Transit Troubles Pipelines As a Source of Conflict
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Gazprom's Monopoly and Nabucco's Potentials
Gazprom’s Monopoly and Nabucco’s Potentials: Strategic Decisions for Europe Nicklas Norling SILK ROAD PAPER November 2007 Gazprom’s Monopoly and Nabucco’s Potentials: Strategic Decisions for Europe Nicklas Norling © Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036, U.S. Institute for Security and Development Policy, V. Finnbodav. 2, 131 30, Nacka-Stockholm, Sweden www.silkroadstudies.org "Gazprom’s Monopoly and Nabucco’s Potential: Strategic Decisions for Europe" is a Silk Road Paper published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. The Silk Road Paper series is the Occasional Paper series of the Joint Center, published jointly on topical and timely subjects. The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program is a joint transatlantic independent and externally funded research and policy center. The Joint Center has offices in Washington and Stockholm and is affiliated with the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy. It is the first Institution of its kind in Europe and North America, and is today firmly established as a leading research and policy center, serving a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders and journalists. The Joint Center aims to be at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security and development in the region. Through its applied research, publications, teaching, research cooperation, public lectures and seminars, it wishes to function as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion regarding the region. -
Security Aspects of the South Stream Project
BRIEFING PAPER Policy Department External Policies SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE SOUTH STREAM PROJECT FOREIGN AFFAIRS October 2008 JANUARY 2004 EN This briefing paper was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is published in the following language: English Author: Zeyno Baran, Director Center for Eurasian Policy (CEP), Hudson Institute www.hudson.org The author is grateful for the support of CEP Research Associates Onur Sazak and Emmet C. Tuohy as well as former CEP Research Assistant Rob A. Smith. Responsible Official: Levente Császi Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union Policy Department BD4 06 M 55 rue Wiertz B-1047 Brussels E-mail: [email protected] Publisher European Parliament Manuscript completed on 23 October 2008. The briefing paper is available on the Internet at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN If you are unable to download the information you require, please request a paper copy by e-mail : [email protected] Brussels: European Parliament, 2008. Any opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. © European Communities, 2008. Reproduction and translation, except for commercial purposes, are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and provided the publisher is given prior notice and supplied with a copy of the publication. EXPO/B/AFET/2008/30 October 2008 PE 388.962 EN CONTENTS SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE SOUTH STREAM PROJECT ................................ ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................iii 1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 1 2. THE RUSSIAN CHALLENGE................................................................................... 2 2.1. -
Payandan Shareholders
PAYANDAN PAYANDAN 1. Company Background Creative Path to Growth Payandan Shareholders PAYANDAN Payandan’s shares belong to Mostazafan Foundation of Islamic Revolution. • Mostazafan Foundation owns 49% • Sina Energy Development Company owns 51% Mostazafan Foundation of Islamic Revolution Sina Energy Development Company PAYANDAN Mostazafan Foundation of Islamic Revolution PAYANDAN SEDCO Sina Financial Paya Saman Pars (Oil & Gas) & Investment Co (Road & Building) Sina Food Industries Iran Housing Group Saba Paya Sanat Sina (Power & Electricity) (Tire, Tiles, Glasswork, Textile, Etc) Ferdos Pars Sina ICT Group (Agriculture) Parsian Tourism Kaveh Pars & Transport Group (Mining) Alavi Foundation Alavi Civil (Charitable) Engineering Group Sina Energy Development Holding Company PAYANDAN SEDCO as one of subsidiaries of The Mostazafan Foundation of Islamic Revolution is considered one of pioneer holding companies in area of oil & gas which aims on huge projects in whole chains of oil and gas. Payandan (Oil & Gas General Contractor) North Drilling (Offshore Drilling) Pedex (Onshore Drilling) Behran (Oil Refinery Co) Dr Bagheri SEDCO Managing Director Coke Waste Water Refining Co Payandan in Numbers PAYANDAN +40 1974 Years ESTABLISHED +1400 +4000 EMPLOYEES CONTRACTOR +200,000,000 $ ANNUAL TURNOVER 75 COMPLETED PROJECTS Company Background PAYANDAN • 48” Zanjan-Mianeh Pipeline • 56” Saveh-Loushan • South Pars – SP No. 14 Pipeline (190KM) • South Pars – SP No. 13 • 56" Dezfoul- Kouhdasht Pipeline (160KM) 1974 1996 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 • Nargesi Gas • F & G Lavan • 56” Asaluyeh Gathering & • South Pars – SP Pipeline Injection No. 17 & 18 • 30” Iran- Payandan is • South Pars – SP No. 22,23,24 Armenia established (oil and • 48” Iraq Pipeline Naftkhane- Pipeline gas contractor) Baghdad (63KM) (113KM) • 56” Naeen-Tehran Gas Pipeline (133KM) • Parsian Gas Refinery • 56” Loushan-Rasht Gas Pipeline (81KM) • Pars Petrochemical Port • Arak Shazand Refinery • Kangan Gas Compressor Station • South Pars – SP No. -
Wiiw Research Report 367: EU Gas Supplies Security
f December Research Reports | 367 | 2010 Gerhard Mangott EU Gas Supplies Security: Russian and EU Perspectives, the Role of the Caspian, the Middle East and the Maghreb Countries Gerhard Mangott EU Gas Supplies Security: Gerhard Mangott is Professor at the Department Russian and EU of Political Science, University of Innsbruck. Perspectives, the Role of This paper was prepared within the framework of the Caspian, the the project ‘European Energy Security’, financed from the Jubilee Fund of the Oesterreichische Na- Middle East and the tionalbank (Project No. 115). Maghreb Countries Contents Summary ......................................................................................................................... i 1 Russia’s strategic objectives: breaking Ukrainian transit dominance in gas trade with the EU by export routes diversification ............................................................... 1 1.1 Nord Stream (Severny Potok) (a.k.a. North European Gas Pipeline, NEGP) ... 7 1.2 South Stream (Yuzhnyi Potok) and Blue Stream II ......................................... 12 2 The EU’s South European gas corridor: options for guaranteed long-term gas supplies at reasonable cost ............................................................................... 20 2.1 Gas resources in the Caspian region ............................................................. 23 2.2 Gas export potential in the Caspian and the Middle East and its impact on the EU’s Southern gas corridor ................................................................. -
Iran Sanctions
Iran Sanctions Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs July 9, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS20871 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) Summary Iran is subject to a wide range of U.S. sanctions, restricting trade with, investment, and U.S. foreign aid to Iran, and requiring the United States to vote against international lending to Iran. Several laws and Executive Orders extend sanctions to foreign companies that do business with Iran, as part of an effort to persuade foreign firms to choose between the Iranian market and the much larger U.S. market. A formal U.S. effort to curb international energy investment in Iran began in 1996 with the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). No firms have been sanctioned under it and the precise effects of that law on energy investment in Iran—as separate from other factors affecting international firms’ decisions on whether to invest in Iran—has been unclear. While international pressure on Iran to curb its nuclear program has increased the hesitation of many major foreign firms to invest in Iran’s energy sector, hindering Iran’s efforts to expand oil production beyond 4.1 million barrels per day, some firms continue to see opportunity in Iran. This particularly appears to be the case for companies in Asia that appear eager to fill the void left by major European and American firms and to line up steady supplies of Iranian oil and gas. ISA was first passed at a time of tightening U.S. -
Iran As an Alternative Supplier of Natural Gas to the EU Draft Online
IRAN AS AN ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIER OF NATURAL GAS TO THE EU Draft Paper Agnieszka Byrczek Tiisetso Mogase Antje Pfeifer Tomas Rezac April 2010 NewSecEU has been funded by the Lifelong Learning Programme of the European Commission This publication reflects the views only of the author, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. 1. Introduction Energy Security can be described as “the condition in which a nation and all, or most, of its citizens and businesses have access to sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future free from serious risk of major disruption of service”. 1 But other factors such as the availability of the sources, the reliability of partners and the infrastructure are also influencing energy security.2 During the last few years the European Commission started intense work on energy security in Europe. According to the Commission‘s Green Paper on security of energy supply (November 2000), if no action is taken, the EU's energy dependency will climb from 50 per cent in 2000 to 70 per cent in 2030. 3 Securing European energy supplies is therefore high on the EU's agenda. Currently, 40 per cent of EU gas imports come from Russia, 30 per cent from Algeria, and 25 per cent from Norway, but some predictions state that by 2030, over 60 per cent of EU gas imports are expected to come from Russia with overall external dependency expected to reach 80 per cent. 4 In recent years, supply of European countries with Russian gas was affected by the Russia-Ukraine dispute in winter 2006 and the disruption of gas supply in January 2009 to different amounts. -
Iran Sanctions
Iran Sanctions Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs February 10, 2012 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS20871 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Iran Sanctions Summary The international coalition that is imposing progressively strict economic sanctions on Iran is broadening and deepening, with increasingly significant effect on Iran’s economy. The objective, not achieved to date, remains to try to compel Iran to verifiably confine its nuclear program to purely peaceful uses. As 2012 begins, Iran sees newly-imposed multilateral sanctions against its oil exports as a severe threat - to the point where Iran is threatening to risk armed conflict. Iran also has indicated receptivity to new nuclear talks in the hopes of reversing or slowing the implementation of the oil export-related sanctions. The energy sector provides nearly 70% of Iran’s government revenues. Iran’s alarm stems from the potential loss of oil sales as a result of: • A decision by the European Union on January 23, 2012, to wind down purchases of Iranian crude oil by July 1, 2012. EU countries buy about 20% of Iran’s oil exports. This action took into consideration an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s possible efforts to design a nuclear explosive device, and diplomatic and financial rifts with Britain, which caused the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran on November 30, 2011. • Decisions by other Iranian oil purchasers, particularly Japan and South Korea, to reduce purchases of Iranian oil. Those decisions are intended to comply with a provision of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. -
A Middle Power in a Regional Context: Italy's Economic Security, The
Department of Political Science Chair of Security Studies A Middle Power in a Regional Context: Italy’s Economic Security, the MENA Region and the Leonardo-Finmeccanica Case SUPERVISOR Prof. Carlo Magrassi CANDIDATE Nicolò Biscottini Student Reg. No. 625032 CO-SUPERVISOR Prof. Federico Niglia ACADEMIC YEAR 2015/2016 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS At first sight, it might seem reckless to believe that five long and intense years of life and study can be contained in a single final work. Nevertheless, I can affirm with conviction that in the following pages there is not only the Nicolò of yesterday and today but also, and above all, my family, my professors and my teachers who have made me what I am and allowed me to find myself here today to write these lines. First of all, I would like to thank those who have made it possible for this work to take shape, that is the holder of the Chair of Security Studies of LUISS, Guido Carli, Gen. Magrassi, Col. Totaro, Dr. Pasquazzi, and my co-examiner Prof. Niglia. I am not so much grateful for their unquestionable high academic standards as for the humanity and professionalism they showed me during the drafting and elaboration of this work. Special thanks to Dr. Pasquazzi for always being there (really) in a moment of need. Secondly, I strongly desire to express my gratitude to the representatives of the institutional, academic and Italian industrial sectors who provided me with so much information that I was able to integrate into my research. Therefore, I would like to thank Gen. B.A. -
Sanctions Against Russia Over Ukrainian Crisis Are Counterproductive
Sanctions against Russia over Ukrainian crisis are counterproductive The tension and the ongoing civil war in Ukraine’s increasingly bloody battles will be expensive for the West and will damage what had been an already precarious relationship between the West and the former Soviet bloc. The West has embarked on an inexplicable ‘crusade’ against Moscow, which has reacted in an entirely predictable manner to the political crisis in Ukraine and then to the civil war involving the largely pro-Russian population in eastern the eastern part of the country and the more pro-EU population in the western regions. Ukraine never existed as such and the struggle now is over border solutions adopted in the fallout of the Soviet Union under pressure from NATO. There was no actual State of Ukraine before the October 1917 Revolution that led the path to the formation of the Soviet Union. Historical arguments aside, Russia has sufficient historical and diplomatic claims over Ukraine that its involvement is understandable and its concerns of Western interference entirely warranted if not downright justified. Nevertheless, the West, NATO, Canada and the United States in particular (though Canada playing an especially and comical role as part of Prime Minister Harper’s ‘hawkish’ foreign policy) have put pressure on Russian President Putin to relinquish Russian interests in Ukraine. This policy is rather more ridiculous than it sounds. It is akin to having Russia and its allies (including China and the BRICS countries) demand that The United States and Canada relinquish interests in Mexico or the Caribbean. The West’s economic (and military) isolation and encirclement maneuver aims to weaken Russia in an effort to cut ties with the separatists Eastern Ukraine. -
The Profitability of Transnational Energy Infrastructure: a Comparative Analysis
The profitability of transnational energy infrastructure: A comparative analysis of the Greenstream and Galsi gas pipelines Roberto Cardinale The Bartlett Faculty of the Built Environment, University College London 1-19 Torrington Place, Fitzrovia, London WC1E 7HB [email protected] Abstract This paper explores how the profitability of European transnational gas infrastructure is affected by (i) alternative ways to organize the gas supply chain; and (ii) different forms of energy diplomacy. In particular, through a case study, the paper analyses how these factors determined the realisation and success of the Greenstream pipeline and the stalemate of the Galsi pipeline, despite the potential for both projects to be profitable. The issue is important in view of the full transition to the EU Single Market, of which unbundling and privatisation are policy pillars. In fact, before the transition, vertical integration in the foreign upstream and energy diplomacy were key elements for infrastructure profitability. The paper argues that these elements are still important, as constraints to gas procurement and binding contractual relations with producers have not changed substantially. Nevertheless, securing those advantages within the EU Single Market framework requires significant innovations. In particular, the paper suggests forms of EU energy diplomacy, based on bilateral trade deals, which could achieve forms of vertical integration for energy firms as well as help EU and non- EU counterparts align their interests. This paper may prove particularly relevant for the recent debate on how to shape EU energy diplomacy. Keywords Transnational gas infrastructure profitability; vertical integration; unbundling; energy diplomacy; EU Single Market; energy security. 1. -
Nuclear Deal: Impact on Iran-Turkey Economic Relations
Nuclear Deal: Impact on Iran-Turkey Economic Relations By Mert Yildiz, Gareth Hollins, Rachel Ziemba, and Jonathan Schanzer February 2016 Foreword by Jonathan Schanzer1 The recent implementation of the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) will have a profound impact on the Middle East. From heightened tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia to Iran’s ability to finance terrorist proxies with sanctions relief, there are many reasons for Iran’s neighbors to worry. But not every country is fraught with concern. Turkey has hailed the deal as a diplomatic success.2 More to the point, Ankara sees the potential for real economic opportunity with its long-sanctioned neighbor. As this report from Roubini Global Economics explains, a more prosperous Iran with access to foreign currency affords Turkey a new market to sell industrial and commercial goods, and to offer tourism services, as well. Energy, not surprisingly, will dominate Iran’s exports to Turkey. But Ankara, much like the rest of the world, will need to be careful how much it relies on Tehran. The fear of Iran violating the JCPOA, and thereby inviting renewed international sanctions, is a constant factor among all of the many countries and companies looking to cash in on the economic opportunities. Of course, Turkey has already taken great liberties by exploiting a loophole in those sanctions by executing an elaborate “gas-for-gold” sanctions- busting scheme that yielded Iran some $13 billion in Turkish gold from 2012 to 2013.3 This “golden” loophole was closed by the U.S. Congress in 2013.4 1. -
Iran Sanctions
Iran Sanctions Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs June 22, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS20871 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Iran Sanctions Summary There is broad international support for imposing progressively strict economic sanctions on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine its nuclear program to purely peaceful uses. However, there is not a consensus on how effective the sanctions are on core Western goals. In January 2011, Secretary of State Clinton claimed that sanctions have accomplished a core objective of slowing Iran’s nuclear program. But, nuclear talks in December 2010 and in January 2011 made virtually no progress, suggesting that Iran’s leaders do not feel sufficiently pressured by sanctions to offer major concessions to obtain a nuclear deal. Because so many major economic powers have imposed sanctions on Iran, the sanctions are, by all accounts, harming key sectors of Iran’s economy by reinforcing the effects of Iran’s economic mismanagement. Among other indicators, there have been a stream of announcements by major international firms since early 2010 that they are exiting the Iranian market. Iran’s oil production has fallen slightly to about 3.9 million barrels per day, from over 4.1 million barrels per day several years ago, although Iran now has small natural gas exports that it did not have before Iran opened its fields to foreign investment in 1996. In addition, Iran’s overall ability to limit the effects of sanctions has been aided by relatively high oil prices in mid-2011.