MIL UN P H L I) I G I A B L E I' AST THE WIND OF CHANGE': BRITISH DECOLONISATION IN AFRICA, 1957-1965

Carl Peter Watts estimates the importance of the different reasons for British withdrawal.

Introduction nlike other empires in history - such as the Roman, Byzan- U tine, Ottoman, or Habsburg - the collapse of the was remarkably rapid. This was espe- cially true of the British Empire in Af- rica, which was largely dismantled in the years 1957-1965. Historians continue to disagree on the importance of metropoli- tan, colonial and international causes of this withdrawal. This article will argue that colonial nationalism and an increas- ingly hostile international environment contributed to the timing of indepen- dence in British Africa, but these influ- ences must also be understood against a background of changing metropolitan circumstances and the deliberate cal- culations of British pohcy-makers. This causal interlock will be demonstrated in relation to several episodes of decolo- nisation between 1957 and 1965, in- cluding the Gold Goast in West Africa, the East African territories of Tangan- yika, Uganda, and Kenya, and the col- lapse of the Gentral African Federation.

Colonial Nationalism Historians like D. A. Low have empha- sised that without pressure from nation- alism Britain would have been more reluctant to quit its African colonies. According to this view, without colo- nial resistance neither the impact of international politics nor the process of domestic reassessment would have been enough to undermine British imperial power. African nationalism was stimu- lated by the Second World War, which Above: This poster from the Second World War emphasised the unity of Britain and required Britain to tighten control over the Commonwealth-Empire. Such propaganda made it difficult for the British to deny its colonies in order to harness essen- constitutional reform in Africa after the war tial resources for the fight against the

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Axis powers. In 1942 the Governor of 1956, the colony became independent territories into federations. In East Africa Uganda, Sir Charles Dundas, suggested under Nkrumah's leadership as the state the attempt to establish a federation of the war would have a 'rousing influence, of in 1957. Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika foun- chiefly political and social, and it will One British official observed that dered on the rocks of African opposition. be sheer blindness not to foresee tbe Ghana had become independent 'with and the Tanganyika Africa logical consequences'. Africans wanted less bitterness' than former colonies in Union capitalised on discontent gener- to be rewarded for their services to the Asia, yet within a short time Nkrumah ated by local government reorganisation British Empire with greater economic became a spokesman for anti- and agricultural improvement schemes. and political opportunities, but they and African unity, which embarrassed The Governor, Sir Richard Turnbull, were bitterly disappointed when these Britain in Commonwealth meetings and warned that local nationalism would failed to materialise. When Charles at the United Nations. Lord Home, then undermine British rule unless there was Arden-Clarke took over as Governor of Commonwealth Secretary, wrote that a rapid transfer of power. The Colonial the Gold Coast following riots in 1948, Nkrumah regarded himself as 'a Messiah Office appreciated that swift decolonisa- the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech sent to deliver Africa from bondage . tion would encourage Nyerere and other Jones, told him that the colony stood on In contrast to West Africa, British nationalists to collaborate with the UK, the edge of revolution. An investigative colonies in East and Central Africa which Britain sought as a substitute for commission concluded that 'a substan- contained significant white settler popu- direct control. By 1960 the Conserva- tial measure of reform is necessary to lations, who dominated local politics and tive government was increasingly worried meet the legitimate aspirations of the the economy. They sought to maintain that the effects of violent confrontations indigenous population'. However, time their dominance by denying universal with nationalism in the Belgian Congo for reform was running out. In 1950 suffrage to Afiicans, and persuading the and French Algeria could spill over into 's Convention People's British government to consolidate colonial British colonies. It was against this back- Party (CPP) orchestrated a campaign ground that the British Prime Minister of civil disobedience in support of Harold Macmillan delivered his famous self-government, and Nkrumah was speech to the South African Parliament imprisoned for a brief period. However, * * Nkrumah regarded in February 1960, in which he declared: Arden-Clarke recognised that the CPP himself as *a Messiah 'The wind of change is blowing through embodied popular political aspirations this continent and whether we like it or and he therefore released Nkrumah. In sent to deliver Africa not, this growth of national conscious- the 1951 elections the CPP won 34 out fronn bondage' f f ness is a political fact. We must all accept of 38 seats and Nkrumah soon became it as a fact, and our national policies must prime minister. As a result of further take account of it. , Colo- CPP electoral victories in 1954 and nial Secretary in 1959-61, acted more

Above: A summit meeting of the modem multi-racial Commonwealth of Nations in the 1980s, with (inset) a similar; all-v\Ai(te meeting fnam the 1920s (with George V in the centre of the bottom TOWan d Stanley Baldwin to his right).

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violent methods oF the Mau Mau, which showed the limits oF AFrican nationalism in Kenya. In this instance Britain was v\ illing to resort to a policy oF coercion, which partly rejected the political inFIu- ence oF the white settler population over the Gonservative government. A state oF emergency was declared and the authorities imprisoned the charismatic leader oF the Kenyan AFrican Union, . The British Army also mounted counterinsurgency operations. During Operation Anvil (April 1954), the Army rounded up thousands oF Kikuyu in the capital, Nairobi, and sent them to holding camps For questioning and political rehabilitation'. However, the brutality oF the counterinsurgency campaign stained the reputation oF the British Army and the colonial police Force. The revelation that 11 prisoners were beaten to death at the Hola deten- tion camp in March 1959, and that there had been an attempted cover-up, gener- ated cross-party indignation in Parlia- ment and a wave oF revulsion among the British puhlic. Gonsequently, the British government ordered the release oF Kikuyu detainees and an end to the prison policy oF 'compelling Force'. TTie Governor oF Kenya, Sir Patrick Rcnison, continued to regard Kenyatta as 'dark- ness and death', but in 1961, as a result oF popular pressure in Kenya, he came round to the view oF British oFFicials who thought that he ought to be released From prison and independence granted on the basis oF AFrican majority rule. Kenyatta became President oF Kenya in 1963

In 1953 the British Government established the Gentral AFrican Federa- tion, which the historian Ronald Hyam has described as 'the most controver- sial large-scale imperial exercise in constructive state-building ever under- taken by the British government'. The Federation consisted oFthe territories oF Above: lain Macleod, Britain's progressive Secretary of State for the Colonies, talks with Southern , , Julius Nyerere, leader ofTANiJ (theTanganyika African National Union), in Dar-es-Salaam. and . The European popula- Tanganyika became independent, under Nyerere's leadership, in 1961. In 1964 it joined with tion constituted a tiny minority (8 per Zanzibar to form present-day Tanzania. cent in , 3 per cent in Northern Rhodesia, and just 0.3 per cent in Nyasaland) but their social, quickly than even Macmillan had envis- especially traumatic. The Mau Mau economic and political dominance stim- aged. He accelerated the original time- uprising (1952-60) appeared to illus- ulated the growth oFAFrican nationalism. table For independence in East AFrica trate the strength oF AFrican nation- Racial tension increased throughout the by a decade, so that independence was alism. However, the Mau Mau were Federation and in January 1959 there grunted to Tanganyika in 1961, Uganda drawn only From the Kikuyu tribe, who was widespread rioting in Nyasaland, in 1962, and Kenya in 1963. constituted just one-Filth oF the popula- which prompted the authorities to British decolonisation in Kenya was tion, and not all Kikuyu agreed with the declare a state oF emergency.

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Macleod sought to calm down the the ability to recruit local collaborators, on to African colonies the public would situation in Nyasaland by instigating but during the 1950s the British found have been reluctant to countenance the release of the Gongress that they could no longer rally enough heavy expenditure on lurther emergen- Party (MGP) leader, Hastings Banda. collaborators and that African national- cies resulting from confrontations with In December 1959 Macleod wrote to ists were becoming more successful in African nationalists. Macmillan advising that 'There are no mobilising popular support. Although more moderate leaders likely to emerge Britain was able to contain even violent than Banda himself and an early move local challenges to its rule, as in Kenya, Decolonisation towards independence was the best there was a growing concern among course of action. Banda was released on policy-makers that similar confronta- tended to cause more 1 April 1960, and a new constitution was tions might become worse in the future. agreed in July 1960. Elections in August This concern was reinforced by the debate within political 1961 resulted in a majority for the domestic and international instability parties than between MGP and internal self-government was that had accompanied French reversals achieved in the spring of 1963. Mean- in Algeria and Indochina. As discussed them.This was while, in October 1960, the Monckton below, the British government calcu- particularly true for Gommission recommended an African lated that attempts to prolong colonial majority on the Northern Rhodesia rule in Africa on the basis of force would many Conservatives, Legislative Gouncil and concluded that be a dangerous strategy against the back- who were anguished by the Federation could not be maintained ground of changing metropolitan condi- in its present form. Macleod wrote to tions and the developing Gold War. the pace of withdrawal the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy fronn Africa f f Welensky, telling him: 'We cannot hold the position by a Ganute-like process Metropolitan Factors of ordering tides to return ... move we The historian A.J.P. Taylor once Doubt about the economic value of must. The Federation was dissolved on remarked: 'The British maintained that Britain's African colonies was another 31 December 1963. Nyasaland became they were no longer strong enough to factor that conditioned the calcula- independent as Malawi in , and maintain their Empire. It would be truer tions of metropolitan policy-makers. Northern Rhodesia became independent to say that they no longer believed in it.' In the 1950s Britain was experiencing as Zambia in October 1964. The white Gertainly, there was some disillusion- an economic boom which led Harold settlers in Southern Rhodesia declared ment in Britain about African affairs. The Macmillan to remark in July 1957 that themselves independent in November rapid succession of African crises during 'most of our people have never had it 1965. but legal independence under 1959 and 1960 - the Nyasaland emer- so good'. Yet Macmillan, who had been African majority rule was not achieved by gency, the Hola camp atrocities, and the Ghancellor of the Exchequer before the state of Zimbabwe until April 1980. Sharpeville massacre in - he became Prime Minister, was not I I gave ammunition to imperial critics who convinced that the Empire offered fired on the moral bankruptcy of British substantial economic benefits to the imperial administrators and the racism of majority oí the British population. He Macleod wrote white supremacists. Yet despite the indig- instructed Whitehall to carry out an audit to the Federal Prime nation of indixidual MPs such as Fenner of Empire and, although this cost-benefit Brockway and Barbara Gastle, and pres- analysis proved inconclusive, he made Minister, Sir Roy sure groups such as the Movement for up his own mind that the Empire was Welensky, telling him: Golonial Freedom, there is little exadence fast becoming a liability. Doubts about that African issues made a significant the economic advantages of the Empire *We cannot hold impact on parliamentary politics. Decol- subsequently became more pronounced. the position by a onisation tended to cause more debate Although British living standards were within political parties than between rising, other indicators - such as the Canute-like process them. This was particularly true for many sluggish rate of growth, regular balance of ordering tides Gonservatives, who were anguished by of payments deficits, and a shrinking the pace of withdrawal from Africa. The share of world manufacturing exports to return ... move fact that imperial and Gommonwealth — suggested that the British economy we must' f ^ issues were largely absent from general was in relative decline. By the early elections in 1959 and 1964 suggests that 1960s it was also becoming apparent public opinion was not preoccupied by that a growing proportion of British The frequency with which local polit- African crises. Nevertheless, the Gonser- exports were going to Europe rather than ical unrest punctuated the final stages of vative government did have to operate the Empire-Gommonwealth. and at this British rule suggests that it is a signifi- in a changing political environment. point Britain accelerated decolonisation cant factor in explaining British with- The British people wanted welfare, not in Africa and applied to join the European drawal from Africa. At its height British warfare, and it is reasonable to assume Economic Gommunity. imperialism had derived its strength from that if the government had tried to hang Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to

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requirements, but this level of expendi- ture proved unsustainable, and by 1964 Britain's armed forces were seriously stretched by global commitments. The extent of Britain's over-stretch was partly responsible for the decision not to inter- vene militarily against the white settlers in Central Africa and for Britain's with- drawal from 'East of Suez'after 1968. From a metropolitan perspective, then, the moral critique of Empire interlocked with a developing sense of its economic and strategic redun- dancy. Britains economic weakness demanded greater domestic investment and modernisation, shifting the balance of exports away from colonial econo- mies towards Europe, and reducing the hurden of overseas expenditure. Taken together, these factors suggested that an Empire based on conventional colonial rule was less useful than a Common- wealth through which Britain could attempt to exert informal influence.

The International Environment The struggle to maintain Britain's global influence became increasingly difficult as a result of international develop- ments dating hack to the end of the First World War During the interwar period the League of Nations Mandate system introduced the idea of accountability into colonial administration, suggesting that imperial powers had a respon- Above: jomo Kenyatta, the Kikuyu leader who was imprisoned by the British in 1951-61 sihility to develop territories for the but who became the first Prime Minister and then President of an independent Kenya. He benefit of the colonial population. Then pursued a policy of conciliation towards his country's white settlers. the Second World War - a war against fascist and Japanese imperialism and racism - gave great hope to nationalist assume that all plans to reverse Britain's then Britain's withdrawal from Africa was movements seeking autonomy and inde- relative economic decline and modernise complete, with the exception of Southern pendence. Although Britain recovered its the economy hinged upon a reorientation Rhodesia (now simply 'Rhodesia ), which Asian colonial territories by 1945, Japa- of policy towards Europe. Indeed until continued to cost Britain millions of nese victories had shattered the image of 1965 Harold Wilson and the Labour Party pounds each year in lost trade as a result white racial superiority, thus encouraging favoured closer links with the Empire- of economic sanctions. African nationalists in their desire for Commonwealth to achieve this objec- Britain's strategic capabilities, independence. Then, after the Second tive. Labour's 1964 election manifesto including its ability to retain its imperial World War, the United Nations provided declared that a future Labour government possessions in/Vfrica, were conditioned to a critical forum lor anti-colonial pressure, would revitalise the Commonwealth some extent by economic factors. In 1957 and in 1960 the Afro-Asian bloc secured through economic and technical co-oper- Britain became the worlds third thermo- the passage of General Assembly Reso- ation. Wilson and the right wing of the nuclear power, but its global position was lution 1514 (.XV), the Declaration on the Party also saw the Commonwealth as an becoming increasingly difficult to main- Granting of Independence to Colonial essential vehicle for Britain's continued tain as a result of the expense of modern People, which emphasised the respon- global role. However, the Rhodesian crisis military equipment, both nuclear and sibility of imperial powers for bringing wrecked these aspirations and once again conventional. In 1960 it was estimated their colonies to independence without Whitehall was asked to produce studies that Britain should spend around 7-8 per delay. This was a source of great pres- on the value of the Commonwealth. By cent of gross national product on defence sure on Britain, especially in relation

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to difficult racial issues such as those alarm some sections of the US govern- and shrinking strategic capabilities, ln in the Gentral African Federation and ment. Also, whereas in the final years concert with the United States, Britain Southern Rhodesia. of the Federation there had been no decided that it was prudent to settle with Britain also had to contend with threat to British and American economic African nationalists before war broke out contradictory impulses from the United interests, the prospect of a unilateral between blacks and whites, or before States in the context of the Gold War. declaration of independence (UDI) by the Africans turned to the USSR or On the one hand, the USA was ideo- Southern Rhodesia raised the possibility Ghina for assistance. Although Britain's logically opposed to imperialism and put of economic sanctions against Southern withdrawal from Africa was rapid, the pressure on Britain to quit its colonies so Rhodesia and Rhodesian retaliatory action British government nevertheless enjoyed that US businesses could gain access to against the economy of its neighbor, a fundamental advantage in dealing with new markets and resources. Successive Zambia. Britain and the United States nationalist leaders because they were American governments also believed that could not ignore this eventuality because ultimately willing to co-operate in order decolonisation was necessary to prevent they were heavily involved in and depen- to secure independence. After indepen- communism from becoming more attrac- dent upon Zambian copper production. dence they were broadly friendly towards tive to nationalist movements seeking These shifting circumstances prompted Britain and the United States - despite international support. This partly explains the United States to become more vocal the impact of Rhodesia's UDI - which why President Eisenhower was so angry in the period following the dissolution suggests that the British had achieved with the Eden government during the of the Federation. As the likelihood of a fundamental objective in their with- Suez Grisis of 1956. On the other hand, UDI increased, Anglo-American relations drawal from of Africa. it is important not to exaggerate the became subject to greater strain, particu- effects of American anti-colonialism. larly because the British government was Macmillan moved quickly to restore slow to formulate the details of its contin- Issues to Dehate Anglo-American relations after Suez and gency plans. After UDI the United States • Did Britain withdraw from its African the United States was usually keen to continued to support Britain publicly, colonies because of pressure from help Britain in the management of diffi- especially in the United Nations, but African nationalists? cult colonial problems, such as those in privately American officials grumbled • How and why did attitudes towards Gentral Africa. Until the demise of the about the imprecision in British policy. African colonies change in Britain Gentral African Federation the United Documentary evidence in Britain and during the 1950s and 1960sr States gave consistent support to British the United States demonstrates just how • To what extent did the international policy. A key reason for this was the fact closely the two powers collaborated on environment become more hostile that Gold War considerations were of African matters, especially in assessing to colonialism and what effect did only marginal relevance; there was no the extent of communist infiltration this have on British colonial policy significant communist activity in any of of the continent. Indeed Sir Andrew in Africa? the Federation territories and African Gohen, a former Governor of Uganda nationalists actively sought American and a British representative at the UN, I' LI r t h e r R e a d i n support, so the US government was rela- was worried that 'killing communism' tively relaxed about British policy. seemed to be the main objective of Lawrence j. Butler, Britain and Empire: African policy in the 1960s, rather than Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World preparing stable and viable regimes for (Tauris, 2002). independence. The preoccupation oi Judith M. Brown, and Wm. R Louis British de- British and American policy-makers (eds). The Oxford History of the British colonisation in Africa with Gold War concerns has led some Empire Vol. IV: the Twentieth Century historians, such as Ronald Hyam and (Oxford University Press, 1999). can best be explained William Roger Louis, to conclude that John Danwin, Brrto/n ar)d Decolonisation: by the exigencies of British decolonisation in Africa can best Retreat from Empire in the Post-war be explained by the exigencies of the World (Blackwell, 1988). the international international environment. Robert F. Holland, European environment , 1918-81 (Palgrave Conclusion Macmillan, 1985). Ronald Hyam, Britain's Declining Empire: British decolonisation in Africa in the the Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968 During 1964 and 1965, however, some period 1957-65 was influenced to (Cambridge University Press. 2007) of the underlying factors that had shaped some extent by nationalist movements Nicholas White, Decolonisation: the BrrOsh US policy in the earlier period began to in British colonies, and by the lessons Experience since 1945 (Longman, 1999). shift. For example, as the discrimination learned from French and Belgian decolo- against Africans in Southern Rhodesia nisation. Policy-makers judged that the Dr Carl P.Watts teaches Modern History and showed no sign of abatement and Britain British public would not tolerate exten- Government and Politics at the Isle ofWight continued to profess its inability to sive British military' commitments in College 6th Form. He is an Honorary Fellow in the intervene, opportunities for communist Africa. Nor could Britain afford this in Department of History at Southampton University infiltration increased, which tended to the context of relative economic decline and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.

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