Smallpox, Genetic Engineering, and Bio-Terrorism
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Construction and Characterization of an Infectious Vaccinia Virus And
Proc. Nat. Acad Sci. USA Vol. 80, pp. 7155-7159, December 1983 Biochemistry Construction and characterization of an infectious vaccinia virus recombinant that expresses the influenza hemagglutinin gene and induces resistance to influenza virus infection in hamsters (hybrid vaccinia virus/chimeric gene/live virus vaccine/recombinant DNA) GEOFFREY L. SMITH*, BRIAN R. MURPHYt, AND BERNARD MOSS* *Laboratory of Biology of Viruses and tLaboratory of Infectious Diseases, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD 20205 Communicated by Robert M. Chanock, August 29, 1983 ABSTRACT A DNA copy of the influenza virus hemagglu- striction sites for the insertion of the foreign gene segment (6, tinin gene, derived from influenza virus A/Jap/305/57 (H2N2) 7). was inserted into the genome of vaccinia virus under the control In this communication, we describe the formation and prop- of an early vaccinia virus promoter. Tissue culture cells infected erties of a vaccinia virus recombinant that contains the influ- with the purified recombinant virus synthesized influenza hem- enza virus gene for hemagglutinin (HA). The HA genes from agglutinin, which was glycosylated and transported to the cell sur- several influenza subtypes have been cloned and their se- face where it could' be cleaved with trypsin into HAI and HA2 quences determined (14-18), and some of these been ex- subunits. Rabbits and hamsters inoculated intradermally with re- have combinant virus produced circulating antibodies that inhibited pressed in simian virus 40 (SV40) virus vectors (19-22). The hemagglutination by influenza virus. Furthermore, vaccinated product-of this gene is probably the most thoroughly studied hamsters achieved levels of antibody similar to those obtained upon integral membrane protein: its three-dimensional structure has primary infection with influenza virus and were protected against been determined (23), antigenic sites have been mapped (24), respiratory infection with the A/Jap/305/57 influenza virus. -
Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras Ryan Hagglund
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal Volume 25 | Issue 1 Article 4 2008 Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras Ryan Hagglund Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Ryan Hagglund, Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 25 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 51 (2012). Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol25/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PATENTABILITY OF HUMAN-ANIMAL CHIMERAS Ryan Hagglundt Abstract The chimera was a mythological creature with a lion 's head, goat's body, and serpent's tail. Because of recent advances in biotechnology, such permutations on species are no longer the stuff of myth and legend The term "chimera " has come to describe a class of genetically engineered creatures composed of some cells from one species, which thus contain genetic material derived entirely from that species, and some cells from another species, containing only genetic material from that species. Scientists have created a goat- sheep chimera or "geep" which exhibits physical characteristicsof both animals. Likewise, scientists have also used the tools of modern molecular biology to create human-animal chimeras containing both human and animal cells. While none of the human-animal chimeras hitherto created have exhibited significant human characteristics,the synthesis of human-animal chimeras raises significant ethical concerns. -
Pathogens As Weapons Gregory Koblentz the International Security Implications of Biological Warfare
Pathogens as Weapons Pathogens as Weapons Gregory Koblentz The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare Biological weapons have become one of the key security issues of the twenty-ªrst century.1 Three factors that ªrst emerged in the 1990s have contributed to this phenomenon. First, revelations regarding the size, scope, and sophistication of the Soviet and Iraqi biological warfare programs focused renewed attention on the prolifera- tion of these weapons.2 Second, the catastrophic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the anthrax letters sent to media outlets and Senate ofªces in the United States during the following month, demonstrated the desire of terror- ists to cause massive casualties and heightened concern over their ability to employ biological weapons.3 Third, signiªcant advances in the life sciences have increased concerns about how the biotechnology revolution could be ex- ploited to develop new or improved biological weapons.4 These trends suggest that there is a greater need than ever to answer several fundamental questions about biological warfare: What is the nature of the threat? What are the poten- tial strategic consequences of the proliferation of biological weapons? How ef- Gregory Koblentz is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I would like to thank Robert Art, Thomas Christensen, Linda Fu, Jeanne Guillemin, Kendall Hoyt, Milton Leitenberg, John Ellis van Courtland Moon, Julian Perry Robinson, Harvey Sapolsky, Mar- garet Sloane, Jonathan Tucker, and Stephen Van Evera for their support and discussion of previous drafts. I am also grateful for comments from the participants in seminars at the Massachusetts In- stitute of Technology’s Security Studies Program, Harvard University’s John M. -
Vaccinia Virus and Poxvirology M E T H O D S I N M O L E C U L a R B I O L O G Y™
METHODS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY BIOLOGYTMTM Volume 269 VVacciniaaccinia VirusVirus andand PoxvirologyPoxvirology MethodsMethods andand ProtocolsProtocols Edited by Stuart N. Isaacs Vaccinia Virus and Poxvirology M E T H O D S I N M O L E C U L A R B I O L O G Y™ John M. Walker, SERIES EDITOR 291. Molecular Toxicology Protocols, edited by 270. Parasite Genomics Protocols, edited by Sara Phouthone Keohavong and Stephen G. Grant, E. Melville, 2004 2005 269. Vaccina Virus and Poxvirology: Methods 290. Basic Cell Culture, Third Edition, edited by and Protocols,edited by Stuart N. Isaacs, 2004 Cheryl D. Helgason and Cindy Miller, 2005 268. Public Health Microbiology: Methods and Protocols, edited by John F. T. Spencer and 289. Epidermal Cells, Methods and Applications, Alicia L. Ragout de Spencer, 2004 edited by Kursad Turksen, 2004 267. Recombinant Gene Expression: Reviews and 288. Oligonucleotide Synthesis, Methods and Appli- Protocols, Second Edition, edited by Paulina cations, edited by Piet Herdewijn, 2004 Balbas and Argelia Johnson, 2004 287. Epigenetics Protocols, edited by Trygve O. 266. Genomics, Proteomics, and Clinical Tollefsbol, 2004 Bacteriology: Methods and Reviews, edited 286. Transgenic Plants: Methods and Protocols, by Neil Woodford and Alan Johnson, 2004 edited by Leandro Peña, 2004 265. RNA Interference, Editing, and 285. Cell Cycle Control and Dysregulation Modification: Methods and Protocols, edited Protocols: Cyclins, Cyclin-Dependent Kinases, by Jonatha M. Gott, 2004 and Other Factors, edited by Antonio Giordano 264. Protein Arrays: Methods and Protocols, and Gaetano Romano, 2004 edited by Eric Fung, 2004 284. Signal Transduction Protocols, Second Edition, 263. Flow Cytometry, Second Edition, edited by edited by Robert C. -
Molecular Phylogenetic Analysis
Assignment #2 Physics 498: Statistical Physics of Biological Complexity and Information Molecular Phylogenetic Analysis Date of Submission: 31th October, 2001 Rahul Roy Center for Biophysics and Computational Biology University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign email: [email protected] Evolve by Borrowing ? Rahul Roy Center for Biophysics and Computational Biology University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign Introduction Molecular evolution over a period of four billion years has resulted in the development of present myriad of species from a hot soup of molecules. It has resulted in the evolution of complex multicellular organisms (Eukaryotes) along with single-celled organisms like prokaryotes at the same time. The question that has baffled scientists for long is: how did this incredible transition from a soup to this complex state take place? The discussion, that still continues, as how life started from the primordial soup is not the emphasis of the present debate, though Stanley Miller showed in, as back as 1950s, that organic chemicals can be synthesized from completely inorganic inputs. It has been proposed based on structural and functional complexity and fossil evidence that prokaryotes must have predated the eukaryotes by at least 1.0-2.0 billion years [Knoll, 1992]. This has led to the notion that eukaryotic cells have evolved from more simple prokaryotic organisms with which they share numerous common (or related) molecules [Margulis, 1970; Zillig, 1991]. Indeed, studies have shown that a number of eukaryotic organelles (namely mitochondria and chloroplasts) bear a close evolutionary relationship to specific groups of prokaryotes (namely α-proteobacteria and cyanobacteria, respectively) [Gray, 1992] So, how did the complex multicellular eukaryotes evolve from prokaryotes? To understand the origin of the eukaryotic cells a number of theories have been proposed. -
Alibek, Tularaemia and the Battle of Stalingrad
Obligations (EC-36/DG.16 dated 4 March 2004, Corr.1 dated 15 Conference of the States Parties (C-9/6, dated 2 December 2004). March 2004 and Add.1 dated 25 March 2004); Information on 13 the Implementation of the Plan of Action for the Implementation Conference decision C-9/DEC.4 dated 30 November 2004, of Article VII Obligations (S/433/2004 dated 25 June 2004); Second www.opcw.org. Progress Report on the OPCW Plan of Action Regarding the 14 Note by the Director-General: Report on the Plan of Action Implementation of Article VII Obligations (EC-38/DG.16 dated Regarding the Implementation of Article VII Obligations (EC- 15 September 2004; Corr.1 dated 24 September 2004; and Corr.2 42/DG.8 C-10/DG.4 and Corr.1 respectively dated 7 and 26 dated 13 October 2004); Report on the OPCW Plan of Action September 2005; EC-M-25/DG.1 C-10/DG.4/Rev.1, Add.1 and Regarding the Implementation of Article VII Obligations (C-9/ Corr.1, respectively dated 2, 8 and 10 November 2005). DG.7 dated 23 November 2004); Third Progress Report on the 15 OPCW Plan of Action Regarding the Implementation of Article One-hundred and fifty-six drafts have been submitted by 93 VII Obligations (EC-40/DG.11 dated 16 February 2005; Corr.1 States Parties. In some cases, States Parties have requested dated 21 April 2005; Add.1 dated 11 March 2005; and Add.1/ advice on drafts several times during their governmental Corr.1 dated 14 March 2005); Further Update on the Plan of consultative process. -
BWPP Biological Weapons Reader
BWPP Biological Weapons Reader Edited by Kathryn McLaughlin and Kathryn Nixdorff Geneva 2009 About BWPP The BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP) is a global civil society activity that aims to strengthen the norm against using disease as a weapon. It was initiated by a group of non- governmental organizations concerned at the failure of governments to act. The BWPP tracks governmental and other behaviour that is pertinent to compliance with international treaties and other agreements, especially those that outlaw hostile use of biotechnology. The project works to reduce the threat of bioweapons by monitoring and reporting throughout the world. BWPP supports and is supported by a global network of partners. For more information see: http://www.bwpp.org Table of Contents Preface .................................................................................................................................................ii Abbreviations .....................................................................................................................................iii Chapter 1. An Introduction to Biological Weapons ......................................................................1 Malcolm R. Dando and Kathryn Nixdorff Chapter 2. History of BTW Disarmament...................................................................................13 Marie Isabelle Chevrier Chapter 3. The Biological Weapons Convention: Content, Review Process and Efforts to Strengthen the Convention.........................................................................................19 -
Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes
Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes Amy E. Smithson Report No. 32 December 1999 Copyright©1999 11 Dupont Circle, NW Ninth Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone 202.223.5956 fax 202.238.9604 [email protected] Copyright©1999 by The Henry L. Stimson Center 11 Dupont Circle, NW Ninth Floor Washington, DC 20036 tel 202.223.5956 fax 202.238.9604 email [email protected] Preface and Acknowledgments This report is the second major narrative by the Stimson Center’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project on the problems associated with the vast chemical and biological weapons capabilities created by the USSR. An earlier report, Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects (October 1995), contained the first public discussion of security shortcomings at Russia’s chemical weapons facilities and the most detailed account publicly available of the top secret chemical weapons development program of Soviet origin, code-named novichok. Toxic Archipelago examines another aspect of the USSR’s weapons of mass destruction legacy, the proliferation problems that stem from the former Soviet chemical and biological weapons complexes. Given the number of institutes and individuals with expertise in chemical and biological weaponry that have been virtually without the financial support of their domestic governments since the beginning of 1992, this report provides an overview of a significant and complex proliferation dilemma and appraises the efforts being made to address it. This topic and other issues of chemical and biological weapons proliferation concern are also covered on the project’s worldwide web page, which can be found at the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project section of the Stimson web site at: www.stimson.org/. -
Smallpox - an Old Disease, a New Threat
Smallpox - An Old Disease, A New Threat Part I - A New Threat The worldwide eradication of smallpox by the World Health Organization (WHO) 20 years ago is a success story that, ironically, could end in catastrophe. This is the first of a three part series that will explore the history of the disease and the modern dangers from a virus that was on the brink of extinction. Today, the only known stocks of the smallpox virus are at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta and at the Russian State Center for Research on Virology and Biotechnology in Koltsovo, Russia. These stocks were slated for destruction on June 30, 1999; however, the World Health Assembly, which governs WHO, decided to postpone the elimination of smallpox until possibly as late as 2002. That decision came after the Clinton administration asked for a delay to allow time for further research on the virus. The concern about destroying the virus comes from reports that terrorist groups may have stocks of the virus that could be used for biological warfare. Because of the success of WHO in eliminating smallpox, a large percentage of the world (including everyone in the U.S. and Canada born after 1973) has not been vaccinated against the disease. Thus, we have a large susceptible population that can be easily infected and can lead to an epidemic. Given that smallpox is very contagious and that most doctors would not recognize smallpox, the danger is its reemerging is clear. Ken Alibek, author of the book "Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World-Told from the Inside by the Man Who Ran It," was a top scientist working on biological weapons in the Soviet Union. -
Isla Vozrozhdeniya 1 Isla Vozrozhdeniya
Isla Vozrozhdeniya 1 Isla Vozrozhdeniya Renacimiento - Vozrozhdeniya Возрождения Localización geográfica / administrativa Mar de Aral País(es) Kazajistán Uzbekistán Coordenadas 45°09′00″N 59°19′00″E La isla Vozrozhdeniya (en ruso Возрождения; Renacimiento), era la principal de las islas ubicadas al interior del Mar de Aral (literalmente «Mar de Islas»).[1] Originalmente se encontraba al lado uzbeko del mismo, pero ahora, se trata de una península compartida por Kazajistán, al norte, y Uzbekistán, al sur. Esta particularidad se debe a que en 1960, la Unión Soviética decidió desviar parte del agua de dos ríos: el Amu Daria y el Sir Daria; para poder desarrollar cultivos de regadío en el desierto de Asia Central.[2] El nivel del mar comenzó a disminuir y finalmente, la isla se uniría por completo al continente en 2002.[3] Instalaciones de armas biológicas En 1948 se construyó un laboratorio soviético secreto de armas biológicas junto a Kantubek, en la isla;[4][5] que actualmente es una península y territorio en disputa entre Kazajistán y Uzbekistán. Los detalles concretos sobre la historia, las funciones y la situación actual de estas instalaciones no han sido revelados aún. La base fue abandonada en 1992 tras la desintegración del ejército soviético.[5][6] Diversas expediciones científicas demostraron que ese lugar se había utilizado para la producción, pruebas y también el desecho de armas biológicas.[7][8] Estos fueron limpiados, gracias a un proyecto internacional conjunto para limpiar los vertederos, en particular los de ántrax.[7][9] Aunque algunas fuentes especularon que éste podía ser el origen del bacilo usado para los ataques con ántrax en 2001,[7][10] en la actualidad ha quedado extensivamente establecido que este ántrax procede de la conocida cepa Ames utilizada en el USAMRIID norteamericano y otros países aliados de los Estados Unidos.[11][12][13][14] Isla Vozrozhdeniya 2 En la cultura popular • En el videojuego Call of Duty: Black Ops viajas a la isla, donde se almacenaban y transportaban armas biológicas (en este caso, el letal Nova 6). -
Grzegorz Nizioł
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia 2012, nr 2 (3) ISSN 2084-3291 G RZE G ORZ N I Z I O ł Czynniki naturalne warunkujące bezpieczeństwo Uzbekistanu i Tadżykistanu oraz regionu Azji Centralnej emat wpływu czynników naturalnych na kształtowanie bezpieczeń- Tstwa państw Azji Centralnej – Uzbekistanu i Tadżykistanu, a także poczynania władz oraz organizacji międzynarodowych na ograniczanie zagrożeń i ich skutków jest w literaturze przedmiotu dosyć ubogi, chociaż czynniki naturalne odgrywają znaczącą rolę w zachowaniu stabilności re- gionu. Jednym z najistotniejszych problemów naturalnych jest wysychające Je- zioro Aralskie, którego wydawałoby się nieodwracalne procesy przyczyni- ły się do zmiany klimatu, postępującego ubóstwa, chorób społeczeństwa zamieszkującego okolice dawnego basenu, ale także do napięć politycz- nych związanych z gospodarowaniem zasobami wodnymi w regionie, któ- re doprowadziły do katastrofy ekologicznej. Następstwem wysychającego Jeziora okazał się problem Wyspy Odro- dzenia obecnie połączonej z lądem, na której w czasach Związku Radziec- kiego przeprowadzano eksperymenty z bronią biologiczną, a po zakończe- niu testów nie zneutralizowano wszystkich patogenów pozostawiając je na miejscu w zakopanych tuż pod powierzchnią rdzewiejących pojemnikach. Podobna sytuacja tyczy się zatopionych pojemników z odpadami radioak- tywnymi w Kirgistanie przy granicy z Uzbekistanem. Korozja i rozszczel- CZYNNIKI NATURALNE WARUNKUJąCE BEZPIECZEńSTWO UZBEKISTANU I TADżYKISTANU… 153 nienie pojemników doprowadziło już kilkukrotnie do skażenia rzek w Ko- tlinie Fergańskiej. Kolejną istotną kwestią są okresowo występujące katastrofy naturalne i ich następstwa. Trzęsienia ziemi, osuwiska skalne, lawiny śnieżne i błot- ne, powodzie oraz susze to kataklizmy, które na przestrzeni lat udowodni- ły, że są zagrożeniem dla mieszkańców Azji Centralnej, jednak przy obec- nie prowadzonej polityce nic nie wskazuje na to by były one poważnie traktowane. -
Dugwaysheep-Cia1.Pdf
This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of: The Black Vault The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military. Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com Central Intelligence Agency ~ Washington,• D.C. 20505 4 October 2017 Mr. John Greenewald, Jr. Reference: F-2017-00026 Dear Mr. Greenewald: In the course of processing your 13 September 2016 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records pertaining to the 1968 Dugway Sheep Incident, the Defense Intelligence Agency located two documents and referred them to us on 27 September 2016 for review and direct response to you. We have reviewed the enclosed documents, which we determined can be released to you in their entirety. If you have questions regarding our response, you may seek assistance from CIA's FOIA Public Liaison. You may reach the FOIA Public Liaison at: 703-613-1287 (FOIA Hotline) Sincerely, Allison Fong Information and Privacy Coordinator Enclosures C06628898 Approved for ~~~~9J.fcMfB C06628898 UNCLASSJ FlED// ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX958 MCN = 90243/46334 TOR = 902432222 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1705 2432223-UUUU--RUEALGX. ZNR UUUUU HEADER R 3122232 AUG 90 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC INFO RUEALGX/SAFE R 312114Z AUG 90 FM FBIS RESTON VA TO RUDKMKB/FBIS LONDON UK//BBC// RUDKFV/FBIS VIENNA AU RUEBHAA/STORAGE CENTER FBIS RESTON VA RUEOACC/CDR PSYOPGR FT BRAGG NC//ASOF-POG-SB// RUEKJCS/DEFINTAGNCY WASH DC RUDMNOP/NAVOPINTCEN SUITLAND MD RUFHVOA/VOA MUNICH GE ACCT FBWA-EWDK BT CONTROLS UNCLAS 3P SERIAL: WA3108211790 /*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/ BODY PASS; ATTN BBC PRESS ATTN 90SV0013A COPY TO UD COUNTRY: USSR SUBJ: TAKE 1 OF 4--BACTERIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT IN 1979 SUSPECTED SOURCE: MOSCOW LITERATURNAYA GAZETA IN RUSSIAN NO.