NUMBER 18 May 2010
HOW TO TALK AND HOW NOT TO TALK TO SYRIA: ASSESSING THE OBSTACLES TO AND OPPORTUNITIES IN A FUTURE ISRAELI-SYRIAN-AMERICAN PEACE NEGOTIATION
Itamar Rabinovich
INTRODUCTION Syria, nor the effort to revive the Israeli-Syrian negotia- tion has gained much traction. Damascus must be cha- In the ebb and flow of Middle East diplomacy, the two grined by the fact that when the Arab-Israeli peace interrelated issues of an Israeli-Syrian peace settlement process is discussed now, it is practically equated with and Washington’s bilateral relationship with Damascus the Israeli-Palestinian track. have gone up and down on Washington’s scale of im- portance. The election of Barack Obama raised expecta- This paper analyzes the difficulties confronting Wash- tions that the United States would give the two issues ington’s and Jerusalem’s respective Syria policies and the priority they had not received during the eight years offers an approach for dealing with Syria. Many of the of the George W. Bush administration.1 Candidate recommendations stem from lessons resulting from the Obama promised to assign a high priority to the resusci- past rounds of negotiations, so it is important to under- tation of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and separately stand what occurred (and what went wrong) over the to “engage” with Iran and Syria (as recommended by the past two decades. Iraq Study Group in 2006). PART I In May 2009, shortly after assuming office, President THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE Obama sent the assistant secretary of state for Near 1990S AND 2000S Eastern affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, and the senior director for the Middle East in the National Security Council, The 1990s augured well for the effort to resolve the Daniel Shapiro, to Damascus to open a dialogue with Israeli-Syrian conflict. Two American presidents Bashar al-Asad’s regime. Several members of Congress (George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton) and three also travelled to Syria early in Obama’s first year, includ- Israeli prime ministers (Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, ing the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign and Ehud Barak) assigned priority to the Syrian track Relations, John Kerry, and the chairman of the House over the Palestinian track of the peace process. They Committee on Foreign Affairs, Howard Berman. In ad- saw Israeli-Syrian peace as the key to a geopolitical dition, when the president appointed George Mitchell as change in the region, viewed the Israeli-Syrian dispute special envoy to the Middle East, Mitchell named as his as easier to resolve than the Israeli-Palestinian national deputy Fred Hof, a respected expert on Syria and the conflict, and believed that Hafiz al-Asad, the authorita- Israeli-Syrian dispute. Last summer, both Mitchell and tive leader of a powerful regime and functioning state, Hof visited Damascus and began their give and take with would be a more reliable partner than Yasir Arafat.2 Syria. While there was an initial hurdle in Asad’s insistence on And yet, after this apparent auspicious beginning, neither a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights as a the bilateral relationship between the United States and
Itamar Rabinovich is the Bronfman Distinguished Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. precondition to a serious discussion of the terms of shakable insistence on regaining a hundred percent of peace, Prime Minister Rabin overcame this when he de- what he defined as Syrian territory (the line of June 4, cided to “deposit” with the Clinton administration a 1967) and refusal to engage in any public diplomacy conditional willingness to withdraw fully from the terri- that would help his counterparts sway Israeli public tory in return for a package of peace and security accept- opinion to support full withdrawal from the Golan able to Israel. This enabled the parties to draw through Heights and the evacuation of some 18,000 settlers. the hypothetical contours of a settlement—full Israeli Asad also believed that diplomacy should be conducted withdrawal in phases, a full-fledged peace treaty includ- from a position of strength and that bargaining assets ing normalization of relations, a security regime, and a and sources of leverage should be held until an agree- Syrian endorsement of a parallel Israeli-Lebanese peace ment is reached and should not be abandoned a mo- agreement—while satisfying the Syrian precondition. ment too soon. To his Israeli counterparts, that ap- proach conveyed a sense of ambivalence that cast While Israel and Syria negotiated directly throughout the doubt on the sincerity of his intentions. Finally, the 1990s (and at several points did so at a senior level), the Clinton administration devoted immense resources and negotiations were in fact trilateral. Not only was the creative diplomacy to the negotiations, but in retrospect United States the sponsor and coordinator of this effort, it seems clear that it should have been tougher on both but it was quite clear that the United States was the ob- sides.3 ject of Asad’s interest. Asad was, of course, anxious to regain the Golan Heights, but he saw peace with Israel The Transformation of 2000 as the unpalatable prelude and precondition to a differ- ent, positive relationship with the Beginning in 2000, the trilateral Is- United States. In this respect, ironi- raeli-Syrian-American relationship cally, he was walking in the footsteps The Clinton administration de- that had existed throughout the of Anwar al-Sadat, the object of his voted immense resources and crea- 1990s began to transform. Several fury and contempt in the late 1970s. tive diplomacy to the negotiations, events and developments in Damas-
but in retrospect it seems clear that cus, Washington, and Jerusalem, And yet, an Israeli-Syrian agreement explain this: was not reached and the negotiation it should have been tougher on collapsed in March 2000 during Bill both sides. • In Damascus, it took Ba- Clinton’s and Hafiz al-Asad’s ill-fated shar al-Asad several years to summit in Geneva. The reason for consolidate his power and the failure of the Geneva meeting to start mastering the management of Syria’s remains to be fully explained and is a matter of contro- foreign and national security policies. But even versy, but a principal cause of the breakdown seemed to the better established and more dexterous Ba- be Asad’s realization that he was close to dying. As a shar of today still has yet to reach his father’s result, he decided to assign priority to ensuring a smooth stature, authority, and ability to manage com- transition of power to his son, Bashar. Indeed, the fail- plex geopolitical affairs. For instance, Hafiz al- ure in Geneva was followed in short order by Hafiz’s Asad conducted his relationship with Iran as an death and Bashar’s accession to the presidency. alliance of equals and he treated Hizballah and its leader, Hasan Nasrallah, as a client. Under Aside from the Geneva episode, how can the overall Bashar, Syria has become the subordinate party failure to reach an Israeli-Syrian deal during the Clinton in the partnership with Iran, and Nasrallah has presidency be explained? The single most important rea- become Syria’s peer. Additionally, Bashar mis- son was that Israel and Syria were willing, but not anx- managed his relationship with the Bush ad- ious, to forge an agreement. For two adversaries like ministration, particularly in the Iraqi and Leba- Israel and Syria to cross the gap and pay the costs en- nese context, and turned George W. Bush into tailed in a peace settlement, the rewards of peace and the a bitter enemy. price of a lingering conflict have to be compelling. But in the 1990s, Israeli leaders faced the pressure and tempta- • In Washington, the transition of power from tion of the other tracks of the peace process. Israel the Clinton administration to the Bush admini- could, and indeed did, shift to another track when the stration led to a change in the United States’ preferred Syrian track appeared intractable. view of Syria. The Bush administration saw
Syria as a squalid dictatorship, a close ally of The Israeli leaders’ reluctance and ambivalence were Iran, a sponsor of terrorism, and a country reinforced by Hafiz al-Asad’s negotiating style—an un-
HOW TO TALK AND HOW NOT TO TALK TO SYRIA| MEMO NUMBER 18| 2 building and acquiring weapons of mass de- process with Syria. Not only was Sharon fo- struction. Yet, prior to and immediately after the cused on the Palestinian issue, he was opposed invasion of Iraq, the administration tried to to the notion of withdrawal from the Golan build a dialogue with Syria. However, these ef- Heights, and was quite happy pursuing a pol- forts failed and the failure’s impact was exacer- icy that was congruent with that of the Bush bated by Syria’s support of the “Sunni insurrec- administration. As a result, he rebuffed at least tion” in Iraq and by its suspected role in the as- two attempts by the Asad regime to restart the sassination of the Lebanese prime minister, negotiation process. After Sharon fell ill in Rafiq al-Hariri, in February 2005. These is- 2006, Ehud Olmert, as acting and then as the sues—Iraq and Lebanon—were new elements elected prime minister, initially followed in Washington’s relationship with Damascus. Sharon’s Syria policy. But in February 2007, Prior to the Bush presidency, in the 1990s, Iraq Olmert changed course, agreeing to Israeli- was not as big an issue, and the Clinton admini- Syrian talks mediated by Turkey. The in- stration (as well as the Israeli government of the volvement of Turkey in the Israeli-Syrian talks day) was willing to acquiesce to Syria’s hegem- would bring yet another element into what ony in Lebanon as part of a settlement package. had never really been a bilateral relationship or In contrast, beginning in 2003, Washington be- process to begin with. came incensed with the fact that Syria was the principal gateway for anti-American foreign The Turkish Mediation fighters on their way to Iraq, and attached great importance to the protection of Lebanon’s sov- A few years earlier, the notion of Israeli-Syrian talks ereignty and democracy. mediated by Turkey would have seemed somewhat un- usual. But under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish-Syrian Having weighed its options, the Bush admini- relations improved dramatically, and not at the expense stration decided on a middle course: It would of Turkish-Israeli relations—Ankara’s link with Jerusa- not use force against Syria, nor would it enter lem remained healthy. Olmert, who kept a cordial rela- into dialogue with Damascus. Instead, it opted tionship with President Bush, apprised him of his deci- to isolate the Asad regime and penalize it with sion to open a channel to Syria. The American presi- sanctions. By the same token, it opposed the re- dent did not conceal his unhappiness, but refrained sumption of the Israeli-Syrian negotiation track. from expressing outright opposition to Olmert’s deci- In its view, such a resumption would endow sion. Asad with the very legitimacy that the admini- stration had sought to deny him. As the secret talks began to pick up steam in mid-2008, both sides had an interest in going public. Olmert’s per- • In Jerusalem, Israel’s view of Syria and the sonal problems were mounting (he was facing the pos- prospect of an Israeli-Syrian settlement altered sibility of being indicted on charges of fraud), and he several times during the first decade of the was therefore interested in publicizing the negotiation twenty-first century. Soon after the failure of in order to create political capital. In addition, he hoped the March 2000 Clinton-Asad meeting, Prime that by announcing the talks, pressure would be created Minister Ehud Barak withdrew unilaterally (in to expedite them, and he would be able to forge a leg- coordination with the UN, but not with Leba- acy before leaving office. On the Syrian side, Damascus non and Syria) from southern Lebanon. In do- was interested in publicizing the indirect negotiations in ing so, Barak severed the link between Israel’s order to break out of the isolation into which the Bush security challenge in Lebanon and the Israeli- administration had been seeking to push it. Syrian peace process. The impact of this devel- opment was magnified by Syria’s military with- Many details of the negotiations remain unknown, but drawal from Lebanon in 2005. The overall re- Olmert, apparently, found his own way of conveying sult was a much stronger and less dependent the equivalent of Rabin’s “deposit.” Yet, the Syrian ne- Hizballah that posed a greater security chal- gotiators attempted to garner a more formal, binding lenge to Israel, and more than in previous years, commitment from Israel regarding withdrawal to the was an extension of Iranian power rather than a line of June 4, 1967. At the same time, Olmert tried to Syrian proxy. obtain from Syria a commitment to realign its regional policy away from Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas as a new, Ariel Sharon, who became Israel’s prime minis- updated Israeli sine qua non for a deal. Additionally, ter in early 2001, had no interest in a peace
HOW TO TALK AND HOW NOT TO TALK TO SYRIA| MEMO NUMBER 18| 3 Israel reiterated its longstanding demand for normalized the complexion of the Israeli government, and the relations and security arrangements. questions regarding Bashar al-Asad’s persona and lead- ership all compound the challenge of forging an agree- The whole venture crashed around the time of Olmert’s ment. December 22 working visit to Ankara, partly as a result of events outside the contours of the Israel-Syria dia- If and when the current circumstances and outlook logue. Olmert had hoped that Syria’s foreign minister, change and a decision to invest a major effort at reach- Walid Muallim, would be joining the negotiations at that ing an Israeli-Syrian settlement is made, a comprehen- point, but this did not happen (Olmert’s expectations sive policy should be formulated in order to orchestrate may have been too high). To make matters worse, five and implement three parallel efforts: an Israeli-Syrian days later, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in the negotiation, an American-Syrian bilateral negotiation, Gaza Strip, incensing Erdoğan, who was not just critical and a realignment of Syria’s regional policies as part of of the operation but of being put in an awkward posi- a broad effort to transform the politics and geopolitics tion—Erdoğan was concerned it would appear like Ol- of the Middle East. mert had advised him of the imminent operation. Israel and Syria While the indirect talks failed to produce an Israeli- Syrian agreement, they did pave the way for Syria’s Syria may insist that it wants Turkey to play an impor- emergence from the United States-imposed isolation. tant role in any new talks with Israel. Despite, or per- For instance, President Nicolas Sarkozy invited Bashar haps because of, Israel’s current tension with Turkey, al-Asad to visit Paris in July 2008, Israel may agree to assign a role to and other European suitors soon Ankara (especially if it serves to followed suit, all happy to defy the The task facing Washington to- change Turkey’s regional policies will of George W. Bush. day—the only actor who can or- and leads to a better bilateral rela- chestrate and see through a com- tionship with Israel). But while At the same time as the talks medi- Turkish participation may not be a ated by Turkey were occurring, an- prehensive peace effort—is far bad idea, Turkey should not be the other significant issue was develop- more complex and daunting than mediator. It would be up to Wash- ing. It was during this period that it was in the 1990s. ington to play the major role in re- Israel discovered the joint Syrian- viving the Israeli-Syrian track. North Korean construction of a nu- clear reactor in northeastern Syria. Any U.S. initiative should begin with The 2007 Israeli operation against the reactor, as well as exploratory talks with Israel and Syria in order to ascer- other unpublicized operations against Syria that took tain whether both parties are ready to go the distance. place while Damascus and Jerusalem were engaged in Specifically, Washington’s discussion with Israel should indirect talks, illustrated two important things about begin at a working level (i.e., Senator George Mitchell both sides: The Olmert government learned to adopt the and his team meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Syrian modus operandi of talking and striking simulta- Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and their neously. At the same time, Asad was willing to make teams) and continue in a meeting between the president bold, and in many respects, irresponsible decisions, but and the prime minister. The president would want to once hit over the knuckles, was capable of controlling hear from the prime minister how far he is willing and his temper and not retaliating. committed to go, and the prime minister would need to hear what commitments the United States would plan PART II to obtain from Syria and what the United States would THE ARCHITECTURE OF A NEW NEGOTIATION be willing to do in order to offset the security and eco- nomic costs to Israel of a peace deal with Syria. As mentioned, the Syrian track of the peace process of the 1990s was essentially a trilateral Israeli-Syrian- At present, though, such an initiative does not appear American negotiation. Yet, the task facing Washington on anybody’s radar, not even the United States’. Presi- today—the only actor who can orchestrate and see dent Obama and his team have assigned priority to the through a comprehensive peace effort—is far more Palestinian issue. Additionally, they are having a diffi- complex and daunting than it was in the 1990s. The cult time forging a common policy with Prime Minister roles played in the region by Iran and Turkey, the posi- Netanyahu and his government with regard to that is- tion held by Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, sue, and realize the impracticality of pushing a parallel, major initiative on the Syrian track.
HOW TO TALK AND HOW NOT TO TALK TO SYRIA| MEMO NUMBER 18| 4 Yet, if a move to advance peace with Syria is made, it is • The severity of the Iranian challenge would important the American administration understand lead both the United States and Israel to con- where the Netanyahu government stands. During his clude that pulling Syria away from Iran is an election campaign, Netanyahu spoke clearly against the urgent necessity. notion of a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and has maintained this stance since being elected. The • Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would begin, prime minister and his spokesmen have publicly said that but permanently stall. Israel would like to reach a peace agreement with Syria predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan Heights— • Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would bring something Netanyahu knows full well is not acceptable about the prospect of a partial or limited to Syria. Yet, despite the prime minister’s stance, his agreement (such as an agreement on a provi- government’s position may not be as iron-clad as it ap- sional Palestinian state) that would enable the pears. Israeli government to move ahead on both tracks. In 1998, during his first term, Netanyahu used an American businessman, Ronald Lauder, as his emissary Should any of the above occur, and negotiations with to Hafiz al-Asad. Lauder conveyed Netanyahu’s version Syria become a priority for the parties, Washington’s of the “deposit,” indicating Israel’s willingness in princi- talks with Syria would have to begin at a working level. ple to withdraw to the line of June 4, 1967 in return for A Barack Obama–Bashar al-Asad summit in the style of an acceptable package of peace and security from Syria. Bill Clinton’s meetings with Hafiz al-Asad is currently While Netanyahu denies this version of the Lauder epi- not likely, nor would it be in the United States’ interest. sode, it is important to note that his government is not It could become a useful policy tool at a later stage, uniformly against a serious dialogue once significant progress is achieved. 4 with Syria. Bashar al-Asad has said in public Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, that he is ready to sign a peace treaty even more so the professional de- and even more so the professional with Israel in return for an Israeli fense establishment, think it is criti- defense establishment, think it is withdrawal to the line of June 4, cally important to forge a deal with 1967 (while building the option of Syria. They assign the highest priority critically important to forge a deal with Syria. initiating hostilities in the absence of to dealing with the Iranian security a diplomatic process), but has hard- challenge and view an Israeli-Syrian ened some of Syria’s positions rela- deal as an important step toward re- tive to those taken by his father in gional realignment and blunting the the 1990s (Bashar has spoken in public against normali- Iranian threat. Indeed, earlier this month, the Israeli me- zation of relations with Israel and has insisted on link- dia began to report in rather dramatic terms on a split age to the Palestinian track). Getting him to go back to between the national security establishment and the the Syrian position of the 1990s may take some effort, prime minister and his immediate circle regarding the but would not be a major obstacle. Much greater diffi- 5 Syria track. (While Washington may be tempted to try culties are likely to be presented by other issues: to take advantage of this fault line, it should bear in mind that earlier efforts to meddle in Israeli politics have • On the issue of Israeli withdrawal, Bashar al- often proved counterproductive.) Asad has said publicly that he is ready to sign a
peace treaty with Israel if Israel withdraws to Israeli policymakers understand that it would be difficult the line of June 4, 1967. The difficulty rests on to shift from the Palestinian track to the Syrian one. the familiar Syrian insistence on getting an ex- They are well aware that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is plicit Israeli commitment to withdrawal to the real and needs to be addressed. They are also aware of line of June 4, 1967 as a precondition to enter- the Obama administration’s conviction that progress on, ing into negotiations, and the familiar Israeli if not a resolution of, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is refusal to grant such a commitment at the out- important for U.S. interests in the Arab and Muslim set. In order to jumpstart the negotiations, the worlds. Obama administration would have to find a
formula that would overcome this obstacle. For the current configuration to change, one or more of the following developments needs to occur:
HOW TO TALK AND HOW NOT TO TALK TO SYRIA| MEMO NUMBER 18| 5 • Another lingering issue from the 1990s is Is- States’ interest to isolate Iran, since doing so would raeli’s insistence on Syrian recognition of Israeli only serve to radicalize it. Instead, Syria maintains, sovereignty over Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee). someone should speak with the Iranian leadership, and At the same time, Syria insists that it is entitled the country best qualified for that role is Syria. In short, access to the lake, as demarcated by the line of Damascus’s response to the demand that it reorient its June 4, 1967. regional position in order to gain an improved relation- ship with Washington is that it should be able to keep • Even if an initial breakthrough is achieved, a its channels with Tehran open and build channels with host of issues will have to be resolved, including Washington, and then serve as an effective go-between. the establishment of a security regime, the crea- In other words, Syria would like to continue its tradi- tion of a timetable for Israel’s withdrawal from tional policy of straddling the fence. the Golan Heights, and the implementation of Syrian “normalization” measures that coincide Most recently, in a speech in Damascus, Asad revealed with Israeli withdrawal. On this last issue, Israel that he had rejected an offer transmitted to him by demands that any withdrawal be phased and President Shimon Peres for direct Israeli-Syrian nego- that in the early, modest phases, Syria offer gen- tiations, provided that Syria sever its relationship with erous doses of normalization in order to help Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. Asad stated that Syria had build support in Israel for the concessions. no intention of breaking its bond with Iran, and de- Many Israeli policymakers see this as particularly nounced those (namely Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO) critical because current Israeli law states that a who “have decided to eliminate the option of armed majority (sixty-one votes) in the Knesset is re- opposition and have become prisoner to the option of quired for territorial concessions in the Golan peace when they should be ready for both options [at Heights, and the Israeli prime minister may de- the same time].”7 cide that a referendum is required to approve and legitimize a major withdrawal. The American-Syrian Bilateral Relationship
• The above point is related to the larger issue of Syria’s ultimate interests are to normalize its relation- public diplomacy. As mentioned above, one of ship with the United States, be removed from the State the major obstacles to reaching a settlement in Department’s list of states supporting terrorism, have the 1990s was Hafiz al-Asad’s refusal to engage all the sanctions against it rescinded, become the bene- in public diplomacy or reach out to the Israeli ficiary of U.S. aid, and become an interlocutor, if not a public. On a number of occasions, when under partner, with regard to U.S. policies in the Middle East. American pressure, Asad agreed to acts of pub- From Damascus’s perspective, a trilateral Israeli-Syrian- lic diplomacy, but because he and his emissaries American negotiation can help Syria realize these goals. acted with such evident reluctance, the results were counterproductive.6 While Bashar (and his A successful diplomatic venture that would break influential wife) seems to understand the impor- Syria’s bonds to Iran, distance Syria from Hamas and tance of media and public opinion in parliamen- Hizballah, and lead to Israeli-Syrian peace and a new tary democracies more so than his father did, he American-Syrian relationship could constitute a major may be reluctant to offer, what to him may exploit, the contemporary equivalent of what Henry seem like, another Syrian concession. Kissinger and his successors were able to accomplish with Egypt in the 1970s. But Asad is not Sadat. Sadat But the greatest hurdle will likely arise when the United decided to reorient Egypt’s politics and policies, and States raises the demand of Syrian realignment—namely leaped from the Soviet train before he was assigned a that Damascus distance itself from Tehran, Hizballah, seat on the American one. It is not at all certain that and Hamas, as a condition of an American-Syrian ac- Asad has made such a decision, but even if he did, he commodation and of an Israeli-Syrian deal. This no- would insist on seeing and checking his new seat and tion—that a fundamental reorientation of Syrian foreign then drive a hard bargain over the terms. policy is a critical U.S. and Israeli demand—has been known for quite some time, and several Syrian spokes- During the past few months the difficulties inherent in men have already responded to it. Syria claims that any any attempt to draw Syria away from Iran were illus- demand that a country alter its foreign policy or sever its trated by two sets of events. In the first case, Iran relationship with a third party is not legitimate. Syria also sought to flex some of its diplomatic muscle in Syria in argues, more specifically, that it is not in the United the aftermath of Under Secretary of State William Burns’s February visit to Damascus. Burns’s visit was
HOW TO TALK AND HOW NOT TO TALK TO SYRIA| MEMO NUMBER 18| 6 another step in the Obama administration’s effort to three main reasons the administration supports dia- develop a bilateral dialogue with Syria. It must have wor- logue with Syria. First, Feltman said, past dialogue with ried Iran because Tehran responded by organizing a “re- Damascus has yielded some results, particularly with sistance” summit in Damascus, attended by the Iranian regard to Iraq. Second, efforts to isolate Syria were un- president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Hizballah’s dermined by U.S. allies, including France, Saudi Arabia, leader, Hasan Nasrallah. During the public part of the and Israel (under Olmert) who engaged with Asad. meeting, Bashar al-Asad chose to ridicule Secretary of Lastly, Feltman said, there is a prospect of distancing State Hillary Clinton’s call for Damascus to distance it- Syria from Iran: “Syria’s relationship with Iran seems self from Tehran.8 primarily based on perceived political interests, rather than cultural ties or complementary economies. But as In the second case, in April, both American and Israeli with most partnerships, there are clear policy differ- sources (followed by official statements) revealed that ences. With respect to Israel, the Syrians have a clear Syria had transferred to Hizballah a new set of upgraded interest in negotiating a peace agreement for the return Scud missiles. Several explanations have been offered for of the Golan Heights, whereas Iran opposes any form this weapons transfer, including that it is designed to of peace with Israel. Syria has a secular government, facilitate Syria’s return to direct military presence in whereas Iran has a theocratic one.”12 Feltman never Lebanon and that it is yet another way of signaling to spoke openly of distancing Syria from Iran, but said Washington that Syria must not be ignored. But an addi- Damascus should be confronted with a clear choice: tional, plausible explanation is that it is an indication of “One path leading toward participation in a Middle Syria’s subordination to Iran’s calculus. The revelation East of greater openness, prosperity and peace and an- led to congressional pressures on the administration to other leading to continued stagnation and instability.”13 delay the departure of Robert Ford as the new U.S. am- bassador to Syria.9 But the administration also took a tough approach. On May 4, shortly On April 21, in the aftermath of after Feltman’s testimony, President Syria’s weapons transfer, Assistant Given the Obama administra- Obama renewed U.S. sanctions on Secretary of State for Near Eastern tion’s commitment to withdrawing Syria. The president used strong Affairs Jeff Feltman appeared before U.S. troops from Iraq, an Ameri- language in his message to Congress, the House Foreign Affairs Subcom- writing that Syria’s actions and poli- mittee on the Middle East and South can-Syrian understanding on Iraq cies “pose a continuing unusual and Asia in order to explain and defend could conceivably be reached. extraordinary threat to the national the decision to send Ambassador security, foreign policy and economy Ford to Damascus.10 Feltman argued of the United States.”14 that, indeed, the United States had many difficulties in its relationship with Syria, and was As stated, Washington’s core interest in negotiating critical of several aspects of the latter’s politics and poli- with Syria is the possibility of distancing Damascus cies. But, Feltman argued, while Syria is a close ally of from Tehran and linking this reorientation to a peace Iran, there are important differences between the two. In deal with Israel. Some of the other outstanding issues, addition, Feltman said, engagement with Damascus has including Syrian support of terrorist organizations and made some progress and having an ambassador in place pursuit of weapons of mass destruction would in effect is a good way of improving the dialogue and the likeli- be resolved through a realignment of Syria’s foreign hood of positive outcomes. Feltman’s testimony was a policy, if such realignment is achieved. But two other rare exposition of the administration’s perception of issues will have to be addressed separately: Syria and of its own policy toward Damascus, and there is value in examining it in detail. Iraq: Over the past seven years, the U.S.-Syrian rela- tionship has been poisoned by Syria’s direct and indi- After defining Washington’s principal concerns in the rect support of anti-American insurgents and terrorists Middle East, Feltman went through the familiar litany of in Iraq. The Syrians are fully aware of the political and Syria’s misbehavior—sponsoring terrorism, undermining diplomatic costs of this policy, but in their eyes, the stability and democracy in Lebanon, undermining U.S. penalties inflicted on them by Washington are out- efforts in Iraq, supporting Hamas, and pursuing nuclear weighed by their desire to see Iraq free of the United capabilities—but also offered that Syria could be benefi- States’ presence and dominant influence. cial to U.S. interests: “Syria figures prominently in each of these issues—often as part of the problem, and poten- Given the Obama administration’s commitment to tially as part of the solution.”11 Feltman then articulated withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq and its interest in
HOW TO TALK AND HOW NOT TO TALK TO SYRIA| MEMO NUMBER 18| 7 leaving behind a functioning, fairly stable Iraqi state, an compensate for the deterrence it lost when its nuclear American-Syrian understanding on Iraq could conceiva- reactor was destroyed in September 2007. But, since it bly be reached. Syria does not want an Iraq dominated can be argued that Syria also transferred the weapons by the United States, does not want fragmentation of the because it was doing Iran’s bidding, it seems safe to say Iraqi state, and does not want a Saddam-like, powerful, that Hizballah’s arsenal is designed not only to deter hostile regime to its east. Damascus is also not interested Israel from launching new military actions in Lebanon, in seeing Iraq turn into an Iranian client-state; having but to deter Israel or the United States from attacking Iran as both an ally and a neighbor may be too much for Iran’s nuclear installations. In addition, it cannot be Damascus. Over the next few years, as local forces and ruled out that Hizballah’s arsenal would be employed in external actors try to shape the course of events to their a bid to provoke Israel in the event that severe sanc- liking, one can envisage a measure of American-Syrian tions are imposed on Iran. collaboration. But, despite some common interests with Washington, challenges exist. It will be difficult for Da- Syria’s actions raise the following question: has the Syr- mascus to overcome the temptation to use another in- ian leadership thought through what the implications of strument—in this case, Iraq—to demonstrate to Wash- a Hizballah conflict with Israel or the United States ington its ability to cause nuisance when ignored. would be for them? In 1976, Hafiz al-Asad launched his original intervention in Lebanon because he was afraid Lebanon: The United States became committed to the that victory by the PLO and its allies in the Lebanese protection of Lebanon’s sovereignty and democracy un- civil war would drag Syria into an unwanted war with der the George W. Bush administration. During that Israel. But, importantly, he did so with tacit American time, the United States helped force the Syrian military and Israeli approval. Bashar is more reckless than his to withdraw from Lebanon and viewed the Fouad Sin- father, though at some point he may realize that Iran iora government as the one successful example of its and Hizballah can pose serious threats to Syria’s na- policy of fostering democracy in the tional security, as well as long-term Middle East. Much has changed since threats to Syria’s position in Leba- then. The issue of Syrian national secu- non. rity interests in Lebanon could The 2006 war in Lebanon played into become an important element of a The issue of Syrian national security the hands of the Iran-Hizballah-Syria productive American-Syrian dia- interests in Lebanon could become coalition. The lack of a clear-cut Is- logue, but the prospect of identify- an important element of a produc- raeli victory is widely interpreted in tive American-Syrian dialogue, but Lebanon and in the region as an ing a common American-Syrian the prospect of identifying a com- achievement for Hizballah and its agenda for Lebanon is slim. mon American-Syrian agenda for two patrons—Iran and Syria. As Lebanon is slim. Syria would want such, while Sa’d al-Hariri won the U.S. recognition of its special posi- 2009 election to be Prime Minister Siniora’s successor, tion in Lebanon, and would offer in return a vague and Syria refrained from using violence before and dur- commitment to Lebanese sovereignty and democracy, ing the election, Damascus was successful in offsetting as well as a very subtle, almost imperceptible, assurance the election results during the coalition formation and that it would distance itself from Iran and Hizballah. chipped away at the moderate, pro-Western March 14 Syria may for instance offer a firmer commitment to Alliance. Hariri’s and the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s stop arms shipments to Hizballah, but given the or- pilgrimages to Damascus were powerful illustrations of ganization’s existing arsenal, such a commitment, even the revival of Syrian political influence that occurred if kept, would be limited in value. Washington and Je- without massive military presence. rusalem may want a Syrian commitment to help in dis- mantling Hizballah, turning it into a normal civilian But appearances can be misleading. Syria may have been party, but Damascus would be highly unlikely to agree successful in these latest political battles, but it has been to this. losing ground to Iran and Hizballah. In the late winter of 2009-2010, Syria, as mentioned, transferred advanced The Larger Context missiles to Hizballah, thus upgrading the group’s already impressive arsenal of rockets and missiles. Syria trans- As argued, resolving the Israeli-Syrian conflict will take ferred the weapons because it sees its relationship with more than bilateral talks between the parties. It will take Hizballah as an extension of its own military posture vis- serious U.S. involvement to address the interests of all à-vis Israel. In a manner of speaking, Syria’s build-up of sides. But this U.S. effort to resolve the Israeli-Syrian Hizballah’s arsenal of rockets and missiles is meant to conflict and settle its own bilateral relationship with
HOW TO TALK AND HOW NOT TO TALK TO SYRIA| MEMO NUMBER 18| 8 Damascus would be conducted within a larger regional CONCLUSION and international context, one in which several interests must be accounted for: Sketching the outlines and dynamics of a new Israeli- Syrian peace negotiation, orchestrated by the United Iran: During the early days of the Obama administra- States as part of a larger effort to reshape the geopoli- tion, when it set out to “engage” with both Tehran and tics of the Middle East, is clearly a hypothetical exer- Damascus, it had to pay attention to the potential ten- cise. While there are indications that parts of the Israeli sion between its efforts to create warmer relations with government are interested in a revival of the Syrian Tehran and its efforts to lure away Iran’s chief ally in the track and while Syria’s stated position is that it wants region. This no longer seems to be an issue, but Iran will such a revival, Syria’s ruler is acting with a manifest in all likelihood try to disrupt any American attempt to sense of confidence and is clearly comfortable with his pull Syria away from its orbit. Ahmadinejad’s February country’s regional position. Additionally, the United visit to Damascus demonstrated Iran’s determination to States is currently pursuing a Middle East policy that respond seriously to any American overture to Syria. has different priorities, and there are no signs that Should a genuine American-Syrian dialogue begin to Washington is contemplating a radical change of unfold, an Iranian counter-effort is to be expected. Iran course. Yet, should the administration change its mind is likely to exert direct pressure on Syria and might also or should the Israeli government decide to do what its use its Lebanese and Palestinian clients to provoke a predecessors did in the past and shift tracks in the crisis, particularly if an American overture toward Syria peace process, a trilateral Israeli-Syrian-American deal is unfolds simultaneously with the stiffening of anti-Iranian feasible, but negotiating it would be a daunting task, sanctions. requiring a massive investment of time and political resources, and exceptional diplomatic skills. If success- Turkey: Erdoğan’s government is likely to take a dim ful, such a move would produce an Israeli-Syrian peace view of Syria altering its current regional orientation to a deal, a new bilateral relationship between the United new posture based on a closer relationship with the States and Syria, Syrian disengagement from its alliance United States and peace with Israel. Its chagrin would be with Iran and the “resistance camp” and a new configu- enhanced if it is excluded from new rounds of Israeli- ration in Lebanon. Syrian negotiation—a process it feels is part of its new diplomatic portfolio. It would be up to Washington to But for such an optimistic scenario to materialize, sev- assuage Ankara and find a role for Turkey in a fresh eral major conditions would have to be met: there round of Israeli-Syrian negotiations without relinquish- would have to be a willingness and ability on the part of ing its own leading role. Israel’s leadership to pay the territorial price of peace with Syria; there would have to be a willingness and The Palestinian Track: As noted above, there will ei- ability on the part of Syria’s leadership to disengage ther have to be a partial or an interim agreement be- from Iran, and to transform Syria’s regional policy and, tween Israel and the Palestinian Authority or a total col- at least to some extent, its domestic politics; and there lapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process for Israel to would have to be forceful, skillful American diplomacy resume negotiations with Syria. A partial or limited that would integrate Washington’s sponsorship of the agreement with the Palestinian Authority would leave Israeli-Syrian negotiation, its own bilateral negotiation the Israeli government with sufficient political space for with Syria and the interest of other regional and inter- a renewal of the Syrian negotiations and would limit Pal- national actors into a comprehensive strategy. estinian and Arab criticism of a “separate deal” between Jerusalem and Damascus. Progress on the Israeli-Syrian For the time being, it seems unlikely that a fresh initia- track against the backdrop of an Israeli-Palestinian im- tive of this scale and boldness would be taken and that passe would require a major diplomatic effort orches- in the absence of a new Israeli-Syrian negotiation, the trated by Washington in order to prevent a political current American effort to build a bilateral dialogue backlash or violent outburst. with Syria will continue to face the very same difficul- ties that Feltman’s testimony revealed. Russia and Western Europe: Russia and several West European countries, France in particular, have a stake in Additionally, it seems that, with regard to Syria, both the Syrian and Lebanese arenas. They are not in a posi- the United States and Israel will keep moving in circles tion to start or sponsor an Israeli-Syrian negotiation, but without making progress. Israel’s government is fo- once it begins, they would seek to play a role and affect cused on the Palestinian issue and in practice has no its course. It would be up to the United State to direct Syria policy of which to speak (though its policy plan- their interest to constructive channels. ners are likely devoting thought to Iran, Syria, and Hiz-
HOW TO TALK AND HOW NOT TO TALK TO SYRIA| MEMO NUMBER 18| 9 ballah). From Washington’s perspective, the effort to position by pulling Syria away from its orbit appears satisfy Syria by conducting a bilateral dialogue, absent a difficult to implement. Instead, Washington could dra- renewal of Israeli-Syrian negotiations, is not working. matically enhance its leverage by turning the issue around and dealing more effectively with Iran itself. At Yet, should the United States decide to renew an Israeli- this point engagement with Iran has yielded no results Syrian negotiation, it should bear in mind the lessons of and the deadline for sanctions has been moved twice. the failed efforts of the 1990s: commitment and ingenu- What is called for is at least one tangible act taken or ity must be supplemented by forcefulness; and a sense of inspired by the Obama administration, such as Ameri- urgency and greater stakes have to be introduced into can and European sanctions in the absence of a con- the equation. In retrospect, it seems that what Washing- sensus in the Security Council. This would affect Syria’s ton’s diplomacy with regard to the Israeli-Syrian track in own attitude and would also provide Washington with the 1990s lacked most was leverage. Today, such lever- significant leverage on an Israeli prime minister who age could be found through a different formulation of made dealing with the Iranian threat the main purpose the linkage between the Syrian track and the Iranian is- and theme of his tenure. sue. The notion of seeking to weaken Iran’s regional ###
1 See Itamar Rabinovich, “Damascus, Jerusalem, and Washington: The Syrian-Israeli Relationship as a U.S. Policy Issue,” Analysis Paper number 19, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, March 2009, available at
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