brief 12

The UNTAES Experience: Weapons Buy-back in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Croatia)

october 98 brief 12

Contents

Zusammenfassung German summary 4

Executive summary 5 Preface 6 About the author

Derek Boothby served as Deputy Prologue to a Collection Effort 9 Transitional Administrator of UNTAES from February 1996 to Politico-military background 9 March 1997. He was previously the The Basic Agreement and the establishment Director of the Europe Division in of UNTAES 11 the United Nations Department of Political Affairs. His earlier service in Demilitarization and the economy 13 the UN included work on the former Impetus for the weapon collection effort 14 Yugoslavia on the staff of Mr. Cyrus Vance, Deputy Director of Program Design and Implementation 16 Operations for weapons inspections in Iraq, and a number of positions in Discussions with Croatian autorities 16 the Department for Disarmament Affairs. Mr. Boothby currently resides Program elements and inception 17 in the United States and can be Weapon storage and disposition 20 reached via e-mail at [email protected]. Program Outcome and Impact 22

An element of a broader strategy 22 The views expressed in this paper are Numerical results and costs 22 those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of either Shifting perceptions 23 the United Nations or the Bonn Addressing the availability and visibility of weapons 24 International Center for Conversion. Overall assessment of the program 25

References 26

Appendices

I. Basic Agreement 27

II. Promotional Poster—Serbian (Cyrillic) script 30

III. Promotional Poster—Croatian (Latin) script 31

IV. UNTAES Bulletin, Issue No. 16 (October 1996) 32

V. UNTAES Bulletin, Issue No. 17 Cover Photo: (October 1996) 33 UNTAES buy-back program: weapons turned in at the Russian VI. Weapon Buy-back Program Battalion's Weapons Buy-back Results to 7 March 1997 34 location at Klisa, Eastern Slavonia.

2 B·I·C·C brief 12 The UNTAES Experience: Weapons Buy-back in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Croatia) by Derek Boothby

october 98B·I·C·C 3 brief 12

Zusammen-

Funktionstüchtige Waffen wurden fassung nach Zagreb gebracht und dort auf UN-Gelände bis zum Ende des German Summary UNTAES-Mandats im Januar 1998 verwahrt. Sie wurden dann den kroatischen Behörden übergeben. Alte, Ende 1995 wurde parallel zum Abkom- Obwohl das Mandat der UNTAES unbrauchbare oder gefährliche Waffen men von Dayton, mit dem die Waffen nicht ausdrücklich vorsah, die Zivilbe- sowie sämtliche Munition wurden von in Bosnien und Herzegowina endlich völkerung zu entwaffnen, war es klar, den UNTAES zerstört. zum Schweigen gebracht wurden, daß solch eine Aktion nötig war, um zwischen Serben und Kroaten über die überhaupt Recht und Ordnung Alles in allem war das Waffen-Rück- Zukunft des letzten von Serbien einziehen zu lassen, um Frieden und kauf-Programm höchst erfolgreich. besetzten Teils Kroatiens verhandelt. Sicherheit zu gewährleisten und um die Natürlich wurden nicht alle Waffen Dieses Gebiet, westlich der Donau, der Rahmenbedingungen für die zukünfti- von der Zivilbevölkerung abgegeben, natürlichen Grenze zwischen den ge Übergabe eines entmilitarisierten aber jede einzelne Waffe und jeder beiden Ländern, war seit dem Fall des und sicheren Gebietes an die alleinige Schuß Munition, die eingesammelt Zentralortes Vukovar im November Kontrolle der kroatischen Regierung wurden, verminderte deren Gesamtan- 1991 unter der Kontrolle der Serben. zu schaffen. zahl und trug zusammen mit vielen Das Ergebnis dieser Verhandlungen anderen Aspekten der Tätigkeit der wurde in Erdut, einem Dorf am Ufer Die Option, in Razzien Waffen zu UNTAES langsam aber sicher mit dazu der Donau, am 12. November 1995 suchen und zu beschlagnahmen, wurde bei, daß die Region von einem unsiche- unterzeichnet. Es sah vor, daß der UN von den UNTAES verworfen, da man ren Kriegsgebiet zu einem Gebiet Sicherheitsrat eine Übergangs- befürchten mußte, daß die Bevölke- wurde, in dem man sich wieder sicher verwaltung einsetzte, die das Gebiet für rung die UNTAES schnell als Besat- aufhalten kann. einen bestimmten Zeitraum ‘regieren’ zungsmacht ansehen würde. Man sollte, und daß er eine internationale mußte andere Wege finden, ausrei- Beruhend auf den UNTAES Erfah- bewaffnete Truppe zur Sicherung des chende Anreize für die freiwillige rungen gibt es wenig Zweifel daran, Friedens und der allgemeinen Sicher- Rückgabe von Waffen zu schaffen. daß ein Waffen-Rückkauf-Programm heit autorisierte. Aus diesen Überlegungen entstand das unter den richtigen Voraussetzungen - Konzept eines Waffen-Rückkauf- mit Bedacht geplant und sorgfältig Am 15. Januar 1996 gab der UN Programms, das von der kroatischen durchgeführt - ein besonders sinnvoller Sicherheitsrat grünes Licht für eine Regierung finanziert wurde. Verhand- Beitrag zu umfassenden Bemühungen zweijährige UN Friedensmission in lungen mit der kroatischen Regierung um die Wiederherstellung von Frieden diesem Gebiet. Die Aufgabe der begannen im Juni 1996; im Oktober und Stabilität nach Bürgerkriegen ist. UNTAES (United Nations Transitional wurde man sich einig und das Pro- Administration in Eastern Slavonia, gramm begann. Baranja and Western Sirmium) war die friedliche Reintegration des Gebietes in Zwischen dem 2. Oktober 1996 und die Republik Kroatien. dem 19. August 1997, dem Ende des Waffen-Rückkauf-Programms, wurden UNTAES war mehr als eine reine ca. 10.000 Gewehre, 7.000 Friedensmission. Als ‘Regierung’ hatte Panzerabwehrrakenten-Werfer, 15.000 die Übergangsverwaltung weitreichende Granaten und fast zwei Millionen Verantwortung auch in zivilen Berei- Schuß Munition abgeliefert. Während chen, wie z. B. die Einhaltung von des Programms konnte die Bevölke- Recht und Ordnung. Obwohl die rung die Waffen an vier Sammelplät- ansässige serbische Armee im Juni 1996 zen der UNTAES in der Region gegen entwaffnet worden war, gab es immer Barzahlung und ohne Feststellung von noch eine große Zahl von Waffen in Personalien abgeben. Kroatische den Händen der serbischen Bevölke- Experten ermittelten die zu zahlenden rung. Dazu gehörten Gewehre ebenso Beträge und zahlten sie direkt bar an wie Panzerabwehrraketen, Mörser, die Ablieferer aus. Dies geschah auf Minen und viele Typen von Munition. Wunsch der UNTAES, die kein Geld verwalten wollten, um auszuschließen, daß später irgendwelche Anschuldi- gungen über eine falsche Verwaltung des Geldes erhoben würden.

4 B·I·C·C summary

Executive

Weapons in good condition were Summary transferred to Zagreb and placed in storage in UN custody until the end of the UNTAES mandate in January 1998 when they were handed over to the In late 1995, at the same time as the Although the mandate of UNTAES Croatian authorities. Weapons that Dayton Accord was at last bringing contained no specific reference to were old, unserviceable or dangerous, silence to the guns in Bosnia and removing weapons from civilian hands, and all ammunition recovered, were Herzegovina, a separate agreement was it was clear that a determined effort of destroyed by UNTAES. being negotiated between Serbs and this nature was consistent with the Croats over the future of the need to ensure civil law and order, the Overall, the weapons buy-back remaining Serb-occupied part of maintenance of peace and security and program was a highly successful Croatia. This region, lying on the the preparation of conditions for the operation. It certainly did not remove western bank of the River Danube that eventual handing over of the region, all the weapons from civilian hands, was the border between the two demilitarized and secure, to the but every weapon and every round of countries, had been under Serb control sovereign control of the government ammunition recovered reduced the since the fall of its main town, of Croatia. numbers at large and steadily Vukovar, in November 1991. Singed at contributed, together with the other Erdut, a village on the bank of the A ‘search-and-seize’ operation by aspects of UNTAES work, to moving River Danube, on 12 November 1995, UNTAES was discounted, as it would the region from the tension of war the agreement called upon the UN have resulted in UNTAES being towards s return of stability. Security Council to establish a quickly regarded as an occupation transitional administration to “govern” force. Other methods had to be found, In the light of the UNTAES the region for a transitional period and with appropriate inducements that experience, there would appear to be to authorize an international force to would attract the voluntary surrender little doubt that in appropriate maintain peace and security. of weapons. Trom these considerations circumstances a weapons buy-back the concept arose of a weapons buy- program—sensitively designed and Authorized by the United Nations back scheme financed by the Croatian carefully implemented—can be a Security Council on 15 January 1996, government. Discussions with Croatian highly useful contribution to wider for the next two years a UN peace- authorities began in June 1996 and by efforts to restore peace and stability in keeping operation took place in the early October, arrangements had been civil societies in the wake of war. region. With the title of United agreed and the program began. Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Between 2 October 1996 and 19 Sirmium (UNTAES), its mission was August 1997, when the program ended, to achieve the peaceful reintegration of the program recovered approximately the region into the Republic of 10,000 rifles, 7,000 anti-tank rocket Croatia. launchers, 15,000 grenades and almost two million rounds of ammunition. UNTAES was more than a The program provided for payments in straightforward peace-keeping cash and anonymously, at four operation. With authority to “govern” collection points in the UNTAES the region, the Transitional Administra- military compounds in the region. The tion had extensive civil responsibilities amounts to be paid were determined including the maintenance of law and by Croatian weapons experts who then order. Following the demilitarization of paid cash direct to the person the local Serb army in June 1996, there concerned. This was at UNTAES were significant numbers of weapons request so that no UNTAES personnel in the hands of the Serb population. handled any money, thereby eliminating The weapons ranged from handguns to the risk of subsequent allegations over anti-tank rockets and mortars, mines, the mishandling of cash. cassette bombs and a wide range of ammunition.

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Preface

measures into peacekeeping operations and cease-fire and peace agreements; The termination of several long- In August 1997, the United Nations establishing weapons collection, buy-back standing armed conflicts in recent Panel of Governmental Experts on and destruction programs; setting up years has raised the prospects for the Small Arms delivered its final report educational programs to promote awareness redirection of resources towards more to the Secretary-General.2 Aside of the negative consequences of illicit peaceful pursuits. However, in many from highlighting the extent to trafficking, and; promoting re-integration respects, the immediate post-conflict which the proliferation of small of former combatants into civilian life. period is characterized as a time of arms is threatening international uneasy transition. Ex-combatants must development efforts and the peace- Though these initiatives are be demobilized and reintegrated into keeping operations of the UN itself, encouraging, significant gaps remain in civil society, the long process of the report urges the UN and its both knowledge of past experience physical and psychological healing must Member States to step up their and plans on how to proceed with begin, dysfunctional public institutions efforts in combating the illicit use implementation of practical measures rebuilt, and disrupted development and transfer of these weapons. in the areas circumscribed. However, restarted in a sustainable way—all Among other things, the report with further elaboration of what has significant challenges in and of specifically recommends: UN support been done and what is possible, states themselves. The presence of a large for post-conflict disarmament measures can be compelled to take concrete volume of weapons—especially small such as weapons turn-in programs and action. arms and light weapons—in this disposal of weapons; the integration of environment directly endangers the weapons collection and disposal plans into fulfillment of these objectives. peace settlements; and the prompt collection Weapons collection at and destruction of all weapons not under BICC Despite the extreme difficulties in legal civilian possession and not required implementing disarmament in the for national defense or internal security. 1 The case study presented in BICC Brief immediate post-conflict period, 12—covering the weapons buy-back countries emerging from a period of On 26 June 1997, the European program conducted by UNTAES in conflict, as well as the international Union Council of Ministers adopted Eastern Slavonia—has been community, have begun to recognize the “EU Programme for Preventing commissioned in conjunction with the importance of removing the and Combating Illicit Trafficking in BICC’s project on Weapons Collection and weapons threat from the post-conflict Conventional Arms,” in which both Disposal as an Element of Post-Settlement equation. With increasing frequency, Member States and the European Peace-Building. The project, spanning a weapons collection is becoming an Commission express their political two-year period, is partially funded by explicit and essential element of peace commitment to take action to the Ford Foundation and the United settlements. The agreements marking prevent and combat illicit trafficking States Institute of Peace, in addition to the termination of conflicts in Nicara- in arms—particularly small arms. BICC’s own institutional core funding. gua, El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, The Programme itself lays out a In essence, the project has been Liberia, Mozambique, Angola, Mali, framework of activities which fall designed to enable a better and the Central African Republic, into three categories: 1) measures to understanding of the interaction and among others, have all borne this out prevent illicit arms flows from or relative importance of weapons to varying degrees of success. The though Member States; 2) measures collection and disposal among other international community also has to help other countries prevent illicit post-conflict processes—such as the recently introduced important initiati- arms flows from or though their demobilization and reintegration of ex- ves calling for the proper integration territories; 3) measures to assist combatants. of weapons collection into conflict- countries, especially in post-conflict termination agreements: situations or situations where a minimal degree of security and stability exists, in suppressing the illicit flow of arms. The latter includes incorporating appropriate

1 In such a situation, combatants are often uncertain a peace will hold and unwilling to give up their arms, and the unstable security environment warrants even ‘civilian’ possession of weapons for self-defense. 2 Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. United Nations General Assembly document A/52/298, 27 August 1997.

6 B·I·C·C preface

As part of this project, we have chosen destruction, especially in the immediate general economic situation in the to undertake a focused comparison of post-conflict and/or force country several countries where weapons demobilization phase, is a key choke- collection was considered an essential point and provides a window of impetus for the collection effort element of the process. The cases opportunity to begin to make inroads selected to date include: Guatemala, El into stemming the flood of weapons in legal context Salvador, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), circulation in conflict-prone regions. Mali, the Central African Republic, and Equally as important, the timely and cultural acceptability of weapons Liberia. These cases share both effective collection of weapons can be significant similarities and offer a measure of conflict prevention; availability and visibility of weapons significant differences from which to preventing the subsequent spread of evaluate aspects of weapons collection these weapons to other conflicts within types and volume of weapons in and derive lessons learned. or outside the immediate area. circulation There are, potentially, two phases to Approach and sources of weapons flows (internal weapons collection in a post-conflict circulation, leaks, imports) society. In what I will term Phase I methodology collection, the immediate threat of Program factors—The goals, design, and reversion to open conflict is removed As noted above, the core of the project conduct of the collection program itself. This or lessened by the disarmament and is a focused comparison of case studies includes a detailed review of program demobilization of ex-combatants. to determine the elements of documentation (including elements of However, this does not remove the successful weapons collection program peace agreements referencing threat of weapons or the potential for design and implementation, as well as disarmament provisions and peace- reversion to violence. Frequently, in the relevancy of weapons collection in keeping force mandates) as well as societies which have undergone drawn- the broader context of peace-building interviews with key informants of the out and divisive conflict, a culture of and development. In order to achieve process. Analysis would include: violence is instilled and weapons have maximum comparability among the been dispersed throughout studies commissioned, each author has definition and feasibility of program communities—among combatants and been provided with a set of factors goals non-combatants alike. Therefore, Phase from which to base their data II collection and related activities are a collection and analysis. These factors incentive structure, adequacy and group of longer-term efforts aimed at were designed to be relevant to the side-effects disarming an armed civilian environment, conduct and outcome of population, reducing the availability weapons collection in the selected whether the program was part of a and visibility of weapons, and countries. This set of baseline factors broader strategy (education, diminishing the perception that is as follows: awareness, enhanced security) weapons are a means to settle disputes. Essentially, the experience in Eastern Contextual factors—The general timing and duration Slavonia reflects both these aspects of environment triggering and influencing the weapons collection and thus offers performance of the collection effort. This storage and destruction fertile ground for analysis. includes a broad review of the political economy of each country as well as a form(s) of the collection effort The project is specifically geared to more detailed analysis of the (voluntary hand-in, buy-back, generate a strategy for the integration conflictual context that prompted the amnesty, enforcement action) of effective weapons collection weapons collection effort and the programs into post-conflict peace- nature of the weapons-related threat. scope of collection (ex-combatants, building activities, and to develop a Analysis of these factors will require civilian population, etc.) practical handbook to guide consideration of the: practitioners in the effective collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons. Weapons collection and

B·I·C·C 7 brief 12

role of external assistance (incl. intangibles—secondary and tertiary peacekeeping forces, advisors, effects of the collection experience financial and technical assistance) We, at BICC, trust you will find the Outcome factors—Actual program following study not only engaging, but results as well as the perceived impact by the also ripe with practical observations relevant actors and civilian population. This from which to inform further planning, group of factors aims to evaluate the implementation and evaluation of impact of the weapons collection weapons collection efforts. effort and whether original goals and objectives were achieved. These factors, especially, will require both Joseph Di Chiaro III quantitative and qualitative analysis of Project Leader the program’s impact:

number and condition of weapons collected

overall program cost

perception of the general population as to the collection program and its outcome

whether the program addressed the supply and demand of weapons

whether the original goals of the program were reached

whether the potential for violence has been decreased

final disposition of the weapons

whether collected weapons have been replaced through further supply

whether the visibility of weapons decreased or increased

8 B·I·C·C prologue

Prologue to a

days, as the JNA saw no reason to fight Collection Effort when virtually no Serbs lived in the country. However, in Croatia—which contained almost half a million Serbs—the fighting was vicious and From October 1996 to August 1997 a By the time of Tito’s death in May bitter. For the Serbs, it was a matter of weapons buy-back program was carried 1980, the strains of keeping the protecting Serb lives and property by out by the United Nations Transitional Socialist Federal Republic of asserting territorial control. To the Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Yugoslavia together were already Croats it was blatant Serb aggression. Baranja and Western Sirmium mounting. In the years that followed, (UNTAES). During those ten months, the federal institutions deteriorated and By September, the JNA controlled over approximately 10,000 rifles, 7,000 anti- the country disintegrated into factional a quarter of Croatian territory. It was tank rocket launchers, 15,000 grenades struggles. Fanned by the flames of in three separate blocks: in the Krajina and almost two million rounds of nationalism and widening around the Serb stronghold of Knin, ammunition were removed from disagreements with the federal in the part of Croatia known as civilian hands (United Nations Security authorities in Belgrade, first Slovenia in Western Slavonia, and in Eastern Council, 1997). Before describing how September 1989, then Croatia in April Slavonia and the Baranja although the this program was organized and carried 1990, declared sovereignty while town of Vukovar itself remained in out, it is of interest to consider how remaining members of the federal Croatian hands. such a large quantity of arms and republic. Within Croatia, some 12 ammunition came to be in the hands percent of the population of 4.7 of a civilian population of some million were Serbs, mostly in the three 135,000. regions of the Krajina, Western Slavonia and Eastern Slavonia. Politico-military Increasingly, during 1989 and 1990 background hostile acts between militant members of the respective communities polarized opinion and spread deep By its constitution of 1974, the apprehension and fear on both sides. Socialist Federal Republic of More incidents and provocations Yugoslavia under Tito was organized occurred and, in May 1990, for administrative purposes into six confrontation between Croats and republics, with two autonomous Serbs escalated sharply when a number provinces within the republic of of Croatian policemen were killed in a Serbia. The boundary line between the Serb ambush in Borovo Selo, on the republic of Croatia and the northern outskirts of Vukovar. In the autonomous Serb province of weeks that followed, further violent Vojvodina was drawn for the most part incidents took place that led to the down the river Danube, from the atmosphere becoming yet more highly Hungarian border in the north to Ilok charged. in the south. Principally intended as an administrative demarcation, when On 25 June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia Croatia’s independence was recognized declared themselves independent. internationally in 1992 this boundary Open warfare broke out in the summer became Croatia’s eastern border with of 1991 between the Yugoslav People’s Serbia. Army (JNA) and the poorly equipped defense units of the two new states. The war in Slovenia lasted only ten

B·I·C·C 9 brief 12

Box 1: The geographical setting

As the River Danube emerges southwards from Hungary, on its long way to the Black Sea, it winds its way majestically across a highly fertile alluvial plain before turning south-east, then east towards Belgrade and beyond. Over the years, the wide river has altered its course from time to time, meandering through marshlands and thickly wooded areas. Inland from the river the land is very rich, with vineyards, orchards and extensive open fields producing abundant harvests of wheat, barley, corn, sunflowers, rapeseed and other crops.

Along both its banks, the Danube passes villages and towns that have been inhabited for centuries: Batina, Apatin, Aljmas, Erdut, Dalj, Borovo Selo, Vukovar, Ilok and Backa Palanka. To the west of the Danube, the northern part lying between the tributary river of the Drava and the Danube is known as the Baranja, while the central section is part of the larger area of Eastern Slavonia and the southern part, extending from below Vukovar past Ilok and into Serbia is Western Sirmium. In the Baranja, the only town of size is Beli Manastir, but further south the largest urban concentration is the town and river port of Vukovar which, until war destroyed it in 1991, was a handsome and ethnically mixed town of some 58,000 residents with architecture and houses that reflected the history and wealth of the region.

The Vukovar area itself has been settled for some 5,000 years, as evidenced by archeological finds at the Vucedol site by the river five kilometers south of the town. The Romans established their presence in the vicinity of Vukovar, reclaimed marshland and planted the first vineyards. Demographically, the region as a whole has witnessed the ebb and flow of many peoples and, until 1991, the population on both sides of the river was a mix of Serbs, Croats, Hungarians, Slovaks, Vlachs, Ruthenes and others.

The width and speed of the Danube have permitted few bridges, but the richness of the land and the value of the river as a route of transport and communication have attracted the interests of powerful states and migrating peoples. On both banks of the river and the surrounding lands, Roman, Frankish, Turkish, Austro-Hungarian and German armies have marched, deployed and constructed defensive positions. State authority has changed hands on many occasions as military power and political authority have risen and fallen. In the 20th century, with the rearrangement of state borders that followed the end of World War I, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created, which was subsequently, in 1928, given the name of Yugoslavia.

10 B·I·C·C prologue

After sporadic mortar attacks in those people who remained, the region The Basic Agreement August, between September and was ethnically Serb, most of the land and the establishment November 1991 the Serbs launched could still be farmed and the produce sustained land and air bombardment sold or bartered in Serbia. of UNTAES against Vukovar. Situated on the right bank of the Danube, it was an easy Punctuated by sporadic bombardments Through August and September 1995, target for Serb artillery across the river and probing attacks against each Peter Galbraith, US Ambassador to the and Serb aircraft from nearby bases. other’s lines, this uneasy situation Republic of Croatia, and Thorvald JNA troops and Serb paramilitaries continued until the summer of 1995. Stoltenberg, UN Representative to the attacked the town by land, putting By then, Croatia had armed and trained International Conference on the most of its residents to flight, and the its military forces with assistance from Former Yugoslavia, worked with the few who remained took shelter in their abroad despite the general arms two sides to negotiate a text on cellars. In the street fighting that took embargo declared by the UN Security arrangements for bringing the territory place over three months, the town was Council. In two swift and brutal peacefully under Croatian authority. virtually destroyed. Vukovar fell on 18 military operations, first Western November and those residents who Slavonia and then the Krajina were In addition to seeking to avoid a emerged from almost three months in recovered. The tide of ethnic cleansing repetition of the dramatic events and their cellars found a town that was was turned with a vengeance as now it the exodus of Serbs that had taken almost unrecognizable. Over 200 was Serbs who were ejected; almost place in Western Slavonia and the patients and wounded at the hospital 200,000 Serbs fled from their homes Krajina, the international community were taken out by the JNA and Serb and streamed eastwards. While many did not wish to see a resumption of paramilitaries to a farm south of continued on into Serbia, some arrived conflict in Eastern Slavonia just at the Vukovar, interrogated, beaten, shot and in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and time when the Dayton Accord was able dumped in a mass grave. This atrocity Western Sirmium to make homes in to bring war to an end in Bosnia. further enraged Croatian public former Croatian houses that had been Croatian military action to recover opinion, setting the scene for eventual looted and burned some four years control of their territory pre-Dayton revenge. earlier. This brought the number of was one thing, but further open war, Serbs in the region to some 125,000, killings and ethnic cleansing post- By the end of 1991, except for a few of whom about 60,000 were displaced Dayton was quite another. It therefore mostly elderly Croats living in isolated from elsewhere in Croatia. became essential to find a way of Croatian villages, the only other Croats avoiding such an outcome. living in the region were those In August 1995, the Serbs in Eastern intermarried with Serbs. Through the Slavonia became greatly alarmed at the Eleven basic principles of a settlement countryside to the west ran a sinuous, prospect of a Croatian attack to were tentatively agreed by early heavily mined no-man’s land. The two recover the last Serb-held enclave on October, but it was only in the margins nearest Croatian towns, Osijek and Croatian territory. These fears were of Dayton that Presidents Milosevic Vinkovci, were under Serb siege and heightened in early September when and Tudjman hammered out the deal well within Serb artillery range. As in NATO took strong military action that led to what became known as the most of Croatia, the population against the Serbs in Bosnia and Basic Agreement. It was eventually polarized and Serbs who had lived in Herzegovina and forced the parties to signed at Erdut, on the banks of the those towns, in fear of their lives, fled the conflict to the negotiating table at River Danube, on 12 November 1995. to the security of the Serb-held areas. Dayton. This concern was well justified Unlike the hundreds of pages and From a pre-war population of Eastern as, emboldened by their two earlier maps that constituted the Dayton Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium successes, there were loud public calls Accord, the Basic Agreement on the estimated to be about 180,000, the in Zagreb for a third operation in Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja number of Serbs and others remaining Eastern Slavonia that would eradicate and Western Sirmium consisted of had declined to less than half that the Serb problem once and for all. only fourteen paragraphs (see text, figure. Vukovar, its port, railways, Appendix I). public services, schools, churches, shops, houses and industry were As its first provision, the Basic Agree- destroyed. The villages that had had ment stipulated that there would be “a Croatian residents were a tragic picture transitional period of 12 months” of houses smashed, looted and burned, which could be “extended at most to churches defaced—a rural life savagely another period of the same duration if torn by the brutality of war. But for so requested by one of the parties.”

B·I·C·C 11 brief 12

The signatories called on the UN deployed at the outset could generate the On 15 January 1996, the UN Security Security Council to establish a mutual confidence necessary for the parties Council adopted resolution 1037(1996) Transitional Administration to “govern to take the difficult steps required of them establishing a UN peace-keeping the Region during the transitional under the basic agreement.” mission under the name of United period in the interest of all persons Nations Transitional Administration resident in or returning to the Region.” The Secretary-General’s preference for for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and They also requested the Council to a multinational force, rather than a UN Western Sirmium (UNTAES). Its authorize an international force to force, authorized by the Security military component was described as maintain peace and security. Council and with a Chapter VII “an initial deployment of up to 5,000 mandate was clear. He proposed a troops” with the following mandate: The Basic Agreement declared that the force of 9,300 troops, plus logistic Region would be demilitarized support, attached for command and “(a) To supervise and facilitate the according to the schedules and logistical purposes to the demilitarization as undertaken by the procedures determined by the interna- implementation force being deployed parties to the Basic Agreement, according tional force and not later than 30 days in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Originally to the schedule and procedures to be after deployment of that force. The it was also envisaged in some capitals established by UNTAES; demilitarization must include all that the international force would not military forces, weapons and police, be a UN force,1 but for a number of (b) To monitor the voluntary and safe return except for the international force and reasons it became apparent that his of refugees and displaced persons to their for police operating under the report should include a UN option. home of origin in cooperation with the supervision, or with the consent, of Somewhat reluctantly, therefore, the United Nations High Commissioner for the Transitional Administration. There Secretary-General offered as a second Refugees, as provided for in the Basic was no mention of the control or option that the operation should be Agreement; disposal of weapons that might remain entrusted to a UN force of the same in civilian hands. size. (c) To contribute, by its presence, to the maintenance of peace and security in the The UN Security Council, in adopting Finding 9,300 troops, and their region; and its resolution 1025(1995) on 30 necessary logistic support, at the same November, requested the Secretary- time as a major military operation was (d) Otherwise to assist in the implementation General to draw up a report and make being mounted in Bosnia and of the Basic Agreement.” recommendations on how the Basic Herzegovina was no easy task for the Agreement might be implemented. He international community. Moreover, as (United Nations Security Council, presented that report on 13 December a UN operation it would increase the 1996) (United Nations Security Council, costs on the five permanent members 1995) and his concerns regarding the of the UN Security Council, even On 17 January the Secretary-General fragility of the situation in the region though only one of them (Russia) informed the Security Council of his were quite apparent: would actually have troops on the decision to appoint Mr. Jacques Paul ground. In the absence of any US Klein as the Transitional Administra- “4. After four years of hostilities and troops, there was an even stronger tor. prolonged tension, deep-rooted mistrust need for American commitment to be prevails and each party perceives the other to in evidence. In December Mr. Jacques have broken agreements and committed acts Paul Klein, a career United States of aggression. There is, in this Serb- Foreign Service diplomat (and also a controlled area, both an element of Major-General in the US Air Force 1 Croatia had come to regard the presence of lawlessness and a fear of Croatian military Reserve), was identified as the UN troops as an obstacle to the recovery of its and police action. The Croatian government prospective candidate for the territory. At the same time, Washington did not has, in the recent past, repeatedly stated its leadership of the UN operation and believe that the UN had the capacity and muscle to perform the function successfully—a preparedness to embark on military action visited Belgrade, Zagreb and the judgment with which the Secretary-General did to achieve the reintegration of the territory. region. With personal assurances of not disagree as he had no confidence that the Against this background, and given the cooperation from Presidents Milosevic necessary troops and resources would be failure of earlier attempts to demilitarize and Tudjman, he returned to the forthcoming from member States. The original US idea was to have a combination of US and the sector under a United Nations peace- United States with the view that the Russian troops, but when it became clear that the keeping operation, deployment of an operation was practicable and could be deployment of yet more US troops, in addition insufficient force would be likely to done with 5,000 troops provided that to those in Bosnia, would be rejected by the US undermine implementation of the basic the member States fully supported it. Congress, and that no other variation of a agreement and to precipitate the very chain NATO option was available, Washington had no alternative but to fall back to a force of UN of events the operation is intended to ‘blue-helmets.’ prevent. Only a substantial military force

12 B·I·C·C prologue

It should be noted at this point that the By mid-April, UNTAES had four years since the end of the fighting legal authority of UNTAES was, for a established its civil, police and military almost nothing had been done to UN operation, unusually headquarters in Vukovar, and at the restore the economy. It must be straightforward. In most UN peace- end of April the Jordanian and recognized that the conditions in and keeping operations, the UN leadership Pakistani battalions arrived by ship at around Vukovar in the first months does not have independence of the Croatian port of Rjeka and moved after the fighting must have been control, but has to deal with one or overland to the region. As Spring almost indescribable, with bodies in the more existing governments and work progressed, the local population ruins, rubble in the streets, no with those authorities in implementing witnessed more and more evidence of electricity or water supplies, and winter the mandate given to the operation by a vigorous UN presence. As the troops weather. As time passed, basic clearing the UN Security Council. For and their military assets arrived and up was done and the hospital was put UNTAES, there was no doubt that the were deployed, with heavy equipment back into working order, but with the region was part of the sovereign taking up its positions and helicopter destruction of the port, industry, the territory of Croatia, but in accordance gunships exercising over the region, an railways, shops and businesses, there with the Basic Agreement and unspoken but clear message was being were almost no jobs. Apart from resolution 1037(1996), it was the deliberately sent to the Serb and individual efforts, there was no Transitional Administrator who had Croatian authorities, and to the people reconstruction as there was no money the legal responsibility to govern the of the region, that UNTAES was more available. Unemployment was UNTAES region. In practice, the local robustly equipped than other UN approximately 70 percent. The Serbs continued to run much of the missions and would be prepared to economy, except the agriculture sector, day-to-day business of local authority. impose security if challenged. This was devastated and there was little Only the Transitional Administrator attitude, together with other aspects of financial or other support from any was in a position to make binding the style with which UNTAES source to help it to recover. arrangements with the Croatian implemented its mandate, undoubtedly government in Zagreb, the Serbian helped to create an atmosphere that When, in late May 1996, UNTAES government in Belgrade and the local was conducive to the civilian declared itself ready to supervise Serb authorities. population subsequently taking part in demilitarization of the Serb army, it the weapons buy-back program. was recognized that one of the Over the following four months, the products of this process would be 1,600 Belgian and Russian troops Demilitarization and further unemployment. To a small already in the region as part of the the economy extent, this was alleviated by taking existing UN peace-keeping operation some of the demilitarized soldiers into were supplemented by a further 3,300 the local police force. This did not troops. These consisted of battalions At the beginning of the year, before improve the expertise and from Jordan and Pakistan, with their the arrival of UNTAES troops, the professionalism of the police, but at M60 and T95 tanks, M113 armored region was the home of between 8,000 least it reduced the numbers of those personnel carriers and howitzers; a and 12,000 armed Serb soldiers of the released on to the streets with no job helicopter squadron from Ukraine with ‘Army of the Republika Srpska and no prospects. Mi-24 assault helicopters and Mi-8 Krajina,’ 11 Slavonia Baranja Corps The only part of the legal economy transport helicopters; an Argentinean and a number of Serb para-militaries. that functioned, albeit with difficulties, reconnaissance company; a Slovak Almost every able-bodied male was was agriculture. Between ploughing engineering battalion; a Czech field serving, or liable to serve, in some and planting in the spring and harvest hospital and surgical team; and an form of military capacity, reserve or in the autumn, there was seasonal work Indonesian medical company. A small paramilitary group. Some of the for those living in the region who had Polish special police group was added officers were from the JNA and the farming equipment and land to later. There were also 100 military military equipment included 120 tanks, cultivate. There was, of course, no observers from 22 countries. The 120 artillery pieces, 140 mortars and means of exporting the produce Force Commander was Major-General other heavy weapons. The Serb police westwards to markets in Croatia, but Jozef Schoups from Belgium, (milicja) were also supplemented by traditional ties with Serbian markets to succeeded in February 1997 by Major- personnel from Yugoslavia. the south and east continued. But this General Willy Hanset also of Belgium. was work generally open only to This military atmosphere pervaded a indigenous residents of the region. The setting in which the economy was 60,000 Serbs displaced from the virtually at a standstill. Vukovar had Krajina and Western Slavonia were, for been extensively destroyed and in the the most part, jobless.

B·I·C·C 13 brief 12

Totally cut off from any financial combination of a jobless, demoralized, limit was set on the number of support from the Croatian side, the apprehensive population with ready weapons that could be registered. local Serb authorities depended heavily access to large quantities of weapons Permits to carry weapons, in addition on subventions from the Yugoslav was seen by UNTAES as a major to registration, were issued for hunting government in Belgrade. These were threat to the maintenance of civil law and sporting purposes subject to a granted in return for oil being and order. Furthermore, the prevalence distance limit of 10 kilometers from produced from the Djeletovci oilfields of weapons and their use by armed place of residence. in the southern part of the region and groups might tempt some of the more taken to help the Yugoslav economy. militant Serbs to carry out attacks The issuance of registration licenses In mid-April 1996, however, a behind- across the no-man’s land against and carrying permits was implemented the-scenes deal between Belgrade and Croatian targets (although, in the end, through local police stations and the Zagreb resulted in the pumping of oil this never occurred). In turn, such arrangements were introduced in late being stopped. From then on the developments would invite Croatian June 1996, shortly after the end of financial subventions from Belgrade punitive action and bring UNTAES demilitarization. With these two major also began to dry up. Progressively, into a political, or worse military, aspects in place, it became time to salaries of police, teachers and others confrontation with Croatian institute arrangements to take as many were paid later and later as the year authorities. Finally the continued of the remaining weapons out of went on. possession of weapons by local Serbs civilian hands as possible. would be highly unacceptable to the As is often the case in war zones, there Croatian government, could be an The nature and scope of the was a thriving black market. Coffee, obstacle to the eventual transfer of weapons threat cigarettes and other goods entered the authority to Zagreb, and would region from across the Danube and by certainly result in retribution by the In considering what might be the best country roads and trails from Serbia in Croatian authorities after the departure approach to the matter of weapons the south, often dodging efforts to of UNTAES at the end of its mandate. collection, UNTAES had to take fully collect customs duties. This, too, meant In these circumstances, as soon as into account local attitudes towards that the sources of income open to the demilitarization of the Serb army was firearms. Throughout the Balkans there local Serb authorities diminished, with completed, the next logical step was an is a traditional acceptance of civilian the result that there was no money to organized effort to control the possession of weapons. Not only are employ people in demolishing rubble weapons that remained and, as far as they needed for hunting and sporting, or any works of reconstruction. The possible, get them out of civilian but on occasions of weddings, presence of UNTAES itself, with hands. celebrations or other significant days, it international personnel paying rent for is not uncommon for weapons to be their accommodation and with The first part of this effort was the fired into the air. The unwary foreigner, opportunities for offering some jobs to designation of weapons that could be newly arrived into a Serb area, might local employment, eased some of the held legally and a system for their easily mistake the customary feu de joie economic strain. For the majority of registration. The procedure designed on Serb Orthodox New Year’s Eve as the population, however, finding by UNTAES was modeled closely on the noise of a spirited gun battle. sources of income was a constant the Weapons Act of Croatia of 1992, challenge. as amended in 1995, as this would This possession of guns was further eventually be the law in force in the strengthened by the effects of war and Impetus for the region at the end of the UNTAES the perceptions by most families that weapon collection mandate. The weapons permitted were weapons, including automatic rifles, effort defined by exclusion: automatic, semi- were needed for self-protection against automatic weapons with more than ten indiscriminate ethnic violence, murder, rounds of storage capacity, silenced rape and robbery. Identifying the problem weapons, exploding projectiles and other devices, and any other types of In addition to hunting rifles and By late June 1996, the UNTAES Force weapons or devices UNTAES handguns, there was a wide variety of Commander was able to carry out a designated as prohibited, were not hand-held weapons, grenades, mines series of inspections and then certify allowed. Weapons not prohibited could and mortars in the region. Moreover, that demilitarization had been be registered for self-defense purposes except in the Baranja which was successfully completed. But as soldiers and could be kept in the owner’s home protected by the river Drava, the Serbs took off their uniforms and merged or regular place of abode. Following had long expected that a Croatian into civilian life, they often took their usual practice in Croatia, no numeric hand-carried weapons with them. The

14 B·I·C·C prologue

attack would be spearheaded by tanks coming eastwards across the open Box 2: An illustrative list of weapons in fields. To rebuff such attacks, the JNA civilian hands had brought into the region and distributed large numbers of mines and Handguns: single-shot anti-tank rocket launchers. pistol CZ M 70 cal 7.65 BR Many of these were left behind when pistol CZ M 99 cal 9 mm Luger and 40 S&W the JNA departed, together with large trophy pistol cal 9 mm Luger (“Parabellum” Luger 08, Walther P 38, etc.) quantities of ammunition of all kinds.

Thus, weapons left behind by the Serb Long military weapons: military during the conflict and upon repeater rifle CZ “company 44” MS demilitarization were the primary semiautomatic rifle PAP M 59/66 cal 7.62x39 source of available weapons. But it was semiautomatic sniper rifle with optical device CZ M 76 cal 7.9 clear that, since the end of the hand- to-hand fighting in late 1991, weapons Long hunting weapons: had been circulating freely and in large shot gun “boker” SSSR IZ quantities among the local population. hunting carbines Zastava-70 (various calibers)

Secondary sources were across the Automatic weapons: traditionally open border with Serbia, to the east and south. Although automatic pistol “Skorpion” cal 7.65 UNTAES border monitors were automatic rifle M 70 CZ cal 7.62x39 stationed at the border bridges and sub-machine gun M 53 CZ cal 7.9 crossings, and greater efforts were machine gun Heckler & Koch PM cal 5.9 Para made after demilitarization to stop the import of weapons, the fact remained Other weapons: that it was not practicable to search portable launcher M 57 extensively every vehicle and all its RPG 7 contents as they entered the region. In grenade launcher MGL 40 particular to the south the border with guided anti-tank rockets Serbia lay across open countryside and hand grenades wooded areas through which local people knowing the trails and secondary roads were always able to bring in further weapons if they so wished. However, as there were already The types of weapons in circulation announcements, UNTAES declared large numbers of weapons in the varied widely, as did their age and that mines were highly dangerous and region, it seems doubtful that there was condition. Some were modern, still in should not be moved or carried. any organized illicit trafficking. the manufacturer’s wrapping, while Subsequently, however, despite these others were relics of World War II and instructions there were occasions when In early 1996, when UNTAES was first even, on occasions, of earlier vintage. mines were brought to the collection established, it was not unusual to see Box 2 provides an illustrative list. points and were accepted by UNTAES handguns and similar small weapons for destruction.2 being carried in the streets. This was In addition, there were anti-personnel primarily due to the fact that many and mortar mines, cassette bombs, local Serbs were also serving in the grenade fuses, artillery projectiles and a Serb army, or liable to do so, and the wide range of ammunition. At the local Serb milicja did not regard the beginning of the buy-back program, practice as one that they should do UNTAES categorically refused to anything about. As UNTAES troops accept mines. In public 2 Although mines were dangerous to transport and police grew in numbers, the to the collection points, it would have been situation improved but handguns were irresponsible for UNTAES to have sent them often still carried discreetly, particularly away. In the final weeks of the program over 500 mines, including TMA4 anti-tank mines, were by local thugs and ‘mafiosi.’ brought to the collection points in the Baranja. Their source was never identified but UNTAES military believed that they might have come from minefields around Kopacevo.

B·I·C·C 15 brief 12

Program

weapons as the idea of paying Serbs Design and money from the Croatian public purse did not seem likely to attract much support in Zagreb. However, the Implementation practical value of such a program was quickly recognized, particularly as there was already a similar program in operation in Croatia now that conflict was over. Neither the Basic Agreement nor Serb milicja, with Croatian police being resolution 1037(1996) approved by the added gradually as the months passed. Once the principle of a Croatian- Security Council in January 1996 The quality of the TPF improved over financed buy-back was accepted, details contained any specific reference to a time, but due to their natural of the arrangement were discussed. weapons buy-back program, nor would sympathies with local Serbs and the The Croatian position was that persons such a reference be expected. But the historical fact that the early stages of offering weapons should hand in the philosophy of the UNTAES leadership the Serb/Croat confrontation had seen weapon, leave their names and was to regard the mandate as a floor violence and shooting within the addresses and then return for cash at a on which the fabric of implementation police, the Serb members of the TPF later date, by which time it would have was to be constructed, rather than a could never be totally relied upon to been possible to carry out checks on ceiling that placed restraints and limits take action against local Serbs. the weapons. UNTAES declared that on the operation. Accordingly, a in those circumstances, Serbs would determined effort to significantly Thus, it was necessary to keep the goal not come forward. UNTAES insisted reduce the quantities of weapons in straightforward—to get as many that returns should be anonymous and civilian hands was consistent with the unauthorized weapons, ammunition cash payments should be made on the need to ensure civil law and order, the and explosives off the streets and out spot. The Croats also wanted to pay in maintenance of peace and security and of the hands of the civilian population. the Croatian currency, kunas, to which the preparation of conditions for the Keeping this goal simple helped UNTAES responded that the Serbs eventual handing over of the region, considerably in the design of a used Yugoslav dinars and would not demilitarized and secure, to the practicable and achievable program. accept kunas on principle. Recognizing sovereign control of the government that it would be equally unacceptable of Croatia. Discussions with for the Croats to pay in dinars, the Croatian authorities solution was found in using German One possible method that was marks (DM). promptly discarded was a house-to- Within UNTAES it was clear that, as house search. Such a ‘search and seize’ UNTAES wanted weapons collection policy would have been unacceptably no one in the local population was procedures that would be controlled going to surrender weapons voluntarily intrusive and would have resulted in and monitored by UNTAES, but with and without reward, success could only UNTAES being quickly regarded as an the assessments of weapon condition occupation force. On the contrary, it be achieved by purchasing weapons for and value being made by Croatian cash. But UNTAES had no money to was necessary that UNTAES should experts at the site of collection. purchase weapons, even if it had been win the confidence and respect of the Moreover, in order to preclude the risk local population if the aims of the civil possible to overcome the position of any subsequent allegation over the generally adopted by the UN that the aspects of the UNTAES mandate were mishandling of cash, UNTAES asked organization should never be in the to be achieved. Moreover, it would that the payments should be made have been an incorrect use of business of purchasing weapons. Who directly by the Croatian representatives would have interests strong enough to UNTAES troops and an inappropriate to Serbs without any money ever function for UN civil police. It was find money for such a program? The touching the hands of UNTAES decided that such invasions of private answer was: the Croatian government. personnel. property would only take place if there were incidents that necessitated such Exploratory discussions with the Regarding the disposal of weapons Croatian authorities began in June actions, and that on such occasions the collected, UNTAES wanted them all to 1996, between the Deputy Minister of local police force would be used. be destroyed. However, the Croats the Interior and the Deputy objected on the grounds that as the Transitional Administrator of In this context, it should be recalled weapons would be purchased with UNTAES. Initially, and perhaps that one of the tasks of UNTAES was Croatian money they would then be to establish and train a Transitional understandably, the Croatian reaction Croatian property and should be was that rather more direct methods Police Force (TPF). This force was handed over for Croatian disposal as should be used to relieve Serbs of their constructed in stages from the original they saw fit. UNTAES argued that

16 B·I·C·C design and implementation

Serbs would not participate if they It was decided that each WBL would did not accept the price offered (or in thought that weapons in good be open Monday to Friday, from 09.00 the event that the Croatian expert condition might soon be re-issued by to 16.00. Each battalion was should have insufficient cash). In such the Croatian authorities and even responsible for escorting a Croatian cases, if the weapon was one that perhaps used against Serbs. Eventually, weapons expert into and out of the could be legitimately held and a satisfactory compromise arrangement region, and for his security. The registered under the arrangements was found (see section on “Weapon process of handing in weapons was described earlier, it was taken into storage and disposition” below). anonymous, with no identification of custody and a receipt was provided to persons bringing them to the WBL. the person concerned. Once he had These discussions, the establishment Anyone seen taking photographs or registered the weapon properly with of price lists, and the setting up of video was stopped and the film the police and had a registration workable arrangements within destroyed unless the person concerned certificate, he could return and recover UNTAES for receipt and storage of was in possession of written the weapon in exchange for the receipt. weapons took about three months. The authorization by UNTAES. Weapons All other weapons were taken into weapons buy-back program began in were separated from ammunition and custody by UNTAES and a nameless earnest on 2 October 1996. explosives, so that the type and receipt was issued, which the person condition of the weapon could be concerned could exchange for cash at a Program elements assessed by the Croatian representative later date if he so chose. In no and inception and a military expert, and the price to circumstances were weapons allowed be paid determined by the Croatian to leave the military compound, unless expert. The money was then paid in they were weapons that could be Operational structure cash directly to the person who had legitimately held and had been properly handed over the weapon or weapons. registered. As discussions with the Croatian authorities proceeded, extensive Comprehensive records were Public awareness consideration was given within maintained and submitted daily to UNTAES to the procedures to be UNTAES headquarters, together with In order to inform the local population adopted to ensure that the program an updated daily report. Weapons of the arrangements for weapons buy- would be successful. It was clear that identified for retention were separated back, an extensive publicity campaign there must be well-controlled from those identified for destruction. was mounted. Posters were printed, in arrangements for the acceptance and The latter were subsequently destroyed Serbian and Croatian,3 announcing the custody of weapons, and that these at each WBL, whereas ammunition and program and giving examples of the could only be provided by the explosives were kept separately and in buy-back prices (see Appendices II and UNTAES military. The Force safe custody for (approximately) III). Special articles were also published Commander instructed his staff to weekly collection and transfer to in the UNTAES Bulletin, a newssheet draw up an Operation Order based on special explosive ordnance disposal prepared and published in both the concept that there would be four sites for disposal by UNTAES experts. languages by UNTAES Public Affairs Weapons Buy-back Locations (WBL), It was made clear that the Croatian approximately every ten days (see one at each battalion headquarters experts could witness those Appendices IV and V). In addition, the (Belgian and Pakistani battalions in the destructions if they so wished. leadership of UNTAES made special north, and Russian and Jordanian broadcasts on the local radio to battalions in the south). Each battalion In order to guard against any risk of announce the program and respond to was required to provide security for the dangerous incidents, whether call-in questions. WBL and tobe prepared to store accidental or malevolent, private weapons under secure conditions. In vehicles bringing weapons and explosi- addition, each battalion was required to ves to the WBL were not allowed to make arrangements to store enter the battalion compounds. The ammunition and explosives for a few items were transferred to battalion days until they were removed for transport and conveyed to the WBL destruction. under UNTAES custody. This gave rise to consideration of what action should 3 UNTAES carefully used both the Serbian be taken if the person with the weapon (Cyrillic) script and the Croatian (Latin) script in its printed matter. The UNTAES Bulletin, printed in broadsheet form, was reversible with one language on one side and the second language on the other. So that UNTAES staff would be able to read the Bulletin, it was also printed in smaller numbers in English, which is the version shown in Appendices IV and V.

B·I·C·C 17 brief 12

It was made clear that there would be than originally expected, before shifting These results gave rise to a number of no enforcement by UNTAES of the to payment in kuna in Spring 1997. theories. First, it was possible that buy-back program, but that it was in Throughout the period there were people thought it ‘easier’ to do everyone’s interests that the weapons in some criticisms in the Croatian business with the battalions in the the region should be significantly parliament and the media that Serbs south than in the north. On the other reduced—and here was a way of doing should not be paid money for their hand, it indicated that there were more it that raised money, with no questions weapons. Another factor regarding weapons available in the south than in asked, at the same time. Notice was payment in kuna was the marked the north. This was highly likely, as a also given that anyone found with a psychological rejection by local Serbs Croatian tank attack from the west had weapon, but not in possession of a of the kuna as a currency. This was due been long expected by the Serbs and valid registration or authorization, to the historical and symbolic the number of anti-tank weapons would have the weapon confiscated on associations of the kuna which, not indicated the reception that such an the spot. surprisingly, carried the Croatian attack might have received. Another national flag. One of the challenges factor could have been the comparative In announcing the program, UNTAES facing UNTAES was how and when to openness of the border with Serbia in made clear that it was open to all shift the currency of the region from the south, providing opportunities for people living in the region, with no Yugoslav dinars to the Croatian kuna. smuggling from Serbia or even Bosnia distinction being made between men, Following preparatory steps, such as and Herzegovina. women, ex-combatants, Serbs, payments in kuna to public employees Hungarians, Ruthenes, and so on. of the region, this was eventually One of the effects of the high UNTAES promised that the procedure achieved over a two month period in numbers of returns was that on several was deliberately simple and May/June 1997, following which dinars occasions the Croatian experts anonymous, and ensured that that were no longer legal tender. exhausted their supplies of cash early promise was kept. The public was told and the WBLs had to be closed ahead that any weapons would be accepted, The buy-back prices were set entirely of the daily schedule. except mines which were highly by the Croatian authorities and prices dangerous and should be reported so and types of weapons listed were Evaluation and adjustment that UNTAES demolition experts adjusted by the Croats as experience could deal with them in situ. Once the was gained. Care was taken to avoid, as After the first two weeks, sufficient program was in operation, UNTAES far as possible, the creation of a market experience had been gained to review kept the population well informed of that would attract weapons from the implementation of the program its progress, including of an occasion outside the region. From time to time and make adjustments. In addition, the when two men had brought in 70 anti- during the program, there were some Croatian authorities expressed their tank rocket launchers and had received, concerns that weapons were being unhappiness with several aspects. On at the declared price of DM 155 each, brought in or smuggled across the 16 October a meeting was therefore the sum of DM 10,850 in cash. The border with Serbia, but it was never held, at ministerial level, between the public was also told where the possible to prove this conclusively. Croatian authorities and UNTAES destruction of ammunition and representatives. Items raised by the explosives would take place, so that the Early experiences were often Croats included: noise of explosions would not create surprising, as may be seen from Figures misunderstandings. 1 and 2. For example, in the first two the success at some of the WBLs weeks of the program, the Jordanian was due to the fact the program was Adequacy of the incentive WBL received 1,188 grenades anonymous, and so individuals structure (including rifle-grenades and anti-tank could sell weapons that did not grenades), almost twice as many of this belong to them; At first, it was announced that the type as the other three WBLs together. program would last only from early In the same period, the Russian WBL October 1996 to early January 1997, and the Jordanian WBL together but subsequently the program was received 2,163 light anti-tank weapons. extended and eventually did not end This number compared with the 171 until 19 August 1997. Payment in light anti-tank weapons received by the German marks continued for longer two Belgian and Pakistani WBLs. In addition, the Russian and Jordanian WBLs, both situated in the southern part of the UNTAES region, received over 400,000 rounds of ammunition and explosive charges.

18 B·I·C·C design and implementation

a number of vehicles bringing Figure 1: Buy-back program results by weapons had foreign (i.e., especially battalion, 2–18 October 1996 Yugoslav) license plates, indicating that weapons were being brought Ammunition figures in thousands. into the region for sale to the buy- back program; Note: Figure recreated from charts supplied by the author.

some members of the Transitional Police Force (TPF) were 1400 confiscating weapons from people 1200 en route to the WBLs and this Rifle attitude discouraged individuals 1000 MG from participating in the buy-back 800 Grenade program; 600 Law 400 Ammo UNTAES supervision of weapons was not sufficiently secure and so it 200 might be possible for weapons to 0 reappear in the hands of civilians; BB PB RB JB Battalio n ammunition and explosives were not being destroyed daily; BB: Belgian Battalion PB: Pakistani Battalion weapons were not being stored RB: Russian Battalion satisfactorily and would deteriorate; JB: Jordanian Battalion

Croatian experts were not being given sufficient protection;

payments would continue to be made in German marks, but the time would come when payments would be made in kuna. Figure 2: Buy-back program results by type, 2–18 October 1996 In response, UNTAES representatives made the following points: Ammunition figures in thousands. Note: Figure recreated from charts supplied by the author. the success of the program showed how valuable it was to have the principle of anonymity, and this would be maintained; 1400 many of the vehicles in the region 1200 still had Yugoslav license plates and 1000 there had been no evidence to prove 800 that weapons were being brought BELBAT (BB) into the region, but UNTAES 600 would tighten up its checks for PAKBAT (PB) weapons at the border crossings; 400 RUSBAT (RB) 200 JORBAT (JB) 0 MG Law Rifle Ammo Grenade Type

B·I·C·C 19 brief 12

the allegations against the TPF Although it was apparent that there This impasse was resolved by an would be investigated,4 but the TPF were indeed some initial difficulties in agreement that UNTAES should had been given general instructions the implementation of the program transport the weapons to secure and to confiscate unregistered weapons that had to be resolved, it was also appropriate storage at Pleso Airport, as part of their responsibilities to clear that in general the arrangements Zagreb, where they would be kept maintain law and order. Moreover, it for the buy-back program had been under guard by UNTAES military until was known that there were well thought through and were the end of the UNTAES mandate. organized criminal elements at successful. This was important as it This solution neatly achieved the aims work, probably seeking to take constituted yet another step in building of removing serviceable weapons from advantage of the buy-back program; confidence and trust. the region, and therefore out of reach of any recovery, and yet keeping them UNTAES was confident that Weapon storage and in UNTAES custody. It also gave weapons handed in were kept disposition Croatian military personnel convenient securely and there was no risk of access to the weapons for maintenance them being ‘recycled’, but the purposes until the end of the arrangements would be checked; As described above, the arrangements UNTAES mandate in January 1998. negotiated with the Croatian regarding daily destruction of authorities provided for the assessment In early November 1996 it was ammunition, it had been found that of weapon type and condition to be estimated that by the end of the buy- the amounts handed in and the made by a Croatian expert at each back program there might be some other destruction tasks (e.g., dealing collection site. Weapons that were old 3,500 weapons to be stored in with mines and other explosive or in bad condition were kept by UNTAES custody at Pleso.5 An items that were in great abundance UNTAES for destruction. Small arms UNTAES team was given the task of in the region) was proving to be were crushed and heavier weapons finding suitable, secure storage that more than the UNTAES ordnance were disabled by pouring concrete into would be cost-effective and provide destruction teams could safely the barrel. Ammunition and explosives opportunities for Croatian weapon handle on a daily basis. Destruction were destroyed under controlled experts to carry out any necessary would therefore be carried out every conditions by UNTAES demolition maintenance. The team was instructed few days rather than daily; teams organized by the Force Engineer not simply to pay lip service to the at special sites well away from public provision of security as, if any of the the problem of proper storage for areas. Arrangements were made to weapons were stolen or went missing weapons and arrangements for enable Croatian representatives to be while under UNTAES guard, the maintenance needed further present, if they so wished, to satisfy embarrassment to the UN would be consideration; themselves that UNTAES was carrying significant. Even the possibility that out the destruction satisfactorily. some informal group of Croats might the issue of protection would be deliberately seek to embarrass the UN considered as part of general The issue of how and where to store in this way was not overlooked. security issues, including handling weapons in good condition was not of public gatherings at the WBLs, resolved until some weeks after the and discussed with the TPF; buy-back program had started. Initially the Croatian authorities wanted them a special UNTAES-Croatian to be in Croatian custody, but working group would be established UNTAES insisted that they should to address the issues of remain in UNTAES custody on the implementation. grounds that the Serb population might quickly develop mistrust in the program if they thought that the weapons were being handed directly to the Croats. 4 As there were no Croatian members of the TPF at this juncture, these allegations were interesting in themselves: they indicated that the Croats either had sources of information inside the region, or were operating covertly to gather intelligence. 5 At that time, the end of the buy-back program was announced as January 1997. It was always assumed that this date would be extended but the ultimate duration was unknown. By the time the program ended on 19 August 1997, over 10,000 weapons were stored at Pleso.

20 B·I·C·C design and implementation

Two strengthened military aircraft deactivated and removed from shelters in the UN compound at Pleso UNTAES custody for sale by the airport were identified as suitable, each Croatian authorities but thereafter the with a floor space of about 50 square program stopped and was not meters. A watchtower and special subsequently resumed during the fencing were installed, and the site put period of the UNTAES mandate. under guard by Jordanian soldiers of UNTAES. The first four containers of Following the end of the buy-back weapons for safe custody were program, on 19 August 1997, the final transported by UNTAES to Pleso in consignment of weapons for storage late November. On 5 December 1996, was transferred to Pleso and by 12 following careful inspection, counting September there was a total of 10,136 and preparation by UNTAES and weapons in UNTAES custody. With Croatian experts, the weapons were the end of the UNTAES mandate in moved to the storage under UNTAES sight, during the summer of 1997 guard and with a double-key system for UNTAES began its military drawdown access. A UN container was placed to and contingents began to return to block the gates, with instructions that it their respective countries. It was could be moved only with decided that the Jordanian platoon authorization of the UN Military would be repatriated on 15 October Liaison Officer Zagreb. and on 24 September the Force Commander wrote to the Croatian On 27 May 1997, by which time more authorities requesting that they take than 7,000 weapons were in storage, over the full time guard of the the Croatian Minister of Interior wrote weapons storage from 14 October. to the Transitional Administrator of UNTAES, informing him of a request Custody of the weapons, however, by authorized trade agencies of Austria remained an UNTAES responsibility and Germany to purchase the long and, with the full cooperation of the firearms in custody, for ‘decorative Croatian authorities, the double-key purposes.’ Such a sale was attractive to system of access was continued. Croatia as it would result in recovering Croatian officials wanting access to the some of the costs of the buy-back weapons had first to inform the UN program. The Minister confirmed that Civil Liaison Officer who, in turn, was the firearms in question would be required to obtain clearance from deactivated to the German standard for UNTAES headquarters in Vukovar and deactivating firearms so that they then maintain a full time presence would be no longer usable and, if the throughout every Croatian visit. proposal was accepted by UNTAES, the deactivation should be monitored On 16 January 1998, with the end of and supervised by UNTAES experts. the UNTAES mandate, the UN containers were removed from their Following approval from UN positions in front of the storage doors Headquarters in New York, and and the UN keys were formally handed subject to the weapons being rendered over to the Croatian authorities, permanently unusable, on 20 June thereby transferring the entire control UNTAES replied positively to the of the remaining weapons to the Croatian proposal and requested a Croatian government. copy of the German deactivation standard (German Federal Ministry of Science, 1979). It was ascertained that the intention was to deactivate some 2,000 weapons over a period of several weeks, starting by mid-July. By early August, 362 weapons had been

B·I·C·C 21 brief 12

Program Outcome Numerical results and and Impact costs

Table 1 presents a comparison of reported and published numbers of An element of a This had to be achieved in the face of weapons collected at the program’s broader strategy the unreliability of local Serb TPF mid-way point and at its conclusion. members, their reluctance to tackle armed mafiosi gangs and their These numbers do not fully reflect the One of the primary objectives of unwillingness to deal robustly with range of weapons and explosives UNTAES was to hand over the region occasions of Serb crowd violence. On handed in. In addition there were a to the Croatian authorities at the end several occasions UNTAES was small number of handguns, various of the UNTAES mandate pressed by the Croatian authorities to mines, over 100 mortars, detonators, demilitarized, safe and secure. This carry out raids on private homes and explosive charges and even, towards entailed, in the first place, taking a other inhabited places that were the end, some hand-held ground-to-air deeply apprehensive Serb population suspected of harboring weapons. missiles. The condition of the weapons with access to large numbers of Unless there was direct evidence of and ammunition varied from very weapons to a situation where law and illegal activity UNTAES resisted such good, and sometimes still in the order could be effectively maintained pressure, on the grounds that original packing, to antique, rusty and by the TPF, under monitoring and UNTAES was not in the business of downright dangerous. supervision by UNTAES Civil Police. establishing a police state. On the Once that had been achieved, it set the contrary, UNTAES wanted to generate The Croatian government provided all stage for the gradual introduction of a level of confidence and trust as part the money for the payments made in Croatian members of the TPF and of moving towards a society in which exchange for weapons and prepared the local population for the people could live together once more. ammunition. As stated earlier, in the arrival of Croatian authority on the The buy-back program contributed early months payments were made in departure of UNTAES. The weapons significantly to this by reducing the German marks, and subsequently in buy-back program was therefore an numbers of weapons available to Croatian kuna. The provision of this important part of this broader strategy civilians but without doing that in such money was not without political of keeping the region peaceful and a way as to antagonize the local difficulties for the Croatian secure while progressive steps were population. government. There were voices in the taken by UNTAES to shift it from Croatian parliament and in the media Serb control to Croatian control over a that objected strongly to the idea of period of two years. paying Serbs money for their weapons. There were many in Croatia who had deep and bitter memories of incidents

Table 1: Mid-term and final collection results

Sources: a Appendix VI, b Vercernji List (Croatian newspaper), 20 August 1997

Items 7 March 1997a 19 August 1997b

Rifles (including automatic and semi-automatic) 3,590 9,146

Rocket launchers and anti-tank weapons 4,777 6,375

Grenades (hand, rifle, anti-tank) 10,274 14,521

Ammunition (rounds) 723,200 over 1,900,000

22 B·I·C·C outcome and impact

of violence and brutality committed by Recognizing these fears, UNTAES, in offering low prices or by bullying, and Serbs in 1991 and 1992, and to them its civil affairs programs, was actively then taking them to the WBLs for sale. the concept of using scarce Croatian trying to maintain public calm and In retrospect, it may be surmised that financial resources to benefit Serbs plant the seeds of confidence for the much of the large quantities brought in while the scars of war had not yet been future, for example: during the first few weeks probably repaired was anathema. It may have came from hidden caches of arms been for these and similar reasons that for the first time in five years mail known to a limited number of people. the Croatian government never made links had been restored with other Exchanging them for cash was too public the overall cost of the program. parts of Croatia; good an opportunity to be missed.

Shifting perceptions the border in the Baranja with Overall, as the program was extended Hungary had been opened for and the Serb population saw the limited use; general situation move steadily towards In October 1996, the general attitude the end of the UNTAES mandate, the of the local Serb population to the joint Serb/Croat discussions were public attitude to the handing in of program was very skeptical. This was taking place to find ways of moving weapons became more positive. In the not surprising when one bears in mind forwards in health, education, final weeks of the program, in August how much had happened in the agriculture; 1997, there was an upsurge in business previous eighteen months. Since May as people felt that they might as well 1995, the Krajina and Western Slavonia a weekly market was being held on get money for weapons as long as the had been lost to Croatian military the road in the no-man’s land program lasted, as once it ended they action, some 200,000 Serbs had fled between the Serb and Croatian areas would receive nothing and the from their homes, the Serb cause in that allowed families and friends to continued possession of firearms Bosnia and Herzegovina had suffered be reunited; might well lead to difficulties. Indeed, major reverses from NATO bombing on the last day the Croatian officials and the deployment of the combat UN agencies and non-governmental quickly ran out of cash and several troops of IFOR. Eastern Slavonia had organizations were giving hundreds of weapons were handed in seen the arrival of many thousands of constructive assistance to the without payment. Additionally, as the displaced Serbs who had little more displaced and the needy. Transitional Administrator reported on than whatever they had been able to 22 September 1997, despite the end of bring with them in their panicked In these circumstances, it took the buy-back program, residents of the flight. Politically, by the Basic Agree- considerable time for the public at region continued voluntarily to turn in ment signed at Erdut in November large to take a positive attitude to the military weapons. In the month 1995, the region had been negotiated buy-back program. Despite the efforts following the end of the program, a away to be transferred to Croatian of UNTAES to promulgate the details total of 204 rifles, 11 anti-tank rockets, authority, without most of the people of the arrangements widely, many 238 grenades, and 55,000 rounds of being either consulted or even properly people in the villages seemed not to ammunition were handed in (United informed by their Serb leadership. know about the program. Some were Nations Department of Public hostile as they viewed the program Information, 1997). In early 1996, following the arrival of a simply as a means to remove the Serb new, stronger UN presence, the Serb ability to defend themselves when the army had melted away and had been Croats returned. demilitarized. The people were confused, deeply fearful and looking in There were others, however, who saw vain for leadership in which they could the opportunities for profit have confidence. Then, in October immediately. For some it was a quick 1996, Serbs were being invited to rid way of making money in exchange for themselves of their remaining defensi- weapons, several of which were 6 ve weapons. They were being told by unusable or virtually so—even if they By October 1996, the Croatian government Croatian television that UNTAES and media were already agitating strongly for were still in their manufacturer’s UNTAES to leave in January 1997, but in would be present only for a few more packaging. The persons staffing the months.6 Who would protect them November the UN Security Council helped to WBLs began to see several faces on a calm the situation considerably by extending the when UNTAES had gone? regular basis. It became clear that some mandate until January 1998. people, either criminals or opportunists, were going to villages and obtaining weapons, either by

B·I·C·C 23 brief 12

Addressing the A changed environment weapons, provided that they are availability and declared and properly licensed. visibility of weapons The difference in atmosphere between Moreover, firearms in the hands of the situations at the start and the end Serbs will inevitably be regarded by of the UNTAES mandate was marked. returning Croats as potential threats to Supply and demand At the beginning, the region was very life and limb, and by Serbs as their much in a military mode, with elements ultimate method of self-defense for In a broad sense, the issue of supply of the local Serb army and the Serb use in the last resort. Probably in a and demand for weapons in the region milicja very much in evidence. The clear effort to show that undeclared was not relevant. The buy-back atmosphere was tense as the dramatic weapons would not be tolerated once program removed the excess supply, events of 1995 (the evacuation of Croatian authority was in place, when but UNTAES suspected that many Serbs from the Krajina and Western the buy-back program ended in August Serbs secreted at least one weapon in Slavonia, followed in September by the 1997 the Croatian government made a attics or outhouses for possible use if robust NATO action in Bosnia and public announcement to the effect that physically threatened by returning Herzegovina, the Dayton Accords and persons who did not turn in their Croats. the Basic Agreement signed at Erdut in weapons would be liable to prison November 1995) were only a few penalties of up to ten years (Glas With the demilitarization of the Serb months old. Slavonije, 19 August 1997). army in May/June 1996, UNTAES had declared the import of weapons to the The establishment and deployment of Easing the potential for region as forbidden. Vehicles crossing UNTAES in the early months of 1996 violence the three bridges over the Danube steadied the situation considerably. from Serbia were liable to search and With the demilitarization of the local The transfer of large quantities of any weapons discovered were Serb army, the firm assertion of weapons and ammunition from civilian confiscated. But the border with Serbia UNTAES control, and the hands or access into the custody or was, deliberately, never made totally introduction of civil measures to move destruction of UNTAES certainly watertight by UNTAES controls as the population towards peace and decreased the potential for violence. such actions would have been stability—of which the weapons buy- However, for the most part, while perceived by the local Serbs as steps back program was one—there was a UNTAES was present there was little towards closing the border altogether progressive decrease in the visibility of actual civil violence. UNTAES was not which, in turn, could have led to panic weapons in the region. UNTAES made seen by the Serbs as an ‘enemy’ and the and mass evacuation. Moreover, it was it clear that the carrying of weapons in Croats were still outside the region. impossible to patrol by boat or on land public would not be permitted, except The potential for real violence applied the length of the Danube flowing for properly authorized sporting or only to the risk of Croatian military through the region, and to the south of hunting rifles. For the most part these intervention or Serb para-military the region the border with Serbia ran instructions were respected. There forays across the separation zone, through wooded land and open fields. continued to be incidents of neither of which occurred nor were Determined smuggling of weapons criminality in which handguns, and threatened. could therefore not be prevented but, occasionally automatic weapons, were as recounted earlier, there was never used. There were also occasions when The other risk of violence could have any hard evidence that organized grenades were used in family disputes occurred after the departure of smuggling was taking place. or to settle old scores. In general, UNTAES in January 1998, when full however, the readiness to resort to the authority passed to the hands of the While there can be no certainty, it is use of weapons steadily diminished as Croatian government. No organized highly unlikely that there has been any time passed. The existence of the buy- violence has taken place, and with subsequent supply of weapons. The back program certainly contributed isolated exceptions firearms and circumstances that brought about the positively to this change in attitude. explosives have not been used in presence of such high quantities of clashes between Serbs and Croats. The weapons and ammunition in the region At the same time, it must be Croatian police have conducted no longer exist and have been replaced recognized that in the long run the weapon searches in houses, but usually by a totally different situation. With the traditional cultural acceptability of for other reasons—such as suspicion end of the UNTAES mandate on 15 weapons will probably be little of drugs or other criminality—rather January 1998, the region passed to the affected. As noted earlier, firearms are than indiscriminate intrusions into full sovereign authority of the Croatian an accepted feature of life and often homes. government and therefore the laws of fired into the air at times of celebration the rest of Croatia became fully and commemoration. Croatian law applicable in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja does not prohibit the possession of and Western Sirmium. firearms, except certain classes of

24 B·I·C·C outcome and impact

Nevertheless, the early months have in the early months, many people notwithstanding the positive not been easy and many dispirited suspected that somehow their results—in the form of numbers of Serbs have left the region and moved names would be noted and records weapons and ammunition into Serbia or abroad. The elected Serb kept of who handed in weapons, surrendered—at the end of the leadership and the Croatian authorities therefore there was a ‘wait and see’ program the general feeling in have worked together, not easily and attitude; UNTAES was that there were still not with much mutual trust, to rebuild considerable quantities that had not a future for the region. Some leaders, others were afraid to hand in their been handed in. on both sides, have worked hard and weapons and ammunition, partly conscientiously to establish a process because they wanted to retain some All these comments are of a practical of reconciliation, but all too often their form of self-defense; nature and not critical of the program efforts have been undermined by itself. Informal exchanges with others who have had narrower agendas. some tried to bring their weapons individual members of UNTAES, The Transitional Police Force (TPF) discreetly, (e.g., in large paper bags, military and civilian, and with some of has been absorbed into the national or by asking a UN Military those involved on the Croatian side Croatian police structure under firm Observer to act as an intermediary) have all confirmed that there was a but fair control and the bridges across in order to avoid being seen by their general satisfaction with the objectives the Danube are now international neighbors; and implementation of the program. border crossings, with workable transit arrangements for local persons resident despite wide announcements of the The primary goal of the program was in Croatia but with relatives and friends anonymity of the program, some to reduce the numbers of offensive in Serbia. men sent their wives or children to weapons and ammunition in the region hand in weapons; and thereby reduce the risks of Overall assessment of violence. In UNTAES’ view every the program as time passed, it became clear from weapon, explosive or round of their repeated visits that some ammunition handed in at the WBLs people were ‘middlemen’, selling was one less available on the streets or As a part of the overall UNTAES weapons on behalf of others, or in the hands of the civilian population. effort, the weapons buy-back program even ‘brokers’ who bought weapons In this, the buy-back program was was an undoubted success. It could not in the villages then sold them to the successful far beyond expectations in have been carried out without the full program for a profit; the quantities of weapons that were cooperation of the Croatian recovered. The program did not government which provided the the number of handguns remove all weapons from the region, money, in the face of some opposition surrendered was small, due probably nor was that result ever expected. But in certain quarters in Zagreb, and the to the greater ease with which the program contributed significantly experts to assess the types and pistols could be retained and hidden to the overall aims of UNTAES and condition of the weapons handed in. and also due to the tradition of the Croatian government of bringing The terms of the program were possessing a weapon; the region—demilitarized, safe and negotiated amicably between UNTAES secure—under the authority of and the Croatian authorities and the many waited until the final days of Croatia. principles of anonymity and cash the program before handing in payment on the spot proved to be of weapons and ammunition; In the light of the UNTAES significant importance. Once the initial experience, there would appear to be problems with implementation had despite UNTAES efforts to give little doubt that in appropriate been ironed out, for the most part the wide publicity to the program by circumstances a weapons buy-back program worked well. The insistence radio, television and print media, program—sensitively designed and by UNTAES that no UNTAES there were still many who professed carefully implemented—can be a personnel would handle the money at not to know about the program. highly useful contribution to wider any time was also a valuable aspect as it This might have been a combination efforts to restore peace and stability in effectively precluded any of genuine ignorance, illiteracy, civil societies in the wake of war. misunderstanding or risk of subse- general mistrust or simple pretense; quent allegation of misappropriation.

Among the observations and impressions formed by members of the UNTAES military who took part in 7 Extracted from the final reports to UNTAES 7 the program were the following: headquarters by the Belgian and Russian battalions, dated 25 August and 16 September 1997 respectively.

B·I·C·C 25 brief 12

References

German Federal Ministry of Science. 1979. “Merkblatt über Kriterien für die Unbrauchbarkeit der Kriegs- waffen der Nummer 29a-c der Kriegswaffenliste (KWL) sowie der Rohre und Verschlüsse für diese Kriegswaffen (Nr. 34 und 35 KWL).” 16 February.

United Nations Department of Public Information. 1997. “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Croatia— UNTAES.” [http://www.un.org/ Depts/DPKO/Missions/ untaes_b.htm]

United Nations Security Council. 1995. “Report of the Secretary-General.” UN Security Council Document S/1995/1028, 13 December.

United Nations Security Council. 1996. UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1037 (1996), 15 January.

United Nations Security Council. 1997. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium.” UN Security Council Document S/1997/767, 2 October.

26 B·I·C·C appendix I

Appendix I: Basic Agreement

B·I·C·C 27 brief 12

28 B·I·C·C appendix I

B·I·C·C 29 brief 12

Appendix II: Promotional Poster—Serbian (Cyrillic) script

30 B·I·C·C appendix III

Appendix III: Promotional Poster—Croatian (Latin) script

B·I·C·C 31 brief 12

Appendix IV: UNTAES Bulletin, Issue No. 16 (October 1996)

32 B·I·C·C appendix V

Appendix V: UNTAES Bulletin, Issue No. 17 (October 1996)

B·I·C·C 33 brief 12

Appendix VI: Weapon Buy-back Program Results to 7 March 1997

34 B·I·C·C B·I·C·C 35 brief 12

Publications

brief 3: Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf BICC series such as brief, report and report 7: (eds.), Coping with Surplus Weapons: A paper are published either in English Corinna Hauswedell, Paul Klemmer Priority for Conversion Research and Policy, (with a German summary) or in and Herbert Wulf (Hg.), Konversion - June 1995 German (with an English summary). Herausforderung für Wissenschaft und Forschung (Konferenzdokumentation) brief 4: report 1: [Conference proceedings], December 1995 Kees Kingma and Vanessa Sayers, Edward J. Laurance and Demobilization in the Horn of Africa, Herbert Wulf, with the assistance of report 8: Proceedings of the IRG Workshop, Addis Joseph Di Chiaro III, Conversion and the Ulrike Lindemann and JØrgen Ababa, 4-7 December 1994, June 1995 Integration of Economic and Security Klußmann, Konversion militärischer Dimensions, January 1995 Liegenschaften - Eine weltweite Herausforde- brief 5: rung, Konferenzreportage [Base Closures—A Werner Voß and Michael Brzoska, report 2: Global Challenge, Conference proceedings], Eurofighter 2000: Consequences and Nicola Mögel, Thomas Sachse und Oktober 1996 Alternatives, February 1996 Hans-Henning Schröder, Chancen und Probleme der Rüstungskonversion in der report 9: brief 6: Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten: Jörn Brömmelhörster, KONVER II: Michael Renner, Cost of Disarmament: Konversionsprofile ausgewählter Regionen - Konversionsförderung durch die Europäische An Overview of the Economic Costs of the Nizhnij Novgorod, Republik Udmurtien, Union/Fostering of Conversion by the Dismantlement of Weapons and the Disposal Ekaterinenburg, Republik Belarus [Pro- European Union, March 1997 of Military Surplus, March 1996. blems and Prospects of Defense Conversion in the Commonwealth of Independent States: report 10: brief 7: Conversion Profiles of Selected Re-gions— Ksenia Gonchar, Research and Edward J. Laurance, The New Field of Nizhnii Novgorod, Udmurtiya, Development (R&D) Conversion in Russia, Micro-Disarmament: Addressing the Yekaterinburg, and Belarus], March 1995 May 1997 Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons, August 1996 report 3: report 11: Joseph Di Chiaro III (ed.), Conversion of Keith Cunningham, Base Closure and brief 8: the Defense Industry in Russia and Eastern Redevelopment in Central and Eastern Pawel Wieczorek and Katarzyna Europe, Proceedings of the BICC/CISAC Europe, July 1997 Zukrowska, Conversion in Poland: The Workshop on Conversion, 10-13 August Defense Industry and Base Redevelopment, 1994, April 1995 report 12: November 1996 Kiflemariam Gebrewold (ed.), report 4: Converting Defense Resources to Human brief 9: Keith Cunningham and Andreas Development, Conference Proceedings, Greg Bischak, US Conversion after the Klemmer, Restructuring the US Military October 1998 Cold War, 1990-1997, Lessons for Forging Bases in Germany: Scope, Impacts and a New Conversion Policy, July 1997 Opportunities, June 1995 brief 1: Ksenia Gonchar, Yevgeny Kuznetsov brief 10: report 5: and Alexander Ozhegov, Conversion of Yitzhak Shichor, Peaceful Fallout: China’s Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and the Post-Soviet Defense Industry: Implications Military Nuclear Complex to Civilian Use, Herbert Wulf (eds.), Military Conversion for Russian Economic Development, October 1997 for Social Development, July 1995 February 1995 brief 11: report 6: brief 2: Joseph Di Chiaro III, Reasonable Petra Opitz, Krisenmanagement in der Anke Habich, Werner Voß und Peter Measures: Addressing the Excessive russischen Rüstungsindustrie - Regionale und Wilke, Abhängigkeit der Werften im Accumulation and Unlawful Use of Small unternehmensbezogene Konversionsstrategien Ostseeraum von der Rüstungsproduktion Arms, August 1998 [Crisis Management in the Russian Defense [Dependence of Shipyards in the Baltic Sea Industry], October 1995. Region on Defense Production], March 1995 brief 12: Derek Boothby, The UNTAES Experience: Weapons Buy-back in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Croatia), October 1998

36 B·I·C·C publications

paper 1: paper 10: Jörn Brömmelhörster and John Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and Moses Kiggundu, Retrenchment Programs Frankenstein (eds.), Mixed Motives, Herbert Wulf, Demilitarization and in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for Uncertain Outcomes—Defense Conversion in Conversion, World Social Summit, Demobilization, July 1997 China, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, Copenhagen, March 1995 1997 paper 11: paper 2: Ian Davis and Steve Schofield, Upgrades forthcoming: Andreas Klemmer, United Nations and Surplus Weapons: Lessons from the UK Publications Related to the Subject of Disposal Agency, August 1997 report 13: Conversion: An Annotated David DeClerq, The Disposal of Small Bibliography, April 1995 paper 12: Arms and Light Weapons: A Survey and Susanne Kopte, Nuclear Submarine Practical Guide to Destruction Methodologies, paper 3: Decommissioning and Related Problems, Winter 1998/99 Yevgeny Kuznetsov (ed.), Learning to August 1997 Restructure: Studies of brief 13: Transformation in the Russian Defense paper 13: Yudit Kiss, The Transformation of the Sector, June 1996 Peter O'Meara Evans, Destruction of Defense Industry in Hungary, Winter 1998 Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China, paper 4: September 1997 Mersie Ejigu and Tekalign Gedamu, Conversion in Africa: Past Experience and paper 14: Future Outlook, June 1996 Ksenia Gonchar; Conversion within the Context of Economic Reform: The Case of paper 5: Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, May 1998 Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, Dutch Surplus Weapons, July books: 1996 Michael Brzoska and Werner Voss paper 6: (eds.), Auswirkungen und Alternativen des Joseph DiChiaro III, Conference on Eurofighter 2000 [Consequences and Dismantlement and Destruction of Nuclear, Alternatives of the Eurofighter 2000], Chemical and Conventional Weapons, 19-21 Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 1996 May 1996, Conference Summary, December 1996 BICC, Conversion Survey 1996. Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and paper 7: Demobilization, Oxford University Press, Irmgard Nübler, Human Resources UK, 1996 Development and Utilization in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs, BICC, Conversion Survey 1997. Global January 1997 Disarmament and Disposal of Surplus Weapons, Oxford University Press, UK, paper 8: 1997 Denise Spencer, Demobilization and Reintegration in Central America, March BICC, Conversion Survey 1998. Global 1997 Disarmament, Defense Industry Consolidation and Conversion, Oxford paper 9: University Press, UK, 1998 Stacy Larsen, An Overview of Defense Conversion in the Ukraine, June 1997 Ulrike Lindemann und Ulrich Schirowski, Truppenabbau und Konversion in NRW, Handbuch für Kommunen [Handbook for Communities in NRW], January 1996

B·I·C·C 37 About the Center

The Bonn International Center for analyzing the international conversion Conversion (BICC) is an independent process, such as its annual conversion non-profit organization dedicated to survey, its series of reports, briefs, and promoting and facilitating the process- papers, as well as its Internet service es whereby people, skills, technology, ConverNet. equipment, and financial and economic resources can be shifted away from the BICC was established in 1994 with defense sector and applied to alterna- generous support from the German tive civilian uses. Through research and State Government of North Rhine- analysis, technical assistance and ad- Westphalia (NRW). The Center’s vice, retraining programs, publications, shareholders include the states of and conferences, BICC supports North Rhine-Westphalia and governmental and non-governmental Brandenburg as well as the West- initiatives as well as public and private deutsche Landesbank Girozentrale sector organizations by finding ways to (WestLB), Düsseldorf/Münster and reduce costs and enhance effectiveness the Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft in the draw-down of military-related NRW. BICC cooperates with multi- activities. As a result, BICC contrib- lateral institutions, German and utes to improved post-conflict settle- international organizations and ment and structural development. foundations.

BICC’s six program areas are: Published by Defense expenditures and © BICC, Bonn 1998 Bonn International Center for Conversion budget reallocation Director: Dr. Herbert Wulf Publishing management: Michael Dedek An der Elisabethkirche 25 Civilian applications for D-53113 Bonn military R&D Germany Phone +49-228-911960 Fax +49-228-241215 Industrial conversion and E-mail: [email protected] restructuring Internet:http://bicc.uni-bonn.de

Demobilization and reintegration ISSN 0947-7322 Layout: Svenja Görgens Base closure and redevelopment Printed in Germany All rights reserved Dismantling and disposal of surplus weapons

BICC is an international think tank, which conducts research, makes policy suggestions and facilitates and medi- ates the conversion process at all levels—local, national and global. The Center provides consulting services to a range of public and private organi- zations. In order to function as an international clearing-house, BICC actively collects data and information on all conversion program areas, and produces a variety of publications