Pg/Msc/10/52438 Being a Research Project

PG/MSC/10/52438

BEING A RESEARCH PROJECT PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTERS OF SCIENCE DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA

MARCH, 2012. i

EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF SECURITY AGENCIES IN 2011 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA

RESEARCH PROJECT

JOEL TOPE EBENEZER

PG/MSC/10/52438

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE ( MSc) DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION WITH SPECIALIZATION ON HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

MARCH, 2012

APPROVAL PAGE

This research project has been approved for the Department of Public Administration and local government, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

………………………… ………………………….. DR M. O. IKEANYIBE PROF. FAB. O. ONAH SUPERVISOR H.O.D

DATE………………… DATE……………………..

……………………… …………………………… PROF. E.C EZEANI EXTERNAL EXAMINER DEAN OF FACULTY DATE………………….. DATE……………………

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that Joel Tope Ebenezer Pg/Msc/10/52438 has written this project under our guidance and supervision and to the best of our knowledge, his work is original and he did acknowledge all secondary information and materials contained therein.

I therefore approve the project report for and on behalf of the Department of Public Administration and Local Government, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

…………………….. ………………………… DR M. O. IKEANYIBE DATE SUPERVISOR

…………………… ……………………….. PROF FAB. O. ONAH DATE H.O.D

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my father, my helper, my defender, and friend, God

Almighty the three in one.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My gratitude goes to God Almighty, who made the accomplishment of this project a reality. I must also express my heartfelt gratitude to all my lecturers at the department of Public Administration and Local Government. Their commitment and selflessness is worthy of note and emulation.

I wholeheartedly appreciate the contributions of my supervisor Dr Okey

Marcellus Ikeanyibe, who, without his meticulous and rigorous perusal of the project work, the present quality of research work would not have been achieved.

Also the ceaseless supply of research materials from Mr Obinna, my former roommate is also highly appreciated, may God bless him.

My sincere gratitude, goes to my wife Roselyn Iyehi Joel for her unflinching support and untiring proofreading of my research work.

I also appreciate the moral support and prayers of my children, Martha

Olufemi, Barnabas Olutobi, James Jesutobi, Oluwayinka, and Comfort

Ifeoluwa. Thank you all and God bless you.

Joel T.E

Abstract

The role of security agencies in the management of elections in Nigeria occupies a significant and strategic position in the election process, and, by implication, the consolidation of electoral democracy. Since such agencies play significant roles in organising democratic elections, their actions and inactions could make or mar elections. Owing to this glaring fact, this study was aimed at ascertaining the impact of the role of security agencies in Nigeria elections, using the 2011 general elections as a case study. However, the study also tried to investigate what brought about the inefficiency of the security agencies during the 2011 election in Nigeria and to discover what constitutes the unfavourable environment for the security agencies during the 2011 General elections. It was also aimed at discovering if there is any significant relationship between the role of the security agencies and the success of 2011 Nigeria General elections. The study started with the introduction where the researcher discussed the background of the study and it also embodied the statement of the problem and the objectives of the study, significance, scope and limitations of the study. It continued with the second chapter where the major focus was on reviewing the works of other scholars that has contributed to the subject of discussion. It progressed to the third chapter that constitutes the study area and the research methodology. Chapter four focused on the data presentation and analysis using statistical methods. It also encompassed the testing of the hypotheses formulated for the study and that paved way for chapter five which is the concluding chapter.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval Page ...... i Dedication ...... ii Acknowledgment ...... iii Table of Contents ...... iv

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background to the Study...... 1 1.2 Statement of the Problem...... 5 1.3 Objectives of the Study ...... 7 1.4 Significance ...... 8 1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study ...... 9

CHAPTER TWO 2.1 Literature Review ...... 11 2.1.0 Introduction ...... 11 2.1.1 The Concept of Election ...... 11 2.1.2 Electoral Process as a Concept...... 14 2.1.3 Overview of Nigeria’s Electoral Process...... 17 2.1.4 Role of Security Agencies in Nigeria Elections ...... 27 2.1.5 Problems Encountered by Security Agencies in Nigeria Elections...... 30 2.1.6 Ways of Enhancing the Effectiveness of Security Agencies in Nigeria Elections...... 32 2.2 Theoretical Framework ...... 39 2.3 Hypotheses ...... 43 2.4 Operationalization of Key Concepts...... 43 2.41 Methodology ...... 45 2.4.2 Data gathering Instruments ...... 45 2.4.3 Population of Study...... 45 2.4.4 Sample of Study ...... 46 2.4.5 Sampling Procedure ...... 46 2.4.6 Method of Data Analysis ...... 47

CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON 2011 GENERAL ELECTIONS...... 48

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 4.0 Introduction ...... 55 4.1 Data Presentation ...... 55 4.1.1 Presentation and Analysis of Personal Data of Respondents ...... 55

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4.1.2 Age Distribution of Respondents...... 56 4.2 Presentation and Analysis of the Substantive Data...... 60 4.3Findings and Discussion of Findings ...... 76

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5.1 Summary ...... 79 5.2 Recommendations ...... 80 5.3 Conclusion ...... 82 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 84 APPENDIX ...... 88

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

An election is a contest for legitimate power that can be described as a competition, fought within a political forum. It is important in this context to recognise that elections do not avoid confrontation, but rather, focus on its management and containment within accepted boundaries.

In practice, the assurance of equitable security during an electoral process is essential to retaining the participants’ confidence and commitment to an election. Consequently, security is both integral to the goal of an election and an inseparable part of the electoral process.

There is no single model of elections or democracy that is universally applicable to all countries. An election is unique and defined, not only by the electoral rules, but also shaped by the social values, politics, religions, history and culture of the people. In the same way, the security of an election is unique to the circumstances in which it is conducted. The stakes of any given election are different even if it is held periodically in the same country due to the changing forces that shape the national interest and corresponding political agenda (Adejumobi, 2007).

Similar to a sporting event, the rivalry between opposing teams entails competition within an accepted set of rules, but does not allow for the use of violence to seek victory. Extending on this comparison, if violence does occur, it can lead to the disqualification of players (candidates), teams (political

2 parties), an amendment of the results or the abandonment of the competition altogether. As such, the emergence of electoral violence is not a result of the process being followed, but signals a critical departure from the accepted rules that govern the process (Ezeani, 2007).

At the beginning of this 21st century, the system of government chosen by a great majority of countries on the planet is known as democracy. Whether it is the direct form practised in the city-states of ancient Greece or its current representative form, citizens have always resorted to elections to implement democracy. Better still, since the third wave of democratization which began in

Southern Europe in the mid 70s, elections have become the major feature of democracy to the extent that not only is it impossible to imagine a democratic regime without elections, but also there is now a real risk of confusing the holding of regular, reasonably competitive and transparent elections with democracy.

However, election as a mode of electing people to control State Power, does not bring only benefits and is not without risks for democracy, especially when it is new. In fact, elections generally have their own characteristics which make them a potential source of insecurity, conflict and instability for the democratic system as a whole if they are not well managed. More specifically, the issue of security during the electoral process is one of the major problems which arises in the management of elections in new democracies especially those of West Africa. The issue of security during the implementation of the

3 electoral process poses major problems to new democracies. In fact, the issue of security during elections can come up at all stages of the electoral process meaning the pre-electoral, electoral and post-electoral phases. Its importance is such that it involves almost all players in the electoral process ranging from ordinary citizens to leaders of public institutions. Sometimes beyond the said stakeholders, the issue of security during elections involves actors outside

(regional or non-regional) the country where elections are being held. It happens sometimes that within the same country various group of citizens present various degrees of vulnerability to insecurity during the electoral process.

In Nigeria, and probably elsewhere in the world, the legal framework for the management of elections is potentially one of the major sources of insecurity and instability. In fact, a misuse of this legal framework such as the deliberate manipulation of these laws by those who are in charge of its management10 and/or reckless use of this legislation is likely to lead to insecurity, violence, instability and sometimes call into question the political system itself. Thus, the legal framework can be diverted from its normal objective for other purposes.

The legal framework can prevent certain categories of people from enjoying fully the rights to participate in the management of their country’s affairs through the electoral process. In fact, electoral laws can contribute to the exclusion from the electoral process citizens who under normal circumstances should have the right to participate.

The legal framework can also be exploited to change election results and pave the way for the seizure of power. Most often, it is the president or the contestant in the majority party who, using his majority in parliament, manipulates the legal framework to maintain himself in power or strengthen his majority in parliament. This involves, for instance, the revision of the

Constitution and part or the entire electoral code or texts regulating the electoral process to create conditions conducive for the election or re-election of the incumbent president. This can also involve exploiting the legal framework with the view to reinforcing parliamentary majority.

Another problem encountered by security forces during elections is the use of ammunitions by political thugs. Our experience in the recently concluded elections indicate that there is an unbridled flagrancy in the smuggling and use of arms and ammunition by political thugs and party supporters. The result has been that political opponents are either intimidated or outrightly killed or injured.

The implication of all this is that illegal arms get into the hands of unauthorised persons who used them for criminal activities. Resources which ordinarily would have been spent on developmental projects are spent combating such crimes or repairing damages caused by these hoodlums. Worse still the economic community are put on edge and many investors are scare away by the apparent lack of security for their investment

The 2011 election were characterized by electoral violence, however the level of unbridled use of fire arms, were not as high as the previous elections, that were mostly characterized by unmitigated violence and confusion particularly in the Easter part of Nigeria.

The security agencies were more proactive in dealing with issues of insecurity during the 2011 election in Nigeria.

However, in some cases there were evidences of inefficiency on the part of security agencies that resulted in serious security challenges during the 2011 election in Nigeria.

The foregoing is tantamount to a threat to our national security. The recent episode in Anambra State illustrates what damage unbridled political gangsterism could cause.

1.2 Statement of Problem

6 elections in Nigeria have witnessed several security lapses during elections and this contributes to failure of Nigeria elections. Most times, these security agencies are well funded and well equipped by the Nigeria government in order to enhance their performances during elections but they still don’t achieve the aim to which they were called. Security remains a concern, as more than 50 people already have died in election-related violence in the election year.

Nigeria shut its land borders, while police and soldiers stopped all vehicles moving around in cities (Associated Press, 2011).

Also, the manner in which the electoral process is technically managed poses the problem of insecurity, violence and instability. In fact, this can be the case when officials of the security agencies involved in the elections management do not perform their functions in quite a favourable environment.

Under such conditions which might include influence from the government officials and political parties, god-fatherlism, corruption, political thugs, ethnic influence, etc, it is possible that the management of elections are marred by inadequacies which create a bias in the implementation of the electoral process and the ensuing results and it is also likely that the organization of elections would be affected by several inadequacies. This study is an investigation into the factors that contributed to the ineffectiveness of security agencies during the

2011 general election.

It is in view of the above problem that the following research questions are posed:

(i) What brought about inefficiency of the security agencies during 2011

election in Nigeria?

(ii) What were the challenges that faced the security agencies during the

2011 general election?

(iii) Is there any significant relationship between the role of the security

agencies and the outcome of Nigeria 2011 General elections?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

Every good research work has its objectives clearly written out. This constitute the purpose of the research work. Where there are no clearly stated objectives, the researcher will likely deviate from the intended mission. It is when the objectives are considered in relation with the findings and results of the research that one can be able to effectively assess the research question.

The broad objective of this research is to ascertain the impact of the role of security agencies in Nigeria elections, using the 2011 general elections as a case study.

The specific objectives of the study are stated below;

(i) To investigate what brought about the inefficiency of the security

agencies during election in Nigeria.

(ii) To ascertain what constitutes the challenges for security agencies during

the 2011 General elections.

(iii) To discover if there is any significant relationship between the role of the

security agencies and the success of 2011 Nigeria General elections.

1.4 Significance of the Study

Any reasonable research work must be designed to be of significance to the society. Also, the significance of a study deals with the benefits that will be derived from it after it has been concluded. This goes further to signify that any research carried out without defining its significance may be regarded as a waste of time and resources.

In view of this, this study will be of great significance to both practitioners, scholars and students theoretically, practically and empirically.

Theoretically, this study will increase bank of knowledge by enriching the available theories and suggesting ways of formulating new ones through its results and findings.

Empirically, this study serves as a base for future researchers that might want to delve into the field of election management.

Practically also, this study is very significant because it will help suggest

ways and improvise techniques of enhancing the performances of the security

agencies during elections.

1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study

Scope of the Study

It is very clear and obvious that there are many election periods in

Nigeria but it might be very difficult and rigorous for the researcher to cover all of them. Owing to this, this study was made specific to a 2011 Nigeria General elections.

Limitations of the Study

There are some factors, which have constituted hindrance to the success of this research work, they include the following:

Time Constraint

The time within which this study is expected to be completed is relatively short compared to the enormous work involved. This made it impossible for the work to be as thorough as it ought to be.

Finance

Limited financial resources also constituted a hindrance to the success of the study. A lot of money was required for transportation to various resource centers where information will be generated.

Lack of Co-Operation

Most of the individuals questioned were unwilling to give detailed explanation on the issues raised. This limited the information available to the researcher.

Data Inadequacy

This work had some limiting factors like inadequacy of data or near absence of a reliable and up to date central data bank on the theme of the study.

Adequate and accurate records on the 2011 General Elections were not maintained both at the commission headquarters in Enugu and its website.

However, despite these limitations, the study recorded a huge success through perseverance.

CHAPTER TWO

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1.0 Introduction

In order to evaluate and clarify the related works of other scholars in our field of study, the related literatures will be reviewed under the following sub- themes:

‹ The concept of Election

‹ Electoral process in Nigeria

‹ Security issues in Nigeria Elections

‹ Role of Security Agencies in Nigeria Elections

‹ Problems encountered by Security Agencies in Nigeria Elections.

‹ Ways of enhancing the effectiveness of Security Agencies in Nigeria

Elections

2.1.1 Concept of Election

The universal use of elections as a tool for selecting representatives in modern democracies is in contrast with the practice in the democratic archetype, ancient Athens. Elections were considered an oligarchic institution and most

12 political offices were filled using sortation, also known as allotment, by which officeholders were chosen by lot.

Electoral reform describes the process of introducing fair electoral systems where they are not in place, or improving the fairness or effectiveness of existing systems. Psephology is the study of results and other statistics relating to elections (especially with a view to predicting future results).

To elect means "to choose or make a decision (Benoit, Jean-Pierre

Kornhauser, 1994) and so sometimes other forms of ballot such as referendums are referred to as elections, especially in the United States.

History of Election

Elections were used as early in history as ancient Greece and ancient

Rome, and throughout the Medieval period to select rulers such as the Holy

Roman Emperor and the Pope (Arrow, 2003). Elections were also used to select rajas by the gana in ancient India. Ancient Arabs also used election to choose their caliph, Uthman and Ali, in the early medieval Rashidun Caliphate; and to select the Pala king Gopala in early medieval Bengal (Robin, 1996). The modern "election", which consists of public elections of government officials, didn't emerge until the beginning of the 17th century when the idea of representative government took hold in North America and Europe (Arrow,

2003)

Questions of suffrage, especially suffrage for minority groups, have dominated the history of elections. Males, the dominate cultural group in North

America and Europe, often dominated the electorate and continue to do so in many countries (Muellar, 1996). Early elections in countries such as the United

Kingdom and the United States were dominated by landed or ruling class males.

However, by 1920 all Western European and North American democracies had universal male suffrage (except Switzerland) and many countries began to consider women's suffrage. Despite legally mandated universal suffrage for males, political barriers were sometimes erected to prevent fair access to elections.

Types of Election

In most democratic political systems, there are a range of different types of election, corresponding to different layers of public governance or geographical jurisdiction. Some common types of election are:

Presidential election

General election

Primary election

By-election

Local election

Co-option (Alan, 2007)

A referendum (plural referenda or referendums) is a democratic tool related to elections in which the electorate votes for or against a specific proposal, law or policy, rather than for a general policy or a particular candidate or party. Referenda may be added to an election ballot or held separately and may be either binding or consultative, usually depending on the constitution.

Referenda are usually called by governments via the legislature, however many democracies allow citizens to petition for referenda directly, called initiatives.

Referenda are particularly prevalent and important in direct democracies, such as Switzerland. The basic Swiss system, however, still works with representatives. In the most direct form of democracy, anyone can vote about anything. This is closely related to referenda and may take the form of consensus decision-making. Reminiscent of the ancient Greek system, anyone may discuss a particular subject until a consensus is reached.

The consensus requirement means that discussions can go on for a very long time. The result will be that only those who are genuinely interested will participate in the discussion and therefore the vote. In this system there need not be an age limit because children will usually become bored. This system is however only feasible when implemented on a very small scale.

2.1.2 Election Process as a Concept

Within the context of a representative democracy, elections must be perceived and managed as a process and not as a one off event that happens

15 only on a given day or over a limited number of days. It is rather a process, known as electoral process or electoral cycle which can evolve in a continuous manner almost without interruption between two elections. The electoral cycle can be divided into three phases, namely, pre-electoral phase, electoral phase and post-electoral phase.

Pre-electoral phase

The pre-electoral phase is the period stretching from the start of actual preparations for holding forthcoming elections to the end of the electoral campaign. This phase is essentially devoted to preparatory activities and execution of tasks directly linked to preparations for immediately due elections.

These include, for example, the amendment of the legal framework, training of electoral agents, sensitization of citizens, compilation and updating of the voters’ register, electoral campaign, etc.

Electoral phase (electoral period)

This is the polls which generally last for a day (or several days in some countries). This phase includes all operations leading to the casting of votes by voters and ends with the closure of polling stations.

Post-electoral phase

The post-electoral phase is the period between the closing of polling stations (meaning the end of the electoral period) and the declaration of final election results (after all electoral disputes are settled). It includes, depending on the specificities of each country, operations such as the collation of results, declaration of provisional results, resolution of electoral disputes and declaration of final results. The division of the electoral cycle into phases always has some arbitrariness.

In fact, the demarcation line between the various phases stated above could be shifted without compromising the relevance of the analyses made here.

Each phase can be extended depending on the activities and tasks one decides to include and activities under one phase can be implemented in another phase depending on the circumstances and specificities of each country. The specificities of an electoral process go beyond what is indicated here. In fact, elections present other characteristics.

Other characteristics of elections

Elections or to be more precise, an electoral process has a number of specificities which make them a potential source of conflict. In fact, this involves a number of arrangements necessary for the organization of elections but their implementation may have political implications to which political stakeholders and citizens are very sensitive. The said arrangements are mostly

17 related to the necessary measures that need to be taken to improve the chances of organising free, fair, transparent and sufficiently inclusive elections.

2.1.3 Overview of Nigeria’s Electoral Process

There are a lot of challenges with the conduct of elections in Nigeria from the 1922 election to the 2007 election. It has been documented that elections in

Nigeria are constant tales of violence, fraud and bad blood (Igbuzor, 2010). The challenges include among other things irregularities which put the credibility of the entire electoral process in doubt; problems with the legislative framework which puts constraints on the electoral process; several organisations are not playing their roles to ensure credible, free and fair election; the electoral system does not give room for inclusiveness; lack of independence of electoral commissions; long process of election dispute resolution; irresponsible behaviour by politicians and followers manifesting in thuggery and violence; lack of effective democratic institutions and monetisation of politics (Igbuzor,

2010).

In order to address the challenges of election in Nigeria especially the

2007 election, the former President, Alhaji Umar Musa Yar’Adua set up a 22 member Electoral Reform committee in August, 2007 to “examine the entire electoral process with a view to ensuring that we raise the quality and standard of our general elections and thereby deepen our democracy.” The committee had the following terms of reference:

• Undertake a review of Nigeria’s history with general elections and identify factors which affect the quality and credibility of the election and their impact on the democratic process.

• Examine relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution, the electoral Act and other legislation that have bearing on the electoral process and assess their impact on the quality and credibility of general elections.

• Examine the roles of institutions, agencies and stakeholders in shaping and impacting on the quality and credibility of the electoral process. These should include Government, Electoral Commission, Security Agencies, Political

Parties, Non Governmental Oragnisations (NGOs), Media, General Public and the International Community.

• Examine electoral systems relevant to Nigeria’s experience and identify best practices that would impact positively on the quality and credibility of the nation’s electoral process.

• Make general and specific recommendations (including but not limited to constitutional and legislative provisions and/or amendments) to ensure: i. A truly independent Electoral Commission imbued with administrative and financial autonomy; ii. An electoral process that would enable the conduct of elections to meet international standards; and iii. Legal processes that would ensure election disputes are concluded before inauguration of newly elected officials.

• Mechanism to reduce post-election tensions including possibility of introducing the concept of proportional representation in the constitution of governments.

• Make any other recommendations deemed necessary by the committee.

The terms of reference of the committee is very elaborate covering many of the challenges facing the conduct of credible, free and fair election in the country. The Electoral Reform Committee Report submitted its report on 11th

December, 2008. The committee received 1,466 memoranda, held public hearing in 12 states, two in each of the six geo-political zones and Abuja.

During the public hearing, 907 presentations were made. Experts were invited from eleven countries and the committee made no foreign trips. The report of the committee was presented in six volumes. Volume one is the main report containing the executive summary and main recommendations. Volume two and three contain memoranda received by the committee while volume four is the verbatim report of the public hearings. Volume five and six contains report of retreats held with foreign experts and the appendices to the main report.

The report concluded that the 2007 election is the worst in the 85 year history of Nigeria’s elections which also showed a progressive degeneration of outcomes. The report concluded that the Election Management Bodies (EMBs) are overburdened with too many responsibilities which have affected their performance. The report also pointed out that the legislative framework is inadequate to guarantee the conduct of free and fair election especially with

20 regard to the appointment, membership, mandate and functioning of Election

Management Bodies. The report identified some factors that are responsible for the poor electoral outcome in Nigeria including the mindset of Nigerians about elections, poverty, corruption, lack of good governance, electoral system, incumbency, military intervention etc.

The report made a number of recommendations to address the identified problems including appointment of board of INEC by the National Judicial

Council after advertisement and selection process, unbundling of INEC, independent candidacy, introduction of a mixed system of First-Past-The Post and proportional representation and amendment of the 1999 Constitution and the 2006 Electoral Act.

The report suggested the appointment of the Board of INEC by the

National Judicial Council (NJC) who should advertise all the positions spelling out requisite qualifications, receive application/nominations from the general public, shortlist three persons for each position and send the nomination to the

National Council of State to select one from the shortlist and forward to the

Senate for confirmation. The report recommended the unbundling of INEC and the establishment of an Electoral Offences Commission (EOC), Political Parties

Registration and Regulatory Commission (PPRRC), Constituency Delimitation

Commission (DCD) and Centre for Democratic Studies. The report attached three bills to amend the constitution, the electoral act and to create the Electoral

Offences Commission (EOC). The report recommended for the amendment of

21 the constitution and electoral laws to allow for independent candidate. The report prescribed that Nigeria should retain the First-Past-The-Post electoral system but should also inject a dose of proportional representation based on closed party lists, thus involving a mixed system. The report further recommended that 30 percent of existing legislative seats at the council, state houses of Assembly and the House of Representatives should be created and filled through a proportional representative system based on list by the political parties. The report recommended the open secret system of voting. It also recommended that election dispute should be concluded before swearing in of elected officials.

To be able to implement the recommendations, the report prescribed roles for the National Assembly, Executive, judiciary, INEC, political parties, security agencies, media, religious and traditional institutions, CSOs and international organisations. While receiving the report from the Electoral

Reform Committee (ERC), the then President, Alhaji Umar Musa Yar’Adua committed to implementing the recommendations. He stated clearly: “our focus on the electoral reform is predicated on the belief that elections are the very heart of democracy hence they must not only be fair but they must also be seen to be so by our people and the rest of the world. We will carefully study and implement with the support of the National Assembly those recommendations that will guarantee popular participation, ensure fairness and justice, and bring credibility to the electoral process in Nigeria. It is our abiding belief that failure

22 in instituting an acceptable process by which the representatives of the people are chosen will definitely resort in failure in the long run. For us to proceed in our effort, however, we need the buy in of all stakeholders: politicians, the media, civil society and indeed all Nigerians. Nurturing and sustaining a credible electoral regime indeed entail the co-operation and magnanimity of a winner who can appreciate the burden of responsibility, and gallant losers who will gracefully accept defeat in the certainty of the process if the process is fair.

From inception, this administration has considered it a sacred mandate to institute deep and elaborate reforms that will lead to the restoration of the integrity of the electoral system in this country, and to ensure that future elections will meet minimum acceptable international standards.”

The Federal Government white paper on the Electoral Reform Committee was released in March, 2009. The Federal Government accepted many of the recommendations of the committee including unbundling of INEC, the open secret ballot system, display of voters list, announcement of result at the polling both, independent candidacy, abolition of State Independent Electoral

Commission, funding of INEC to be on first line charge on the consolidated revenue fund, politicians convicted of violence and thuggery to be banned for ten years.

But the Federal Government rejected the recommendation that appointment of INEC Board and the three bodies to be created should be done by the National Judicial Council. The Government also rejected the

23 recommendation that election petition should be disposed off before swearing in. President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan has included electoral reform as one of his top most priority. He sent the Justice Mohammed Uwais report unedited to the National Assembly and nominated a new Chairman for INEC (Prof.

Attahiru Jega) along with national commissioners and Resident electoral commissioners that have been commended by a cross section of Nigerians to be people of integrity. The National Assembly has amended the constitution through the First Amendment to the 1999 Constitution and enacted the 2010 electoral bill which has been signed into law by President Goodluck Jonathan.

While signing the Electoral Act 2010 into law, the President Goodluck Jonathan reinterated his commitment to guaranteeing the sanctity of the ballot and committed to doing all that is needed to guarantee free, fair and credible elections.

ELECTION SECURITY THREATS AND ANALYSIS

The nature of an election makes it vulnerable to a range of security threats against participants, infrastructure, information and materials. Effective election security analysis must draw on information and expertise from multiple arenas. A high-level of communication and coordination among the agencies responsible for the administration and security of an election is a significant advantage. Neither can security analysis and planning be effective when it occurs only in a period shortly before the electoral process starts, nor depend

24 solely on reactive strategies. Anticipating and pre-empting security risks, mitigating their impact or probability of occurrence, is a strategic endeavour of both the electoral authorities and their security partners.

An electoral process is constituted from a complex series of interdependent sub-processes, generically including: boundary delimitation, civic education, voter education, voter registration, party registration, candidate nomination, the campaign period, polling operations, tallying and counting, dispute resolution and the official announcement of results. With the exception of boundary delimitation (which often occurs following a decennial census exercise) these sub-processes occur in some form during each election cycle.

Each of these sub-processes can be characterised by different types of threats, influenced by: the particular approach adopted, cross-influence between sub- processes and the individual circumstances of the election.

Further, the circumstantial conditions of an election can alter quickly, requiring the rapid reprioritisation or invalidation of initial security assumptions. Accordingly, the analysis of threats and risks is a continuous task throughout the electoral process, and is not simply event driven. The types of security threats likely to arise in a particular election are influenced by both structural and circumstantial aspects of the election process. The structural design of the electoral process such as the choice of electoral system may foster or deter certain threats. For instance, an electoral system that uses a single national district (the national borders form a single electoral constituency) and

25 allows voters to cast their vote at any polling station, will offer no direct incentive to forcibly move voters within the territory – since irrespective of where the vote is cast, it will be counted in the final tally. On the other hand, this arrangement may promote efforts to forcibly migrate eligible voters across national borders, so they cannot participate. In security terms, this scenario reflects a heightened structural risk for border control operations during the voter registration and polling phases of an election.

Circumstances will dictate in each election, and at each stage of the electoral process, the level and priority of risk posed by different threats. For example, when an election is a presidential run-off (the final two candidates competing), the danger of political assassination represents a significantly higher risk than an election of several hundred parliamentarians to an assembly.

Similarly, if an election is being conducted as part of a post-conflict peace agreement, it has a very different risk profile to an election held in a country with an unbroken history of democratic elections.

One methodology to map an election’s risk profile is by the identification of mission critical assets (people, infrastructure, information and materials), without which, the election cannot reasonably proceed. In combination, the unique structural and circumstantial aspects of an election will dictate at what phase of the process an asset is critical, and notably, if this may change between sub-processes. Some electoral processes by their nature are better able to adapt to certain types of attack. For instance, the destruction of ballot boxes at a

26 polling station after polling has been completed may or may not cripple the ability of the electoral authorities to produce a result from the election.

The impact of such an attack will vary significantly depending on a range of both structural and circumstantial factors. Separating ‘mission critical’ from

‘recoverable’ threats is a key step in building the election risk profile and determining priorities. Against the backdrop of these regular security challenges, several new threat trends have emerged in the past few years. These include international terrorism and organised crime:

International terrorism

As a well-recognised ritual of democracy, elections can attract threats from diverse groups, whose motivations may have no connection to the national stakes of an election. As recent events have demonstrated, international terrorists have the capacity and motivation to conduct “spectacular attacks” geared towards fulfilling their own propaganda agendas. The intensity of media coverage during an election is a highly visible period, affording an attractive opportunity for such attacks to occur.

Organised Crime

The political tensions that arise during an election offer organised crime groups an appealing opportunity – at a time when the authorities’ ability to differentiate between politically motivated violence and criminally motivated

27 violence can be extremely difficult. Paradoxically, a group committing politically motivated offences may try to have their actions interpreted as purely criminal, whereas criminally motivated groups may wish to obscure their actions behind a political façade. Of further concern, these interests have become convergent in some post-conflict settings, where organised criminal groups have been known to kidnap individuals and sell the hostages to political groups for propaganda value.

It is necessary in any section on electoral threats and analysis to highlight a cautious approach in carrying out this function. As noted in the principles above, non-partisanship and impartiality as well as transparency and accountability are important guides for electoral security. The choice of methods and subjects of information collection, during an election period, must be sensitive to the possibility of interpretation as a political intent and possible backlash. As such, extra emphasis on procedures that adopt checks and balances, are an important safeguard of the analytical process during elections.

2.1.4 ROLES OF SECURITY AGENCIES IN NIGERIA ELECTION

A major goal of any civilized society is to ensure that law and order is maintained thereby guaranteeing the general security of the citizenry and ensuring public tranquility. Chapter II, Section 14 (2) of the Constitution of the

Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 states inter alia

(a) the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government, and

(b) the participation by the people in their government shall be ensured in accordance with provisions of this Constitution"

In accordance with this Constitutional provision, the governments of

Nigeria have the responsibility to cater for the security and welfare of

Nigerians, and also to ensure that Nigerians freely participate in their governments. The basic form of such participation is the exercise of the right to vote. Therefore any situation that obstructs any citizen from exercising his civic and constitutional rights to vote and be voted for must be taken as a violation of his civic and Constitutional right to freedom of expression.

The government is supported in the pursuance of these by the Nigeria

Police which owes its legal existence to Section 214 (1) of the 1999

Constitution which states:

" there shall be a Police Force for Nigeria which shall be styled the Nigeria Police Force and subject to the provision of this Section, no other Police Force shall be established in the Federation or any part thereof" The statutory duties and functions of the Nigeria Police Force are clearly defined under Section 4 of the Police Act CAP 359, Laws of the Federation of

Nigeria 1990. These duties are listed as:-

I. the protection of life and property;

ii. the prevention and detection of crime;

iii. the apprehension of offenders;

iv. The preservation of law and order and

v. the enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged, as well as performance of such military duties within and without Nigeria as may be required of them.

Statutes on the Policing of Electoral Process by the Police:

The instrument of power and authority of the Police to discharge its statutory functions including policing the electoral process are contained in the various statutes, such as the Nigeria Constitution, Police Act, Criminal and

Penal Codes, Public Order Act, Electoral Act, Criminal Procedure Act or Code etc.

As should be expected and like security problems relating to elections, the role of SFs in the electoral process can have many facets. In other words, it is a multiple and varied role. The intervention of SFs is necessary at all stages of the electoral process and concerns all key stakeholders as well as the major factors of the process.

That is why, to ensure the integrity of the electoral process, the security forces are responsible, at every stage of the process, for the protection of persons and property, election materials, officials and institutions involved in the process. Security forces, besides ensuring the security of the electoral process at all stages, can also be involved, if need be, in the resolution of certain logistic problems.

In spite of their multiple and varied nature, tasks that may be entrusted to the security forces to ensure the security of the electoral process can be grouped into three categories. These are mainly static functions (for example, protection of buildings), dynamic functions (for example, security of transportation of election materials) and stand-by functions (i.e. stand-by forces that can be mobilized at any time, if need be).

Objectives of electoral security

• Physical security of buildings and materials

• Personal security of voters, candidates, representatives of political parties and that of the body responsible for the management of elections and the community in general

• Security of information, computers, software and election communication systems.

2.1.5 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY SECURITY AGENCIES IN

NIGERIA ELECTIONS.

Electoral violence disrupts the electoral process and creates dissent among the stake holders. When these crises are properly managed, these dissent are localised and do not adversely affect the stability of government. If therefore not properly managed, electoral violence, could, in conjunction with other prevailing factors lead to anarchy and ultimately to political instability. Our

31 experience in the recently concluded elections indicate that there is an unbridled flagrancy in the smuggling and use of arms and ammunition by political thugs and party supporters. The result has been that political opponents are either intimidated or out rightly killed or injured.

The implication of all these are that illegal arms get into the hands of unauthorised persons who used them for criminal activities. Resources which ordinarily would have been spent on developmental projects are spent combating such crimes or repairing damages caused by these hoodlums. Worse still the economic community are put on edge and many investors are scare away by the apparent lack of security for their investment The foregoing is tantamount to a threat to our national security. The recent episode in Anambra

State illustrates what damage unbridled political gangsterism could cause.

Electoral Violence:

In general terms, all forms of violence that emanate, at any stage, from differences in views, opinions and practices during the process of elections, could be regarded as electoral violence. Electoral violence is the employment of force by political parties or their supporters to intimidate opponents and threats to a democratic regime, and has often accounted for seizures of political power by the use of undemocratic means, such as force"

In some instances, the violence was used to intimidate opponents in order to force them not to dare open and free expression of their choices of candidates; whilst in others, violence was in reaction to rigging of elections.

2.1.6 Ways of enhancing the effectiveness of Security Agencies in Nigeria

Elections

Good security critical to a free, fair and competitive electoral process.

Electoral staff need a safe working environment. Candidates need to be able to move about the country and to campaign freely, and voters need to be able to attend rallies and to vote without fear or intimidation.

Having good physical security enables the Electoral Management Body

(EMB) to administer the elections according to their operational plans in a logical and well-thought out manner, rather than reacting to events. Good security enables the freedom of movement for EMB staff and candidates that is so necessary for a free and credible electoral process. It also enables the safe and timely movement of valuable electoral assets and sensitive electoral materials to registration and polling sites.

Good security, and an electoral climate without fear, can increase the participation of political parties, candidates and the voters. It also enables a more objective coverage of events by the media and easier circulation of voter education messages and materials. Good security also protects the integrity of the process and the accuracy of the results. Systems and procedures designed

33 with integrity mechanisms, including monitoring and tracking systems, are essential components.

In general, good security requires:

• Good planning;

• An integrated approach to security issues;

• Coordinated effort of all actors and participants;

• Good systems and procedures;

• Adequate staff and funding; and

• Appropriate equipment.

As with the other steps of the process, security benefits from good planning. Strategic and comprehensive planning looks at the process as a whole, as well as breaking it down in to its individual parts. This includes looking at all levels of the process (national, regional, local), all aspects of the process

(starting with the legal and institutional frameworks) and all actors (EMB, police, political parties, observers, etc).

Good security entails a clear understanding of the division of responsibilities between the different actors and the development of a good coordination mechanism between them and the different levels of election administration (national, regional and local). It identifies vulnerable areas within the process and the physical sites that need protection, and the development of protective mechanisms that are then woven into a comprehensive election security plan.

Good systems and procedures are an essential part of good security. This includes management systems. One of the areas that can create problems for many EMBs, which is not often thought of as a potential security problem, is the payroll system. In some countries, issues over late pay have created serious problems, where unhappy registrars or poll workers have taken election materials hostage, rioted or actually worked to subvert the system. Knowing who is on the payroll, how much they will be paid, and the how and when of payment is a security imperative. Other management issues, such as not having enough staff or funding can also affect the physical security of the process.

Essential steps may be dropped or staff spread to thin-all creating opportunities for mistakes, corruption or fraud.

Problems can also arise with inadequate or inappropriate equipment and materials. These issues go back to the planning phases when the communications and systems were designed and the procurement plan was developed. The system adopted must be appropriate to the conditions within the country (i.e. if there are mountains, will the radio system reach to the other side?) and reliable (can the radios be easily operated and maintained?). Ensuring that the EMB and law enforcement have good communications with all EMB offices and polling stations ensures that EMB instructions can reach all areas of the country, and that a polling station facing problems can immediately report them back to the EMB or police department.

The organisation and conduct of credible elections demand adherence to principles and rights, which in practice, impose significant challenges for ensuring effective security, including:

Transparency requires that the steps of an electoral process be well advertised to the public;

Elections must be held in compliance with national laws that usually create immutable timeframes;

Freedom of speech and association can create a politically-charged atmosphere which may polarise communities;

The institutions responsible for the administration and security of an election must fulfil their mandates impartially, and may be constrained by the need to avoid perceptions that they are favouring a particular political competitor;

Inclusiveness requires that an election be a highly decentralised operation, with massive logistical requirements involving the recruitment of tens of thousands of temporary staff, and the operation of polling places and offices.

To operate effectively within these electoral requirements, security forces need to be guided by their own principles, including:

Equitable and rights-based

Participants in an election must be treated in an equitable manner by both security forces and electoral officials. Reasonable and proportionate responses to actions must be consistent, which cannot be influenced by arbitrary factors, such as, political affiliation. An election is a mechanism by which people are able to exercise their political, civil and human rights. Security protocols must consider and acknowledge these rights, as well as the heightened sensitivity and scrutiny to the respect for these rights that occur during an election period.

National ownership

Elections are a sovereign process. However, in some circumstances such as, post-conflict or transitional elections, national security forces may need to be strengthened by international forces. To the degree permitted, the security of an election should fall within the ownership and control of a national authority to reflect sovereignty and avoid allegations of international interference.

Advantageously, indigenous security forces are the most sensitive to their cultural practices and may therefore be best positioned to interpret and respond to emerging threats.

Strategic

Elections are normally planned 18 to 24 months before polling day and occur as a widely dispersed exercise requiring significant planning and

37 preparatory activities. Security forces (police and/or military) rarely possess sufficient standing resources to secure an election, and simultaneously carry-out their regular duties. Integrated strategic planning by the electoral and security institutions is essential to prioritise, allocate and coordinate necessary resources.

Non-partisan and impartial

To be effective, security forces must avoid allegations of partisan bias. If security forces are found to behave in a partisan way, rather than defusing tensions they may heighten them and undermine their own function in the process. During the election period (especially during the campaign period) normal security actions may become the subject of analysis which evokes political dimensions. In politics in general, and in elections in particular, perception is as important as reality. As such, senior security managers must actively consider these political dimensions to preserve not only the reality, but the perception of impartiality.

Flexible and efficient

Electoral processes can face late-stage amendments to accommodate emerging legal, operational or political conditions that arise. In the first instance, security planning should include a range of contingency plans and resources to ensure flexibility. Alternatively, clearly defined constraints on security capabilities and resources based on efficient planning should be

38 available to inform decision makers on the range of options that are feasible to accommodate. The efficiency of these operations, both in delivering substantive security services and adjusting to changes, is an important indicator for the confidence of the electoral participants.

Transparent and accountable

In security operations there is always a tension between operational security policies of ‘need to know’ and the public interest. In an election period, disclosure policies are normally best weighted towards the public interest, recognising the importance and value of transparency. In cases where it is necessary to protect information, extra accountability measures may be necessary to ensure post-event justifications. Transparency in this context also refers to enhancing consultative mechanisms with political groups, civil society and other organisations to ensure the role and functions of security forces are well understood in the process.

A favourite saying of this author is: ‘The best operational solution is rarely politically feasible’. In many cases, the political dimensions of an election can create obstacles to otherwise seemingly simple security decisions.

This feature of the electoral process highlights the potential frustrations that can arise between security and electoral officials.

Ultimately, an operational solution cannot be considered desirable if it does not address the necessary political conditions. This discord emphasizes the

39 need for strong communication and coordination between security forces and electoral institutions.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

In this work, the researcher shall used the systems approach to explain the relationship between security and elections. Systems theory was originally proposed by Hungarian Biologist Ludwiig von Bertalanffy in 1928. The system approach was first developed in the biological and social engineering sciences before it was adopted by social scientist in explaining social and organizational phenomena.

David Easton (1965:121) utilized the approach in his System Analysis of

Political Life . Daniel Katz and Robert Khan (1966:9) also used the open system approach in studying The Social Psychology of Organizations . G.O. Nwankwo

(1988:209) also adopted the systems approach in his book “Education and

Training for Public Management in Nigeria” (Quoted in Onah F.O. 2008:141).

The theory can also be traceable to other scholars such as Wendell French

(1978), Edastoad (1981) among others.

The central tenets of the systems theory can be summarized as follows;

1. A system can be perceived as a whole with its parts and their

interdependent relationships.

2. A system has its boundary and can be viewed in terms of its relationship

with other systems.

3. Systems have sub-systems and are also a part of a supra system.

4. A system can be regarded as either open or close. According to Koontz et

al (1980:111) a system is regarded as open if it exchanges information,

energy, or materials with its environment a happens with biological or

social system; it is regarded as closed if it does not have such interaction

with the environment.

5. A system interacts with its environment in terms of process that involves

input, conversion, output of energy, information and materials. A system

tends to re-energize or modify itself through the process of information

feedback from the environment.

6. As Katz and Khan (1966) further explain, “the entropy process is a

universal law of nature in which all forms of organization move towards

disorganization or death”. Onah (2008:141).

This framework perceives an organization as an open system consisting of interdependent parts that are in continuous interaction with the environment.

From this interaction, organizations draw inputs in the form of people, raw materials, money and information. These are transformed into outputs which are exported back to the environment. This interaction with the environment is therefore necessary for organizational survival.

The researcher adopted this approach because problems such as security issues are considered not only in terms of securing lives and properties, but also in terms of the objectives and goals of the total electoral system. This implies that the researcher is also concerned with the objectives of the total system, rather than objective of any component within the system.

The system theory emphasizes that an organization which functions as a whole and thereby comprising other sub-systems which function jointly to achieve the raison desire of the organization. It conceives an organization to be functional when all the sub-systems are also effective and efficient. Its justification is in the functional interrelatedness of parts that enthrone the criterion of efficiency which is seen as an imperative for organizational survival and goal achievement.

David Easton (1965) propounded this theory to justify his definition of politics as the authoritative allocation of values. For him, the political system is a set of human interaction through which values are allocated authoritatively.

Five concepts were introduced in the so called political system advocated by

Eastern or we may call it conversion process, they are environment, input, conversion, output and feedback.

The theory’s primary aim is to show interdependence of a system in such a way that any dysfunction in one of the parts affects the whole. The political system was seen essentially as a system of converting inputs into authoritative

42 decision. To arrive at authoritative decision, the system takes input, demand and support. Demands are claims on how values are allocated. Support according to him exists when the environment backs up the system or is favorably disposed to it.

Output emerges from the system in the form of authoritative decision and there is a process of feedback. Feedback is a process through which the system adopts its self to the environment by modifying its behavior and changing its interest structure. All these interactions culminate the system maintaining itself in equilibrium.

For the purpose of our study, therefore the major components of model are environment, input, conversion, output and feedback. For the purpose of this, election process as a political system which converts inputs from the environment into authoritative decision. The demand input will mean the demand for adequate security during elections periods. The input of support is also taken to mean the dedication, devotion, commitment by the security agencies.

The feedback mechanism will be taken to mean the method through which the security agencies express their satisfaction or disenchantment with output produced. All these interactions culminate in the system maintaining itself in equilibrium.

2.3 Hypotheses

Many scholars have, in one way or the other, expressed the importance of hypotheses in research studies. According to Osuala (1975; 73), a hypothesis is in a very real sense the core of the study in which it is used. He went on to say that it guides the researcher in planning the course of the inquiry, choosing the kind of data needed, in deciding the proper statistical treatment and in examining the result of the study.

It is in view of the above explanations that this research tends to examine the following hypotheses;

(1) The Nigeria security agencies were inefficient in performing their duties during the 2011 general election.

(2) The security agencies in Nigeria were handicapped by unfavourable environment surrounding them during the 2011 general elections.

(3) There is no significant relationship between the role of the security agencies and the success of 2011 Nigeria General elections.

2.4 Operationalization of Key Concepts

Election security: Election security is the process of protecting electoral stakeholders, information, facilities or events. Security in this context means paying attention to human security and not regime security. The people should

44 come first in all deliberations, in all planning, in all protective mechanisms. The security agencies should focus on the wellbeing of the people because they are the ‘customers’ and as thus the ‘bosses’.

Electoral Violence : Electoral Violence means any random or organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stake holder to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an election process. Accordingly, the nature of election violence may include physical harm, intimidation, blackmail, verbal abuse, violent demonstrations, psychological manipulation, or other coercive tactics aimed at exploiting, disrupting, determining, hastening, delaying, reversing, or otherwise influencing an electoral process and its outcome.

Election : An election is a formal decision-making process by which a population chooses an individual to hold public office. Elections have been the usual mechanism by which modern representative democracy operates since the

17th century.

Electoral Process: It is also known as electoral cycle. It is a process of election which can evolve in a continuous manner almost without any interruption. It is divided into three phases, namely, pre-electoral phase, electoral phase and post- electoral phase.

2.4.1 Methodology

Survey research design was used for this research work. However, library information constitutes also reasonable percentage of the data used in the work.

2.4.2 Data Gathering Instruments

‹ Questionnaire

The research instrument used for data collection for the study was a four factor structured questionnaire. The questionnaires were issued to the literate and learned with closed ended questions and open ended where necessary. ii. Secondary data

There was a general review of relevant literatures such as textbooks, journals and other printed documents, magazines and newspapers. Unpublished works were also consulted.

2.4.3 Population of study

The population of study comprised of all the officers and members of the security forces such as police, the civil defence corps army in Nigeria.

However, due to the difficulty of reaching these people, a sample will be chosen from the population.

2.4.4 Sample of Study

The simple random sampling that is, sampling with replacement was used to sample 350 staff out of the total population that formed the study population

2.4.5 Sampling Procedure

The questionnaires were administered personally on 350 officers.

i) 97 Police Officers

ii) 98 Military Officers

iii) 77 Civil Defence Corp Officers

iv) 77 Navy officers

The respondents were required to tick ( √) against an option that best suited their opinion (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). Some of the administered questionnaires completed were retrieved at the spot while others were collected at much a later date. Out of the 350 administered questionnaires,

277 were well completed. Hence, this number makes the sample of study.

2.4.6 Method of data analysis

The data collected in the course of this study will be presented both descriptively and statically. The descriptive method deals with the presentation of the variables of the study (in relation to the subject) such as the profiles of respondents.

The descriptive method is employed to enable explain answers obtained from interview process and questionnaires presented to respondents.

Statistically, data will be presented with the use of tables to show the frequency of respondents and their responses to research questions presented in the questionnaire.

The Simple Percentage (%) method for the presentation and analysis of numerical data will be used to test the hypothesis posited for the study.

Whereby numerical data is converted to and presented in percentages using this formula;

% F x 100 N 1

Where, F = Frequency or number of responses to questions

N = Total number of respondents and

% = Symbol for percentage

CHAPTER THREE: BACKROUND INFORMATION ON

2011 GENERAL ELECTION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

As Nigerian prepares for another election in April 2011, signs and trends send signals of a repeat of electoral violence across Nigeria. If trends in 2003 and 2007 are to be relied upon in predicting the scale of electoral violence in the

2011 elections, then Nigeria might as well prepare for the worst. Although, the appointment of the new Chairman was greeted with cheers and hope, the political parties are showing no sign of changing from the trends of the previous elections. The spirit of Nigerians and the enthusiasm around the country suggest readiness on the part of the large majority of the electorate for free and credible violent free election.

Consolidating democracy and ensuring credible elections in Nigeria requires building the institutional capacity of the electoral commission, comprehensive and broad based electoral framework as well as controlling the level of violence through a framework that would give responsibility to all stakeholders with radical reprimand for failure. The 2011 elections present an opportunity for

Nigeria commitment to credible and transparent elections. However, the vibes from the political circle suggest that Nigeria might be in for large scale violence as witnessed in 2003 and 2007. A recent report on electoral hot spot indicates high propensity for violence across the zones. However, the countdown to 2011 party primaries, was characterised by contemptuous and disparaging language,

49 employed as a political weapon to intimidate and exclude political opponents from putting forward any challenge to the PDP in the 2011 April polls.

President Obasanjo set the ball rolling in this regard when, in September 2010, he enjoined members of the PDP to see the 2011 elections as that of “Operation

Totality”. Operation totality which was aptly described by Reuben Abati as

“verbal bomb”, was indeed re-awakening of the “do-or-die” politics of 2007.

It is important to note that the use of “Operation Totality” to associated with the methods that would be used by the PDP to “recapture” all the states it had lost and remain in power perpetually is to say the least disappointing.

Nonetheless, this method could be used at the same time to eliminate all sorts of electoral malpractices, to carry out complete elimination of unpatriotic political godfatherism which had remained a major problem in Nigerian electoral practices. Moreover, it could also be used to install men and women of integrity in the political system, remove all corrupt electoral officers and security agencies, and ensure the principle of internal democracy, upon which a viable democratic system would be built. It is important, too, to note that the principle of internal democracy in Nigerian politics is either non-existent or weak. This is evident from what obtained in the last party primaries conducted by all the political parties across the country.

Using the DPD further as an illustration, the use of foul and caustic language to intimidate political opponents into withdrawal from the competition was evident in the campaigns of presidential primaries between Atiku Abubakar

50 and President Goodluck Jonathan. In the build-up to the January 13, 2011 primaries, both of them were locked up in the party zoning arrangement and unpleasant advertorials of one another’s alleged weaknesses rather them addressing critical issues of national importance. This type of campaign is inimical to the development of democracy.

Lawan Kaita, a one-time governor of old Kaduna State, had on the 5

October, 2010, contributed his quota in the use of foul and caustic utterances to make a cheap point. Contributing in the debate and controversy surrounding the

PDP zoning method for presidential ticket, he remarked that:

Anything short of a Northern presidency is tantamount to stealing our Presidency. Jonathan has to go and he will go. Even if he uses the incumbency power to get his nomination on the platform of the PDP, he would be frustrated out. The North is determined, if that happens, to make the country ungovernable for President Jonathan or nay other Southerner who finds his way to the seat of power on the platform of the PDP against the principle of the party’s zoning policy. This statement was really a landmine, which explored after the presidential election of 16 April 2011, in the North in the form of violence in Kaduna and Bauchi States, particularly, because President Jonathan was declared the winner. The violence was unfortunate and condemnable. Kaita’s utterances were sacrilegious and condemnable. The language of political campaign, which caused much electoral discomfort to some political opponents and a large segment of Nigerians was

President Jonathan’s use of the word “rascals” rather than “radicals” to describe the leaderships of South-West states. According to him: The South-West is of critical significance to the economic and political advancement of the country. The progress of the zone is the progress of Nigeria. It makes perfect sense that such a critical segment of Nigeria is governed by those who have what it takes… The entire South-West it too important, too sophisticated and too educated to be in the hands of rascals. This seemingly unguarded electioneering campaign language aimed at political exclusion, denigration of the oppositional leadership of the southwest region and discouraging leadership of the region by any political party other then the PDP, received a barrage of acidic comments from scholars and politicians. The leaders of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Asiwaju Bola Tinubu, reacted swiftly to the President’s comment by calling the PDP, “Poverty Development Party” for daring to describe the Southwest leaders as rascals. He added: I think the president is wrong because this is an insult to our parents. It is a speech from a drunken sailor fisherman whose boat is about to capsize. That is an insult to our parents. You don’t come to this land, seek our votes and then insult our parents that they have raised rascals. However, it is not surprising that President Jonathan called the Southwest leaderships rascals considering the fact that earlier in December 201, Tinubu had described the PDP as a “poverty party” and asked the party to stop

52 dreaming of winning elections in the Southwest states of Lagos, Oyo and Ogun.

He added that if:

We have done what we should do, we (the CAN) will win, but if they (the PDP) won’t and people are finding excuses, I am not ready to discuss that, we’re getting ready to get power from PDP, it is a party of falsehood and poverty. Following Tinubu’s response, Wale Ojo Lanre, the media adviser to the former governor of Ekiti State, Segun Oni, described Tinubu with all sorts of names such as: “rascal calling himself uncouth” and the “sole proprietor of ACN”, whose members are born propagandists and men of low integrity”. As Rueben

Abati further noted, the use of this foul language was not surprising as Ayo

Fayose, the former governor of Ekiti State and former President Obasanjo had used similar language on themselves. Then Obasnajo called Fayose a “bastard” while Fayose responded by calling Obasanjo “father of bastards”. Also, a closer examination of the political parties especially the ruling People ’s Democratic

Party (PDP) reveal high level intra-party strife, disintegration and violence.

Campbell (2010) argued that the party has little internal discipline, no political platform or principles, and it generates little popular enthusiasm. With the declaration of intent by the incumbent and with the reversion of PDP agreed pattern of rotational presidency, the Nigerian political atmosphere look highly charged and tensed. Some faction of the political elite mostly from the North are very disgruntled with the current power equation in PDP and are not willing to

53 compromise for the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan as the PDP flag bearer. This formation persuaded the former Head of state General Babangida

(Rt) to step aside for former Vice President Alhaki Atiku Abubakar in order to improve their chances of wrestling power out from the incumbent. The trend means that there would be no elite consensus candidate from PDP. Hence the current intra-party crisis is unavoidable and there are chances of anti party activities in days and weeks to come. However, as Campbell noted; a divided

PDP poses problem to security and stability of Nigeria (Campbell, 2010, p. 2).

This pattern is not new in Nigeria and the outcomes in the past were not very destabilising. The April 2011 election is by and large a potential time bomb for further conflict in Nigeria. Aside the PDP, other parties including the

Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Congress for Progressive Change CPC, All

Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) and the Labour Party (LP) are showing no signs of relenting and are all fired to challenging the ruling PDP at all levels. And with the candidacy of former chairman of the anti graft commission (EFCC)

Mallam Nuhu Ribadu and the former Head of State General Buhari (Rt),

Nigeria seem set for a very decisive period in its electoral history.

The recent court decision against some PDP states also indicates that candidates might opt to win clearly and clean rather than entangles themselves in webs of intricacies and uncertainty. In honest assessment one cannot predict for certain what the intents of a Nigerian politician. The only certain thing is that there will be large scale violence and level of intolerance from rival parties

54 especially if there are attempt to thwart election outcome. Another worrisome scenario is the attitude of the Nigerian electorates to voting. Having been denied the dividends of democracy for many years and with hunger and unemployment still pervasive materialism and monetary inducement would play a big role in the forth coming elections. In a research carried out, it was discovered that almost one out of five (1/5) Nigerian is personally exposed to vote buying and that almost one in ten (1/10)experiences threats of electoral violence (Bratton,

2008). The implication is that violence reduces turnout; and vote buying enhances partisan loyalty that in turn cause electoral violence. The research further exposed that the politicians concentrate their effort on vote buying, material inducement and other forms of electoral violence in rural poor communities (Bratton, 2008). This means that to ensure credible and violent free elections in the forth coming polls requires great attention both in urban and rural areas and the role of security agencies is further brought to fore, in our quest for credible election in Nigeria.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter focused mainly on data presentation and analysis of data generated from the responses of our respondents. The questionnaires were administered personally on 350 workers in the target groups as the respondents.

The respondents were required to tick ( √) against an option that best suited their opinion. Some of the administered questionnaires completed were retrieved at the spot while others were collected at much a later date. Out of the 350 administered questionnaires, 277 were well completed and returned.

4.1 Data Presentation and Analysis

4.1.1 Presentation and Analysis of Personal Data of Respondents.

Data based on Gender Distribution.

Table 4.1: Gender Distribution.

Sex No of Respondents Percentage (%)

Male 148 53.4

Female 129 46.6

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

Table 4.1 above indicates that 148 respondents with the percentage of

53.4 are males while 129 respondents with the percentage of 46.6 are females.

This shows that majority of the respondents are males.

Data from the Age Distribution of Respondents.

Table 4.1.2: Age Distribution of Respondents.

Age No of Respondents Percentage (%)

20-30 53 19.1

31-40 127 48.4

41-50 69 22.4

51-60 28 10.1

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

The above table comprises the age distribution of our respondents. The table signifies that 53 respondents with 19.1% were within the age bracket of within 20-30 years and 127 respondents with 48.4% were within the age bracket of 31-

40 years. It also shows that 69 of the respondents with 22.4% were within the age range of 41-50 and 28 respondents with 10.1% were within the age range of

51-60. The table also shows that employees within the age bracket of 31-40 are

57 more in number which then means that most of the respondents are matured and responsible.

Data based on educational qualification of respondents.

Table 4.1.3: Educational Qualification of Respondents.

Highest Educational No of Respondents Percentage (%)

Qualification

WASCE/GCE, O/L 18 6.5

OND 21 7.6

HND 49 17.7

Bachelors Degree 128 43.7

Masters Degree 58 20.9

Others 10 3.6

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

Table 4.3 above shows that 18 respondents with 6.5% has WASCE/GCE or O/L certificates, 21 of them with 7.6% possessed OND certificates and 49 of them with 17.7% possessed HND certificates respectively. The Bachelors

Degree holders were 121 respondents with 43.7%, the Masters Degree holders were 58 with 20.9% while 10 of the respondents with 3.6% possessed other certificates.

Data from the Length of service of respondents.

Table 4.1.4: Length of Service of Respondents.

Length of Service No of Respondents Percentage (%)

1-10 58 20.9

11-20 87 31.4

21-30 82 29.6

31 & Above 50 18.1

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

Table 4.4 shows the length of service of respondents. 58 of the respondents with 20.9% were within the length of service range of 1-10 years,

87 of them with 31.4% were within the length of service range of 11-20 years.

Also, 82 respondents with 29.6% were within the length of service range of 21-

30 and 50 of them with 18.0% were within the length of service range of 31 and above. This then shows that respondents within the length of service range of

11-20 are more in number.

Data based on Category of Respondents.

Table 4.1.5: Category of Respondents

Category of Respondents No of Respondents Percentage (%)

Police Officers 77 25.0

Military Officers 78 25.4

Civil Defence Corp Officers 57 21.8

Navy officers 65 27.8

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

Table 4.5 shows that 77 respondents with 25.0% are Police officers, 78 respondents with 25.4% are Military officers, 57 respondents with 21.8% comprises the Civil Defence corp officers while 65 respondents with 27.8% are

Navy officers.

4.2 Presentation and Analysis of the Substantive Data:

Question 7 : Security forces in Nigeria plays important role in Nigeria elections?

Table 4.2.1 : Response

Response Frequency Percentage (%)

Strongly Agree 88 31.8

Agree 107 36.2

Strongly Disagree 50 21.4

Disagree 23 8.3

No Idea 9 3.3

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

The above table shows that out of 277 respondents, 88 of them with 31.8% strongly agreed, 107 of them with 36.2% agreed, 50 of them with 21.4% strongly disagreed, 23 respondents with 8.3% disagreed while 9 of them with

3.3% where indifferent on the question that Security forces in Nigeria plays important role in Nigeria elections.

This clearly shows that majority of the respondents agreed that the

Security forces in Nigeria plays important role in Nigeria elections.

Question 8 : These roles that they play enhance the creditability of Nigeria general elections.

Table 4.2.2 : Response

Response Frequency Percentage (%)

Strongly Agree 101 36.4

Agree 74 26.7

Disagree 40 14.6

Strongly Disagree 45 16.2

Undecided 17 6.1

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

Table 4.2.2 constitutes the response of the respondents on the question; these roles that they play enhance the creditability of Nigeria general elections.

The table clearly showed that 101 respondents with 36.4% strongly agreed, 74 of them agreed with 26.7%, 40 of the respondents with 14.6% disagreed, 45 of them with 16.2% strongly disagreed while 17 of them with 6.1% where undecided on the question.

At the conclusion of the analysis, it was discovered the majority of the respondents agreed that these roles that the security agencies play enhance the creditability of Nigeria general elections.

Question 9 : Nigeria security forces undergo some form of training in preparation for the general elections.

Table 4.2.3 : Response

Response Frequency Percentage (%)

Strongly Agree 87 31.4

Agree 98 35.7

Disagree 53 19.1

Strongly Disagree 12 4.3

Undecided 27 9.5

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

Table 4.2.3 The above table showed that 87 respondents with 31.4% strongly agreed, 98 of them agreed with 35.7%, 53 of the respondents with

19.1% disagreed, 12 of them with 4.3 strongly disagreed while 27 of them with

9.5% where undecided on the question.

However, our findings signify that majority of the respondents strongly believe that Nigeria security forces undergo some form of training in preparation for the general elections.

Question 10 : This orientation increases their effectiveness and efficiency during the election.

Table 4.2.4 : Response

Response Frequency Percentage (%)

Strongly Agree 109 39.4

Agree 72 26.0

Disagree 41 14.8

Strongly Disagree 28 10.1

Undecided 27 9.7

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

The above table depicts that the respondents have no doubts that orientation increases their effectiveness and efficiency during the elections. This was shown in the table where 109 respondents with 39.4% strongly agreed, 72 of them agreed with 26.0%, 41 of the respondents with 14.8% disagreed, 28 of them with 10.1 strongly disagreed while 27 of them with 9.7% where undecided on the question.

Question 11 : Nigeria security forces are well equipped financially to enable them effectively carry out their duties during the elections.

Table 4.2.5 : Response

Response Frequency Percentage (%)

Strongly Agree 36 13.1

Agree 65 23.4

Disagree 74 26.7

Strongly Disagree 81 29.2

Undecided 21 7.6

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

The above table showed that 36 respondents with 13.1% strongly agreed,

65 of them agreed with 23.4%, 74 of the respondents with 26.7% disagreed, 81 of them with 29.2 strongly disagreed while 21 of them with 7.6% where undecided on the question.

The result from the above table shows that the respondents believe that

Nigeria security forces are not well equipped financially to enable them effectively carry out their duites during the elections

Question 12 : Nigeria security forces do not perform their functions effectively during elections.

Table 4.2.6 : Response

Response Frequency Percentage (%)

Strongly Agree 124 44.8

Agree 62 22.4

Disagree 26 9.6

Strongly Disagree 58 21.0

Undecided 7 2.5

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

The above table constitutes the response of the respondents on the question; Nigeria security forces do not perform their functions effectively during elections. After the analysis, we discovered that 124 respondents with

44.8% strongly agreed, 62 of them agreed with 22.4%, 26 of the respondents with 9.6% disagreed, 58 of them with 21.0% strongly disagreed while 7 of them with 2.5% where undecided on the question.

The result shows that Nigeria security forces do not perform their functions effectively during elections.

Question 13 : Their low performance might be caused by ethnic influences, godfatherism and corruption.

Table 4.2.7 : Response

Response Frequency Percentage (%)

Strongly Agree 46 16.6

Agree 139 50.2

Disagree 62 22.4

Strongly Disagree 7 2.5

Undecided 23 8.3

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

The above table shows that 46 respondents with 16.6% strongly agreed,

139 of them agreed with 50.2%, 62 of the respondents with 22.4% disagreed, 7 of them with 2.5 strongly disagreed while 23 of them with 8.3% where undecided on the question.

The result from the above table shows that the respondents agreed that security agencies’ low performance might be caused by ethnic influences, godfatherism and corruption.

Question 14 : Lack of adequate fund and equipments also contribute to their low performance.

Table 4.2.8 : Response

Response Frequency Percentage (%)

Strongly Agree 94 34.0

Agree 98 35.4

Disagree 23 8.3

Strongly Disagree 43 15.5

Undecided 19 6.8

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

The above table shows the response of the respondents on the question; lack of adequate fund and equipment also contribute to their low performance.

94 respondents with 34.0% strongly agreed, 98 of them agreed with 35.4%, 23 of the respondents with 8.3% disagreed, 43 of them with 15.5 strongly disagreed while also 19 of them with 6.8% where undecided on the question.

The result from the above table shows that lack of adequate fund and equipments also contribute to the security agencies’ low performance.

Question 15 : Lack of trained personnel of the Nigeria security agencies contribute to their inefficiency during the general elections.

Table 4.2.9 : Response

Response Frequency Percentage (%)

Strongly Agree 59 21.3

Agree 128 46.2

Disagree 23 8.3

Strongly Disagree 61 22.0

Undecided 6 2.2

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

The above table shows the response of the respondents on the question; lack of trained personnel by the Nigeria security agencies contribute to their inefficiency during the general elections. 59 respondents with 21.3% strongly agreed, 128 of them agreed with 46.2%, 23 of the respondents with 8.3% disagreed, 61 of them with 22.0 strongly disagreed while also 6 of them with 2.2% where undecided on the question.

The result from the above table shows that lack of trained personnel by the Nigeria security agencies contribute to their inefficiency during the general elections.

Question 16 : The lapses on the side of Nigeria security agencies contribute to the failure of Nigeria general elections.

Table 4.2.10 : Response

Response Frequency Percentage (%)

Strongly Agree 83 30.1

Agree 90 32.5

Disagree 46 16.4

Strongly Disagree 39 14.1

Undecided 19 6.9

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

The above table shows the response of the respondents on the question; the lapses on the side of Nigeria security agencies contribute to the failure of Nigeria general elections. 83 respondents with 30.1% strongly agreed, 90 of them agreed with 32.5%, 46 of the respondents with 16.4% disagreed, 39 of them with 14.1% strongly disagreed while 19 of them with 6.9% where undecided on the question.

The result from the above table shows that the lapses on the side of Nigeria security agencies contribute to the failure of Nigeria general elections.

TEST OF HYPOTHESIS USING SIMPLE PERCENTAGE METHOD

The three hypotheses posited for this research will be tested using the simple percentage method, because of its relevance in the testing of hypothesis.

Besides, it furnishes more conclusively, whether a group of observed frequencies, deviate significantly from a group of expected frequencies.

TEST OF HYPOTHESIS ONE

V The Nigeria security agencies are inefficient in performing their duties during the 2011 general election

The null and alternative hypotheses are stated below:

Null: The Nigeria security agencies are not inefficient in performing their duties during the 2011 general election

Alternative: The Nigeria security agencies are inefficient in performing their duties during the 2011 general election.

In order to test the above hypothesis, question 12 was posited in the questionnaire which states thus; Nigeria security forces do not perform their functions effectively during elections.

Table 4.2.11 : Response

Response Frequency Percentage (%)

Strongly Agree 124 44.8

Agree 62 22.4

Disagree 26 9.4

Strongly Disagree 58 21.0

Undecided 7 2.5

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

44.8% strongly agreed, 62 of them agreed with 22.4%, 26 of the respondents with 9.4% disagreed, 58 of them with 21.0% strongly disagreed while 7 of them with 2.5% where undecided on the question.

Conclusion:

The percentage of the respondents that agreed is 67.2 while the percentage of the respondents that disagreed is 30.4. Therefore, Ho is rejected because % of agreed responses is > (greater than) disagreed responses.

Implication :

The implication of this result is that the alternative hypothesis (H 1 ) was upheld, which states thus; the Nigeria security agencies are inefficient in performing their duties during the 2011 general election.

TEST OF HYPOTHESIS TWO

V The security agencies in Nigeria were handicapped by unfavourable environment surrounding them during the 2011 general elections.

The null and alternative hypotheses are stated below:

Null: The security agencies in Nigeria are not handicapped by unfavourable environment surrounding them during the 2011 general elections.

Alternative: The security agencies in Nigeria are handicapped by unfavourable environment surrounding them during the 2011 general elections.

In order to test the above hypothesis, question 13 was posited in the

questionnaire which states thus; their low performance might be caused by

ethnic influences, god-fatherlism and corruption.

Table 4.2.12 : Response

Response Frequency Percentage (%)

Strongly Agree 94 34.0

Agree 98 35.4

Disagree 23 8.3

Strongly Disagree 43 15.5

Undecided 19 6.8

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

The above table shows the response of the respondents on the question; lack of adequate fund and equipment also contribute to their low performance.

The result from the above table shows that lack of adequate fund and equipments also contribute to the security agencies’ low performance.

Conclusion

The percentage of the respondents that agreed is 69.4 while the percentage of the respondents that disagreed is 23.8. Therefore, Ho is rejected because % of agreed responses is > (greater than) disagreed responses.

Implication :

The implication of this result is that the alternative hypothesis (H 1 ) was upheld, which states thus; the security agencies in Nigeria are handicapped by unfavourable environment surrounding them during the 2011 general elections.

TEST OF HYPOTHESIS THREE

V There is no significant relationship between the role of the security agencies and the success of 2011 Nigeria General elections.

The null and alternative hypotheses are stated below:

Null: There is no significant relationship between the role of the security agencies and the success of 2011 Nigeria General elections.

Alternative: There is significant relationship between the role of the security agencies and the success of 2011 Nigeria General elections.

In order to test the above hypothesis, question 8 was posited in the questionnaire which states thus; these roles that they play enhance the creditability of Nigeria general elections.

Table 4.2.13 : Response

Response Frequency Percentage (%)

Strongly Agree 88 31.8

Agree 107 36.2

Strongly Disagree 50 18.1

Disagree 23 8.3

No Idea 9 3.3

Total 277 100

Source: Research, 2011.

Analysis

The above table shows that out of 277 respondents, 88 of them with

31.8% strongly agreed, 107 of them with 36.2% agreed, 50 of them with 18.1% strongly disagreed, 23 respondents with 8.3% disagreed while 9 of them with

3.3% where indifferent on the question that Security forces in Nigeria plays important role in Nigeria elections.

Conclusion:

The percentage of the respondents that agreed is 68 while the percentage of the respondents that disagreed is 26.4. Therefore, Ho is rejected because % of agreed responses is > ( greater than) disagreed responses.

Implication :

The implication of this result is that the alternative hypothesis (H 1 ) was upheld, which states thus; there is significant relationship between the role of the security agencies and the success of 2011 Nigeria General elections

4.3 Findings and Discussion of Findings

At the conclusion of the analysis conducted in the course of this research, the following findings were made and discussed below:

Security forces in Nigeria plays important role in Nigeria elections.

During the course of this research, we discovered that Nigeria security agencies played some important roles during the 2011 general elections. These roles includes helping to safeguard the election materials and officials, ensuring and conducting peaceful behaviour of voters and maintaining peace and order prior, during and after the 2011 general elections.

The roles that Nigeria security agencies play enhance the creditability of

Nigeria general elections. However, our findings signify that the roles played by the security agencies so much contribute to the creditability of the 2011 elections. The security agencies were deployed to some strategic points where there are fears of violence, like Jos and some of the northern states.

It was observed that Nigeria security forces undergo some form of training in preparation for the general elections. This training takes the form of orientation and seminars for the security officers that will be used for the

77 elections. The officers are further enlightened on the emerging issues and new techniques employed by the election thugs. They are exposed on ways of managing the electorates during the elections and methods of curbing post- election violence.

We also observed that this orientation increases the security official’s effectiveness and efficiency during the election. This is because the offcials are being reminded of the objectives and aims of involving them in the elections.

They are also exposed to ways of managing election violence and they are reminded to put away their self interest while on duty.

On the negative side, we discovered that Nigeria security forces are not well equipped financially to enable them effectively carry out their duties during the elections. The security forces lack adequate fund to fuel their trucks and vehicles, buy some gadgets like bullet proof, etc. This limits their level of performance because some areas where elections are held in the rural areas cannot be assed by them.

Nigeria security forces do not perform their functions effectively during elections. This is caused by so many reasons which include lack of adequate fund and materials. Nigeria security forces also lack adequate trained personnel and that makes them not to perform creditably.

Our findings also showed that security agencies’ low performance might be caused by ethnic influences, god-fatherlism and corruption. These factors are classified among the unfavourable environments that hinder the security

78 agencies from performing their functions effectively. Ethnic influences and corruptions influence the security agencies to divert election materials and influence the result of elections negatively.

Inadequate fund and equipment also contribute to the security agencies’ low performance. Our findings showed that the security agencies were poorly funded and they lack materials to carry out their responsibilities. These lead to their low level of performance during elections.

Lack of trained personnel by the Nigeria security agencies contribute to their inefficiency during the general elections. We discovered that lack of trained personnel affected the activities of security agencies during the 2011 general elections. Most of the officers deployed for the elections were not adequately trained, as such leading to some loopholes in the duties of the security agencies.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary

This study was aimed at ascertaining the impact of the role of security agencies in Nigeria elections, using the 2011 general elections as a case study.

However, the study also tried to investigate what brought about the inefficiency of the security agencies during the 2011 election in Nigeria and to discover what constitutes the unfavourable environment for the security agencies during the 2011 General elections. It was also aimed at discovering if there is any significant relationship between the role of the security agencies and the success of 2011 Nigeria General elections.

The study started with the introduction where the researcher discussed the background of the study and it also embodied the statement of the problem and the objectives of the study, significance, scope and limitations of the study. It continued with the second chapter where the major focus was on reviewing the works of other scholars that has contributed to the subject of discussion. It progressed to the third chapter that constitutes the study area and the research methodology. Chapter four focused on the data presentation and analysis using statistical methods. It also encompassed the testing of the hypotheses

80 formulated for the study and that paved way for chapter five which is the concluding chapter.

5.2 Recommendations

This study discovered so many facts at the conclusion of this research and it is based on these findings that these recommendations are being posited:

One of the major problems that hinder the Nigeria security agencies from functioning effectively is lack of fund. Nigeria security agencies should be adequately funded to enable them function effectively. In the 2011 general elections, the federal government did not make plans to adequately finance the security agencies, rather, huge sum of money was used to finance campaign rallies and sponsor political thugs. Police officers on other hand find themselves in difficult situations

Whereas they would like to uphold the rule of law, disobeying an order from a powerful individual with connections in the corridors of power can mean a transfer to some remote village or worse still loss of the only means of livelihood. However, the reason most police officers become incorrigibly corrupt and violent is the life they live. Nigeria security agencies are poorly paid, lack decent accommodation and in most cases badly lack the tools of trade. Other than the gun which all of them must have, most police officers on

81 patrol actually walk because they don’t have enough vehicles to move fast on the scenes of crime and where they have a vehicle at the police station, chances of having no fuel in that vehicle are very high. Therefore, adequate plans should be made to sponsor the security agencies physically and financially.

Nigeria security agencies should be properly trained prior to any general election to enable them be in tune with emerging security threats. Security problems during elections are complex and they liable to change with time. A good example is using political thugs to snatch ballot boxes which has now metamorphosed to sponsoring these thugs to wear police or military uniforms.

The security agencies to be properly trained to be able to curb these emerging security problems during elections.

In order to help stop the influences from the god fathers and ethnic groups, the security agencies should not be deployed to the state where they were born or where they are indigenes. This will help stop ethnic influence on the security agencies during elections.

Apart from personal benefits, the police and other security agencies must be well equipped with motor vehicles in order to combat crime during elections.

They should have two sets of vehicles; the branded ones for traffic patrols and dealing with mob riots and unbranded ones to track dangerous criminals. They must be educated to work with civilians in order to track perpetrators of violence not only during elections but off election seasons as well. Changing

82 public and police attitude about violence must be an on-going process. For any meaningful transformation to take place in the way we conduct our politics, stringent ethics and integrity laws both for the law enforcement officers and political actors must be accompanied by massive public education aimed at attitude change. It is this change of attitude that will dissuade political operators from unleashing violence on their opponents. When we change public perception of politics, they will see the benefits of conducting peaceful elections devoid of violence. And the government should be prepared to make violence more expensive and unattractive.

5.3 Conclusion

As was mentioned earlier, this study was aimed at ascertaining the impact of the role of security agencies in Nigeria elections, using the 2011 general elections as a case study. At the conclusion of this research, it was observed that the inefficiency of the security agencies during the 2011 election in Nigeria was necessitated by some factors which include inadequacy of fund and materials.

We also observed that influence from god fathers and ethnic influences are among the factors that constituted unfavourable environment for the security agencies during the 2011 General elections and that there was a significant relationship between the role of the security agencies and the outcome of 2011

Nigeria General elections.

We strongly believe the findings and the recommendations made at the conclusion of this study, if well put into consideration, will help improve the creditability of Nigeria elections through enhanced election security.

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APPENDIX Question : Security forces in Nigeria plays important role in Nigeria elections?

Table 4.2.1 : Response Response Frequency Percentage (%) Strongly Agree 88 31.8 Agree 107 36.2 Strongly Disagree 50 18.1 Disagree 23 8.3 No Idea 9 3.3 Total 277 100 Source: Research, 2011. Question : These roles that they play enhance the creditability of Nigeria general elections.

Table 4.2.2 : Response Response Frequency Percentage (%) Strongly Agree 101 36.4 Agree 74 26.7 Disagree 40 14.6 Strongly Disagree 45 16.2 Undecided 17 6.1 Total 277 100 Source: Research, 2011.

Question : Nigeria security forces undergo some form of training in preparation for the general elections. Table 4.2.3 : Response Response Frequency Percentage (%) Strongly Agree 87 31.4 Agree 98 35.4 Disagree 53 19.1 Strongly Disagree 12 4.3 Undecided 27 9.5 Total 277 100 Source: Research, 2011. Question : This orientation increases their effectiveness and efficiency during the election. Table 4.2.4 : Response Response Frequency Percentage (%) Strongly Agree 109 39.4 Agree 72 26.0 Disagree 41 14.8 Strongly Disagree 28 10.1 Undecided 27 9.7 Total 277 100 Source: Research, 2011.

Question : Nigeria security forces are well equipped financially to enable them effectively carry out their duties during the elections. Table 4.2.5 : Response Response Frequency Percentage (%) Strongly Agree 36 13.1 Agree 65 23.5 Disagree 74 26.7 Strongly Disagree 81 29.2 Undecided 21 7.6 Total 277 100 Source: Research, 2011.