Foreign Policy Analysis (2009) 5, 265–286
Anatomy of Failure: Bush’s Decision-Making Process and the Iraq War
David Mitchell and Tansa George Massoud Bucknell University
The Bush administration’s decision-making process leading to the inva- sion of Iraq in 2003 has been singled out for its many shortcomings: failure of intelligence; lack of debate concerning options; an insufficient invading force; and poor postwar planning. Contrary to the administra- tion’s claim that no one foresaw the difficulties of waging a war in Iraq, many concerns about the challenges the United States would face were raised inside and outside of government. Yet, none of this information had a significant effect on the decision-making process. This paper develops a decision-making model that integrates elements from the individual to the organizational level and explains how important infor- mation was marginalized, leading to a poor policy outcome. The model illustrates how the combined effects of the president’s formal manage- ment style, anticipatory compliance on the part of key players, bureau- cratic politics, and the intervening variable of the 9 ⁄ 11 terrorist attacks contributed to a defective decision-making process.
A number of policy errors were committed relating to the Iraq war: options were not debated; intelligence was selectively used; the invasion lacked a sufficient force; a failure to anticipate an insurgency fueled by the disbanding of the Iraqi military and Ba’ath party; and poorly devised and executed postwar planning. The postwar difficulties can be measured by the financial, human, and diplo- matic costs of the war. These negative results have led individuals to compare the outcome of the Iraq war with other fiascos, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and President Johnson’s escalation of the Vietnam War (Fallows 2006:48). Thomas Ricks goes so far as to title his account of the war ‘‘Fiasco.’’ Ricks (2006:3) argues that ‘‘the U.S.-led invasion was launched recklessly, with a flawed plan for war and a worse approach to occupation.’’ The planning for the Iraq war was developed by an administration with an experienced security team: U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. How can we explain such poor planning, given such a knowledgeable and experienced for- eign-policy team? Studies about the Iraq war thus far include journalistic accounts about the military dimension or the decisions leading to the invasion by individuals close to the administration. A variety of explanations have been offered, including the personality and beliefs of the president, influence of Cheney and Rumsfeld, insularity of the White House, bureaucratic infighting,
Author’s Note: A previous version of this article was presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, March 2008, San Francisco, CA. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments.