Fixing Electoral Boundaries in India
Laws, Processes, Outcomes, and lmplications for Political Representation
EDITED BY MOHD. SANJEER ALAM AND K.C. SIVARAMAKRISHNAN
O~ORD UNIVERSITY PRESS j Contents
List of Tables and Figures vii Prefacl' xi
Introduction Mohd. Sa'ljeer Aillm and K.C. Sivaranuiurishnan
The Concept of Constituency 17 Andrew Rehftld
2 Drawing Electoral Boundaries in India: Institutions and Laws 46 SuvrajyoLi Gt!pta
3 Delimitation in India: A Politico-historical Overview 64 K.C. Sivamnwkrishttan
4 One Person, One Vote, Different Values: Comparing Delimitation Practices in India. Canada. the United Kingdom, and the United States 88 Ltsa Hanelley
5 Fourth Delimitation of Electoral Constituencies: A Critical Assessment 112 Sanjay Kumar vi I Contents
6 Identity, Identification, and Political Representation: The Missing Scheduled Tribes in Uttar Pradesh 133 A.K. Verma
7 Selection of Reserved Seats: Laws, Procedures, Practices, and Implications for Equality of Political Opportunity 148 Mohd. Sanjeer Alam
8 Delimitation and Political (Under)representation of Minorities: The Case of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh l67 Mirza Asmt'T Beg
9 Incumbency in Maharashtra Assembly Elections: Assessing the Impact of Delimitation 178 Ajit Karnie and Mala Lalvalli
10 Delimiting Boundaries of the Third Tier of Democracy: A Note 201 Bhanujoshi.
11 Socio-economic Profiles for India's Old Electoral Constituencies, 1971and 2001 217 Rikhil R. Bhavnani and FrancesclI ReftHtIIJensenius
12 Matching Census Tracts and Electoral Boundaries: The Bottom-up Aggregation Approach 230 Mohd. Sanjeer Alam
Bibliography 253 Index 263 Al1(mt tlte Editors and Cvntrilmlors 275 10
BHANU JOSHI
Delimiting Boundaries of the Third Tier of Democracy A Note"
here has been tremendous prolrlerauon of the third tier of democ- Tracy following the 7:1rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts (1')92). But despite two decades of luncuorung of the third tiers of democracy-c-gram panchayats, corporations, and municipalities-little is known about their electoral arrangements. Not only do the boundar- It'S of the lowest tiers of democracy remain unaligned with the map of first and second LitTS,the division of electoral constituencies for the third tier of government, unlike the first and second tiers, have remained unclear and under- researched. Against this backdrop, this chapter aims to address the followmg concerns (.I) how often and on what basis the boundaries of local bodies are drawn or redrawn; (b) who draw the boundaries and whether there is uniformity in the structures and processes involved m boundary delimitation across the Indian states as
, I would like to thank Pranav Sidhwaru lor his assistance with this chapter. 1 would also like to acknowledge the comments from, and discussions with, Sanjeer Alam, Partha Mukhopadhyay, K C; Sivararnakrishnan. Yogendra Yadav, two anonymous referees, and participants In a seminar at the Centre fur Study of Developing Societies (CSDS). 2021 Fixing Ele,'LOral Boundaries in [ndia in the case of Lok Sabha and assembly constituencies; and (c) how the issues of group representation (for example, the Scheduled Castes [SCs] and Scheduled Tribes [STs J) are addressed, Although it would be ideal to look at both rural and urban local bodies, this chapter, nevertheless, focuses on the latter.
The Urban Local Bodies and Electoral Arrangements
India has had a history of local governments pre-73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts (CAAs). However, the reluctance and resistance of bureaucrats and elected representatives at higher levels towards a true devolution of power has combined to weaken local governments (Kumar 2006). The phenomenon of frequent supersession of elected municipalities has added to the problem' The process of decentralization in India got a major fillip with the enactment of the twin CAAs-the 73rd and the 74th-in early 1990s, broadly based on the recommendations of the Asbok Mehta Cornmittee.! Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 64th Constitutional Amendment Bill (precursor to the 73rd and 74th CAA). the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, said:
Till now there have been weaknesses in the structure of our democracy because although the superstructure is strong, the foundation has been weak" .. Once we accord to democracy in the Panchayats the same sanc- tity as is now enjoyed by Parliament and the State Legislatures, we will be opening the doors ro the participation in democratic institutions of something like seven lakh elected represenrarives."
1 Consultation Paper on Decentralisation and Municipalities (2002), Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, 2002 (pp. 1009--72), Delhi: Controller of Publications.
Z The nnd and 73rd Constitutional Amendment Bills were separately in- troduced in the Lok Sabha on 16 September 1991. The Bills were referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) which submitted its report in July 1992. These Bills were then again brought into the house on 1 December 1992 and passed on 23 December 1992. They received the presidential assent in April 1993, and were renumbered as 73rd and 74th CA.A5. 3 64th Constitutional Amendment Bill of 1989, Speech inthe sth Lok Sabha, Lok. Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 15 May 1989 (pp. 3D-I). Delimiting Boundaries of the Third Tier of Democracy 1203
The essential understanding to this speech in general, and the legislation in particular, was to have a new breed of elected representatives who would be closer to the people and better able to fulfil their aspirations. Given the focus of these amendments to expand the funnel of representation and to have regular elections, the 73rd and 74th CAAs were recognized as a watershed in the history of local governments for various reasons." As far as urban local bodies are concerned, the 74th CAA institutionalized elections to be held every five years. Mote importantly, it did not make allowance for hiatus between the forma- tions of two consecutive municipalities. It also went ahead to provide reservations to women and backward classes, an issue which remains contentious till date in the state and national elections. However, with the focus being political legitimacy accorded to the local governments, not much thought was given to the functional and financial domains of these governments.' Given the commitment to conduct regular elections, the 64th and 65th Amendment Bills (precursors to the 73rd and 74th Bills) vested the responsibility of conducting election in the Election Commission of India (ECI). However, this provision was given up in the later version of the Bills. Eventually, the responsibility of conducting election was finally vested in a new institution, which was to be called the state elec- tion commissions (SECs).6 The SECs, under Articles 243K (73rd CAA) and 243ZA (74th CAA), have been vested with similar powers as the ECI under Article 324(1), which is, '[tjhe superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all
4 Also, see the 'Statement of Objects and Reasons', available at http://mcliacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend74.htm(accessed8 November 2011).
5 This is evident from the parliamentary discussion on the two bills-once in 19805 and then, again, in early 1990s-where the rhetoric and arguments for and against were contested on the political identity and not so much on the functional and financial domains. For more information on the behind- the-scenes account of the two bills, see Sivaramakrishnan (2000b). 6 The version of the bills, as presented by the P.V Narasimha Rao gov- ernment, proposed for the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) of the state to con- duct the elections, which was vetted by the ]PC. However, this was changed in the final version of the bills when they were passed. Discussions with K.C. Sivaramakrishnan suggest that the then Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), T.N. Seshan, was against the idea of ECl or its offices being used for the purposes of conducting the local elections. 2041 Fixing Electoral Bounaaries in India elections to the Panchayats (and Municipalities in case of urban) shall be vested in a State Election Commission consisting of a State Election Commissioner to be appointed by the Governor'." While there are no ambiguities in the Constitution about the role of SEC in preparation of electoral rolls and conduct of elections, it is silent on the powers of the SECs for delimiting electoral divisions for local governments. The Constitution (under Article 246, Clause 3) empowers the state legisla- tures to enact laws with respect to all matters relating to, or in connec- tion with, elections to the municipalities. in other words, it is for the state governments to layout the scheme of delimitation of electoral constituencies for the local governments. The states were given wider latitudes in matters of local governments with a view to strengthen the federal structure of the Constitution.
Delimitation of Electoral Divisions for Local Bodies: Issues and Practices
The power to divide an urban local body into territorial constituencies is derived from the provisions contained in the respective State Municipal Acts (Maiti and Joshi 2011). Table 10.1 summarizes the powers of dif- ferent authorities with regard to matters such as the conduct of elec- tion, updating of electoral rolls, delimitation of electoral divisions, and reservation rosters. It can be observed that out of the 28 states in India", the power to carry out the delimitation and the reservation exercise for the urban local bod- ies stays with the states governments in as many as 21 states." Thus, the SECs delimit the territorial constituencies for the conduct of urban local elections in only six states. These states include Maharashtra, Gujarat, Bihar, jharkhand, West Bengal, and Arunachal Pradesh. This group of
7 Article 243ZA(1): 'The superintendence, direction and control of the prepa· ration of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Municipalities shall be vested in the State Election Commission referred to in article 243K (2) Subject to provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, make provision with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to the Municipalities:
S Information is for the period before the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh.
9 1include Delhi in this group since Lieutenant Governor is an extension of the central government. TABLE 10.1 Authorities Responsible for Delimiting Electoral Boundanes for Urban Local Bodies in India
State Conduct of Revision of Delimitauon of Reservation Election Hlectoral Rolls Electoral Divisions
1 Kerala SEC SEC DC of Kerala# DC of Kerala 2 NCT of Delhi SEC SEC Lt Governor Lt Governor 3 Gujarat SEC SEC SEC SeC 4 Maharashtra SEC SEC SEC SEC West Bengal SEC SEC SEC Stan: Covernrnent 6 jharkhand SEC SEC SEC. SEC 7 Arunachal Pradesh SEC SEC ShC SEC 8 Bihar SEC SFC SEC SEC 9 Karnataka SEC SEC State Government Slate Covernrnent 10 Odishn SEC SEC State Government State Government 11 Madhya Pradesh SEC SEC Stale Government Start· Government 12 Punjab SEC SEC State Government State Government 13 Haryana SEC SEC State Government State Government 14 Goa SEC SEC State Government State Government 15 Jammu & Kashmir CEO CEO State Government State Government 16 Manipur SEC SEC State Government State Government 17 Sikkim SEC SEC State Government State Government 18 Tripura SEC SEC State Government State Government 19 Rajasthan SEC SEC State Government State Government
(Cont,t.) TABLE 10.1 (Contd.)
20 Uttar Pradesh SEC SEC State Government Stale Government 21 Meghalaya SEC SEC State Government State Government 22 Nagaland SEC SEC State Government State Government 23 Uttarakhand SEC SEC Stare Government State Government 24 Mizoram SEC SEC State Government State Government 25 Tamil Nadu SEC SEC State Government State Governmem 26 Andhra Pradesh SEC SEC State Government Stare Government 27 Himachal Pradesh SEC SEC State Government State Government 28 Chhattisgarh SEC SEC State Government State Government India-Parliamentary Elections ECT ECl DC of Tndia* DC of [ndia India-Assembly Elections ECl ECl DC of India DC of India
SOIiTCe: Respective State Municipal Acts. Notes: 1. # DC of Kerala is headed by the State election commissioner. 2. * DC of India is established by an act as passed by the Parliament. 3. NCT = National Capital Territory: SEC = State Election Commission: ECI = Election Commission of India; CEO = Chief Electoral Officer; DC = Dclimiration Commission. Deltmiling Boundaries oj lIte Third Tier of Democracy 1207 states bears similarities partly owing to the common past. For instance, the urban local bodies in Gujarat and Maharashtra continue to be gov- erned by the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. Bihar and Jharkhand have had the same legislation as they were united when the Municipal Act was enacted. West Bengal has historically had better implementation of the 74th CAA relative to other Indian slates. Although [he power to delimit electoral constituencies for local bodies rests with governments in most of states, there are some exceptions to this pattern. For example. Kerala is the lone state where delimitation of electoral constituencies for local bodies is carried out by a Delimitation Commission (DC) headed by the state election commissioner.'? It was set up in 2{){)6. consisting of the state election commissioner as the chairman and four offi cers, not below the rank ofSccrcrary to Government, as members. Karnataka has adopted a mixed approach. The Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 empowers the state government to delimit and reserve wards in urban local bodies, but for local bodies in rural areas, it is the deputy commissioner who has the authority to delimit and
reserve the constituencies. II Similarly. in case of Gujarat, Maharasbtra, Arunachal Pradesh. and West Bengal. while the SEC divides and reserves the city wards and determines the extent of every ward, it is the state government that determines the number of wards in the city and the number of reserved consntuencies.'! In Tamil Nadu, the state government delimits and reserves seats through the city commissioner in case of Chennai district and district commissioners m case of other districts.P Odisha has taken a different path. In this state, the district magistrate is mandated to carry our the delirnitation and reservation exercises for all the urban local bodies. There are also a few states in which delimitation of electoral divi sions for local government is done by an ad hoc body. For example, in the states of Haryana and Punjab, the state governments constitute an ad hoc body consisting of Director, Local Bodies (as the chairman); the deputy commissioner of the district: president or administrator of
10 The Kcrala Panchayat Raj ACL, 1994.
II Sections 7 and 10 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1964.
12 Sections 9. 9A, and 10 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act. 1888.
13 Districr Municipal Act. 1920; the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act. 1919; the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971; and Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971. 2081 Fixing Electoral BOllndaries in India
the committee concerned; and the executive officer or secretary of the committee concerned. In the case of Delhi. the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi appoints a delimitation committee for delimitation of wards. It is thus quite clear that there are great variations in the structures that are assigned the task of delimiting constituencies for urban local bodies across the country. The lack of uniformity in the structures and processes underlying delimitation has led to some important con- sequences. First, differences in structures are linked to differentials in efficiency. In some states. delimitation exercise is delayed, and so are the elections. In some other states, the delimitation exercise is not car- ried out at regular intervals. leading to violation of the basic tenet of democracy. that is, one person-one vote-one value. Second. the question of reservation as mandated in the 74th CAA is closely linked to delimitation. The issue of reservation in local bodies is far more complex than that for state and national elections. While at the national and state levels constituencies are reserved onJy for the SCs and the STs. the list of social groups for which constituencies are reserved for urban local bodies expands to include the Other Backward Classes (OBCs). women. etc. In absence of actual population figures of OBCs. fixing the number of seats to be reserved for this social group remains a hotly contested issue. Moreover, the OBCs are a heterogeneous group and their relatively wealthier and better-educated members are not eligi- ble for state-sponsored affirmative action policy." While beating a bunch of writ petitions filed against the process of delimitation and Backward Class enumeration by the commissioner of Creater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (CHMC). the Andhra Pradesh High Court observed in . 2009: 'Viewed from any angle, failure to identify and exclude the creamy layer from among the BC voters before determining the Socially and Economically Backward Class (SEBC) voters for the purpose of reserva- tion of seats under section 5(2) (b) ofHMC Act is clearly illegal,'!" This
)4 This category is also referred to as 'creamy layer'. The term was intro- duced by the Sattanatban Commission in 1971, which directed that the 'creamy layer' should be excluded from the rese.rvations (quotas) of civil posts and ser- vices granted to the OBCs.
15 This is in consonance with an earlier judgement, Citannala Ramachan· dra Rao v. State oj A.P., 2000(2) ALT655. wherein the petitioner contested the way in which the enumeration was done to determine the extent of the wards determined for the Backward Classes in Hyderabad. Deilmiting BOllm/nnes of the Third Tier of Democracy 1209 dispute with regard to reservation of scats led to a deadlock and delayed the elections by more than two years. In order to avoid complexities, some states have caped the reserved scats for OBCs. For example, Maharashrra has fixed 27 per cent of the total wards to be reserved for the OBCs, regardless of the actual proportion of their population.!" Given the fact that conducting regular elections without delay and inclusion of the marginalized groups into mainstream electoral politics constitute the soul of the decentralization policy. leaving these ISSUCS to the discretion of the state governmcnts appears to have impaired the functioning of the local bodies.
Outcomes of Delimitation
The idea behind conducting periodic delimitation of constituencies has been to rationalize population of the territorial constituencies so thai, over a period of time. there is an adjustment to demographic changes that acknowledges the universal principle of parity in the value of votes, a central tenet of democracy. Various studies, includ- ing the ones in this book. have shown how delay or non conduct of delimitation in the national and state elections has resulted in over and under-representation of population However, as far as the local bodies are concerned, this issue has not attracted any worthwhile auention. In this section, an attempt IS made to see how equal the constituencies are for local bodies. While it is not possible to examine the issue of population parity of all urban local bodies here, a sample of few cities may indicate what the situation is likely to he In what follows. five cities have been taken up to analyse population across wards wrthin the urban local bodies." Achieving perfect population equalny across constituencies IS not feasible. Given the impossibility of perfect population parity, some
I. In a more recent case, AjiUaiswll/ v. State of UP, (2011) 4UPL]Z46(AII) DB, the court said, 'non-availability of data on caste cannot however, be a ground to either delay election and deny the constitutional rights of proportional representation'.
17 The data were gathered by janagraaha for Bangaiore, Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS) for Hyderabad, and Institute of Social Studies (ISS) for Kolkara for a Centre for Policy Research (CPR) study The data for other cines have been collated by the author l10 I Fixing Electoral Boulldanes ill Intlw
TJ\BI.F. 10.2 Proportion of City Wards wuh Variance over ± 10 per cent City General Backward Other Overall Corporations Classes Reserved 2 3 4 s
Mumhai 44 54 33 42 Bengaluru 63 67 64 64 Hyderabad 83 80 79 80 Kolkata 83 80 82 Oc:lhi 61 57 59
S,HIYCt'· Author's calculations. data from various sources.
amount of population variance is always allowed, called 'limit of toler- ance'. The DC of lndia allowed ±l 0 per cent variance from the average in delimiting parliamentary and assembly constituencies. The same principle can be applied to local bodies as populations are not evenly distribured across wards. It would be also interesting to know how general and reserved wards fare in terms of voter parity Are reserved wards worse than the general wards or vice versa? It can be observed (from Table 10.2; Figures 10.1-10.5) that the wards (electoral divisions) remain far from equal in terms of voters.
45% 40% 35% ." 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5%
0% +-<-;---=2':':0%""-'-=-20%=-''-0---:-10%:=-1--1'"'0%'-:-'-0 ':':O%:-r-::O%"'·-'O-"'I 0%:-:-'-1-=0%"'-,0""""20%'-'--'''---=-=--' 10.39 12.99 28.57 27.27 11.69 11.48 13.11 18.03 27.87 22.95 3.37 12.36 38.20 29.21 11.24
PIGURE 10.1 Population Variance across Elecwral Divisions: Mumbai City Corporation Sources: Compiled by author from data obtained from Census of India. Primary Census Abstract. 2001, and State Election Commissions of Mumbai, Bengaluru, Ilydcrabad. Kolkata, Delhi Dellllllting BOllluiltnes of the TIIird Tier- of DClI10LYacy 1211
••••• Ge:;.:n;__ -I 45% - B.tckward Classes 40% Other Rewrved 35% 30% •••....•...... • ]5'lt. ".-:...." ....., 20% 15% 10% .•....(".." . 5% 0% 1- .:> <= 20% -20%to-lo%1-10% to 0%
I'I(;UIU'10.l Population Variance across Hlertoral DiviSlom l lydcrabad City
Corp, 11' .iuon
S"UllL'. Coruprlcd by author from d.lt.1 Ohl,lilwtllrom Census ol lndia, Prull Gen ----l Batkward Classes 30% ° Oh1 er Reserve 25% ...... 00· _o 'II • ..,...._. 20% -.- _. ",. __ ...... :.... _. , 15% _. _. " _ ___;. ....-- 10% -- " .. 5% -20%10-10% -10%100% >20% 11.21 1776 22.43 22.73 9.09 13.64 16.00 24.00 8.00 FIGURE 10.3 Population Valiance across Electoral DiVisions: Bengaluru City Corporation Sourer: Compiled by author from data obtained from Census of india, Primary Census Abstract, 2001. and State Blccnon Commissions of Murnbai, Bengaluru, I Iyderabad, Kolkata, Delhi. 2121 Fixiltg Electoral Boundmies in India -. Gen 40% - Other Reserved 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% S% O%~------~------~------.------.-----~r-----~ <=-20% -20%10-10% -10%toO% 0%t010% 10%1020% >20% 35.05 14.43 8.25 825 6.19 27.84 29.S5 15.91 13.64 6.82 455 29.5S FIGURE 10.4 Population Variance across Electoral Divisions: Kolkata City Corporation SOIIl-ce: Compiled by author from data obtained from Census of India, Primary Census Abstract. 2001, and State Election Commissions of Mumbai, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Kolkara, Delhi. _. Gen 4S% -- Other Reserved 30% 25% .; .;' 20% 15% 10% 5% O%~------'------T------~ <=-20% >20%-10%toO% 16.07 29.46 17.86 16.25 20.63 11.88 FIGURE 10.5 Population Variance across Electoral Divisions: Delhi City Corporation Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Census of India, Primary Census Abstract, 2001, and State Election Commissions of Murnbai, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Delhi. Delimiting BOllndariesof the Third Tier of Democracy 1213 In Kolkara, Hyderabad, Bcngaluru, and Delhi. overwhelming major- ity of wards are either larger or smaller than the average by over ±10 per cent. A little deeper look at the size of electorate across wards suggests that there are many wards in these cities which are twice as large as the average size of electorate of a ward. In Hyderabad, such wards include Hydernagar (Ward No. 124). Mothinagar (Ward No. 119). and Chanda Nagar (Ward No. 114). Interestingly, the size of electorates in wards reserved for Backward Classes tends to he disproportionately large as compared to those under the general category. Overall. the situation is slightly better in Mumbai than other cities. with about 42 per cent of wards having a deviation over tl0 per cent from [he average size of electorate Why does Mumbai fare better? Is it because of the SEC that delimits the boundaries of Mumbai City Corporation? It could have been said so if other cities would have differ- ent authorities to delimit wards boundaries. But the results from other CIties where SECs delimit wards boundaries are different. Simply put. it is difficult 10 make a case out of the dchrrutarion outcomes in Mumbai that ifsECs arc charged with the delimitation exercise across states. the results would be better. Clearly, the delimitation of electoral divisions for local bodies is a faulty process. Due attention is not paid to the principle of' equality of electorates'. Let us now tum to another equally important issue. that is. non conduct of elections as a result of complete opaqueness on the part of state governments in matters related to delimitation and reservation rosters. To illustrate this. two case studies ofBengaluru and Hyderabad are cited here. The two cities are selected simply because of availabil- ity of some relevant information. These case studies bring to the fore the fact that arbitrary actions and bureaucratic inertia often result in prolonged litigation and arbitration by the court. which in tum effect regularity of elections. Bcngaluru City Corporation The Bengaluru Municipal Corporation was constituted under Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. After the 74th CAA, two rounds of elections were held in Bengaluru. The first round of election was held in 1996 and the second in 2001. The third round 2141 Fixing Electoral Boundaries in Intiia of elections was due in November 2006 but the stare government planned to expand the Bengaluru Mahanagar Palike (BMP) to include municipalities and town panchayats of the adjoining areas. On 19 January 2007, Bruhat (Greater) Bengaluru Mahanagar Palike (BBMP) was officially formed by merging 100 wards of BMP, along with seven city munidpal councils (one town municipal council and 110 villages around Beogaluru dty). The total area of Bengaluru hence increased from the 226 sq km to nearly 800 sq km under BBMP 18 However, the first elections to the reconstituted corpora- tion were delayed on various grounds. Ideally, after the term of the council got over on November 2006, an elected corporation should have been in place. However, the state government and the SEC dragged their feet until the Karnaraka High Court set deadlines (2 October 2008, 9 March 2009, and 31 July 2009) for conducting the BBMP elections. The elections to the BBMP were delayed for nearly two-and-half-years on the pretext that the SEC did not have wards (the BBMP was increased from 100 to 147 and then 198 wards) delimited aod that the state government had not provided the former with a roster to reserve the wards as per the law. Since the BBMP had been expanded, the elections could not be conducted on the roster for previous year (Idiculla 2009). The HIgh Court stayed the ward reservation guidelines issued by the state government because the latter sought to reserve the wards based 00 the SC/ST population of the assembly constituencies and not as per the SC/ST population of BBMP wards. The elections were finally conducted in 2010 after a delay of nearly four years. 19 Hyderabad Municipal Corporation: The Question of Creamy Layer In Hyderabad, the erstwhile Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (MCH) was renamed GHMC. following the merger of many urban local bodies. With this, the area of the municipal corporation 18 Government of Karnataka, notification, No. UDD 92 MNY 2006, 2 November 2006. 19 The elections were held on 28 March 2010 and the counting happened on 5 April 2010. DdmllLing BIHHI'/liries of till' third Tier of Democracy 1215 increased to 800 sq kms. The MCH's term ended in 2007. With the reconstitution of MCH as GHMC ill 2008, various leaders across the political spectrum as well as other political and social activists approached the HIgh Court and filed publtc Interest litigarions (PILs) questioning the creamy layer of Backward Classes and reservation of certain wards. The I [igh Court admitted the cases and directed the stare government not to conduct the elections until the cases were disposed. Interestingly. the GHMC first cued festivals, and then den- gU(·. as reasons IDr delay in elections (Express News Service 2009). It was towards the close of 2009 th.u the Supreme Court quashed the stay put by the lligh Court and allowed the GHMC to conduct the elections. Similarly, in 2014. the elections to the GHMC were delayed ag,lin because of non-delimitation of the wards The GHMC. again, blamed the stall' government for not supplying the rcscrvanon roster [() conduct elect ions.e" Chcnnai Innovates but Compromises Parity A new innov.uive strategy was adopted for delimitation of the Chcnnai Municipal Corporation The corporation W to We have nOI received any communication from the g()vernment and the de-limitation of wards is not in our agenda tor now', Somesh Kumar. the Com- missioner of GHMC was quoted. See Times News Network (2014). 21 b I fIXing ElfelM,I' B"lmdarit'.~ '" IlI,ha read: 'Wards have to be delimited based 011 factors such as population, area, revenue erc ' (Karthikeyan 2012), In brief, wards were to remain unequal in terms of population 1ft.* The central thought behind the Idea of local governments has been to deepen democracy, to give more power to people in deciding matters that affect their everyday lite. Bur despite the fact that local governments too arc constitutional bodies and integral to the democratic system, they remain .1S a separate cnut y. Not only do they remain unaligned with the uppl'r tiers of democracy, there arc also different structures and rules for dehnuung electoral drvisions wirhin them. While the prin- ciple of equality in franchise is the primary criterion in drawing elec- toral boundaries for upper tHTS, I he same hardly applies to dehmuation of' electoral boundaries for tilt' third tier of democracy. A!'.a result, the size of electorate across wards vanes a great dcal.Icading to under/ over enfranchisement, To put it a little differently, it is a gross violation of the notion of one person-one vote- one value', This problem will remain .15 long as the third tier ofdemocracy is regarded as the exclusive domain of the state governments io legislate over or usc discretionary powers in shaping the structures and func tioning of the local governments It would not only be ideal but also uf greater benefit to democracy if the electoral boundaries of different tiers of democratic governance map onto each other, and rhc principle of equality 111 franchise IS maintained m all of them To conclude, the aspect of how to divide territories tor local governments calls for the urgent aucntion of scholars and other stakeholders: •and it requires meticulous thoughts as well as innovative approaches. The sooner the problem is overcome, the bcuer it is for the health of democracy.