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Echoing emotions: reactions to emotional displays in intergroup context van der Schalk, J.
Publication date 2010
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Citation for published version (APA): van der Schalk, J. (2010). Echoing emotions: reactions to emotional displays in intergroup context.
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UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:29 Sep 2021 Chapter 5
General Discussion Chapter 5 General Discussion
The current dissertation focuses on emotional contagion in intergroup contexts.
A first aim of the studies was to show that reactions to emotions of others depend on the intergroup context and on social categorization processes. A second aim was to show that reactions to others’ emotions impact upon the relations between social groups. In the present research we investigated these processes by studying emotional reactions to others’ facial displays while manipulating the group identity of the other person.
Summary of Main Findings
The first set of studies showed that Dutch participants were better at recognizing emotions when displayed by North-European models, compared to Mediterranean models. This supports other research suggesting that there is an ingroup advantage in emotion recognition (e.g., Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). These studies also revealed that participants had stronger approach and avoidance action tendencies in response to ingroup emotion displays. This finding indicates that individuals have stronger behavioral responses to emotions of the ingroup than to emotions of the outgroup, and also suggests that emotions of ingroup members are more relevant for observers than emotions of outgroup members. The findings of these studies therefore provide empirical support for the argument that individuals are more emotionally responsive to their fellow group members, compared to non-group members. We further demonstrated that observing emotional displays of ingroup members increased liking of these models, whereas observing the same displays of outgroup members decreased liking of these models. Previous research has also shown that expressing and sharing of emotions occurs more frequently with intimates (Clark, Fitness & Brisette, 2004; Rimé, Mesquita,
Philippot, & Boca, 1991), and that sharing of both positive and negative emotions has a beneficial effect on the relationships between people. The findings of the current studies suggest that observation of others’ emotions indeed has a positive effect on the relationship between individuals, but only if they share group membership.
The second set of studies more specifically investigated mimicry of perceived emotional displays. These studies showed that emotions of others are an emotion- eliciting event in itself. The nature of the emotional response depends on the relationship between expresser and observer. Ingroup emotional expressions of anger and fear were mimicked to a greater extent than outgroup emotional expressions of these emotions.
106 107 Chapter 5 General Discussion
In the case of outgroup emotions, expressions of the outgroup evoked emotions
that diverged from the emotions perceived. Participants reported fear in response
to outgroup anger displays, and showed facial expressions of aversion in response
to outgroup fear displays. Once again, these studies showed that individuals have
differential reactions to others’ emotions depending on intergroup context, both at a
behavioral and at an experiential level.
The studies also replicated the finding that seeing ingroup emotion displays
increases liking for ingroup members, whereas seeing outgroup emotional displays does
not increase liking for outgroup members. Moreover, we found that mimicry of negative
emotions mediated the increase in liking for the ingroup. This suggests that automatic
behavioral responses to emotions of others improve the relationship between individuals
that share group membership, but that lack of these behavioral responses work against
the relationship between individuals that do not share group membership.
This general finding did not hold for all emotions, however. The attenuation
of emotional mimicry to outgroup displays was not found for emotional displays
of happiness. This finding suggests that reactions to others’ emotions are not only
determined by group membership, but also by the specific meaning of the emotion
displayed. We suggest that happiness displays, even from outgroup members, can be
disarming, and that such displays can therefore overcome group boundaries. This idea
was further investigated in the final set of studies. We found that when individuals
were reminded of their mortality, emotional contagion of outgroup happiness increased.
Moreover, when individuals were reminded of death and viewed happiness displays,
attitudes towards the outgroup became more positive. This suggests that reminders
of death can increase the desire to affiliate and that when this desire is met by a
happy display, individuals are more emotionally responsive to outgroup displays, and
the relationship between non-group members improves. In contrast, when this desire
is answered with an angry display, individuals are more emotionally responsive to
ingroup displays, and the relation between non-group members deteriorates. In other
words, emotional responsiveness to emotions of others is influenced by contextual
and motivational factors. These findings also suggest that the bias towards outgroup-
members in emotional bonding can be overcome when individuals are motivated to
affiliate.
106 107 Chapter 5 General Discussion
Intergroup Emotional Convergence and Divergence (IECD).
The findings reported in this dissertation provide new insights into how individuals respond to emotions of others. People respond behaviorally and emotionally to emotional displays, but the nature of their response depends on the relationship that they have with the displayer. Specifically, group membership has a profound effect on behavioral and emotional responses. We introduce a new model that captures these findings, the Intergroup Emotional Convergence and Divergence (IECD) model
(see Figure 5.1).
The IECD model presumes that when emotional displays are perceived, the observer simultaneously judges the group membership of the displayer. Emotion and intergroup context then interact to determine behavior and feelings of the perceiver.
Importantly, behavioral and emotional reactions to others’ displays can be convergent with or divergent from the emotion displayed. At the behavioral level, convergence results in mimicry of facial display (e.g., frowning in response to anger displays), and
160divergence Chapter 5: Generalresults Discussion in behavioral contrast (e.g., pulling up the upper lip in response to
Convergence (mimicry)
Facial Behavior Intergroup context Divergence (contrast)
Emotion Convergence (contagion)
Feeling
Divergence
Figure 5.1. Model for Intergroup Emotional Convergence and Divergence (IECD). Emotion perception and intergroup context interact to determine facial behavior and feeling. Reactions to others’ emotions can be convergent and divergent, and occur both at the behavioral and the experiential level.
108 109 Chapter 5 General Discussion
fear displays). At the emotional level, convergence results in emotional contagion (e.g.,
‘catching’ the anger of another person), and divergence results in the experience of
contrasting emotions (e.g., aversion in response to fear displays). In general, individuals
converge towards emotions of the ingroup, whereas they diverge from emotions of
the outgroup. The specific emotion that is displayed, however, also influences whether
people converge or diverge. When emotions signal affiliation (e.g., happiness), the
perceiver may converge to the display, independent of group membership of the
displayer. In this way, emotion and intergroup context interact on behavioral and
emotional reactions to displays.
This pattern fits with the social functions of emotions, in terms of affiliation
and distancing. According to Fischer and Manstead (2008) emotions are functional
because they help the individual to overcome social problems. In a social world,
emotions help to form and maintain relationships, or to establish social positions by
creating distance between individuals. Based on our findings, we argue that reactions to
emotions have similar functions. Specifically, we argue that that emotional convergence
serves an affiliating function, and that emotional divergence serves a distancing
function. By converging emotionally, individuals increase understanding for the other
person and express support. In this way, the emotional bond between individuals is
maintained or enhanced. By diverging, in contrast, individuals distance themselves
quite literally from the other person, and no bonding through shared affect occurs. We
further argue that individuals are motivated to affiliate with others when they share
group identity, whereas they are motivated to distance themselves from others when
they do not share group identity. When ingroup-members express (negative) emotions
individuals will converge emotionally. In contrast, when outgroup-members express
(negative) emotions, individuals will diverge.
This suggests that emotions can both enhance and impair existing relationships.
When individuals share group membership, they will converge to each others’ emotions
and this in turn will increase affiliation, whereas individuals who do not share group
membership will diverge from each others’ emotions, which will increase the distance
between them. In line with this reasoning, the studies in Chapter 2 and 3 showed
that—even after minimal exposure—viewing ingroup emotional displays increased liking
of ingroup models, but viewing outgroup emotional displays did not increase—and even
108 109 Chapter 5 General Discussion
decreased—liking of outgroup models. Although we only measured the evaluation of models, we suggest that this increase in positive evaluation may reflect an increase in emotional bonding between individuals. Because we only found this effect for ingroup models, these findings suggest that emotions have a positive effect on bonding only if individuals already share some similarities, for example through group membership
(Clark et al., 2004; Anderson, Keltner & John, 2003).
The studies in Chapter 3 additionally showed that the increase in liking was mediated by mimicry of the displays. This supports other research showing that automatic mimicry of behavior contributes to affiliation (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003;
Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, Chartrand, 2003; Stel, van Baaren &
Vonk, 2008; Stel et al., 2009). Adopting the facial displays of an interaction partner thus does not only smoothes interactions (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), but also seems to enhance our liking of the other person. This may mean that individuals infer their liking of another person from their automatic behavioral responses to this person’s emotions.
The distancing function of emotion was demonstrated by the findings that individuals emotionally diverge from emotions of the outgroup, and that liking of outgroup models did not increase, and even decreased in some cases, after viewing outgroup emotional displays. We argue that by emphasizing emotional distance with outgroup-members, reactions to emotions confirm and strengthen group boundaries
(Keltner & Haidt, 1999).
The nature of the divergent response also reflects the dynamics of the intergroup relation. For example, if participants report fear in response to outgroup anger, this can be interpreted as a flight response to aggressive threat that is functional in the sense that it protects the ingroup from harm. This emotional reaction reflects the perception that the other group is regarded as more dominant than one’s own group.
If group members show aversion in response to outgroup fear, on the other hand, this signals a superior position of one’s own group in relation to the other group. Aversion is related to contempt, and this emotion can be interpreted as a signal of rejection and social exclusion (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). By expressing aversion in response to outgroup fear, a group member assigns inferiority to the other group and explicitly demonstrates a lack of respect. These specific emotional reactions demonstrate the
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importance of discrete emotions in response to emotions of outgroup members. This
suggests that reactions to outgroup emotions should be specified beyond the valence
(a positive-negative) dimension, because discrete emotions provide specific information
about the attitude towards and the relation with the outgroup. We will further elaborate
on this issue in the section below.
To summarize, we present a model of Intergroup Emotional Convergence
and Divergence (IECD) based on the findings discussed in this dissertation. We argue
that displays of negative emotions bring people together when they share group
membership, but drive people apart when they do not share group membership. This
indicates that reactions to emotional displays follow the two proposed social functions
of emotions: affiliation and distancing (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). Affiliation is reflected
in convergent behavior (mimicry) and feeling (emotional contagion), and distancing is
reflected in divergent behavior and feeling. Convergence and divergence to ingroup
and outgroup displays also depend on the type of emotion that is perceived, however.
When displays signal affiliation—e.g., happiness—people will converge to the outgroup,
especially when they are motivated to affiliate with a larger social group. Perception of
emotional display and group membership of the displayer thus interact to determine
the response to emotional display in terms of convergence and divergence, both at a
behavioral and at an experiential level.
Intergroup Emotional Contagion
Group-based emotional contagion. Although a central question in the current
dissertation dealt with intergroup emotions, the approach of the studies and the
paradigms employed were distinct from common practice in research on intergroup
emotions. Intergroup Emotion Theory (IET) mainly deals with the elicitation of group-
based emotions. The first proposition of IET is that when group membership is salient,
individuals will appraise events in terms of the goals of their group and will experience
emotions concordantly (i.e. Doosje, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 1998; Mackie,
Devos & Smith, 2000; Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus & Dumont, 2006). Thus, IET predicts
that group membership and social categorization processes contribute to the appraisal
of events and the elicitation of emotions in intergroup situations.
In contrast, the studies in the current dissertation focused on another aspect
of the emotion process, namely on the expressions of emotions by ingroup or outgroup
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members. We argued that reactions to these expressions are affected by intergroup context and social categorization processes. In this way, the current dissertation extends IET, by showing that emotional displays can in themselves be emotional eliciting events, and that intergroup context determines the emotional reactions that these displays evoke. This also implies that group-based emotions are not only evoked by group-based concerns, but also by group-based emotion expressions, which in turn elicit emotional mimicry and emotional contagion. The studies in this dissertation support this idea by demonstrating that individuals are better at recognizing ingroup emotional display, that ingroup displays evoke stronger action tendencies, that ingroup displays are mimicked more, and that ingroup displays increase ingroup liking. In other words, individuals are more empathically sensitive to the emotions of their fellow group members. This means that group-based emotions are not only the result of appraisals of events that have implications for the wellbeing of the group. In addition, these can also be evoked by emotional displays of group members.
Reactions to emotions as prejudice. A second proposition of IET is that emotions, and not just general affect, form the basic elements of prejudice and discriminatory behavior. This implies that intergroup attitudes can be understood as emotions felt towards other groups, and that (negative) intergroup behavior can be understood as action tendencies that are the result of these emotions (Dijker, 1987;
Cotrell & Neuberg, 2005). In line with this reasoning, the findings of the current dissertation suggest that discrete emotional reactions to outgroup members provide more specific information about intergroup attitudes than a classic positive-negative evaluation does.
For example, in Chapter 3 we found that outgroup members elicit emotion- specific divergent responses, which may reflect specific stereotypes and prejudiced attitudes. Fear in response to an angry outgroup may reflect an aggressive stereotype about the outgroup, whereas aversion in response to a fearful outgroup may reflect a derogatory stereotype. These findings show that emotional reactions to the same outgroup can be quite different, depending on the emotion displayed. Furthermore, in a social context, fear reflects avoidant action tendencies, whereas aversion reflects active exclusion (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). This suggests that negative behavioral tendencies in response to outgroup emotions may depend on the specific emotion displayed. If
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emotion-related action-tendencies indeed reflect discrimination (Smith, 1993), automatic
emotional reactions to displays of outgroups may thus contribute to discrimination.
Moreover, the specific discriminatory behavior directed at the outgroup also depends
on the emotion displayed. This demonstrates that discrete emotional reactions to
displays of the outgroup provide more insight into intergroup attitudes and behavior.
Several findings in the dissertation show that reactions to emotions of members
of other groups are also biased in other ways. First, the studies in Chapter 2 revealed
that outgroup emotional displays evoked weaker approach and avoidance tendencies.
If emotions are expressed in order to elicit approach or avoidance behaviors from
others, and outgroup displays do not elicit these behaviors to the same extent, then
outgroups are denied supporting behavior that the ingroup would receive. This reflects
bias towards the outgroup, not in the sense that negative behavior is directed against
the outgroup, but more in the sense that there is lack of positive behavior towards
the outgroup. Second, as was discussed in the section on the IECD model, it was
shown that viewing emotional displays of the ingroup increased liking of the ingroup,
but that viewing emotional displays of the outgroup did not increase liking (Chapter
3), and even decreased liking (Chapter 2) of the outgroup. This illustrates that displays
of emotion have a beneficial effect on the relationship with the ingroup, whereas this
beneficial effect on the relationship is absent for the outgroup.
The findings discussed in Chapter 4, however, showed that when individuals
are reminded of death, happiness displays decreased outgroup derogation. This
indicates that emotion displays of the outgroup can improve intergroup relations, when
this emotion signals affiliation. For this to occur, however, the perceiver has to be
specifically motivated to connect with the other group.
Infra-humanization. Another theory that relates prejudice and emotions is
‘infra-humanization theory’ (e.g., Leyens et al., 2000). Infra-humanization refers to the
phenomenon that people attribute less human essence to the outgroup. As a result,
emotions that are considered uniquely human are associated more with the ingroup
than with the outgroup. For example, when participants have to select words that
they think are characteristic for either the ingroup or the outgroup, uniquely human
emotions, such as pride or disappointment (both positive and negative), are selected
more often for the ingroup than for the outgroup (Leyens et al., 2001). Our findings
112 113 Chapter 5 General Discussion
suggest that the bias in emotion-attribution may not be restricted to uniquely human emotions.
Our studies employed a different paradigm than the studies of Leyens and colleagues (2000) and we did not ask people about their associations between emotions and groups. Instead, we investigated primary emotional reactions to ingroup and outgroup emotions. Our findings showed that there is an ingroup advantage in attribution of nearly all emotions, the exceptions being fear and embarrassment. This shows that ‘primary’ emotions—like anger, disgust, happiness, sadness and surprise—are also attributed more accurately to the ingroup than to the outgroup. We suggest that individuals are generally biased in their response to emotions of the outgroup and not just in their response to uniquely human or ‘secondary’ emotions.
Furthermore, embarrassment could be considered a uniquely human emotion, but there was no ingroup advantage in the recognition of embarrassment. This finding suggests that emotion-attribution does not so much reflect infra-humanization, but rather the specific associations that individuals may have towards outgroups—i.e. shame-proneness of Mediterranean cultures. Future research could further investigate the relation between stereotypes about specific groups (e.g., the ‘temperament’ of
Italians, or the ‘reservedness’ of the British), and the attribution of discrete emotions
(e.g., ‘romantic’, or ‘cool’).
Research on infra-humanization has also shown that people are less polite to outgroup members who express uniquely human emotions, compared to outgroup members who express primary emotions (Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens & Giovanazzi,
2003). The findings described in the current dissertation, however, suggest that outgroup displays of primary negative emotions do not have a positive effect on the relationship between members of different groups, either. This indicates that the distinction between primary and secondary emotions does not suffice to understand polite or friendly responses to emotions of the outgroup. Instead, we argue that intergroup context and the affiliation or distancing signal of the emotion together predict relationship- improvement between individuals.
To recapitulate, the findings described in this dissertation confirm or extend several models that describe the relation between emotions and prejudice (Cotrell
& Neuberg, 2005; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002; Leyens et al., 2000; Smith, Seger
114 115 Chapter 5 General Discussion
& Mackie, 2007). The studies suggest that people are more empathically sensitive
to emotions of their fellow group members, and that this may contribute to group-
based emotions. Furthermore, reactions to discrete emotional displays of the outgroup
provide more specific insight into intergroup attitudes and behavior. Finally, the results
of the studies suggest that the different emotional reactions to ingroup and outgroup
do not depend on the ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’ nature of the emotion displayed.
Intergroup context and the affiliation or distancing signal of the emotion together
predict relationship-improvement between individuals. In line with the IECD model, we
argue that that the combined effect of intergroup context and social signal of the
discrete emotion determine reactions to emotions of others.
The Relationship Between Mimicry and Contagion
According to Emotional Contagion Theory (ECT), there is a causal relation
between mimicry of perceived emotional behavior and the subjective experience of the
same emotion (Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson, 1994). The results of the current studies,
however, show a lack of correlation between facial behavior and self-reported emotion,
and differential patterns of findings for both measures. Previous studies also failed to find
evidence for the causal relation between emotional mimicry and emotional contagion.
Hess and Blairy (2001) for example, found evidence for both emotional mimicry
and emotional contagion in response to dynamic emotional displays, but regression
analyses did not reveal the presumed causal relation between mimicry and emotional
contagion. Other researchers also reported lack of correlation between mimicry and
emotional contagion (Barger & Grandey, 2006; Blairy, Herrera & Hess, 1999; Gump &
Kulik, 1997), and differential patterns of findings for facial behavior and self-reported
emotions (e.g., Sonnby-Borgström, 2002). For example, in a study of McHugo and
colleagues (1985) political preference determined self-reported emotional contagion in
response to emotional displays of President Ronald Reagan, but political preference did
not influence mimicry of Reagan’s facial behavior (smiling and frowning).
Contrary to ECT then, our findings do not support a one-to-one relationship
between subjective feelings and facial displays. How can these findings be interpreted,
in light of our IECD model? The IECD model presumes that emotion and intergroup
context interact to determine behavior and feeling directly. Contrary to ECT, we argue
that no afferent feedback of facial muscle activity is necessary for emotional contagion
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to occur. We do assume, however, that because facial behavior and subjective experience are often evoked at the same time, there may be a correlation between both reactions, but there is no causal relation between the two.
The IECD thus presumes that emotional mimicry and contagion are relatively independent processes, and that there is a direct link between perception and behavior, and between perception and feeling. This is in line with various other theoretical models, such as for example the Perception-Action Model (PAM) account of empathy
(Preston & De Waal, 2002), embodiment theory (Barsalou, 1999; Niedenthal, 2007), and the perception-behavior link (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; see also Bargh & Chartrand,
1999). In these models it is first of all proposed that perception and action share the same cognitive representations. We will turn to these models and discuss their relation to the IECD model below.
The Perception-Action Model (PAM) account of empathy reserves a central role for emotional mimicry and emotional contagion as explanations for empathy (Preston
& de Waal, 2002). These authors argue that when individuals perceive expressions of emotions, brain areas that are associated with the motor behaviors of the expression and brain areas that are associated with the subjective experience of the emotion are automatically activated (e.g., Rizzolatti, Fogassi & Gallese, 2001). This contributes to the understanding of what the other person is feeling. Preston and De Waal further argue that emotional mimicry and emotional contagion are both subordinate categories of empathy, and that the neural bases of empathy are distributed in various areas of the brain. From this, we may infer that emotional mimicry and emotional contagion do not need to be causally related in order to foster empathy. Thus, extending these insights from the PAM-account of empathy, the IECD predicts that emotional mimicry and contagion are relatively independent responses to perceived emotional display.
Second, embodiment theory moves beyond emotions and empathy and posits that all human conceptual knowledge is represented in perceptual and sensory-motor areas of the brain (Barsalou, 1999). Like ECT and the PAM-account of empathy, embodiment theory claims that emotional mimicry and emotional contagion have a function for understanding other people’s emotions (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal,
Barsalou, Winkielman, Kraut-Gruber & Ric, 2005; Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon &
Vermeulen, 2009; Oosterwijk, Rotteveel, Fischer & Hess, 2009), but the theory makes
116 117 Chapter 5 General Discussion
the more general claim that all higher order cognitive functioning involves perceptual
and sensory-motor re-enactment. In this way, it treats emotional mimicry and emotional
contagion as ‘special cases’ of embodiment. The IECD model focuses more specifically
on reactions to others’ emotions. Like embodiment theory, however, we argue that
automatic behavioral and emotional reactions to emotions of others can influence how
individuals think and feel about the other person. We suggest that automatic behavioral
reactions and subjective feelings contribute to other cognitive processes like intergroup
attitudes.
Third, the perception-behavior link (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; see also Bargh
& Chartrand, 1999) also supposes that there is a direct link between perception of
behavior and the execution of that same behavior. This is for example demonstrated
by the fact that individuals imitate non-functional behaviors, like nose rubbing and foot
shaking in social interactions (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). The perception-behavior link,
however, posits that human beings are not always susceptible to immediate imitation of
perceived behavior. Instead, inhibition of the direct link between perception and action
is important for humans to flexibly operate in the social world. Otherwise we would not
be capable of controlling our impulses. This flexibility of human behavior is warranted
because cognitive processes can inhibit the perception-behavior link. As such, factors
like disincentives, goals, self-focus, and liking are hypothesized to moderate the effect
of perception on behavior. Moreover, the perception-behavior link predicts that people
show automatic contrasting behavior when a comparison between the self and the
perceived concept is made salient. In line with this reasoning, the IECD model predicts
that emotional mimicry and contagion are inhibited in reaction to outgroup displays,
and that outgroup displays can evoke emotionally divergent reactions (see also,
Epstude & Mussweiler, 2009; Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008)
The IECD resolves an issue in research on reactions to emotional displays.
Some researchers question the proposition of ECT that emotional contagion reflects
‘infection’ of emotional states, and rather argue that it reflects an emotional response
to an emotion eliciting stimulus (Magnée, Stekelenburg, Kemner & de Gelder, 2007). In
light of the IECD, we argue that both propositions hold some truth. Emotion-perception
can evoke different behavioral and emotional responses—i.e., emotional convergence and
divergence. According to IECD, intergroup context and the discrete emotion displayed
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influence the social meaning of the display in terms of bonding/distancing. Together these determine which response—convergence or divergence—becomes dominant.
How can the IECD model specifically account for the differential patterns of findings in Chapter 3, where emotional mimicry of outgroup displays was inhibited, but emotional contagion was not? One explanation is that our behavior and feelings may be regulated independently. This may imply that feelings are more often subject to regulation than our facial reactions, simply because we are more aware of our feelings when we have to report them. As facial behavior is more automatic, these may be less subject to regulation attempts. Interestingly, this explanation may also account for the fact that McHugo et al. (1985) found an opposite pattern of result for emotional mimicry and emotional contagion. In their study, it was found that political opponents of President Ronald Reagan did not report emotional contagion in response to Reagan’s facial displays, whereas these respondents did show mimicry of Reagan’s facial displays. For these participants too, emotional responses may have been subject to regulation (i.e. not reporting the same emotion as a political adversary), whereas it may have been harder to regulate facial behavior in response to this highly charismatic leader (i.e., mimicry of Reagan’s facial behavior).
To summarize, the IECD model treats emotional behavior and feeling states as two components of a response to others’ emotional displays that can be independently regulated. We further argue that behavioral responses to others’ emotions are less subject to regulation than emotional responses. In this sense, lack of mimicry and behavioral contrast may be interpreted as implicit measures of intergroup attitudes.
Directions for Future Research
Future studies could further investigate the premises of the IECD. We argue that intergroup context interacts with discrete emotions to influence emotional convergence and divergence. Our studies focus on anger, fear, and happiness, but there are many other emotions that may be of relevance in intergroup situations. For example, we may speculate that ingroup sadness displays may evoke empathic sadness (Bourgeois
& Hess, 2008), while outgroup sadness may evoke schadenfreude (Leach, Spears,
Branscombe & Doosje, 2003). Similarly, expressions of ingroup guilt about misbehavior of the ingroup in the past may evoke contagion of guilt (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears
& Manstead, 2006; Zebel, Doosje & Spears, 2009), while expressions of outgroup guilt
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about misbehavior of the outgroup in the past may evoke satisfaction.
Our main argument is that specific reactions to discrete emotional displays
will depend on the emotional bonding or distancing function of that display. We argue
that happiness signals affiliation, but other positive emotions, like ‘relief’, may not
specifically signal a motivation to affiliate. We would predict that only emotions that
signal affiliation would increase emotional bonding between ingroup and outgroup.
It may therefore also be interesting to investigate the reactions to expressions
of aversion and contempt, because these emotions are strong signals of distancing.
We may speculate that for these particular emotions, ingroup displays evoke divergent
responses (i.e. fear), because contempt signals threat of being socially excluded. In this
situation emotional divergence may serve an affiliation function. Outgroup displays of
contempt on the other hand, may evoke convergent contempt, because in this situation
emotional convergence may serve a distancing function. We may further speculate
that this may result in a downward spiral of negative intergroup emotions (intergroup
anger, or even hatred). Further research would be needed to investigate whether such
predictions would receive empirical support.
It is possible that other contextual factors may also determine convergence
and divergence. For example a competitive context may evoke divergence in a similar
way that intergroup context does (Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2010). Other
factors may also be relevant, like personal concerns and goals, coping resources,
or social/cultural display rules. For these contextual factors, too, we argue that the
social meaning of the display in terms of bonding/distancing determines the response
to emotions. This may explain why previous research reported findings that could
both reflect emotional convergence and divergence (Hess & Blairy, 2001; Lundqvist &
Dimberg 1995). With lack of further contextual information, both emotional convergent
and divergent responses may become dominant in response to emotional displays.
This also suggests that some individuals may be more prone to show emotional
convergence, while others may be more prone to show emotional divergence. Future
research could investigate how other contextual factors relate to the IECD model, how
other contextual factors influence the social meaning of displays, and how individual
differences in emotional convergence and divergence may play a role.
The findings presented in Chapter 4 showed that convergence to outgroup
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happiness increases when people are reminded of their mortality. We have argued that mortality salience increases the desire to affiliate. Mortality salience, however, is an indirect way to manipulate affiliation need. Future studies could therefore use more direct strategies to manipulate the need to belong. Participants could, for example, show increased affiliation motivation after they have been socially excluded, and their responses to emotional displays of the people that excluded them or other persons could be investigated.
Finally, another relevant direction for future research is timing of reactions to emotional display. If emotional mimicry and emotional contagion are immediate responses that are inhibited by social contextual factors, inhibition should occur later in time. This would mean that levels of convergence to similar and dissimilar objects should be the same at onset, and that differences in emotional convergence should occur somewhat later. This time-based pattern of inhibition of emotional convergence could be explored. Similarly, onset timing of emotional divergence effects could be investigated. These studies could provide more detailed insight into how responses to emotions of others develop over time.
Strengths and Limitations
The studies in the present dissertation have several merits in comparison to previous research on reactions to emotions of others. First, a new set of standardized emotional expressions was developed, the Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expression Set
(ADFES). The ADFES is the first set of filmed emotional expressions that features North-
European and Mediterranean models. The ADFES received excellent recognition rates, and because dynamic displays are more arousing (Sato & Yoshikawa, 2007a) and elicit greater facial mimicry (Sato & Yoshikawa, 2007b; Sato, Fujiumura & Suzuki, 2008;
Weyers, Mühlberger, Hefele & Pauli, 2006) than static displays, the ADFES is suitable for studying emotional contagion and mimicry. Mediterranean people (Turks and Moroccans) are salient minorities in the Netherlands (Dijker, 1987; Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof
& Vermeulen, 2009; Dotsch, Wigboldus, Langner, & Van Knippenberg, 2008), and therefore the inclusion of these groups in the set was relevant for the studies in this dissertation. Future studies on intergroup relations in areas where differences between these ethnic groups are salient may also benefit from the ADFES.
Second, the studies in the dissertation included both facial behavior and
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self-report measures of emotion. It is sometimes believed that there is a one-on-one
relation between these measures, but the current studies showed differential patterns
of results for the two measures. Facial behavior is expected to be a more unobtrusive
measure of emotional reactions, whereas self-report gives insight into how individuals
subjectively respond to emotions of others. Thus, facial behavior and self-reported
emotions each provide unique information about emotional reactions. The current
studies suggest that facial behavior is an implicit measure of emotional bias (Chapter
3), and that subjective reactions to emotions of others are enhanced when individuals
are specifically motivated to defend their worldview or to affiliate with others (Chapter
4).
Third, the studies in Chapters 2 and 3 included reactions to several different
(negative) emotions. Previous studies on emotional mimicry or contagion mostly relied
on only two emotions, one positive and one negative (i.e. anger and happiness, Sonnby-
Borgström, Jönsson, & Svensson, 2003; Wild, Erb, Bartels, 2001; or sadness and
happiness, Likowski, Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2007). This makes it difficult to
disentangle effects of specific emotions from those of valence-based reactions. Chapter
3 showed that outgroup anger and fear displays evoke differential facial behavior and
self-reported emotions. This indicates that discrete emotions of ingroup and outgroup
have distinct social meanings, and that in order to understand reactions to emotions
the specific social meaning of the display has to be taken into account.
A limitation of the studies in the dissertation is that the effects that were
found were not very strong, and some only reached marginal levels of significance. As
we have argued in Chapter 3, emotional contagion effects are weak in general (see for
example Hess & Blairy, 2001; Lundqvist & Dimberg, 1995). In the present paradigm we
investigated a moderator (social categorization) of this effect, and it is therefore not
entirely unexpected that some of the effect sizes that were found are small. This may
be due to the fact that the paradigm that was employed was minimal and provided no
information about the reason why the target was displaying an emotion, no direct face-
to-face contact, and no specification of the target of the emotional display. Because
effects of social categorization on emotional mimicry and contagion were found even
in this minimal setting, however, we argue that the effects of social categorization on
reactions to emotional display will have a more profound effect in situations in which
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perceivers have more information available. For example, during a sports event, fear displays of supporters of the losing team may enhance divergent responses of scorn from supporters of the winning team. In this situation, the interests of two groups are diametrically opposed, and outgroup displays signal threat of anticipated defeat.
This may increase aversion or contempt toward the outgroup in light of an imminent victory. The results of the current dissertation also suggest, however, that additional contextual factors do not always simply work as a catalyst to emotional convergence and divergence. The IECD model predicts that emotion and intergroup context interact to determine convergent and divergent responses, and that the social function of the display in terms of bonding or distancing predicts the exact response to others’ emotions. An important direction for future research thus lies in the investigation of how the findings described in this dissertation are related to responses to emotions of others in real-life settings.
Finally, our studies mainly used ethnic differences as a manipulation of ingroup and outgroup. It could therefore be argued that our findings only apply to the differential reactions of Dutch individuals to emotional displays of North-European
(i.e., Dutch) and Mediterranean (i.e., Turkish and Moroccan) models. Study 1 in Chapter
3, however, used a different manipulation of intergroup context (field of academic studies) and also showed effects of social categorization on emotional mimicry.
Moreover, previous studies in other labs using different paradigms also showed an ingroup advantage in emotion recognition (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002), and attenuation of mimicry to outgroup displays (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008). We therefore argue that the findings of this dissertation can be applied to social categories in domains other than ethnicity.
Implications and Recommendations
The findings discussed in this dissertation may have implications for intergroup situations. In many Western societies various ethnic and social groups live together. As a result, there is regular interaction between members of different groups. The results of the current dissertation suggest that when these interactions include emotions, individuals differ in their responses to emotions of people from their own group versus those of other groups. Individuals have more difficulty in recognizing emotions from people from other groups, and relationships between different group members may
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suffer from displays of emotion. In various intergroup situations, then, awareness of the
bias in responses to the emotions of non-group members could help to regulate these
responses and prevent deterioration of intergroup relations. In the following section,
we discuss several situations where this may apply, namely job interviews, in health
care, for customs and police officials, and finally in the media and the political arena.
There are many more situations where the findings of the current dissertation may be
relevant, but these examples illustrate the possible consequences of this bias that can
also be applied to other situations. We also present recommendations for how this
bias may be overcome.
Implications. In the Netherlands, demographic data show that ethnic minorities
are at a disadvantage when applying for jobs (Andriessen, Dagevos, Nievers & Boog,
2007). The results of the current studies suggest one reason why this might be the
case. Being interviewed for a job is for many people an emotional situation. It involves
concentration, nervousness, and uncertainty, amongst other emotions. We may suggest
that interviewers may be biased in their choice of ingroup or outgroup applicants
because of their response to emotions like anxiety for several reasons. First of all,
there is an ingroup advantage in emotion recognition. Second, viewing emotional
displays of ingroup members increases the positive evaluation of these individuals,
whereas viewing emotional displays of outgroup members does not increase or even
decreases the positive evaluation of these individuals. If we apply these findings to the
situation of a job interview, the emotions displayed during the interview by ingroup
members will increase sympathy for this applicant and may thus improve hiring
chances. This will not be the case for outgroup applicants, and therefore hiring chances
are not improved. This means that in front of a hiring committee that consists of
ethnic majority members, job applicants who are members of ethnic minorities have a
disadvantage compared to members of the ethnic majority.
As another example, health care personnel are often confronted with patients,
and relatives of patients, who are highly emotional. When these individuals are
categorized as an outgroup by health care workers, for example because they are
part of a social minority, they may also be at a disadvantage when expressing their
emotions in these situations. Our findings suggest that health care personnel will
have more difficulty in recognizing the emotions of minorities. Furthermore, they may
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be less empathic to the emotions of these people, and this may even decrease the sympathy for these individuals. This may lead to a negative spiral in the interaction, because emotional individuals of minority groups may get the feeling that they are misunderstood, and that they are not treated in the same manner as members of the majority group.
Similarly, customs officials and military police working at airports could benefit from emotion recognition training. It is the job of customs officials to recognize suspicious behavior of individuals who want to enter a country of destination. As such, it is important that customs officials do not fail to notice emotional behavior that may signal malicious intentions. At the same time, customs officials cannot afford to search all travelers to the same extent and so they have to make quick choices. The results of the current studies suggest that customs officials may be biased in interpreting the emotions of outgroup members. Because there is an ingroup advantage in emotion recognition, customs officials will have difficulty in discerning the exact emotions of outgroup members. Thus, regular travelers’ nervousness may be interpreted by the customs official as suspicious behavior when the traveler is an outgroup. In contrast, because viewing ingroup emotions increases liking of the ingroup, suspicious behavior of ingroup travelers may be misinterpreted as common travelers’ anxiety. It is therefore particularly important for custom officials to develop an unbiased perception of other people’s emotions.
The same logic could also be applied to police officials. Police officials have a function that involves reassuring distressed civilians and recognizing suspicious behavior. Police may also suffer from a bias in recognizing distress of individuals that are outgroup members, and respond less empathically to these individuals’ emotions (Vrij & Fischer, 1995; Vrij & Winkel, 1992). Similarly, emotions of outgroup members may be mistakenly interpreted as suspicious behavior. Again, this may hinder the interaction with outgroup members and these may feel misunderstood or even discriminated against.
Finally, the findings reported in Chapter 4 demonstrate the role that emotional displays may have on intergroup relations, in situations of intergroup conflict. This may be particularly relevant for the media and for politicians. When individuals experience threat and perceive anger of others, bigotry towards other groups increases. This means
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that politicians and media can spread bigotry by reminding people of their vulnerability
and by providing an angry message. This thesis also shows, however, that when people
experience threat and they perceive happiness of others, bigotry can decrease. This
suggests that politicians and media can decrease bigotry when people fear for their
existence by displaying affiliation toward the outgroup. Some situations may benefit
from increased support for offensive action against other groups, for example when
countries face a real threat from another nation and countries go to war. In other
situations, however, societies may have an interest in reducing intergroup conflict, for
example when different groups within society come into conflict. The studies in Chapter
4 demonstrate the role of emotions in these situations. The findings suggest that in
times of threat emotional displays can both improve and worsen intergroup relations.
Recommendations. Several recommendations are given. First, hiring committees
should not focus on the emotions that applicants display, but on the qualities and
skills that are required for the function. Obviously, this recommendation applies to job
interviews in general, but the current studies show that this is particularly relevant when
minority members apply. It is also recommended that hiring committees should be as
diverse as possible, in order to be less biased towards a diverse range of applicants.
Second, we recommend that health care personnel are specifically trained
in reading and responding to emotions of others in various situations, and that this
training include emotional displays of members of various ethnic groups. Such training
is available (e.g., F.A.C.E. Training, www.face.paulekman.com; Humintell, www.humintell.
com) and could be implemented immediately. Emotional recognition training could help
health care personnel to improve their response to emotional clients. This may improve
interaction between health care workers, patients, and relatives of patients, which may
further improve implementation of treatment procedures.
Third, customs and police officials should be similarly trained in reading
emotions of other people. We also recommend that police forces hire people from
various ethnic backgrounds. At the moment this is already policy in the Netherlands
(Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2008). Ethnically diverse police teams
may benefit from the ingroup advantage in emotion recognition of various colleagues.
This may be especially relevant in intergroup situations that are emotionally ambiguous.
In particular, police working in ethnically diverse neighborhoods should work in ethnically
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diverse teams.
Finally, politicians and media should be sensitive to the emotions that they express in situations of intergroup conflict. Especially in situations where people feel that their existence is threatened, this has profound effects on the relation between various groups in society. In these situations, display of different emotions can either increase or decrease bigotry. Although some people may benefit from intolerance towards minority groups, democratic societies can only exist as long as they protect minorities. The studies in Chapter 4 suggest that displays of anger can be used to set different groups in society against each other. We recommend some reticence in displaying negative sentiments when situations of intergroup conflict arise.
Conclusion
Taken together, the findings of the current dissertation show that emotional displays—in particular negative emotional displays—bring individuals together when they share group membership, but drive individuals apart when they do not share group membership. Intergroup interactions can be emotional, and if members of different groups do not respond empathically to emotional signals of the other person, the interaction will not run smoothly and the relationship with the other person may suffer. This seems to suggest that emotions only have a negative effect on intergroup relations. Not all emotions have a negative effect on intergroup relations, however.
Happiness displays, for example, can overcome group boundaries, and individuals converge to outgroup happiness displays to the same extent as they do to ingroup happiness displays—sometimes even more so. This illustrates that while some emotions can signal distancing, other emotions can signal affiliation, even if there is an initial distance or dissimilarity with the other person. If people become aware of the different effects of their emotions, they may become more adequate in responding to the emotional displays of strangers.
Returning to my example at the beginning of this dissertation, what can we conclude about my friend’s and my own initial reaction to the emotional content of the responses we received to our opinion article? As you may remember, we received some very angry responses to our piece from Jewish readers. In response, my friend became angry himself, whereas I became anxious. Based on the findings of the studies that we presented, we may now come to understand our differential reactions. Because the
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anger came from his ingroup, my friend, as a Jew, caught the emotion from the letters.
Whereas for me, as a Christian, the anger came from an outgroup, and I diverged
from the emotions that were expressed. For both of us this was a functional reaction.
Although maybe confrontational, by becoming angry my friend displayed involvement
in an issue that concerned his ingroup. For me, my anxiety displayed a willingness to
drop the controversy. As a further illustration of this fact, our feelings reversed once a
Dutch-Christian columnist expressed his discontent about our piece in a Dutch morning
newspaper. This aroused my anger, whereas my friend became reluctant to reply.
But apart from being a nice illustration of our findings, there was a lesson
for me in this example. Maybe my friend and I made a mistake in how we voiced our
opinion. We did not realize back then that support for this particular politician had
drawn firm boundaries in the Dutch-Jewish community. Moreover, our own emotions
may have backfired. By voicing our dislike, we incurred the wrath of readers who were
in favor of this politician. As an experiment in using emotions to divide a group of
people, our piece was astonishingly successful (Damen, 2009). Now our next challenge
lies in using emotions to bridge the gap.
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