View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by NSU Works Nova Law Review Volume 18, Issue 3 1994 Article 7 Why Didn’t Nixon Burn the Tapes and Other Questions About Watergate Stephen E. Ambrose∗ ∗ Copyright c 1994 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr Ambrose: Why Didn't Nixon Burn the Tapes and Other Questions About Waterga Why Didn't Nixon Bum the Tapes and Other Questions About Watergate Stephen E. Ambrose* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ........................... 1775 II. WHY DID THEY BREAK IN? ........... 1776 III. WHO WAS DEEP THROAT? .......... .. 1777 IV. WHY DIDN'T NIXON BURN THE TAPES? . 1778 V. VICE PRESIDENT FORD AND THE PARDON ........ 1780 I. INTRODUCTION For almost two years, from early 1973 to September, 1974, Watergate dominated the nation's consciousness. On a daily basis it was on the front pages-usually the headline; in the news magazines-usually the cover story; on the television news-usually the lead. Washington, D.C., a town that ordinarily is obsessed by the future and dominated by predictions about what the President and Congress will do next, was obsessed by the past and dominated by questions about what Richard Nixon had done and why he had done it. Small wonder: Watergate was the political story of the century. Since 1974, Watergate has been studied and commented on by reporters, television documentary makers, historians, and others. These commentators have had an unprecedented amount of material with which to work, starting with the tapes, the documentary record of the Nixon Administration, other material in the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, plus the transcripts of the various congressional hearings, the courtroom testimony of the principal actors, and the memoirs of the participants. But despite the billions of words that have been written and said about * Stephen Ambrose is Boyd Professor of History and Director of the Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans. He is an editor of the Eisenhower papers and has authored more than a dozen books on history and political affairs, including NIXON: THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN 1962-1972. This essay comprises the edited remarks of Professor Ambrose delivered at the Watergate Era Symposium held at Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center in Fort Lauderdale, Florida on March 25-26, 1993. Published by NSUWorks, 1994 1 Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 7 1776 Nova Law Review Vol. 18 Watergate, fundamental questions about the scandal remain. These questions include: Why did the burglars break into the offices of the Democratic National Committee ("DNC")? Who was Deep Throat? Why didn't Nixon burn the tapes once Alexander Butterfield had revealed their existence? Did Nixon cut a deal with Vice President Gerald Ford-a resignation for a pardon? These are the questions I will take up in this essay. II. WHY DID THEY BREAK IN? The day after the arrest of the burglars in the offices of the DNC, Nixon scribbled some comments on a Ron Ziegler memo that characterized the break-in as a "third-rate burglary." Nixon wrote, "He [Ziegler] understated. Attempt at burglary. Bizarre business. There was no involvement whatsoever by W[hite] H[ouse] personnel." Thus did the cover-up begin, and to this day those words constitute Nixon's basic defense; he knew nothing about it and he could not for the life of him figure out why anyone would want to break into the DNC. In a lifetime of bold and brazen acts, this was the boldest and most brazen, as well as the most successful. Two decades later, Nixon's query still dominates discussion and investigation of Watergate. Why break into the DNC? Who on earth ordered such a foolish thing? The answer revolves around the strange relationship between Howard Hughes, Larry O'Brien and Richard Nixon. Hughes gave money to both the Democratic and Republican parties and, Nixon believed, had paid off a nine million dollar debt from Hubert Humphrey's 1968 campaign. Nixon knew that Hughes had O'Brien on his payroll. Nixon also knew that Hughes had, at various times over the preceding twenty-five years, given money to him [Nixon]--often large amounts, in cash. Further, Nixon had made some big money from Florida real estate investments made with Bebe Rebozo-and evidently Hughes was in on the operation, and Nixon was afraid that O'Brien knew about the whole scheme. In 1972, H.R. "Bob" Haldeman talked with White House aide Jeb Magruder about the puzzle of who ordered the break-in and why. Haldeman's handwritten notes of the conversation read: "Plan hatched here-Hunt, Liddy & Colson. Colson called Jeb twice-to get going on this thing. Specifically L. O'Brien info re Fla. dealings." Another Nixon defense is his question: Why should I have taken chances when I knew I was a sure-thing winner in the 1972 election? The effectiveness of the argument relies on the public's short and faulty memory. https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss3/7 2 Ambrose: Why Didn't Nixon Burn the Tapes and Other Questions About Waterga 1994] Ambrose 1777 In early 1972 Nixon was trailing Senator Edmond Muskie in the polls. His big lead did not come until after the Democrats nominated George McGovem-by which time he had already put the pressure on CREEP Chairman John Mitchell to get more intelligence on what O'Brien knew. Also remember, in 1968, Nixon had a twenty-eight point lead over Humphrey, but almost got beat. He was ahead of John Kennedy in 1960, too, only to lose. To sum up, in the spring of 1972, Nixon was by no means a certain winner and he wanted every edge he could get. "To this (lay," Haldeman said at a 1987 conference at Hofstra Universi- ty, "no one knows who ordered the break-in." That is true in the strictest sense-no one has ever found an order reading, "break into the DNC, signed RN." Nixon and his associates and defenders have raised all sorts of dark possibilities: that it was a CIA or JCS plot, or a John Dean/Al Haig plot, or that the Democrats set it up themselves. In my opinion, John Mitchell ordered the operation; his principal agent was Jeb Magruder; the operatives were men hired by Chuck Colson, G. Gordon Liddy and H. Howard Hunt; all these men were responding to unrelenting pressure from Nixon to find out what O'Brien knew. III. WHO WAS DEEP THROAT? Next question: Who was Deep Throat? Once again, I don't have an answer, only an opinion. Deep Throat was a composite character made up by Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward for dramatic purposes (and it surely worked). Their information came from a variety of sources, none of whom met them in underground garages in the middle of the night. This is based on my judgment that no one person in the Administration knew as much as Deep Throat supposedly knew. A more substantial question is: What was the role of the press in general, and Woodward and Bernstein in particular, in forcing Nixon's resignation? The media, naturally enough, thought that it was central, critical, and the sine qua non of the entire Watergate story. In my view, the press played a peripheral role. Had there been no press coverage, or no Washington Post investigative reporting, there still would have been a trial in Judge John Sirica's court, there still would have been the Ervin Committee Hearings, and there still would have been impeachment proceedings. What brought Nixon to resignation was not the press but his own conduct, as revealed by the constitutional process that was based on the separation of powers. The courts and the Congress did their jobs. The system worked. Published by NSUWorks, 1994 3 Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 7 1778 Nova Law Review Vol. 18 IV. WHY DIDN'T NIXON BURN THE TAPES? What many people believe to be the most puzzling question of all is actually the easiest to answer. The question is: When Butterfield revealed the existence of the tapes, why didn't Nixon pile them up on the White House lawn, call in the reporters, pour some gasoline over the tapes, say, "watch, you bastards!" and toss a match on the pile? John Connally urged him to do just that. Connally sent a message to Haldeman: "Please, Bob, use your influence to convince the President to bum the tapes .... Say they must be destroyed now that their existence has been made public." There was a perfect cover. Nixon could say that the conversations dealt with national security affairs and matters highly embarrassing to politicians from both parties. Since that was true, and since every politician who had been in the Oval Office since 1971 was at that moment racking his brain to remember what he had said there, a bonfire would have elicited protest and criticism, but it would not have destroyed the President. Nor would it have been illegal. Nixon regarded the tapes as his personal property, a position upheld by the precedent that any President's papers are his personal property, and a position upheld by the courts in 1992. As the tapes had not been subpoenaed, burning them would not be destroying evidence in a criminal case. Still, a bonfire would have raised another storm. Leonard Garment warned that it would forever seal an impression of guilt in the public mind. Spiro Agnew agreed with Garment.