COLOMBIA: PEACE AT LAST? Latin America Report N°45 – 25 September 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. A WAR WITHOUT WINNERS ...................................................................................... 2 A. THE STATE OF THE ARMED CONFLICT.......................................................................................... 2 B. THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT STRATEGY .................................................................................... 4 C. THE INVISIBLE CONFLICT ............................................................................................................ 6 III. FARC: MILITARY SURVIVAL, POLITICAL DECAY ............................................. 9 A. COHESION AND IDENTITY ............................................................................................................ 9 B. THE REASONS FOR RESILIENCE .................................................................................................. 11 C. ESTRANGEMENT WITH SOCIETY ................................................................................................. 14 IV. OBSTACLES TO PEACE .............................................................................................. 16 A. POLITICAL RESISTANCE ............................................................................................................. 17 B. THE MILITARY ........................................................................................................................... 18 C. PARAMILITARY SUCCESSORS AND ENABLING NETWORKS ......................................................... 21 D. GUERRILLAS .............................................................................................................................. 23 V. FOUNDATIONS FOR SUCCESFUL TALKS ............................................................. 25 A. MILITARY RESTRAINT, IHL AND HUMANITARIAN GESTURES .................................................... 25 B. MANAGING THE DOUBLE POLITICAL AGENDA ........................................................................... 27 C. SOCIAL OWNERSHIP ................................................................................................................... 28 VI. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ........................................ 31 VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 32 APPENDICES A. MAP OF COLOMBIA .......................................................................................................................... 33 B. TEXT OF THE “GENERAL AGREEMENT FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE CONFLICT AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A STABLE AND LASTING PEACE” ......................................................... 34 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 37 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN SINCE 2009 ..... 38 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 39 Latin America Report N°45 25 September 2012 COLOMBIA: PEACE AT LAST? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS After decades of failed negotiations and attempts to defeat spawned the insurgency and that allows the guerrillas to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) participate in the construction of peace as social and politi- guerrillas and the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN) cal actors. The government operates from a position of militarily, a political solution to the Western Hemisphere’s strength. Its military advantage, if not decisive neverthe- oldest conflict may be in sight. Following a year of secret less appears irreversible; Santos, who is more sensitive contacts, formal peace talks with FARC are to open in than his predecessor to victims’ rights, has started to tackle Oslo in October 2012 and continue in Havana. They may problems such as rural development that are of direct con- be extended to the ELN. There seems a firmer willingness cern for the guerrillas, and his administration has acknowl- to reach an agreement, as the government realises military edged the state’s responsibility for some key human rights means alone cannot end the conflict and FARC appears to violations. It also still has a reasonably cohesive partner recognise that the armed struggle permits survival but little to deal with, avoiding the problems that can be envisaged else. With no ceasefire in place, both sides must act with if more years of heavy military pressure were to cause restraint on the battlefield to generate immediate humani- FARC to splinter. tarian improvements. And they will need to balance the requirements of fast, discreet negotiations and those of Nevertheless, the outcome depends on more than the will representativeness and inclusion. The government and the and negotiating skill of the parties. After 50 years of guer- guerrillas have the historic responsibility to strike a deal, rilla warfare, systematic human rights violations and indif- but only strong social and political ownership of that deal ference by both to the plight of rural areas, communities can guarantee that it leads to the lasting peace that has been in conflict regions no longer consider the guerrillas defend- elusive for so long. ers of their interests and have lost faith in the state’s capac- ity and willingness to solve their problems. Negotiations There are many challenges, but they are, on balance, less thus need to be sustained by the active participation and formidable than on previous occasions. Scepticism towards endorsement of civil society, notably of rural and indigenous the guerrillas remains widespread, and there is political communities. To lay the foundations for durable peace, opposition to the talks, most vocally and radically articu- talks will ultimately need to lead into a wider social pro- lated by former President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010). His cess aimed at tackling the problems affecting the country- discourse resonates strongly among large landowners and side that provide the backdrop for the conflict. Lasting other powerful regional actors with significant stakes and peace is also only possible on the basis of accountability a historical proclivity for using violence to defend their in- for the many grave abuses committed by all sides in the terests. But the large majority of Colombians back a peace conflict. The international community, represented during process, and mainstream political forces have endorsed it, the talks primarily by Norway, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile, though a failure to secure quick results could breathe new will need to stand by Colombia throughout, including as life into political resistance. The security forces are better it takes up the challenges of a post-conflict society. aligned with the civilian leadership than in the past and represented at the negotiation table, reducing risk of the Fears over peace talks are tactically exaggerated by their coordination failures between political and military agen- opponents. But those promoting a political settlement also das that have marred previous peace attempts. need to keep expectations in check. A deal would not elim- inate violence. It likely would fail to convince some FARC Broader conflict dynamics also encourage a political settle- elements to lay down arms, notably those deeply involved ment. With neither side likely to win by arms alone, both in the drugs trade. There would still be significant security have a strong incentive to negotiate. FARC is weakened threats from illegal armed groups rooted in the officially militarily, but an entire generation of its leaders now has demobilised paramilitaries and from other organised crimi- possibly its last opportunity to vindicate decades of strug- nal gangs. Nor can the socio-economic problems underlying gle in a peace deal that responds to some of the issues that the conflict be solved overnight. But ending the conflict Colombia: Peace at Last? Crisis Group Latin America Report N°45, 25 September 2012 Page ii with the guerrillas would give Colombia the best prospect 3. Ensure that any political settlement leads into a wider yet to come to grips with all these issues. Crisis Group social peacebuilding process aimed at meeting basic will accompany the process with analysis and recommen- rights and addressing Colombia’s rural problems in dations on the substance of the agenda. continuous dialogue with local communities. Ten years of intense counter-insurgency warfare have 4. Ensure buy-in of the security forces, including by: greatly weakened the combat strength of the guerrillas a) reducing judicial uncertainty through strengthening and pushed them into ever more remote rural hideouts, of the independence, capacities and impartiality substantially reducing the impact on the major urban cen- of military courts; and tres. But the conflict still costs lives on a daily basis, holds b) beginning discussion on eventual security sector back socio-economic development and impedes the con- reform and post-conflict mechanisms to provide solidation of a truly inclusive and pluralistic democracy. benefits to demobilising security personnel. The road ahead will not be short or smooth, but Colombia cannot afford to muff this chance