World Bank Document

Document of The World Bank

Public Disclosure Authorized Report No: ICR00003190

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H2350)

ON AN

Public Disclosure Authorized IDA GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 10.3 MILLION (US$15 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA-BISSAU

FOR A

MULTI-SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION PROJECT Public Disclosure Authorized

February 27, 2015

Energy & Extractive Industries Global Practice AFCF2 Africa Region

Public Disclosure Authorized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective 02/15/2015)

Currency Unit = C.F.A Francs 1.00 C.F.A Franc = 0.02 US$ US$ 1.00 = 578 C.F.A francs

FISCAL YEAR

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BOAD Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement (West African Development Bank) BOT Build, Operate, Transfer CFAF Communauté Financière Africaine Franc (currency used in the African Financial Community EAGB Electricidade e Águas de Guinea-Bissau (Electricity and Water Utility of Guinea Bissau) EEWRP Emergency Electricity and Water Rehabilitation Project EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return EU European Union EWESUP Emergency Water and Electricity Services Upgrading Project FM Financial Management FMS Financial Management System GDP Gross Domestic Product GoGB Government of Guinea Bissau GWh Gigawatt hour HFO Heavy Fuel Oil ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Association IFC International Finance Corporation IRR Internal Rate of Return ISN Interim Strategy Note ISR Implementation Status and Results Report kV Kilovolt kWh Kilowatt hour LICUS Low Income Countries Under Stress LSDP Letter of Sector Development Policy MDGs Millennium Development Goals M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency MIRP Multisector Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project MIS Management Information System MW Megawatt

NGO Non Governmental Organization NPV Net Present Value OMVG Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Gambie (Gambia River Development Organization) OP Operational Policy PAD Project Appraisal Document PCU Project Coordination Unit PDO Project Development Objective POS Private Operation Scheme PPP Public Private Partnership PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSRDP Private Sector Rehabilitation and Development Project SSA Sub-Saharan Africa TA Technical Assistance WTP Willing To Pay

Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Vera Songwe Sr. Global Practice Director: Anita Marangoly George Practice Manager: Meike van Ginneken Project Team Leader: Leopold Sedogo ICR Team Leader: Leopold Sedogo

Republic of Guinea-Bissau Multi-Sector Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project Implementation Completion and Results Report

CONTENTS

Data Sheet

A. Basic Information ...... i B. Key Dates ...... i C. Ratings Summary ...... i D. Sector and Theme Codes ...... ii E. Bank Staff ...... ii F. Results Framework Analysis ...... iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ...... v H. Restructuring (if any) ...... v I. Disbursement Profile ...... vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ...... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...... 8 3. Assessment of Outcomes ...... 14 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...... 22 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ...... 22 6. Lessons Learned ...... 24 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ...... 26 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...... 27 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ...... 28 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ...... 38 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ...... 40 Annex 5. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...... 42 Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents ...... 56 Annex 7. Revised Indicators 2010 Restructuring ...... 57

MAP IBRD 34679

A. Basic Information Multi-sector Country: Guinea-Bissau Project Name: Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project Project ID: P097975 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H2350 ICR Date: 02/28/2015 ICR Type: Core ICR Government of Guinea- Lending Instrument: SIM Borrower: Bissau Original Total XDR 10.30M Disbursed Amount: XDR 9.88M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 10.30M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Economy Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: BOAD

B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 09/28/2005 Effectiveness: 08/31/2007 08/31/2007 Appraisal: 04/24/2006 Restructuring(s): 07/16/2010 Approval: 06/15/2006 Mid-term Review: 11/03/2009 Closing: 06/30/2011 03/31/2014

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Moderately Quality at Entry: Government: Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Moderately Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Unsatisfactory Performance:

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Quality at Entry Project at any time Yes None (QEA): (Yes/No): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Moderately

Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 16 16 Energy efficiency in Heat and Power 40 57 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 17 0 Water supply 27 27

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 24 25 Other urban development 13 0 Regulation and competition policy 13 20 State-owned enterprise restructuring and privatization 25 30 Water resource management 25 25

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Gobind T. Nankani Country Director: Vera Songwe Madani M. Tall Practice Manager: Meike van Ginneken Subramaniam V. Iyer Project Team Leader: Leopold Sedogo Boris Utria ICR Team Leader: Leopold Sedogo ICR Primary Author: Maria-Alexandra Planas

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The Project's development objective is to increase the availability of urban power, water and roads infrastructure services. That objective will be pursued through: (i) improving the institutional and management capacity and governance in the power, water and roads sectors; (ii) restoring the access, reliability and quality of electricity supplies and services in the city of Bissau to pre-conflict levels; (iii) restoring and increasing access to and quality of water supply services in the city of Bissau to the pre-conflict levels; and, (iv) rehabilitating damaged roads in the city of Bissau.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The revised Project's development objective is to assist the Government in increasing the availability and reliability of electricity and water supply in its capital city and improve the institutional and management capacities in the energy and water sectors.

(a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Annual Original indicator: electricity Increase of 7.4 35 distribution to electricity generation 12.2 (35% achieved) end-users (GWh) from 2.6MW to in Bissau 15MW Direct/indirect beneficiaries to 172,000 electricity supply 115,000 140,000 New indicator (85,656) (122% services (number, (58,300) (69,720) achieved) female ( percent)) Number of people provided with access to “improved water sources” under the Project through new 91,350 (99% 81,000 New indicator 92,500 piped household achieved) water connections that are resulting from the Project intervention (number)

iii

Direct/indirect beneficiaries to 91,953 101,300 118,500 water supply New indicator (45,972) (77% (50,500) (59,013) services (number, achieved) female (percent)) Level of water 70 (2006 baseline) 50 45 39 (86% achieved) losses (percent) 55 (2009 baseline) Collection rate of 40 (2006 baseline) 80 95 73 (77% achieved) electricity bills 81 (2009 baseline) Percentage of reduction of transit time for public transport Dropped at restructuring services (minibuses, taxis, etc.)

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Increase electricity generation 15 5.5 11 (200% achieved) 2.4 capacity owned by EAGB (MW) Number of prepayment 15,137 (101 % 0 New indicator 15,000 meters installed achieved) (number) Reduce total energy losses 50 10 21 47 (47% achieved) (percent) Improved community water points constructed or 0 New indicator 58 58 (100% achieved) rehabilitated under the Project (number) Extend water distribution networks to 26 54 43.7 54 (115% achieved) unserved areas under the Project (kms.).

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 10/05/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 06/26/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 12/17/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.08 4 06/06/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.68 5 12/19/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.49 Moderately 6 06/15/2009 Unsatisfactory 5.32 Unsatisfactory Moderately 7 12/18/2009 Moderately Satisfactory 7.82 Unsatisfactory 8 06/27/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.08 9 11/05/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.20 10 07/29/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.73 11 04/05/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 12.12 12 01/16/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 12.12 13 06/08/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 13.33 14 02/25/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 15.16 H. Restructuring (if any)

ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions Need to restructure Project activities due to ambitious 07/16/2010 Y MS S 8.08 project design and lack of private sector interest in the energy sector Extend closing date due to 09/12/2012 N MS S 12.12 suspension of activities resulting from political coup Extend closing date to finalize activities under implementation 05/23/2013 N MS S 13.33 and reallocate funds between categories

I. Disbursement Profile

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

Country Background

1. At appraisal Guinea-Bissau was one of the world’s poorest countries where more than two-thirds of the population of about 1.5 million people lived under the poverty line, with an average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of US$195 per annum.

2. The country entered into a period of armed social conflict in 1998, which resulted in the dismantling of large segments of the economy, social disruption, and physical destruction of economic, infrastructure, and social service delivery assets and systems. A new Government was elected in 2000, which was able to undertake a series of successful recovery activities, but the country continued to suffer from lack of political, economic, and social stability. A reform-minded transition Government was put in place following the parliamentary elections of March 2004. This Government established an encouraging record in the area of economic management and launched the preparation of a highly participatory Poverty Reduction Strategy. The presidential election of August 2005 was followed by a brief period of political tension. By January 2006 the Government had stabilized, and in March 2006 a new government program was approved providing the necessary political and institutional stability for the government to reconfirm its standing commitments with the donor community.

3. While there was a broad consensus on the need to support all sectors and regions of the economy, there was agreement within the Government of Guinea Bissau (GoGB) and the donor community that the rehabilitation of basic urban infrastructure, especially power and water services, was paramount in the process of underpinning economic recovery and political stabilization, and, singularly, to support the revitalization of the public and private sectors of the economy.

Sector Background

4. Power sector. Electricidade e Águas da Guiné-Bissau (EAGB, the Electricity and Water Utility of Guinea Bissau) was established in 1983 to handle supply and distribution to the public of electricity and water. EAGB’s situation at appraisal was characterized by: (i) an insufficient and unreliable supply of electricity (both production and distribution well below demand); (ii) high technical losses; (iii) a weak commercial management, including poor revenue collection systems; (iv) a high (US$0.45/kwh) and ineffective tariff structure; and (v) negative environmental consequences associated with an oil spill behind the EAGB plant in Bissau. EAGB’s nominal installed generation capacity was about 16 MW. However, due to frequent breakdowns, lack of maintenance and a fire breakout in December 2003, the available capacity fluctuated between 2.6 MW and 3.6 MW. Basic needs of households suffered from unreliable electricity supply. Economic activity was also severely handicapped by insufficient power supply.

5. As all electricity generation in the country was based on diesel systems, the improvement of the supply system and, in particular, the improvement of governance and transparency in the petroleum sector were sine qua non to the improvement of the functioning of the power sector and to the country’s overall economic competitiveness.

6. Water sector. Guinea-Bissau faced major challenges in supplying water to its urban population, which accounted for 60 percent of the total population. The status of water services in the city of Bissau (326,000 habitants) was especially alarming and had continuously deteriorated over the past decade. Only 18 percent of households had access to private connections in the capital city. About 8 percent of the households were supplied through 53 free public standpipes under precarious hygienic conditions. The majority of the population (74 percent of the total), including all slum dwellers, relied on traditional shallow wells highly exposed to the risk of pollution by wastewater from pit latrines. Bissau was supplied by 11 boreholes with a total assessed production capacity of 30,000 m3/day. However, only 56 percent of this capacity was utilized because of frequent interruptions in pumping operations due to electricity shortage and an insufficient water storage capacity (1130 m3, or seven percent of the daily production). Most parts of the water distribution networks in the capital city consisted of old asbestos cement pipes in such poor condition that 70 percent of the water produced was lost through leakage and un-metered household connections. Overall, the water service was poor and intermittent, limited to three or four hours per day in most neighborhoods in Bissau. The average water tariff (US$0.25/m3) did not cover production costs. The low bill collection rate (60 percent) combined with high technical losses (70 percent) resulted in very poor overall sector efficiency, which did not exceed 20 percent.

7. Roads sector. Guinea-Bissau had a 2,755 km national road network, including 770 km of paved roads and 1,985 km of modern earth roads. The network was largely dilapidated due to the non-existence of a maintenance policy and program, the State’s financial difficulties, institutional weaknesses, and the physical effects of the civil wars. The city of Bissau had a network of communication routes comprising 50 km of paved roads and 150 km of earth roads. Most of this network was built between the 1950s and 1970s. Its maintenance was almost non-existent with very few rehabilitation works undertaken since they were constructed. About 80 percent of the national fleet of 5,240 vehicles was concentrated in Bissau, which had resulted in the marked deterioration of the main roads linking the center, the port, and the industrial zone to the residential areas. Within this context, the immediate priorities for the urban road sector were to: (i) rehabilitate existing paved roads; and (ii) surface or re-gravel/reshape existing earth roads. The state of the roads in Bissau constituted a major barrier to the normalization of economic activity and delivery of social services in the city.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

8. The Project's Development Objective (PDO) was to increase the availability of urban power, water and roads infrastructure services. That objective was to be pursued through: (i) improving the institutional and management capacity and governance in the

power, water and roads sectors; (ii) restoring the access, reliability and quality of electricity supplies and services in the city of Bissau to pre-conflict levels; (iii) restoring and increasing access to and quality of water supply services in the city of Bissau to the pre- conflict levels; and, (iv) rehabilitating damaged roads in the city of Bissau.

9. The following indicators were included at approval to measure Project performance:

Table 1: Project Indicators at Approval PDO Indicators Original Target Indicator Baseline Value Comment Values Modified during Number of electricity customers served 0 15,000 restructuring Number of additional people served with Modified during 0 32,000 water services restructuring Percentage of reduction of transit time for public transport services (minibuses, No values provided at appraisal Dropped at taxis) restructuring

Intermediate Indicators Component 1: Institutional Development and Sectoral Studies Preparation of long- term / Least-cost “National Energy Development Strategy”.

New tariff policies Institutional and capacity development in No development adopted in the power the power, water and roads sectors. Dropped at policies prepared and water sectors. restructuring or implemented

Transport Strategy and Road Investment plan elaborated and Adopted.

Component 2 Restoration and Rehabilitation of the Power System Increase of electricity generation from 2.6 MW to 15MW by private sector operator Modified during 2.6 MW 15 MW with international technical performance restructuring standards Power generation increased Modified during 10,000 Mwh/yr 65,700 Mwh/yr. restructuring Reduce Transmission and distribution losses Dropped at 35% 10% restructuring

Target values modified Improve collection rate of electricity bills 40 % 80% at restructuring

Biomass co-gen pilot systems set-up and 3 systems set-up and Dropped at operating. 0 operating restructuring Component 3: Rehabilitation of Water Production, Treatment and Urban Distribution Target values modified Reduce levels of water losses 70% 50% at restructuring Increase the water storage capacity by Dropped at 700 cubic meters 0 700 m3 restructuring Extend water distribution networks Target values modified 0 km 26 km at restructuring Component 4: Rehabilitation of Urban Road Infrastructure

Linear extension (km) of passable roads Dropped at with improved mobility through 0 km 10 km restructuring rehabilitation of “hot spots”

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

10. The revised PDO is “to assist the Government in increasing the availability and reliability of electricity and water supply in its capital city and improve the institutional and management capacities in the energy and water sectors.” The PDO was revised as part of the first Project restructuring due to ambitious project design and lack of private sector interest in the energy sector and to better reflect the cancellation of the road rehabilitation activities; it was also slightly modified to reconcile a discrepancy between the Financing Agreement and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD).

11. Indicators were also revised as part of the first Project restructuring to better reflect the restructured Project activities and to incorporate new core energy sector indicators as shown below (Annex 10 includes the revised results framework):

Table 2: Revised Project Indicators Restructuring Target Indicator Baseline Value (2009) Comment Values PDO Indicators

Annual electricity distribution to 35 Modified at 7.4 end-users (GWh) in Bissau restructuring

Direct/indirect beneficiaries to 115,000 140,000 electricity supply services New indicator (58,300) (69,720) (number, female (percent)) Number of people provided with access to “improved water 81,000 92,500 New indicator sources” Direct/indirect beneficiaries to 101,300 118,500 water supply services (number, New indicator (50,500) (59,013) female (percent))

Level of water losses (percent) 45 Target revised 55 Collection rate of electricity bills 81 95 Target revised

Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Modified during Increase electricity generation 5.5 restructuring capacity owned by EAGB (MW) 2.4

Number of prepayment meters 0 15,000 New indicator installed (number) Reduce total energy losses 50 35 Target revised (percent) Improved community water points constructed or 0 58 New indicator rehabilitated under the Project (number): Extend water distribution networks to unserved areas 26 43.7 Target revised (kms.).

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

12. Original Project beneficiaries were the urban population of Bissau benefiting from improved electricity, water, and road services. With the first Project restructuring, beneficiaries were identified as the population benefiting from improved/expanded electricity and water supply systems in the capital.

1.5 Original Components

13. The Project included five main components: (i) Institutional Development and Sectoral Studies; (ii) Restoration/Rehabilitation of the Power System; (iii) Rehabilitation of Water Production, Treatment and Urban Distribution; (iv) Limited Rehabilitation of Urban Road Infrastructure; and (v) Project Management, Monitoring & Evaluation. The components are summarized below:

14. Component 1: Institutional Development and Sectoral Studies (US$2.50 million). This component would undertake institutional and capacity development support and sectoral studies for the Ministry of the Economy, State Secretariat for Energy, Ministry of Natural Resources, EAGB, and the Ministry of Public Works, Construction and Town Planning to achieve the development of the energy, water, and road sectors and the improvement of the technical and financial management of the respective sectors’ assets.

15. Component 2: Restoration and Rehabilitation of the Power System (US$2.35 million). This component would essentially support a fast-tracked restoration and rehabilitation of power generation and distribution and commercial operations in Bissau, including: (a) the restoration of power generation via the competitive contracting of a private operator for the generation of 15 MW for a period of three to five years (henceforth denominated as Private Operation Scheme, or POS); (b) the rehabilitation of the electricity billing collection system by the establishment and operation of an electricity pre-payment meter system (15,000 units) by a private operator through a Build, Operate and Transfer scheme (BOT, financed by IDA through the Private Sector Rehabilitation and Development Project, PSRDP); and (c) the rehabilitation of the distribution network (financed by the West African Development Bank, BOAD).

16. Component 3: Rehabilitation of Water Production, Treatment and Urban Distribution (US$4.85 million). This component would finance the rehabilitation and reinforcement of water production systems in the city of Bissau and included the following sub-components: (a) Water Production including: (i) the construction of a new reservoir (700 m3) within the existing premises of EAGB in the vicinity of the “August 3 Hospital”; and (ii) replacement of the pumping system of the existing borehole; (b) Water Distribution including (i) replacement of 3.6 km of primary water distribution networks along existing roads and 9 km of tertiary water distribution networks; and (ii) extension of 26.3 km of tertiary water distribution networks to unserved areas and the construction of 700 water connections and 50 public standpipes in peri-urban areas of Bissau; and (c) Billing System and Operation tools including (i) supply and installation of 6,000 water meters; (ii) supply and installation of 11 macro water meters; and (iii) equipment and logistical supplies to EAGB, including water analysis kits, fire standpipes, operation tools, and vehicles.

17. Component 4: Limited Rehabilitation of Urban Road Infrastructure (US$3.20 million). This component included a limited rehabilitation of “pot holes” along a set of roads of 20-30 kilometers in the city of Bissau. This component would finance: (a) feasibility studies to determine the type of works needed as well as the eligibility criteria and timing for reconstruction of urban roads in the Recipient’s territory; (b) implementation of a limited roads rehabilitation program, including civil works, acquisition of equipment, and provision of consultant services to rehabilitate the primary and secondary road network in the city of Bissau; (c) supervision activities for civil works under item (b) above; and (d) acquisition of one 4x4 vehicle.

18. Component 5: Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation (US$0.60 million). This component would finance the operational costs of the Project Coordination Unit (PCU). There was also a contingency of US$1.50 million included under the Project.

1.6 Revised Components

19. The first Project restructuring in July 2010 canceled some of the activities under Components 3 and 4 and reallocated IDA funds to emergency power generation.

20. The following activities were cancelled:

 Component 3: Rehabilitation of Water Production, Treatment and Urban Distribution. Financing for the water reservoir was cancelled. The financing of the reservoir was added to a new project under preparation – the Emergency Electricity and Water Rehabilitation Project (EEWRP), which was approved by the World Bank Board on July 23, 2010.

 Component 4: Limited Rehabilitation of Urban Road Infrastructure. The following sub-components were cancelled: 4.2. Supervision/Control of roads rehabilitation works (US$0.30 million) and 4.3. Road Rehabilitation Works (US$2.60 million). The rationale for the cancellation of these activities was the fact that the European Union (EU) was preparing a project that would include a larger roads rehabilitation program, making the small road components in this project obsolete. The sub-component 4.1: Preparation of a road rehabilitation investment program was deemed crucial in planning sector development and in mobilizing resources from the donor community.

21. The resources released from the cancelled activities were used to address emergency power generation capacity needs. New activities included the purchase of 3 MW of thermal generation capacity and the extension of the lease on the existing 2.5 MW generation capacity for one year. The purchase of 3 MW of generation capacity was originally tendered under the IDA funded PSRDP. The selected bid of €1.5 million exceeded the available budget by US$600,000. The IDA reallocation was essential to maintain a minimum level of electricity supply in Bissau and avoid a complete blackout of the city, which could have had humanitarian implications.

22. Table 3 below shows the changes in IDA funding allocation by component. Table 3: Project Costs Project Costs (US$million) Components/Activities Original Restructured Change July 2010 1. Institutional Development and Sector Studies 2.50 2.79 0.29 2. Restoration and Rehabilitation of power system 2.35 4.88 2.53 3. Rehabilitation of Water Production, Treatment 4.85 4.74 -0.11 and Urban Distribution 4. Limited Rehab. of Urban Road Infrastructure 3.20 0.42 -2.78 5. Project Management, Monitoring & Evaluation 0.60 1.67 1.07 6. Contingency 1.50 0.50 -1.00 Total IDA financing 15.00 15.00 0.00

1.7 Other significant changes

23. A second restructuring in September 2012 extended the Project closing date from September 30, 2012 until June 15, 2013. A third restructuring in May 2013 included an extension of the closing date from June 15, 2013 to March 31, 2014, and a reallocation of the proceeds of the IDA grant. In total, the three closing date extensions amounted to two years and nine months.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

24. Project preparation and implementation must be viewed through the lens of a fragile and volatile political context. The fragility of the post-conflict situation influenced the design of the Project and later modifications.

Soundness of the Background Analysis

25. Technical analysis of the sectors to be supported by the Project was thorough and the activities to be supported by the Project were aligned with Government priorities in the water and energy sectors as reflected in the GoGB’s 2005 Interim National Power and Water Sector Rehabilitation and Development Programs. Within the overall context of the Interim National Program for the Power and Water sectors, a short-to-medium term investment program was jointly identified by the GoGB, IDA, and BOAD. The Multisector Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (MIRP) focused on key activities for the city of Bissau within those sectors. In addition, the Project included some priority activities to be financed for the roads sector such as the rehabilitation of the primary and secondary road network in the city of Bissau, which were later dropped during the first project restructuring as explained in Section 1.6. The project was appraised by a team with the required technical skills.

26. Lessons learned and incorporated in Project design. Project preparation benefited from the experience gained from the World Bank’s operational involvement in infrastructure projects in the Africa region and in Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) and incorporated key lessons learned, especially: (i) the need to adopt a flexible approach allowing a parallel implementation of the investment program and the institutional reforms; (ii) the need to implement measures aimed at restoring power and/or water production and distribution accompanied by the implementation of activities intended at establishing a system-wide culture of bill payment; (iii) providing support to the development and adoption of an appropriate tariff policy in order to restore the financial equilibrium of the water and electricity sectors; and (iv) allowing the mobilization of fixed- term specialized external expertise to support the utility in sanitizing the technical and commercial management systems while allowing the utility to concentrate on handling a the physical assets restoration/rehabilitation process

27. Rationale for Bank involvement. After years of political instability, on March 16, 2006 a new government program was approved providing the necessary political and 8

institutional stability for the country to be able to reconfirm its standing commitments with the donor community. The rehabilitation and expansion of the country infrastructure systems and services was considered a key input and precondition to economic stability and growth, private sector development, social services delivery, and employment and income generation. In that context, the Project was critical to the rebuilding of basic urban power, water, and road infrastructure in the city of Bissau, which, in the absence of immediate external support, would further deteriorate with unforeseeable consequences on economic growth, health, and other social services.

28. Moreover, the participation of IDA in the infrastructure sector was considered essential for the re-engagement of the broader donor community in Guinea Bissau, not only from the funding point of view, but because of the need to restore governance, transparency, and credibility to the Government’s capacity to implement donor funded programs and projects. Furthermore, given its long standing experience on energy and water sector rehabilitation and reforms and on road maintenance, management, and financing in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), the Bank had a comparative advantage to support the design and implementation of strategic rehabilitation work in the energy, water, and roads sectors.

Assessment of Project Design

29. The Project design responded to the immediate needs of the country at the time. However, the Project objective of increasing the availability of urban power, water, and roads infrastructure services and expected outcomes were ambitious compared to the size of the operation (US$15 million of new IDA, US$5 million of parallel BOAD financing, and US$5 million reallocation under an existing IDA project). Even given the small size of the country, the Project targeted three major infrastructure sectors (electricity, water, and roads) which required substantial financial resources and implementation of important reforms to achieve the expected results. Moreover, the design of Component 2 supported a fast-tracked restoration and rehabilitation of power generation and distribution and commercial operations in Bissau, relying heavily on private sector participation for a power plant in an unstable political and macroeconomic environment with a utility in a difficult financial situation. While it is understandable that the Government and donors partners, including IDA, wanted to take a comprehensive approach, it was not realistic given the situation on the ground. Ultimately, lack of interest from the private sector in the installation and management of the pre-payment metering systems and its commercial operation, and in Public Private Partnerships (PPP) for the water sector resulted in changes to those activities.

30. As mentioned, the Project’s scope was quite ambitious, and valid reasons existed at the time of appraisal to justify the approach that was adopted, including: (i) the fact that the Project would finance activities that were considered an “urgent first and critical step” towards the rebuilding of basic urban power, water, and road infrastructure in the city of Bissau and contribute to the long-term development of those sectors by laying the foundation for the required future investments; (ii) the absence of alternative sources of financing; and (iii) the fact that this design was a proactive response in a post-conflict

context where the Project was the first donor intervention in infrastructure. Moreover, projects in small countries tend to include a range of components/sectors as there are often fewer but more multi-sector operations in the country.

31. The initial indicators were a mix of inputs and outputs. Baseline data was not collected for various subcomponents. The PDO indicators listed in the Financing Agreement were listed as output indicators in the PAD. Some of the indicators relied not only on activities to be implemented under the Project.

32. Project components and organization are considered adequate as they were separated by sector with clear sub-components/activities to be implemented by a centralized PCU (given the shortage of skilled staff in the sector agencies and the need to coordinate among agencies). This was a suitable arrangement given the limited capacity of sector institutions.

Adequacy of Government Commitment

33. The Government and a key set of stakeholders who supported project preparation were committed to the reform agenda and restoration of the sectors included in the Project, but the volatility of the political environment reduced buy-in with respect to expectations at appraisal. The Government’s commitment to undertake wide-ranging reforms in the power and water sectors to improve the availability and reliability of electricity supply and water services in the country at the time of Project preparation was evident by the activities implemented or pledged to be implemented by the Government prior to Project appraisal. For the energy sector, the GoGB had taken important steps including: (a) the ratification of the standing “Energy Sector Policy Note” and the commitment to update it to incorporate the findings and recommendations of several ongoing and planned studies for the development of the energy sector; and (b) the revision of and commitment to promulgate a new “Electricity Law” acceptable to IDA by December 31, 2006. For the water sector, the Government had issued a Letter of Sector Development Policy (LSDP) to formulate sector reforms aiming at: (i) increasing water coverage in urban centers; (ii) restoring financial viability with an appropriate tariff policy based on cost recovery; and (iii) improving the sector management and performance through PPPs.

Adequacy of Risk Assessment

34. The PAD includes an assessment of risks and proposed mitigation measures. Some of the identified risks turned out to have a significant impact on the Project’s implementation performance. For example, the political/social context of the country was identified as a risk at appraisal and this risk materialized: in March 2009 the President of Guinea-Bissau was assassinated, and in 2012 the country experienced a military coup. The coup triggered Bank Operational Policy (OP) 7.30 on April 17, 2012, which led to the suspension of disbursements, which in turn led to delays in Project implementation. As a result of this volatile political situation, the GoGB was not able to implement reforms needed to put the sectors targeted by the pojrect on a road to recovery. Some risks that affected Project implementation, such as the financial sustainability and the technical

performance of the utility, were not identified at appraisal, but were addressed during the 2010 restructuring. 

35. The risk of lack of interest from the private sector in investing on the energy and water sectors was identified at appraisal and was proposed to be mitigated by IDA’s involvement in the Project and the setting-up of an IDA Partial Risk Guarantee instrument for the power component (POS. scheme and fuel supply). This risk materialized, as the proposed POS scheme was no longer considered appropriate during the mid-term review and was cancelled during the restructuring of 2010 (see section 2.2 for details cancellation of this scheme). 

36. The project also identified risks related to financial management (FM) due to the country level weaknesses in the budget execution process. The mitigation measure was to create a PCU within the existing and experienced Project Implementation Unit (PIU) of the Private Sector Rehabilitation and Development Project (PSRDPPIU) located in the Ministry of Economy to mitigate the risk. This was an adequate mitigation measure and the risk did not materialize. FM and procurement ratings were satisfactory for most of the Project implementation period.

37. There was no Quality at Entry assessment undertaken by the Bank’s Quality Assurance Group (QAG).

2.2 Implementation

38. The Project was approved by the Board on June 15, 2006, became effective on August 30, 2007, and closed on March 30, 2014. As described in Section 1.7, the Project underwent three restructurings.

39. The activities co-financed by the BOAD for the rehabilitation and installation of urban distribution network were completed during the first two years of Project implementation. These activities contributed to the reduction in electricity losses and increasing power distribution for end-users.

40. Also, after some initial delays, the investments in the water networks (with the exception of the construction of the water reservoir) were nearly completed by the time of the Project mid-term review (MTR) in November 2009. By the MTR, the implementation of the roads rehabilitation component was significantly delayed, and the activities initially planned for the electricity to be financed by IDA had changed. The MTR showed solid performance in procurement and disbursements. This was in large part due to an efficient, competent, and well-managed PCU under the Ministry of Economy. At MTR, progress towards achieving the PDO was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU) while implementation progress was rated Moderately Satisfactory (MS).

41. By the MTR, it was obvious that power generation capacity available for distribution and water pumping had decreased in Bissau. This was due to the decommissioning of unusable nominal installed capacity and the serious delays in the

commissioning of regional power infrastructure. EAGB was not able to lease power capacity or purchase enough fuel to run additional capacity due its dire financial situation. A collapse of electricity generation in Bissau in December 2007 underlined the need for financing emergency generation.

42. At MTR, the Bank was requested to restructure the Project to extend the closing date and reallocate funds to allow for the co-financing of emergency generation capacity and leasing of emergency generators. As such, the Project was instrumental in maintaining some public power generation capacity given the significant operational and financial problems of EAGB. The first Project restructuring in July 2010 responded to the evolving emergency situation and extended the Project closing date from June 30, 2011 to September 30, 2012 to allow the PDO targets to be achieved. Project resources were reallocated to co-finance the purchase of emergency generation capacity (2 x 1.5 MW) and to finance a contract for leasing emergency generators (3 x 850 kW) that had been signed in January 2008. At the same time, by the MTR it was clear that the POS was no longer appropriate since the OMVG hydropower project would not be operational before 2017, and thus a leasing contract of eight years did not make economic sense. Also, it was very unlikely that a private operator would take the risk of leasing capacity to EAGB even with a Bank provided partial risk guarantee given EAGB’s financial situation and macroeconomic risks in Guinea Bissau. Lastly, as part of the first restructuring the transport component was mostly cancelled and resources reallocated.

43. At the same time, a new IDA project of US$12.7 million was prepared under the Rapid Response to Crisis and Emergency OP/BP 8.00 and financed by the IDA Crisis Response Window. The Emergency Electricity and Water Rehabilitation Project (EEWRP) was designed to assist the GoGB in the rapid restoration and improvement of electricity and water supply services in its capital city by investing in physical assets for electricity generation and water storage, thereby restoring essential utility services to households and the means of production and economic activities for firms.

44. From 2009 to early 2012, Project implementation was progressing well and disbursement had reached 78 percent by the end of the first quarter of 2012. However, the military coup on April 17, 2012 triggered Bank OP 7.30 and led to the suspension of disbursements. The suspension was lifted in January 2013. To address delays in Project implementation resulting from the suspension, a second restructuring extended the Project closing date from September 30, 2012 until June 15, 2013. This was to allow time for completion of activities yet to be procured and some sector studies and technical assistance that still needed to be finalized.

45. A third restructuring included a final extension of the closing date from June 15, 2013 to March 31, 2014, and a final reallocation of Grant proceeds. The extension of closing date was requested so that the technical assistance, environmental clean-up works, and some other activities could be completed. A minor reallocation of proceeds among disbursement categories was carried out to: (i) accommodate the additional operating cost related to the extension of the closing date; (ii) reflect the latest procurement plan; and (iii)

accommodate a slight increase in the cost of works, training, and goods, which was compensated by savings in consultant services.

46. After the first restructuring in 2010, Project implementation was consistently rated moderately satisfactory or satisfactory. At closing, all Project activities were implemented (except for the environmental clean-up works for the new generation plant since the new plant was not installed – see para 52). Final disbursement was US$15.14 million, slightly above the approved US$15 million (and 96 percent of the US$15.77 million available at Project closing due to exchange rate gains). The approved SDR Project amount was 10.3 million and final disbursements were SDR 9.89 million.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

47. Design of M&E System. The results framework included in the original Project design covered activities to be financed by the MIRP, the funds to be reallocated under the PSRDP, and the BOAD parallel co-financing. The justification for this was the integrated and interdependent nature of the projects that were all part of the same framework of outcomes. In hindsight, the M&E system design led to difficulties in monitoring activities to be implemented by other financing sources. It also created a “double accounting system” in the case of the indicator “Improve collection rate of electricity bills,” which was measured both by the PSRDP and MIRP.

48. Implementation of the M&E System. Monitoring and evaluation was challenging throughout Project implementation due to EAGB's low capacity to provide reliable technical, commercial, and financial data, as reflected in various Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) and Aide-memoires. The quality of data improved overtime. During the 2010 restructuring, the new M&E framework tried to address some of its initial deficiencies, but ended up including indicators related to activities to be implemented by the EEWRP (i.e., electricity generation capacity owned by EAGB, collection rate of electricity bills, installation of the pre-paid meters).

49. The changes in the M&E framework created confusion for EAGB and the PCU in terms of what needed to be measured. For instance, the addition of new core indicators to be measured (i.e., Direct/indirect beneficiaries to water supply services (number, female (percent)); number of people provided with access to “improved water sources”) needed to be clarified after which the PCU collected the required data.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

50. Financial Management. Financial management was rated satisfactory throughout Project implementation. PIU staffing remained adequate and proper books of accounts and supporting documents were kept in respect of all expenditures. The auditors’ opinions on the annual financial statements were submitted on time and were unqualified. The interim un-audited financial reports were also submitted on time and the quality of the reports was satisfactory.

51. Procurement. Procurement was rated satisfactory throughout Project implementation. All Project components were implemented following the Bank’s applicable procurement guidelines for works, goods, and services. The PCU was staffed with a Procurement Specialist proficient in Bank procedures. The Project faced a problem with a bidding process that took place 2008 for extending the contract with MARFORCE for the leasing of the generators, but it was satisfactorily addressed with the re-launch of the procurement process.

52. Safeguards. The Project was classified as category B and triggered OP 4.01. Safeguards were rated S or MS throughout Project implementation. During the MTR, it was agreed to reinforce the PCU by recruiting a qualified Social and Environmental Specialist to ensure appropriate implementation of social and environmental aspects of the Project. At Project closing, the environmental clean-up of the power plant site was not implemented due to delays in finalizing the contract for installing the new generators that did not allow the launch of the environmental clean-up. This activity will be financed by the Emergency Water and Electricity Services Upgrading Project.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

53. The ongoing Emergency Electricity and Water Rehabilitation Project (EEWRP) and a new IDA operation - the Emergency Water and Electricity Services Upgrading Project (EWESUP) - approved by the Bank Board in the first semester of 2014 for US$22.5 million will continue supporting the water and energy sectors. The country’s power supply will remain dependent on oil-based generation for the next three years at least. The Bank is providing support to shift from more expensive diesel oil (distillate diesel oil) to lower- cost heavy fuel oil (HFO) and to re-establish revenue collection. In that context, the EWESUP is financing the provision of HFO in order to help build a sustainable supply chain for the power plant, improving the reliability and efficiency of overloaded medium and low voltage, securing the electricity supply of water production, and improving customer management and revenue collection, among other activities. EWESUP is also financing rehabilitation of distribution networks and additional prepayment meters that are expected to reduce losses and increase revenues. At the same time, financing for the OMVG interconnection is likely to be approved by various donors (including the Bank) in the first half of 2015, which over the longer term is expected to help reduce generation costs.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

54. The Project is assessed as highly relevant to the development priorities of the Government both at outset and at completion. The country urgently needed to increase the availability and reliability of electricity and water supply in its capital city and improve the institutional and management capacities in the energy and water sectors.

55. The Project supports the Bank’s twin goals of reducing extreme poverty and

boosting shared prosperity by providing access to safe water to the poor in unserved peri- urban areas of Bissau and by restoring water and electricity services under affordable conditions throughout the city. The Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) finalized in in November 2014 points out that poverty is broadly distributed across the population and country, including the capital city, and that the lack of reliable basic public utilities, electricity and water, constrains livelihood and business development opportunities.

56. The Project is highly relevant to the Government’s Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP II). The Project is fully aligned with two of its core areas: (i) Pillar 3, Promoting sustainable, inclusive and broad-based economic growth through support to economic sectors with strong growth potential; and (ii) Pillar 4, Developing human capital within the framework of a better life for the people, as well as gender equity, in the context of the new sectoral and cross-cutting policies.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

57. The achievement of the Project Development Objectives (PDO) is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU). It should be noted that, despite this rating, the Project had a considerable positive impact on the electricity sector in Guinea-Bissau and helped maintain and restore electricity and water services during a very difficult period. This had economic, health, and the security benefits in a fragile country.

58. In accordance with the Bank’s Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) guidelines, since the PDO and some of the PDO targets were formally modified during the July 2010 restructuring, the Project has been assessed against both the original and the revised PDO. The achievement against both the original and the revised PDO results in an MU rating.

Table 4: Assessment of original versus revised PDOs Against original Against revised Overall Comments PDOs PDOs Rating Moderately Moderately Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Rating value 3 4 Weight (% 50% disbursed 46% disbursed 96% disbursed disbursed against XDR against XDR against XDR before/after PDO approved amount available amount (US$15.77 m change available at closing due to gains in exchange rate but 101% against approved grant of US$15 m) Weighted value 1.50 1.84 3.34 (2x3) Final rating Moderately (rounded) Unsatisfactory

Table 5: Achievement of revised PDO Indicators Baseline Value Restructuring Target achieved Percentage Indicator (2009) Target Values achieved Annual electricity

distribution to end- 35 7.4 12.2 35 users (GWh) in

Bissau Direct/indirect

beneficiaries to 115,000 140,000 172,000 electricity supply 122 (58,300) (69,720) (85,656) services (number,

female (percent)) Number of people provided with access 81,000 92,500 91,350 99 to “improved water sources” Direct/indirect beneficiaries to 101,300 118,500 91,953 water supply 77 (50,500) (59,013) (45,792) services (number, female (percent)) Level of water losses 45 39 86 (percent) 55 Collection rate of 81 95 73 77 electricity bills

59. Prior to the Project restructuring of 2010, PDO achievements were rated as MU. The rehabilitation and installation of urban distribution network had contributed to the reduction in electricity losses and increasing power distribution for end-users. Considerable progress was achieved on rehabilitation of water infrastructure (with the exception of the construction of the water reservoir). However, several activities were not on track, especially the reduction and billing recovery and the POS for a 15 MW power generation leasing contract. The road rehabilitation activities had seen very little progress.

60. The achievement of the PDO after restructuring is also rated as MU. This rating takes into consideration that the Project almost reached or exceeded the targets for two PDO indicators, but only partially achieved the targets for four other PDO indicators. The indicator that exceeded its target was the number of “Direct/indirect beneficiaries to electricity supply services” thanks to the successful installation of more than 15,000 pre- paid meters. In addition, the target for “Number of people provided with access to “improved water sources” is estimated to be 99 percent achieved due to the successful implementation of all Project activities in the water sector (more below).

61. The PDO target on “annual electricity distribution to end-users (GWh)” was mostly achieved in 2013 when it reached 33.2 GWh. However, due to external problems with fuel supply in 2014, the amount of electricity distributed decreased in 2014. Thus only 35 percent of the target was achieved at Project close. It should be noted that the installed capacity to generate and transmit the power is available and once the fuel supply issue is

solved, distribution to end-users is expected to reach and exceed the 35 GWh target. The current fuel supply crisis can be attributed to various factors, including the dire financial situation of the utility, which does not have the financial resources to pay for the required fuel; technical problems related to the difficulties to switch some of the generators to operate on less expensive HFO; and macroeconomic problems due to the GoGB’s lack of resources to pay for diesel imports. Moreover the focus of the MIRP was on supporting the restoration and rehabilitation of critical infrastructure in the energy and water sectors in the city of Bissau and not on the utility´s financial and commercial recovery. The improvement of the utility´s financial and commercial performance is being addressed by the ongoing Emergency Electricity and Water Rehabilitation Project (EERP) and the Emergency Water and Electricity Services Upgrading Project (EWESUP) - approved by the Bank Board on July 29, 2010 and May 29, 2014 respectively.

62. The targets for “direct/indirect beneficiaries to water supply services” was 77 percent achieved, and the target for the “level of water losses” was 86 percent achieved. The partial achievements of these water targets can be explained by a disconnect between the PDO targets, which were overestimated, and the activities. All activities related to water supply services were adequately implemented, includes: (i) replacement of 3.6 km of primary water distribution networks and 9 km of tertiary water distribution networks; (ii) an extension of 26.3 km of tertiary water distribution networks to unserved areas; (iii) the construction of 700 water connections and 50 new public standpipes in peri-urban areas of Bissau; and (iv) the supply and installation 6,000 water meters and provided equipment and logistical supplies to EAGB to improve operational performance of the water utility.

63. The target on the “collection rate of electricity bills” was 77 percent achieved. This can be explained by the fact that EAGB faced problems with the new billing software installed in 2013 by SENELEC (the Senegalese electric utility), which resulted in delays in billing of an important number of customers during the first semester of 2014. Problems with the software were mostly resolved after the Project closed. A large number of pre- paid meters were installed at the end of Project implementation and have led to collection rate improvements since Project closing. However, this improvement was not captured before Project closing, which is the date that indicators were monitored for ICR purposes. In addition, improvement of collection rates for government customers was difficult to achieve since the utility did not stop providing electricity to those customers even given lack of payment. The collection rate has improved since Project, closing, reaching 98 percent for household and commercial customers. However, the collection rate for central government and local authorities remains less than 50 percent, impeding achievement of the overall target of 83 percent.

64. In addition to the PDO indicators, four of the five intermediate indicators were achieved. The reduction in total energy losses was the only intermediate indicator that could not be achieved mostly due to the poor technical and financial performance of EAGB. The situation of the distribution network in the country has further deteriorated due to the state of the country and the energy sector, leading to more technical losses. In addition, some of the private “independent” energy suppliers are still able to connect to EAGB’s network due to the confusion derived from the de facto situation where there are

multiple producers. This situation will improve once EAGB is able to supply all the demand in Bissau and shut down the illegal private producers. However, with the installation of the 15,000 pre-paid meters and the additional ones that will be installed in the next couple of years, it is expected that the commercial losses will be substantially reduced.

3.3 Efficiency

65. The original Project documentation included an economic and financial analysis for the power and water investment activities. The institutional development and road maintenance activities were not included in the analysis, which is justifiable given the largely qualitative nature of the expected outcomes.

66. The analysis performed at appraisal was primarily a financial analysis rather than a full economic analysis. The forecasts considered only the expected additional costs and revenues accruing to the utility (EAGB) as a result of the Project. The impact on users (additional consumer surplus, increased tariffs, etc.) was not part of the analysis. The Project document provided only the estimated Net Present Value (NPV) for power investments, and only an Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for water investments.

67. It is important to properly assess ex post the Project impact. The Project has contributed to maintaining water supply in Bissau as well as some level of electricity service. The Project also contributed to EAGB continuing to provide minimum electricity services, although those were was rationed and mostly directed to the following beneficiaries: government services, health facilities, water supply (pumping), peace keeping forces, and public lighting. Even if provided at a loss by EAGB, electricity services had a significant economic value for users. Deriving estimates of the value of the willingness to pay (WTP) from the prices paid by private users (commercial or households) to alternative suppliers (micro-generators operating with diesel) results in a more nuanced assessment of the project efficiency.

Financial analysis

68. An implied IRR has been calculated for three scenarios using the original economic analysis in the PAD.

69. The three scenarios analyzed in the PAD were the following:

 “Short term energy scenario” considering EAGB costs and revenue over only a five year period (2007-2011) corresponding to the duration of diesel-fueled generation capacity;  “Worst case scenario” consisting of the continuation of rental for an additional 15 years (until 2026);  “Realistic Scenario” assuming the transition to HFO-based generation from 2012 onwards (also until 2026).

70. The last two scenarios consisted of forecasts far into the future and thus largely depended on factors that were unrelated to the Project itself (e.g., investments in HFO generation). Also, the forecast of cost and revenues over the long term were very uncertain, leading for instance to a feature in the “Worst case scenario” of large deficits at the end of the period resulting in a dual IRR (-1 percent and +269 percent).

71. The assumptions for the financial and economic analysis at appraisal stage were very optimistic for all three scenarios. All three scenarios assumed an immediate reduction of total (technical and non-technical) distribution losses from over 40 percent to eight percent. A dramatic reduction in distribution losses was optimistic and unlikely, especially in view of the fragile situation of the country. For all three scenarios, assuming distribution losses of 20 percent (already a very significant improvement) would have resulted in negative NPVs.

72. In reality, distribution losses remained very high (around 45 percent). The analysis done for the purpose of the ICR takes into consideration these actual losses and results in a negative NPV for each scenario.

Table 6: Financial analysis – electricity Original PAD ICR Analysis Initial Implied investments NPV IRR NPV IRR US$ million US$ million % US$ million % Short Term Scenario 10.95 11.67 268% (26.87) NA Realistic Scenario 10.95 34.46 224% (30.17) NA Worst case Scenario 10.95 12.84 269% or (77.88) NA -1%

Water Sector

73. It is difficult to reassess the Project IRR and NPV for water investments ex post given the original methodology. The PAD indicated an Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) of 43 percent for water investments. No NPV was provided. This can be explained by the methodology, which did not take into consideration the costs of the initial capex investments in water (US$4.3 million), but only modest increase in interest costs for five years (two percent of the initial investments) and capital repayments over 15 years starting in year six. Furthermore, the calculation assumed a reduction of water distribution losses from 70 percent to 40 percent over a two year period (the PAD main text indicates a reduction to only 50 percent, but this does not reflect the actual assumption used as per calculations in the relevant Annex). Also, the calculation of benefits includes extra revenue from a future 20 percent increase in water tariffs), which was not logically attributable to the Project.

Ex post economic analysis

74. At the time of Project preparation, EAGB’s operational and financial performance was very weak. The Project did not bring about sufficient improvement in EAGB’s performance to restore the company’s financial viability. However, EAGB continued to provide essential services. For the purpose of the ICR, an ex post economic analysis has been carried out to assess the economic impact of the Project based on a comparison of electricity service cost of EAGB services to that of private micro-generators (small diesel gensets ), which range from 500 to 1,000 CFAF per kWh (~USc 100 to 200). This is equivalent to two to four times EAGB’s tariffs.

75. An ex post economic analysis shows an EIRR of 32.9 percent for incremental generation investments. The ex post analysis assumes a willingness to pay (WTP) at the lower bound of the range of observed prices for micro-generation in Bissau (USc 100 per kWh). The analysis applies a discount of 20 percent to this value in order to reflect the fact that due to the relatively high level of non-payment, the electricity supplied by EAGB is presumably used less efficiently than for private micro-generators. Assumptions on the cost are based largely on the technical and financial reporting from EAGB for 2013 and 2014. An assumption was made that generation equipment is used for five years, which is a worst- case scenario as generation equipment might have a useful technical life of 15 years if properly maintained. On this basis, the levelized cost of electricity delivered to EAGB’s customers through incremental investment in thermal generation is estimated at US$0.69 per kWh with a 10 percent discount rate (and 0.71 with a 15 percent discount rate).

76. The ex post economic analysis suggests that there is a good economic case for supporting EAGB in the provision of essential services. It is also clear that there is a significant scope for reducing EAGB’s supply costs (reducing specific consumption, switching to lower cost HFO instead of DDO, increasing load factor, improving maintenance, etc.). Details of the economic analysis modelling are provided in Annex 3.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

77. Overall outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory, taking into consideration the high relevance of the Project, the Moderately Unsatisfactory PDO achievement, and the Moderately Satisfactory achievement in terms of efficiency per discussion above. Despite the MU rating, it should be noted that Project was able to achieve much in a difficult political situation. The Project addressed urgent needs in the water and energy sectors, and the Project helped maintain and restore electricity and water services in a fragile country. The fuel supply crisis in the last years of Project implementation had a negative effect on the achievement of the PDO targets. Also the targets for the water sector activities were overestimated at Project design. The financial analysis shows the major financial problems of the utility EAGB, but the economic analysis shows the economic value of the services provided to households and business as a result of the Project.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

78. Poverty, gender, and social impacts are not easily estimated under the Project due to the lack of baseline analysis and follow-up surveys and end of Project surveys; gender disaggregated data was estimated per the figures on female beneficiaries in the results framework. However, it should be highlighted that without the Project the electricity and water and related health situation in the country would have further deteriorated following the energy crisis of 2007.

79. On the energy sector, the number of electricity connections increased more than anticipated by the Project, and the installed capacity for power generation is available, however power generation has been constrained since late 2013 (especially due to fuel supply problems) and load shedding is a problem. It is expected that once the fuel supply issues are resolved, the utility will continue to increase access to more people in the country.

80. With regards to water sector, health and gender impacts due to increased and better water services are directly correlated. Better water services in the city of Bissau due to the Project activities benefit all residents, andt women in particular. The reduction in the extensive time and effort spent gathering water spent mainly by women allows them to devote more time to educational, productive, and recreational activities, and/or for doing other household chores. Moreover, adequate water services reduce the incidence of cholera and other water related diseases that affect the city population, particularly vulnerable groups, such as children, the elderly, and women.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

81. The Project contributed moderately to the strengthening of the technical and managerial capacities in EAGB as well as the water and energy directorates at the Ministry of Trade, Energy, Industry and Environment through in-country formal and informal training sessions as well as through the participation of staff in the preparation and review of studies. Staff increased their competencies and know-how in areas such as energy and water policy formulation, energy and water regulation, commercial and financial aspects of the utility, and technical aspects, such as the installation and maintenance of pre-paid meters.

82. No unintended outcomes.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

83. There was neither a beneficiary survey nor a stakeholder workshop done at completion in the context of this ICR.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial

84. This ICR rates the risk to the sustainability of the development outcomes as Substantial. This rating is largely due to the political situation of the country and the fragility context, characterized by instability, frequent political changes, and a weak central government, coupled with the persistent problems faced by EAGB (e.g., difficult financial and commercial situation) that make it difficult to implement any major reform or investment program, attract private sector participation in the sector, or even attract support from development partners. Nonetheless, it is expected that the two IDA sector projects under implementation will continue supporting the objectives of the MIRP and improve the financial and commercial situation of EAGB.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

85. The Bank’s performance during the Project preparation is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. The Bank did a thorough analysis of the energy, water, and road sectors to be supported by the Project. As a result, the Project design focused on responding to real and urgent needs faced by the country at the time of Project appraisal. The Project was also in line with the country’s and the Bank’s development priorities and integrated lessons learned from previous Projects in the region. However, the Project design was overly ambitious vis-a-vis the available funds and in terms of expected outcomes.

86. Implementation arrangements were well designed and allowed to implement all Project activities despite the political situation. The M&E framework and the financial and economic analysis showed shortcomings. Social and environmental mitigation measures were adequately incorporated into Project design.

87. Risks were identified, but some risks were underestimated. For instance, the risk regarding the willingness of the private sector to invest in a small fragile state was underrated. Also, the risk mitigation measures related to the financial and technical weakness of the utility identified at appraisal were insufficient.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

88. The Bank team closely supervised Project implementation, including fiduciary and safeguards issues. The Bank team adopted an adaptive and flexible approach that ensured the continued relevance of Project activities in a rapidly changing environment through consecutive restructurings. For example, the lease of 2.5 MW of capacity and purchase of

3 MW of additional capacity not initially included in initial Project design was instrumental in overcoming blackouts and ensuring continued electricity services in Bissau.

89. The Bank provided hands on support that helped implementation of Project activities to continue during various political crises and a period of suspension of disbursement. The Bank undertook regular missions to supervise the energy sector technical aspects and was proactive in supporting and providing advice to the Government in addressing key challenges and emergency situations. The continuity of the Bank team over the Project preparation and implementation period helped to customize implementation support to the specific circumstances in the country. The Project had three task managers over a period of preparation and implementation stretching over a decade. In both transitions of task managers, the new task manager was a team member already.

90. Supervision of the water and the roads sector was sometimes uneven, as noted in various ISRs. Fiduciary supervision was carried out regularly and no major fiduciary problems occurred. Environmental and social issues were adequately monitored and the Bank team provided support to strengthen the PCU´s safeguards capacity.

91. Overall Bank performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. This rating combines the Bank performance rating in ensuring quality at entry (MU) and the Bank performance rating for quality of supervision (MS). The overall rating takes into account the deficiencies in Project design as well as the importance of adaptable supervision of a project in post-conflict states. It should be noted that any project, whatever the quality at entry, would have faced obstacles given the coup d’état and the breakdown of the electricity system in Guinea-Bissau during Project implementation. The team was able to deal with issues as they arose, and took proactive actions accordingly (restructuring, support on M&E, etc.).

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

92. Performance of the GoGB vis-a-vis the Project is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. In addition to the difficult political issues faced by the country that resulted in the assassination of the President in 2009 and a military coup in 2012 delaying Project implementation, the Government did not fulfill expectations regarding to the use HFO for the ABC generators installed in 2012 to lower cost of production.

93. Even though the focus of the Project was on supporting the restoration and rehabilitation of critical infrastructure in the energy and water sectors in the city of Bissau and not on the utility´s financial and commercial recovery, adjusting water and electricity tariffs and other sector reform measures would have helped improve the financial and technical situation of the utility. The GoGB understands the problems faced by the electricity and water sectors and the need to implement significant reforms. However, the

political situation in the country has been an obstacle to implement such reforms. The transitional Government established after the military coup of 2012 did not have the necessary political power to implement the measures needed. The Bank will continue its work in the sector under the ongoing projects, and will work with the new Government, established in July 2014, on sector reform, which remains challenging.

94. The limited performance of the power utility, EAGB, also had a negative impact on Project implementation and the achievement of the project development objectives. Despite some improvements, EAGB is still in a dire financial situation as evidenced by the fuel crisis and the lack of maintenance of the distribution network. The commercial situation is improving with the installation of the pre-paid meters, and this is expected to be reflected in an improvement on the financial situation overtime.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory

95. The PCU performance was satisfactory as evidenced by the mostly Satisfactory and MS ratings on ISRs throughout Project implementation. Project activities were completed despite some delays mostly due to the 2012 military coup that hindered completion of some activities. Procurement, financial management, and safeguard issues were adequately handled by the PCU. Despite the lack of capacity of the beneficiary institutions (i.e., EAGB and the relevant departments at the sector ministry) as well as multiple changes in management in those institutions that could have resulted in significant delays, the PCU took the leadership on the implementation of the various components and activities and maintained a proactive role throughout Project implementation ensuring that activities could be successfully completed.

96. The overall rating for Borrower Performance is Moderately Satisfactory. The Moderately Satisfactory rating recognizes the vast amount of work done by the PCU in a difficult political context that allowed the completion of all Project activities despite the limitation in the performance of the Government and the utility.

6. Lessons Learned

97. Adaptability and flexibility during project implementation. Designing multi- sectoral projects can be appropriate in small fragile countries where the needs are often numerous and the number of projects limited. In these situations a flexible approach should be adopted and the implementation should be especially aggressive in exploiting every available opportunity to revise, restructure, and retain only the sub-components with the highest potential. This was the case of the MIRP where a flexible approach was adopted and allowed the Project to better serve the needs of the country and respond to an emergency situation (i.e., lack of power at the end of 2007, extensions of closing date to account for a political situation, etc.). The flexibility in Project implementation allowed to

country to maintain a modicum of power supply in critical moments averting an even bigger crisis.

98. Project development objectives and outcomes need to be defined realistically in capacity constrained and fragile countries. Fragile environments are characterized by risks that are hard to mitigate. In order to allow for the unforeseen, project teams should allow for long implementation periods. Given uncertainties in fragile countries, PDO level indicators should be closely related to project activities to avoid a disconnect between the completion of activities and the achievement of the PDO level indicators. In the case of the MIRP, all the anticipated activities were implemented, but not all PDO indicators were achieved. This is partly due to the fact that some of the activities were only implemented at the end of the Project period and therefore were not yet reflected in the final indicator values. However, some PDO indicators were too broadly defined and had very ambitious targets that did not reflect the activities financed by the Project.

99. Strong Implementation Unit. Another lesson from the MIRP for projects where the existing institutions are fragile and unstable is the importance of building a strong PCU. A key reason for the achievements of this Project was the capacity and quality of the PCU. Over time, strong PCU capacity needs to be transferred to and local institutional capacity built.

100. Multi-sectoral projects require engaged multi-sectoral supervision teams. Multi- sectoral projects, especially of a small size, are challenging and expensive to supervise. In the case of MIRP, it was mapped to the energy unit and as such, the unit took leadership in its supervision. This led to an imbalance in supervision, with water and transport specialists less actively involved in Project supervision. This was a missed opportunity to provide much needed advice and support to the country in those areas and improve implementation (especially in the transport sector before the restructuring). Internal Bank incentives for cross-sectoral collaboration have since evolved.

101. The willingness of private sector to invest in fragile states is limited and should be realistically assessed in project design. The Project was initially designed to have participation of the private sector in the energy and water sectors. However, during implementation it was clear that the willingness of the private sector to get involved in a volatile political environment was overestimated. While private sector investments are needed in fragile states, a realistic analysis of the willingness of the private sector to get involved in such a context should be conducted.

102. M&E design should be simple in a weak institutional setting. In the case of MIRP, the M&E design changed, including with the introduction of core sector indicators. The lack of reliable data limited the ability to measure the degree to which specific components achieved the desired goals. In hindsight, seeing the difficulties in gathering reliable data since the beginning of project implementation, it would have been desirable for the Bank team to proactively address this issue early on during project implementation. Furthermore, the MIRP indicators relied on activities to be achieved by the PRSDO, EEWRD, and the BOAD operations, which though they were interrelated proved difficult to monitor.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies

103. A draft of the ICR was shared with the PCU, and the PCU conveyed to the Bank Task Team that it agreed with the conclusions of the ICR. The Borrower’s ICR is included in Annex 5.

(b) Cofinanciers

104. The Bank team reached out to BOAD for comments. The BOAD project closed several years ago without a formal evaluation. The team that worked on it was no longer available to provide comments.

N/A

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions)

Component 1 2.90 2.93 101 Component 2 11.05 14.50 131 Component 3 4.85 4.13 85 Component 4 3.20 0.33 10 Component 5 1.00 2.93 293

Total Baseline Cost 23.00 24.82. 108

Physical and Price Contingencies 588 2.00 0.34 Total Project Costs 25.00 25.16 101 Total Financing Required 25.00 25.50 103

(b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Cofinancing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Borrower 0.00 0.00 IDA Grant 15.00 15.16 101 IDA PSRDP 5.00 5.00 100 West African Development Bank 5.00 5.00 100

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

1. Component 1: Institutional Development and Sector Studies (Original Project US$2.50 million, Final Cost US$2.53 million) This component supported institutional and capacity development and sector studies for the Ministry of Economy, State Secretariat for Energy, Ministry of Natural Resources, EAGB and Ministry of Public Works, to achieve the development of the energy, water and road sectors and the improvement of the technical and financial management of the respective sectors’ assets. This component included:

2. Sub-Component 1.1: Power Sector (Original Project US$1.51 million; Restructured Project US$ 1.65 million). This sub-component included the following activities:

(i) Preparation and implementation of a comprehensive re-organization plan for EAGB, including a productivity enhancement program, capacity development, training, and technical assistance for the improvement of its power operations. A first study to assist the GoGB to identify the best option for reform of EAGB was financed under the Private Sector Rehabilitation and Development Project (PSRDP), but was not completed (Guinea-Bissau was under suspension at the time); an individual consultant was recruited under the MIRP for finalizing the study and recommending options for institutional reform of the water and electricity sectors and for restructuring EAGB.

Based on the conclusions of a workshop held in December 2009, the Government adopted the recommendations of the workshop and updated the sectoral policy by 2010. It was decided to finance under the restructured MIRP human resources study and evaluation of the operational assets for EAGB (US$100,000). This study was completed.

It was also agreed to finance under the EEWRP operation the following activities: i) update legislation and related decrees water and electricity (US$350,000); ii) EAGB restructuring preparation activities; and iii) technical assistance to ensure operational management of EAGB during the transition period of two years and prepare its restructuring.

(ii) Technical assistance to EAGB for the elaboration of an efficient and transparent electricity tariff structure and indexation formula (US$100,000). The final report was submitted to the Government in 2014 after extensive consultation with all stakeholders and is awaiting Governmental approval.

(iii) Elaboration of a comprehensive assessment of the potential to sustainably produce modern energy (power and other fuels) from the country’s existing and potential agro-industrial and forestry base (agricultural/agro-industrial and forestry residues and bi-products, energy crops, woody biomass, etc.); and preparation of a “Medium to Long Term National Energy Development Strategy,” specifically including least-cost and renewable energy options capable of supporting the establishment of

a sustainable national energy platform, and the elaboration of a “National Energy Sector Investment and Resource Mobilization Plan” (US$930,000). The Medium to Long Term National Energy Development Strategy was finalized in 2014 and various workshops were held to discuss it with the different stakeholders. This activity also included training of two EAGB staff on NEPLAN and ArcGis programs.

(iv) Engineering studies and preparation of Bidding Documents for the Generation contract, the Network Rehabilitation and expansion including the procurement of necessary tools and equipment, and Metering and Billing System. A new technical assistance to complete the engineering studies and preparation of Bidding Document for the new investments to be financed under the EEWRP was financed under the MIRP (US$170,000).

(v) Procurement of a Financial and Accounting Management System for EAGB, including the necessary training for the utilization of such system and Technical Assistance. These activities were implemented through the technical assistance contract to manage EAGB’s commercial and financial departments. The budgeted amount for this task was reallocated to component 2.2 under the restructured MIRP.

(vi) Institutional development and strengthening support for the Ministry of the Economy, for the Secretariat of Energy and, when established, for the Multisector Regulatory Agency. Support in the form of purchasing vehicles, computers, office equipment, and training was provided to the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of Economy. An estimated budget of US$75,000 was allocated to support each of these ministries, and additional funding of US$50,000 was allocated to the Department of Energy. The total budget was US$275,000. This activity was managed under the component 5 of the restructured MIRP. The Multisector Regulatory Agency has not been established yet, even though the Government has already approved it and is expected to be put in place in the next six months.

3. Sub-component 1.2: Water Sector (US$0.64 million). This sub-component included support for the preparation and implementation of the sector reform, ensure the establishment successful public-private partnership (PPP) to improve EAGB’s commercial and financial management performance, and help implement provisions of the LSDP (regulatory framework, tariff policy, management of public standpipes, etc.) through technical assistance, consulting services and public communication. In addition to the study completed under component 1.1.1, the Project financed:

(i) Engineering studies, preparation of Bidding Documents and supervision of works for the 700 m3 reservoir, the water network rehabilitation and expansion including the procurement of necessary tools and equipment, and metering. Due to the delay in the commissioning of the reservoir, a new supervision contract had to be procured to supervise the completion of the reservoir (Estimated value: US$150,000); this activity was financed under the restructured MIRP.

(ii) Diagnostic study of water production systems (US$50,000). Problems with the selected consultant led to the cancellation of the contract. The PCU is still waiting for reimbursement of the advance by the Bank that provided the commercial guarantee. This study was not undertaken.

(iii) Establishment of a new management system for public standpipes. The Project supported the establishment of the system and provide communities with sensitization training on challenges involved in this new mode of community management of public standpipes. The study has been completed and 58 management committees have been created for the 58 standpipes funded and commissioned by the Project.

(iv) Technical assistance to EAGB Commercial and Financial management including software, TA & training for EAGB Financial and Accounting Operations: Increase the efficiency of EAGB and public entities involved in the water sector by strengthening their capacities in management and planning, through technical assistance, training and equipment supplies.

These activities were realized through the technical assistance contract to EAGB for its commercial and financial management. Also, the budgeted amount was reallocated to the component 2.2 under the restructured MIRP.

4. Sub-component 1.3: Roads Sector (Original Project US$0.35 million; Restructured Project US$0.50 million). This sub-component financed the institutional and capacity development needs of the Ministry of Public Works to enable it to effectively manage its resources and efficiently run its road and water sanitation rehabilitation, construction and maintenance works, and to enable it to effectively discharge its sector planning, policy making and regulatory responsibilities, especially with regard to the coordination and harmonization with the other Ministries (for example the Ministry of Transport and Communications). This sub-component was meant to support the reforms undertaken in the road sector (sector strategy, road fund) to improve the sector institutional and regulatory framework.

5. One of the specific objectives of the transport component was to provide technical support to institutions of the Ministry responsible for infrastructure and road transport and for the development of a strategic framework This strategic focus has been made even more necessary by the redevelopment intervened in the government structure and now between the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry responsible for infrastructure. The two ministries received technical assistance to: (i) finalize the Transport Sector Strategy and development of a Letter of Transport Sector Policy; the transport sector strategy has to be inclusive with regard to infrastructure development and transport services; it also has to be carried out on an internodal based approach (US$50,000); (ii) develop a Road Sector Investment Plan that takes into account the medium and long term investment needs, including the road network maintenance requirements. During the MTR mission, it was agreed to cancel the road investment component (Component 4) and therefore to postpone the development of a road sector investment plan; (iii) mobilize and coordinate donor investment support for the roads sector and participate in the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport

Program (SSATP) (US$50,000); iv) establish of a revised road code (US$50,000); v) strengthen institutional capacities (US$160,000); (vi) undertake training in the fields of management and financing of road maintenance, management of projects, administration of land transport, road safety and procurement. (US$50,000); and (vii) provide equipment and logistical supplies, vehicles, computer equipment and software, office furniture (US$90,000).

Summary Table for Component 1 Estimated cost Item Project Component US$ million IDA MIRP Final Initial Restructured Cost 1. Institutional Development and Sector Studies Sub-total 2.50 2.79 2.53

6. Component 2: Restoration and Rehabilitation of the Power System. (Original Project US$2.35 million, Final Cost US$5.64 million). This component supported a fast- tracked restoration and rehabilitation of power generation and distribution, and commercial operations in Bissau. This objective was achieved through three cross-supporting actions, with some of the sub-component being financed by the MIRP, by the closed IDA Private Sector Rehabilitation and Development Project (IDA-PSRDP), by BOAD, and by the EEWRP.

7. Sub-component 2.1: Restoration of power generation (Approved Project US$2.10 million; Restructured Project US$3.24 million). This sub-component included the following activities:

(i) Leasing contract: Mobilization and demobilization costs: the original Project envisaged that 15 MW of thermal power generation capacity would be leased by EAGB for a period of three to five years via the competitive contracting of a private operator (denominated as Private Operation Scheme - POS.). It was also envisaged that the Project would finance transportation and small works for site preparation for the mobilization and de-mobilization costs, up to a ceiling of US$1.1 million, of the POS. Such a POS was not possible, therefore the restructuring of 2010 included support for the purchase of additional generation capacity (see (iii) below).

(ii) Environmental management plan for the current generation site: this activity aimed at implementing the recommendations of the consultant's report on environmental auditing and environmental and social assessment for new generation investment and rehabilitation of the main production of electricity in Bissau. The implementation of the mitigation plan, control, and organization was estimated at about US$390,000. This activity was not implemented due to delays by the contractor of the new generation plan that delayed the procurement of the contractor for the clean-up works.

(iii) Generation, emergency investments: the situation in terms of generation capacity had considerably worsened in 2007 that resulted on the implementation of a number of emergency operations by the Project. Those activities were not included in the original Project, but were included in the restructured MIRP as follows:

a. Purchase of emergency generation capacity (2 x 1.5 MW): co financed by the PSRDP (US$1,726,326) and the MIRP (US$600,000). To enable the performance of the contract and allow EAGB to operate the two generators under the best conditions, the MIRP also financed some additional works and supplies (approximately US$180,000). Both generators started operation in 2008, but are now awaiting repairs and have not been operational since June 2012. One of the generators is now with the supplier outside Guinea-Bissau and it has not been repaired due to discrepancies between the supplier and EAGB. The second generator is not working either, but is expected to be repaired by EAGB.

b. Leasing of 2.5 MW of power capacity: Given the delays in the commissioning of the (2x1.5 MW) mentioned in (a.) above, and the urgency of providing some electricity to Bissau (no power at all at the end of 2007), a contract for leasing emergency generators (3 x 850 kW) was signed and generators were commissioned in January 2008 for the first two, and in February 2008 for the third. This lease contract was extended until June 2012 to facilitate the production of power by EAGB. In addition, the MIRP financed the purchase of spare parts and lubricants for the MTU and ABC generators.

Estimated Generation, emergency investments cost IDA-MIRP US$ million a. Purchase of emergency groups (2 x 1.5 MW) 0.6 b. Provision of a power of 2.5 MW 2.25 Sub-total 2.85

(iv) Implementation of decentralized power generation - cogeneration from biomass: The purchase of cogeneration equipment initiated by LICAJU and SICAJU (Sociedade de Transformacao de Caju Lda and Sociedade Industrial de Caju) was completed. The equipment for these plants have been financed by the PSRDP. Additional financing by this activity was provided by the restructured Project and was completed.

8. Sub-component 2.2: Rehabilitation & improvement of Commercial Management System. (Approved Project US$0.25 million; Restructured Project US$1.47 million) The strategy to improve commercial and financial performance of EAGB was based on the implementation of two specific activities: (i) a technical assistance contract for commercial, accounting and financial management of EAGB; and (ii) a supply and

installation contract of prepayment meters and setting up a new commercial management system. The MIRP financed the following activities:

(i) Technical Assistance for the improvement/recovery of the commercial, accounting and financial management of EAGB. The Technical assistance contract was considered essential for the success of the strategy. After an international competitive bidding process, a three years TA contract was signed in February, 2009 and became effective in May, 2009. Originally, the MIRP was financing only the first year of the contract (US$0.85 million), but due to the financial situation of EAGB a provision of US$500,000 to finance the second year of the contract was added in the restructured MIRP. This contract was suspended by the contractor in 2009 due to the instability in the country that followed the assassination of the President at the time. A renegotiated agreement with the contractor was processed.

To assist the Technical Assistant in the implementation of its activities, the Bank also financed various support contracts: (i) purchase of four pick-up vehicles (about US$90,000); (ii) purchase of seven motorcycles 50 cm3 (about US$5,000); (iii) hardware (about US$15,000); and (iv) fuel for above vehicles for a period of six months (approximately US$10,000).

(ii) Supply and installation of prepayment meters (15,000 units) and associated commercial management systems: The rehabilitation of the electricity billing collection system by the establishment and operation of an electricity pre-payment meter system (15,000 units) was one of the main pillars of the strategy to improve commercial and financial performance of EAGB. Initially, this activity was supposed to be financed by the PSRDP and therefore not budgeted by the MIRP. This expenditure was financed through the EEWRP (US$2.5 million). A technical study as well as the procurement of the meters was carried-out by the MIRP.

(iii) Sub-component 2.3: Rehabilitation & reinforcement of Urban Distribution Network (Approved Project US$0.00 million; Restructured Project US$0.17 million). The rehabilitation of the distribution network was financed by BOAD and included: (i) the rehabilitation and extension of the existing urban distribution system, including replacement of transformers, and the upgrading of the distribution voltage to 10 kV for the existing leftover of 6 kV systems; (ii) establishment of necessary equipment pool for the operation and maintenance of the urban distribution network; and (iii) training of EAGB staff on the operation, maintenance, and management of the power distribute on network. A small contract for purchase and installation of power cells (at the Bissau power plant) was included in the Project restructuring and financed by the MIRP (US$170,000).

Summary Table for Component 2 Project Component Estimated cost Item US$ million IDA MIRP Final Initial Restructured Cost 2. Restoration and Rehabilitation of Power System Sub-total 2.35 4.88 5.64

9. Three intermediate indicators measured achievement of the component activities as follows:  Increase electricity generation capacity owned by EAGB from 3 MW to 5.5 MW1 through the Project. This indicator was achieved as MIRP financed the purchase of 3 MW (2 X 1.5 MW) of new generation.  Number of prepayment meters installed (15,000). By Project completion 15,137 prepayment meters have been installed. However, it should be noted that the purchase of the pre-paid meters was financed by EEWRP.  Reduce total energy losses from 50 percent to 35 percent. This indicator was not achieved. At Project closing, energy losses were estimated at 47 percent.

10. Component 3: Rehabilitation of Water Production, Treatment and Urban Distribution. (Original Project US$4.85 million, Final Cost US$4.13 million). This component included the following sub-components.

11. Sub-component 3.1: Water production (Original Project US0.86 million; Restructured Project US$0.14 million) This sub-component was financed by IDA and included:

(i) Rehabilitation and reinforcement of water production systems in the city of Bissau. To improve water storage capacity and the distribution network equilibrium, the Project included the construction of a new reservoir (700 m3) within the existing premises of EAGB in the “August 3 Hospital”. A first contract was signed in 2008, but due to many deficiencies of the company, it was decided to terminate the contract. The termination process was completed and a new consultation was completed. A new estimate of the cost of the reservoir was conducted by the consulting engineer that estimated the cost at US$1.23 million. This was financed under the proposed EEWRP, as it exceeded the funds available through the MIRP.

An environmental impact study was financed under the restructured MIRP (US$ 100,000).

1 This is minimum capacity to be made available through MIRP. 34

(ii) Replacement of the old pumping system at the “August 3 Hospital” to increase the volume of water produced and satisfy the medium term water demand (US$33,000).

12. Sub-component 3.2: Water Distribution and Sub-component 3.3: Billing system & operational tools (Original Project US$3.99 million; Restructured Project US$4.60 million). These two sub-components included:

(i) Replacement of: (a) 3.6 km of primary water distribution networks along existing roads (November 14 Avenue and Pansauna Isna Avenue); and (b) 9 km of tertiary water distribution networks in the neighborhood of Ajuda. On completion of these works, water losses were expected to be reduced from 70 percent to 50 percent.

(ii) Extension of 26.3 km of tertiary water distribution networks to unserved areas and the construction of 700 water connections and 50 new public standpipes in peri- urban areas of Bissau (particularly in neighborhoods of Luanda and Bandim). Private connections called “social connections” were subsidized by the Project with beneficiaries making only a small contribution. Public standpipes 100 percent financed by the Project will be operated by private entrepreneurs on a fee-for service basis.

(iii) Supply and installation 6,000 water meters. All water connections were to be equipped with meters so that users could be billed for their actual consumption, rather than on a lump sum basis as it is the case currently

(iv) Equipment and logistical supplies to EAGB: water analysis kits, fire standpipes, operation tools and vehicles, to improve operational performance of the water utility.

13. All activities under this sub-component were successfully implemented by the MIRP.

Summary Table for Component 3 Estimated cost

US$ million Item Project Component IDA-MIRP Final Initial Restructured Cost 3. Rehabilitation of Water Production, Treatment & Urb. Distribution Sub-total 3.99 4.60 4.13

14. The intermediate outcome indicators to measure progress in implementing this component were:  Improved community water points constructed or rehabilitated under the Project (number): the target was 58 and it was achieved by the MIRP.  Extend water distribution networks to unserved areas under the Project. The target was 43.7 kms and it was achieved.

15. Component 4: Limited Rehabilitation of Urban Road Infrastructure. (Original Project US$3.20 million, Final Cost US$0.33 million) Within the Project’s IDA resource constraint, this component financed the following activities:

(i) Preparation of road rehabilitation investment program through feasibility studies to determine the type of works needed, as well as the eligibility criteria and timing for reconstruction of urban roads in the Recipient’s territory;

(ii) Implementation of a limited road rehabilitation program, including civil works, acquisition of equipment and provision of consultant services to rehabilitate the primary and secondary road network in the city of Bissau. It was confirmed during the Mid Term Review Mission the cancelation of this road rehabilitation component and an agreement was concluded between the Government and the Mission to reallocate the resources originally destined for the road investments to the energy component.

Summary table for Component 4 Estimated cost

US$ million Item Project Component IDA-MIRP Final Initial Restructured Cost 4. Limited Rehabilitation of Urban road Infrastructure Sub-total 3.20 0.42 0.33

16. Component 5: Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation. (Original Project US$0.60 million, Final Cost US$2.53 million). This component financed the operating costs which were incremental recurrent expenditures including office equipment and supplies, office rental, vehicle maintenance costs, fuel and spare parts, and travel expenses and per-diems, all needed for the supervision of the two projects (restructured MIRP and

EEWRP). As the MIRP PCU was also in charge of implementing the EEWRP, funds were allocated to the EEWRP only for its last year of implementation.

Summary Table for component 5 Estimated cost Item Project Component US$ million IDA-MIRP Final Initial Restructured Cost 5. Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation Sub-total 0.60 1.48 2.53

Unallocated/Contingencies Estimated cost Item Project Component US$ million IDA-MIRP Final Initial Restructured Cost 6. Contingencies Sub-total 1.50 0.50 0.34

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

Financial analysis: comparison ex ante and ex post Original PAD ICR Analysis Initial Implied NPV NPV FIRR investments FIRR US$ US$ million million % US$ million % Short Term Scenario 10.95 11.67 268 ($26.87) NA Realistic Scenario 10.95 34.46 224 ($30.17) NA Worst case Scenario 10.95 12.84 269 or ($77.88) NA -1%

Ex post Economic Analysis of Generation Investments

At the time of Project preparation, EAGB’s operational and financial performance was very weak. The Project failed to bring about sufficient improvement in EAGB’s performance to restore the company’s financial viability. Still, EAGB provides an essential service, as evidenced by the existence of private micro-generators in Bissau. The prices practiced by private micro-generators vary significantly, ranging from 500 to 1,000 CFAR per kWh (~USc 100 to 200), equivalent to two to four times EAGB’s tariffs. For the purpose of the ICR, an ex post economic analysis has been carried out to assess the economic impact of the project based on a more realistic estimate of the value of the service provided.

The ex post analysis assumes a willingness to pay (WTP) at the lower bound of the range of observed prices for micro-generation in Bissau (USc 100 per kWh) and applies a discount of 20 percent to this value in order to reflect the fact that due to the relatively high level of non-payment, the electricity supplied by EAGB is presumably used less efficiently than for private micro-generators. Regarding the cost of supply by EAGB, the modelling assumptions are estimates, based largely on the technical and financial reporting from EAGB for 2013 and 2014. The assumptions are meant to reflect the observed inefficiencies and high cost per unit of EAGB, erring on the pessimistic side.

On this basis, the analysis indicates that the levelized cost of electricity delivered to EAGB’s customer’s through incremental investment in thermal generation would be US$0.69 per kWh with a 10 percent discount rate (and 0.71 with a 15 percent discount rate). This assumes that new generation equipment are used for five years (with the assumption that inadequately maintained generation equipment will have in reality a useful technical life well short of the norm which would be 15 years). When compared to the discounted benefits derived from the estimated WTP (US$0.80 per kWh), the discounted Project costs results in an EIRR of incremental generation investments of 32.9 percent.

The ex post economic analysis suggests that there is a good economic case for supporting EAGB in the provision of essential services, as long as the fact that expanding supply will require additional financial transfer to support the utility. It is also clear that there is a significant scope for reducing EAGB’s supply costs (reducing specific consumption,

switching to lower cost HFO instead of GO, increasing load factor, improving maintenance, etc.).

Key assumptions Capital Cost of thermal generation USD/kW 2000 Cost of Gas Oil US$/liter 1.00 density of G.O. g/liter 850 specific consumption g/kWh 240 load factor % 40% Technical distribution losses % 10% technical life of gensets Years 5 Willingness to pay Usc/kWh 80 estimated from EAGB reporting for 2013 and 2014 Other Opex (personnel, O&M…)

Economic analysis ‐ Investment in 1 MW of generation Year012345 Investment KUSD 2,000 Annual Generation MWh 0 3,456 3,456 3,456 3,456 3,456 Energy delivered MWh 0 3,110 3,110 3,110 3,110 3,110 Fuel and Lubricants KUSD 0 944 944 944 944 944 other opex (O&M, administration…) KUSD 0 304 304 304 304 304 Personnel KUSD 0 287 287 287 287 287 Capital costs (excluding generation) KUSD 0 88 88 88 88 88 Total costs KUSD 2,000 1,622 1,622 1,622 1,622 1,622 Value of energy delivered KUSD 2,488 2,488 2,488 2,488 2,488 Net Benefits(costs) KUSD (2,000) 867 867 867 867 867

EIRR 32.9% NPV @ 10% KUSD $1,168.48 Discounted cost of kWh delivered @10% Usc/kWh 69 NPV @ 15% KUSD $787.12 Discounted cost of kWh delivered @15% Usc/kWh 71

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending

Supervision/ICR Iradj A. Alikhani Consultant IEGPS Laurent Mehdi Brito Consultant AFCF1 Moez Cherif Senior Energy Economist AFTG2 TTL Stephane Garnier Sector Leader AFTEG TTL Leopold Sedogo Energy Specialist GEDDR TTL Bourama Diaite Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPW Saidou Diop Sr Financial Management Specia AFTMW Ibou Diouf Sr Transport. Spec. AFTTR Matar Fall Lead Water and Sanitation Spec AFTU2 Edeltraut Gilgan-Hunt Environmental Specialist AFTN1 Thanh Lu Ha Senior Program Assistant AFTG2 Eric G. Haythorne Consultant FFIMS Fatouma Toure Ibrahima Senior Financial Specialist AFTG2 Wane Amadou Konare Consultant LCSEN Fanny Kathinka Missfeldt- Senior Energy Economist MNSEE Ringius CTRFC- Suzanne F. Morris Senior Finance Officer His Mark M. Moseley Lead Counsel LEGPS Osval Rocha Andrade Financial Management Specialis AFTMW Romao Cheikh A. T. Sagna Senior Social Development Spec AFTCS Awa Seck Senior Economist AFTG2 Seynabou Thiaw Seye Program Assistant AFCF1 Fily Sissoko Manager, Financial Management SARFM Madani M. Tall Country Director AFCF2 Cheick Traore Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPW Eric Jean Yoboue Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPE Dawit Yohannes Language Program Assistant AFTG1 Maria Alexandra Planas ICR Energy Consultant AFTG2 Fabrice Bertholet Senior Financial Analyst GEEDR

(b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) USD Thousands Stage of Project Cycle No of staff weeks (including travel and consultant costs) Lending FY06 46 233.92 FY07 01 6.25 FY08 0.00

Total: 47 240.17 Supervision/ICR FY06 0.00 FY07 19 106.43 FY08 14 56.07 FY09 12 73.41 FY10 21 128.81 FY11 14 63.75 FY12 8 33.61 FY13 5 24.08 FY14 5 25.60

Total: 99 162.50

Annex 5. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

RELATÓRIO DO FECHO DO PMRI

Nome do Projecto: Multi-Sectorial de Reabilitação de Infra-estruturas (PMRI) Projecto: P097975 Donativo: IDA H2350 Data de Aprovação: 15/06/2006 Data de Assinatura: 15/06/2007 Data de Efectividade: 31/08/2007 Data de Encerramento: 31/03/2014 Prazo final de desembolso: 31/07/2014 Valor original aprovado: 10.300.000 XDR Agência de Execução: UI-PMRI/PURSEA

I. DESCRIÇÃO DO PROJECTO E EVOLUÇÃO DA SUA IMPLEMENTAÇÃO

1. INTRODUÇÃO

O Projecto Multissectorial de Reabilitação das Infra-estruturas (PMRI) é composto por cinco componentes principais, isto é: (i) Desenvolvimento Institucional e Estudos Sectoriais, (ii) Restauração e Reabilitação do Sistema de Eléctrico, (iii) Reabilitação da Produção, Tratamento e Distribuição de Água Urbana; (iv) Reabilitação Limitada de Infra- estruturas Rodoviárias urbanas, e (v) Gestão, Monitorização e Avaliação do Projecto. O Acordo de don IDA H2350 foi assinado em 2007 e entrou em vigor apenas em 2007 devido as suspensão imposta ao país nessa data. O baixo nível de desembolso associado ao risco de não serem atingidas as metas/(performances) programadas para os sectores de agua e electricidade influenciou a decisão de reestruturação a quando da revisão a meio percurso realizado em 2019 que, para alem da reestruturação propriamente dita do projecto foi identifica a insuficiência de fundos para se poder atingir os objectivos. Assim, o banco optou em vez de reforçar os fundos do PMRI, pela criação de um novo projecto(PURSEE) com as mesmas componentes e os mesmos objectivos.

Os investimentos e actividades levadas a cabo em simultâneo pelos dois projectos possibilitara a rápida melhoria no desempenho dos sectores de água e electricidade e provocaram o alívio das pessoas que foram afectadas negativamente pela crise económica global. Assim, o PMRI foi complementado pelo PURSEA, através das seguintes quatro componentes que se sobrepõem parcialmente com as componentes do PMRI: (i) Desenvolvimento Institucional e Melhoria do Desempenho Sectorial, (ii) Restauração e Reabilitação do Sistema de Electricidade, (iii) Reabilitação de Produção/Armazenamento de Água, e (iv) Gestão, Monitorização e Avaliação do Projecto.

Em baixo vem descrita com detalhes a evolução da execução do PMRI, as sua componentes e as suas interligações com o PURSEA. As acções de desenvolvimento institucional/planos e o programa de investimento que foram desenvolvidos em paralelo.

Componente 1: Desenvolvimento Institucional e Estudos Sectoriais

Esta componente tem como objecto o apoio ao desenvolvimento institucional, reforço de capacidade e estudos sectoriais para o Ministério da Economia, Secretaria de Estado da Energia, Ministério dos Recursos Naturais, EAGB e Ministério das Obras Públicas, concretamente no desenvolvimento dos sectores de energia, água e estradas e a melhoria da gestão técnica e financeira dos bens activos do respectivo sector.

Sub componente 1.1: Sub-componente energia

(vii) Elaboração e implementação de um plano de reorganização global da EAGB, incluindo um programa de aumento da produtividade, desenvolvimento de capacidades, formação e assistência técnica para a melhoria das suas operações. Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: Um primeiro estudo para apoiar o Governo da Guiné-Bissau a identificar a melhor opção para a reforma da EAGB foi iniciado e financiado no âmbito do Projecto de Reabilitação e Desenvolvimento do Sector Privado (PRDSP). Contudo , o referido estudo não foi concluído (a Guiné-Bissau encontrava-se em regime de suspensão). Posteriormente um consultor individual foi recrutado, sob financiamento do PMRI, para finalizar o estudo e formular recomendações sobre as opções para a reforma institucional do sector da água e electricidade e para a reestruturação da EAGB. O relatório do consultor foi discutido num workshop com as autoridades , sindicatos e a sociedade civil , em Dezembro de 2009 na cidade de Bissau. O Governo exprimiu o seu empenho relativamente a reforma proposta através de (i) adopção das conclusões do referido workshop, e (ii) através da actualização da sua carta de política do sector, concluída e aprovada em Março de 2010. Com base nas conclusões do workshop, decidiu-se pelo financiamento, no âmbito do PMRI reestruturado e no quadro da operação PURSEA, as seguintes actividades: a. A actualização da legislação e dos decretos relacionados (US$ 350.000)- transferido para o PURSEA. b. Preparação da reestruturação da EAGB (US$ 350.000), actividade essa que está a ser financiada pelo PURSEA; c. Estudo sobre os recursos humanos e avaliação de bens activos operacionais; d. Avaliação das opções de PPP, incluindo riscos e respectivas medidas de mitigação (estava a ser executada através da CFI, mas neste momento esta actividade está suspensa ); e. Consulta das partes interessadas e campanha de comunicação estratégica- Transferido para o PURSEA

(viii) Assistência técnica a EAGB para a elaboração de uma estrutura tarifária eficiente e transparente e fórmula de indexação;  Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: Esta actividade foi concluída em 2014. No dia 17 de Dezembro de 2013, fez-se um ateliê de validação do documento do

estudo, com a participação de quase todas as instituições ligadas ao sector. Após a recolha de sugestões e comentários, o Consultor produziu o relatório final do documento a ser submetido ao Governo para que uma decisão seja tomada relativamente à alteração da grelha tarifária de água e electricidade em Bissau. Convém salientar que 3 técnicos da DGE/EAGB receberam uma formação na Tunísia sobre a projecção financeira e cálculo de tarifas de água e electricidade, tendo os mesmos efectuados simulações com dados da EAGB. O estudo foi concluído e a proposta de reestruturação da grelha tarifaria para agua e electricidade aguarda a aprovação e adopção do Governo.

(ix) Elaboração de uma avaliação abrangente do potencial para produzir de forma sustentável energia moderna (electricidade, e outras formas de energia ) a partir da base existente e potencial do país nos domínios agro-industrial e florestal (agrícola/agro-industrial, resíduos e subprodutos florestais, culturas energéticas, biomassa lenhosa, etc.); preparação de uma "Estratégia Nacional de Desenvolvimento de Energia de médio a longo prazo", incluindo especificamente opções de menor custo e de energias renovável capazes de apoiar a criação de uma plataforma nacional de energia sustentável, e a elaboração de um "Plano Nacional de Investimento no Sector da Energia e Mobilização de Recursos";

Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: O Estudo para Elaboração do Plano Director para Energia foi concluído em 2014. Várias sessões (reuniões) de trabalho foram feitas a fim de se discutir e validar os diferentes documentos do estudo. Foram produzidos os seguintes relatórios:  Relatório de Síntese Documento estratégico;  Parte 1 Estudos Técnicos;  Parte 2 Projecção Financeira;  Relatório Potencial Energético;  Relatório Definitivo de previsão das Necessidades Energéticas;  Plano de Desenvolvimento para as Energias Domésticas e Alternativas;  Relatório Definitivo de Base de Dados;  Relatório Definitivo do Potencial Energético – Anexos;  Anexo 1 “Ensoleillement” na Guiné-Bissau;  Anexo 2 – Estudo dos Ventos na Guiné-Bissau;  Anexo 3 Estudo sobre o Consumo em Energia e Água na Guiné-Bissau.

Houve formações dos técnicos da EAGB e da Secretaria de Estado da Energia no domínio dos programas NEPLAN e ArcGis, que foram previstas no âmbito do estudo.

(x) Estudos de engenharia e preparação dos cadernos de encargos para o contrato de Produção, a Reabilitação da Rede e a ampliação, incluindo a adjudicação das ferramentas e equipamentos necessários, e o Sistema de Medição e Facturação;

Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: Esta actividade foi concluída parcialmente em 2006 e foi financiada no âmbito do crédito PRDSP.

Posteriormente, devido as novas actividades identificadas como necessárias, as mesmas foram retomadas e concluídas com os fundos do PMRI, financiada ao abrigo da Componente 5 do PMRI para uma nova assistência técnica a UCP com o propósito de realizar estudos de engenharia e preparar os Cadernos de Encargos para os novos investimentos programados no âmbito do PURSEA.

(xi) Implementação dum Sistema de Gestão Financeira e Contabilidade para a EAGB incluindo a formação necessária para a utilização desse sistema e Assistência Técnica.

Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: Essas actividades foram realizadas através do contrato de assistência técnica para gestão comercial e financeira da EAGB. O valor orçado para essa tarefa foi atribuído a componente 2.2 no quadro do PMRI reestruturado. No cumprimento do contrato assinado com a empresa SENELEC, para a Assistência Técnica à Gestão Comercial e Financeira da EAGB (ATGC-EAGB), foram realizadas as seguintes actividades:

a) Produção do relatório sobre o diagnóstico na central eléctrica de Bissau. b) Instalação de um sistema informático com vista a “Securização da caixa” no sistema de cobrança da EAGB: É uma actividade proposta pela SENELEC, no sentido de permitir a EAGB de organizar a sua gestão e garantir a arrecadação das receitas no período que antecede a implementação de um novo sistema de gestão clientela e de contadores pré-pagos. Inicialmente com algumas deficiências, o sistema instalado está a ser melhorado gradualmente. c) Recenseamento parcial dos clientes da EAGB. Esta prestação foi interrompida e só depois concluída através de uma adenda igualmente financiada pelo PMRI. d) Elaboração do Caderno de Encargo (DAO) para a aquisição de contadores pré- pagos: O referido DAO foi elaborado com o apoio do PMRI. (xii) Desenvolvimento Institucional e apoio para o fortalecimento do Ministério da Economia, Secretaria de Estado da Energia; criação de uma Agência Reguladora Multisectorial. Foi Proposto um orçamento estimado em US$ 75.000 apoiar cada um destes ministérios, e um financiamento adicional de US$ 50.000 foi atribuído a Secretaria de Estado da Energia. A estimativa/orçamento total foi de US$ 275.000, e ao Ministério das Obras Públicas foi atribuído um orçamento separado ( de USD500.000) no quadro da componente 1.3.

Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: O apoio na forma de aquisição de veículos, computadores, equipamentos de escritório e formação foi concedido ao Ministério das Obras Públicas, Secretariado de Estado da Energia, Ministério de Recursos Naturais e Ministério da Economia, e posteriormente foi gerida no âmbito da componente 5 do PMRI reestruturado. Não foi possível até a presente data a criação de uma Agência de Regulação apesar de no âmbito dos compromissos assumidos com a UMOA, o Governo ter aprovado a legislação e os Estatutos do referido órgão.

Sub componente 1.2: Sub-compnente Água

Apoiar o Governo na elaboração e implementação da reforma do sector, assegurar o êxito do estabelecimento da parceria público-privado (PPP) para melhorar o desempenho da EAGB nas áreas da gestão comercial e financeira, e ajudar a aplicar as disposições do LSDP (quadro regulamentar, política tarifária, gestão de fontanários públicos, etc.) através de assistência técnica, serviços de consultoria e comunicação pública. Além do estudo realizado ao abrigo da Componente 1.1.1, o Projecto financiou:

(v) Estudos de engenharia, preparação de Cadernos de Encargos e fiscalização de obras de construção do reservatório de 700 m3, reabilitação e extensão das redes água, incluindo a aquisição equipamentos e utensílios de trabalho.

Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas :esta actividade foi concluída parcialmente no âmbito do PMRI. Devido ao atraso que se verificou na construção do reservatório, um novo contrato de supervisão foi celebrado para a conclusão do reservatório e que foi igualmente financiado pelo PMRI reestruturado. (vi) Estudo/diagnóstico sobre sistemas de produção de água

Actividades levadas : O contrato com a HYDROPLAN foi assinado em …. O referido gabinete fez a sua primeira deslocação a Bissau em Abril de 2011. Mas logo na reunião d o inicio dos trabalhos, o representante do gabinete afirmou não poder fazer os ensaios porque não estava previsto no contrato e na proposta por eles formuladas. Afirmação essa que foi logo contestadas visto que se tratava de ma interpretação dos TDR’s/contrato por parte do consultor. Facto esse que conduziu, posteriormente à rescisão do contrato. Uma carta datada de 27 de Junho de 2011, foi endereçada ao Banco emissora de garantia de avanço dos trabalhos, a fim de solicitar a devolução do montante pago no avanço. Até a presente data, não foi restituída esse montante avançado por parte deste Banco comercial. Outras acções necessárias: É necessário relançar outra vez este estudo/diagnostico importante para se conhecer as condições de exploração dos furos de água na cidade de Bissau. (vii) Criação de um novo sistema de gestão de fontenários públicos: O Projecto apoiará a criação do sistema e proverá as comunidades com formação de sensibilização sobre os desafios envolvidos nesta nova modalidade de gestão comunitária dos fontenários públicos.

Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: O estudo foi concluído e 58 comités de gestão foram criados para os 58 fontenários financiados pelo Projecto. (viii) Assistência técnica para a gestão comercial e financeira da EAGB; Software, AT e formação para as Operações Financeiras e Contabilísticas da EAGB: Aumentar a eficiência da EAGB e das entidades públicas envolvidas no sector da água, através do reforço das suas capacidades de gestão e planeamento, através de assistência técnica, formação e fornecimento de equipamentos.

Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: Esta actividade foi restruturada, passando para o sub-componente da Assistência Técnica à Gestão da EAGB, atrás mencionada.

Sub componente 1.3 Sub-componente Estradas

Esta sub-componente previa o financiar o desenvolvimento da capacidade institucional e as necessidades do Ministério das Obras Públicas de modo a permitir-lhe gerir eficazmente os seus recursos e executar as suas obras de reabilitação de estradas, água e saneamento, além de permitir-lhe assumir com eficácia as suas responsabilidades de planeamento do sector, tomada de decisões e regulação, especialmente no que diz respeito à coordenação e harmonização com os outros Ministérios (Por exemplo, o Ministério dos Transportes e Comunicações). Esta sub-componente destina-se ainda a apoiar as reformas realizadas no sector rodoviário (estratégia sectorial, o fundo rodoviário) com vista a melhorar o quadro institucional e regulamentar do sector.

Um dos objectivos específicos da componente transportes era o de fornecer apoio técnico às instituições do Ministério responsável pelos transportes e infra-estruturas rodoviárias e para o desenvolvimento de um quadro estratégico. Este foco estratégico tornou-se ainda mais necessário pela alteração na estrutura do governo e agora entre o Ministério dos Transportes e do Ministério responsável pelas infra-estruturas.

Os dois ministérios receberam assistência técnica para:

Finalizar a Estratégia do Sector dos Transportes e o desenvolvimento de uma Carta de Política Sectorial dos Transportes; a estratégia para o sector dos transportes tem que ser abrangente no que respeita ao desenvolvimento das infra-estruturas e serviços de transportes. Não é de mais referir que o estudo tem como principais objectivos, por um lado, procurar dar resposta aos constrangimentos que afectam o funcionamento da DGVTT, tanto a nível da sua orientação estratégica como do seu funcionamento operacional (compreendendo a realização de inspecções e fiscalizações, recolha de receitas para o Tesouro), por outro lado, a intervenção visa actualizar o quadro legal do sector dos transportes rodoviários, particularmente no contexto de regras de UEMOA (tráfego, regulamentação do transporte automóvel, inspecções de veículos e outras normas exigidas).

Actividade concluída até a presente data: Ao todo, foram produzidos os seguintes relatórios, em versão francesa e portuguesa:

a) Relatório de Instalação; b) Relatório de Diagnóstico c) Relatório Intermédio; d) Regulamento de Sinalização de Trânsito e) Regulamento das Inspecções e dos Centros de Inspecção; f) Bases Gerais da Concessão para os Centros Privados de Inspecção; g) Código da Estrada; h) Regime Geral das Contra-Ordenações; i) Regulamento Sobre o Ensino da Condução; j) Manual de Procedimentos; k) Regulamento de Matrículas; l) Regulamento da segurança Rodoviária;

m) Regulamento dos Transportes em Automóvel; n) Plano Estratégico para a DGVTT o) Relatório Final

(i) Desenvolver um Plano de Investimento do Sector Rodoviário, que leva em conta a médio e longo prazo as necessidades de investimento sectoriais, incluindo os requisitos de manutenção da rede rodoviária;

Durante a revisão meio percurso do projecto, em concordância com o Governo, foi decidido o cancelamento da componente de investimento rodoviário (Componente 4) e, portanto, o adiamento do desenvolvimento de um plano de investimento do sector rodoviário. (ii) Mobilizar e coordenar a assistência dos doadores para investimento no sector rodoviário e participar na iniciativa SSATP

Actividades concluída: com ajuda do Banco, o Governo da Guiné-Bissau aderiu oficialmente ao Programa de Transportes da Africa Saariana (SSATP). Em princípio, o PMRI deveria financiar a primeira contribuição anual de participação da Guiné-Bissau nas reuniões anuais (US$ 50.000). Mas, felizmente o representante do Ministério dos Transportes participou na sua primeira reunião anual, utilizando custos próprios da SSATP. Assim, este montante foi reafectada.

(iii)AT-Sistema de Informação Portuária, com a finalidade de apoiar a APGB na sua gestão portuária. Actividades concluída: Este estudo foi concluída no segundo trimestre de 2012: O gabinete TIS.pt encarregue da realização do estudo sobre a instalação de um sistema de informação para o porto de Bissau, concluiu o estudo, e produziu o relatório final em duas versões, francês e português, tal como foi solicitado. Esse relatório foi enviado às instituições beneficiárias (Secretaria de Estado dos Transportes e Comunicações, APGB).

(iv) Revisão do código da estrada;

Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: Esta actividade foi reagrupada no ponto acima e foi concluída em 2014 (ver atrás). (v) Reforçar as capacidades institucionais, no tocante à assistência técnica para actividades específicas, a missão do BM e o Governo concordaram em considerar os seguintes campos e perfis de competências: (i) um perito em estradas para apoiar o Director-geral de Estradas e Pontes nos domínios de gestão de contratos, incluindo a criação de instrumentos de acompanhamento de construção, (ii) um especialista de renome internacional na área do transporte terrestre para apoiar a Direcção-geral dos Transportes Terrestres na sua reorganização, a concepção de novos

bilhetes de transporte e o desenvolvimento de um instrumento de recolha de estatísticas de acidentes de transportes rodoviários e, (iii) um especialista em transporte marítimo para assistência à Direcção-geral da Marinha Mercante.

Actividades concluídas: Devido o atraso verificado na implementação destas actividades, a União Europeia e o BOAD disponibilizaram fundos para esse efeito. Assim, esta subcomponente foi cancelada e o montante reafectado. (vi) Formação dos quadros e técnicos: uma dotação específica foi reservada para os custos de apoio a participação numa formação contínua nas áreas de gestão e financiamento da manutenção de estradas, gestão de projectos, administração de transportes terrestres, segurança rodoviária e adjudicação de contratos (US $ 50.000).

Actividade concluída: Tal como a actividade anterior, esta actividade foi financiada por outros financiadores. Formação para os Ministérios das Obras Públicas e dos Transportes (US$ 50.000). Actividade concluída: Infelizmente esta actividade não foi realizada pelo pessoal do Ministério das Obras Públicas, uma vez que nunca chegaram de responder as cartas enviadas pela UC-PMRI, anunciando a programação do projecto disponibilidade dos fundos. (vii) Fornecer equipamento e material logístico, veículos, equipamentos de informática e software, mobiliário de escritório (US$ 90.000).

Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: Foi comprado uma viatura, computadores e materiais de escritórios para o Ministério das Obras Públicas.

Componente 2: Restauração e Reabilitação do Sistema de Electricidade

Esta componente fundamental do projecto apoiou a restauração acelerada e reabilitação do sistema de produção e distribuição de energia electrica, e operações comerciais na Bissau. Esta sub-componente foi realizada através de três acções transversais de apoio, com algumas das sub componentes que foram financiados no quadro do Projecto de Reabilitação e Desenvolvimento do Sector Privado da IDA (PRDSP-IDA), BOAD, pelo PURSEA e PMRI.

Sub componente 2.1: Restauração da produção de energia eléctrica

(v) Esquema de Operação Privada (EOP): custos de mobilização e desmobilização: o projecto inicial previa que 15 MW de capacidade de produção de energia eléctrica seriam alugados e postos a disposição da EAGB por um período de 3 a 5 anos através da contratação competitiva de um operador privado (denominado como Esquema de Operação Privada -

EOP). Estava também previsto que o projecto financiaria transportes e pequenas obras de preparação do local para os custos de mobilização e desmobilização, até ao limite de US$ 1,1 milhão, do esquema de operação privada (EOP).

Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: um tal Esquema de Operação Privada (EOP) não foi possível devido a insolvência da EAGB constatada na altura e da iminente disponibilidade de produção de energia hidroeléctrica da OMVG anunciada , que foi agora adiado para 2016/17.Havia necessidades de garantias a serem dadas pelo governo ou pelo MIGA, montagem essa que não foi possível atempadamente provocando atrasos irreversíveis no processo. Por conseguinte, a nova proposta consistiu em realizar um estudo das opções para uma nova central eléctrica para expansão da capacidade de geração, em paralelo com a aquisição de capacidade de produção adicional. Houve a necessidade de modificar as actividades do projecto, porque as componentes inicialmente concebidas e o montante do empréstimo não seriam suficientes para atingir os objectivos de desenvolvimento desejados.

(vi) Plano de Gestão Social e Ambiental para o local de produção actual: Esta actividade destina-se a implementar as recomendações do relatório do consultor de auditoria social e ambiental e a avaliação ambiental e social para novos investimentos de produção de electricidade em Bissau. A implementação do plano de mitigação, controlo e organização foi estimada em cerca de US$ 390.000. Dado o estado das instalações existentes do ponto de vista ambiental e social, esta actividade devia ser lançada rapidamente sob pena de abandono do local.

Actividades até à data: Houve necessidade de finalizar os trabalho de instalação dos equipamentos para depois finalizar o programa de saneamento. O consultor procedeu a actualização do referido Plano e a elaboração do DAO para os trabalhos e aquisições de equipamentos. Contudo não foi possível materializar esses planos de aquisições e trabalhos por falta de tempo (devido ao fecho do PMRI). Houve inclusive o lançamento do concurso para aquisição de equipamentos para segurança no trabalho mas que depois foi suspenso, por falta de tempo.

Outras acções necessárias: Esta actividade deve retomada logo que houver verbas para o efeito.

(vii) Produção, investimentos de emergência: A situação em termos de capacidade de produção piorou consideravelmente em 2007, uma série de operações de emergência foram entretanto realizadas. Essas actividades não estavam incluídas no projecto inicial e foram incluídas no PMRI restruturado.

Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas:

a. Compra de geradores de produção de emergência (2 x 1,5 MW): o contrato para a compra de geradores foi assinado e foi co-financiado pelo PRDSP (US$ 1,726.326) e pelo PMRI (US$ 600.000). Para possibilitar a execução integral do contrato e permitir a EAGB operar os dois geradores nas melhores condições, o PMRI também financiou algumas obras e fornecimentos adicionais (cerca de US$ 180.000) (celas e sistemas de protecção para permitir a evacuação de energia em melhores condições. Ambos os geradores entraram em funcionamento desde 2 de Dezembro de 2008. Mas, devido aos vários problemas ligados à manutenção/exploração, estes geradores estão avariados e fora de serviço desde Junho de 2012. Um dos motores com o transformador foi enviado a Dakar para expertise do fabricante cummins/Matforce e o dossier encontra-se em litígios. A MATFORCE apresentou recentemente, uma proposta de reparação dos dois grupos no valor de 140 milhões de F CFA. O eventual financiamento dessa operação poderá ser feito pelo governo. b. Aluguer de 2,5 MW de potência: Em virtude do atraso no processo de aquisição dos grupos (2x1.5 MW), e a urgência de fornecer alguma electricidade a cidade de Bissau (sem nenhuma electricidade no final do ano 2007), um contrato de aluguer de geradores de emergência (3 x 850 kW) foi assinado e os 2 primeiros geradores foram instalados em Janeiro de 2008, e um terceiro grupo, em Fevereiro de 2008. Este contrato de aluguer foi prorrogado varias vezes até Junho de 2012. Por forma a colmatar as deficiências financeiras da EAGB, com os fundos do PMRI, foram recentemente (2014) adquiridos peças sobressalentes e 107 tambores de 200 litros de óleo para grupos MTU, aumentando assim a potência da central eléctrica para 3 MW. De igual forma foram comprados 15 tambores de 200 litros de óleo para os grupos ABC. (viii) Implementação de geração descentralizada de energia – co- produção de energia a partir de biomassa: A compra de equipamentos de co-produção iniciada por LICAJU e SICAJU foi concluída. Os equipamentos para estas unidades fabris foram financiados pelo PRDSP. Sub componente 2.2: Reabilitação e melhoria do Sistema de Gestão Comercial

A estratégia para melhorar o desempenho comercial e financeiro da EAGB foi baseada na implementação de duas actividades específicas: (i) um contrato de assistência técnica para a gestão comercial, contabilística e financeira da EAGB e (ii) um contrato de fornecimento e instalação de contadores pré-pagos e definição um novo sistema de gestão comercial. (iv) Assistência técnica para o melhoramento/recuperação das áreas gestão comercial, contabilística e financeira da EAGB. O contrato de assistência técnica era fundamental para o sucesso da estratégia. Actividades concluídas: Após um processo de licitação internacional competitiva, um contrato de três anos de assistência técnica foi assinado em Fevereiro de 2009 e entrou em vigor em Maio de 2009. O Projecto PMRI financiou o primeiro ano do contrato, que não chegou a ser concluído devido aos acontecimentos politico/militar que levou a suspensão do contrato por parte do consultor (valor orçamentado US$ 0,85 milhões). Para facilitar a execução das suas actividades, o Banco deu também a sua não objecção para assinatura de vários contratos de apoio à EAGB: (i) compra de quatro viaturas pick- up (no montante de 47 milhões de FCFA (cerca de US$ 90.000)), (ii) compra de 7

motocicletas de 50 cm3 (no montante de 2.520.000.00 FCFA (cerca de US$ 5.000)), (ii) computadores hardware (valor: 6.990.000.00 FCFA (cerca de US$ 15.000) e (iv) combustível para os veículos acima mencionados para um período de 6 meses, num montante de aproximadamente US$ 10.000. Outras acções necessárias: Deve-se implementar uma acção de assistência técnica à gestão da EAGB no quadro da nova estratégia para a reforma e transformação da EAGB. (v) Realização de APD e DAO para fornecimento e instalação de contadores pré-pagos (15.000 unidades) e respectivo sistema de gestão comercial: A reabilitação do sistema de facturação de electricidade pela criação e funcionamento de um sistema de contagem baseado em contadores pré- pagos (15.000 unidades) é um dos principais pilares da estratégia para melhorar o desempenho comercial e financeiro da EAGB. Actividades concluída: O estudo foi feito assim como DAO que serviu para aquisição dos contadores no âmbito do PURSEE

Sub componente 2.3: Reabilitação e Reforço da Rede Eléctrica de Distribuição Urbana

A reabilitação da rede de distribuição foi financiada pelo BOAD e tinha as seguintes actividades: (i) reabilitação e ampliação do sistema eléctrica de distribuição urbana existente, incluindo a substituição de transformadores, a adaptação da tensão de distribuição de 10 kV para o remanescente existente de sistemas de 6 kV; (ii) estabelecimento de uma reserva de equipamentos necessários para a operação e manutenção da rede de distribuição urbana e (iii)a formação de pessoal da EAGB nas áreas de funcionamento, manutenção e gestão da rede de distribuição de energia. Todos os elementos operacionais desta componente foram objecto de estudos de desenvolvimento institucional e sectoriais incluídos no projecto, especialmente a reconstrução de toda a gestão comercial da EAGB. Actividades concluídas: Esta componente do projecto foi financiada na sua totalidade pelo BOAD. Foi assinado um contrato com a RMT para o fornecimento e instalação de equipamentos para o sistema de energia de Bissau (incluindo o fornecimento de ferramentas e equipamentos para a rede de O&M e formação). O contrato de supervisão das obras foi financiado pelo PMRI esteve a cardo do gabinete CABIRA. Essas duas actividades foram concluídas com êxito (ver a tabela em anexo 1).

Outras acções necessárias: ( por insuficiência de fundos, os investimentos programados no âmbito do estudo (APD) financiado pelo PRDSP foram separados em duas fase (A e B). Deve-se notar que as obras executadas reflectem apenas a primeira fase de reabilitação e extensão das redes de energia em Bissau. A segunda fase devia ser financiada pela UE (10º FED). Mas, devido ao golpe militar de 12 de Abril de 2012, houve sansões ao país por parte da EU, e este cancelou o financiamento.

Componente 3: Reabilitação da Produção, Tratamento e Distribuição de Água Urbana

Sub componente 3.1: Produção de Água

Esta sub componente foi financiada pela IDA e incluiu:

Reabilitação e reforço dos sistemas de produção de água na cidade de Bissau. Para melhorar a capacidade de armazenamento de água e o equilíbrio da rede de distribuição, estava programada a construção de um novo reservatório (700 m3) no " Hospital 3 de Agosto".

Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: um primeiro contrato para a construção do reservatório tinha sido assinado em 2008, mas devido a muitas deficiências apresentadas pela empresa construtora , decidiu-se pela rescisão do contrato. O processo de rescisão foi concluído e uma nova consulta foi lançada. Uma feita nova estimativa do custo do reservatório pelo consultor e, finalmente o reservatório foi estimado em US$ 1,23 milhões. Por falta de verbas no PMRI, esta actividade foi transferida e executada no âmbito do PURSEA. Foi realizado um estudo de impacto ambiental no quadro do PMRI reestruturado.

(iii)Substituição do antigo sistema de bombeamento no "Hospital 3 de Agosto" para aumentar o volume de água produzida e satisfazer a procura de água a médio prazo.

Actividades concluídas: a consulta foi realizada e as duas (2) bombas foram entregues pelo fornecedor a EAGB. O valor do contrato foi de US$ 33.000

Sub componente 3.2: Distribuição de Água e Sub componente 3.3: Sistema de facturação e ferramentas de trabalho

Estas duas sub componentes incluem:

(v) Substituição de: (a) 3,6 km de redes de distribuição primária de água ao longo das estradas existentes (Avenida 14 de Novembro e Avenida Pansau na Isna), e (b) 9 km de redes terciárias de distribuição de água no Bairro da Ajuda. Estima-se que após a conclusão destas obras, as perdas de água foram reduzidas de 70 por cento para 50 por cento. (vi) Extensão de 26,3 km de redes terciárias de distribuição de água para áreas não cobertas e construção de 700 ligações de água e 50 novos fontenários públicos nas áreas semi-urbanas de Bissau (em particular nos bairros de Luanda e de Bandim). As ligações privadas, denominadas de "ligações sociais" seriam subvencionadas pelo projecto e os beneficiários dariam apenas

uma pequena contribuição à EAGB para o contrato de serviço. Fontenários públicos totalmente financiados pelo projecto seriam operados por gestores privados mediante o pagamento de uma taxa do serviço efectuado. Por forma a utilizar o saldo nesta actividade, foram executadas (vii) Fornecimento e instalação de 6.000 contadores de água. Todas as ligações de água deverão ser equipadas com contadores para que os consumidores possam ser facturados pelo seu consumo real, em vez de se utilizar uma avença, como estava a ser praticado. (viii) Equipamentos e material logístico para a EAGB: kits de análise de água, bocas-de-incêndio, ferramentas de trabalho e veículo, para melhorar o desempenho operacional da empresa de água. Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: As actividades de (i) a (iv) foram realizadas com sucesso no âmbito de um único contrato (ver anexo 2).

Componente 4: Reabilitação Limitada das Infra-estruturas Rodoviárias Urbanas Esta componente tinha como plano o financiamento das seguintes actividades:

(iii)elaboração do programa de investimento em reabilitação rodoviária através de estudos de viabilidade para determinar o tipo de obras necessárias, assim como os critérios de elegibilidade e o calendário para a reconstrução de vias urbanas (Bissau);

Actividades levadas a cabo e concluídas: o estudo foi realizado (APD, DAO) e foram entregues ao Ministério das Obras Públicas. Outras acções necessárias: O financiamento necessário para implementar o programa prioritário foi estimado em US$ 30 milhões. (iv) implementação de um programa limitado de recuperação de estradas incluindo obras de construção civil, aquisição de equipamentos, e prestação de serviços de consultoria para reabilitar as redes de estradas primárias e secundárias na cidade de Bissau. Actividades de supervisão de obras de construção civil. Decisão de cancelar esta actividade: o cancelamento desta componente de reabilitação de estradas foi confirmado durante a revisão intercalar do projecto e um acordo foi celebrado entre o Governo e o Banco para reafectar os recursos inicialmente previstos para os investimentos rodoviários para a componente de energia. Neste momento, parte desta actividade esta a ser executada com o financiamento da BOAD. Componente 5: Gestão, Monitorização e Avaliação do Projecto

Disponibilização de fundos para formação, aquisição de equipamento e apoio operacional à UCP para a coordenação global, avaliação, supervisão e execução do projecto, incluindo, nomeadamente: (a) reforço da capacidade da UCP para cumprir as suas responsabilidades no âmbito do projecto, (b) formação ao pessoal da UCP para lhe permitir melhorar os seus conhecimentos em questões de desembolso, gestão financeira, políticas sociais e

ambientais e políticas de salvaguardas e procedimentos de adjudicação, (c) a realização de auditorias para o projecto; (d) a implementação de um programa para monitorar e avaliar a realização do projecto, e a aquisição de uma (1) viatura 4x4 para uso da UCP.

Actividades de gestão, auditorias e formação foram implementadas ao longo período em que durou o projecto. Os meios de trabalho foram igualmente adquiridos e estão registados na lista do património pertencentes ao projecto

Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents

 Multisector Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project’s Project Appraisal Document  Restructuring Papers  ISRs  Aide-Memoires  Draft Borrower´s Completion Reports  EAGB statistics  Emergency Electricity and Water Rehabilitation Project’s Project Appraisal Document  Emergency Water and Electricity Services Upgrading Project’s Project Appraisal Document

Annex 7. Revised Indicators 2010 Restructuring

Project Development Objective (PDO): The Project's development objective is to increase the availability of urban power, water and roads infrastructure services.

Revised Project Development Objective: The Project’s development objective is to assist the Government in increasing the availability and reliability of electricity and water supply in its capital city and improve the institutional and management capacities in the energy and water sectors.

D=Dropped Cumulative Target Values** Respon Data sibility C=Continue Revised N= New Baseline Freque Source/ for PDO Level Results Indicators* R=Revised Baseline YR 1 YR 2 YR 3 Core Core 2006 ncy Methodol Data 20092 2010 2011 2012 ogy Collecti on Indicator One: Annual electricity distribution to end-users (GWh) in Recorded 7.4 10 17 35 Annual data by PCU - Bissau [Annual energy produced] X N EAGB/ on MIRP [14.8] [16.5] [27] [40] a monthly

basis.

2 The revised baseline for 2009 includes updated target values, based on information obtained in the field during the preparation of the additional financing. However, given the state of the electricity and water sectors in Bissau, the reliability of the information available is open to question.

Indicator Two: Direct/indirect C beneficiaries to electricity supply 115,000 120,000 126,000 133,000 Recorded services (number, female Annual data by PCU - (58300, (59760, 49.8 (62750, 49.8 (66235, 49.8 ( percent)) 49.8 percent) percent) percent) EAGB/ on MIRP percent) a monthly X basis.

Indicator Three: Number of people provided with access to “improved water sources” under Recorded the Project through new piped 81,000 84,000 88,200 92,500 Annual data by PCU - household water connections that EAGB/ on MIRP are resulting from the Project a monthly intervention (number) basis. X N Indicator Four: Direct/indirect Recorded beneficiaries to water supply 101,300 104,300 108,500 112,800 data by PCU - services (number, female Annual EAGB/ on MIRP (50500, (52000, 49.8 (54000, 49.8 (56200, 49.8 ( percent)) 49.8 percent) percent) percent) a monthly percent) basis. X C Indicator Five: Level of water C 70 percent Recorded PCU - losses ( percent) 55 percent 50 percent 47.5 percent 45 percent Annual data by MIRP (estimated) EAGB/ on X a monthly basis. Indicator Six: Collection rate of Recorded PCU - electricity bills 81 percent 83 percent 85 percent 90 percent Annual data by MIRP 40 percent EAGB/ on X C a monthly basis.

Indicator Seven: Percentage of X D reduction of transit time for public transport services (minibuses, taxis, etc.) Intermediate Indicators Component 2

Increase electricity generation 2.4 5.5 8.5 9.5 EAGB PCU - capacity owned by EAGB (MW) MIRP

Number of prepayment meters 0 2000 12000 15000 EAGB PCU - installed MIRP

Reduce total energy losses 50 33 25 21 EAGB PCU - (percent) MIRP

Intermediate Indicators Component 3

Improved community water points 50 58 58 58 EAGB PCU - constructed or rehabilitated under MIRP the Project (number) Extend water distribution networks 26 54 54 54 EAGB PCU - to unserved areas under the Project. MIRP

MAP IBRD 34679