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Disinformation Primer │ I February 2021 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are many people to thank in terms of their contributions to this primer. It was conceived and developed by Joshua Machleder and Shannon Maguire at USAID, together with the NORC at the University of Chicago team including Susan Abbott, Renée Hendley, and Luis Camacho. We thank the following individuals for sharing their time, opinions, and expertise: Deepanjalie Abeywardana (Verite Research, Sri Lanka); Akintunde Akanni (Lagos State University), Daniel Arnaudo (National Democratic Institute); Manisha Aryal (Chemonics); Rafiq Copeland (Internews); Marius Dragomir (Central European University, Center for Media, Data and Society); Dejan Georgievski (Media Development Centre Skopje); Dean Jackson (National Endowment for Democracy); Rasto Kuzel (Memo 98, Slovakia); Shanthi Kalathil (National Endowment for Democracy); Gillian McCormack (Internews); Michael Mirny (IREX); Sarah Oates (University of Maryland); Igor Rozkladaj (Center for Democracy and Rule of Law, Kyiv); Bruce Sherman (USIP Peace Tech Lab); Juni Soehardjo (media lawyer, Indonesia); Tara Susman-Pena (IREX); Emeka Umejei (University of Ghana, Accra); Herman Wasserman (University of Capetown); Nancy Watzman (FirstDraft News); Bob Wekesa (University the Witwatersrand); and Tim Weninger (University of Notre Dame). We also want to thank the United States Department of State Global Engagement Center for their review and feedback. We appreciate the feedback and advice offered by Nicholas Glavin, Mary-Beth Polley, and Phillip Tolentino. In addition, numerous current and former staff at USAID contributed to the development of the primer. We greatly appreciate the opinions and feedback from the following: Mariam Afrasiabi, Kora Andrieu, Matthew Baker, Keti Bakradze, Jared Ford, Maher M. Frijat, Andrew Greer, Adam Kaplan, Lauren Kirby, Nadereh Lee, Taly Lind, Amy Malessa, Laura McKechnie, Michael McNulty, Kyle Novak, Diana Parzik, Marko Pjevic, Lisa Poggiali, Joseph Scheibel, Gloria Steele, Samantha Turner, Sara Werth, Thomas White, and Johanna Wilkie. USAID.GOV DISINFORMATION PRIMER │ I TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................................................ i Disinformation Primer ...................................................................................................................................................... 1 Introduction: How to Use This Primer ........................................................................................................................ 1 I. Part One: Why Does Disinformation Matter? .................................................................................................... 2 II. Part Two: Understanding Information Disorder ................................................................................................ 7 III. Part Three: How does Disinformation Work Online? ................................................................................... 22 IV. Part Four: What Social Factors Contribute to Disinformation? ................................................................... 30 V. Part Five: What are Some Anticipated Challenges? ......................................................................................... 37 VI. Part Six: What are Some Emerging Solutions for Disinformation? .............................................................. 44 VII. Part Seven: Ten Things USAID and Its Partners Can Do to Counter and Prevent Disinformation.... 59 Annex I: Glossary of Terms ........................................................................................................................................ 63 Annex 2: Types of Misinformation & Disinformation ............................................................................................ 69 Annex 3: Emerging Solutions ....................................................................................................................................... 70 Annex 4: Passive & Active Drivers of Disinformation ........................................................................................... 74 Annex 5: Quick Resources for Planning a Disinformation Strategy ................................................................... 76 Annex 6: Section-by-Section Resources ................................................................................................................... 77 Annex 7: What to Read & Watch .............................................................................................................................. 80 USAID.GOV DISINFORMATION PRIMER │ II TABLE OF FIGURES Figure 1: Information Disorder ................................................................................................................................. 3 Figure 2: Groundviews’ Series on Media Literacy ................................................................................................ 8 Figure 3: Russian Produced Meme to Persuade Ukrainians against Euro-Integration ............................... 10 Figure 4: Step-By-Step Guide to Combatting Disinformation ......................................................................... 11 Figure 5: Popular Messaging Apps .......................................................................................................................... 13 Figure 6: Digital Connectivity is on the Rise Globally ....................................................................................... 13 Figure 7: Smartphone Ownership .......................................................................................................................... 14 Figure 8: Gender Dynamics and Online Violence ............................................................................................... 15 Figure 9: The Dangerous Speech Five-part Framework ................................................................................... 16 Figure 10: Ben Nimmo’s, Breakout Scale: Measuring the Impact of Influence Operations ........................ 26 Figure 11: Valerij Zaborovskij’s Diffusion Model .................................................................................................. 33 Figure 12: Full SNA on Disinformation in West Papua ...................................................................................... 34 Figure 13: Zoomed in SNA for Papua, Showing Central Nodes ....................................................................... 34 Figure 14: Forensics on the Spread of Fake Coronavirus Information by Fringe Parties in South Africa ................................................................................................................................................ 35 Figure 15: Number of Internet Shutdowns in 2019 ............................................................................................. 41 USAID.GOV DISINFORMATION PRIMER │ III DISINFORMATION PRIMER This primer presents an overview of disinformation culture to give readers a sense of key concepts, terminology, select case studies, and programmatic design options. Disinformation is by no means new. Although social media platforms have emerged as the most efficient spreaders of false information, disinformation is also spread through analog media such as radio, television, and newspapers. It is, however, the combination of traditional analog media, in concert with new digital technologies, that allows information to spread faster and more broadly (even across borders) in unprecedented ways. Experts have described this phenomenon as “information disorder,” a condition in which truth and facts coexist in a milieu of misinformation and disinformation—conspiracy theories, lies, propaganda, and half- truths. They have labeled its ability to undermine democracy and individual autonomy “a wicked problem,” i.e., a problem that is difficult and complex, such as poverty or climate change. Despite the immensity of the challenge, there are promising ways that journalists, civil society organizations, technology specialists, and governments are finding to prevent and counter misinformation and disinformation. This primer presents several programmatic ideas to consider for standalone or integrative approaches as part of democracy and governance-related programming. INTRODUCTION: HOW TO USE THIS PRIMER This primer is compiled with the intention of helping USAID staff and partners to understand the basics of disinformation, how it is spread, why it is spread, and how programming can help reduce its damaging impact on societies around the world. It is organized into seven parts that each focus on illuminating the issue with insights from leading thinkers. PhotoThese placementinsights are -supplemented Place Section with Photo resources, Here (in case front studies, of text) and examples to illustrate different dimensions of the problem and to enable readers to pursue deeper discussions and resources that can help their programs and projects. The primer and its many annexes can be used as a guide or reference, and its modular design can supplement training programs aimed at different aspects of the disinformation conundrum. Photo: ©2018 Unsplash/Abhijith S. Nair USAID.GOV DISINFORMATION PRIMER │ 1 I. PART ONE: WHY DOES DISINFORMATION MATTER? Part One explores how the well-worn and known tactics of disinformation are being adapted and used around the world. Evidence is mounting that “false information can reach more people, penetrate more deeply into
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