Haredi) Siyasal Partilerin Analizi

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Haredi) Siyasal Partilerin Analizi T.C. İSTANBUL ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI DOKTORA TEZİ TOPLUMSAL GÜVENLİK YAKLAŞIMI AÇISINDAN İSRAİL’DE ULTRA-ORTODOKS (HAREDİ) SİYASAL PARTİLERİN ANALİZİ FERİT BELDER 2502130401 TEZ DANIŞMANI DOÇ. DR. SEVGİ UÇAN ÇUBUKÇU İSTANBUL- 2019 ÖZ TOPLUMSAL GÜVENLİK YAKLAŞIMI AÇISINDAN İSRAİL’DE ULTRA-ORTODOKS (HAREDİ) SİYASİ PARTİLERİN ANALİZİ FERİT BELDER Bu tezde İsrail’deki Haredi siyasi partiler olan Yahadut HaTora ve Şas partileri toplumsal güvenlik perspektifinden analiz edilmektedir. Çalışma, İsrail’deki Haredi siyasi partilerin temel algılarının, davranışlarını ve stratejilerini anlamak için toplumsal güvenlik yaklaşımının ana fikirlerini, kavramlarını ve düşünce yöntemini kullanmaktadır. Çalışma güvenliğin inşa edilmiş doğasının ve güvenlik çalışmalarında devlet eksenli yaklaşımının odağından devlet dışı boyutlara doğru değişiminin altı çizilerek başlanmıştır. Bu bağlamda, dinin, güvenliğin bu değişen gündeminde nasıl yer aldığı mevcut literatür ve Haredi kimliği ile Yahudi dini arasındaki ilişkiye referansla tartışılmıştır. İkinci olarak, Haredi kimliğinin tarihi gelişimini (mikro bağlam) ele almakta, İsrail’de din-devlet ilişkilerinin yaratımı ve dönüşümü (makro bağlam) hakkında tarihsel bir anlatı sunmaktadır. Bu bölümde savunulan temel görüş ise Haredi partilerin toplumsal güvenlik algılarının bu mikro ve makro bağlamlar içerisinde şekillendiğidir. Bu bölüm ayrıca Haredi partilerin din-devlet ilişkilerine ve Haredi kimliği ile ilgili konulara yaklaşımdaki referans olarak İsrail’deki statüko düzenlemesini, karşı karşıya kaldığı meydan okumalara yoğunlaşarak yeniden değerlendirmektedir. Üçüncü bölümde, çalışma Haredi partilerin politikalarını dört konu üzerinden analiz etmektedir: Haredi eğitim özerkliği, Yeşiva öğrencilerinin askere alımları, Yahudiliğe geçiş ve Şabat düzenlemeleri. Bu bölüm Haredi partilerin bu konulara Yahudiliği bir inanç olarak, bir toplumsal kimlik (Haredi) olarak ve devletin ulusal karakteri olarak güvenlikleştirerek kimlik- güvenlik ekseninden yaklaştıklarını iddia etmektedir. 2009, 2013 ve 2015 seçimleri ilk üç tema için örnek vakalar olarak seçilmiş olmakla beraber Şabat konusu belirli krizler etrafında analiz edilmiştir. Bu bölümün temel bulguları tezin temel hipotezi olan Haredi partilerin motivasyon ve davranışlarının, dinle alakalı değişik düzey ve biçimlerdeki güvenlik endişeleriyle şekillendiği argümanını da desteklemektedir. Bu yolla, geleneksel Aşkenaz- Sefarad ayrımı temelinden farklı olarak Yahadut HaTora ve Şas partilerinin kıyaslanma ve karşılaştırmaları için analitik bir araç sağlanmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bu tez toplumsal güvenlik literatürüne büyük ölçüde ihmal edilmiş olan dinin rolünün analiz edilmesi vasıtasıyla katkı sağlarken temel olarak din- iii devlet ilişkileri üzerinde tartışılan Haredi siyaseti literatürüne de güvenlik perspektifinin uygulanmasıyla katkı sağlamıştır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Haredi siyaseti, toplumsal güvenlik, Yeşiva öğrencileri, Şabat, Yahudiliğe geçiş, eğitim, Yahadut HaTora, Şas iv ABSTRACT ANALYSING ULTRA-ORTHODOX (HAREDI) POLITICAL PARTIES IN ISRAEL FROM THE SOCIETAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE FERİT BELDER This thesis analyses the Israeli Haredi political parties which are Yahadut HaTora and Shas from the societal security perspective. The study uses the core ideas, concepts and way of thinking of the societal security approach in order to understand the main perceptions, behaviours and strategies of the Haredi political parties in Israel. This study begins with the theoretical framework by stressing the constructed nature of security and the changing focus of security studies from state-centric perspective to non-state dimensions. In this regard, it is discussed how the religion could be located in this changing agenda of security by giving references to the existing litature and the relationship between the Haredi identity and the Jewish religion. Secondly, it examines the historical evolution of the Haredi identity (micro context) and provides an historical account on the creation and transformation of the state-religion relations (macro context) in Israel. The main argument supported in this chapter is that the societal security perceptions of the Haredi parties are being shaped within these micro and macro contexts. The chapter also revisits the status quo arrangement in Israel by stressing the major challenges against it as the key reference to adress the motivation of Haredi parties in their approaches to the state-religion relations and the key issues regarding the Haredi identity. In the third chapter, the study analyses Haredi parties’ policies in four key issues which are the autonomy of the Haredi education, the conscription of Yeshiva students, conversion to Judaism and the Shabbat regulations. This chapter claims that Haredi parties are approaching these issues from the identity-security nexus by securitising Judaims as a belief, community identity (Haredi) and the national character of the state. 2009, 2013 and 2015 elections are taken as case studies for the first three themes whereas Shabat issue is analysed with the cases of particular crises. The findings of this chapter support the main hypothesis of this thesis which is that the motivations and the behaviours of the Haredi political parties are being shaped by the security concerns about the religion in different levels and forms. In this way it is also provided an analytical tool to compare and contrast v Yahadut HaTora and Shas parties apart from the traditional comparisons on the basis of Askhenazi- Sephardi divison. In conclusion, this thesis contributes to the societal security literature by analysing the role of religion which has largely been neglected as well as the literature of the Haredi politics which have mainly been discussed in state-religion relations by applying the security perspective. Keywords: Haredi politics, societal security, Yeshiva students, Shabbat, Conversion to Judaism, Education, Yahadut HaTora, Shas vi ÖNSÖZ İsrail’de Ultra-Ortodoks (Haredi) siyasal partiler ve genel olarak Harediler, İsrail siyasetinin ve toplumunun ayrıksı unsurları olarak görülme eğilimindedirler. Bu durum belli oranda doğrudur, ama aynı zamanda hayatın ve siyasi mücadelenin de içindedirler. Bu aktörleri merkeze alan ve onların siyaseti algılama, anlamlandırma biçimini sorunsallaştıran çalışmalar konusunda ise her ne kadar bazı çok değerli yazarlar ile birtakım araştırma kurumlarının kapsayıcı çalışmaları olsa da, özellikle Türkiye’de genel olarak bir akademik ilgi eksikliğinden bahsetmek mümkündür. Pek çok kez anti-Siyonizm ile eşleştirilen Haredi hareket içerisindeki çoğulculuk ise gözlerden kolayca kaçabilmektedir. Bu minvalde bu çalışma Haredi siyasal partiler olan Yahadut HaTora ve Şas’ın İsrail Devleti ile kurdukları ilişki ile Haredi toplumu ve genel İsrail toplumu seslenirken tercih ettikleri söylemler, harekete geçirmeye çalıştıkları kavramlar ve diğer referanslara yoğunlaşarak bir Haredi toplumsal güvenliği meselesini tartışmayı amaçlamıştır. Modernliğin etkilerine gösterilen tepkiler bir yanda, Siyonizme verilen yanıtlar diğer yanda modern Haredi kimliğinin ‘güvenlik’ ekseninde oluştuğu görülmektedir. Aynı şekilde hem Britanya Manda döneminde hem de İsrail Devleti’nin kuruluş dönemi ve sonrasında bu ‘güvenlik’ eksenli yaklaşım farklı biçimlerde ve siyasal düzenlemelerle sürdürülmüştür. Bu yaklaşımın krize girdiği dönemlerde ise Haredi siyasi partiler kimlik güvenliğini değişik biçimlerde gündeme taşımışlardır. Bu minvalde bu çalışmanın temel amacı da bir tarihsel gerçeklik olarak Haredi siyasi hareketi ve Haredi toplumunu kimlik-güvenlik ekseninde analiz etmek olmuştur. Bu resmin diğer tarafında ise 1980’lerde filizlenen, 1990’lı yıllarda ise Soğuk Savaş’ın sona ermesiyle ortaya çıkan iç savaş ve etnik temelli çatışmaları açıklamak için başvurulan, devlet dışı güvenlik konuları bağlamında ortaya çıkan ‘toplumsal güvenlik’ literatürünün ortaya koyduğu düşünce yöntemi, kavram seti ve soruların din konusundaki çekingenliğine karşı Yahudiliğin bir inanç, bir toplumsal grup ve ulusal kimlik referansı olarak güvenlikleştirilmesinin İsrail Devleti özelinde ve Haredi siyasal partiler ekseninde tartışılmaya müsait olması yatmaktadır. Bu çerçevede tezin literatüre katkısı iki yönlüdür. Öncelikle Haredi siyaseti çalışmalarına kimlik- güvenlik perspektifinden bir katkı sunarak Haredi siyasal tercihlerinin dini inanç, ideal Yahudi toplumu formu olarak Haredi kimliği ve devletin Yahudi karakteri (ulusal kimlik) noktasında nasıl korumacı bir söylem ve pratiği hayata geçirdiği analiz edilmektedir. İkinci olarak ise toplumsal güvenlik literatüründe etnik kimlik karşısında (dini azınlıklar ya da etnik işaret olarak dini kimlik dışında) ikincil vii konumda kalan din boyutu tartışmanın merkezine getirilmiş ve makro düzeyde ya da ulus- altı düzeyde bir güvenlik nesnesi olarak ele alınma eğilimindeki din olgusunu ulusal düzeye taşıyarak toplumsal güvenlik kavramın açıklayıcılığını tartışmıştır. Tez çalışmam sürecinde beni fikirsel anlamda besleyen, metinleri sabırla okuyarak bana geri dönüşler yapan, tezimin her sürecinde gelişimine katkıda bulunan, samimi desteğini her şartta yanımda hissettiğim çok değerli danışman hocam Doç. Dr. Sevgi Uçan Çubukçu’ya öncelikle şükranlarımı sunarım. Tez önerisi toplantısından başlayarak Tez İzleme Komitelerinde hem tezin bölümlerini okuyarak beni yönlendiren, tezin şekillenmesinde katkı sunan ve yapıcı eleştirileriyle beni besleyen Tez İzleme Komitesi üyeleri Prof. Dr. Nurcan Özgür Baklacıoğlu
Recommended publications
  • Israel's National Religious and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict
    Leap of Faith: Israel’s National Religious and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict Middle East Report N°147 | 21 November 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iv I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Religious Zionism: From Ascendance to Fragmentation ................................................ 5 A. 1973: A Turning Point ................................................................................................ 5 B. 1980s and 1990s: Polarisation ................................................................................... 7 C. The Gaza Disengagement and its Aftermath ............................................................. 11 III. Settling the Land .............................................................................................................. 14 A. Bargaining with the State: The Kookists ................................................................... 15 B. Defying the State: The Hilltop Youth ........................................................................ 17 IV. From the Hills to the State ..............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Lost Decade of the Israeli Peace Camp
    The Lost Decade of the Israeli Peace Camp By Ksenia Svetlova Now that Israeli annexation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank is a commonplace notion, it seems almost impossible that just twelve years ago, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) were making significant progress in the US-sponsored bilateral peace negotiations. Since then, the stalemate in the talks has become the new normal, under three consecutive governments headed by Benjamin Netanyahu. The Palestinians, led by Mahmoud Abbas and his government, have been cast as “diplomatic terrorists” for asking the international community for help. The Israeli peace camp has been subjected to a vicious smear campaign that has shaken its self-esteem and ruined its chances of winning over the public. This systematic smearing of Israeli and Palestinian two-staters has paid off. In the April 2019 elections, Israel’s progressive Meretz party teetered on the edge of the electoral barrier while Labor, once the ruling party, gained only six mandates (5% of the votes). The centrist Blue and White, a party led by ex-army chief Benny Gantz, carefully avoided any mention of loaded terms such as “the two-state solution” or “evacuation of settlements”, only calling vaguely to “advance peace” – as part of Israel’s new political vocabulary, which no longer includes “occupation” or even “the West Bank”. Despite offering no clear alternative to the peace option it managed to successfully derail, the Israeli right under Netanyahu has been in power for over a decade in a row, since 2009. Israel’s left-wing parties are fighting to survive; the Palestinians are continuing their fruitless efforts to engage the international community; and the horrid reality of a single state, in which different groups have different political and civil rights, seems just around the corner.
    [Show full text]
  • Strateg Ic a Ssessmen T
    Strategic Assessment Assessment Strategic Volume 19 | No. 4 | January 2017 Volume 19 Volume The Prime Minister and “Smart Power”: The Role of the Israeli Prime Minister in the 21st Century Yair Lapid The Israeli-Palestinian Political Process: Back to the Process Approach | No. 4 No. Udi Dekel and Emma Petrack Who’s Afraid of BDS? Economic and Academic Boycotts and the Threat to Israel | January 2017 Amit Efrati Israel’s Warming Ties with Regional Powers: Is Turkey Next? Ari Heistein Hezbollah as an Army Yiftah S. Shapir The Modi Government’s Policy on Israel: The Rhetoric and Reality of De-hyphenation Vinay Kaura India-Israel Relations: Perceptions and Prospects Manoj Kumar The Trump Effect in Eastern Europe: Heightened Risks of NATO-Russia Miscalculations Sarah Fainberg Negotiating Global Nuclear Disarmament: Between “Fairness” and Strategic Realities Emily B. Landau and Ephraim Asculai Strategic ASSESSMENT Volume 19 | No. 4 | January 2017 Abstracts | 3 The Prime Minister and “Smart Power”: The Role of the Israeli Prime Minister in the 21st Century | 9 Yair Lapid The Israeli-Palestinian Political Process: Back to the Process Approach | 29 Udi Dekel and Emma Petrack Who’s Afraid of BDS? Economic and Academic Boycotts and the Threat to Israel | 43 Amit Efrati Israel’s Warming Ties with Regional Powers: Is Turkey Next? | 57 Ari Heistein Hezbollah as an Army | 67 Yiftah S. Shapir The Modi Government’s Policy on Israel: The Rhetoric and Reality of De-hyphenation | 79 Vinay Kaura India-Israel Relations: Perceptions and Prospects | 93 Manoj Kumar The Trump Effect in Eastern Europe: Heightened Risks of NATO-Russia Miscalculations | 103 Sarah Fainberg Negotiating Global Nuclear Disarmament: Between “Fairness” and Strategic Realities | 117 Emily B.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel, Palestine, and the Olso Accords
    Fordham International Law Journal Volume 23, Issue 1 1999 Article 4 Israel, Palestine, and the Olso Accords JillAllison Weiner∗ ∗ Copyright c 1999 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke- ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj Israel, Palestine, and the Olso Accords JillAllison Weiner Abstract This Comment addresses the Middle East peace process, focusing upon the relationship be- tween Israel and Palestine. Part I discusses the background of the land that today comprises the State of Israel and its territories. This Part summarizes the various accords and peace treaties signed by Israel, the Palestinians, and the other surrounding Arab Nations. Part II reviews com- mentary regarding peace in the Middle East by those who believe Israel needs to surrender more land and by those who feel that Palestine already has received too much. Part II examines the conflict over the permanent status negotiations, such as the status of the territories. Part III argues that all the parties need to abide by the conditions and goals set forth in the Oslo Accords before they can realistically begin the permanent status negotiations. Finally, this Comment concludes that in order to achieve peace, both sides will need to compromise, with Israel allowing an inde- pendent Palestinian State and Palestine amending its charter and ending the call for the destruction of Israel, though the circumstances do not bode well for peace in the Middle East. ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND THE OSLO ACCORDS fillAllison Weiner* INTRODUCTION Israel's' history has always been marked by a juxtaposition between two peoples-the Israelis and the Palestinians 2-each believing that the land is rightfully theirs according to their reli- gion' and history.4 In 1897, Theodore Herzl5 wrote DerJeden- * J.D.
    [Show full text]
  • Curriculum Vitae Dr. Ofira Gruweis-Kovalsky Contact: Kefar Tabor P.O.B 256 Israel 15241 Home Tel: 972- 4- 6765634. Mobile: 972
    1 Curriculum Vitae Dr. Ofira Gruweis-Kovalsky Contact: Personal details: Kefar Tabor P.O.B 256 Israel 15241 Citizenship: Israeli Home Tel: 972- 4- 6765634. Languages: Hebrew and English Mobile: 972-52-3553384 E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] Academic rank Senior Lecturer, Zefat Academic College, Israel (2017- present) Associate researcher Herzl Institute University of Haifa, Israel (2009-present) Associate researcher at the HBI Brandeis University, USA (2015-present) Adjunct lecturer, MA and BA programs in Israel Studies, University of Haifa, Israel (2010–present). Lecturer, Zefat Academic College, Israel (2014-2017) Education 2009-2010: Post Doc. Department of Geography and Environment, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, "The History of Jerusalem as Israel Capital City". 2009: PhD, Summa cum Laude. 'Land of Israel Studies' Dept., University of Haifa. "The Vindicated and the Persecuted": Myth, Ritual, and Propaganda in the Herut Movement 1948-1965. 2006: MA, Magna cum Laude. 'Jewish History' Dept., University of Haifa. 'The Myth of the Altalena Affair and the Herut Movement'. 1980: BA, Jewish History Dept. and Land of Israel History Dept., Tel Aviv University. Israel. Certificates Mediator, Emek Yizrael Academic College, Israel (1999). Archive manager, Tel Hai Academic College and the Israel National Archives (1994). 2 Scholarly Positions: Head of the general studies division, Multidisciplinary Department, Zefat Academic College, Israel (2018-present) Senior Lecturer, Multidisciplinary Department, Zefat Academic College, Israel (2017-present) Lecturer, Multidisciplinary Department, Zefat Academic College, Israel (2014 -2017) Adjunct lecturer, Land of Israel Studies Dept., Jewish History Dept., University of Haifa. MA and BA programs (2010–present). Assistant editor, Ze’ev Jabotinsky's Ideological Writings.
    [Show full text]
  • Burden Sharing and the Haredim
    8 Burden Sharing and the Haredim On March 12, 2014 the Knesset passed, on its which scholars should remain exempt, but also third reading, Amendment 19 to the Military states that draft evaders will be subject to arrest if Service Law, which aims to widen the participation quotas are unmet. !e comprehensive exemption of Ultra-Orthodox young men and yeshiva granting all Haredi yeshiva students aged 22 students in military and civilian national service. and over who join the workforce is of particular !is amendment also aims to promote their significance. integration into the working population. On April 17, 2014, the Ministerial Committee on Background: !e History of Burden Sharing in Military Service set concrete steps for the amendment’s implementation the Exemption (!e Arrangement and follow up. !ese were given the force of a for Deferral of Army Service Cabinet resolution. Under the new arrangement, by Yeshiva Students) the amendment will take full e"ect on July 1, Compulsory military service applies under the 2017, following an adjustment period. When in Security Service Law (Combined Version) of 1986. full force, the military or civilian national service According to this law, Israeli citizens are subject inductees will number 5,200 a year (two thirds to conscription at age 18 unless granted an of the age cohort according to current figures). exemption. Exemption was the subject of lively Until then, yeshiva students will be able to defer debates between yeshiva heads and the political their enlistment and receive an exemption at age leadership in the early days of the state. !e 22, as long as the yeshivot meet their recruitment executive committee of the Center for Service targets, which will be implemented according to to the People considered the conscription of the mandated schedule: in 2014, a total of 3,800 yeshiva students, and in March 1948 authorized Haredim are expected to join the IDF or national a temporary army service deferment for yeshiva service; in 2015, 4,500; and 5,200 in the years that students whose occupation was Torah study.1 follow.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel and Overseas: Israeli Election Primer 2015 (As Of, January 27, 2015) Elections • in Israel, Elections for the Knesset A
    Israel and Overseas: Israeli Election Primer 2015 (As of, January 27, 2015) Elections In Israel, elections for the Knesset are held at least every four years. As is frequently the case, the outgoing government coalition collapsed due to disagreements between the parties. As a result, the Knesset fell significantly short of seeing out its full four year term. Knesset elections in Israel will now be held on March 17, 2015, slightly over two years since the last time that this occurred. The Basics of the Israeli Electoral System All Israeli citizens above the age of 18 and currently in the country are eligible to vote. Voters simply select one political party. Votes are tallied and each party is then basically awarded the same percentage of Knesset seats as the percentage of votes that it received. So a party that wins 10% of total votes, receives 10% of the seats in the Knesset (In other words, they would win 12, out of a total of 120 seats). To discourage small parties, the law was recently amended and now the votes of any party that does not win at least 3.25% of the total (probably around 130,000 votes) are completely discarded and that party will not receive any seats. (Until recently, the “electoral threshold,” as it is known, was only 2%). For the upcoming elections, by January 29, each party must submit a numbered list of its candidates, which cannot later be altered. So a party that receives 10 seats will send to the Knesset the top 10 people listed on its pre-submitted list.
    [Show full text]
  • The Struggle for Hegemony in Jerusalem Secular and Ultra-Orthodox Urban Politics
    THE FLOERSHEIMER INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES The Struggle for Hegemony in Jerusalem Secular and Ultra-Orthodox Urban Politics Shlomo Hasson Jerusalem, October 2002 Translator: Yoram Navon Principal Editor: Shunamith Carin Preparation for Print: Ruth Lerner Printed by: Ahva Press, Ltd. ISSN 0792-6251 Publication No. 4/12e © 2002, The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies, Ltd. 9A Diskin Street, Jerusalem 96440 Israel Tel. 972-2-5666243; Fax. 972-2-5666252 [email protected] www.fips.org.il 2 About the Author Shlomo Hasson - Professor of Geography at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and deputy director of The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies. About the Research This book reviews the struggle for hegemony in Jerusalem between secular and ultra-orthodox (haredi) Jews. It examines the democratic deficit in urban politics formed by the rise of the haredi minority to power, and proposes ways to rectify this deficit. The study addresses the following questions: What are the characteristics of the urban democratic deficit? How did the haredi minority become a leading political force in the city? What are the implications of the democratic deficit from the perspective of the various cultural groups? What can be done in view of the fact that the non-haredi population is not only under-represented but also feels threatened and prejudiced by urban politics initiated by the city council? About the Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies In recent years the importance of policy-oriented research has been increasingly acknowledged. Dr. Stephen H. Floersheimer initiated the establishment of a research institute that would concentrate on studies of long- range policy issues.
    [Show full text]
  • Netanyahu Formally Denies Charges in Court
    WWW.JPOST.COM THE Volume LXXXIX, Number 26922 JERUSALEFOUNDED IN 1932 M POSTNIS 13.00 (EILAT NIS 11.00) TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2021 27 SHVAT, 5781 Eye in the sky A joint goal Feminist religious art IAI unveils aerial Amos Yadlin on the need to When God, Jesus surveillance system 6 work with Biden to stop Iran and Allah were women Page 6 Page 9 Page 16 How did we miss Netanyahu formally denies charges in court Judges hint witnesses to be called only after election • PM leaves hearing early the exit • By YONAH JEREMY BOB two to three weeks to review these documents before wit- Prime Minister Benjamin nesses are called, that would ramp? Netanyahu’s defense team easily move the first witness fought with the prosecution beyond March 23. ANALYSIS on Monday at the Jerusalem Judge Rivkah Friedman Feld- • By YONAH JEREMY BOB District Court over calling man echoed the prosecution’s witnesses in his public cor- arguments that the defense A lifetime ago when living ruption trial before the March had between one to two years in northern New Jersey, I 23 election. to prepare for witnesses. But often drove further north for It seemed that the judges ultimately the judges did not work. were leaning toward calling seem anxious to call the first Sometimes the correct exit the first witness in late March witness before March 23. was small and easy to miss. or early April, which they A parallel fight between the But there were around five would present as a compro- sides was the prosecution’s or so exits I could use to avoid mise between the sides.
    [Show full text]
  • Media Accountability Online in Israel. an Application of Bourdieu’S Field Theory
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Kniep, Ronja Article — Published Version Media Accountability Online in Israel. An application of Bourdieu’s field theory Global Media Journal: German Edition Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Kniep, Ronja (2015) : Media Accountability Online in Israel. An application of Bourdieu’s field theory, Global Media Journal: German Edition, ISSN 2196-4807, Universität Erfurt, Erfurt, Vol. 5, Iss. 2, pp. 1-32, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-201500645 , http://www.globalmediajournal.de/de/2015/12/18/media-accountability-online-in-israel-an- application-of-bourdieus-field-theory/ This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/231999 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
    [Show full text]
  • 5TJT 010314.Indd
    B’Lev Ari . See Page 28 Acu-Zen . .See Page 41 Gurwin . See Page 42 Our Place . See Page 49 Yaffa Wigs . See Page 53 I-4 Tours . See Page 63 See Page 23 See Pages 3-5 Serving Nassau County, Brooklyn, Queens, Manhattan, Bronx, and Staten Island JANUARY 3, 2014 פרשת בא WWW.5TJT.COM VOL. 14 NO. 17 2 SHEVAT 5774 $1.00 White House: No On Pollard FROM THE EDITOR See Page 71 BY LARRY GORDON Values And Justice From here it looks like offi- cial Israel has gone mad. The release of 26 more convicted See Page 39 Arab terrorists this week has reopened wounds, which had never really closed, for Haim Tzah, GPO GPO Tzah, Haim Tzah, bereaved families who live with the awful pain of their MKs Nachman Shai, Ayelet Shaked, and Efi Lahav presented President Shimon Peres with a petition signed by 106 members of Knesset calling on President Obama to release Jonathan Pollard. See Page 22 Continued on Page 14 See Page 14 Tekhelet Conference: HEARD IN THE BAGEL STORE A Royal Blue Event With BY LARRY GORDON A New Discovery The Protest That Wasn’t Segal Eli Segal See Page 9 BY TOBY KLEIN Frankly I don’t get it. Plane- GREENWALD loads of chareidim who reside mostly in Jerusalem planned on The exploration to fi nd the arriving in New York this week genuine hilazon—the snail to demonstrate against the gov- that produces the tekhelet ernment of Israel for wanting to that was worn by the Kohen institute some drastic changes.
    [Show full text]
  • The Image of the Amish in the New York Times Versus the Image of the Haredim in Haaretz
    conflict & communication online, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2014 www.cco.regener-online.de ISSN 1618-0747 Benyamin Neuberger & Keren-Miriam Tamam The image of the Amish in the New York Times versus the image of the Haredim1 in Haaretz (1980-2010)2 Kurzfassung: Der vorliegende Aufsatz vergleicht die Presseberichterstattung über die Beziehung zweier ultra-religiöser Gruppen, der Amish-Gemeinde in den USA und der Haredi-Gemeinde in Israel, zu ihren jeweiligen Staaten. Obwohl die Amish in Israel mitunter als "ame- rikanische Haredim" bezeichnet werden, gibt es bedeutende Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Gruppen und ihrer Darstellung in den Me- dien. Nichtsdestotrotz gibt es aber auch hinreichend viele Ähnlichkeiten, um einen Vergleich zu rechtfertigen. Im Wesentlichen spiegeln die Unterschiede der Berichterstattung über die beiden Gruppen in der New York Times und in Haaretz die grundlegenden Unterschiede ihrer Stellung in ihrer jeweiligen Gesellschaft und ihrer Haltung gegenüber dem Staat wider. Während die Amish die USA als "land of freedom" akzeptieren, betrachten die Haredim Israel nicht als einen wirklich jüdischen Staat. Während sich der Dialog zwischen den Amish und ihrem Staat um bürgerliche Freiheiten und Rechtsgrundsätze dreht, leitet sich die Auseinandersetzung mit den Haredim von einer abweichenden Wahrnehmung des Charakters des israelischen Staates her. Die Haltung der Haredim gegenüber der Mehrheitsgesellschaft und dem Staat ist in großem Maße konflikthaltig und damit meilenweit entfernt von der Einstellung der Gelas- senheit, die für die Amish charakteristisch ist. Abstract: This article compares the newspaper coverage of the relationship of two ultra-religious groups, the Amish community in the USA and the Haredi community in Israel, with their respective states.
    [Show full text]