Towards a Theory of Mutual Recognition in IR1

Andreas Herberg-Rothe ([email protected])

Towards a theory of mutual recognition in IR1

Draft for my presentation at the ISA Asia-Pacific conference, Hong Kong 25.-27. June 2016

Do not circulate or quote without the explicit permission of the author

1. Introduction

In the wake of globalization, many pundits articulated whether the theoretical concepts developed from the era of nation states (Ulrich Beck) are still tenable for the portrayal of the twenty-first century international relations. Furthermore, many concepts regarded as central in the IRT came to be perceived as a form of American political and social science. Given the absence or non-maturity of Chinese, Russian, African, Islamic, or Indian IRTs, the mainstream IRT originated almost exclusively from the Anglo-Saxon world.

Although at the beginning in the 90th of last century, globalization was also seen as an American enterprise it led to the “rise of the others” (Zakaria) or a multicomplex world (a slight modification of Acharya’s concept – Acharya 2014 a) of nation-states and global institutions, enterprises and NGOs. This comprises the two following macro-developments:

1. Globalization enabled the former great empires (China, Russia, or India) to reestablish their status as major powers and civilizations and also led many developing countries (Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa) to increase their voices; this development led to the rise of multiple centers of power with different layers across the world.

2. Globalization additionally dissolved traditional identities and forms of government (to some degree as a result of social inequality), which led to social fragmentation and re- ideologization of domestic conflicts, as already can be observed with respect to the rise of the Islamic State. The conclusion is that the role of ideologies was not over

1 I’m very grateful to Key-young Son’s (Seoul), who worked with me so closely together in the last years, to Miriam Förstle, my research assistant, who was essential in commenting, writing and discussion and for the intensive dialogue with my student Marzie Ghiasi. Nevertheless, all remaining faults are only my own. with the end of the twenty century or the advent of globalization, but that it changed from modern to post-modern ideologies. The rise of post-modern ideologies is the result of globalization as well as the denial of recognition to the great civilizations of the world (see Herberg-Rothe and Son 2016).

The rise of the others and the ideological segmentation of societies due to globalization mainly led to intensified struggles for recognition in the national and international spheres (see Terhalle 2015 on the problem of mutual recognition between the United States and China). For instance, China’s foreign policy has been perceived in the United States through the lens of the U.S.’s own understanding of international relations, and vice versa. As to China’s rise, it is of paramount importance whether it will be socialized into the Westphalian system of states, a position, which Hilary Clinton has been advocating, or whether it will act according to its own principles and values as a civilization. In order to deal with struggles for recognition constructively, it is essential for both sides to fully recognize how “the other” understands the contemporary world.

This development contributed already to the questioning of the validity of established IRT concepts and the introduction of non-Western conceptions in order to understand better the global dynamic and worldwide conflicts as well as struggles for recognition.

The future task of global IR does not lie in just furthering the understanding of international relations, but according to Amitav Acharya about how to ensure the global recognition of difference and plurality, given the emergence of various new actors and institutions. As Amitav Acharya emphasized, “Global IR is about recognizing and respecting diversity, not creating homogeneity or universality.”(Acharya 2014 b) But the main problem in a globalized world is going much further in order to differentiate between those social practices in the great civilizations of the earth, which could, should and must be recognized – and those which cannot.

Recognition in IRT

The discipline of IRT is still mainly an American enterprise and does not reflect the voices, experiences and thinking of the vast majority of mankind and might be viewed to some extend as an American social Science, despite the progress made so far to develop approaches which are rooted in local or regional experiences (Acharya 2015). Area studies and local approaches are viewed as exotic with no or minor relevance for the discipline in general. Although there are different achievements (Katzenstein, Acharya), they are not able yet to bridge the gap between dominant Western IRT and local and regional approaches. This schism is embodied in different kinds of exceptionalism, may it be a kind of eurocentrism or ethnocentrisms, of the “West against the Rest” or the “Rest against the West”. In order to bridge this gap various authors have developed the idea of pluralistic universalisms. In sharp critique of the universalism of the enlightenment, which is viewed as generalizing of only values, norms and interests of a single, the Western civilization – and was very often pursued in an extreme violent way – a pluralistic universalism would be able to incorporate the variety of the world’s civilizations and view their different practices, values and approaches, not as an obstacle to a world civilization, but just to the reverse, as an expression of the richness and fruitfulness of the civilizations of the world. In Acharya’s view, such a pluralistic universalism would be an alternative to monolithic universalism of only one civilization as well as cultural relativism (Acharya 2014 b).

Although we could agree that pluralistic universalism is a meaningful concept to counter all kinds of exceptionalism of one’s own cultures, it does not solve the problem of differentiating itself from cultural relativism. So, in trying to develop a global IRT the task is not only to differentiate the new approach from the mere Western approach, but also from cultural relativism. It can be even assumed, that area studies, local and regional schools will only be able to bridge the gap between the West and the” Rest” and also with similar importance within the “Rest”, when they can distinguish their approach from cultural relativism. We assume that constructivism, de-constructivism and critical theory have their strength in rejecting a monistic universalism, but fail in differentiating themselves from all kinds of cultural relativism.

In order to cope with these problems we propose the three intertwined concepts of a floating balance of contrasts according to Clausewitz, the understanding of recognition in Clausewitz and Hegel and finally harmony in the approach of Confucius, but not as mere hierarchical societal relation. In between the contrasts of monolithic universalism and cultural relativism these three concepts are designed to initiate an epistemological process based on the idea of self-transgressing, development, nevertheless not of a single identity, as in Hegel’s approach, but of the contrasts of real life and finally a new ontological world view. By beginning with the floating balance we advance to mutual recognition and enable a new identity as a further developed Confucian harmony, this process may be capable to avoid the traps of monolithic universality as well as cultural relativism.

Different approaches

Since the peace of Westphalia, the mainstream IRTs viewed international relations as a kind of a billiard game and variations within the IRTs were associated with a different understanding of the billiard game. For example, realism is concerned with mutual repulsion and enmity, whereas liberal institutionalism emphasizes attraction and competition. The bureaucratic politics models emphasize that the billiard balls are driven by the forces within society and so forth.

The East Asian understanding of international and global affairs rejects the compartmentalization of IRTs and adopts a holistic approach. Particularly, they differ over the relationship between center and periphery, thus envisioning the various layers and circles of relationship between center and periphery. In this way, the East Asian civilization provides the foundation for a peaceful coexistence between center and periphery. Such an understanding would enable different actors to co-exist on different layers and circles around the center. One could say that in Chinese approaches the concept of harmony is paramount, in Islam theory the concept of justice, in Western approaches that of symmetrical relations, in Persian civilizations that of a particular illumination, in Indian that of gradations.

Our approaches are grounded in liminality as a reflection of the contemporary world besieged by ambiguity or disorientation after the collapse of the post-Cold War order. It remains to be decided in the future whether the West is in decline, or whether the “Rest” is just catching up. The West may be in an irreversible but relative decline, but the new powers have yet to hold a hegemonic status. At this moment, we propose such ideas as the Clausewitzian floating balance and the Confucian harmony as ways to find a form of linkage or “connectivity” (Paraq Khanna in his new book) between various Western and East Asian methodologies. The Confucian notions of harmony are deeply associated with hierarchy and good governance, whereas the Clausewitzian floating balance centers on how to forge a dynamic and developing equilibrium between contrasts. Beyond Western rationality as well as “critical” constructivism

Assuming that the rise of the others and the rest is the predominant and overall tendency in the twenty-first century, the task of IRT is to find ways how the West and the Rest can live together, after the pitfalls of colonialization, European-American hegemony as well as the failed attempts, either to merely imitate Western modernity or the total rejection of it..

There are several and serious paradoxes in treating this subject. For one, the West is proud of his emphasis on pluralism on one side and is still sticking to the universality of his own norms and values on the other side. Although one could argue, that these values are guarantying the plurality of life and thinking of all humankind, this solution is by far not appropriate, because in the end it would mean an adoption of the Western values. After the fall of the Berlin wall and the democratization of the area from Berlin to Vladivostok, the eminent German philosopher Jürgen Habermas assumed that from now on the democratic and enlightened West would be generalized and would influence and taint the despotic East. It is more than a little tragic at work that even the most elaborated Western philosophers and sociologists like Habermas, Beck and Giddens in the end are criticizing the inherent connection between Western modernity and violence, intolerance and destruction, but are still sticking to the mere Western model by outlining an idealized mere Western modernity without these pitfalls. For example, Habermas is pursuing a perspective of a pure rationality in his model of an idealized discourse community, but is not getting aware of his own Eurocentric bias in excluding all other kinds of rationality.

All those Western critics of the negative aspects of Western modernity still envision a kind of “enlightened enlightenment” without recognizing that they are still conducting a discourse in which they teach the uneducated civilizations of the earth the “real” European enlightenment. They still conduct a dialogue in which only the other, the “Rest” has to be educated and exclude the possibility to learn from one another. Although it is right, that we need to distinguish between the genesis of human rights in the European discourse in the 17th and 18th century and the universal validity of them, the problem is occurring, when different human rights conflict with one another. One overarching problem for example in current world society is whether property is a human right or by taking into account the absolute unmoral social inequalities it should be restricted.

The antinomies of human life have not been resolved by Kant, they just have transcended on a higher level, as Hegel as already judged. The basic values of human rights are not as such disputed, but they could not be defined for once and all by only one of the great civilizations of the earth. We just can’t define dignity, freedom, equality in such a way, in which we could apply them directly in all circumstances. In Germany, to explain just one example, dignity is a concept which cannot be defined in a legal manner and at the same time is the basis for all legislation. In fact, the whole German constitution and all legislation is based on the concept of dignity in § 1, but it is widely acknowledged that you can’t give a clear definition of dignity at all. In Germany the concept of dignity is according to the Grundgesetz the basic of all legislation, but you can’t define it in a legal way. To explain this concept we can use a vivid example: The concept of dignity could be compared with the task to build a house on the balance of a swing.

So, in accordance with the approach of a floating balance and harmony between contrasts, these concepts are disputed in their concrete application. This might be seen as unfortunate, but just as the same is with the case of dignity, this impossibility and inability to define these concepts enables the process of further developing them – in my view in a dialectical, Clausewitzian-Hegelian sense. By summarizing it could be said, that a dialogue among the civilizations of the earth does not aim to teach the Non-Western civilizations the Western rationality – but to learn from one another. It is our deepest conviction that the Western and like-minded could hold on to such values as freedom, equality, emancipation, and human rights, only if these could be harmoniously balanced with the contributions of the other great civilizations and cultures.

Based on these fundamentals the idea of a second or even third modernity should be rejected, because this would only hide the fact that this is still a mere Western enterprise. But the solution is also not a mere revival of ideas of ancient civilizations without adaptions to the changes of the modern world. It is essential in a globalized world for the great civilizations to live with one another and to learn from one another.

The problem in such a dialogue is what can be subject to mutual recognition and what must be rejected and excluded. On one side terrible violations of human rights like that of the IS- barbarians cannot be recognized. The problem nevertheless remains whether we would just recognize those practices, which we ourselves could tolerate. Tolerance is of course a value in itself – but where are the limits and the borders of what can be tolerated? Recognition of plurality is always an aim in itself – here we are following so different constructivist thinkers like Acharya, Katzenstein, David Held as well as postmodernists like Lyotard and de- constructionists like Derrida. Nevertheless, where all these approaches fail is the question, to what degree we can speak of a plurality of reason, civilization, human rights and so forth – where are the boundaries of plurality? In the de-constructivist approach there is no inherent logic of a content at all, but each content is related to the relevant context – the content is reduced to the sum of its contexts (here we are following the question posed by Aristotle, whether the whole is more than the sum of its parts). Insofar, even constructivism which is critical to the hegemony of Western ideas remains a Western enterprise by replacing the holistic approach of most of the other civilizations by the “sum of the parts” approach of Western rationality. Any content is just the sum of its contexts. “Critical” theory is an indispensable achievement in critiquing the seemingly universal validity of values, which in the end not only remain bound to their roots in Western thinking, but are still a universalization of values of a singular civilization. But the attempt to substitute this approach by mere plurality in the meaning of just multiplicity is just the other way round and would initiate only a new binary universal system of singularity versus multiplicity and in the end would produce a schism between absolute universality and also absolute relativity of “our” moral norms.

Constructivist and de-constructivist approaches are supplementing the thinking in opposites and contrasts through the play of differences. They are rightly doing so, because a binary thinking nearly always is installing a primacy of one of the both poles above the other. But this attempt produces nothing else than a new binary thinking, the primacy of differences and diversity above unity. The same is true with modern system theory in rejecting the idea of a developing unity in Hegel’s account and by implementing a hyper-binary separation between system and lifeworld from Habermas to Luhmann. Our approach is characterized by the attempt to assume, that there are a lot of differences in between contrasts, so the whole of society and action is not determined by these contrasts alone and in particular not by the primacy of one of them above the other – but these differentiations remain in between the sphere of the contrasts, which are their boundaries (I have elaborated this approach in the dialectical relationship of self-preservation and self-transgression in my interpretation of Clausewitz, Hegel, Lyotard and Hannah Arendt; see Herberg-Rothe 2007 and Herberg-Rothe 2005; Herberg-Rothe and Key-young Son 2016; forthcoming). In the end, universality of the values of one single civilization as well as just the plurality of civilizations (Katzenstein) is only installing a binary approach – the primacy of one side in this contrast is merely replaced by the primacy of the other side in all variations of constructivism, in short, the primacy of universal values of one civilization is replaced by their multiplicity.

The struggle for recognition

German philosopher George W.F. Hegel once noted the importance of the struggle for recognition between the master and the servant, if not the slave. His proposition centered on the idea that the master is not working while the servant or slave is working – and therefore, although oppressed, the slave is the one who is developing and transgressing beyond his status and therefore freeing himself on a higher level. But if he would become a master himself, the same process starts over again. Therefore, we have to differentiate between a symmetrical and an asymmetrical form of recognition. (see Herberg-Rothe 2005 and Herberg-Rothe 2007).

To get to the point: In his earlier works, Hegel is pursuing a perspective of asymmetrical recognition, whereas the approach of early Clausewitz (both between 1806 and 1812) centers on the idea of symmetrical recognition. The main thesis of this paper therefore argues that we have to revitalize Hegel's concept of struggle for recognition as the decisive force of the conflicts in the twenty-first century by contrasting and combining it with Clausewitz's different concept of a mutual recognition and its different consequences.

Self-Preservation and Self-Transcendence in the Life-and-Death Struggle

We must differentiate between two major theoretical threads in the life-and-death struggle and its meaning for the development of societies. The first is basically defined by Machiavelli and Hobbes. The English social philosopher Thomas Hobbes distinguished between the state of nature and the social state. He used the phrase “state of nature” to describe the general state of mankind if every governing political body were hypothetically subtracted from social life. In Hobbes’s conception, the individual maintains a stance of permanent self-defense, if not op- portunistic aggression, towards his fellow human beings, and social relations generally become a war of all against all.2 Are such conditions possible in real life, or is the “state of nature,” like “absolute war” in the theory of Clausewitz, merely an abstraction to be employed for the purpose of analysis? The nearest historical approach to the state of nature may be found in the conditions created by social upheavals, uprisings, and revolutions as well as in failed states. In these situations, the old political powers are no longer capable, and the new powers not yet capable, of controlling social life. The “natural” struggle for survival fills this vacuum between the old sovereignty that has failed and new one that has not yet been created (Syria is a vivid example today).

Hobbes used the theoretically constructed condition of a war of all against all to demonstrate that the contractually regulated submission of all subjects to a sovereign ruling power is the only reasonable outcome of an instrumentally rational weighing of interests. In this conception, instrumental rationality is central to limiting violence.3 The real-life return to the “state of nature” in societies shattered by violence can be analyzed in light of this theoretical tradition. If the state (or its equivalent central authority) is no longer capable of exerting political control over society, or is unable to maintain its monopoly of power, there is a constant dan- ger that individuals or social groups may return to the natural state of the struggle for self- preservation.

Fichte presents a seemingly very similar argument in his essay on Machiavelli, but emphasizes a different perspective, which is centered on the idea of recognition and not as Hobbes, self-preservation: anyone “who establishes a republic (or even a state) and gives it laws must assume that all people are evil and that all without exception will release their inherent evil as soon as they find an opportunity.” It is unnecessary for Fichte to debate whether this actually applies to everyone. He concludes that the state, as an institution possessing coercive powers, necessarily assumes that its subjects are all evil, and this assumption in turn justifies its exis- tence.4

2 Günther Buck, “Selbsterhaltung und Historizität,” in Subjektivität und Selbsterhaltung, ed. Hans Ebeling (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976); Herfried Münkler, Thomas Hobbes (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1993), 108-111. The concept of state of nature is also discussed by Claus Offe, “Moderne ‘Barbarei’: Der Naturzustand im Kleinformat?” in Modernität und Barbarei, ed. Max Miller and Hans-Georg Soeffner (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1996), 258–89.

3 Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung: Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992), 117–18.

4 Thomas Hobbes, Vom Bürger (1642) in Vom Menschen—Vom Bürger. ed. Günter Gawlick, 2nd ed. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1966), 57-327, quotation p. 68; Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Über Machiavelli als The second theoretical thread presented by life-and-death struggle leads to different conclu- sions, as Hegel’s work shows. Where Machiavelli and Hobbes hypothesize a primary struggle for self-preservation, Hegel postulates a life-and-death struggle for recognition. It was his position that the struggle for recognition generates intra-societal pressure toward the establish- ment of political institutions that would guarantee freedom. For Hegel, it is the individual’s claim to intersubjective recognition that creates social life and also instills it with a moral tension that transcends the forms of social practice institutionalized thus far. Although this tension leads to recurring stages of conflict, its outcome is a state of lived freedom. For Hegel, the struggle for recognition is recursive, such that the violation of established forms of recognition becomes the decisive motive for resuming the struggle for recognition.5

Axel Honneth has argued that, within Hegel’s hierarchy of forms of recognition, the violation of an existing level is a necessary though painful step towards reaching a higher form. Hegel would have even granted “criminal acts” a constructive role in the “formative process of [man’s] ethical life.” Even criminal violation of existing forms of recognition would unleash conflicts that would make individual subjects aware of underlying relations of recognition. Hegel’s construction was guided by the conviction that the only way to arrive at true intersubjective relations was first to destroy inherited, unconscious forms of non-recognition. Only the awareness of recognition in intersubjective relations can create a moral community over the long term. From this perspective, the “natural annihilation” inherent in war, violence, and crime is directed against the “abstraction of the cultured,” and is the result of a previously incomplete recognition of individuals or groups within society.6

Whether this explanation can be applied to all conceivable violations of recognition is hard to say. If we take it as absolute, each violation of recognition must be a positive step towards higher forms of recognition. However, compared to Honneth's position, Hegel did not go as far and in his later writings granted the struggle for recognition only a limited role in human Schriftsteller, und Stellen aus seinen Schriften, in Werke, supplementary volume 1: Staatsphilosophische Schriften, ed. Hans Schulz and R. Strecker (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1919), quotation 23-26; also see Münkler, Hobbes, 96–7 and 117.

5 Honneth, Anerkennung, 11 and 36–44.

6 Honneth suggests a parallel between the motives of criminals for violating recognition and the motives of states for going to war. Hegel’s remarks on the problem of recognition between states are by no means as extensive as his discussion of the individual violation of recognition, however. Cf. Hegel, Enzyklopädie, vol. 3, in Werke, 10: 219–26 and 345–6, and Honneth, Anerkennung, 39 and 89. In his newest works, Honneth has dismissed this correlation. Nevertheless he is just overemphasizing the struggle for recognition in Hegel’s Jena phase and undervalues Hegel’s Berlin writings (see Herberg-Rothe 2005) development (Herberg-Rothe 2005). It is also necessary to consider whether the struggle for recognition is only a matter of violently coercing a previously incomplete recognition—of rendering established norms more general. But life-or-death struggle can also be a struggle for new forms of recognition or self-realization. Conceptually, such conflicts are triggered by the demand for the uninhibited development of one’s own subjectivity, independent of established codes of behavior and honor. However, contrary to Honneth's position, I think that attempts to assert particular interests in which recognition is not at stake cannot be construed as a “struggle for recognition.” Violence that remains bounded by such interests thus lacks the moral nobleness and potentially transformational character of the life-or-death struggle.

Let us now turn to Clausewitz’s position. Clausewitz regarded the violation of existing recognition as a major cause of the French Revolution. In his essay “Agitation” (1819), he at- tributes the social tensions in France to the nobility’s failure to recognize the rights of the new socioeconomic classes and the peasants. Originally, the rights of the nobility in society were a necessary consequence of the balance between classes, writes Clausewitz. But after nearly all European states had developed into monarchies during the seventeenth and eighteenth cen- turies, the nobility retained its privileges only in relation to its subordinates, not in relation to the prince. As a result of these developments, the nobility no longer held a share of the sovereign power that legitimized its earlier privileges.

Because peasants and the middle classes were also subordinates, they saw the nobility’s reten- tion of its historical rights as pure privilege, a kind of unwarranted favor. This violated the recognition of the peasants and the new middle classes within the state-centered society. In Clausewitz's view, the “totally changed condition of the nobility” and the “unhealthy place it was given in the new framework of the state” as well as the “cultural advance of the middle classes and the intelligentsia” were responsible for the escalation of social tension in France, which eventually became so extreme that it had to be resolved somehow, “either gradually through voluntary changes, or suddenly by force.”7

Clausewitz’s early theoretical approach emphasizes the impetus to violence arising from the violation of existing forms of recognition, and the unlimited obligation to seek honorable re- dress this imposes. His conception can be described as self-preservation through self-assertion and, if necessary, self-destruction. Hegel, finally, advocates a historical hierarchy of develop-

7 “Agitation,” in Clausewitz, Carl, Historical and Political Writings. edited by Peter Paret and Dan Moran, 342–4. ment, in which even the most transgressive acts of violence are supposed to sustain or advance the fundamental structures of state and society.

The problem with recognition is in differentiating between those actions that could be recognized, although they differ from Western value norms, and those which could not be accepted. From a pure Kantian view, this problem cannot be resolved and leads either to the consequence of universalizing only our own westernized norms (or vice versa) or to procedural conceptualizations also in the tradition of Kantianism (see the critique of the last concept by such various theoreticians as Axel Honneth, Maximilian Terhalle, and Maria Garcia). Therefore, it must be emphasized that the Kantian solution of using norms derived from the concept of the individual and universalizing them directly or the related method, technique, and procedure has also proven desperately wrong.

What would be a Hegelian approach? This could be best explained by contrasting is with its most fervent critic, Jean Francois Lyotard. Although Lyotard’s understanding of Hegel in the epistemological regard is a “detour” via Kant back to a Hegelian figure of thought, he is productive in the second point, the remembrance of a universality that is not totalizing. For in marked contrast to his initially quite apologetic differentiation between conflicting statements of symmetrical relations and asymmetrical antagonism and the basic derivation of the infliction of injustice through treating an asymmetrical antagonism as symmetrical conflict, Lyotard goes in other directions in the course of the explication of his position. Lyotard prefaces these other directions with the concept of blending different manners of discourse into each other (Digression on Kant II). According to all criticism of great narratives, one could have expected that Lyotard also deconstructed the discourse on human rights. Quite the contrary, he does not do exactly that. Lyotard attempts to determine a generality that is not totalizing or will not be used deductively, on the basis of the Declaration on Human Rights from 1789. (Lyotard 1987).

With regards to the Declaration, Lyotard speaks about how this is supposed to be a declaration of rights, a normative legitimation that nevertheless does not relate to regulations that should be directly applied. In fact, it was about setting boundaries. These boundaries served as legitimation of essentially negative normative regulations, to whose adherence the authority that set them is also held. For Lyotard, the Declaration on Human Rights is one of self-limitation, of regression, as much about power as human freedom. In fact, Lyotard exposes the problems with the concrete determination of the authority that manifests itself “in the name” of humanity or the French nation. Despite this constraint, Lyotard’s determination of the Declaration on Human Rights can be valid as a mediation between the generality of symmetrical conflicts and the asymmetry of antagonism: the determination of a generality that allows no further deductions, but rather one that sets limits on fighting, war, and endless violent conflict. This is also nota bene Hannah Arendt’s position on the determination of the normative, the moral, as the setting of borders.8

A new dialectics beyond constructivism and critical theory

Following his dialectical method, Hegel always highlights at the beginning one of two extremes in the dynamic field of an epistemological and in itself contradictory discourse, but also the transition from one pol to the other, within which the sought-after solutions are to be located. Hegel himself is such a pole within a discourse himself. In the epistemological regard, Jürgen Habermas hinted at this proposition in the formulation of a path from Kant to Hegel and back to Kant. With that said, this development is, however, not at an end, because concerning Robert Brandom’s Hegel-oriented philosophy he assumes that the path from Wittgenstein via Kant to Hegel is a reasonable alternative to the prevailing symbiosis between Wittgenstein and Heidegger.9 Apropos such a reversal would also be valid: from Hegel to Kant and back to Hegel. Taken together, this means that the path of philosophy as well as that of political theory goes “from Kant to Hegel and back to Kant – and once again on to Hegel, and so on…” without Alpha or Omega, without Beginning and End (Herberg-Rothe 2005). Philosophically and systematically, Kant and Hegel occupy the extreme positions in this epistemological field that is likewise “opened” by these extremes and within which the advancements (as contraposition as well as mediation) of philosophy move. This does imply a floating balance and harmony in between Kant and Hegel.

8 See Herberg-Rothe, Andreas, Lyotard und Hegel. (Passagen publisher: Vienna 2005) 9 Habermas, Jürgen, Wege der Transzendentalisierung. Von Kant zu Hegel und zurück. In: Habermas, Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. Frankfurt 1999, p. 138-185; Habermas, Die analytische Sprachphilosophie nimmt Hegel in Besitz. „Expressive Vernunft“. Robert Brandoms Weg von Wittgenstein über Kant zu Hegel.. In: Frankfurter Rundschau from 20 June 2000, p. 22; see also: Brandom, Robert, 2000, Expressive Vernunft. Begründung, Repräsentation und diskursive Festlegung. Frankfurt; Herberg-Rothe 2005.

China’s newly rise as a Westfalian State or as civilization

It is a commonly accepted fact that China has risen to a great power within the last 50 years and will close the gap to the superpower USA within another 15 years. However it remains vague, what kind of China the world will experience. Will China develop into a traditional state, the one we know in Europe since the Westphalian Peace of 1648, whereupon the course of its development, democratic or nationalistic-military, is highly uncertain? Or will it persist as a state, which is embedded in a 2500 years lasting Chinese civilization and is bound to these values? It is already a commonplace that China is on the rise. That is true despite the current economic slowdown, which will most likely be overcome in a few years. Therefore, it is a terrible mistake to assume that China will collapse in the near future. China did not fall apart yet - neither after the death of Mao, the decline of Soviet communism nor the financial crisis of 2007/08. With respect to the recent crisis China even managed extraordinary well to cope with the related problems. However, assuming that China is on the rise does not exclude to think about the question, what kind of China the world will see in the future, how it will find its place in a globalized world and how it will treat the “rest” of the world. Although there is a close relationship between China as a state and China as a civilization, they are not identical in total. In the course of history different kinds of rulers and families have been alternated variously, but the Chinese civilization has always been able to integrate even invaders and adopt them to the Chinese civilization which subsequently flourished again. So, our approach could be best characterized by the assumption that sticking to the Chinese civilization will enable the Chinese state to cope with the challenges posed by globalization and in the end enable the state of China to find its place as a well-respected part of the international community. We are highly uncertain whether this would be true the other way around, as Zhang Weiwei seems to advocate in his influential book about China as a civilizational state.

There is a vivid example of this problem between a civilization and its restriction to a state when viewing the US hegemony after the demise of USSR. The civilizational values of the founding principles of the US are still a positive example, but the exercise of power through various administrations have been problematic, to say the best. We can discover a growing influence of a discourse in the US. Its predominant assumption signifies that the US-values could only be applied within the Western world, whereas outside the boundaries of the West it has to stick to the rules of the jungle. This is exactly the major problem because there is no single jungle outside the Western world, yet different civilizations. Therefore we are pleading for the mutual recognition among the great civilizations of the world instead of either Sino centrism or US hegemony.

Certainly, the West might have learned much more than we are aware of from other civilizations. Neither Sun Tsu needs the approval of Clausewitz, nor Confucius that of Plato, Kant or Hegel. Nevertheless, it is a characteristic of the approach of Confucius that it is never a loss of time to nurture the desire to learn from one another. The Western world and the ancient civilizations, based on the teachings of Confucius, Lao-Tse, Islam, Zoroaster and the Veda, have to learn from one another in a globalized world. Throughout the world a discourse, dubbed “We against the Rest,” is gaining momentum. No matter how powerful, great and populated any single state might be at present and in the future, the “Rest” will always remain the vast majority in a globalized world. The inevitable consequence is that we need some kind of mutual respect, recognition and willingness to learn from the experiences in the past between the great civilizations in the world. This is not only a demand the West has to stick to. Otherwise all civilizations remain bounded to their narrow political and economic interests and repeat the failure of the past. Although there is no universal civilization of mankind yet, in order to avoid the catastrophes of the twentieth century we need to overcome the binary thinking of “We against the Rest”. The answer might be the mutual recognition of the great civilizations of the earth – in short, by a floating balance (Clausewitz) and harmony (Confucius) between the civilizations. Globalization is transcending each and every state in the world – so we should bind ourselves to the norms and values of the great civilizations of mankind instead of our narrow national interest.

Recognition and Clausewitz’s true logical antithesis

Recognition is not a kind of status quo, but according to Hegel and Clausewitz a process in which we transcend the boundaries of our own. Ludwig Wittgenstein has said, that „the borders of my language are the boundaries of my world“. In this sense is Wittgenstein arguing, that what could be said at all, can be said very clearly, and about what you cannot speak clearly, you should keep silent. Wittgenstein had one aim: The development of logical systems without contradictions, in order to avoid antinomies in natural speech and to avoid violent conflicts about the right interpretation of concepts. Only for this reason, keeping silence about god, Jesus, the nation, everything, about you can't talk rationally, was a rational strategy. Wittgenstein’s conception is determined by the experience of the First World War, a war, which nobody seemed to want, which was in the view of Wittgenstein the result of mutual misunderstanding.

Although we can agree with Wittgenstein and his epigones that speech and language are neither a pure subject-object-relation, as the concepts of constructivism are rightly advocating, but contrary to their approaches neither pure intersubjectivity, as the linguistic turn of the 20th century is telling us, but the mediation, the sphere between what we can comprehend and what not, a window to the world outside of us. Contrary to Lyotard’s critique of Hegel’s dialectic, endless suffering, violence as well as countless atrocities, symbolized by the Auschwitz metaphor is neither the end of philosophy nor history, neither speech nor language, even not Hegel’s speculative philosophy – but its greatest challenge – perhaps its provocation, too. To accept this challenge and knowing at the same time, that we never will succeed, this, we owe to the victims of the Holocaust. (Herberg-Rothe 2005)

Perhaps we have to examine our understanding of speech and language even more than the linguistic turn of the 20th century did. Perhaps we are still used to understand both only in categories of true and false, of completeness and totality. What, if speech would be also, perhaps even mostly, a kind of devotion to the other? Auschwitz then would not be the synonym of the unspeakable, whose causes would remain unknown, but for the most radical devotion which is possible for humankind. Or, as Hannah Arendt, who escaped barely the henchmen of the Nazis, has said: „What is remaining is the will to understand“. Based on being aware, that no language could express the totality of suffering, we are getting aware of this difference and by turning to the suffering of others we transgress the borders of our language and speech and of ourselves! This dialectical impetus is also applicable to the problem of recognition of a plurality and at the same time setting boundaries to practices which can’t be recognized.

We can sum up this approach by turning to Clausewitz’s conception of the unity of and difference between antitheses in the following terms. The unity of antitheses, in the duel and in the relationship between attack and defence as synonyms for self-transcending and self- preservation, rests on polarity. Both polarity and the true logical antithesis are only valid when they apply to one and the same object. The relationship between the opposing poles in polarity is a symmetrical one. However, Clausewitz does not restrict himself to characterising polarity, and he goes on to consider its limits. He develops his own model in the true logical antithesis of attack and defence.10 (Herberg-Rothe 2007)

The following characteristics should be noted:

1. In a true logical antithesis, as in polarity, the polar opposites are not things or objects. They are antithetical tendencies within a single identity. Within this identity, the opposites cannot be separated from one another. In addition, in a true logical antithesis each of these tendencies is implied in the other. This is not dualism, since polarity ensures the maintenance of an inseparable unity. Nor is it monism, since this identity, its ‘essence’, can only be characterised by the two opposites. This kind of opposition and its unity is clearly distinguishable from a binary code, in which there is only one sequence of antitheses as substances. The field of action in warfare is structured and given dynamism via this kind of opposition, and this is quite different from how a binary code works.

2. Each pole of the pair in such a ‘true logical’ antithesis is attached to its own opposite, though these take different forms. Defence is attached to attack, which leads to changes in the content of the concept and form of defence as an element of attack. The transition from attack to defence therefore needs a mediacy, because it is tied to the standstill in the military action. This non-attack (standstill) is the point located half way between attack and defence, the moment when a transition from attack to defence occurs. Defence, on the other hand, has its direct antithesis within itself, since – as the metaphor of the flashing sword of vengeance expresses it – it shifts to its antithesis directly at the most intensive stage of combat.

3. The true logical antithesis of attack and defence cannot be characterised as a double negative. It contains different kinds of antithesis within itself: the polarity of the duel, the positive and the negative purpose, and the weaker and stronger form. The logical antitheses of attack and non-attack and of defence and non-defence are integrated into this more comprehensive antithesis.

This means that Clausewitz’s model of the true logical antithesis incorporates polarity and at the same time, in contrast to this determination, makes it possible to account for the development of and transition between opposites within this unity. With the help of

10. Clausewitz’s implicit model is so important that it even goes beyond Hegel’s conception; see, Herberg- Rothe, Andreas, Lyotard und Hegel. Vienna 2005. Clausewitz’s treatments of polarity and of the true logical antithesis, we can conclude that his different conceptualisations of war in Chapter 1, Book I of On War are antithetical tendencies within every war. The antitheses of his initial definition of war at the beginning and of the ‘wondrous Trinity’ at the end of Chapter 1 can be understood as poles of one and the same object. These poles are not separate ‘things’. They provide the basis for the unity of war by functioning as antithetical tendencies within it, and as its borders. We can elucidate the diversity of the antitheses and the transitions that can often be observed in war with the help of the model of the true logical antithesis. Just as this specific antithesis contains within it a unity made up of different antitheses, so Clausewitz articulates in the first chapter a variety of polar antitheses which, taken together, make up war as a whole.

To summarize this perspective for further research, it could be said that we have to rethink our basic conceptualizations derived from Hobbes and Kant and to take into account the struggle for recognition put forward by Clausewitz and Hegel in order to understand current developments. On the strategic level of countering tendencies to an escalation of violence between states and within states, this does mean the re-politicization of violence exercised by non-state actors. But contrary to some approaches (such as Honneth’s), that does not mean the legitimation of all kinds of violence as struggle for recognition. Contrary to the discourse of “realistic” provenience of international relations but also to the discourse of the institutionalization and thus socialization of great powers relations, it does mean the development of, firstly, a discourse of mutual recognition between the great civilizations, and, contrary to the theory of Thomas Hobbes, the initiation of a second discourse about differentiating between political violence of non-state actors and criminal, unacceptable violence of state and non-state actors. The difference would be no longer whether it is a state or a private institution, which acts violently, but whether it is legitimate or not in all three aspects of just war traditions: ius ad bellum, ius in bello, ius post bellum (see Herberg-Rothe, 2005 a).

The end of Western modernity – what comes next?

The western concept of modernity has been put in question since the First and Second World Wars, the Holocaust (Zygmund Bauman) and the processes of colonization since 1492 and of decolonization in the 20th century. Nevertheless, the first reaction in the West was to maintain, that these problems were related to an insufficient realization of the concepts of modernity. Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck developed the conceptualization of a second modernity, a reflexive modernity, in which the premises and promises of the first western modernity (1648-1991) were used as a tool to claim the positive principles and ideals of the first modernity against its insufficient realization. Eisenstadt went further by arguing that there was no universal concept of modernity, but only different concepts, which each were cultural determined.11 Nevertheless, although this proposition made it possible to highlight the cultural determinations of different paths to modernity, just like in the concept of a plurality of reason by Jean Francois Lyotard, these positions fail to address the question, where the boundaries of the propositions are till one can speak of modernity at all.

We therefore argue that a reflexive modernity, a second modernity, is not sufficient to address the current problems of modernization processes throughout the world, which mainly leads to a fragmentation of the self as well as of communities – accompanied with violence to reassure one's own identity. The thesis is that a reflexive theory of modernity is an essential precondition for being aware of the problems of modernity like colonialism, slavery, two world wars and the holocaust. But as already maintained it is nearly impossible to value and judge the positive and negative sides of Western values equally. In order to overcome the binary systems of the past we propose to give up the concept of modernity itself. At present there are at least five different concepts of modernity and it can be observed that their proponents are struggling for the hegemony of their ideas. The classical concept of Western modernity in the wake of the enlightment, a second, reflexive modernity, developed by Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, the concept of a fluid modernity, established by Zygmunt Bauman, post-modernity, invented by Jean Francois Lyotard and finally the concept of multiple modernities, a concept put forward by Shmuel Eisenstadt. Add to this some approaches to a third modernity and the question, whether there might be an Asian or Islamic modernity, we are almost lost in the sheer number of very different concepts of modernity.

11 Giddens, Anthony (1991). The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Giddens, Anthony (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity. Self & Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press; Beck, Ulrich; Giddens, Anthony; Lash, Scott (1994). Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Cambridge: Polity Press; Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. (2002). Multiple Modernities. Transaction Publ.: New Brunswick; Bauman, Zygmunt (2000). Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Nearly all of the above mentioned concepts are trying to rescue Western modernity against its insufficient realizations or its terrible dark sides. But what if the problem cannot be solved by a new binary code in the form that Western modernity has nothing to do with its barbarities or vice versa that the seemingly positive values of Western modernity are nothing bat garbage? What if the binary code and generalizing the individual as in Kant’s categorical imperative is in itself the problem of Western modernity? One could emphasize that Western modernity is unique in some respect – but this position it would neglect the contributions of other great civilizations of the world to the values of humanity. Tolerance and human rights as well as republican thinking and good governance were not solely invented in the West; they have a long history for example since the reforms of Cyrus the Great. Moreover trying to rescue the values of Western modernity would in the end sharpen the East-West divide by concentrating only on one side between the contrasts of our civilizations. We assume that both sides have to learn from one another in an open dialogue.

Eastern values and Western modernity

In order to exemplify this conceptualization, we could demonstrate it by the floating balance between the opposites within Western modernity and the attempt to replace “Western” values. In the 1990s, there emerged a debate and public discourse about "Asian values", as opposed to "Western values". With this concept, the prime ministers of Malaysia and Singapore tried not only to explain their success, but also to legitimize their own authoritarian roles.12 The distinction between Western and Asian values centered on the concept of freedom and the question of whether human rights are universal or historically and culturally determined. The core of the debate seemed to be the question about the relation of the freedom of the individual versus the order of the related community. All other distinctions stem from this fundamental difference.

Whereas the Western understanding seems to favor the individual above the community, the Asian proponents of the debate put emphasis on the community, which gives even meaning to the understanding of the individual. In line with some understandings of Hinduism,

12 The Government of Singapore (2002). The five shared values.; http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/771081/posts; Ling, Ool Giok (2002). Cultural Politics and Asian Values. The Tepid War. In: SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia. April 2007, Vol. 22 Issue 1, p 150-152. London: Routledge. Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, the latter understanding seemed to give priority to hierarchically structured social, political and cultural kinds of order. The political background of this debate was quite obvious. “If the imaginary two worlds, the East and the West, were merged largely by Western imperialism in the nineteenth century for the first time in world history, it is historically unprecedented for an underdog to rise, challenging the global hegemony of Western norms, rules, and institutions. In fact, it was Japan that had challenged Western hegemony in a series of wars culminating in World War II as the first Westernized East Asian power in the early twentieth century, but its ascendency has been dwarfed by the rise of China and East Asia as a civilization or an empire at the turn of the twenty-first century. With the Western states still retaining hegemonic status in ideas and institutions, what could East Asian elites do to voice their visions for a new world order?”

The eminent Chinese scholar Zhang Weiwei has raised in his most influential book about China, The Civilizational State, the idea that the world is at a watershed, the transforming of a hierarchical international system into a more symmetrical one.13 Zhang Wei Wei has been echoed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in his criticism of the international hegemony of the United States. In fact, he is obviously right in maintaining that in the 21st century hierarchically structured international relations are a remnant of European colonization as well as the subsequent American hegemony. But of course, this should not apply only to the US, but for China itself, too. Additionally, the idea of symmetrical relation does not only apply to international relations, but also to relations within a nation, a culture and society.

The question, then, is whether the concept of symmetrical relations within a society and hierarchical international relations is exactly the Western understanding of modernity? Should it be replaced by an Asian understanding of symmetrical international relations and hierarchical relations within society? To sum up, the Western world as well as East Asia may need a "floating and developing balance" of the contrasts of modernity, which would enable a position beyond Western modernity because of its inherent concept of a floating balance instead of a binary system.

How this would look like? It seems to me as there is a binary code of imitating and opposing Western modernity. Some are still copying too many elements of Western modernity and

13 Zhang, Weiwei (2011): The China Wave. Rise of a Civilizational State. World Century Publishing Cooperation: Hackensack. some others are relying on reactionary, far right, and very old concepts such as nation, race, and religion. Some are trying to combine a Western modernity, based on industrialization and technology with very old "non-Western" conceptions of identity. Maybe they were even forced to copy certain elements of Western modernity. Because of the rapid and unstoppable globalization processes which spread all over the world without chance to escape from them. In this context, Morandi and Triebel argue that western rationalism, ruthless economy and policy making, social reforming from above are just some approaches that are spread out by the Western world. The cloak of modernization would just be used to publicize the Western ideas and act in the way mentioned above towards the Non-Western world.14

In my view, Western modernity is characterized by at least five elements:15 a) Rationality, b) Individualism, c) Domestication of nature, d) Secularization, e) Functional differentiation.

Some have labeled this kind of modernity as a partitioned, divided modernity, because the complementary (and conflicting) tendencies of these five elements have been neglected in the course of Western modernity: for example, emotion and intuition, the community; being in harmony with nature, religious feelings, and finally, being part of a whole. Henceforth we find five contrast: a) rationality versus emotion and intuition; b) individualism versus community; c) domestication of nature versus the feeling of being part of nature; d) secularization versus religious feelings; d) functional differentiation versus being aware of the whole, that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

In history, there have been a lot of counter-movements to this Western modernity, which nevertheless were at their roots a product of modernity itself. They rely on constructions of an ideal past, which in reality never existed in this ideal form, may it be the community at the time of Mohammed or ethnic identity (the German race) or whatsoever - perhaps current nationalism, too. The main problem is, how to criticize Western modernity and "liberalism" without denying its undeniable progress in the history of mankind? What is needed in the

14 Morandi, Pietro and Triebel, Armin (2004), Beyond the line? (WeltTrends e.V., ed.), Modernisierung und Islam, p. 18 f., see also Förstle, Miriam, 15 Different concepts of Modernity can be viewed at: Brock, Ditmar (2014). Die radikalisierte Moderne. Moderne Gesellschaften. (The radicalized Modernity. Modern Societies). Springer VS: Wiesbaden; Schrader, Heiko (2003). Globalisation, fragmentation, and modernity. Universitätsbibliothek: Magdeburg; Heinlein, Michael (Hrsg.) (2012). Futures of Modernity. challenges for cosmopolitical thought and practice. transcript: Bielefeld; Featherstone, Mike (Hrsg.) (1997). Global modernities. Sage: London. learning curve "in between" the West and Asia might be a floating and developing balance: between rationality and emotion, intuition; between individualism and the community; between domestication and nature; between secularization and the religious sphere; between the part and the whole.

Concerning hybrid wars the tasks for security-policies are doubled: On one side, the atrocities committed by the members of the Islamic State are leading to some kind of self-transgression by the exercise of extreme violence (Sofsky 1996). For a considerable number of IS-fighters the return to a civil life may be impossible by now, given the collaborative exercised amount of violence, crimes and especially sexual cruelties. It may be reasonable that there is only one possibility to fight these disinhibited combatants to the bitter end. Nevertheless, we have to differentiate this struggle from that against the seemingly never ending replenishment of new fighters who are excluded, not recognized and disillusioned in the process of globalization and liquid modernity. In order to restrict and contain this replenishment, the only possibility seems to be the conduction of a discourse of mutual recognition among the great civilizations of the world; here in particular concerning the political Islam not as religion, but as civilization. Religions are tempted to exclude one another with reference to the absolute, whereas the related civilizations are enabling the integration of the other. Worldwide we are witnessing the dramatic rise of a thinking in categories of “We against the Rest”16 The solution to cope with this development is not the “clash of civilizations”, as Huntington’s has prophesied (Huntington 1996), but in fact the dialogue among the great civilizations of the earth.

This is also true for intra-state conflicts. The classical attempts to counter terrorism by operative and structural measures have not yet succeeded in the case of IS, neither in Iraq or Afghanistan. A merely military victory against IS may just multiply the cancer of terrorism throughout the Islamic-Arab World and additionally contribute to failed states stretching from Turkey to China and Saudi-Arabia to Morocco. Although the gruel actions of the IS bands are in no way to be recognized as legitimate, they are bound to the denial of recognition to the great civilizations of the world, which not only have been vanished in the process of European colonization and subsequent American hegemony, but which also lost their recognition as civilizations. The rise of the others in a globalized world is inevitable (Zakaria) – our task is to develop forms of recognition which center on the civilizational foundations of Islam,

16 See Herberg-Rothe, Andreas and Son, Key-young (2016), Balancing East and West. Clausewitz and Confucius within the order wars of the twenty-first century (forthcoming). Buddhism/Taoism, Confucianism, Christianity and Hinduism, to name the most important ones. Only by recognizing their civilizational achievements, the uprooted, excluded and superfluous people of the world, which are the vast majority of mankind, are able to build an identity by their own in a globalized, fluid modernity. The alternative to such a process of mutual recognition among the great civilizations of the earth as precondition for settling disputes about divergent interests, would be the repetition of the catastrophes of the twentieth century.

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Info about the author: Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Dr. phil. habil., is a senior lecturer at the faculty of social and cultural studies at the university of applied sciences, Fulda and was a private lecturer of Political Science at the Institute for Social Sciences, Humboldt-University Berlin (up to 2012). He is teaching and doing research in the field of “Violence and Peace in World Society”. He was an associate of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme “The changing character of War” (2004-2005) and convener (together with Hew Strachan) of the conference “Clausewitz in the 21st century” (Oxford 2005). He was a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Centre for International Studies (2005-2006).

He is the author of “Clausewitz's puzzle. The political theory of war. Oxford University Press” and edited together with Hew Strachan the anthology “Clausewitz in the twenty-first century. Oxford University Press 2007” . His articles include: New Containment Policy: Grand Strategy for the Twenty- first Century? In: RUSI-Journal, Whitehall, London Whitehall April 2008, Vol. 153, No. 2, pp. 50-55; The re-politicisation of war and violent conflict -The world powers are striking back In: Ralph Rotte/Christoph Schwarz (eds.): War and Strategy, New York (Nova Science) 2010 and Clausewitz's concept of strategy. Balancing purpose, aim and means. In: Journal of strategic studies, Dec. 2014. His last book about Clausewitz (together with Jan Willem Honig and Dan Moran) has just been published: Clausewitz: The state and war. Stuttgart 2011. In 2010 and 2011 he hold lectures at Westpoint Academy about Tolstoy and Clausewitz (this article is slated to be published in Chinese) as well as in Washington about curbing war and violence in world society, the emergence of world order conflicts, Clausewitz and partisan warfare and in Oxford about the democratic warrior. Some of his political-philosophical articles are collected in his volume: Lyotard und Hegel. Dialektik von Philosophie und Politik. Wien 2005 (Lyotard and Hegel. The dialectics of the political and philosophy). He held his most recent lecture about the last topic at the 29.th international Hegel conference in Istanbul in October 2012. In September 2013 he gave a lecture about the evolving battle space of the twenty-first century at Nanyang University, Singapore. In July 2014 he has convened an international symposium in Tokyo about "Lessons of 1914 for Asia today" and has just edited the proceedings of the conference: Lessons from World War I for the rise of Asia (Ibidem publishers, 2015).

Together with Key-young Son (Seoul) he is writing a new book about:

“In Between East and West. Floating balance, harmony and recognition in the order wars of the twenty-first century” (forthcoming 2016).