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Home , Mahinda Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka Freedom Party, United National Party, Wimal Weerawansa, World Socialist Web Site

Refugee Review Tribunal

AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: LKA17796 Country: Date: 20 February 2006

Keywords: Sri Lanka – JVP – Rajapakse Government – Civil War – Revenge Killings

This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions

1. What is the status of the JVP in the new SLFP government elected in 2005? 2. What is the nature of the JVP? Does it have a military wing? 3. What has been the effect of the civil war on the JVP influence? 4. Has the party chosen the parliamentary path or the war path? 5. How many JVP members are in the Government, and in the Parliament? 6. Is there a record over the past decade of the JVP being involved in revenge killings against Sinhalese and former members? 7. What is the JVP influence over the Army and police?

RESPONSE

1. What is the status of the JVP in the new SLFP government elected in 2005?

As outlined in the following, Mahinda claimed a narrow victory in the November 2005 parliamentary election in Sri Lanka, with the support of the JVP (also known as Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or People’s Liberation Front):

An election to elect a new President was held on 17th of November 2005. Although there were 13 candidates contesting, it was a two men race representing the two main Sinhalese political parties. The contest was between the then Prime Minister (MR) of the (SLFP) and the opposition leader and former Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe (RW) of the (UNP).

With the failing to vote in the presidential elections, Mahinda Rajapaksa with the help of JVP & JHU was elected by a narrow margin as President. (Rajakulendran, V 2005, ‘Where does Sri Lanka go after their leaders have spelt out their political positions?’ Analysis Group http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers17%5Cpaper1644.html – Accessed 8 February 2006 – Attachment 1).

According to an article by Nanda Wickramasinghe on the World Socialist Web Site, the JVP was instrumental in gaining support for the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, making a visible presence at rallies and offering advice, while grassroots campaigners have promoted the party through distributing leaflets and broadcasting propaganda:

After more than a decade of broken SLFP promises, the prime minister needed the JVP to breathe some life back into the party’s credibility. And he also needed the JVP, which, unlike the SLFP, still has a significant active base, as the raw material for the election campaign.

The JVP leaders seized the opportunity with both hands. They have figured prominently at Rajapakse’s main rallies—hailing the prime minister as the embodiment of the Sinhala Buddhist ideal. The leader of the JVP parliamentary faction, , was appointed as Rajapakse’s campaign co-spokesman.

The JVP’s main political leader Somawansa Amarasinghe has featured on the platforms, seated next to Rajapakse and offering advice. At the grassroots level, JVP members have provided the manpower to put up posters and banners, distribute leaflets, broadcast propaganda and carry out the other day-to-day work of the campaign. (Wickramasinghe, N 2005, ‘The JVP and the political crisis in Sri Lanka’ World Socialist Web Site http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/nov2005/jvp-n18.shtml – Accessed 8 February 2006 – Attachment 2).

Information regarding the current status of the JVP is also available in the following Risk Briefing, from The Economist Intelligence Unit dated February 2006:

Sri Lanka is hostage to the ethnic conflict between the minority Tamils and the majority Sinhalese population. The political scene is dominated by two parties with differing views on the Tamil insurgency and economic policy. Following the elections of April 2004 no party holds a majority in parliament, and the risk of instability was heightened by the exit of the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) from United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) government in June 2005. The JVP has lent support to the new hard-line president, Mahinda Rajapakse, of the People's Alliance (PA), who was elected in the November 2005 presidential ballot. However, Mr Rajapakse has appeared to enjoy only mixed support from his own party. The balance of power within parliament remains precarious. (‘Sri Lanka risk: Political stability risk’ 2006, Economist Intelligence Unit - Risk Briefing 6 February – Attachment 3).

Although the JVP were active in gaining support for the SLFP, the JVP rejected ministerial cabinet posts offered to them in November 2005. The following BBC article discusses the rejection of these posts by the JVP in greater detail:

Sri Lanka's president has named his new cabinet but there is no place for allies in the Sinhala nationalist JVP or Buddhist monk party. Mahinda Rajapakse appointed a 25-strong cabinet following his presidential election win last Thursday.

The JVP was said to be unhappy with the posts offered and declined them. The all- monk JHU said it had not expected posts and would support the government.

President Rajapakse will also be defence and finance minister.

On Monday, hardliner was sworn in as prime minister.

No sooner than the cabinet was sworn in it suffered its first casualty - the new skills and employment promotion minister quit saying he deserved a more high profile post.

The swearing in of the cabinet was delayed from Monday because of the horse- trading over jobs.

Sources say the JVP, a strong ally of Mr Rajapakse in the election, was offered five portfolios but disagreements led the party to decide not to take any. (‘New Sri Lanka cabinet appointed’ 2005 BBC News Online http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/- /2/hi/south_asia/4462538.stm – Accessed 6 February 2006 – Attachment 4).

Background material on the current status of the JVP is available in the following RRT Country Research Response, from December 2005:

• RRT Country Research 2005, Research Response LKA17718, (Q 1) 13 October – Attachment 5.

2. What is the nature of the JVP? Does it have a military wing?

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, (JVP), was founded in 1965 with the aim of providing a leading force for a socialist revolution in Sri Lanka. According to Wikipedia, the JVP “originated as an extremely violent terrorist group attempting to overthrow the elected ”. Wikipedia describes the JVP in the following manner:

The People's Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna) is a nationalist Marxist in Sri Lanka….

…The modern JVP, compared to its earlier incarnation in the 1970s and 1980s, focuses far less on ideas of socio-economic transformation and instead focuses on national issues and takes a hardline nationalist position in opposition to groups such as the and LTTE which want an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka. (Wikipedia 2006, ‘Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna’ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janatha_Vimukthi_Peramuna – Accessed 7 February 2006 – Attachment 6)

Further information regarding the nature of the JVP is available in the 2005 report by The Asia Foundation:

The JVP ideology, though it is not immutable and unchanging, has always operated in the interstices of , Buddhism and . But, increasingly, its ideological commitment to nationalism and growing support base among the Buddhist clergy have overshadowed and diluted its commitment to Marxism. Essentially, the JVP mobilize around a discourse of exclusion and resistance. Following armed insurgencies in 1971 and 1987-1989 and its brutal suppression, the JVP has shown a remarkable ability to revive itself in a relatively brief time span… The JVP has re-emerged as the main voice of Sinhala nationalism and had become a significant “third voice” in electoral politics. From the mid-1990s, the movement has grown with every election, with the 2004 elections as a highpoint…(Jonathan Goodhand and Bart Klem 2005, Aid, Conflict, And Peace-building in Sri Lanka 2000 – 2005, The Asia Foundation http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SRILANKAEXTN/Resources/SLAidConflictPeac e.pdf – Accessed 8 February 2006 – Attachment 7).

In relation to whether the JVP has a military wing, the same source suggests that the Party has made the transition from a violent to political group with success and that the difference between the LTTE and the JVP is that the LTTE remains “a primarily military organization”:

Though the JVP has made the transition from violence to politics with remarkable success, it still retains many of its earlier characteristics that mark it out from other mainstream and minority parties in Sri Lanka…

…There is a remarkable parallel between the LTTE and JVP in terms of their nationalist ideology, modes of organization, and attitude to mainstream politics – though the chief difference is that the LTTE remains a primary military organization. As a result of their engagement with mainstream democratic politics, both groups face new contradictions and internal tensions.(Jonathan Goodhand and Bart Klem 2005, ‘Aid, Conflict, And Peace-building in Sri Lanka 2000 – 2005’, The Asia Foundation http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SRILANKAEXTN/Resources/SLAidConflictPeac e.pdf – Accessed 8 February 2006 – Attachment 7).

While information was not located that stipulated the actual presence of a military wing within the JVP, analysts suggest that the JVP is pushing for a military agenda. As part of a deal struck with the newly elected President Mahinda Rajapakse, the JVP ensured that the agenda of the new government was to bolster the military, according to a November 2005 by Nanda Wickramasinghe writing for the World Socialist Web Site:

The prime minister agreed unequivocally to the JVP’s demands—that he renounce a temporary deal with the Liberation Tigers of (LTTE) to jointly administer aid to the victims of the December 26 tsunami; and, that he demand a rewriting of the current ceasefire and bolster the military.

By committing himself to a deal that sets the course for war, Rajapakse was playing with fire. (Wickramasinghe, N 2005, ‘The JVP and the political crisis in Sri Lanka’ World Socialist Web Site http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/nov2005/jvp-n18.shtml – Accessed 8 February 2006 – Attachment 2).

The JVP’s apparent resistance to the cease fire agreement suggests that there is a military agenda to their political aspirations. Jehan Perera in the South Asian Journal states the following:

Spearheading the opposition to the cease-fire agreement is the JVP (People's Liberation Front), a Marxist-oriented political party that attempted to violently overthrow the government in 1971 and again in 1988-89. On both occasions, the JVP was militarily suppressed at the cost of tens of thousands of lives, estimated at around 15,000 and 30,000, respectively. The JVP's position draws upon a perception shared by many Sinhalese that the devolution of power is a means of dividing the country along ethnic lines. The fear of the division of the country in the minds of a sizeable proportion of the Sinhalese constitutes a major obstacle to a negotiated settlement with the LTTE. Clearly, the preferred option of this section of the population is a military solution that would eliminate the LTTE and, thereby, end the threat to the country's unity. (Perera, Jehan 2004, ‘Sri Lanka: Confrontation to Accommodation’, South Asian Journal http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/Journal/srilanka_confrontation.htm – Accessed 9 February 2006 – Attachment 8).

A 2006 BBC article by Nick Bryant makes reference to violent activities and threats in relation to the JVP. The article documents his experiences of a visit to north-east Sri Lanka, an area described as “fast becoming a key battlefield…(and where)…fears grow that troops and rebels are preparing to resume full-scale hostilities”:

Our visit to was a tale of two journeys.

We were prevented from entering the port because our arrival coincided with a suspected Tamil Tiger grenade attack on a police checkpoint, which prompted the security forces to seal off the road.

Our departure was complicated by a virtual blockade of the city by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the extreme nationalist party, whose half-drunk supporters had surrounded our vehicle earlier that day and threatened to beat us up.

On the way in, we witnessed the ruthlessness of the rebels, who have come now to express themselves almost exclusively through violence and appear to be measuring their success in the blood of members of the security forces.

On the way out, we saw the brute force of Sinalese nationalism.

The attack on the police checkpoint was viewed by the security forces as almost routine - one of over 1,000 violations of the 2002 ceasefire agreement by the Tamil Tigers, the government alleges.

The suspected rebels waited until dark before hurling two grenades. One exploded metres short of the checkpoint, injuring a policeman. Another landed on the sandbag- protected bunker, but failed to detonate.

Then the checkpoint came under a hail of gunfire, a trademark of rebel attacks.

'Undeclared war' We arrived a few minutes later, just after the army had launched their search for the suspected rebels. Two military motorbikes flashed by with gun-toting soldiers perched precariously on the back.

In an area dense with palm trees and undergrowth, and cloaked by now in almost complete darkness, their chances of success did not look good. Sure enough, they failed to flush out the attackers.

When we finally reached our hotel, the music in the lobby was a panpipe version of the Simon and Garfunkel classic Bridge Over Troubled Water.

Only five days before, the Sea Tigers had launched a suicide bomb attack on a Sri Lankan Navy patrol boat nearby in which 13 sailors were killed.

It seemed a particularly unfortunate choice.

Trincomalee, where Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims are almost evenly split but the government is in control, is fast becoming a key battlefield in what feels more and more like an undeclared civil war.

Twenty-four hours after we arrived, the JVP started to enforce its three-day strike, which was called partly in protest at the recent upsurge in rebel violence.

'Mob rule'

Early that Thursday morning, we had set off from our hotel to meet up with the Sri Lankan army, who had promised to allow us to film one of their patrols.

But our way was soon blocked by a group of JVP strikers, who took great offence at our attempts to film the empty streets and barricaded shops.

As our vehicle was brought to an abrupt halt, we were quickly encircled. Some of the strikers covered their faces with scarves, one of them gripping a hacksaw in his right hand.

Others started making calls on their mobile phones to summon reinforcements. (Bryant, N 2006, ‘Sri Lanka's undeclared civil war’ BBC Online http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4621284.stm – Accessed 7 February 2006 – Attachment 9)

Further information regarding whether the JVP has a military wing is available in the following Research Response, which provides information about JVP members being associated with violent incidents:

• RRT Country Research 2005, Research Response LKA17718, (Q 3) 13 October – Attachment 5.

3. What has been the effect of the civil war on the JVP influence?

An article by Upali Cooray in the journal Lines, outlines the influence of the JVP since 1988 and states that the support the JVP received from the rural youth in the 1970s and 1980s has expanded and that today they have “made impressive gains in urban centres such as Colombo and Gampaha”. The JVPs reaction to the tsunami disaster and “The work that the JVP cadres have carried out in Tsunami affected areas have won them new recruits and new supporters”. The article states:

In the 70’s and 80’s the JVP was largely made up of rural youth. They had a strong following amongst some sections of the university students and amongst the unemployed rural youth. They still command the support of a large number of rural youth. But there has been a significant change in their support base. At the last general election, the JVP made impressive gains in urban centres such as Colombo and Gampaha. The urban workers of today have strong rural links and that has helped the JVP to expand both its urban and rural bases. In the trade unions sector the JVP has a commanding presence. Today the Communist party, the LSSP and the NSSP have little influence amongst urban trade unions. If there were a democratic system of leadership selection in the Ceylon Mercantile Union (CMU), by now Bala Tampoe would have lost “his union” to the JVP. In any event, many CMU braches in the industrial sector have gone over to the JVP unions. It is important to note that the present crop of JVP union leaders have adopted a more cautious and prudent policy in relation to trade unions. They no longer adopt a policy of dead-end activism that leads to closure of work places and wholesale dismissals. In fact, in recent articles the JVP union leaders have criticised the SLFP and UNP leaders for placing unreasonable demands on the Employers. This is an important change in their approach to trade union activities…

…Tsunami assistance and JVP popularity

The work that the JVP cadres have carried out in Tsunami affected areas have won them new recruits and new supporters. The common perception is that the only important political force in Sri Lanka that is disciplined, incorruptible and totally committed to resolving the problems of the people is the JVP. Even the LTTE cannot match their honesty and dedication. The JVP has adopted a similar approach to the administration of the Pradeshiya Sabha they control and the ministries they run. They have cut out waste and streamline the administration.

It is important to remember that today the JVP is not a small party. It won nearly 19% of the seats in parliament. It has extended its control over many local organisations such as the co-operative societies. In the next period it is poised to increase its share of the vote regionally and nationally. (Cooray, Upali 2005, “An initial assessment of the post-1988 JVP”, Lines http://www.lines-magazine.org/Art_May05/upali.htm – Accessed 10 February 2006 – Attachment 10).

The JVP’s influence in the face of the civil war has seen it rise as a political force rating as the “third largest political grouping in Sri Lanka”, according to a 2004 article by Suryanarayan in The Hindu:

After remaining dormant for a few years, the JVP rose like a phoenix from the developments triggered by the -Sri Lanka Accord of July 1987. The JVP leaders realised that they could spread their influence far and wide by mobilising anti-Indian sentiments. The party therefore shifted its slogan from “ through class struggle to “liberation through patriotic struggle.”

Capitalising on the Sinhala backlash, the JVP became the champion of Sinhala extremism, spread its own brand of violence, and following the dictum of “punishing the traitors,” systematically assassinated political opponents and members of the armed forces. It proclaimed that once again Ruhana was rising up to play its traditional role of protecting the Sinhala-Buddhist identity. For a few months, there were serious doubts about Colombo’s capacity to tackle the worsening security situation. Owing to a variety of factors, the JVP could not attain its objectives. The army gradually gained the upper hand and annihilated hundreds of Sinhala youth…

…The JVP has emerged as the third largest political grouping in Sri Lanka, after the SLFP and the UNP. The increasing strength of the JVP is a matter of concern not only to the opposition, bust also to the SLFP. The President, ’s change of heart and decision to nominate Mahinda Rajapkshe as Prime Minister, instead of Lakshman Kadiragamar, her first preference, reflected sustained pressure by powerful forces within the SLFP; they were of the view that only Mr. Rajapakshe would be in a position to stem the tide of the JVP and, at the same time, preserve and expand the SLFP base. (Suryanarayan, V 2004, ‘The JVP Phenomenon’ The Hindu, 23 April p.10 – Attachment 11).

While the JVP seems to have increased in popularity, analysts argue that it has failed to keep up with the opinions of its voter base. Jehan Perara in the journal Himal states that the JVP have “failed to understand that federalism is about preserving the unity of the country and democratic accountability, as much as it is about sharing of powers between the centre and the regions.” Perera offers a critical assessment of the JVP’s influence in recent years and states:

Espousing an ideology that is a unique blend of Marxism and Sinhalese nationalism, the JVP had notched up considerable electoral success in the general elections of 2004. Formerly a militant outfit, the party came to occupy an important place in the government and was even able to increase its popularity. There were signs that the party might moderate its extreme stance on certain issues after attaining a position of responsibility. Its formal acceptance of the reality of globalisation was one such positive feature. However, the trend towards moderation was never unanimously supported within the party, and the decision to pull out of government clearly reveals that the hardliners have the upper hand…

…The unfortunate reality is that the JVP’s political wisdom and maturity has not grown apace with its increased voter base. They have failed to understand that federalism is about preserving the unity of the country and democratic accountability, as much as it is about sharing of powers between the centre and the regions. By refusing to accept the possibility of constructive engagement with the LTTE, the JVP has actually eroded its own political gains of the last few years. Opinion-makers must try to wean the party away from its dependence on the outdated and destructive ideology of Sinhalese ulta-nationalism. The JVP, for its part, must seek to understand that the joint mechanism, with its federal features, is a positive step that could eventually help bring the country under a system of shared democratic governance.(Perera, Jehan 2005, ‘The Mechanics of Peace’, Himal, July-August www.himalmag.com/2005/july/analysis1.html – Accessed 14 February 2006 – Attachment 12).

4. Has the party chosen the parliamentary path or the war path? According to Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) report of 2001, the JVP has emerged as a mainstream political party within Sri Lanka’s parliamentary . According to DFAT:

While its platform has altered little from its revolutionary past, there are no indications that it intends to take up violence again. Neither are JVP members under particular threat of harassment from the government or security forces…

…The leftist JVP, the former militant Marxist party that led two violent insurrections in the early seventies and late eighties, has re-emerged as something of a third force in southern politics in recent times…

…The party retains its socialist basis, but gone is the militancy and the extreme Marxist-Maoist script of the JVP's earlier avatar, to be replaced by a milder populist rhetoric laced with anti-capitalist, anti-globalisation and occasionally nationalist sentiment. The JVP remains adept at mobilising protests and has organised a number of mass rallies in the past year. The themes of most of these have centred on the rising cost of living.

Not all in Sri Lanka are placated by the JVP's revamped image. A number of interlocutors who lived through the dark period of its militant ascendancy take the view that the JVP might revert to violence if pushed into a corner. The party's manifesto still advocates a revolutionary political agenda. But most would agree that the JVP has learnt the lessons of history and will remain engaged in the democratic mainstream, where it has fared well in recent times. At recent national parliamentary elections and southern provincial council elections the JVP did not seem to resort to the violence and intimidation that characterised on occasion the campaigning of a number of the candidates of the major parties. (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2001, DFAT Report No. 171/01 – Sri Lanka: JVP, 13 June – Attachment 13).

The evolution of the JVP from a party pursuing a war path to a party choosing a parliamentary path is discussed in a 2004 article by Suryanarayan in The Hindu:

Much water has flowed down the Mahaveli Ganga and Kelaniya Ganga since the second JVP uprising. Realising the futility of armed struggle, the new leadership undertook a critical evaluation of the political scene in Sri Lanka and the South Asian region and the role that the party could play in the changing situation. The most important decision the JVP took was to take to the parliamentary path, while simultaneously carrying on extra-parliamentary peaceful struggles. Consequently, the party began to contest elections either on its own strength or in alliance with other political parties. The graph began to show an upward trend, indicating the JVP's increasing popularity among the youth. (Suryanarayan, V 2004, ‘The JVP Phenomenon’ The Hindu, 23 April p.10 – Attachment 11).

Despite evidence that the JVP is pursuing a parliamentary path, alternative sources state that in mid-2005 the JVP protested in opposition to a cease-fire agreement and against the proposed Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure (PTOMS):

More than 1500 cadres and supporters of Marxist Sinhala nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) staged a protest demonstration against the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) demanding Colombo to make the CFA null and void. The main protest was held in front of the Colombo Fort Railway Station Monday evening from 4:30 p.m to 5:30 p.m. Similar protests were also held in Kalutura, Puttalam, , Matala, Monaragala, Ratnapura and Anurathapura on Monday.

Demonstrators shouted slogans against the "division of Sri Lanka" by CFA and Post- Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) and demanded immediate suspension of the CFA signed between the Government and the Liberation Tigers.

Accusing Sri Lanka's President Chandrika Kumaratunge for going ahead with P- TOMS without the approval of the Lankan Parliament, Mr. Wimal Weerawanse, the powerful Propaganda Secretary of the JVP, said that the CFA which was also signed without the approval of the Parliament, has to be made null and void.

Both agreements are disloyal to the majority of the people in the country, according to Mr. Weerawanse.

The JVP is committed abrogating existing agreements that violate the spirit of the constitution, Mr. Weerawanse added.

The demonstration was held on the date of the completion of the first month of the signing of the P-TOMS.( Sri Lanka: JVP launches campaign against CFA in south 2005, TamilNet http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=15459 – Accessed 27 July 2005 – Attachment 14)

Furthermore, the fluid nature of the JVP’s alliances is evidenced by the fact that the JVP left the government in June 2005, in opposition to the signing of the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure and to the cease-fire agreement signed in 2002. According to a November 2005 article on the World Socialist Web Site, the JVP agreed to support “Rajapakse on condition he scrap the P-TOMS and review the ceasefire agreement that had been signed with the LTTE in 2002 to end the 20 year civil war. If implemented, these demands could spark the resumption of military conflict.” The article further states:

The JVP left the previous UPFA government of former president Chandrika Kumaratunga in June, on the basis of opposition to Kumaratunga's attempts to establish a joint post-tsunami operational management structure (P-TOMS) with the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The JVP's walk-out was an attempt to shore up its eroding base of support, under conditions where it had been widely discredited by its role in government. The UPFA had broken all the promises it had made to ordinary working people in the course of the 2004 parliamentary elections, attacking living standards and social facilities.

Upon leaving the government, the JVP intensified a Sinhala chauvinist campaign against any concessions to the LTTE, in order to divert social discontent into communalism. Following the calling of the presidential election, it entered into an agreement to support Rajapakse on condition he scrap the P-TOMS and review the ceasefire agreement that had been signed with the LTTE in 2002 to end the 20 year civil war. If implemented, these demands could spark the resumption of military conflict. (Ratnayake K. 2005, ‘Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka's new president faces crisis over forming a government’ World Socialist Web Site http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/nov2005/raj-23n.shtml – Accessed 29 November 2005 – Attachment 15)

The JVP’s focus on pursuing a parliamentary path is however highlighted in an article by Nanda Wickramasinghe and K. Ratnayake on the World Socialist Web Site. The authors state that the JVP have evolved from being an illegal party and leaders of a murderous campaign in the late 1980s to a prominent party “meet(ing) the needs and aspirations of ordinary working people”. The article further states:

The prominence of the JVP in the present situation is the sharpest expression of the putrification of bourgeois politics in Sri Lanka and the depth of the current crisis. Just over a decade ago, the party was illegal. In the late 1980s, it led a murderous campaign against the Indo-Lanka Accord—the first attempt by a section of the Sri Lankan bourgeoisie to end the civil war. In the name of saving , JVP hit squads killed hundreds of workers, trade union officials and party leaders who refused to fall into line with its policies.

Kumaratunga brought the JVP back into official political life in 1994 after she won the presidential election. Certain elements within the ruling class regarded the party as a useful potential safety valve amid mounting social tensions. JVP leaders found themselves courted by corporate circles and given prominent coverage in the media. In the general elections of the same year, the party received a modest 81,560 votes and won one seat.

The JVP’s electoral successes over the subsequent decade are a reflection of the inability of either the SLFP-led Peoples Alliance or the UNF government to meet the needs and aspirations of ordinary working people. The JVP has simply played the same political card, albeit in a particularly extreme form, used by all bourgeois political parties in Sri Lanka for the last 50 years: namely, anti-Tamil chauvinism. (Wickramasinghe N and Ratnayake K 2004, ‘Sri Lanka’s Constitutional Coup Thrusts JVP to Political Prominence’ World Socialist Web Site http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/feb2004/jvp-f12.shtml – Accessed 14 February 2006 – Attachment 16).

5. How many JVP members are in the Government, and in the Parliament?

According to a January 2006 Agence France Presse article, the JVP hold 39 seats in the 225 member assembly of the Sri Lankan Parliament:

Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse Wednesday secured the defections of four opposition legislators and rewarded them with cabinet portfolios, the government said.

Four MPs from the main opposition United National Party (UNP) crossed over to Rajapakse's People's Alliance and two of them were sworn in as ministers, a government statement said.

Officials said the other two defectors were also due to be sworn in as ministers but the ceremony was delayed until what they consider to be an astrologically auspicious time for them.

The defections help the president to reduce his dependency on his main Marxist ally, the JVP, or People's Liberation Front, which has 39 seats in the 225-member assembly.

Media Minister Anura Priyadharshana Yapa said the defections helped strengthened the president's peace efforts.

"This is very substantial support from the opposition to the president's peace initiative to end the war," he told reporters here.

Without the JVP support, Rajapakse's People's Alliance would have a minority government, but talks are underway with several other minor parties to soon secure an absolute majority, political sources said. (‘Sri Lankan president wins new support with defections’ 2006, Agence France Presse, 25 January – Attachment 17).

Details regarding the 39 Members of Parliament is located on the People’s Liberation Front website available at Attachment 18 (‘JVP Parliamentarians’ No Date, People’s Liberation Front Website http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/photos/photos_jvp_mps_2004.htm Accessed 14 February 2006 – Attachment 18).

Despite having a total of 39 Members of Parliament in the Sri Lanka government, the JVP declined pursuing the Ministerial Cabinet posts offered to them in November 2005. Further information regarding the JVP’s rejection of these posts is available in the following BBC article. For further information, please see Attachment 4. (‘New Sri-Lanka cabinet appointed’ 2005, BBC News Online http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/4462538.stm – Accessed 10 February 2006 – Attachment 4).

Information regarding the Members of the JVP’s Political Bureau is available on the JVP website, available at Attachment 19 (‘The Political Bureau of the JVP’ No Date, People’s Liberation Front Website http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/political_bureau.htm – Accessed 14 February 2006 – Attachment 19).

6. Is there a record over the past decade of the JVP being involved in revenge killings against Sinhalese and former members?

No information was located of the JVP being involved in revenge killings against Sinhalese and former members in the available sources.

However, the incidence of revenge killings in Sri Lanka is documented in various reports involving the LTTE and their various factions:

• ‘Revenge killing by suspected paramilitaries’ 2005, Tamilnet 8 December http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=16502 – Accessed 16 February 2006 Attachment 20. (For information about the Karuna Group faction please see Attachment 21 (‘LTTE Karuna faction to be registered’ 2004, DAWN website, 1 July http://www.dawn.com/2004/07/01/int15.htm – Accessed 15 February 2006 Attachment 21). • 2006 ‘Sri Lanka: A climate of fear in the east’, February, ASA 370012006 Attachment 22.

• Human Rights Watch 2006 World Report2006 – SriLanka, 18 January http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/slanka12252.htm – Accessed 9 February 2006 – Attachment 23.

• ‘Tamil group accuses rebels of killings of political opponents’ 2003, The Academic http://www.theacademic.org/ – Accessed 6 May 2003 – Attachment 24.

7. What is the JVP influence over the Army and police?

No information was located in the sources consulted that suggessted that the JVP exerts influence over the army and police.

Information regarding the politicisation of the police force and whether the Sri Lankan police authorities offers protection to the JVP is offered in the following RRT Research Response:

• RRT Country Research 2005, Research Response LKA17718, (Q 4 and 5) 13 October – Attachment 5.

Police protection has been offered to the JVP to assist them in leaving an area where Tamil residents were protesting against the actions of the JVP. The protest occurred in reaction to the JVP Sahana Seva Balakaya’s construction of temporary housing exclusively for the Sinhalese tsunami refugees in Trincomalee. Details of the protest are available at Attachment 25 (‘Trinco residents blame JVP for violence’, 2005 BBC News Online http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2005/03/050303_trinco_jvp.shtml – Accessed 17 February 2006 – Attachment 25).

Despite the lack of solid evidence that the JVP exert influence over police, a 2005 article on the World Socialist Web Site states that Sri Lankan authorities sided with the JVP in regards to the arrest of a journalist and alleged “LTTE suspect”:

On August 20, a hand grenade was thrown inside the Sudar Oli branch office at Wellawatta in Colombo South. The three employees who were there at that time escaped unhurt only because the grenade failed to explode.

Three days later, on August 23, Premachandran Yathurshan, a Tamil journalist employed by Sudar Oli was physically assaulted by members of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), while he was reporting on their demonstration at Fort railway station in central Colombo. The mob snatched his digital camera, mobile phone and money, as well as his letter of appointment as a Sudar Oli reporter and other documents.

Yathurshan was then handed over to police as an “LTTE suspect” despite his protestations that he was a journalist. Far from dealing with his assailants, the police sided with the JVP and took the reporter into custody. He was released the following day on personal bail of 7,500 ($US75)—the equivalent of about a month’s pay. His personal effects have not been returned. (‘Racist attacks on Tamil newspaper in Sri Lanka’ 2005, World Socialist Web Site, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/sep2005/sril-s03.shtml – Accessed 17 February 2006 – Attachment 26).

A 2004 Tamilnet article states that the police used teargas to disperse JVP protesters in a demonstration against LTTE celebrations, suggesting that the JVP do not exert influence over the JVP:

Trincomalee Police used teargas to disperse a group of about three hundred Sinhala demonstrators led by Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) parliamentarian Mr.Jayantha Wijesekara in front of the Trincomalee Police Headquarters, police sources said. A curfew imposed Friday afternoon around 2 p.m. in Trincomalee town after the incident but was lifted around 5 p.m. the same day.

JVP is a Sinhala nationalist Marxist party and main partner in the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance.

The Sinhala group brought down to Trincomalee from Kantalai, about twenty four miles off northwest of east port town first held a sit-in protest blocking the Colombo- Trincomalee highway Friday morning at Fourth Mile Post junction demanding that they would not leave the place until the Thamileelam national flag hoisted in the Trincomalee Hindu Cultural Hall where the LTTE is holding Maveerar Day celebrations is brought down…

…At the first instance the Police did not allow these protestors to go on procession to the office of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) in Trincomalee from the Fourth Mile post junction. Maximum security was provided to the Trincomalee SLMM office. However around 1 p.m. the protestors started to move towards the Hindu Cultural Hall located in the Inner Harbour Road. The police blocked the Inner Harbour Road when the protestors reached the junction in front of the Trincomalee Police Headquarters. As protestors became violent disobeying the orders of the police, Police Riot Squad fired teargas canisters towards the crowd, sources said. (‘Police use teargas to disperse JVP protestors’ 2004, Tamilnet, http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=13478 – Accessed 17 February 2006 – Attachment 27).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources: Government Information & Reports The http://siteresources.worldbank.org (UN) www.unhcr.org Non-Government Organisations South Asia Analysis Group http://www.saag.org UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org International News & Politics World Socialist Web Site http://www.wsws.org BBC News Online http://news.bbc.co.uk South Asian Media http://www.southasianmedia.net Tamilnet http://tamilnet.com Region Specific Links Himal magazine http://himalmag.com Dawn website http:///dawn.com The Academic http://theacademic.org Topic Specific Links People’s Liberation Front website http://www.jvpsrilanka.com Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org Search Engines search engine http://www.google.com.au/ Yahoo http://www.yahoo.com Online Subscription Services Janes Intelligence Review http://jir.janes.com The Economist http://www.economist.com/index.html Library Networks State Library of New South Wales http://www.sl.nsw.gov.au/ University Sites

Databases: Public FACTIVA Business Briefing DIMIA BACIS Country Information REFINFO IRBDC Research Responses (Canada) RRT ISYS RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. RRT Library FIRST RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. Rajakulendran, V 2005, ‘Where does Sri Lanka go after their leaders have spelt out their political positions?’ South Asia Analysis Group http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers17%5Cpaper1644.html – Accessed 8 February 2006.

2. Wickramasinghe, N 2005, ‘The JVP and the political crisis in Sri Lanka’ World Socialist Web Site http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/nov2005/jvp-n18.shtml – Accessed 8 February 2006.

3. ‘Sri Lanka risk: Political stability risk’ 2006, Economist Intelligence Unit - Risk Briefing 6 February. (FACTIVA)

4. ‘New Sri Lanka cabinet appointed’ 2005 BBC News Online http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/4462538.stm – Accessed 6 February 2006.

5. RRT Country Research 2005, Research Response LKA17718, 3 October. 6. Wikipedia 2006, ‘Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna’ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janatha_Vimukthi_Peramuna – Accessed 7 February 2006.

7. Jonathan Goodhand and Bart Klem 2005, Aid, Conflict, And Peace-building in Sri Lanka 2000 – 2005, The Asia Foundation http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SRILANKAEXTN/Resources/SLAidConflictPeac e.pdf – Accessed 8 February 2006.

8. Perera, Jehan 2004, ‘Sri Lanka: Confrontation to Accommodation’, South Asian Journal http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/Journal/srilanka_confrontation.htm – Accessed 9 February 2006.

9. Bryant, N 2006, ‘Sri Lanka's undeclared civil war’ BBC Online http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4621284.stm – Accessed 7 February 2006.

10. Cooray, Upali 2005, “An initial assessment of the post-1988 JVP”, Lines http://www.lines-magazine.org/Art_May05/upali.htm – Accessed 10 February 2006.

11. Suryanarayan, V 2004, ‘The JVP Phenomenon’ The Hindu, 23 April p.10. (FACTIVA)

12. Perera, Jehan 2005, ‘The Mechanics of Peace’, Himal, July-August www.himalmag.com/2005/july/analysis1.html – Accessed 14 February 2006.

13. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2001, DFAT Report No. 171/01 – Sri Lanka: JVP, 13 June. (CISNET – Sri Lanka CX53772)

14. Sri Lanka: JVP launches campaign against CFA in south 2005, TamilNet http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=15459 – Accessed 27 July 2005. (CISNET – Sri Lanka CX128711)

15. Ratnayake K. 2005, ‘Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka's new president faces crisis over forming a government’ World Socialist Web Site http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/nov2005/raj-23n.shtml – Accessed 29 November 2005. (CISNET – Sri Lanka CX141021)

16. Wickramasinghe N and Ratnayake K 2004, ‘Sri Lanka’s Constitutional Coup Thrusts JVP to Political Prominence’ World Socialist Web Site http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/feb2004/jvp-f12.shtml – Accessed 14 February 2006

17. ‘Sri Lankan president wins new support with defections’ 2006, Agence France Presse, 25 January. (FACTIVA)

18. ‘JVP Parliamentarians’ No Date, People’s Liberation Front Website http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/photos/photos_jvp_mps_2004.htm Accessed 14 February 2006.

19. ‘The Political Bureau of the JVP’ No Date, People’s Liberation Front Website http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/political_bureau.htm – Accessed 14 February 2006. 20. ‘Revenge killing by suspected paramilitaries’ 2005, Tamilnet 8 December http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=16502 – Accessed 16 February 2006.

21. ‘LTTE Karuna faction to be registered’ 2004, DAWN website, 1 July http://www.dawn.com/2004/07/01/int15.htm – Accessed 15 February 2006.

22. Amnesty International 2006 ‘Sri Lanka: A climate of fear in the east’, February, ASA 370012006.

23. Human Rights Watch 2006, World Report2006 – SriLanka, 18 January http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/slanka12252.htm – Accessed 9 February 2006.

24. ‘Tamil group accuses rebels of killings of political opponents’ 2003, The Academic http://www.theacademic.org/ – Accessed 6 May 2003. (CISNET – Sri Lanka CX77489)

25. ‘Trinco residents blame JVP for violence’, 2005 BBC News Online http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2005/03/050303_trinco_jvp.shtml – Accessed 17 February 2006.

26. ‘Racist attacks on Tamil newspaper in Sri Lanka’ 2005, World Socialist Web Site, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/sep2005/sril-s03.shtml – Accessed 17 February 2006.

27. ‘Police use teargas to disperse JVP protestors’ 2004, Tamilnet, http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=13478 – Accessed 17 February 2006.