Lebanon As a Test Case for the EU's Logic of Governmentality In
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Lebanon as a Test Case for the EU’s Logic of Governmentality in Refugee © 2020 IAI Challenges by Tamirace Fakhoury Prior to 2011, Lebanon was no traditional displacement. After nearly a decade gatekeeper in managing migrant and of cooperation between the EU and ISSN 2532-6570 refugee flows to the EU. Following Lebanon in this area, and ahead of mass refugee influx from Syria, the the EU’s new budgetary and policy- small Middle Eastern state acquired key planning cycle (2021–27), now is a importance in the EU’s architecture of key moment to critically assess EU- externalisation, alternatively framed as Lebanon cooperation on displacement the set of norms and practices that the from Syria. EU crafts to govern migration from a distance. I argue that the EU’s logic of governmentality in the context of Lebanon currently hosts more than 1.5 the refugee challenge has remained million Syrian refugees and since 2012 disconnected from a deeper grasp of the EU has been the key funding power Lebanon’s cumulative crises on the seeking to help the refugee-hosting one hand, and its politics of refugee state cope with the spillover effects that reception on the other. Moving mass displacement brought about on forward, the EU would need a revamped the country. approach that looks at Lebanon beyond the prism of a partner in refugee The EU’s recently published New Pact challenges, bringing the principle on Migration and Asylum reiterates of good governance in EU-Lebanon support to refugees and refugee- negotiations as crucial element to hosting countries – including those improve the relationship, placing it in Syria’s neighbourhood – as one of on a more sustainable and mutually the central elements of cooperation beneficial plane. with third countries on migration and Tamirace Fakhoury is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Lebanese American University and the Director of the Institute for Social Justice and Conflict Resolution. She is currently the Scientific Advisor to the Kuwait Chair (2020-2022) at Sciences Po in Paris. This paper was prepared with partial support of the Open Society Foundations, in the IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 94 - DECEMBER 2020 IAI COMMENTARIES framework of the project “A New European Consensus on Asylum & Migration”. Views expressed are the author’s alone. 1 Lebanon as a Test Case for the EU’s Logic of Governmentality in Refugee Challenges Lebanon in the context of mass to return by opening return centres. displacement from Syria At the same time, in light of various geopolitical motives, rival governing In 2011, with the onset of Syria’s lethal parties such as the Sunni-based conflict, Lebanon opened its borders Future Current have warned against to displaced Syrians. What started as rushing repatriation as long as suitable an open-border policy quickly evolved conditions are not in place in Syria.3 into a highly securitised refugee policy. © 2020 IAI By the end of 2014, under the impact of Three features have characterised the heavy strain that the neighbouring Lebanon’s approach towards displaced conflict brought about in Lebanon, the Syrians: incoherent policymaking, government closed its borders to new securitisation and fragmentation. refugee arrivals. Further, it instructed Far from reflecting an absent asylum the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to policy, such features mirror the state’s halt refugee registration. imperative to uphold a reluctant yet strategically ambiguous policy of As soon as the Bashar al Assad regime reception as its preferred mode of action. ISSN 2532-6570 started making territorial advances in Devolving authority over refugees, be it 2016, key political figures in Lebanon to municipalities, landowners, security began lobbying for refugee repatriation agencies or political parties, allows to Syria.1 In this context, factors such the state to disperse accountability for as illegal municipal curfews, evictions refugee rights.4 and crackdowns on employed refugees pushed many Syrians to consider Within this context, Lebanese return.2 In collaboration with security officials have continuously called agencies, the Lebanese government on international powers, including started in 2017 to organise so-called the EU, to channel more aid so as “voluntary returns”, notwithstanding to help the overburdened host state the UNHCR’s disapproval and ongoing withstand the challenge. It would be violence in Syria. no exaggeration to add that Lebanon’s approach to refugee governance has Though they have no legal mandate hovered between openly contesting to do so, parties such as the Shiite- refugees’ stay and adopting a tactical based Hezbollah or the Christian-based “marketplace” strategy to leverage Free Patriotic Movement have played hospitality in return for more financial an active role in coordinating return aid. operations or “encouraging” Syrians 1 Tom Rollins, “Incitement, Tensions Rise Over 3 For a full account of Lebanon’s incoherent Syrian Refugees in Lebanon”, in Al-Monitor, 28 politics on return, see Tamirace Fakhoury, September 2016, http://almon.co/2qx4. “Refugee Return and Fragmented Governance 2 Rouba Mhaissen and Elena Hodges, in the Host State: Displaced Syrians in the Face Unpacking Return. Syrian Refugees’ Conditions of Lebanon’s Divided Politics”, in Third World and Concerns, Beirut, Sawa for Development Quarterly, 8 June 2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/ and Aid, February 2019, https://reliefweb.int/ 01436597.2020.1762485. node/2977858. 4 Ibid. IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 94 - DECEMBER 2020 IAI COMMENTARIES 2 Lebanon as a Test Case for the EU’s Logic of Governmentality in Refugee Challenges The EU’s logic of refugee govern- The EU moreover integrated its refugee mentality in Lebanon response into a broader politics of resilience-building, which took on Three interrelated characteristics two dimensions in Lebanon. Firstly, have marked the EU’s logic of refugee the EU channelled financial support governance in Lebanon since 2011: to activities that would spur benefits reinforced cooperation with the to both refugees and local populations government, emphasis on resilience- in terms of job creation or economic © 2020 IAI building despite the political elite’s growth. Secondly, the EU explored contestation of such an approach, and with the government a set of measures a tactical non-engagement towards that would help Syrians “temporarily” Lebanon’s securitised refugee practices. integrate in Lebanon, and become more self-reliant pending their repatriation, Since 2012, the EU has conducted a means to provide the host state with high-level meetings to explore how incentives for refugee reception. the EU and Lebanon could turn the refugee challenge into an opportunity. The 2016 EU-Lebanon compact ISSN 2532-6570 In the wake of the eighth EU-Lebanon epitomises the EU’s search for a politics Association Council (2017), for example, of refugee resilience in Lebanon.6 The the two sides embedded cooperation so-called tailored partnership channels on the refugee challenge within a wider funding to projects in livelihoods, diplomatic context, seeking mutual economic growth and job creation to benefits in issue areas such as trade and both Syrians and Lebanese, in return the fight against terrorism. for the government’s facilitation of access to residency and employment in The assumption at the time was that certain sectors for Syrian refugees.7 cooperation on refugee governance could evolve into a win-win outcome. Indeed, following the compact, the The EU would implement a plethora Lebanese government sought to of activities in the fields of capacity- facilitate residency requirements building and security-sector reform for Syrian refugees, and ease their in Lebanon. In return, Lebanon would access to employment in, for instance, evolve into an upscaled partner that agriculture. The compact also inspired co-devises solutions on migration a broader conversation on improving management.5 Syrian refugee protection in Lebanon 6 Cindy Huang and Nazanin Ash, “Jordan, Lebanon Compacts Should Be Improved, Not Abandoned”, in Refugees Deeply, 5 February 5 Tamirace Fakhoury, “Leverage and 2018, https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian. Contestation in Refugee Governance: org/refugees/community/2018/02/05/jordan- Lebanon and Europe in the Context of Mass lebanon-compacts-should-be-improved-not- Displacement”, in Raffaella A. Del Sarto and abandoned. Simone Tholens (eds), Resisting Europe. 7 European Commission, EU-Lebanon Practices of Contestation in the Mediterranean Partnership: The Compact, August 2017, https:// Middle East, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/ Press, 2020, p. 142-163. sites/near/files/lebanon-compact.pdf. IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 94 - DECEMBER 2020 IAI COMMENTARIES 3 Lebanon as a Test Case for the EU’s Logic of Governmentality in Refugee Challenges through measures such as allowing Notwithstanding its calls for refugee Syrian refugee children to register on protection and resilience, on-the- Lebanese soil.8 ground pragmatic realism has marked the EU’s policy behaviour. Thus, the EU In practice however, the compact was has sought to upscale collaboration with a non-binding document that lacked the political establishment regardless mechanisms for implementation. of recurrent refugee rights abuses. This Further, the principles the compact set is neither surprising nor novel. © 2020 IAI out to uphold were strongly contested by Lebanon’s political elite. Key officials Drawing non-European partners into have relentlessly critiqued the EU’s crafting refugee governance