Present Conditions

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Present Conditions CHAPTER I PRESENT CONDITIONS The coverage and condition details of the tertiary road Infrastructure network consisting of village access roads are not known,1 except that these roads are all unpaved. Though the road Roads density of 0.03 km of road per square km and 0.88 km per 1,000 people is far lower than most developing countries, etwork. The road network comprises more than the road network touches all the major population centers 6,000 kilometers (km) of national roads, of and reaches to a certain extent into remote areas. The re- Nwhich 3,300 km are primary highways. The corded traffic during the preconflict period on the primary remaining network of more than 2,700 km of secondary network varied between 250 and 1,000 vehicles per day. national roads and 15,000 km of provincial roads is either However, traffic levels were rapidly improving and in most gravel or earthen (Table 1). cases exceeding these figures. The national primary road network largely consists of Condition. More than 2 decades of conflict, combined the ring road (Herat–Kandahar–Kabul–Mazar-e-Sharif– with a prolonged lack of maintenance, have resulted in dam- Sheberghan–Mehmana–Herat) and the international links age to long sections of roads, critical structures, bridges, and to neighboring countries (Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, the snow galleries on the approach to the Salang Tunnel. Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). The 615-km The 2.8-km tunnel has some localized damage and lacks Sheberghan–Herat section of the ring road is only partly ventilation and lighting. Overall, the road network has been constructed and is generally unpaved (Table 2, Map 1). rendered only partially usable and even then at a signifi- cantly high transporta- tion cost. According to the A nonfunctional culvert is all that remains of this section of road between Kabul and Kandahar. last condition survey2 undertaken in 1994, 17% of the network was REPLACE in good condition, 35% in fair condition, and the remaining 48% in poor condition. The situation has deteriorated since then. While the percent- 1 According to rough esti- mates, about 15,000– 20,000 km. 2 Afghanistan Road Condi- tion Survey (ARCS) database, 1991–1994, by Afghanistan Construction and Logistics Unit and the United States Agency for International Development. Present Conditions 1 Some road improvement activities were undertaken Table 1. Major Road Network during the Taliban period (1996–2001). These include Road Classification Length (km) asphalt overlay on a 50-km section of the Kabul-Kandahar National Primary 3,280 road beginning from the outskirts of Kabul. Although all National Secondary 2,785 Subtotal 6,065 50 km received the base course, the wearing course could Province Primary 8,882 only be laid on some 40 km. Similarly, about 195 km of the Province Secondary 6,043 concrete Kandahar–Herat road were repaired by sealing Subtotal 14,925 the transverse cracks to provide a better riding surface. Total 20,990 Interestingly, in the absence of any government-financed Source: CNA Mission estimates. initiative, patching and minor repairs works were being has deteriorated since then. While the percentage of undertaken by enterprising transporters, particularly on the national roads in good condition is more or less the same, Kandahar–Spin Boldak road, to reduce vehicle-operating only 26% remain in fair condition and those in poor con- costs. dition have increased to 54%. Large sections of the roads The condition of the roads is also reflected in travel in the south (Kabul–Kandahar–Spin Boldak) and east time. During field visits in March–April 2002, data were (Kabul–Jalalabad–Torkham) have been lost. The con- crete road in the west (Kandahar–Herat–Torghundi) is only partly traffic-worthy due to joint failures and other damage. Only the road to the north (Kabul–Pol-e Khomri–Konduz–Mazar-e-Sharif) is generally in a bet- ter condition, at least beyond the Salang Pass. Between Kabul and the Salang Pass, replacement of 13 bridges, reconstruction on some sections, and deep patching and strengthening on other sections are required. The Salang Pass, at a 3,300-meter (m) elevation, is a major constraint, as the road is badly damaged and usable only for one-way operation over about a 10-km section that includes the tunnel. Though the pavement structures have been severely This post at the border with Pakistan indicates one of Afghanistan’s six damaged, the road embankments have held up reasonably international road links to neighboring countries. well despite 2 decades of neglect and conflict conditions. The effect of the military actions is more pronounced in collected on actual travel time taken by a four-wheel-drive the form of damaged bridges. For example, 11 bridges vehicle on major road sections. Table 3 summarizes this have been damaged between Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, information. one between Kabul and Torkham, and two between Based on road condition surveys undertaken in Kandahar and Spin Boldak. March–April 2002, the following road improvement needs were identified: · Kabul–Kandahar: 127 km need embankment recon- Table 2. Travel Time on Primary Road Network struction, 281 km need subbase reconstruction, 296 km need base reconstruction, and 462 km need asphalt Travel Average Length Time Speed overlay. Road (km) (hours) (km/hr) · Kandahar–Spin Boldak: 42 km need base reconstruction, Kabul–Torkham 227 6.5 35 and the whole 105-km length needs asphalt overlay. Kabul–Kandahar 506 20.0 25 · Kandahar–Herat: 154 km are fair and need only Kandahar–Spin Boldak 105 2.5 42 repair of transverse joints; the balance of about 200 Kandahar–Herat 560 8.5 66 km requires other treatments, including replacement Kabul–Mazar-e-Sharif 399 15.0 27 of some sections; and six bridges urgently need reha- Mazar-e-Sharif–Hairatan 57 2.0 29 bilitation/reconstruction. Pol-e Khomri–Shirkhan Bandar 164 12.0 14 · Kabul–Jalalabad–Torkham: 12 km need sub-base Source: CNA Mission. reconstruction, 42 km need base reconstruction, and 2 Afghanistan’s Transport Sector: On the Road to Recovery Map 1. Principal Features of Afghanistan’s Transport Sector Present Conditions 3 84 km require asphalt overlay, in addition to repairs to Table 3. Major Road Network and International Links existing asphalt surface from Jalalabad to Torkham. Length · Kabul–Mazar-e-Sharif: urgently needs approximately Road Section Links to (km) 9,000 square meters (sq m) of deep patching and 5,000 sq m of light patching, about 3,000 cubic meters of Ring Road retaining walls, repair of snow galleries and the Salang Kabul–Ghazni–Kalat–Kandahar 506 – Tunnel, and replacement of 13 bridges. Kandahar–Herat 560 – · Mazar-e-Sharif–Hairatan: condition is very good and requires only bulldozing of sand off the road at several Herat–Maymana–Sheberghan 615 – locations. Kabul–Jabalus Sairaj–Pol-e 546 – · Pol-e Khomri–Shirkhar Bandar: road is in good con- Khomri–Mazar-e-Sharif– dition up to Baghlan, but after the first 32 km requires Sheberghan reconstruction all the way up to Konduz, and onward International Links to the border needs deep patching and asphalt over- lays. Kabul–Jalalabad–Torkham 227 Pakistan A summary of the road conditions and rehabilitation/ Kandahar–Spin Boldak 105 Pakistan reconstruction costs is shown in the Chapter III. Cost Recovery. Achieving a higher degree of cost Pol-e Khomri–Konduz–Shir Khan 164 Tajikistan recovery is critical to ensuring both efficiency in resource Naibabad–Hairatan 57 Uzbekistan allocations and long-term sustainability of road sector Herat–Qila Islam 124 Iran investments. To this end, the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) has already revived toll collection activities Herat–Torghundi 116 Turkmenistan through its Toll Department, staffed with 374 personnel, Andkhoy–Aqina 40 Turkmenistan including those manning 73 toll stations in four provinces: Ghazni, Vardak, Samangan, and Jowzjan. The present rates Source: CNA Mission. for the six categories of vehicles being tolled: passenger Role of the Private Sector. As a consequence of cars—Afghanis (AFA).178/km, minibuses—AFA.244/ the prolonged state of conflict over the past decade, a num- km, microbuses—AFA.276/km, trucks and large buses— ber of Afghan road contractors, transporters, and equip- AFA.406/km, multi-axle vehicles—AFA.731/km, and ar- ment suppliers have relocated to neighboring Pakistan and ticulated truck-trailers—AFA.812/km. The original Iran, where they continue to pursue their respective busi- practice of MPW was to utilize these resources for road ness activities. There are some 24 small Afghan road con- maintenance. At present, however, the collected tolls serve struction contractors3 operating in the two countries who as a revenue source for the cash-strapped provinces, al- are now keen to return to Afghanistan in view of the poten- though there is a certain amount of leakage in the system tial for major development activities. However, their equip- and the full toll amount is not passed on. An acceptable ment capabilities are limited, and they will need access to arrangement between the provinces, MPW, and the Min- financing and capacity building in contract management istry of Finance (MOF) for enhancing the tolls rates and to gradually take up major road construction contracts using them for road maintenance activities was being at- directly. Since the beginning of 2002, several of these con- tempted, but MOF was contemplating diverting the toll tractors have returned and established offices in Afghani- revenues to the central treasury. At the time of the Com- prehensive Needs Assessment (CNA) Mission, the situa- stan in anticipation of the upcoming development activities. tion remained very unclear. Moreover, no details were Very few domestic private road construction or main- available on the amount of toll revenues being collected.
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