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Comparing the Greek Phalanx with the Roman Legion Garrett Kochom in Collaboration with Dr Comparing the Greek Phalanx with the Roman Legion Garrett Kochom in Collaboration with Dr. Matthew Waters Department of History University of Wisconsin‐Eau Claire Greek Phalanx (c. 220220-- 168 BCE) Roman Maniple (c. 220220-- 168 BCE) The common formation used by ancient “Handfuls” – Approximately 120 men per maniple, Greek and Eastern armies throughout the and thirty-five maniples per Roman legion Classical and Hellenistic periods. Triplex Acies – The “Triple Line” Heavy infantry formed into a dense mass, Hastati, Principes, Triarii standing shoulder-to-shoulder, chest to back. Armed with short swords, large oval shields, and Usually between sixteen and thirty-two men chain armor. deep and several hundred meters long. Commanded by centurion. Rows one through five holding pikes (called sarissas) straight out in-front of them. These Maniples of each line deployed with gaps between pikes were generally about fifteen to twenty feet the units long. Advantages Rows six through nine holding their pikes at Flexible Roman short swords a 45 degggree angle to help deflect missiles , as well Each maniple could operate independently as be prepared to lower them to fill a position in of the rest of the army. front when a soldier is killed. Phalanx versus maniples (Battle of Could turn unit in any direction relatively Pydna 168 BCE) Last rows held pikes straight up to deflect quickly missiles. These men added density and weight to formation for added resilience and staying Gaps between maniples allowed for power in battle. maneuver while advancing without Advantages disrupting adjacent units The density and number made the formation Relief system very heavy, which gave them great staying power Front line could be substituted for second in the shoving matches of ancient battles. line to give soldiers rest while maintaining Wall of Pikes the front. Allowed the phalanx to keep their Large shield and thrusting sword enemies at a distance Gave soldiers defense advantage at short Phalanx formation Protect against missile weapons range Select Bibliography Many pikes could be showing in a small Multiple lines Anglim, Simon, Phyllis G. Jestice, Rob S. Rice, Scott area. (five pikes to every soldier showing at Allowed for complex formations M. Rusch, and John Serrati. Figgghting Techniq ues of the the front) Lines could serve as reserve for line in front Ancient World: 3000 BC-500 A.D. New York: St. Phalangites generally wore relatively heavy if the enemy managed a breakthrough Martin’s Press, 2002. armor Pila Goldsworthy, Adrian, Cannae. London: Cassell, Disadvantages Missile weapon for distance attacks 2001. Had difficulty advancing over rough terrain. Goldsworthy, Adrian, The Punic Wars. London: Disadvantages Cassell, 2000. Men packed so closely together over such Low density lines Goldsworthy, Adrian, Roman Warfare, London: great distances, obstacles tended to disrupt Usually only 4-6 men deep. Not as much Cassell, 2000. the entire line shoving power as the phalanx Sage, Michael M. The Republican Roman Army: A Very vulnera ble to flflkank and rear Short distance weapons Sourcebook. New York: Routledge, 2008. Cumbersome pikes could not be turned Short swords meant they had to get very quickly to respond to these threats close to enemy to attack. Acknowledgements Very little short range weaponry Only one sword per soldier at the front. Funding provided by: Unable to relieve tired soldier Faculty/Student Research Collaboration Ancient Examples Packed too closely together to swap fatigued Special thanks to: soldiers with fresh ones Battle of Cannae (216 BCE) Must operate as one giant unit Roman Defeat Dr. Matthew Waters Either the entire army advances or the Battle of Zama (201 BCE) Department of History whole line must remain still or the loss of Roman Victory Office for Research and Sponsored cohesion will open gaps in the line. Battle of Pydna (168 BCE) Programs Faculty/Student Research Small units were not possible Roman Victory Collaboration.
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