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BWPP Biological Weapons Reader BWPP Biological Weapons Reader Edited by Kathryn McLaughlin and Kathryn Nixdorff Geneva 2009 About BWPP The BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP) is a global civil society activity that aims to strengthen the norm against using disease as a weapon. It was initiated by a group of non- governmental organizations concerned at the failure of governments to act. The BWPP tracks governmental and other behaviour that is pertinent to compliance with international treaties and other agreements, especially those that outlaw hostile use of biotechnology. The project works to reduce the threat of bioweapons by monitoring and reporting throughout the world. BWPP supports and is supported by a global network of partners. For more information see: http://www.bwpp.org Table of Contents Preface .................................................................................................................................................ii Abbreviations .....................................................................................................................................iii Chapter 1. An Introduction to Biological Weapons ......................................................................1 Malcolm R. Dando and Kathryn Nixdorff Chapter 2. History of BTW Disarmament...................................................................................13 Marie Isabelle Chevrier Chapter 3. The Biological Weapons Convention: Content, Review Process and Efforts to Strengthen the Convention.........................................................................................19 Piers D. Millett Chapter 4. Developments in Science and Technology: Relevance for the BWC........................33 Kathryn Nixdorff and Malcolm R. Dando Chapter 5. A Brief Comparison of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions...........45 Scott Spence and Ralf Trapp Chapter 6. Biological Weapons as a Public Health Issue............................................................53 Nicolas Isla Chapter 7. Biological Weapons as an Environmental Issue........................................................59 Kathryn McLaughlin Chapter 8. Biological Weapons as a Biodiversity Issue..............................................................67 Kathryn McLaughlin Chapter 9. Awareness-raising, Education and Codes of Conduct within the Framework of the BWC ..........................................................................................................................83 Robert J. Mathews and John M. Webb Factsheet: Bioterrorism ...............................................................................................................95 Iris Hunger Factsheet: BWC Implementation ................................................................................................97 Angela Woodward, Scott Spence and Rocio Escauriaza Leal Glossary ............................................................................................................................................99 Contributors ....................................................................................................................................115 - i - Preface It has been predicted that the 21st century will see a biological epoch to rival revolutions in information technology, industrial chemistry, and manufacturing processes. Such developments, heralded as offering unparalleled benefits for humanity, have all ultimately been used for hostile purposes. We know that some have already used biology for malign ends (Chapter 1) and that such efforts have not been the preserve of states alone (Factsheet 1). We must work diligently to ensure that this ‘Century of Biology’ does not result in a new biological arms race. There is a rich history of efforts to ensure biology is used only for peaceful purposes (Chapter 2). The most recent chapter of this saga focuses on the treaty to ban the acquisition of biological weapons – the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Chapter 3). This convention tries to ensure that robust domestic arrangements are put into place to translate international commitments into effective national action (Factsheet 2). Strong national efforts and international action cannot, however, take place in a vacuum. They are ultimately driven by, and depend upon the support of, civil society. Prior to the creation of the BWPP, civil society lacked a coherent voice in discussion on how to prevent the malign use of the life sciences. This book is a testimony to the important contribution that civil society can make to international peace and security. There can be little doubt that the life sciences are advancing faster than ever before (Chapter 4) and that this brings with it a raft of new challenges – for civil society, to understand increasingly arcane technological developments; for scientists, to ensure that their work is not misused by others; for policy makers, to design oversight frameworks capable of keeping abreast of such rapid progress; and for industry, to find ways to talk about issues that can be both unfamiliar and uncomfortable. Efforts to prevent other related technologies from being used as weapons have faced similar hurdles in the past. There are important lessons that we can draw from these efforts and it is useful to compare and contrast approaches in the biological field with, say, efforts to prevent the hostile use of chemistry through the Chemical Weapons Convention (Chapter 5). As the former United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, pointed out in April 2006, dealing with the threat posed by biological weapons is unique and requires “innovative solutions specific to the nature of the threat”.1 This will require us to better characterize what that threat actually is. We need to look at the issue of biological weapons through a variety of lenses, including as a public health issue (Chapter 6), an environmental issue (Chapter 7) and as a biodiversity issue (Chapter 8). It is clear that oversight efforts will require the support of all relevant stakeholder communities but will require particular buy-in from the scientists and technologists who pursue biology on a day to basis. This makes mechanisms for raising awareness and inculcating a culture of responsibility (Chapter 9) ever more important. It is hoped that this book will be a useful tool for future efforts. This book was funded and created through the unwavering support of the Swedish government. BWPP’s thanks must go out to Magnus Hellgren of the Geneva Disarmament Mission for his personal championing of this project. This book would not be here without him. Equally, the personal thanks of the editors go out to the chapter authors, who showed remarkable flexibility in putting together such impressive texts under trying circumstances. Finally, our personal thanks also go out to Piers Millett who helped put the final text together into its final format. Although every effort has been taken to remove errors and inconsistencies from this text, undoubtedly some will have slipped through – they must remain the sole responsibility of the editors. Kathryn McLaughlin, for the editors April 2009 1 K. Annan, Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (New York: United Nations) April 2006. Available at: http://www.un.org/unitingagainstterrorism - ii - Abbreviations ABWs Advanced Biological Warfare Agents ASM American Society for Microbiology BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BW Biological Weapons BWC or BTWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention CBMs Confidence-Building Measures CCD Conference of the Committee on Disarmament CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CNAs Compendiums of National Activities CW Chemical Weapons CWC Chemical Weapons Convention DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation DOC Discrete Organic Chemical ENDC Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FMD Foot and Mouth Disease FBCA Fungal Biocontrol Agents GOARN Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network GP Geneva Protocol iGEM International Genetically Engineered Machine Competition ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IL Interleukin ISU Implementation Support Unit to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - iii - NBC Nuclear, biological and chemical NID National Implementation Database NIM National Implementing Measures NIM Project VERTIC’s National Implementing Measures Project OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons RHD Rabbit haemorrhagic disease RNA Ribonucleic acid RRL Roodeplaat Research Laboratories SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome TNFα Tumour necrosis factor alpha UN United Nations UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission USAMRIID US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases VEREX Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint VERTIC Verification Research, Training and Information Centre VHF Viral haemorrhagic fever VVND Velogenic Viscerotropic Newcastle Disease WHO World Health Organization WHA World Health Assembly WMD Weapons of mass destruction *** - iv - Chapter 1. An Introduction to Biological Weapons1 Malcolm R. Dando and Kathryn Nixdorff Long before it was understood that microorganisms are the causative agents of infections, contagious disease was exploited as a means of biological warfare. A Brief History of Biological Warfare2 There have been many stories told about the use of biological warfare in antiquity and the Middle Ages. The best
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