi Army relationship to politics. It was also cheered as a profoundly significant catalyst for the political transition to democracy from Banda’s autocracy. This article, however, argues that the fact that for close to thirty years the army did not act against Banda or his repressive machinery even when the army itself was a victim indicates the extent of Banda’s hegemony in Malawi. Banda’s hegemony undermined the Army’s potential for resistance to oppression in Malawi. It concludes that the Army’s action to disarm MYP was the result of the civilian political transition and not necessarily the cause. The, Army, therefore, was more of a beneficiary of the political transition than a catalyst. Keywords: hegemony, oppression, political change INTRODUCTION Political change from former life president Dr. H.K. Banda’s autocracy to democracy in Malawi in the early 1990s was remarkably peaceful. This, given the repressive nature of Banda’s regime, was contrary to fears that Banda would not easily give up power. Dr. Banda led Malawi to independence from British colonial rule in 1964 and ruled the country as a single-party dictatorship of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) up to 1993.
    [Show full text]