Lebanon As a Test Case for the EU's Logic of Governmentality In

IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 94 - DECEMBER 2020 ISSN 2532-6570 © 2020 IAI 1 Tamirace Fakhoury isan Associate Professor of Political Science at theLebanese American with thirdcountries on migration and the central elements of cooperation in Syria’s neighbourhood –asone of hosting countries –including those support to refugees andrefugee- on Migration andAsylum reiterates The EU’s recently published New Pact the country. mass displacement brought about on state cope with thespillover effects that seeking tohelp therefugee-hosting the EU has been the key funding power million Syrian refugees and since 2012 Lebanon currently hostsmore than1.5 distance. EU craftstogovern migration from a the set of norms and practices that the externalisation, alternatively framedas importance intheEU’s architecture of small Middle Easternstate acquiredkey mass refugee influx from Syria, the refugee flows totheEU. Following gatekeeper inmanagingmigrant and Prior to2011,Lebanon wasno traditional expressed are the author’s alone. framework of theproject “A New European Consensus on Asylum &Migration”. Views This paper was prepared with partial support of theOpenSociety Foundations, in the is currently theScientific Advisor tothe Kuwait Chair (2020-2022) at Sciences Po in Paris. University and theDirector of theInstitute for Social Justice and Conflict Resolution. She by Tamirace Fakhoury Challenges Logic of Governmentality inRefugee Lebanon asaTest Casefor theEU’s Lebanon inthisarea,andahead of of cooperation betweentheEUand displacement. After nearly adecade beneficial plane. on amore sustainable andmutually improve therelationship, placing it negotiations ascrucial element to of good governance in EU-Lebanon challenges, bringingtheprinciple the prismof apartnerinrefugee approach that looks at Lebanon beyond forward, theEUwould needarevamped reception on theother. Moving one hand, and its politics of refugee Lebanon’s cumulative criseson the disconnected from adeepergraspof the refugee challenge hasremained governmentality inthecontext of I argue that theEU’s logic of from Syria. Lebanon cooperation on displacement key moment tocritically assessEU- planning cycle (2021–27),now isa the EU’s newbudgetary andpolicy- Lebanon as a Test Case for the EU’s Logic of Governmentality in Refugee Challenges

Lebanon in the context of mass to return by opening return centres. displacement from Syria At the same time, in light of various geopolitical motives, rival governing In 2011, with the onset of Syria’s lethal parties such as the Sunni-based conflict, Lebanon opened its borders Future Current have warned against to displaced Syrians. What started as rushing repatriation as long as suitable an open-border policy quickly evolved conditions are not in place in Syria.3 into a highly securitised refugee policy.

© 2020 IAI By the end of 2014, under the impact of Three features have characterised the heavy strain that the neighbouring Lebanon’s approach towards displaced conflict brought about in Lebanon, the Syrians: incoherent policymaking, government closed its borders to new securitisation and fragmentation. refugee arrivals. Further, it instructed Far from reflecting an absent asylum the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to policy, such features mirror the state’s halt refugee registration. imperative to uphold a reluctant yet strategically ambiguous policy of As soon as the Bashar al Assad regime reception as its preferred mode of action. ISSN 2532-6570 started making territorial advances in Devolving authority over refugees, be it 2016, key political figures in Lebanon to municipalities, landowners, security began lobbying for refugee repatriation agencies or political parties, allows to Syria.1 In this context, factors such the state to disperse accountability for as illegal municipal curfews, evictions refugee rights.4 and crackdowns on employed refugees pushed many Syrians to consider Within this context, Lebanese return.2 In collaboration with security officials have continuously called agencies, the Lebanese government on international powers, including started in 2017 to organise so-called the EU, to channel more aid so as “voluntary returns”, notwithstanding to help the overburdened host state the UNHCR’s disapproval and ongoing withstand the challenge. It would be violence in Syria. no exaggeration to add that Lebanon’s approach to refugee governance has Though they have no legal mandate hovered between openly contesting to do so, parties such as the Shiite- refugees’ stay and adopting a tactical based Hezbollah or the Christian-based “marketplace” strategy to leverage Free Patriotic Movement have played hospitality in return for more financial an active role in coordinating return aid. operations or “encouraging” Syrians

1 Tom Rollins, “Incitement, Tensions Rise Over 3 For a full account of Lebanon’s incoherent Syrian Refugees in Lebanon”, in Al-Monitor, 28 politics on return, see Tamirace Fakhoury, September 2016, http://almon.co/2qx4. “Refugee Return and Fragmented Governance 2 Rouba Mhaissen and Elena Hodges, in the Host State: Displaced Syrians in the Face Unpacking Return. Syrian Refugees’ Conditions of Lebanon’s Divided Politics”, in Third World and Concerns, Beirut, Sawa for Development Quarterly, 8 June 2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/ and Aid, February 2019, https://reliefweb.int/ 01436597.2020.1762485. node/2977858. 4 Ibid. IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 94 - DECEMBER 2020 IAI COMMENTARIES

2 Lebanon as a Test Case for the EU’s Logic of Governmentality in Refugee Challenges

The EU’s logic of refugee govern- The EU moreover integrated its refugee mentality in Lebanon response into a broader politics of resilience-building, which took on Three interrelated characteristics two dimensions in Lebanon. Firstly, have marked the EU’s logic of refugee the EU channelled financial support governance in Lebanon since 2011: to activities that would spur benefits reinforced cooperation with the to both refugees and local populations government, emphasis on resilience- in terms of job creation or economic

© 2020 IAI building despite the political elite’s growth. Secondly, the EU explored contestation of such an approach, and with the government a set of measures a tactical non-engagement towards that would help Syrians “temporarily” Lebanon’s securitised refugee practices. integrate in Lebanon, and become more self-reliant pending their repatriation, Since 2012, the EU has conducted a means to provide the host state with high-level meetings to explore how incentives for refugee reception. the EU and Lebanon could turn the refugee challenge into an opportunity. The 2016 EU-Lebanon compact ISSN 2532-6570 In the wake of the eighth EU-Lebanon epitomises the EU’s search for a politics Association Council (2017), for example, of refugee resilience in Lebanon.6 The the two sides embedded cooperation so-called tailored partnership channels on the refugee challenge within a wider funding to projects in livelihoods, diplomatic context, seeking mutual economic growth and job creation to benefits in issue areas such as trade and both Syrians and Lebanese, in return the fight against terrorism. for the government’s facilitation of access to residency and employment in The assumption at the time was that certain sectors for Syrian refugees.7 cooperation on refugee governance could evolve into a win-win outcome. Indeed, following the compact, the The EU would implement a plethora Lebanese government sought to of activities in the fields of capacity- facilitate residency requirements building and security-sector reform for Syrian refugees, and ease their in Lebanon. In return, Lebanon would access to employment in, for instance, evolve into an upscaled partner that agriculture. The compact also inspired co-devises solutions on migration a broader conversation on improving management.5 Syrian refugee protection in Lebanon

6 Cindy Huang and Nazanin Ash, “Jordan, Lebanon Compacts Should Be Improved, Not Abandoned”, in Refugees Deeply, 5 February 5 Tamirace Fakhoury, “Leverage and 2018, https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian. Contestation in Refugee Governance: org/refugees/community/2018/02/05/jordan- Lebanon and Europe in the Context of Mass lebanon-compacts-should-be-improved-not- Displacement”, in Raffaella A. Del Sarto and abandoned. Simone Tholens (eds), Resisting Europe. 7 European Commission, EU-Lebanon Practices of Contestation in the Mediterranean Partnership: The Compact, August 2017, https:// Middle East, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/ Press, 2020, p. 142-163. sites/near/files/lebanon-compact.pdf. IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 94 - DECEMBER 2020 IAI COMMENTARIES

3 Lebanon as a Test Case for the EU’s Logic of Governmentality in Refugee Challenges

through measures such as allowing Notwithstanding its calls for refugee Syrian refugee children to register on protection and resilience, on-the- Lebanese soil.8 ground pragmatic realism has marked the EU’s policy behaviour. Thus, the EU In practice however, the compact was has sought to upscale collaboration with a non-binding document that lacked the political establishment regardless mechanisms for implementation. of recurrent refugee rights abuses. This Further, the principles the compact set is neither surprising nor novel.

© 2020 IAI out to uphold were strongly contested by Lebanon’s political elite. Key officials Drawing non-European partners into have relentlessly critiqued the EU’s crafting refugee governance initiatives search for more lasting solutions in is an integral part of the EU’s wider Lebanon. They have also opposed infrastructure of externalisation. calls for refugee employment on Compacts and resilience-building the basis of their encroachment on programmes arise as outsourced Lebanon’s sovereignty. More broadly, modalities that seek to retain refugees they have critiqued refugee solutions where they are, and to discourage the ISSN 2532-6570 promoted by the EU for their lack of fair departure of potential asylum seekers burden-sharing and for adding further from regions of origin.11 strain on Lebanon’s already delicate configuration.9 It would therefore be safe to say that rather than deeply engaging with Against this backdrop, the EU’s call the roots of refugee dispossession for improved refugee inclusion in and tying its funding power to good the compact – and in the Brussels governance, the EU’s logic of refugee Conferences for Supporting the Future governmentality in Lebanon has of Syria and the Region – has not consisted in stabilising the strained materialised. More than 70 per cent polity, while governing migration from of Syrians today do not hold a legal a distance. residency,10 while their livelihoods have seen a dramatic decline even prior to With Lebanon’s fall does the EU’s Lebanon’s economic collapse in 2019. approach falter as well?

Lebanon experienced a massive protest wave – commonly called the revolution 8 Sandra Lavenex and Tamirace Fakhoury, Trade Agreements as a Venue for EU Migration or thawra – in 2019, with citizens calling Governance, DELMI Seminar, Sweden, October for the demise of Lebanon’s inept and 2019. corrupt regime. The revolutionary 9 Tamirace Fakhoury, “Leverage and episode was essentially a reaction to a Contestation in Refugee Governance”, cit. financial crash that led the Lebanese 10 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) andWorld Food Programme (WFP), 2019 11 Sandra Lavenex, Instruments, Methods, Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees Mechanisms of Externalisation, presentation at in Lebanon (VASyR), Beirut, December 2019, the CONREP workshop “Refugee Externalisation https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/ Policies. Responsibility, Legitimacy and details/73118. Accountability”, Prato, 14 June 2019. IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 94 - DECEMBER 2020 IAI COMMENTARIES

4 Lebanon as a Test Case for the EU’s Logic of Governmentality in Refugee Challenges

pound to lose more than 80 per cent of Indeed, Lebanon’s fall has various its value in the months to come. implications for the EU’s external logic of governmentality. The Beyond its financial triggers, the politics of resilience-building, thawra carved an intersectional which is the cornerstone of the EU’s field tying together the struggles of refugee response and seeks to make workers, women, as well as migrants individuals self-reliant rather than and refugees. In this setting, activists states accountable, has left the ruling

© 2020 IAI decried international powers’ elite unscathed and intact. It has also pragmatic collaboration with a corrupt remained poorly synchronised with the regime which has stifled the well-being search for rights-based remedies which of both citizens and refugees. guarantee dignified options to refugees beyond temporary schemes. With the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Beirut blasts in The EU is called in this regard to bring August 2020, anti-regime mobilisation in the principle of good governance diminished, but protests still in its external migration policies.14 ISSN 2532-6570 episodically erupt. In the context of Otherwise, as the Lebanese case cumulative shocks, both refugees and dramatically shows, its policy solutions host populations have experienced to protracted refugee challenges a “catastrophe after catastrophe will remain disconnected from both scenario”. the endemic challenges, and the cumulative shocks that afflict both host Today, more than 50 per cent of and refugee populations. Lebanese citizens12 and more than 70 per cent of Syrian refugees13 have The EU is moreover called to look been thrown under the poverty line. at Lebanon beyond the mono- Lebanon’s collapse, which comes at dimensional prism of a priority partner a time when international powers, in times of crises. In the last decade, including the EU, have channelled the EU has tailored its stabilisation massive aid and implemented a myriad approach to the issue of displacement of resilience-building programmes, on Lebanese soil, arguably relegating has spurred a flurry of critiques on the cooperation on good governance and architecture of external assistance and political reform in the country. stabilisation. As various grassroots activists have 12 UN Economic and Social Commission for pointed out, after Lebanon’s collapse Western Asia (ESCWA), “Poverty in Lebanon: the EU should uphold a people- Solidarity is Vital to Address the Impact of centric policy approach that prioritises Multiple Overlapping Shocks”, in ESCWA Policy the everyday lives and futures of Briefs, No. 15 (August 2020), https://www. unescwa.org/news/Lebanon-poverty-2020. 13 Patricia Khoder, “La communauté 14 Bruno Oliveira Martins and Michael Strange, internationale espère lever 2,6 milliards de “Rethinking EU External Migration Policy: dollars pour le Liban”, in L’Orient Le Jour, 30 Contestation and Critique”, in Global Affairs, June 2020, https://www.lorientlejour.com/ Vol. 5, No. 3 (2019), p. 195-202, https://doi.org/1 article/1224000. 0.1080/23340460.2019.1641128. IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 94 - DECEMBER 2020 IAI COMMENTARIES

5 Lebanon as a Test Case for the EU’s Logic of Governmentality in Refugee Challenges

individuals, rather than cooperation with volatile elite cartels.15

15 Author’s informal conversations with activists, Beirut, October 2019 to August 2020. IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 94 - DECEMBER 2020 IAI COMMENTARIES

6 Lebanon as a Test Case for the EU’s Logic of Governmentality in Refugee Challenges

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli. IAI seeks to promote awareness of international politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and multilateral cooperation. Its focus embraces topics of strategic relevance such as European integration, security and defence, international economics and global governance, energy, climate and Italian foreign policy; as well as the dynamics of cooperation and conflict in key geographical regions such as the Mediterranean and Middle East, Asia, Eurasia, Africa and © 2020 IAI the Americas. IAI publishes an English-language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (Affarinternazionali), three book series (Global Politics and Security, Quaderni IAI and IAI Research Studies) and some papers’ series related to IAI research projects (Documenti IAI, IAI Papers, etc.).

Via dei Montecatini, 17 - I-00186 Rome, Italy T +39 06 3224360 [email protected] www.iai.it ISSN 2532-6570

Latest IAI COMMENTARIES

Director: Andrea Dessì ([email protected])

20 | 94 Tamirace Fakhoury, Lebanon as a Test Case for the EU’s Logic of Governmentality in Refugee Challenges 20 | 93 Nathalie Tocci, Peeling Turkey Away from Russia’s Embrace: A Transatlantic Interest 20 | 92 Lucia Bird, Learning from COVID-19: Implications for the EU Response to Human Smuggling 20 | 91 Liselotte Odgaard, The New Normal in Transatlantic Relations: The US and Europe Eye China 20 | 90 Olimpia Fontana, Italian Euroscepticism and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Survey Insights 20 | 89 Irene Ponzo, How to Turn Rural Europe into a Welcoming Space for Migrants 20 | 88 Stefano Manservisi, The EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum: A Tsunami of Papers but Little Waves of Change 20 | 87 Gabriele Abbondanza, Italy and Australia: Time for a Strategic Partnership 20 | 86 Dario Cristiani, A Ceasefire with Feet of Clay: The Potential Spoilers of Peace in Libya 20 | 85 Roderick Parkes and Mark McQuay, Ending the EU’s Ambivalence to Free Movement in Africa IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 94 - DECEMBER 2020 IAI COMMENTARIES