Tanks at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, September 1916

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Canadian Military History

Volume 20 Issue 4 Article 2

2011

“A useful accessory to the infantry, but nothing more”: Tanks at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, September 1916

Andrew McEwen

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Recommended Citation McEwen, Andrew "“A useful accessory to the infantry, but nothing more”: Tanks at the Battle of Flers- Courcelette, September 1916." Canadian Military History 20, 4 (2011)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. McEwen: Tanks at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette “A useful accessory to the infantry, but nothing more” Tanks at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, September 1916

Andrew McEwen

he Battle of Flers-Courcelette Fuller was similarly unkind about the Tstands out in the broader memory Abstract: The Battle of Flers- tanks’ initial performance. In his Tanks of the First World War due to one Courcelette is chiefly remembered in the Great War, Fuller wrote that the as the combat introduction of principal factor: the debut of the tanks. The prevailing historiography 15 September attack was “from the tank. The battle commenced on 15 maligns their performance as a point of view of tank operations, not September 1916 as a renewed attempt lacklustre debut of a weapon which a great success.”3 He, too, argued that by the general officer commanding held so much promise for offensive the silver lining in the tanks’ poor (GOC) the British Expeditionary warfare. However, unit war diaries showing at Flers-Courcelette was that and individual accounts of the battle Force (BEF) General Douglas Haig suggest that the tank assaults of 15 the battle served as a field test to hone to break through German lines on September 1916 were far from total tank tactics and design for future the Somme front. Flers-Courcelette failures. This paper thus re-examines deployment.4 One of the harshest shares many familiar attributes the role of tanks in the battle from verdicts on the tanks’ debut comes with other Great War engagements: the perspective of Canadian, British from the Canadian official history. and New Zealand infantry. It finds troops advancing across a shell- that, rather than disappointing Allied It commented that “on the whole… blasted landscape towards thick combatants, the tanks largely lived the armour in its initial action failed German defensive lines to capture up to their intended role of infantry to carry out the tasks assigned to it.” a few square kilometres of barren support. It acknowledged, however, that the territory at the cost of thousands “All Arms” co-ordination of tanks, of lives. The successful assault on September attack in Martin Gilbert’s artillery, infantry and aircraft was not Courcelette by the 2nd Canadian The Battle of the Somme (2006) is entitled yet familiar to BEF commanders.5 Division is typically regarded as “The arrival of the tanks: ‘We are An examination of the battle a victory in Canadian memory of feeling top dogs.’” Similarly, Robin from the infantry’s perspective the war. In contrast, British forces Prior and Trevor Wilson’s The Somme suggests a more nuanced outcome. attacking to the east did not achieve (2005) discusses Flers-Courcelette Despite the high hopes of General their intended breakthrough, and in a chapter entitled “Lumbering Haig and others for their effect on the the battle is viewed in the UK as Tanks: The Battle of 15 September.” battlefield, tanks were not expected a minor advance.1 The tanks’ first Such works are in agreement about to be decisive strategic weapons in combat deployment ultimately two principal conclusions: the attack their early operations. Rather, they overshadowed the hard infantry was not a stirring success, but it were intended to serve as tactical fighting of 15 September in the did showcase the potential for the accessories to the infantry assault. broader memory of the Great War. tank as an offensive weapon. The Infantry units were instructed prior Nearly all of the works that British official history discusses the to 15 September that tanks would discuss the Battle of Flers-Courcelette many shortcomings of the tank on be valuable in surmounting enemy highlight the debut of the tank as 15 September but concedes that the machine gun posts and strongpoints, the central feature of the battle. battle was a “valuable tryout” for the but were in no way to be depended For example, the chapter on the 15 possibilities of tank assaults.2 J.F.C. upon for the advance.6 Flers-

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Courcelette was not the harbinger of tank performance was often a massive joint offensive along the of fast, offensive armoured thrusts, narrowly linked to the fate of the foot inter-army boundary in the Picardy but of tactical support for infantry soldiers – low casualties counting as region in May-June.8 These plans attacks. success, and high casualties as failure. were disrupted by the German The Canadian Corps and British Inconsistencies and biases of both the drive towards Verdun in late XV Corps witnessed the greatest war diaries and personal accounts February which aimed to inflict range of tank performance at Flers- may be identified and balanced by such horrendous losses that the Courcelette and will serve as the reference to more broadly based French would be forced to sue for focal point of analysis for this paper. secondary sources, such as official peace and thereby isolate the BEF.9 Out of five corps at the battle, histories and analytical studies. Verdun descended into a savage these two experienced the most Although at Flers-Courcelette battle of attrition. The French suffered success with tanks and feature the most of the tanks suffered mechanical an estimated 115,000 casualties by best-documented analysis of tank breakdown or battle damage and May.10 operations on 15 September. failed to influence events, some tanks Desperate to alleviate the strain As tanks were designed from rendered valuable assistance to the on Verdun, French commander-in- the outset to support infantry attacks infantry in surmounting German chief General Joseph Joffre pressured across no-man’s-land, the yardstick strongpoints. Both eventualities were the British to continue with the for tank success should be based anticipated and prepared for by the planned offensive in Picardy, north upon how the infantry fared.7 Much attacking infantry units. This paper of the Somme River. Haig protested of the primary analysis for this paper will show that the tanks largely lived that his forces would not be ready will therefore rest upon infantry up to their intended tactical support for a major assault until 15 August. battalion war diaries which contain role at Flers-Courcelette. This was unacceptable to Joffre intelligence and after-action reports and he persuaded Haig to commit and offer candid examinations of Strategic Context to a 1 July start date.11 The carnage tank performance. A number of at Verdun meant that the French infantrymen from Flers-Courcelette, s the Great War entered its third contribution to the Somme offensive moreover, left eyewitness accounts Ayear in January 1916 both the would necessarily be decreased, but of the tanks’ performance, which Entente and Central Powers were Haig still maintained hopes for a supplement the war diaries with intent on smashing through enemy breakthrough on the Western Front. a human dimension of combat. lines and ending the stalemate on The British attack went in as These documents must be used with the Western Front. The British and scheduled in the morning of 1 July caution. An infantry unit’s evaluation French high commands agreed to 1916 and was met with horrific

The battle of Flers-Courcelette saw the first use of tanks in battle. C.4 (Chablis), a Mark I (female) tank, assigned to support the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, was disabled early in the battle by a shell which disabled its track (see the damage at the rear of the tank). Canadian War Museum 19920085-460 Canadian War

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Here, C.5 (Crème de Menthe), a Mark I tank traverses the Courcelette battlefield, September 1916. C.5 was a male variant armed with two naval 6-pounder guns and four Vickers machine guns. The female variant replaced the 6-pounders with two additional Vickers machine guns. The two-wheeled trailer pulled behind the tank was a steering tail used to help control the direction of the vehicle.

slaughter. The combination of deep the east to Combles in the southwest.14 attack was scheduled to begin on 15 German entrenchments and dense This stretch of the German line September. barbed wire that survived the long represented their “Third Position,” British artillery bombardment, a stout network of trenches and The Tanks coupled with lack of surprise meant dugouts that were begun in February that the defenders were well- 1916. Haig hoped that breaking aig used every means at prepared. Over 19,000 British and through this position would finally Hhis disposal to increase the Empire soldiers were killed and some crack the German lines.15 possibility of success for this second 38,000 wounded on the first day of The primary drive of the major effort of the Somme offensive. the attack alone.12 Undeterred by the offensive was to be undertaken The centerpiece of the 15 September scale of the losses, Haig continued by General Sir Henry Rawlinson’s attack was to be roughly 50 rhombus- to push. By late August, roughly Fourth Army, which was tasked with shaped Mark I tanks. By the summer eight square kilometres of German- breaking through three primary lines of 1916 several companies of tanks held territory were captured at a of German defences and capturing were training in Great Britain under cost of 100,000 British casualties.13 the villages of Martinpuich, Flers and a shroud of secrecy. There were German strongholds such as those Gueudecourt on the first day. The two principal variants of the Mark at Thiepval and High Wood, and Canadian Corps of the neighbouring I: the male and female. Males were the Quadrilateral trench network Reserve Army would support this armed with four machine guns continued to elude capture even after drive by attacking Courcelette. After and two 6-pounder guns and were months of horrific fighting. the infantry had broken in to the designed to engage German positions By September Haig was ready German lines the cavalry would be obstructing the infantry advance. once again to renew the offensive, committed for a drive on Bapaume The small caliber of a 6-pounder believing that German morale and and the less-comprehensively could not replace the devastating troop strength were nearing the defended rear areas.16 In all, ten power of an artillery barrage, but point of collapse. He decided to divisions were allocated for the it was powerful enough to knock strike along an 11 kilometre front assault against the five German out machine gun posts and enfilade extending roughly from Thiepval in divisions holding the sector.17 The captured trenches.18 The females

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were equipped with six machine had warned French and GHQ that – the creeping barrage. A sharp guns to protect the males against “there should be no preliminary bombardment was to deluge the German infantry. Females would efforts with a few machines, the result German front as the infantry went always accompany male tanks into of which would give the scheme “over the top” to catch the defenders battle.19 These Mark I tanks could away.”25 out of their deep dugouts as they move approximately two kilometres These criticisms of a disgraced prepared to resist the assault. The per hour over ground broken up by politician and a relatively junior barrage was then to drop back into trenches.20 officer seem important in hindsight. no-man’s-land and move forward Haig initially wanted to include The pressures on Haig to renew at “lifts” of 45 metres per minute to tanks in the 1 July attack, but they the offensive, however, made it provide the attacking infantry with a were not available in sufficient hard to delay deployment of a new shield of shrapnel.31 To avoid hitting numbers.21 His patience for the assault weapon from which so much the tanks, 90 metre wide lanes would tanks’ debut grew thin by September, was expected. Indeed, Haig was be left untouched by the barrage for however, and he decided to deploy determined to employ tanks to the tanks to advance in sections of “C” and “D” Companies of the Heavy breathe new life into the stagnating three machines approximately five Section, Machine Gun Corps (as the Somme offensive. His diary entry minutes ahead of the III, XV and XIV tank force was then known) while for 11 August showed impatience British Corps of the Fourth Army.32 many of their fellow tankers were with the length of time it took to The majority of tanks allocated still in transit to France. In the event, transport tanks, crews and spare to the attack were assigned to Fourth 49 out of 150 available tanks of the parts from England to France: “I have Army for its drive on Gueudecourt. Heavy Section were integrated into been looking forward to obtaining Out of the 49 tanks of “C” and “D” the 15 September offensive.22 decisive results from the use of these Companies, 17 were assigned to XIV Haig’s decision to employ ‘Tanks’ at an early date.”26 On 22 British Corps for its attack on Ginchy whatever tanks were available August he wrote that “I cannot wait and the Quadrilateral, eight were directly contradicted the advice any longer for [tanks], and it would allocated to III British Corps for the of many of the tank’s designers. be folly not to use every means at assault on High Wood, and 17 were Winston Churchill was an opponent my disposal in what is likely to be to work with XV British Corps in the of the modest deployment of tanks our crowning effort for this year.”27 capture of Flers and Martinpuich. on the Somme, both before and Christy Campbell, in his recent study Seven were assigned to the Reserve after the fact. While serving as First of the tank action at Flers, argues Army for the assault of Courcelette.33 Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill that Haig’s conduct reflected the The fateful decision to leave lanes was a key figure in the early “recklessness of a man looking for a untouched by the creeping barrage development of the tank, directing last chance.”28 Such criticism neglects open for the tanks meant that many the Landships Committee, the body the immense pressure on Haig to Fourth Army formations were that developed the tank. Despite deliver tangible territorial gains to dependent on the tanks to crush being ousted from government due to balance the awful bloodletting since German wire and strongpoints ahead the Dardanelles fiasco in November 1 July. The tanks would receive their of the infantry.34 In some sectors of 1915, he maintained an interest in first taste of combat on 15 September the attack, the tanks were pressed the machines’ deployment. In a 1916. into a more active role in the opening memorandum dated 7 January 1916, assault than originally intended. In he warned that “none should be Preliminaries the event that the untested machines used until all can be used at once.”23 failed to keep up with the advance, Churchill’s memorandum was he groundwork for the Battle the attacking infantry would be left distributed to the War Committee Tof Flers-Courcelette was similar dreadfully exposed to German fire and Field Marshal Sir John French, to the preparations for the 1 July without the protection of either tanks Haig’s predecessor as GOC of the attack and the 15 September assault or barrage. BEF.24 Partial deployment of the was similarly intended to achieve a Despite Haig’s optimism about tanks, Churchill was convinced, decisive breakthrough of the main the tanks’ capabilities, the small would negate both their priceless German lines with exploitation by number of machines, and the fact that surprise value and their potential for cavalry.29 A heavy bombardment they were untested in battle, meant a mass assault. His views were shared began at 0630 hours on 12 September that they were treated as an adjunct to by another early tank enthusiast, and continued unabated until 15 the infantry’s assault. An operations Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Swinton. September.30 This attack featured order for the 12th Battalion of the In a June 1915 memorandum, Swinton another experimental approach East Surrey Regiment, for example,

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The shell-scarred Somme battlefield. This photo was taken during operations on 15 September 1916 and shows the ground over which the Canadians attacked. The ruins of Courcelette are visible amongst the shell fire and battered tree line.

stipulated that the tanks’ “role is to to conduct battalion-sized exercises the battle were awed despite destroy the hostile Machine Guns before 15 September. These small their ungainly appearance and and Strong Points, and clear the way training exercises were not common, ponderous movement. Captain for the infantry.”35 The infantry were however, and some units were only Duncan Macintyre, a staff officer instructed to call for help from tanks able to send small groups of officers serving with the 28th Battalion by signalling with their rifles and to observe tanks practicing behind CEF, witnessed a tank exercise near helmets in the event that they were the lines.37 Many prudent battalion the front on 13 September. After held up by stiff German resistance. commanders remained skeptical of seeing the tank manoeuvre over The attack was not to depend on tank the tanks’ potential worth on the shell holes and trenches behind the assistance. The same operations order battlefield. An order for the 27th line, Macintyre wrote in his diary noted carefully that “should the tanks Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary that “we felt they would make a big become out of action our Infantry are Force (CEF) commented that “two difference to our side in any fight on no account to wait for them,” and ‘tanks’ will likely be told off to co- they were in.”39 Major Agar Adamson the infantry would keep up the pace operate with us but our plans are to of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian of the advance to “derive the benefit be made irrespective of them.”38 Light Infantry (PPCLI) wrote to of the artillery barrage.”36 Such skepticism was not shared his wife on 14 September that “we The last-minute arrival of by many of the combat troops who have some wonderful new devices tanks in France meant there was were extremely curious about the for putting it over the Germans… little time for training with the characteristics of the new weapons. the new ‘ships’ look promising.”40 infantry. Some formations, such as Those soldiers who witnessed Private Edgar Goddard, also of the the British 56th Division, were able tanks exercising shortly before 28th Battalion, wrote that he and his https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss4/212 6 McEwen: Tanks at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette

friends were “chuckling over the trench in order to protect the left flank Zero hour was set for 0620 hours on surprise that the Germans would of the 2nd Division.44 15 September. get the next day” after seeing tanks The six tanks, plus one in reserve, The infantry battalion war diaries parked behind the lines before the allocated to the Reserve Army are curiously reticent about the attack.41 Whether these writings were assigned to the 2nd Canadian role of tanks during the attack on convey a sincere belief in the tank’s Division.45 These tanks of Heavy Courcelette. The fact that only six potential or a forced optimism for Section’s “C” Company were divided tanks participated in the Canadian home-front consumption is difficult into two detachments of three tanks attack meant that most troops would to say. Nevertheless, these statements and were parcelled out to the 4th and not have the opportunity to fight Canadian War Museum EO-0794 Canadian War suggest the soldiers were confident 6th CIBs for a converging attack on alongside them. Notwithstanding that the new machines would at the the Sugar Factory.46 The tanks were the excellent precision and detail of a least administer a rude shock to the to advance alongside the infantry at few soldiers’ accounts, most primary enemy. zero hour, and thus no gaps were documentation of the Canadians’ left in the barrage as on the fronts experience with tanks at Courcelette The Canadian Corps Attack of the British corps where the tanks is vague and difficult to relate to moved out ahead of the infantry. the course of the battle. Christy ieutenant-General Sir Julian LByng’s Canadian Corps was tasked with anchoring the left flank of the larger Fourth Army drive by capturing the village of Courcelette and holding it against German counterattacks. Major-General Richard Turner’s 2nd Canadian Division was ordered to capture the fortifications in front of Courcelette: Sugar Trench, Candy Trench and a fortified sugar beet refinery known as the Sugar Factory. These defences Museum 19920085-467 Canadian War comprised an interconnected series of dugouts, machine gun posts and barbed wire manned by the German 45th Reserve Division.42 They were between 400 to 800 metres from the Canadian front line.43 The 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade (CIB) was held in reserve for the capture of Courcelette itself, another 800 to 1,200 metres distant, if German defences were breached by the 4th and 6th CIBs in the initial assault. Major- General Louis Lipsett’s 3rd Canadian Division was to attack Fabeck Graben

Top right: Crème de Menthe (C.5), surrounded in a cloud of smoke from its Museum 19920085-478 Canadian War engine, crosses the battlefield. Bottom right: A close-up of the sponson on the side of the hull of a Mark I tank (male). A German shell has penetrated the armour on the shield of the 6-pounder gun likely putting it out of action.

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suffered terrible casualties. It lost ten officers and three hundred other ranks during the attack, roughly 30 percent of the 1,029 casualties of all ranks suffered by the 6th CIB during the assault, and a testament to the ferocity of the 45th Reserve Division’s defence of Courcelette.50 Also in the 6th CIB attack were the troops of the 31st Battalion who were assigned “mopping up” duty during the attack. Its Museum 19870268-001 Canadian War platoons were dispersed amongst the other battalions of the brigade to consolidate captured trenches and eliminate any German strongpoints bypassed by the initial assault.51 One of the members of the unit, Private Donald Fraser, wrote vividly of the

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2012 Bechthold ©2012 Mike by Map drawn attack, in which members of the 6th CIB became quickly pinned-down in no-man’s-land by intense German Campbell’s Band of Brigands and could to “hug” the creeping barrage machine gun and rifle fire. Several Trevor Pidgeon’s The Tanks at Flers, and overwhelm German soldiers of the platoon commanders who two recent and detailed accounts, before they could man their posts. attempted to lead their men forward supply context that helps clarify This unforgiving terrain presented were immediately shot down as they the references to the tanks in the serious obstacles to the ungainly raised themselves above the lips of Canadian war diaries. tanks as they slowly crawled over the craters. Fraser wrote that “the assault Following a sharp bombardment heavily-cratered fields. was a failure and now we were at the at 0620 hours, the Canadians went The 28th Battalion of the 6th mercy of the enemy.” When the men “over the top” and advanced across CIB formed the left flank of the 2nd appeared to give up hope, the third the cratered moonscape in front of Canadian Division and advanced with tank unseen by the 28th Battalion Courcelette towards the German three tanks towards Sugar Trench. lumbered into view and immediately lines. Gunner Eric Blake, a tank The battalion’s war diary commented began firing on German positions. It gunner at Flers-Courcelette, vividly that two tanks got stuck shortly after was tank C.5, “Crème de Menthe,”52 recalled the terrain confronting the advance began. Both of these commanded by Captain Arthur attacking troops of the Fourth and tanks were unable to advance past Inglis, a former infantry officer Reserve armies on 15 September 1916. the Canadian front lines. It appears detached from the Gloucestershire that the rear steering mechanism on Regiment for service in the Heavy You never saw such a sight as the tank C.3, “Chartreuse,” was hit by Branch, commanding No.1 Section countryside is now — one mass of shrapnel, and the tank eventually of “C” Company.53 Fraser wrote shell-holes everywhere you look. drove into a shell hole from which that Crème de Menthe immediately The woods are blown to pieces, and it could not be recovered. Similarly, “gave new life and vigour to our only a few branchless stumps remain C.4, “Chablis,” experienced trouble men,” who were inspired to renew of must have once been fine thickets. when its tracks became loose and the attack and follow Inglis’ tank “as As for the towns and villages, they fell off the caterpillar mechanism.48 if to be in on the kill.”54 Inspired by simply don’t exist now…[there was] Some troops were detached to try the tanks, the infantry advanced and practically not a brick standing on and get the tanks moving again, but captured the German trench. Private another.47 “the attempt was futile.”49 The 28th Joseph Thompson wrote that upon Battalion lost sight of the third tank, seeing tanks grind over the German Canadian infantry and tanks but nevertheless captured its final positions, “the men thought that laboriously advanced over the pock- objectives by 0820 hours. Despite this was such fun and quick work marked ground as quick as they the brisk advance, the battalion that they asked for permission to go

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Above: The ruins of the Sugar Factory photographed shortly after the battle. Right: “The Capture of the Sugar Refinery at Courcelette by the Canadians on September 15, 1916” by Fortunino Matania. This dramatic re-creation of the Canadian action to capture the Sugar Factory faithfully captures the actual battlefield – compare to the photo above. Below right: A close-up of an ad-hoc bunker created by the Germans out Canadian War Museum 19920044-762 Museum 19920044-762 Canadian War of the structure of the original Sugar Factory.

ahead” in the next phase of the attack, “which was readily given.”55 Despite the crucial impetus generated by the timely appearance of Crème de Menthe, the 31st Battalion suffered dreadful losses on 15 September. Less than half the battalion, 318 out of 722 men, answered roll call after the attack.56 The 6th CIB narrative concurred with Fraser’s evaluation of the tank’s importance, stating that Crème de Menthe “proved of much assistance in enabling our troops to advance towards their objective.”57

Following the infantry’s capture of Museum 19920085-832 Canadian War their objectives, Crème de Menthe returned to its start line for refuelling and the two ditched tanks were salvaged.58 Inglis was awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for “reaching his objective and manoeuvring throughout the whole operation.”59

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Canadian troops cheer Cordon Rouge (C.6) after the battle. The horseshoe affixed to the front of the tank provided the good luck needed for the tank to complete its mission of 15 September. Cordon Rouge supported the attack by the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade and was one of only two tanks supporting the Canadians to avoid getting stuck or knocked out.

Sources from the 4th CIB do Battalion moving slowly towards that the infantry battalions either not provide as much detail on the Sugar Trench, but the other two tanks did not appreciate any assistance performance of tanks, but a range of were out of sight. In accordance with rendered by the tanks, or that there evidence indicates that its experience the general order to maintain the were not enough tanks operating on 15 September closely resembled tempo of the advance, the battalion in their sectors to warrant mention. that of the 6th CIB. The 21st Battalion began its assault on the Sugar Factory Nevertheless, the brigade war diary formed the left flank of the 4th CIB without waiting for the ungainly commented vaguely that on the and was tasked with assaulting the tanks to appear, and eliminated all morning of 15 September the tanks Sugar Factory. In the words of a opposition after a sharp fight. The “assisted in taking of some enemy brigade report, the refinery “was battalion captured its final objective positions.”65 Similar to the events known to be a strong position and around 0703 hours and took 125 in the 6th CIB sector, two out of the it was expected would be defended prisoners.62 The war diary noted that three tanks assigned to the 4th CIB with determination.”60 “the battalion advanced well ahead failed to cross the Canadian front The battalion began its attack of the Tanks and the final objective line. C.1, “Champagne,” became at zero hour and swiftly captured was gained before tanks overtook stuck in the mud and its tracks turned the first German line. The creeping them.”63 The stiff German resistance without any traction, forcing the barrage was effective: “no difficulty took its toll on the 21st, which could crew to eventually abandon it. C.2, was experienced taking [the] first only muster 200 all ranks and four “Cognac,” was lost after becoming line trench as our Artillery had machine guns to defend its newly stuck in a shell hole. 66 The remaining demoralized what occupants won positions against counterattack.64 tank, Second Lieutenant John Allan’s remained there.”61 As the battalion The 21st Battalion attack is C.6, “Cordon Rouge,” straddled continued its advance it began to instructive in the overall experience a German trench and poured take heavy casualties from machine of the 4th CIB on the morning of 15 murderous enfilade fire down both gun positions in the Sugar Factory September. The other battalions in the lengths of the line.67 Cordon Rouge’s and the surrounding trenches. One brigade convey almost no information valuable assistance in attacking of the three tanks assigned to the 4th on the role of the tanks during the German trench brought the 4th CIB was seen by troops of the 21st the initial assault. This suggests CIB war diary to comment that the

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tanks “proved their value” in their the infantry as any physical support action was mirrored by bubbling first action.68 Allan was awarded the offered by the tanks. Despite the fact enthusiasm from British and New Military Cross (MC).69 that only two of the six tanks in action Zealand troops. The British XV Corps Following the attacks of the with the 2nd Canadian Division attack similarly showed that even if 6th and 4th CIBs, the tanks’ role in actually engaged German troops, the most of the tanks failed to advance the battle for Courcelette was over. 4th CIB narrative commented that across no-man’s-land, the remaining Buoyed by the initial successes, “the advance of this new offensive few were able to intervene decisively Major-General Turner committed the weapon had much to do with the in places where the infantry had been 5th CIB for an assault on Courcelette success of the operation.”76 stalled by tenacious resistance. itself in the late afternoon of 15 The Canadian high command Because of delays in the shipment September. The 22nd and 25th was not so enthusiastic. The fact that of essential equipment from Britain Battalions attacked at 1815 hours only one third of the tanks committed and mechanical failures, only 26 of without tank support and captured to the attack on Courcelette were able the 42 tanks assigned to Fourth Army the village by 1900 hours. The to render assistance indicated that were available on the morning of 15 capture of Courcelette did not end tanks were not a decisive weapon. September.78 In contrast to the 900 the battle, for the 22nd had to repel The tanks’ performance essentially metre advance of the Canadian Corps 13 counterattacks over the next two validated the concerns of prudent to its objectives, most units of the days.70 battalion and brigade commanders Fourth Army had to advance more One common feature of the who viewed the new weapons with than 3,500 metres to capture their reports is the shock the tanks had on caution. Lieutenant-General Byng first-day objectives, Gueudecourt, German defenders. Fierce debates concluded that “tanks are a useful Lesboeufs and Morval.79 General raged immediately after the battle accessory to the infantry, but nothing Rawlinson ordered the tanks to over the supposed loss of the tanks’ more.”77 advance approximately five minutes novelty value due to a “premature Byng’s remarks offer probably ahead of the infantry in order to disclosure” of their existence at the most balanced assessment of the soften up German defences. This, as Flers-Courcelette. 71 On the other tanks’ capabilities after their first test noted above, required the artillery hand, recent research by Christy of combat. It is important to keep in to leave 90-metre-wide gaps in the Campbell suggests that the Germans mind that throughout the planning creeping barrage for each section of were aware that some kind of new process, tanks were only supposed three or four tanks.80 In the event that armoured fighting vehicle was about to be adjuncts to the infantry assault. the tanks were destroyed or ditched, to debut on the battlefield on the basis Indeed, the fact that units were these gaps in the bombardment of espionage reports from Britain.72 ordered not to wait for tanks in the would leave stretches of German The sense of many Canadian event they were delayed or bogged trench untouched by the barrage, reports is that the enemy infantry down showed that commanding making the attacking infantry received a rude shock on the morning officers anticipated problems with the vulnerable. Nevertheless, the infantry of 15 September. Captain Macintyre new weapons in their first field test. were directed “on no account” to wait recorded that several Germans In the Canadian experience, tanks for the tanks if they lagged behind or “surrendered on [the tanks’] approach performed exactly as expected: not were knocked out.81 and one remarked that it was not war depended upon for success but able The two units in the Fourth Army but ‘savage butchery.’”73 Many of the to assist the infantry wherever they that had the greatest success with the Germans were surprised at the tanks’ could. tanks were Major-General Sydney resistance to machine gun fire, which Lawford’s 41st British and Major- would not stop the machines unless The British XV Corps Attack General Andrew Russell’s New hit by armour-piercing SmK bullets Zealand divisions of the XV British fired by Mauser rifles.74 Private he experience of British XV Corps’ Corps. They attacked beside each Fraser wrote with a certain degree of Tat Flers closely reflected that of other in the drive towards Flers and satisfaction that his erstwhile German the Canadians at Courcelette. Both Gueudecourt,82 and their experience tormentors “got out of their trench corps saw a handful of tanks advance with the tanks was comparable to that and were beating it back over the in the support of infantry and deliver Canadian 2nd Division. open, terrified at the approach of the assistance at critical junctures against The New Zealanders, assigned tank.”75 This severe blow to German stiff German resistance. The glowing four tanks, went over the top at 0620 morale in front of Courcelette was praise of the tanks’ performance by hours and immediately came under evidently as much appreciated by Canadian troops who saw them in intense German fire. The varied

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effectiveness of the creeping barrage the village. It was unable to advance support while D.12 “proceeded to meant that some battalions were into the storm of German fire and deal with the wire and machine- confronted with uncut wire directly decided to wait for tank assistance. guns holding up our men.”84 The 3rd in their path, while others suffered The brigade’s history notes that at Battalion was then able to surmount dreadfully from enfilade fire on 1030 hours, two tanks — Lieutenant German opposition and capture their flanks. The 3rd Battalion of the Herbert Pearsall’s D.11 and Captain Flers Trench. The New Zealanders New Zealand Rifle Brigade (NZRB) Graeme Nixon’s D.1283 — arrived to fell short of the ultimate objective ran into stout German resistance at assist the beleaguered infantry. The of Gueudecourt, but were able to Flers Trench, immediately west of left-hand tank, D.11, provided flank advance to the third objective of Abbey Road Trench by 1100 hours.85 Their roughly 2,230 metre push was one of the farthest advances of any division on 15 September.86

Left: Soldiers of the New Zealand Division stand in a front line trench near Flers, 15 September 1916. Below: Tank D.17 (Dinnaken) supported the British attack on Flers. It advanced up the main street of the village and materially assisted its capture by directly engaging numerous German machine gun positions. After its armament was disabled, the tank was able to make its way back to safety. Here, a group of British soldiers pose with D.17 following the battle.

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Another view of D.17 following the battle. The tank remained in location here for several days before being recovered. It was used as a brigade headquarters during this period. Here the brigadier (with cane) and his staff pose for a photo during a lull in the battle.

D.11 and D.12 were the only tanks in its war diary that the tanks’ slow Zealand battalions, evidence of the able to help the New Zealanders on speed meant they originally “did ferocity of the action all across the 15 September, the other two being not do much except perhaps cause front on 15 September. Ultimately, disabled by German fire.87 The actions alarm in the second enemy line.”90 Rawlinson postponed future attacks of these two tanks nevertheless In what is perhaps the most notable due to the stiff German resistance received glowing praise from most tank action of the day, however, and heavy casualties. The most of the New Zealand regimental Second Lieutenant Stuart Hastie’s distant British first day objective, histories of the battle. The NZRB D.17, “Dinnaken,” advanced with a Gueudecourt, would not in fact be history by Lieutenant-Colonel W.S. group of 122nd Brigade troops up taken until 26 September.96 Austin states that the tanks “came the main street of Flers.91 The 15/ Reports from units of the British well up to expectations.”88 Despite Hampshire war diary states that at XV Corps about the demoralizing the heavy casualties suffered by the this time “one of the armoured cars effects of tanks upon the enemy Otago Regiment’s 2nd Battalion, the [sic] did most useful work smashing echo those from the Canadians to regimental history by Lieutenant in the enemy’s Strong Points and… the west. According to the history Canadian War Museum 19930013-078 Canadian War Arthur Byrne concludes that the tanks also gave the men great confidence.”92 of New Zealand’s Otago Regiment “did actually perform extraordinarily (Hastie was awarded the MC for the the tanks instilled “fear of a kind effective work” by “breathing death action.93) hitherto unknown into those of and destruction.”89 The advance began to bog down the enemy who encountered it.”97 Attacking on the right flank of shortly thereafter. According to the Similarly, the 15/Hampshire war the New Zealanders on 15 September 15/Hampshire war diary, beyond diary commented that the tanks’ was the British 41st Division. It was Flers “organized attack had ceased, assault on German positions tasked with capturing the village of owing to formations having been “without doubt” demoralized Flers and pushing on to Gueudecourt broken up, and to heavy casualties whatever soldiers attempted to resist by the end of the day. In the early among the officers.”94 The battalion the onslaught.98 Gunner Eric Blake stages of the 15 September attacks, alone suffered 292 casualties of remarked that the tanks’ “moral the 15th Battalion of the Hampshire all ranks on 15 September.95 These effect on Fritz the first time we Regiment (15/Hampshire) of the were comparable to the losses of the went into action was undoubted.”99 British 122nd Infantry Brigade noted heavily engaged Canadian and New Whether these comments may be

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understood as accurate reports of the the battle were heavy. The Canadians strictly true, for British infantry of the German reaction, or the headiness of suffered 7,230 casualties in the week- 47th Division captured High Wood victorious troops who had survived long battle.102 The New Zealanders without tank support. However, ferocious combat is difficult to say. lost 100 officers and 3,000 enlisted his remarks are useful in conveying Still, the consistency of accounts from men by 19 September.103 Precise his enthusiasm for the tanks. On Canadian, British and New Zealand German casualties are unknown 17 September Haig wrote that he sources suggest that the tanks’ debut but 4,000 prisoners were captured “decided to ask the home authorities administered a severe shock to the over the course of the battle.104 Flers- to send us out as quickly as many German defenders. Courcelette became just one more [tanks] as possible.”107 grinding advance in the attritional Not everyone agreed that Aftermath abyss of the Somme. the tanks were a success on 15 Nevertheless, Haig appeared September. The fact that only two he battle largely bogged down pleased with the results. The capture of the six tanks assigned to the Tafter 15 September. Heavy rains of Courcelette, Martinpuich and 2nd Canadian Division, and two began to deluge the battlefield and Flers on 15 September led him to out of the four detailed to assist troops found it increasingly difficult write that the battle witnessed the New Zealand Division, were to move up food and supplies, let “more considerable” gains than any able to cross the start line indicates alone attack, in the flooded mire.100 operation “since the commencement that significant improvements in Uncoordinated assaults continued, of the offensive.”105 He was especially tactics and technology would be but the offensive at Flers-Courcelette pleased with the performance of the required for the tanks to become did not reach beyond the first day’s tanks. He remarked that “wherever truly effective. Years later Winston objectives.101 Haig’s desire to smash the tanks advanced we took our Churchill complained bitterly of the German lines and let the cavalry objectives, and wherever they did lost novelty of the tanks “for the mere wreak havoc in the enemy’s rear not advance we failed.”106 This petty purpose of taking a few ruined remained unrealized. The costs of statement is rather general and not villages.”108 Lieutenant-Colonel

Courcelette after the battle.

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Swinton wrote acidly after the war capabilities during the 15 September 17. Miles, Sketch 37. 18. Trevor Pidgeon, The Tanks at Flers: An that “we threw away a surprise… attack. Tanks would be deployed in Account of the First Use of Tanks in War at in the vain hope of resuscitating the small, isolated numbers throughout the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, The Somme, momentum of an offensive which had the rest of the Somme offensive, but September 1916 (Cobham: Fairmile Books, 109 1995), p.21. died away.” Nevertheless, Swinton their participation was nowhere as 19. J.P. Harris, Men, ideas, tanks: British added that the tanks “fully justified noticeable or celebrated as their debut military thought and armoured forces, 1903- themselves” in the battle.110 Haig was at Flers-Courcelette. 1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p.31. undeterred by the loss of surprise and 20. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, 1914-1918, ordered a thousand more machines p.49. for immediate production.111 Notes 21. Miles, p.233. 22. Ibid., p.249. Following the action at Flers- 23. Winston Churchill, “Memoranda on Variants of the Offensive, 7th January Canadian War Museum 20000007-014(b) Canadian War Courcelette, the fighting on the Somme . 1 Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians degenerated into a series of localized Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916, Volume 1916,” in Ibid., appendix 17, p.48. One (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 24. Ibid., p.238. attacks that became increasingly p.463. 25. E.D. Swinton, Eyewitness (Garden City, costly in men and material. When 2. Wilfrid Miles, Military Operations France N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Company Inc., the bloody offensive finally drew and Belgium 1916: 2nd July 1916 to the 1933), p.108 End of the Battles of the Somme (London: 26. Diary entry dated 11 August 1916, in to a close on 19 November, the BEF Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1938), p.365. Douglas Haig, War Diaries and Letters, had sustained approximately 432,000 3. J.F.C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, 1914- 1914-1918, ed. Gary Sheffield and John Bourne. (London: Weidenfeld & casualties for the gain of only a few 1918 (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1920), p.56. Nicholson, 2005), p.217. kilometres at the deepest penetration 4. Ibid, p.59. 27. Quoted in Miles, p.235. of German lines.112 The Canadians 5. G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary 28. Christy Campbell, Band of Brigands: The First Men in Tanks (London: Harper Press, would not advance much more than Force 1914-1919 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1962), pp.169-170. 2007), p.160. they did on 15 September. They lost 6. War Diary (WD), 27th Battalion Canadian 29. Miles, p.242. 16,800 more men on the Somme in Expeditionary Force (CEF), September 30. Ibid., p.297 31. Ibid., p.295. a series of attacks against German 1916. Appendix E, “Instructions with regard to Operations Orders No. 80,” 32. Major-General A.A. Montgomery, 113 trenches along the Ancre Heights. Page 1. Library and Archives Canada “Instructions for the Employment of The five-month struggle was known (LAC) RG 9, III-D-3, volume 4935, reel ‘Tanks,’” dated 11 September 1916, in Pidgeon, The Tanks at Flers, p.56. to the Germans as a Materialschlacht, T-10738, file 422. 7. One of the earliest and most ardent 33. Clough Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps or “battle of material,” a term which advocates for tank warfare, Lieutenant- (New York: George H. Doran Company, reflects the brutally attritional nature Colonel Ernest Swinton, drafted a number 1919), p.61. of memoranda throughout 1915 and 1916 34. Miles, pp.294-295. of the Great War as it progressed into which offer the closest approximation to 35. WD, 12th Battalion of the East Surrey its fourth year.114 early tank doctrine. In February 1916, Regiment, September 1916. Lieutenant- Ultimately, the debut of tanks at for example, Swinton recommended that Colonel H.J. Walmisley-Dresser, tanks’ primary role should be infantry “Battalion Orders,” Appendix. The Flers-Courcelette demonstrated their support through crushing barbed wire United Kingdom National Archives, War tactical capabilities. They did not live and attacking German strongpoints, Office (TNA WO) 95/2634 image 711. 36. Ibid. up to the high hopes of Swinton and and should be placed under infantry command during the attack. Indeed, he 37. Pidgeon, The Tanks at Flers, pp.45-6. Churchill, not least because their wrote that tanks should be considered 38. WD, 27th Battalion CEF, September 1916, deployment in limited numbers “purely auxiliary to the infantry” during appendix E, “Instructions with regard to Operations Orders No. 80,” P. 1, Library did not afford the same shock as a the initial assault. For more information, see Lieutenant-Colonel E.D. Swinton, and Archives Canada [LAC] RG 9, III-D-3, massed assault. Nevertheless, they “Notes on the Employment of Tanks,” in volume 4935, reel T-10738, file 422. did meet expectations as a tactical Miles, Appendix 18, pp.58-59. 39. Lieutenant-Colonel D.E. Macintyre, “War Diary.” p.207, 13 September 1916, LAC weapon in support of the infantry. 8. Martin Gilbert, The Battle of the Somme (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd, MG 30 E241 volume 1. The infantry were told not to rely 2006), p.15. 40 Agar Adamson, Letters of Agar Adamson, upon tanks, so were not all that 9. Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany 1914 to 1919, edited by N.M. Christie and the Great War, 1914-1918, 2nd ed. (Nepean: CEF Books, 1997), p.219. surprised when they broke down. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 41. Jack O’Brien, Into the Jaws of Death Still, when tanks were able to render 2004), p.67. (Teddington: The Echo Library, 2007), assistance, as with Crème de Menthe, 10. Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, The p.89. Somme (New Haven: Yale University 42. See Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary they often did so in the intended Press, 2005), pp.25-9. Force, Map 6. manner: helping beleaguered infantry 11. Ibid., p.31. 43. Ibid. overcome German strongpoints in 12. Cook, At the Sharp End, p.415. 44. Ibid. 13. Ibid., p.416. 45. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, order to capture an objective. Byng’s 14. Miles, Sketch 37. p.169. Note: Only six tanks were to assessment that they were a “useful 15. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, be deployed into combat, with one in reserve. However, this reserve tank accessory to the infantry but nothing p.167. 16. Prior and Wilson, The Somme, p.218. was not committed to the battle, so for more” aptly captures the tanks’

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all intents and purposes the Canadians 65. WD, 4th CIB, September 1916, discussed in most secondary works on worked with six tanks on 15 September. “Operations of 4th Canadian Infantry Flers-Courcelette. See ibid. and Pidgeon, 46. WD, 27th Battalion CEF, September 1916. Brigade at the Somme, September 10th The Tanks at Flers, pp.169-171. Appendix G, “Operations Order 80,” p.3, to 17th 1916,” p.6, LAC RG 9, III-D-3, 92. WD, 15/Hampshire, September 1916, p.2, LAC RG 9, III-D-3, volume 4935, reel volume 4880, reel T-10677, file 235. TNA WO 95/2634, image 714. T-10738, file 422. 66. Pidgeon, The Tanks at Flers, p.128. 93. Pidgeon, The Tanks at Flers, p.170. 47. Gunner Ernest P. Blake, Letter dated 67. Campbell, Band of Brigands, p.199 94. WD, 15/Hampshire, September 1916, p.2, 28 September 1916, in Letters from the and WD, 4th CIB, September 1916. TNA WO 95/2634, image 714. Front: Being a Record of the Part Played by “Operations of 4th Canadian Infantry 95. Ibid., p.4. Officers of the Bank in the Great War, 1918- Brigade at the Somme, September 10th 96. Miles, 385. 1919, edited by Charles Lyons Foster to 17th 1916,” p.11, LAC RG 9, III-D-3, 97. Byrne, Official History of the Otago and William Smith Duthie (Toronto: volume 4880, reel T-10677, file 235. Regiment, p.116. Canadian Bank of Commerce, 1920), 68. Ibid. 98. WD, 15/Hampshire, September 1916, p.2, p.159. 69. Pidgeon, The Tanks at Flers, p.130. TNA WO 95/2634, image 714. 48. Pidgeon, The Tanks at Flers, p.130. Tank 70. WD, 22nd Bn CEF, September 1916, p.4, LAC 99. Gunner Ernest P. Blake, Letter dated 28 commanders typically gave their tanks RG 9, III-D-3, volume 4931, reel T-10732- September 1916, in Foster and Duthie, names which started with the initial letter 10733, file 413. eds., Letters from the Front, p.158. of the company. Thus, “C” Company 71. Swinton, Eyewitness, p.108. 100. Miles, p.349. tanks were termed “Crème de Menthe,” 72. Campbell, Band of Brigands, p.232. 101. Ibid. “Cordon Rouge” and “Champagne.” 73. Lieutenant-Colonel D.E. Macintyre, “War 102. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, “C” Company evidently consulted their Diary,” p.209, 13 September 1916, LAC p.172. liquor collection when conjuring names MG 30 E241 volume 1. 103. Colonel H. Stewart, The New Zealand for their machines. For more information, 74. WD, 4th CIB, September 1916, Division 1916-1919: A Popular History see Campbell, Band of Brigands, p.169. “Operations of 4th Canadian Infantry Based on Official Records (Auckland: 49. WD, 28th Battalion CEF, September 1916., Brigade at the Somme, September 10th Whitecombe and Tombs Limited, 1921), Operation Report, p.2, LAC RG 9, III-D-3, to 17th 1916,” p.11, LAC RG 9, III-D-3, p.92. volume 4935, reel T-10739-10740, file 425. Volume 4880, reel T-10677, file 235. 104. Gilbert, The Battle of the Somme, p.190. 50. Ibid., p.5; WD, 6th Canadian Infantry 75. Roy, ed., Journal of Private Fraser, p.208. 105. Douglas Haig, Sir Douglas Haig’s Brigade (CIB), September 1916, p.11, LAC 76. WD, 4th CIB, September 1916. Dispatches, edited by Lieutenant-Colonel RG 9, III-D-3, volume 4888, reel T-10684- “Operations of 4th Canadian Infantry J.H. Boraston (London: J.M. Dent & Sons 10685, files 261-262. Brigade at the Somme, September 10th Ltd., 1920), p.42. 51. Reginald H. Roy,ed., The Journal of Private to 17th 1916,” p.12, LAC RG 9, III-D-3, 106. Sir Albert Stern, Tanks 1914-1918: The Fraser (Victoria: Sono Nis Press, 1985), volume 4880, reel T-10677, file 235. Logbook of a Pioneer (London: Hodder and p.200. 77. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, Stoughton, 1919), p.96. 52. Campbell, Band of Brigands, p.199. p.170. 107. Diary Entry Dated 17 September 1916, in 53. Pidgeon, The Tanks at Flers, pp.133, 210. 78. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, 1914-1918, Entry dated 11 August 1916, in Haig, War 54. Roy, ed., The Journal of Private Fraser, p.55. Diaries and Letters, 1914-1918, p.231. pp.207-208. 79. Miles, Sketch 37. 108. Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: 1911- 55. Private Joseph Thompson Letter in Foster 80. Major-General A. A. Montgomery, 1918 (New York: Free Press, 2005), p.315. and Duthie, eds., Letters from the Front, “Fourth Army Instructions,” dated 11 109. Swinton, Eyewitness, p.251. p.187. September 1916, in Military Operations 110. Ibid., p.241. 56. Major Horace C. Singer, History of the 31st France and Belgium 1916: 2nd July 1916 111. Ibid., p.246. Canadian Infantry Battalion C.E.F. Darrell to the End of the Battles of the Somme, 112. Prior and Wilson, The Somme, p.301. Knight, ed. (Calgary: Detselig Enterprises Appendix 20, p.66. 113. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, Ltd., 2006), p.167. 81. Ibid., p.67. p.198. 57. WD, 6th CIB, September 1916, p.11, LAC 82. Miles, Sketch 36. 114. Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great RG 9, III-D-3, volume 4888, reel T-10684- 83. Campbell, Band of Brigands, p.188 and War, 2nd ed., p.70. 10685, files 261-262. Miles, p.325 58. Ibid. 84. Lieutenant-Colonel W.S. Austin, Official 59. Pidgeon, The Tanks at Flers, p.133. History of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade 60. WD, 4th CIB, September 1916, (Wellington: L.T. Watkins Ltd., 1924), “Operations of 4th Canadian Infantry p.127. Brigade at the Somme, September 10th 85. Ibid., p.129. Andrew McEwen received his Bachelor of to 17th 1916,” p.2, LAC RG 9, III-D-3, 86. Miles, Sketch 37. Arts (Honours) from Queen’s University volume 4880, reel T-10677, file 235. 87. Campbell, Band of Brigands, p.188. in 2009. Following a Cleghorn Battlefield 61. WD, 21st Battalion CEF, 88. Austin, Official History of the New Zealand Study Tour that same summer, he began September 1916, p.7, LAC RG Rifle Brigade, p.119. his Master’s studies at the University of 9, III-D-3, volume 4930, reel T-10731, file 89. Lieutenant A.E. Byrne, Official History of Waterloo under Dr. Geoff Hayes. This 410. the Otago Regiment, N.Z.E.F. in the Great paper forms the first chapter of his major 62. Ibid., p.8. War 1914-1918 (Dunedin: J. Wilkie & Co. research paper, which examined tanks 63. Ibid., p.11. Ltd), p.116. in action in 1916 and 1917. In September 64. WD, 21st Battalion CEF, September 90. WD, 15th Battalion of the Hampshire 2010 he began his PhD at the University 1916, “Documents belonging to Regiment (15/Hampshire), September of Calgary under Dr. Patrick Brennan. the late Lieut-Colonel Elmer Jones, 1916, p.2, TNA WO 95/2634, image 714. He wishes to thank Dr. Geoff Hayes and O.C. 21st Battalion,” p.7, LAC RG 91. Campbell, Band of Brigands, 192. Hastie’s Professor Terry Copp for their advice 9, III-D-3, volume 4930, reel T-10731, file action received considerable press and support in the original drafting of 410. coverage at the time and is extensively this paper.

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