Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, Vol 7, Issue 1

Contents March 2013 , volume 7, issue 1 Editor’s 4 Demographic Warfare Analysis Mitchell A. Belfer Research 22 A Meeting of Minds: Sino-Pakistani Articles Military Relations Prem Mahadevan 40 Understanding China’s Global Search for Energy and Resources Sigfrido Burgos Cáceres 60 Insurgencies, Border Clashes, and the Security Dilemma: Unresolved Problems for ASEAN Deniz Kocak 82 The Regional Policy and Power Capabilities of Jordan as a Small State Martina Ponížilová 104 After a Violent Revolution: Romanian Democratisation in the Early 1990s Roxana Radu 124 The Europeanisation of Political Communication: Framing the Online Communication of French Political Parties Kateřina Čmakalová 146 National Parliaments in the Council: Parliamentary Scrutiny Reserves Viera Knutelská 166 Agenda Setting of the EU mission in Kosovo — A Constructivist Read Vjosa Musliu 186 International Security and Gender Book Reviews Kateřina Krulišová 189 WikiLeaks: News in the Networked Era Johanna Granville 192 Europe, Regions and European Regionalism Tatiana Shaban 195 Handbook of Transnational Governance Moses Kibe Kihiko 198 The Post-Sarkozy Era: A Review Essay Review Essays Yves Laberge Always more at cejiss.org Frequently updated articles and comments reflecting changes to international relations between hard copy publications. Demographic Warfare Mitchell Belfer Introduction Spectators of the Arab Spring (in general) and Bahrain’s chapter (more specifically) tend to expend their intellectual energies attempting to depict the symptoms of spasmodic violence while simplifying, exag- * gerating or omitting root causes from public discourses.1 It seems that the international public prefers visualising — and reporting on — political violence; or rather violent acts carried out in the name of politics instead of the more mundane, but certainly more important, lines of argumentation which ostensibly drive the engines of upheaval. This analysis focuses on one of the most explosive dynamics current- ly unfolding in Bahrain; demography. Within such a highly charged environment, two main demographic arguments are being advanced: first, that in Bahrain the demographics favour the Shia population while national power favours the Sunni community, and second, the Shia community is disempowered economically; it does not have the same economic rights or employment opportunities as Sunni Bahrai- nis. After conducting some eighteen months of field research, it is clear that both lines of argumentation are false and have only served to further polarise Bahraini society and render reaching a negotiated settlement less likely. This work does not venture to answer who is responsible for propagating such disinformation about Bahrain and neither does it suggest a motive. Instead, this analysis seeks only to pose a counter argument so that researchers may be able to reach their own conclusions after being presented with two sets of argumentation. To achieve the objectives of this analysis, two methods are uti- lised. First, the work presents and critiques the arguments developed by Mansoor Al-Jamri who has been one of the leading proponents of sectarianism and demography in Bahrain’s political situation. Indeed, since Al-Jamri’s works form the basis of a wide spectrum of subsequent 4 research, it is important to investigate the way he derived at his conclusions that the Shia community form the majority of Bahrain’s population. Therefore, the first section challenges Al-Jamri’s propositions and seeks to show a degree of misinformation regarding the demographic situation in Bahrain. Mitchell Once this task is achieved, this analysis then turns to investigating Belfer the second line of argumentation, which is based on the alleged dis- criminatory practises of Bahrain’s Sunni political leadership against the Shia community. Again, this line of argumentation is deeply flawed and eighteen months of field work has uncovered a more balanced economic situation in the country then previously assumed. Let’s Talk About Sects Despite the oft-quoted “sectarianism” that many associate with Bah- rain, honest exploration reveals that, in fact, there are no clear indicators as to religious orientation. This is a unique feature of the country since it is the only state in the wider region which does not ask for religious identification on national censuses. In fact, reflecting on all nine (1941, 1950, 1959, 1965, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2010) of the past censuses leads to the social-scientist question of how to determine the sectarian preferences of the Bahraini population if no official records exist in which sectarian identity is prioritised? In the existing literature, there is no convincing answer to this question and the deeper the topic is explored the greater the inconsistencies of the answers. However, while most authors simply forgo substanti- ating the assumed demographic imbalance between Sunnis and Shia, others adopt more bizarre techniques of unofficial “census-taking.”2 * Take, for instance, Al-Jamri’s measurement and justification that Bah- rain’s population is more than 60% Shia. He argues that while ‘there is no accurate statistics for number of Shia and Sunnis, a closer look at the 2006 election results indicates that around 62% are Shia Muslims.’3 * There are, of course, several problems with Al-Jamri’s argument re- lated to arbitrarily connecting votes in favour of a Shia political bloc, such as al Wefaq, with the religious affiliation of the voter; of assuming that all Shia vote only for Shia blocs and, importantly, reflecting on the rationale behind deploying such statistics is suspect. Each of these must be examined in greater detail to falsify such lines of sectarian argumentation and, therefore, show that depictions of Bahrain as a Shia country dominated by a Sunni regime is a dangerous exaggera- 5 tion meant to further fan the flames of sectarianism and with it mutual recriminations and potential violence. Regarding the first point, election results are no way to determine the religious beliefs of a population, unless there is the (erroneous) pre- cejiss supposition that only Shia Muslims would be attracted to Shia blocs 1/2013 while Sunni Muslims would only vote for Sunni blocs. Careful inspec- tion of the 2006 elections reveals that cooperative religious voting between the Shia and Sunni communities was not only possible but highly probable given the nature of the three main religious blocs; al Wefaq (Shia bloc), Asalah (Sunni bloc, Salafist) and the al Menbar (Sunni bloc, liberal) as they competed with each other and the two, non-religious blocs, the Democratic and the National Justice blocs. In the first case, it was apparent in the 2006 campaign that Asalah was at a decisive disadvantage when compared to al Menbar since the latter adopted a more liberal line concerning women’s rights within Bahrain’s socio-political system. Indeed, al Menbar MP, Dr. Ali Ahmed reportedly told the Bahrain Tribune that ‘Granting women their political rights is not against Islamic precepts. Women should be motivated to achieve their aspirations and contribute to the Kingdom’s develop- * ment.’4 Also, it should be remembered that the ‘al Menbar bloc has [...] backed women’s rights activists’ campaign for the introduction of a unified personal status law, which was vehemently opposed by Shiite * Islamists.’5 Not only by Shia Islamists. Asalah too was adamant about the exclu- sion of women from Bahraini politics and opposed a unified personal status law. Why then, with both the al Wefaq and Asalah (and, in fact al Menbar) wanting to ‘focus on real political and socio-economic issues * rather than being distracted by talk of sectarian politics,’6 is it impossible to imagine that Asalah supporters would vote for al Wefaq since ‘both are opponents of what they consider moral laxity and have been * ready to join forces in order to campaign together on morality issues.’7 Given that the 2006 elections were conducted by secret ballot, there is no way to ascertain whether those that voted for the al Wefaq were indeed Shia and to infer that they were is an irresponsible manipulation of election statistics. Furthermore the 2006 elections had a voter turnout of some 72%, a respectable number, but also one which leaves room to interpret since 28% of the electorate are unaccounted for. If Sunni Muslims formed the majority of this twenty-eight percent what impact would it have on Al-Jamri’s statistical assumptions? This problem is compounded when 6 adding the non-religious blocs into the equation. Is it possible that an equal number of Sunni and Shia voted for these, or such numbers could be imbalanced in favour of one group or the other? The same could be said of other communities. Is it impossible that Christian or Jewish or any number of naturalised Bahrainis also voted for al Wefaq? Policy Certainly, these questions are not meant to be answered. They are only Analysis intended to challenge the insinuation that support for al Wefaq in the 2006 elections automatically reflects the population of Shia in Bahrain. A second problem, one which takes a different track to produce the same result in challenging Al-Jamri’s assertions, revolves around the issue of what constitutes a Shia. Since there are no clear indicators that suggest a particular behaviour for all Shia, aside from some religious practises, it is uncertain why Shia must support al Wefaq. Indeed, there are many different Shia groups living in Bahrain such as the Ajam Shia community which serves as a case in point; it is a community of Persian refugees, who fled the turbulence of early twentieth century conflict in Iran, and settled on the Island. They were welcomed and immediately joined in state-building projects while retaining some of the particulars of their Persian heritage. Yet they, as a community, wanted to make a distinction between themselves and other Shia and Persians and hence drew-up a criterion which determines their unique heritage and place within Bahraini society.

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