DOCSLIB.ORG

The Economics of Natural Gas Infrastructure Investments

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Economics of Natural Gas Infrastructure Investments The Economics of Natural Gas Infrastructure Investments Theory and Model-based Analysis for Europe Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität zu Köln 2011 vorgelegt von Dipl.-Volksw. Stefan Lochner aus Riesa . Referent: Prof. Dr. Marc-Oliver Bettzüge Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Christian von Hirschhausen Tag der Promotion: 16.12.2011 Contents List of Figures iii List of Tablesv Abbreviations vii Summary1 1 Introduction5 1.1 Motivation................................5 1.2 Structure.................................6 1.3 Contributions and acknowledgments..................6 2 Background and Theoretical Considerations9 2.1 Literature survey.............................9 2.2 Analytical analysis: Infrastructure valuation and efficient investments. 14 2.2.1 The value of transmission and storage services........ 17 2.2.2 Optimal investment level..................... 21 2.3 Selected studies on European infrastructure investments....... 26 2.4 Institutional framework for European natural gas infrastructure invest- ments................................... 27 3 European Gas Infrastructure Dispatch and Investment Model 31 3.1 Overview................................. 31 3.2 Mathematical model formulation..................... 34 3.2.1 Objective function........................ 34 3.2.2 Optimization constraints..................... 35 3.3 Model implementation.......................... 40 3.4 Modeling of gas supply......................... 41 3.5 Stochastic demand modeling...................... 43 3.5.1 Temperature modeling...................... 45 3.5.2 Estimating temperature-demand curves............. 47 3.5.3 Household demand frequency distributions........... 51 3.5.4 Household demand scenarios.................. 54 3.5.5 Industry and power generation natural gas demand...... 56 3.5.6 Demand and demand regions.................. 57 3.6 Model validation............................. 58 i Contents 4 Numerical Assumptions of the Model Simulations 63 4.1 Natural gas supply assumptions..................... 63 4.1.1 Pipeline gas imports....................... 63 4.1.2 LNG imports........................... 67 4.1.3 European gas production.................... 68 4.1.4 Supply flexibility......................... 71 4.1.5 Supply costs and value of lost load............... 72 4.2 European natural gas gemand assumptions.............. 74 4.3 Excursus: Effect of temperature-related stochasticity.......... 77 4.4 Infrastructure endowments and expansion options........... 80 4.4.1 Long-distance transmission network............... 81 4.4.2 Storage.............................. 84 4.4.3 LNG import terminals...................... 85 4.5 Infrastructure cost parameterization................... 87 4.5.1 Capital cost of pipelines..................... 87 4.5.2 Capital cost of natural gas storage............... 89 4.5.3 Capital cost of LNG import terminals.............. 92 4.5.4 Model discount rate....................... 93 4.5.5 Operating costs......................... 94 4.6 Scenarios................................ 96 5 Results 101 5.1 Congestion, efficient investments and natural gas flows........ 102 5.1.1 Identification and valuation of congestions........... 102 5.1.2 Efficient investments in European natural gas infrastructure.. 105 5.1.3 Natural gas flows, marginal supply costs and import mix.... 109 5.2 The value of the modeling approach and infrastructure cost sensitivity 115 5.2.1 Stochastic versus deterministic modeling............ 115 5.2.2 Mixed-integer versus linear programing............. 118 5.2.3 Sensitivity on infrastructure investment costs.......... 118 5.3 Scenario analysis............................ 121 5.3.1 Scenario simulations on LNG price and flexibility........ 121 5.3.2 Scenario simulation on additional Southern corridor supplies. 123 5.3.3 Scenario simulation on unconventional gas production in Europe 125 5.3.4 Summary on natural gas market scenarios........... 127 5.4 Investments to increase security of gas supply............. 130 5.4.1 Resilience against transit disruptions in Eastern Europe.... 131 5.4.2 Resilience against supply disruptions from North Africa.... 139 5.4.3 Summary on security of supply investments.......... 143 6 Conclusion 147 Bibliography 149 Appendix 157 ii List of Figures 2.1 Three node grid with storage...................... 15 2.2 Marginal investment optimality condition................ 24 2.3 Discrete investments between two markets............... 25 3.1 Modeled infrastructure elements in Europe............... 32 3.2 Storage injection and withdrawal rates as function of storage level... 39 3.3 Production flexibility factor........................ 42 3.4 Paris average daily temperature and modeled temperature example.. 47 3.5 Set of modeled temperatures for France................ 48 3.6 Temperature-demand curve for France................. 49 3.7 General form of the sigmoid curve................... 50 3.8 Set of modeled demand curves for France............... 52 3.9 Demand density function for winter average and winter day (France). 53 3.10 Five stochastic demand scenarios for France.............. 55 3.11 Derived typical winter days for simulations (France).......... 56 3.12 Validation: Deviation of simulated and actual gas flows in 2008.... 60 4.1 Assumptions on pipeline imports available to the European market.. 64 4.2 Assumptions on indigenous European natural gas production..... 68 4.3 Different projections on European gas demand............. 75 4.4 Winter 2020 demand depending on temperatures........... 78 4.5 Modeled pipeline and LNG infrastructure................ 80 4.6 Pipeline and LNG infrastructure - high resolution............ 81 4.7 Location of storage and storage projects................ 84 4.8 Existing LNG import capacities..................... 87 4.9 Regression on pipeline investment costs................ 88 5.1 Gas infrastructure investments in the Reference demand case.... 106 5.2 Gas infrastructure investments in the High demand case........ 109 5.3 European import mix in Base scenario................. 110 5.4 Gas flows in the European gas market 2025 Reference demand vs. 2010................................... 111 5.5 Gas Flows in the Reference demand case............... 112 5.6 Gas Flows in the High demand case.................. 112 5.7 Locational marginal price ranges by country and year (Reference de- mand case)............................... 113 iii List of Figures 5.8 Amount of investment with different model approach (deterministic, continuous)................................ 118 5.9 Gas infrastructure investments in the High demand case in LP model. 119 5.10 Impact of investment cost increases on infrastructure capacity additions 120 5.11 Gas infrastructure investments with additional Southern corridor sup- plies (High demand)........................... 124 5.12 Pipeline investment costs per region.................. 125 5.13 Gas infrastructure investments with European unconventional gas pro- duction (Reference demand)...................... 126 5.14 Investment costs by infrastructure category and scenario....... 127 5.15 Security of supply enhancing investments regarding SoS1 disruption with 5 % probability........................... 132 5.16 Additional SoS1 infrastructure investments expenditures........ 133 5.17 Total system costs from uncertainty regarding supply disruption.... 134 5.18 Additional gas storage per country depending on emergency probability 138 5.19 Security of supply enhancing investments regarding SoS2 disruption with 5 % probability........................... 140 5.20 Additional SoS2 infrastructure investments expenditures........ 141 5.21 Security of supply enhancing investments regarding certain SoS2 dis- ruption (100 % probability)........................ 142 iv List of Tables 3.1 Model variables and element sets.................... 35 3.2 Model parameters............................ 36 3.3 Production regions in model....................... 43 3.4 Estimated parameters of the sigmoid function of selected countries.. 50 3.5 Relative sigmoid parameters Central and Eastern Europe....... 51 3.6 Number of demand regions by country................. 57 3.7 Model validation: Actual vs. simulated cross border gas flows for 2008 59 4.1 EU gas production............................ 69 4.2 Development of production flexibilities................. 72 4.3 Assumption on gas supply costs and reference supply capabilities.. 73 4.4 Reference demand case assumptions for selected countries in bcm per year.................................... 76 4.5 High demand case assumptions for selected countries in bcm per year 77 4.6 Demand variations between stochastic scenarios, winter 2020.... 79 4.7 Transmission system operators covered in model........... 82 4.8 Natural gas storage - aggregated existing capacities and proposed ad- ditions.................................. 86 4.9 Storage unit investment costs...................... 89 4.10 Selected storage project investment costs............... 91 4.11 LNG import project investment cost................... 93 4.12 Scenarios and variations simulated in Chapter 5............ 99 5.1 Congestion costs in simulation without investment........... 103 5.2 Infrastructure investment costs until 2025................ 107 5.3 Base scenario infrastructure investment by country.......... 108 5.4 LMP mean and standard deviation in 2025............... 114 5.5 Storage levels in deterministic and stochastic models in 2015..... 116 5.6 Storage WGV additions 2015 to 2025 in the High demand case...
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Gazprom's Monopoly and Nabucco's Potentials
    Gazprom’s Monopoly and Nabucco’s Potentials: Strategic Decisions for Europe Nicklas Norling SILK ROAD PAPER November 2007 Gazprom’s Monopoly and Nabucco’s Potentials: Strategic Decisions for Europe Nicklas Norling © Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036, U.S. Institute for Security and Development Policy, V. Finnbodav. 2, 131 30, Nacka-Stockholm, Sweden www.silkroadstudies.org "Gazprom’s Monopoly and Nabucco’s Potential: Strategic Decisions for Europe" is a Silk Road Paper published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. The Silk Road Paper series is the Occasional Paper series of the Joint Center, published jointly on topical and timely subjects. The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program is a joint transatlantic independent and externally funded research and policy center. The Joint Center has offices in Washington and Stockholm and is affiliated with the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy. It is the first Institution of its kind in Europe and North America, and is today firmly established as a leading research and policy center, serving a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders and journalists. The Joint Center aims to be at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security and development in the region. Through its applied research, publications, teaching, research cooperation, public lectures and seminars, it wishes to function as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion regarding the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Aspects of the South Stream Project
    BRIEFING PAPER Policy Department External Policies SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE SOUTH STREAM PROJECT FOREIGN AFFAIRS October 2008 JANUARY 2004 EN This briefing paper was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is published in the following language: English Author: Zeyno Baran, Director Center for Eurasian Policy (CEP), Hudson Institute www.hudson.org The author is grateful for the support of CEP Research Associates Onur Sazak and Emmet C. Tuohy as well as former CEP Research Assistant Rob A. Smith. Responsible Official: Levente Császi Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union Policy Department BD4 06 M 55 rue Wiertz B-1047 Brussels E-mail: [email protected] Publisher European Parliament Manuscript completed on 23 October 2008. The briefing paper is available on the Internet at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN If you are unable to download the information you require, please request a paper copy by e-mail : [email protected] Brussels: European Parliament, 2008. Any opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. © European Communities, 2008. Reproduction and translation, except for commercial purposes, are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and provided the publisher is given prior notice and supplied with a copy of the publication. EXPO/B/AFET/2008/30 October 2008 PE 388.962 EN CONTENTS SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE SOUTH STREAM PROJECT ................................ ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................iii 1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 1 2. THE RUSSIAN CHALLENGE................................................................................... 2 2.1.
    [Show full text]
  • Snam Rete Gas
    TEN-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF THE NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION NETWORK 2016-2025 SNAM RETE GAS Snam Rete Gas Snam Rete Gas Ten-year network development plan Ten-year network development plan 2016-2025 2016-2025 Reference period 2016 – 2025 Reference period 2016 – 2025 Document prepared by Snam Rete Gas S.p.A. Document prepared by Snam Rete Gas S.p.A. In compliance with the D.L. 93 of 11 June 2011 and In compliance with the D.L. 93 of 11 June 2011 and subsequent amendments and additions subsequent amendments and additions TEN-YEAR NETWORK DEVELOPMENT PLAN | 3 Snam Rete Gas publishes the third edition of the Ten-Year Development Plan of its natural gas Snam Rete Gas publishes the third edition of the Ten-Year Development Plan of its natural gas transportation network, following the second publication of the 2015 in accordance with the Legislative transportation network, following the second publication of the 2015 in accordance with the Legislative Decree n. 93 of June 1, 2011, issued to transpose the directive 2009/73/EC, as modified by the law n. 115 of Decree n. 93 of June 1, 2011, issued to transpose the directive 2009/73/EC, as modified by the law n. 115 of 29 July 2015. 29 July 2015. The Plan highlights the commitment of Snam Rete Gas to develop the transportation service, with the aim The Plan highlights the commitment of Snam Rete Gas to develop the transportation service, with the aim to encourage the process of network integration at European level. This commitment is realized through the to encourage the process of network integration at European level.
    [Show full text]
  • A Middle Power in a Regional Context: Italy's Economic Security, The
    Department of Political Science Chair of Security Studies A Middle Power in a Regional Context: Italy’s Economic Security, the MENA Region and the Leonardo-Finmeccanica Case SUPERVISOR Prof. Carlo Magrassi CANDIDATE Nicolò Biscottini Student Reg. No. 625032 CO-SUPERVISOR Prof. Federico Niglia ACADEMIC YEAR 2015/2016 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS At first sight, it might seem reckless to believe that five long and intense years of life and study can be contained in a single final work. Nevertheless, I can affirm with conviction that in the following pages there is not only the Nicolò of yesterday and today but also, and above all, my family, my professors and my teachers who have made me what I am and allowed me to find myself here today to write these lines. First of all, I would like to thank those who have made it possible for this work to take shape, that is the holder of the Chair of Security Studies of LUISS, Guido Carli, Gen. Magrassi, Col. Totaro, Dr. Pasquazzi, and my co-examiner Prof. Niglia. I am not so much grateful for their unquestionable high academic standards as for the humanity and professionalism they showed me during the drafting and elaboration of this work. Special thanks to Dr. Pasquazzi for always being there (really) in a moment of need. Secondly, I strongly desire to express my gratitude to the representatives of the institutional, academic and Italian industrial sectors who provided me with so much information that I was able to integrate into my research. Therefore, I would like to thank Gen. B.A.
    [Show full text]
  • Sanctions Against Russia Over Ukrainian Crisis Are Counterproductive
    Sanctions against Russia over Ukrainian crisis are counterproductive The tension and the ongoing civil war in Ukraine’s increasingly bloody battles will be expensive for the West and will damage what had been an already precarious relationship between the West and the former Soviet bloc. The West has embarked on an inexplicable ‘crusade’ against Moscow, which has reacted in an entirely predictable manner to the political crisis in Ukraine and then to the civil war involving the largely pro-Russian population in eastern the eastern part of the country and the more pro-EU population in the western regions. Ukraine never existed as such and the struggle now is over border solutions adopted in the fallout of the Soviet Union under pressure from NATO. There was no actual State of Ukraine before the October 1917 Revolution that led the path to the formation of the Soviet Union. Historical arguments aside, Russia has sufficient historical and diplomatic claims over Ukraine that its involvement is understandable and its concerns of Western interference entirely warranted if not downright justified. Nevertheless, the West, NATO, Canada and the United States in particular (though Canada playing an especially and comical role as part of Prime Minister Harper’s ‘hawkish’ foreign policy) have put pressure on Russian President Putin to relinquish Russian interests in Ukraine. This policy is rather more ridiculous than it sounds. It is akin to having Russia and its allies (including China and the BRICS countries) demand that The United States and Canada relinquish interests in Mexico or the Caribbean. The West’s economic (and military) isolation and encirclement maneuver aims to weaken Russia in an effort to cut ties with the separatists Eastern Ukraine.
    [Show full text]
  • The Profitability of Transnational Energy Infrastructure: a Comparative Analysis
    The profitability of transnational energy infrastructure: A comparative analysis of the Greenstream and Galsi gas pipelines Roberto Cardinale The Bartlett Faculty of the Built Environment, University College London 1-19 Torrington Place, Fitzrovia, London WC1E 7HB [email protected] Abstract This paper explores how the profitability of European transnational gas infrastructure is affected by (i) alternative ways to organize the gas supply chain; and (ii) different forms of energy diplomacy. In particular, through a case study, the paper analyses how these factors determined the realisation and success of the Greenstream pipeline and the stalemate of the Galsi pipeline, despite the potential for both projects to be profitable. The issue is important in view of the full transition to the EU Single Market, of which unbundling and privatisation are policy pillars. In fact, before the transition, vertical integration in the foreign upstream and energy diplomacy were key elements for infrastructure profitability. The paper argues that these elements are still important, as constraints to gas procurement and binding contractual relations with producers have not changed substantially. Nevertheless, securing those advantages within the EU Single Market framework requires significant innovations. In particular, the paper suggests forms of EU energy diplomacy, based on bilateral trade deals, which could achieve forms of vertical integration for energy firms as well as help EU and non- EU counterparts align their interests. This paper may prove particularly relevant for the recent debate on how to shape EU energy diplomacy. Keywords Transnational gas infrastructure profitability; vertical integration; unbundling; energy diplomacy; EU Single Market; energy security. 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Transit Troubles Pipelines As a Source of Conflict
    T r a n s i t T r o u b l e s P a u l S t e v e n s Transit Troubles Pipelines as a Source of Conflict A Chatham House Report Paul Stevens Chatham House, 10 St James’s Square, London SW1Y 4LE T: +44 (0)20 7957 5700 E: [email protected] www.chathamhouse.org.uk F: +44 (0)20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org.uk Charity Registration Number: 208223 Transit Troubles Pipelines as a Source of Conflict A Chatham House Report Paul Stevens i www.chathamhouse.org.uk Chatham House has been the home of the Royal Institute of International Affairs for over eight decades. Our mission is to be a world-leading source of independent analysis, informed debate and influential ideas on how to build a prosperous and secure world for all. © Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009 Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs) is an independent body which promotes the rigorous study of international questions and does not express opinion of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. The PDF file of this report on the Chatham House website is the only authorized version of the PDF and may not be published on other websites without express permission.
    [Show full text]
  • Putin Can Afford to Cut Off the Gas; the EU Cannot Afford to Be Left Without It
    Putin can afford to cut off the gas; the EU cannot afford to be left without it Yesterday, Italy’s Saipem, the gas division of the energy giant ENI, signed a 2 billion Euro contract to build the first line of the offshore section of SouthStream, the gas mega-pipeline, which Russia’s Gazprom has planned specifically to export natural gas to Europe bypassing Ukraine. On an ordinary day, this would be interesting business news; however, yesterday, the EU and the United States and other NATO countries (including Canada) announced a series of sanctions against key figures in the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The sanctions were slapped because Russia was accused of holding the region of Crimea (since 1954 formally part of Ukraine but largely Russian in ethnicity) under military occupation during a referendum that resulted in an overwhelming approval of joining the Russian Federation. Western governments – with varying degrees of enthusiasm – rejected the referendum (whose vote was 93% in favor of joining Russia), pushing for economic sanctions. For his part, Putin retorted that the referendum “complied with international law”. Far from weak, Putin has emerged from the Crimean situation as the strong leader, who understands and plays the ‘realpolitik’ game better than any of his western counterparts. Putin has been nationalistic but decisive, while those Crimeans who voted in favor of a union with Russia, perhaps observed what has become of Egypt, Libya or Syria, whose people followed western encouragements to ‘freedom’. Putin’s Crimean claims did not emerge from a sudden whim. Russia has had real and historic interests in Crimea for over two centuries; he was defending Moscow’s access to its Black Sea fleet in Sebastopol (the birthplace of the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev).
    [Show full text]
  • Sonatrach Key Words: Pipeline, Environment Protection, Projects
    Title : ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF GAS PROJECTS Last Name: NAIT ALI First Name: NADIA Organization: Sonatrach Key Words: Pipeline, environment protection, projects. 1. Introduction Today, Algeria lives a new phase of its modernisation by adopting legislation related to opening the gas and electricity markets. As the matter of fact, Sonatrach's company undertook strategies in order to update its gas project engineering's process . As the Algerian's natural gas export towards high energy consuming countries increases, Sonatrach’s company will plays an important role in environment protection at a worldwide level. Since, natural gas pollutes less than petroleum and petroleum and coil and rejects less Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. In Sardinia for example by using the Galsi pipeline, the substitution of coil by natural gas introduced interesting social and economical effects whilst preserving environment. Algeria ranks fifth on the global market of natural gas exporters, and second for LNG, which makes Algeria Europe's primary partner for energy. Algeria meets 12% of the total demand from Europe and is one of the four main natural gas exporters with Russia, Norway and the Netherlands. In Algeria significant oil and gas infrastructures exist, next door to Europe, as a testimony of the close relationship it maintains with your countries: the Enrico Mattei Trans-Mediterranean Gas Pipe, the Pedro Durran Farrel Maghreb-Europe gas pipe, LNG units as well as a whole fleet of LNG carriers. Algeria, thanks to its geographical location and its huge gas reserves, has set as its objective to increase production and exports capacity in order to meet the growing needs of its European neighbors.
    [Show full text]
  • Energy Policies of IEA Countries
    Energy Policies of IEA Countries Please note that this PDF is subject to specific restrictions that limit its use and distribution. The terms and conditions are available online at www.iea.org/about/copyright.asp ITALY 2009 Review Energy Policies of IEA Countries ITALY 2009 Review The Italian government has made substantial progress in a number of sectors since the last IEA in-depth energy policy review in 2003. The success of the green certificate and white certificate schemes and continued reform of the electricity and natural gas supply markets are just a few examples and build on the recommendations contained in the previous review. Nonetheless, many challenges remain. Italy recognises the need to diversify its energy supply portfolio to reduce its heavy dependence on fossil fuels and electricity imports, and to decrease its growing greenhouse gas emissions. In 2008, the government announced its intention to recommence the country's nuclear power programme and start building a new nuclear power plant by 2013. To do so, Italy must first develop an efficient process for identifying critical energy infrastructure, including nuclear power, and subjecting it to an effective, streamlined siting and permitting process. Italy will face another major challenge in complying with Europe’s new climate and energy package, particularly in relation to renewable energy and emissions targets. The government must step up efforts to comply with its new responsibilities, specifically by developing and putting in place a comprehensive climate change strategy for the years until 2020. In mid-2009, the legislature enacted a wide-ranging new law that will facilitate the emergence of a robust long-term energy policy.
    [Show full text]
  • An Ad Hoc Arbitration Under the Rules of Arbitration Of
    AN AD HOC ARBITRATION UNDER THE RULES OF ARBITRATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 1976 AND PURSUANT TO THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY PCA CASE NO. 2020-07 BETWEEN NORD STREAM 2 AG (Claimant) - and - THE EUROPEAN UNION (Respondent) CLAIMANT’S MEMORIAL The Tribunal Counsel for the Claimant Professor Ricardo Ramírez Hernández Professor Dr Kaj Hobér Mr Justice David Unterhalter Professor Philippe Sands QC 3 Verulam Buildings Gray's Inn London WC1R 5NT Tel: +44 20 7831 8441 Fax: +44 20 7831 8479 Andrew Cannon Lode Van Den Hende Iain Maxwell Hannah Ambrose Louise Barber Juliana Penz-Evren Jerome Temme Helin Laufer Herbert Smith Freehills LLP Exchange House Primrose Street London EC2A 2EG United Kingdom Tel: +44 20 7374 8000 Fax: +44 20 7374 0888 3 July 2020 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 6 II. SUMMARY OF CLAIM ................................................................................................... 8 III. OVERVIEW OF ECT PROTECTIONS BREACHED BY THE EU ............................... 15 III.1 The EU’s politically-motivated targeting of Nord Stream 2 undermines the very purpose of the ECT and its protection of the rule of law in the energy sector ..................................................................... 15 III.2 Breach of Article 10(1) – Fair and Equitable Treatment ............................... 17 III.3 Breach of Article 10(1) – Impairment by Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures
    [Show full text]
  • ENI Art 9 Decision EN Final Non-Confidential
    TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. SUBJECT MATTER............................................................................................... 3 2. THE ADDRESSEE................................................................................................. 4 3. PROCEDURAL STEPS UNDER REGULATION (EC) NO 1/2003 ....................... 4 4. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT ............................................................................ 5 4.1. The system of infrastructures to import gas into Italy...................................... 6 4.2. Relevant markets............................................................................................ 8 4.2.1. The relevant product markets........................................................ 8 4.2.2. The relevant geographic markets................................................... 8 4.3. ENI's dominant position on the relevant markets ............................................ 9 4.4. Substantial part of the internal market........................................................... 11 4.5. The competitive concern of a refusal to supply strategy................................ 11 4.5.1. Capacity hoarding ........................................................................ 12 4.5.2. Capacity degradation ................................................................... 13 4.5.3. Strategic limitation of investment................................................ 14 4.5.4. Conclusion .................................................................................... 15 4.6. Effect on trade between
    [Show full text]