North, Iran-Contra, and the Doomsday Project: the Original

North, Iran-Contra, and the Doomsday Project: The Original Congressional Cover Up of Continuity-of-Government Planning 北、イラン・コントラ、終末プロジェクト−−「政府の存続」計画にかんしての連邦議会による本来の隠蔽

Peter Dale Scott

North, Iran-Contra, and the Doomsday Project: The Original Congressional Cover Up of Continuity-of-Government Planning

Peter Dale Scott

If ever the constitutional democracy of the United States is overthrown, we now have a better idea of how this is likely to be done. That may be the most important contribution of the recent Iran-contra congressional hearings. -- Theodore Draper, “The Rise of the American Junta,” New York Review of Books, October 8, 1987.

In 1989 I published the following article, “Northwards without North: Bush, Counterterrorism, and the Continuation of Secret Power.” It is of interest today because of its description of how the Congressional Iran-Contra Committees, in their investigation of Iran-Contra, assembled documentation on what we now know as Continuity of Government (COG) planning, only to suppress or misrepresent this important information in their Report. I was concerned about the Oliver North at Iran-Contra Hearings committees’ decision to sidestep the larger issues of secret powers and secret wars, little knowing that these secret COG powers, or Recently I have written about the extraordinary “Doomsday Project,” would in fact be secretly power of the COG network Doomsday planners, implemented on September 11, 2011. (One of or what CNN in 1991 described as a “shadow the two Committee Chairs was Lee Hamilton, government…about which you know later co-chair of the similarly evasive 9/11 nothing.”1 Returning to my 1989 essay, I see Commission Report). the essential but complex overlap between this

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Doomsday Committee and the Iran-Contra Not all of these excesses can be alleged of the secret “junta” or cabal described by Theodore surviving COG Committee after Iran-Contra. Draper and Senator Paul Sarbanes within the But one is extremely relevant to what happened Reagan-Bush administration. on 9/11: the plans for massive warrantless detention. Also relevant is the protection of The original article provides detaileddrug traffickers who were both active terrorists information that draws attention to what we and CIA assets. have since come to know as COG planning or the Doomsday project, and documents the use of “terrorism” as a pretext to justify it and other abuses of constitutional government.

Specifically, the article demonstrates how North and George H.W. Bush (a far more central figure) used the rubric of “counterterrorism” to

a) fight an undeclared proxy war against Nicaragua in defiance of congressional opposition

b) plan for massive warrantless detention Presidential Emergency Facilities. Map by c) create a special network for David S. Rotenstein developing policies at odds with official White House policies (notably the sale of arms to Iran) The article quotes from two relevant parts of Oliver North’s testimony to the Select d) use publicly generated funds to Committees. In the first, North explains why he defeat opponents of the Contra (and other forces in government) were so proxy war in Congress obsessed with on-going plans to detain large numbers of anti-war protesters: “In Vietnam ... e) use publicly generated funds to we won all the battles and then lost the war .... propagandize the American people I would also point out that we didn't lose the war in Vietnam. We lost the war right here in f) use publicly generated funds to this city.” My article points out that North was interfere with a witness to real not alone in this obsession: Contra terrorism

g) falsely claim that the witness North was speaking for a large himself was a terrorist consensus among both policymakers and Cold War h) cover up contra drug trafficking academics who believe that "the and thwart Senator Kerry’s most pressing problem is not in the investigation of this. Third World but here at home in

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the struggle for the minds of plan allegedly envisaged the people.”2 His complaint also round-up and internment of large echoed that of the French colonels numbers of both domestic who believed (in the words of a dissidents (some 26,000) and sympathetic American observer) aliens (perhaps as many as that "France was not defeated in 300,000-400,000) in camps such as Algeria; de Gaulle chose to the one in Oakdale, Louisiana. … retreat."3 This belief in France led the [resentful] colonels, almost all In the televised Iran-Contra of whom were veterans of political Hearings, North was asked by warfare in the colonies, to direct Congressman Brooks to discuss the government funds into "parallel alleged contingency plan to hierarchies" for the manipulation suspend the American constitution. of political opinion in the home Senator Inouye, the committee country. That practice was chairman, twice intervened, ruling uncomfortably close to the use of that the question was "highly government funds by North, Carl sensitive and classified," and Channell, and Richard Miller via should only be discussed in the Channell-Miller network (and executive session. The next day with the support of rightwing North told Senator Boren, a much contributors and North's Office to more pliant questioner, that to his Combat Terrorism), in their knowledge the United States had attempt to elect a Congress more no such plan "in being," and that willing to vote for contra aid.4 he had not participated in [creating such a plan].6

(In the decade and a half since Iran-Contra, the use of government funds to targetWe now know that North’s carefully phrased congressional opponents has been replaced by answer to Senator Boren’s carefully phrased another practice: the outsourcing ofquestion was deliberately misleading. COG government contracts to Private Military planning continued without interruption, until Companies and Private Intelligence Companies it was finally implemented on 9/11. who then channel some of the funds to elect pro-war congressional supporters and defeat Drawing in part on the extensive their critics.)5 supplementary exhibits to the superficial Iran- Contra Report, my article was able to point to The second excerpt from the North Hearings the mechanism whereby so-called concerned North’s role in COG planning: counterterrorism planning could be used to mask a number of unrelated activities, some of them clearly illegal: On July 5, 1987, the Miami Herald reported that North "helped draw up a controversial plan to suspend By creating a counterterrorism the Constitution in the event of network with its own secure national crisis such as nuclear war, system of intelligence violent and widespread internal communications, channels were dissent, or national opposition to a created from which bureaucrats U.S. military invasion abroad." The with opposing viewpoints could

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simply be excluded. The My article correctly stressed the centrality of counterterrorism network even Vice President George H.W. Bush to the group. had its own "special worldwide I was unaware in 1989 that Bush was also antiterrorist computer network, directing the on-going Doomsday COG planning codenamed Flashboard," by which project, which continued to meet under three members could communicate presidents over two decades.9 Nor did I know exclusively with each other and then that Charles Allen, one of the chief figures with their collaborators abroad [to in the Iran arms sales scandal, was serving the exclusion of their nominal under Bush as the deputy director of the superiors]. Those involved in the Doomsday project (where a colleague quoted Iran arms deals appear to have him as saying during a COG meeting, "our job used "flash" messages on this is to throw the Constitution out the secure system as late as October window").10 An advocate as early as 1998 of re- 7 31, 1986. invading Iraq, Allen would rise under President George W. Bush to become Under Secretary for Perhaps the most serious limitation to my essay the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at the was my misassessment of the secret Iran- Department of Homeland Security. Contra cabal as consisting “largely of … middle-level operatives:”

The true cabal appears to have consisted largely of those middle- level operatives brought together by their responsibility for counterterrorism, a group including not only North and Poindexter but also Duane Clarridge and the quintet who moved from developing and reviewing the "counterterrorist" policies with North at the Bush Task Force Senior Review Group to executing them with North through the Operations Sub-Group. (The five were Charles Allen of the CIA, Robert Oakley of the State Department, Noel Koch of the Defense Department, Lt. Gen. John Moellering from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Oliver Revell of the FBI.) Some of these men survived in the Reagan administration unscathed, despite having responsibilities for G.H.W. Bush 1989 the Iran-contra affair that would seem at least comparable to North's.8 Combining what we knew then about the COG

4 9 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF planning apparatus with what we know now, I In June 1986 a new "Alien Border would suggest that we need to discern two Control Committee" was different levels of planning (or, if you will, of established, "to implement specific cabal activity): recommendations made by the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism regarding the control 1) those at the top, including both and removal of terrorist aliens in Vice President Bush and also the U.S.” One of its working figures working outside groups was charged with government, such as Rumsfeld, conducting "a review of Cheney, and James Woolsey (future contingency plans for removal of CIA DCI during the Clinton selected aliens." These 1986 administration); contingency plans "relating to alien terrorists," which were leaked to 2) those embedded in the the press, "anticipated that the INS bureaucracy and charged with may be tasked with ... fleshing out COG plans and other apprehending, and removing from extraordinary secret operations, the U.S., a sizeable group of such as the Iran arms sales. aliens," and again called for According to the New York Times, housing "up to 5,000 aliens in “ the project involved hundreds of temporary (tents) quarters" at a people, including White House camp in Oakdale, Louisiana. As the officials, Army generals, C.I.A. designated coordinator of officers and private companies run counterterrorism in the National by retired military and intelligence Security Council, North would personnel.”11 certainly have known of these contingency plans, which appear to 15 Both levels availed themselves of their own be still with us. special communications networks, Project 908 and FLASHBOARD, to avoid accountability to We know now that these contingency plans the regular administrative were formally implemented in September 2001 hierarchy.12 Communications personnel for the as the new Department of Homeland Security’s first secret network were attached to the rarely security plan Endgame, a ten-year plan to build mentioned White House Communications detention centers, with annual budget Agency (WHCA), an agency whose relevance to allocations in the hundreds of millions of the JFK assassination and 9/11 I have outlined dollars.16 elsewhere.13 Meanwhile Bush presided over a maze-like series of overlapping restricted groups and agencies with changing names, among which were the National Program Office and the Defense Mobilization Planning Systems Agency, responsible for the various Doomsday initiatives.14

In 1989, citing leaked secret memos, I gave this example of secret planning at the second level:

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The Doomsday Project, Deep Events, and the Shrinking of American Democracy (link)

Is the State of Emergency Superseding the US Constitution? Continuity of Government Planning, War and American Societylink ( )

'Continuity of Government' Planning: War, Terror and the Supplanting of the U.S. Constitution (link)

Recommended citation: Peter Dale Scott, North, Iran-Contra, and the Doomsday Project: The Original Congressional Cover Up of Continuity-of-Government Planning, The Asia- Pacific Journal Vol 9, Issue 8 No 1, February 21, 2011.

The text of the original 1989 article, “Northwards without North: Bush, Counterterrorism, and the Continuation of Secret Power,” .

Notes

1 CNN, November 17, 1991, quoted in Shirley In short, the detailed information in this 1989 Anne Warshaw, The Co-presidency of Bush and article, though of less interest today with Cheney [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Politics and respect to the specifics of illicit arms sales, Policy, 2009], 162. casts important additional insight on the elaborate COG planning (or Doomsday Project) 2 George Tanham, counterinsurgency expert, at which, under the decade-long emergency a conference on Low Intensity Conflict; proclaimed in September 2011, has so radically published in Special Operations in US Strategy restructured American law and society. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1984), 293. Tanham continued: “We have to have a firm base here in this country that believes in…what the government is doing. Peter Dale Scott, a former Canadian diplomat But the media are not very helpful….Somehow, and English Professor at the University of we have got to get over the antagonism that California, Berkeley, is the author of Drugs Oil developed during Vietnam [and] achieve a more and War, The Road to 9/11, The War balanced presentation of the news.” Conspiracy: JFK, 9/11, and the Deep Politics of War. His most recent book isAmerican War 3 Angelo Codevilla Modern France (LaSalle, Ill.: Machine: Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug Open Court, 1974), 219. Cf. 213: Connection and the Road to Afghanistan.

Other titles by Peter Dale Scott on related By the end of 1957, the battle of themes include: Algiers had been very decisively

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won. All leading revolutionaries 7 Earl Exhibit #3-8, May 30, 1987 (Bates No. N were either dead, in jail, or abroad. 1823), Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix B, 9, 1144. However, although the governments of the Fourth 8 My essay also describes the importance in the Republic had given General Raoul cabal of CIA officer Duane Clarridge and the Salan full civil and military powers, outsider Michael Ledeen, long of the American they had not ceased to criticize the Enterprise Institute and presently of the conduct of operations, notably the Foundation for Defense of Democracies . Both use of torture in interrogations men went on to become early advocates of U.S. during the battle of Algiers. More war in Iraq, and have been accused of helping significantly, the constant talk of a to foist the forged “Yellowcake” documents that search for a negotiated solution falsely implied Saddam Hussein was secretly angered many in France and acquiring weapons of mass destruction (link). nearly all Europeans in Algeria. Today Clarridge operates his own private Most important, the recurring network of covert operatives, the Eclipse government crises lent an Group, in Afghanistan (New York Times, atmosphere of indecision quite January 22, 2011). Both men are unapologetic inconsistent with the firm policy advocates of U.S. interventions. Clarridge has being pursued on the said, “We’ll intervene whenever we decide it’s scene. Angelo Codevilla, a veteran in our national security interests to intervene.” of the Reagan Intelligence Ledeen’s admiring colleague Jonah Goldberg Transition Team in 1980, in 2010 recalled a Ledeen speech in the early 1990s as authored a tract urging the Tea saying, in effect, "Every ten years or so, the Party movement to ally itself with United States needs to pick up some small the interests of corporations and crappy little country and throw it against the Rupert Murdoch media figures to wall, just to show the world we mean business" overwhelm the intellectual elites of (National Review, April 23, 2002). the universities. 9 In his memoir, Under Fire (New York: Harper

4 Collins, 1991), North describes “my first major Iran-Contra Report, 98-99; cf, Kornbluh. assignment at the NSC'' as involving the (1987: 205-210); Cockburn (1987: 243-245); Doomsday contingency plans, adding that this Earl Deposition, May 15, 1987, 131, 119 (right- wing contributors). Outsourced contractors on was “where I came to know George Bush.” In the megabucks Bush-North Doomsday Project contrast, as the ensuing essay notes, Bush in also kicked back funds to elect sympathetic his campaign autobiography, Looking Forward, legislators. See e.g. Tim Shorrock,Spies for admitted knowing of the secret trip by North Hire: the secret world of intelligenceand McFarlane to Tehran, but claimed not to outsourcing (New York: Simon & Schuster, have known of North's "other secret 2008), 292-96. operations" before November 1986 (George Bush with Victor Gold, Looking Forward: An 5 Peter Dale Scott, American War Machine Autobiography (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 1987), 242-43). My essay challenges Bush’s 175-92. claim.

6 Oliver North,Taking the Stand: The 10 New York Times, April 18, 1994 [“deputy Testimony of Lt. Col. Oliver North (New York: director”]: Mark Perry, Eclipse: The Last Days Pocket Books, 1987), 643; 732-733. of the CIA (New York: Morrow, 1992), 215

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[“out the window”]. Director of Centralimplementation on 9/11 of COG in The Road to Intelligence William Webster formally9/11, 228-29; cf. Peter Dale Scott,The War reprimanded Allen for failing to fully comply Conspiracy (2008), 31n102. with the DCI's request for full cooperation in 14 the agency's internal Iran-Contra scandal Shorrock, Spies for Hire, 78-79. The Bush- investigation. After failing to have theNorth “Crisis Pre-Planning Committee,” reprimand lifted through the regular appeal referred to in the ensuing essay, would appear process, Allen retained future DCI James to have had Doomsday responsibilities as well. Woolsey [a member of the COG planning 15 Memos of September 15, 1986, and October committee] as an attorney and was successful 1, 1986 from Immigration and Naturalization in applying pressure to have the reprimand Service Assistant Commissioner Robert J. lifted (Perry, Eclipse, 216). Meanwhile, Clair Walsh, quoted in Mideast Monitor 4,4 (1987: George, the CIA officer whom Allen and his 2). The ABCC was formally established on June allies needed to circumvent in order to arrange 27, 1986, by former Deputy Attorney General the arms sales, was convicted in 1992 of felony D. Lowell Jensen. charges of perjury for lying to Congress, which might have sent him to prison for ten years 16 Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11 (Berkeley: (George was pardoned by President George University of California Press, 2007), 240. H.W. Bush before sentencing occurred). Thus eventually the supervisor of the Iran arms sales was promoted; the man who was seen as an obstacle to it was convicted.

11 Tim Weiner, New York Times, April 18, 1994: Northwards without North: Bush, “In the Reagan Administration, the project was Counterterrorism, and the supervised by Vice President George Bush. A Continuation of Secret Power senior C.I.A. officer, Charles Allen, was deputy director. In the Reagan and Bush Administrations, the project involved hundreds Media concern with the Iran-contra affair of people, including White House officials, vanished suddenly in the spring of 1988, as Army generals, C.I.A. officers and private soon as it became clear that Vice President companies run by retired military andGeorge Bush, one of the dramatis personae, intelligence personnel.” would become his party's presidential candidate.1 On the surface of it, the Iran-contra 12 Shirley Anne Warshaw, The Co-presidency of controversy might indeed seem to have Bush and Cheney (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford subsided. U.S. arms sales to Iran appear to Politics and Policy, 2009), 162; Shorrock, Spies have ceased. Overt military aid to the contras for Hire, 77-80, 292-96 (Project 908);now appears a remote possibility, although we Newsweek, October 21, 1985, 26should not forget that its successor, (FLASHBOARD). "humanitarian assistance," was exactly what Oliver North called the arms he was supplying 13 David S. Rotenstein, “The Undisclosed to the contras via the Richard Secord Location Disclosed: Continuity of Government Enterprise in 1985-1986.2 Above all, President Sites as Recent Past Resources,”Bush -- as if sensitive to revelations about his Historian4Hire.net, July 15, 2010,link . I once solid support for the Iran arms sales -- has discuss the important role of the secretive selected a more pragmatic inner council for his WHCA in both the JFK assassination and the administration, from which his former staff on

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Iran-contra matters (Craig Fuller and Donald who had denounced to the FBI illegal gun- Gregg) have been surprisingly excluded. running and drug-trafficking by the contra support network. The committees, dominated And yet there is a disturbing institutional by a solid bipartisan majority who favored legacy from the Iran-contra era of flagrant contra support, refused to allow questions to a abuses of covert power. This is the secret North-Secord employee on this subject, and counterterrorism apparatus that in 1985-1986 even suppressed a crucial document that was assembled, under the auspices of then Vice strongly indicated illegal interference with a President Bush, and which became the vehicle federal witness. Like the mainstream press, the for Oliver North's extraordinary influence committees focused narrowly on the within the government. With the worldwide responsibilities of those already departed from decline in the number of private terrorist the Reagan White House: North, Poindexter, incidents, there is even more reason to review McFarlane), and played down the role of the counterterrorism apparatus mounted by the North's counterterrorism associates who are Reagan administration against them, in which still in office. the key coordinator in the National Security Council (NSC) was Colonel Oliver North. The This article will attempt to do what the 1987 congressional investigation of Colonel committees failed to do: to look at the abuses, North's activities revealed in passing how not of departed individuals, but of secret North and his counterterrorism associates in counterterrorism institutions which are still in other agencies abused the secret institutions of existence. Until these abuses are publicly this counter-terrorism apparatus to bypass understood, there is the risk that they will responsible Cabinet members and further the continue, and that the nation will continue to controversial Iran arms sales. drift.

Not all of these abuses ended with the Iran- The Iran-Contra Report, Bush, and contra disclosures and the departure of Oliver Domestic Repression North. In particular, the abuse of counterterrorism powers in embarrassing Since the publication of theReport of the domestic critics of the administration's policies Congressional Committees Investigating the continued, and is all the more alarming Iran-Contra Affair (hereafter Report), there because of the Iran-Contra Select Committees' have been signs of a movement away from an pointed refusal to pursue evidence of it. The incipient constitutional crisis towards a more harassment of domestic critics as “terrorists" is bipartisan foreign policy, particularly in East- a story closely related to the story of Iran- West relations. But there is no reason to contra. The two stories involve the same celebrate these changes as signaling an end to institutions, above all North's Office to Combat this country's recent experience of government Terrorism and the related interagencyby secret networks, with their erosion of Operations Sub-Group, both of which were constitutional checks and balances. On the instituted in 1986 as a result of Vice President contrary, the North-Secord Enterprise's George Bush's Task Force on Combating dealings with convicted drug-traffickers, and its Terrorism. use of dirty tricks against domestic critics of the contra support policy (using procedures The Iran-Contra Select Committees came upon established to fight terrorists) have been flagrant evidence that North had used the systematically understated or ignored by powers coordinated by the Operations Sub- Congress. As a result, the rest of the Group to harass a domestic critic, Jack Terrell, counterterrorism network, who with North ran

9 9 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF the Iran and Contra operations, have mostly institutionalized North's role as coordinator of gone unpunished. the administration's counterterrorist program, and supplied him with a secret office and staff Given the eagerness of Congress to infringe (the Office to Combat Terrorism) that was civil liberties in its anti-drug legislation, the unknown to some other members of the failure of the congressional Iran-contra Report National Security Council.5 Though they seem to denounce either the North-Secord use of to have worked chiefly on the Iran arms deals drug-traffickers or their harassment of and contra supply operation, North and his two domestic whistle-blowers was particularly staffers Robert Earl and Craig Coy (both of alarming. By their active suppression of whom came from the Staff Working Group of documents dealing with drug-trafficking and Bush's Task operated at the heart of a whole domestic harassment, the committees made complex of controversial secret operations in themselves complicit with the administration's defense of the status quo in these areas. 1986. Earl himself testified that he spent between one-quarter and one-half of his time Thus, however benignly we construe their on Iran matters; his colleague Coy "knew intentions, the House and Senate committees everything ... about Democracy Incorporated" may have created a new crisis of credibility in (the contra support operation).6 Earl and Coy the place of an old one, a crisis for Congress as also the minutes of another important creation well as for the administration. That a solid of the Task Force and NSDD 207: the majority within the two committees was in interagency Operations Sub-Group (OSG). support of contra aid (16 out of 27 had voted for it) may explain their failure to weaken the Bush and the Administration's secret powers which North and the FBI were Determination to Continue North's Non- using against critics of the contra support Iran Operations policy. This explains why the president, when he The contents of the Report suggest that it was admitted in March 1987 that the arms sales to written to appease the moderate faction of the Iran were a mistake, asked Bush to reconvene Republican Party, and specifically the three his Task Force "to review our policy for East Coast Republicans (Senators Rudman, combating terrorism and to evaluate the Cohen, and Trible) who joined with theeffectiveness of our current program.”7 Having majority. Others have remarked that the Report been asked, in effect, to evaluate his own touched very lightly on Vice President Bush's creation, Bush's public response in June 1987 involvement in the Iran-contra affair.3 It is was predictable: "our current policy as important to note also that the Report barely articulated in the Task Force report is sound, mentions the central role in the Iran-contra effective, and fully in accord with our affair of two counterterrorism groups for whose democratic principles and national ideals of creation the vice president was responsible: freedom.”8 I am told that secretly the Task North's own Office to Combat Terrorism, and the concomitant interagency Operations Sub- Force ended the extraordinary procedure Group.4 whereby counterterrorism officers from various departments could initiate actions in the OSG Bush in the second half of 1985 was head of the without consulting their superiors in the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Cabinet. Such a change would indeed address Terrorism. On January 20,1986, following the the bureaucratic concerns of North's superiors, report of that Task Force, National Security but not the civil liberties concerns of the Decision Directive (NSDD) No. 207general public.

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Bush's public finding was truly ominous. The Senior Review Group of the Task Force itself. depositions given to the Select Committees by That they should have been reconvened to Earl and Coy revealed that the Office to evaluate what changes were needed was a sure Combat Terrorism had rapidly become the sign, if one were needed, that the Republicans means whereby North could coordinate not were determined to resist any pressures for only the Iran arms sales and the contra supply significant change.11 operation, but also the domestic propaganda activities of Carl "Spitz" Channell and Richard The Counterterrorism Cabal and Its Miller, the closing off of potentiallySurvival embarrassing investigations by other government agencies (that “might ruin a What we have seen in recent years, according greater equity of national security"), and the to Theodore Draper and Senator Paul handling for the White House of right-wing Sarbanes, is government by a secret "junta" 12 contributors to illegal contra arms purchases.9 within the administration. Inasmuch as the NSDD 207 and the subsequent Finding of April primary meaning of "junta" is a group joined for 1986 had also authorized the kidnapping of the public exercise of power, that term may international terrorists, one of the morestrike some as unduly alarmist, or at least controversial covert operations powers enacted premature. But a group operating secretly, and by the Reagan administration.10 And the at cross purposes with other officials in the Operations •Group, another creation of NSDD same administration, there certainly was. I 207, had been used to harass a whistle-blower, shall refer to this group not as a "junta," but Jack Terrell, who had threatened the survival of rather as a cabal. the North-Secord “Enterprise" by telling the At what level did this cabal operate? It was FBI about contra supply illegalities, such as gun-running and drug-trafficking. apparently not at the level of Reagan and those in the Oval Office, who had little sense of what Thus the Bush people in the Reaganwas going on. Nor was it restricted to North administration, having first used North and and Poindexter, who were the expendable then acquiesced in his departure, would appear executors of the cabal's strategy. The true to have approved the continuation of most of cabal appears to have consisted largely of those his secret political activities in the name of middle-level operatives brought together by combating terrorism; they denounced only "the their responsibility for counterterrorism, a mistakes involved in our contacts with Iran." group including not only North and Poindexter (These "caused a temporary reduction in but also Duane Clarridge and the quintet who credibility which has been regained as our moved from developing and reviewing the resolve has become apparent.") In concluding "counterterrorist" policies with North at the his 1987 review, Bush not only endorsed the Bush Task Force Senior Review Group to achievements of the apparatus which North put executing them with North through the together, but also declared that we must "do Operations Sub-Group. (The five were Charles better." Allen of the CIA, Robert Oakley of the State Department, Noel Koch of the Defense It is not surprising that the Vice President's Department, Lt. Gen. John Moellering from the Task Force should so exonerate theJoint Chiefs of Staff, and Oliver Revell of the extraordinary abuses of power committed by FBI.) Some of these men survived in the the counterterrorism apparatus which it set up. Reagan administration unscathed, despite To an extraordinary extent, the men at the having responsibilities for the Iran-contra affair center of that apparatus were drawn from the that would seem at least comparable to

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North's.13 members could communicate exclusively with each other and with their collaborators Robert Oakley, for example, was in 1985-1986 abroad.15 Those involved in the Iran arms deals the State Department expert onappear to have used "flash" messages on this counterterrorism. In this capacity he served secure system as late as October 31, 1986.16 first on the Bush Task Force Senior Review Group, and then co-chaired the Operations Sub- Though the group operated as a cabal, I believe Group (OSG) with North until about July 1986. it would be wrong to see it as a conspiracy. He then resigned from the administration, Rather, the cabal was created as an allegedly because (as a Shultz loyalist) he arrangement which suited all parts of the disagreed with North's Iran arms sales policy. administration, including those who preferred One of National Security Advisor Frankto have no responsibility for a policy (selling Carlucci's early acts of post-Iran-contraarms to Iran) which they could not bring housecleaning in 1987 was to bring Robert themselves to support. This consensual Oakley back from private life to the National sidestepping of responsibility (or what we Security Council. might call "guiltlessness by dissociation") was not even limited to the administration. By their By establishing a special apparatus to combat inattention to North's end-run around the terrorism, the Reagan administration, and the Boland Amendment, congressional leaders had Bush Task Force in particular, created an also communicated the message that they did ongoing network able to bypass normalnot really care very much about North's covert channels and proceed with an Iran arms sales law-breaking, as long as they themselves did policy that was opposed by both Secretary of not have to be called to account for it. As State Shultz and Secretary of DefenseSenator Kennedy noted, it was clear by the end Weinberger, as well as by the area desk officers of 1984 "that President Reagan has decided to in their respective departments and in the CIA. keep his secret war in Nicaragua going no It is noteworthy that the Iran arms deals with matter what Congress says or does.”17 Yet Manucher Ghorbanifar, although they had been Congress, far from reaffirming its budgetary proposed as early as November 1984, were and war-making powers, merely found face- blocked until the Bush Task Force onsaving ways to adjust to this state of affairs. Combating Terrorism began to operate in July 1985. Thereafter the arms deals were handled To recognize that the cabal was tolerated as a by a number of bureaucrats whose common form of in-house deniability (a “divorce of denominator, and whose means ofconvenience") is not to diminish the importance communicating directly with each other, was of the counterterrorist network's law-breaking, their responsibility for counterterrorism, still less of the Task Force that helped to (These men were Michael Ledeen, Charles institutionalize it. A brief review of the end- Allen, Duane Clarridge, Robert Oakley, plus runs resorted to by the counterterrorist Oliver North for the United States; and Amiram network will remind us that the responsibility Nir for Israel.) By creating a counterterrorism for violating law and procedure cannot be network with its own secure system ofrestricted, as the Select Committees' Report intelligence communications, channels were would have us believe, to those who have left created from which bureaucrats with opposing the government.18 On the contrary, we need to 14 viewpoints could simply be excluded. The recognize that abuses occurred which are still counterterrorism network even had its own in need of correction. "special worldwide antiterrorist computer network, codenamed Flashboard," by which The Counterterrorism Network and Iran in

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1985 be this won't work, but the White House was already working it..... The workings of this counterterrorist network I'm running around saying, hey, were particularly dramatic at the time of the here is my burn notice, this guy is two Findings (in December 1985 and January a loser, and, Christ, he is working 1986) that brought the United States into the with the Government of Israel, he prohibited business of arms sales to Iran. Clair has already arranged ... the George, the CIA Director of Operations and the November flight or was an man who sent out a “burn notice" prohibiting intermediary and I'm running CIA dealings with Ghorbanifar, testified how around saying we don't want to CIA Director William Casey (the one senior work with him when two major bureaucrat who favored the initiative) bypassed countries, the Government of him by having Charles Allen, the National Israel, a close ally and ourselves Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism, deal are still working with him.20 with Ledeen and Ghorbanifar on "terrorist" matters.19 The committees' Report accurately depicted Casey and North also by-passed George by the consequences of this maneuver: tasking Allen directly for secret intelligence on Ghorbanifar and his Iranian contact in September 1985, and restricting this Denied access to the intelligence, intelligence to four men (Casey, North, the State Department was not told McFarlane, and Vice Admiral Moreau) who of the Israeli TOW shipment, was favored the arms sales, thus excluding Shultz, not advised of the linkage of Weir's Weinberger, and members of the Operations release to arms shipments, and Directorate. was not informed of the President’s decision or the U.S. Government's involvement (R 169). Mr. Kerr [Committee Counsel]. Can you give me an understanding, if you have one, of why it was that It did not, however, explain that this end-run Colonel North in September of was achieved by going through 1985 looked to NlO Allen for this counterterrorism channels, or that type of assistance as opposed to Ghorbanifar's case officer at this time was going through the Agency to its North' s counterterrorism consultant, Michael 21 Operations Directorate and asking Ledeen. you to do that? At the time of the November HAWK shipment, Mr. George. He didn't want us to what the committees'Report called know about it. McFarlane's "NSC subordinates" once again "took steps to keep the Department of State Mr. Kerr. Do you have any hierarchy in the dark about the complex understanding today as to why he diplomatic problems caused by the operation" didn't want you to know about it? (R 178). Once again (though the Report did not say this) counterterrorism channels were used Mr. George. I think they were to avoid normal channels. going to run an operation on their own..... Our reaction was going to Robert Oakley, the State Department's Director

13 9 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF of the Office of Counterterrorism and If Charge feels compelled to report Emergency Planning, authorized North, the any aspects to [nine characters NSC counterterrorism expert, to have the U.S. deleted: possibly "Secretary"] Embassy in Lisbon assist in obtaining request that he send his messages clearances for planes carrying the HAWKs from through [deleted] channels and we Israel to Iran (R 181). At the same time, will ensure that they get to Char1es Allen, the CIA's NIO for Ambassador Oakley [State's Counterterrorism, approached Duane Counterterrorism Chief].25 Clarridge, who would later head up the CIA's Counterterrorism Task Force.22 Allen showed Clarridge, at North's request, the specially Later, in December, North and an Israeli restricted intelligence on the Ledeen-official met with Assistant Secretary of Defense Ghorbanifar initiative. Clarridge then sent a Richard Armitage, whose deputy Noel Koch cable (which soon disappeared) arranging for was a member (with Oakley and Allen) of the the CIA Chief in Lisbon to work with Richard Senior Review Group of the Vice-President's Secord, whom North had already sent there to Task Force on Combating Terrorism. Armitage work on the problem.23 told North “that Secretary Weinberger would be 'appalled' if he knew North was dealing with The intrigues of North, Secord, Clarridge, and Iranians"; nevertheless, he authorized his Oakley at this point showed a concern for subordinates to prepare a plan to replenish the politics rather than security. The CIA Station missile stocks drawn down by Israel in the Chief in Lisbon cabled to Clarridge that "Copp" arms sales, and he “kept the sole copy [of the (Secord) would phone Washington (North) and plan] in his office safe" (R 194). ask them to give special authorization to the Mission's chargé d'affaires: The chief subordinate so authorized was apparently Armitage's deputy, Noel Koch, who met with North, Secord, and Charles Allen at a This was necessary ... because the February 1986 meeting on the delivery of TOW moment we start[ed] putting overt missiles to Iran, and was later one of three pressure on P[rime] M[inister's] office and F[oreign] M[inister] we people from Defense listed by North on his opened the very real possibility short list of "People who know." (The other two that the demarche would get back were Secretary Weinberger and Colin Powell, to the [U.S.] Ambassador [Frank who later became Reagan's National Security 26 Shakespeare, and thus eventually Advisor.) By this time Koch (and his military to George Shultz], creatinga counterpart Lt. Gen. Moellering) had moved delicate political problem.24 along with Oakley and Allen from the Task Force Senior Review Group to the Operations Sub-Group. Duane Clarridge joined them there According to the committees’Report , in February 1986. Clarridge’s response was to “insure that if the [chargé d’affaires] felt compelled toThe Counterterrorism Network and Iran in communicate with the State Department, he 1986 should use only the CIA Channel” (R 181). Clarridge’s actual cable shows that theThe counterterrorism end-run was used again intention was once again to keep matters in January 1986. After Ghorbanifar failed his within the counterterrorism network: polygraph test, Clair George

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disseminated a notice saying the The paragraph quoted above was the closest CIA would do no more business the Report came to identifying the with Ghorbanifar. Ghorbanifar's counterterrorism network in the administration polygraph failure, however, did as the back channel which allowed a policy to nothing to squelch his relationship proceed while being kept a secret within the with Casey and the NSC staff. administration itself. TheReport did not, Indeed North -- who "wanted" however, point out the extent to which the Ghorbanifar to pass -- had braced counterwork served as a back channel himself for a negative result. He throughout the administration, and not just told Ledeen beforehand that the under Casey inside the CIA. Clair George CIA would make sure Ghorbanifar testified how Charles Allen, in his role as flunked because they did not want National Intelligence Officer for to work with him. Casey, Counterterrorism, reported directly to Casey, notwithstanding Clair George's and was allegedly under orders not to share his 28 advice to terminate the information with the Operations Directorate, Ghorbanifar relationship, found a A similar exclusion of those not cleared for way to deal with Ghorbanifar counterterrorism communications occurred in outside the normal Operations the State and Defense Departments, and at the Directorate headed by George. National Security Council. Someone higher Casey ordered Charles Allen, who than Casey must have been responsible for this was the CIA's senior antiterrorism interagency situation. One suspects that the responsibility will be found in the secret report analyst, to meet with Ghorbanifar of the Vice President's Task Force on "to determine and make a record Combating Terrorism. of all the information that he possessed on terrorism, especially Nor did the report explain that the separate that relating to Iranian terrorism -- channel for counterterrorist intelligence made just take another look at this it possible to float intelligence estimates (for individual." In George's view, Allen example, that Iran had ceased its terrorist virtually became the case officer activities, or was losing the war against Iraq) for Ghorbanifar [thus replacing which the regular U.S. intelligence community Ledeen, who left the would not endorse.29 Administration after the November arms fiasco].... Allen spent five To sum up, members of the Bush Task Force hours with Ghorbanifar at Ledeen's Senior Review Group used their home on January 13 "to assess counterterrorism channels to thwart official Subject's access In Iranian U.S. policy and to conceal their activities from Government leaders" and to obtain their superiors. The Report, while doing a information from him on terrorists reasonable job of chronicling the "secrecy, (R 205). deception, and disdain for the law" of "a small group of senior officials" (R 11), went out of its way to ignore the existence of a Four days later the president signed an counterterrorism network that operated amended Finding authorizing the "thirdthrough its own institutions, institutions which parties" (Ghorbanifar), a Finding that once at least partly still exist.30 again was withheld not only from Congress but from Weinberger and Shultz (R 208-09).27 This should be a matter of grave concern to

15 9 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF those who believe in the open and democratic classified when documents were censored for determination of foreign policy, particularly in release to the public. matters that could lead to war. Members of the counterterrorism cabal, above all North and Thus the Select Committees' Report, like its Revell, had used the extraordinary powers of televised hearings, tended to perpetuate the the counterterrorism apparatus againstmyth that the crisis has disappeared with the domestic opponents of the administration's departure of Oliver North from the White Central American policies as well. House. The net effect of theReport 's compromise language was to play down the The Administration-Select Committee importance that those members of the Consensus on the Need to Continue Covert counterterrorism network who remained in the Operations Reagan administration had had in the generation of this strategy in the first place. It is clear that the "Iran-contra affair" was some sort of political or even constitutional crisis. It is relevant here that a solid majority of the Unfortunately, as in the case of Watergate a committees (17 out of 26 members) had voted decade ago, there was no national consensus for contra aid; and that (according to House on what constituted that crisis, and hence on committee chairman Lee Hamilton) every what must be done to end it. For many outside committee member agreed that "we must be the government, the true crisis was not the able to conduct covert actions.”32 The domestic bureaucratic affair but rather the undeclared enemies North so feared had few war (in this case the contra support policy) and spokespersons on the Select Committees. Only the consequent inner divisions in the nation, two Congressmen (Stokes and Brooks) ever divisions which explained why the secret raised critical questions about North's intrigues had taken place. There were few invasions of domestic liberties; and, spokesmen for such a view in the committees. significantly, both were told that such matters On the contrary, it can be said that the should be considered only in executive session. committees focused on the bureaucratic dysfunctions (North's deceit of his colleagues) At the end of North's testimony Lee Hamilton, much more than on the constitutional crisis chair of the House committee, gave an (North's deceit and manipulation of theextended critique of North's activities that was public).31 much like the critique offered by George Bush. Silent about North's abuses of domestic power, The televised hearings of the Iran-Contra silent about the waging of a secret contra war Select Committees focused very narrowly on in the face of congressional prohibition and the Iran arms sales and the diversion of some popular disapproval, Hamilton focused, like of the concomitant profits to the contra cause. Bush, on the credibility problem raised by the Like the previously issued Tower Commission Iran arms sales: "This secret policy of selling Report, they conceptualized the crisis as a arms to Iran damaged US credibility.”33 problem of cowboy bureaucrats “out Hamilton's restricted window of disagreement of control," and thus suggested that individuals, with North was defined by his affirmations of rather than institutions, contributed to the agreement: erosion of constitutional checks and balances, individual freedoms, and democratic process. Further, they zealously honored the There are many parts of your administration's decision that the testimony that I agree with. I agree counterterrorism apparatus deserved to remain with you that these committees

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must be careful not to cripple the 1981 with responsibility for crisis management, President. I agree with you that and had been reported by the New York Times our government needs the to be leader of a Cabinet-level Crisis capability to carry out covert Management Committee.35 North's secretary, actions. During my six years on the Fawn Hall, joined him in February 1983, and [House] Intelligence Committee, the two then worked on the development of a over 90 percent of the covert secret Crisis Management Center.36 (North also actions that were recommended to met with members of the Office of the Vice us by the President were President on such related committees as the supported and approved.34 Crisis Pre-Planning Committee and the National Security Planning Group.)

With this explicit agreement on the need to There has been much debate as to what this continue covert operations, many of which first phase of North's work on crisis (especially those in Angola and Afghanistan) management involved. On July 5, 1987, the had support arrangements entangled with Miami Herald reported that North "helped North's Iran-contra "Enterprise," thedraw up a controversial plan to suspend the committees mostly averted their eyes from the Constitution in the event of national crisis such broader extent of the North-Secord power as nuclear war, violent and widespread internal apparatus; and they suppressed or delayed dissent, or national opposition to a U.S. military release of important documents relating to it. invasion abroad." The allegedly envisaged the The Report reflected the Bush-North-Hamilton round-up and internment of large numbers of consensus: it too faulted the Iran arms sales for both domestic dissidents (some 26,000) and undermining U.S. "credibility with friends and aliens (perhaps as many as 300,000-400,000) in allies" (R 12); and it found fault not with covert camps such as the one in Oakdale, Louisiana. operations, but rather with "covert policies" that were "a perversion of the proper concept These contingency plans are particularly of covert operations" (R 17). alarming in the light of revelations that the FBI had since 1981 "conducted extensive Because North used both the Enterprise and surveillance hundreds of American citizens and counterterrorism apparatus for the harassment groups opposed to the Reagan administration's of one of his domestic critics, Jack Terrell, we policies in Central America"; and that it may shall do what the committee did not:have conducted at some of this surveillance reconstruct from the public record what little is under the more permissive guidelines which known of North's and Bush's collaboration in governed "cases of suspected international the area of domestic repression, including the terrorism.”37 contingency plans developed by North, under Bush's auspices, for the round-up andThe FBI's industry in identifying political deportation of "terrorist aliens." dissenters seems much more ominous in the light of concomitant contingency plans to round Bush, North, and the Development of such dissenters up. Secret Domestic Powers In the televised Iran-Contra Hearings, North The little-noticed secret relationship between was asked by Congressman Brooks to discuss North and the Office of the Vice President went the alleged contingency plan to suspend the back at least to 1982, when North was the NSC American constitution. Senator Inouye, the staff coordinator for crisis management. Bush committee chairman, twice intervened, ruling at that time was charged by NSDD No. 3 of that the question was "highly sensitive and

17 9 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF classified," and should only be discussed in the chair of the new counterterrorist group. executive session. The next day North told TIWG's first major on was the October 1985 Senator Boren, a much more pliant questioner, interception and capture of the hijackers of the that to his knowledge the United States had no Achille Lauro -- which gave a big boost to such plan "in being," and that he had not North's prestige inside the Administration. participated in it.38 In response to the June 1985 hijack of a TWA Although North's answers to Boren's carefully plane to Beirut, North worked on the release of phrased questions appear to be technically the hostage passengers, and Bush was chosen correct, they are very misleading. A later report to head the longer-term Vice President's Task revealed that a draft executive order giving the Force on Combating Terrorism. As the National president broad emergency powers during a Security Council liaison with the Task Force, severe crisis had indeed been submitted North drafted a secret annex for its report, in through North to the National Security Council which he institutionalized and expanded his in May 1984. The order contained provisions own counterterrorist powers and also made for "alien control" and “the detention of enemy himself the NSC coordinator of all aliens." The then Attorney General, William counterterrorist actions. French Smith, disclosed in 1987 that his 39 opposition had killed the proposa1. In January 1986, by virtue of both the Task Force report and of National Security Decision Nevertheless, the institutional relationship Directive No. 207, North was given a new between Bush and North continued to evolve, Office to Combat Terrorism, which was kept and did eventually result in similar proposals secret even from many other NSC members. that are still operative, as well as in secret Two key members of Bush's Task Force staff, powers which North used against at least one Robert Earl and Craig Coy, moved over to staff domestic critic. This evolution went through North's new office. Earl and Coy spent much of many stages. the next year working on the Iran arms sales and contra support operation, which made it In October 1983, under the guidance of the Vice President's Special Situations Group easier for North to travel. While working for (SSG), North helped draft the National Security North, Earl and Coy were in fact officially Decision Directive which authorized theattached to the Crisis Management Center, 41 invasion of Grenada. That winter the two men where North had worked in 1983. As we have visited El Salvador, where Bush told local army seen, North also became chair of another new commanders they would have to cease their Task Force creation, the new interagency support for death squads. North testified to the Operations Sub-Group. The OSG answered to Iran-Contra Committees that Bush's action the TIWG, which was designed to plan bold "was one of the bravest things I've seen for new pre-emptive measures, such as [sic] anybodv." Bush has since reciprocated by kidnapping, against suspected terrorists. repeatedly referring to North as a “hero.”40 In June 1986 a new "Alien Border Control In April 1984 North drafted another National Committee" was established, "to implement Security Decision Directive, which created a specific recommendations made by the Vice new counterterrorism planning group (the President's Task Force on Terrorism regarding Terrorist Incident Working Group, or TIWG) to the control and removal of terrorist aliens in rescue U.S. hostages in Lebanon (and above all the U.S.”42 One of its working groups was the CIA Station Chief there, William Buckley, charged with conducting "a review of who had just been kidnapped). North became contingency plans for removal of selected

18 9 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF aliens."43 These 1986 contingency plansTerrorist Incident Working Group, convened for "relating to alien terrorists," which were leaked the first time a few hours after this last to the press, "anticipated that the INS may be reference Task Force on January 7, 1986, the tasked with ... apprehending, and removing day that Shultz and Weinberger vigorously from the U.S., a sizeable group of aliens," and opposed the Iran arms-sales plan (R 203). OSG- again called for housing "up to 5,000 aliens in TlWG met twice again that month (January 14 temporary (tents) quarters" at a camp in and 31); but its members appear to have been Oakdale, Louisiana.44 As the designated already meeting with North under the title coordinator of counterterrorism in the National Restricted Terrorist Incident Working Group Security Council, North would certainly have (RTIWG) on November 6 and 21. Finally, the known of these contingency plans, which diaries show at least 14 other meetings with appear to be still with us. the Task Force's senior members (Admiral James Holloway, Ambassador Robert Oakley, Bush's political autobiography,Looking and Charles Allen), its principal consultant Forward, gave the impression he had only (Terry Arnold), and its staff (Robert Earl, and minimal acquaintance with North and the Iran Craig Coy, who eventually became North's own 46 arms-sales initiative. The Vice Presidentstaff). acknowledged only two contacts with North: during the Grenada operation, and when he In his testimony North suggested an even more telephoned North from Israel before meeting intimate relationship with Bush. He told the committee that "when my father died, there that country's top representative (Nir) in the were three peopIe in the government of the Iran arms deals. He admitted knowing of the United States that expressed their secret trip by North and McFarlane to Tehran, condolences." Two of these were Admiral but denied knowing of North's "other secret Poindexter and William Casey, his top bosses in operations" before November 1986.45 the Iran-contra covert operations. The third 47 North's diaries suggest, however, that in this "was the Vice President of the States." period he was in recurring contact with Bush, Bush, North, and the Bureaucratic Bush's advisers, and the other members of Consensus on the Need to Deal with Bush's Task Force. From July 1985 to January Domestic Enemies 1986, when the secret end-run around Secretary Shultz on the Iran arms sales was How seriously should we regard these devised, the available pages of North's diaries contingency plans? Certainly Bush, even in the show only one meeting with President Reagan eyes of his opponents, appears an unlikely (on October after the capture of the Achille candidate to try to rule America by the Lauro hijackers). But they show four meetings imposition of martial law. Nevertheless, there with the vice president, either alone, or with is a deep institutional momentum (as opposed Amiram Nir, the top Is counterterrorism expert to personal impetus) behind the plans to deal (November 19), or in the presence of Donald with domestic enemies -- the same institutional Gregg (July 15, September 10, January 28). In momentum which up to now has also continued addition, there are at least six recorded to promote the policy of contra support despite meetings of North with the Vice President's widespread disapproval both in this country Task Force (on July 25, September 16,and abroad. September 18, October 2, December 11, and January 7). Absolute powers, once acquired, are seldom willingly surrendered; they are too useful for OSG, the Operations Sub-Group of the older other purposes. In our present crisis, powers

19 9 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF conferred in the name of fighting terrorists In Vietnam ... in my opinion, we have in fact been applied against persons like won all the battles and then lost Brian Willson, whose offense was to issue a the war .... I would also point out nonviolent challenge to the Reagan that we didn't lose the war in administration's contra support policies, or Vietnam. We lost the war right persons like Jack Terrell, who had reported the here in this city .... We cannot be illegalities of the North-Secord contra support seen, I believe, in the world today apparatus. as walking away and leaving failure in our wake. We must be The reluctance of the press or Congress to able to demonstrate, not only in explore the use of counterterrorism powers Nicaragua, but in Afghanistan and against dissenters to the contra support policy Angola, and elsewhere where is itself a symptom of a national division (like that over Vietnam) that is already too deep for freedom fighters have been told our political processes to resolve easily. The "We will support you," we must be administration and its intelligence apparatus able to continue to do so. If we do 48 are apparently as determined to maintain those not, we will be overwhelmed. policies as growing numbers of people are to oppose them. The logical corollary to such a determined Here it is important to remember that Bush, as position was indeed that America's most a former Director of Central Intelligence, was serious enemies are its domestic ones, and that the original preferred presidential candidate of plans for "victory" in Central America must many CIA employees and veterans in 1980; and entail plans for "victory" in Washington, D.C. that CIA veterans like Daniel Murphy and Donald Gregg were afterwards members of his North was speaking for a large consensus inner circle. Through the vice president's among both policymakers and Cold War responsibilities for three crucial areas of covert academics who believe that "the most pressing operations – crisis management, drugs, and problem is not in the Third World. but here at counterterrorism -- the CIA veterans around home in the struggle for the minds of the Bush maintained continuous contact with people.”49 His complaint also echoed that of the others still inside the agency, such as the CIA’s French colonels who believed (in the words of a chief counterterrorism coordinator Duane sympathetic American observer) that "France Clarridge. was not defeated in Algeria; de Gaulle chose to retreat."50 This belief in France led the political Nevertheless, the Iran-Contra Selectcolonels. almost all of whom were veterans of Committees refused to look at the development political warfare in the colonies, to direct of emergency domestic powers against large government funds into "parallel hierarchies" numbers of aliens, and possibly other for the manipulation of political opinion in the opponents of the administration's war policies. home country. That practice was uncomfortably This was an alarming omission. North, at least, close to the use of government funds by North, believed fervently in the necessity of dealing Earl, Coy, Carl Channell, and Richard Miller via with domestic enemies. the Channell-Miller network (and with the In response to a friendly leading question from support of rightwing contributors and North's the House Chief Republican Counsel, George Office to Combat Terrorism), in their attempt to Van Cleve, North explained how his Vietnam elect a Congress more willing to vote for contra experience affected his view of the contras: aid.51

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The committees' response to North's defiant both arms and guns were being smuggled. The rationale for domestic repression was to avoid, North-Owen-Hull connection was later amply rather than to explore, the large area where documented by the Select Iran-Contra North had been working on just suchCommittees (R 106-109), while Terrell's contingency plans. In his remarks at the end of allegations about drug running at the Hull the North Hearings, Senate committeeranch, ignored and indeed suppressed by the chairman Inouye noted that he, unlike many of Justice Department and the Select Committees, his colleagues on the panel, had voted against have been largely corroborated by witnesses aid to the contras; and he quoted eloquently (Jorge Morales, Gary Betzner, Werner Lutz) and pertinently from Thomas Jefferson on the before the Kerry Subcommittee. right to dissent.52 North and Owen were concerned to learn in Yet it was Senator Inouye who, sounding his April 1986 that U.S. Assistant Attorney gavel, told Congressman Brooks that press Feldman and an FBI agent from Miami, after references to “a contingency plan in the event interviewing Terrell, had arrived in Costa Rica of emergency that would suspend the American to interview Hull (R 107-108). Their concern Constitution" touched upon "a highly sensitive was at least in part personal, because the and classified area," and should not beinvestigators were passing around a chart that 53 discussed in open session. One has the linked North and Owen, through Hull, to a uncomfortable impression that he, and the Cuban-American terrorist and suspected drug other veterans of the Intelligence Committees, trafficker called Rene Corvo, who was a focus were only too aware of the updatedof the Miami investigation.55 As North knew contingency plans still in place. from the FBI memos forwarded to him, the Miami FBI's zeal to pursue the Corvo North's Use of the Counterterrorist Network investigation (in contrast to the Washington Against a Whistle-blower Justice Department's later measures to slow it It is known that North, with the assistance of down) derived from the fact that many of the FBI Executive Assistant Director Oliver Revell, people important in it were extremists involved did use the secret powers of the OSG against a in earlier terrorist actions, notably the bombing 56 former contra supporter, Jack Terrell, who had of a Miami bank in 1983. Terrell's own notes begun to report on contra support illegalities to and memos from his discussions in Miami, the FBI. In 1986 Terrell's revelations helped which are largely corroborated by newspaper open an investigation by U.S. Assistantreports, suggest that the Miami Cuban network Attorney Jeffrey Feldman in Miami into gun- around Corvo in the contra supply operation running and drug-trafficking by contraincluded key members of past intelligence- supporters (R 107). Thanks to the new powers sponsored terror networks, notably the so- conferred on North by the Bush Task Force, called CORU network which in 1976, when copies of the FBI memos were, "because it was Bush was Director of Central Intelligence, took an international terrorist matter," forwarded credit for continuously to North's office.54 From early on, the Justice Department in Washington injected Cuban civilian airliner and of former Chilean 57 itself into the Miami investigation (R 107). Ambassador Orlando Letelier.

Terrell charged specifically that North was North’s concern increased as Terrell began to linked, through his assistant Robert Owen, to a go public with his charges. When the Christic contra support base in Costa Rica that was Institute suit, filed on May 29, 1986, used owned by an American called John Hull, where Terrell's charges to accuse Hull and Owen of

21 9 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF being part of a terrorist conspiracy, North investigate not Hull or Corvo, but rather Terrell initially asked the FBI to have its Intelligence the whistle-blower. On the same day, July 15, Division investigate the Christic Institute, along someone in the FBI "suspected that Terrell with other aspects of what he, and the FBI, might be involved" in an alleged assassination called a "Nicaraguan Active Measuresplot: not the plot against Pastora, but the plot, Program" directed against North. Heof which it had heard from "a classified complained in particular about the FBI's failure source[,] that pro-Sandinista individuals might to obtain "any information concerning drug have been contemplating an assassination of charges against North."58 President Reagan" (R 112).62

The FBI "determined that there is a definite On July 17, this was conveyed to North by his association between the dates of theFBI counterpart on the Operations Sub-Group, Congressional votes on Contra aide (sic) to the Oliver Revell. North met with Robinette the Nicaraguan rebels and the 'active measures' same evening, and told him to take his July 15 being directed against Lieutenant Colonel memo, along with Terrell's book excerpts about North." Nevertheless, the FBI, trying to stay the alleged plots against Pastora, to Revell at out of a sensitive political fight between the the FBI.63 He also prepared a memo for Admiral White House and Congress, declined to pursue Poindexter, calling Terrell a "terrorist threat," the matter.59 and focusing at the outset on Terrell's role in the Christic Institute suit. Then on June 25, 1986, for the first time Terrell aired on the CBS show “West 57th" his charges As a source for this allegation, North noted that about the relationship of North and Owen to "one of the security officers for Project the John Hull ranch in Costa Rica. By now Democracy" (North's euphemism for the North- Richard Secord, who unlike North was a Secord "Enterprise" of private companies) had defendant in the Christic suit, was using investigated Terrell, and that this "security Enterprise funds to have an investigator, Glenn officer" (Secord's investigator Glenn Robinette, interview Terrell. On July 15, Robinette), was meeting that night with the FBI Robinette submitted a memo on Terrell, in representative to the Operations Sub-Group, which he reported on Terrell's unpaidOliver Revell. The memo explained that the FBI relationship to the Christic Institute, and added "was preparing a that Hull's air strips, according to Terrell, counterintelligence/counterterrorism "were used for landings and transfer of military operations plan" against Terrell, "for review by equipment but also drugs.”60 Robinette also OSG-TIWG tomorrow." This plan was transmitted to North excerpts Terrell had given presumably approved by the OSG, since one him from a book he was writing, in which he week later North reported that the FBI and the talked about contra discussions of past and Secret Service now had Terrell under "active future attempts to assassinate the dissident surveillance." contra leader Eden Pastora.61 (A bomb attempt on Pastora's life in May 1984, which killed and Glenn Robinette's repeated meetings with injured many others, was the central allegation Terrell in July 1986 had nothing whatsoever to in the charges brought by the Christicdo with terrorism or counterterrorism, but Institute.) were instead a naked attempt to silence Terrell as a witness. This is clear from a second At this point the secret counterterrorism unaddressed Robinette memo of July 17, 1986, powers established by Bush to deal with held but not released by the Select assassination threats went into high gear to Committees, which reported on his efforts to

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"investigate" Terrell. The memo confirms why of a civil law suit [the Christic the Enterprise was concerned about Terrell: Institute's suit] and his charges are "what he knows ... could be embarrassing to at the center of Senator Kerry's R[ichard] S[ecord];” and "Terrell may actually investigation [of the contra support possess enough information ... to be dangerous operation's alleged involvement in to our objectives." drug-trafficking] in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.”66 The memo corroborates Terrell's own story that Robinette tried to silence Terrell by offering funds for a proposed helicopter serviceNorth's memos did not mention what had business in Costa Rica. It recommends that chiefly concerned his aide Robert Owen: that Robinette's "interest" in this project beTerrell's reports to the FBI about John Hull, increased: "The 'investors' would require that Owen, and North had launched an investigation he reduce or stop his 'political talking' as it by Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Feldman in would 'affect our investment.'" The memo Miami. Inasmuch as Terrell had volunteered his concludes that by this means "the chopper or information to the FBI, the Justice Department, air freight service in Costa Rica" could be and a congressional committee, Robinette's "connected to some future non-commercial actions and recommendations might appear to [covert operations support?] work;” and that constitute improper interference with a "we would have him [Terrell] in hand and witness. somewhat in our control.”64 We know from North's later memos on Terrell On the same day, July 17, North also prepared that by July 25 his own memo for John Poindexter, reporting on Robinette's evaluation of Terrell, but also significantly altering it. Where Robinette had the Operations Sub-Group (OSG) of called Terrell an "Operational Threat" (a the Terrorist Incident Working possible "serious threat to us based on ... his Group (TIWG) ha[d] made available previously spoken statements"), North called to the FBI all information on Mr. Terrell a "Terrorist Threat." Where Robinette Terrell from other U.S. had said Terrell "may possess enough Government agencies. Various information ... to be dangerous to our government agencies -- Customs, objectives," North wrote that "one of the Secret Service, the Bureau of security officers for Project Democracy" Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms -- (Robinette) had evaluated Terrell "as have information of some of 'extremely dangerous' and possibly working for Terrell's activities and the FBI is the security services of another country."65 currently consolidating this information for their investigation. A later North memo added:

By this date "the FBI, in concert with the It is important to note that Terrell Secret Service," had "Terrell under active has been a principal witness surveillance.”67 against supporters of the Nicaraguan resistance [i.e., of the The FBI Expands the Terrell Investigation contras] both in and outside the to Others U.S. Government. Terrell's accusations have formed the basis On July 29 and 30 the FBI and the Secret

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Service polygraphed Terrell for two whole logs that Terrell had been studying there. (Also days, after which the FBI "eliminated him as that fall, the Washington office of four being a threat to the President.”68 Revell nonviolent Gandhians who were fasting on the reported this to the OSG, adding however that Capitol steps was broken into after they too the FBI was still "pursuing other possible areas had been designated "terrorists" by the FBI.) of investigation.”69 The efforts of North and others to bring Indeed it was. By now the FBI had put others pressure on Terrell cannot be described as a under surveillance, including two members of failure. When Terrell came to Washington, he the Nicaraguan Embassy, and Davidprepared for Senator Kerry's staff a series of MacMichael, an acquaintance of Terrell and memos describing the drug activities of men in vocal critic of contra aid. Robinette had told the the contra support network like Rene Corvo, FBI on July 17 that he had reached Terrell at Felipe Vidal, Norwin Meneses, and Frank 74 the International Center for Development Castro. None of these names (not even Policy (ICDP), a Washington public interest Corvo's) will be found in the Select group which brought Terrell to Washington to Committees' account of the Rene Corvo be interviewed by the staff of Senator Kerry's investigation in Miami (R 106-109). And none of Subcommittee; the FBI now began, apparently these names have as yet surfaced in the through its Terrorist Unit, to investigate the Hearings of Senator Kerry's Senate Foreign ICDP, and soon reported evidence that the Relations Subcommittee on Narcotics. Center was giving Terrell money.70 Terrell's essential credibility as a witness is corroborated by subsequent revelations about The FBI's investigation of the Center continued the John Hull ranch in Costa Rica, the North- for some weeks, and least three ICDP Owen relationship to it, and the belatedly employees were interviewed by the FBI about released Robinette memo about efforts to get their foreign contacts.71 The FBI's interest in Terrcll "in our control." Yet it is he, and not the Intemational Center for Development Policy John Hull, who has since been indicted by a appears to have continued after U.S. Attorney Miami Grand Jury, a Grand Jury which Kellner "received a letter from John Hull [on ironically was originally impaneled partly as a August 27, 1986] making serious allegations of result of the information about Hull which impropriety by members of Senator Kerry’s Terrell gave the FBI (R 109). staff,” which Kellner had brought with him to Mark Richard in Washington on August 29 (R In 1988, having been already warned of his 109). Terrell's activities at the International impending indictment by the Reagan-Meese 72 Center were central to Hull's allegations. Justice Department, Terrell declined, on the Kellner testified that Hull's affidavits were advice of counsel, to answer questions when "amateurish" and that he did not believe them; summoned as a witness by the Christic nevertheless, his own deposition confirms that Institute. Deprived of testimony from the man 73 the affidavits were investigated. an FBI Teletype once described as a "star witness" in the suit, the Christic Institute suit Because Terrell had used the Center'swas thrown out when it came to trial.75 telephones. it seems likely that the electronic surveillance on Terrell expanded into electronic It is hardly surprising that North would use the surveillance of the Center itself. In November, powers conferred on him to cover up his when the Hasenfus contra supply plane went support operation's illegalities, and particularly down, the Center was burglarized; and the only the stories about and assassination plots. What documents taken were copies of the airplane's is most surprising is that Congress, despite its

24 9 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF professed concern about drugs, alsounique. After Senator Frank Church had participated in this cover-up. It is clear m FBI concluded his much more circumspect Teletypes that Terrell had been interviewed by Hearings and Report on the CIA, he too was them about “alleged…smuggling of weapons defeated at the next election. So was Senator and narcotics.”76 Yet the Report of the Iran- Dick Clark, author of the Clark Amendment, Contra Committees, as assiduously as North, which prohibited further CIA covert operations suppressed every reference to Terrrell’s drug in Angola. So were the only two members of allegations (R 106-08), as well as to the plot Congress (Senators Wayne Morse and Ernest against Pastora. It falsely presented Terrell as a Gruening) who dared to vote against the Tonkin self-admitted CIA assassin (R 112); and let it Gulf Resolution, which in 1964 committed appear that Terrell had been interviewed as a Congress to the undeclared war in Vietnam. suspect in alleged assassination plots, rather than as a witness (R 116). Thus Congress has So was (in his 1986 Senate Primary attempt) so far afforded this whistle-blower no relief. Congressman Michael Barnes, "a vocal opponent of military assistance to the Contras" The Failure of Congress (R 99). As "Spitz" Channell boasted in a telegram to Oliver North, "We, at the Anti- Both the Iran-Contra Committees' ownTerrorism American Committee (ATAC), feel performances and the narrowly drawnproud to have participated in a campaign to congressional resolutions under which the ensure Congressman Barnes' defeat" (R 99). committees were established show a concern to One of the Channell-Miller documents stressed sidestep the larger issues of secret powers and the effect this defeat would have on other secret wars, which threaten once again to congressmen: divide this country as it drifts towards a military involvement in Central America that If we get rid of Barnes we get rid could prove even more divisive than Vietnam. of the ring leader and rid of the Where the committees' Report suppresses or problem. Special PAC to do 1 thing misrepresents the truth (as happens too often), only: to RID Congress of it is usually to prevent disclosure of other Congressmen that are trying to covert operations already authorized by undermine President in his anti- Congress.77 terrorist policies .... Destroy Barnes -- use him as object lesson Congress' demonstrated reluctance to raise the 79 larger issues of covert operations is to others. understandable. The track record of those isolated congressmen who have challenged The average congressman was not likely to covert operations or foreign interventions in ignore a lesson so richly subsidized by public the past is not encouraging. Congressman Otis and private resources. As Peter Kornbluh has Pike, after his House Select Committee in 1975 written, authored a report critical of the CIA, was defeated at the next election; the Pike Report, by maneuvers without precedent or parallel in The administration's tenacious two centuries of U.S. congressional history, public diplomacy campaign so could not even be presented directly to intimidated Congress that not even Congress.78 a succession of scandals in the spring and summer of 1986 could Congressman Pike's exemplary fate is far from prevent the president from

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eventually achieving his goals. 1). Even as the contra program 2 became mired in charges of Report of the Congressional Committees misappropriated funds, rampant Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair corruption, drug trafficking, and (henceforward cited as R), 100th Congress, 1st gross mismanagement, Congress Session, H Rept. No. 100-433; S. Rept. No. approved a quantum escalation in 100-216 (November 1987), p. 100. U.S. intervention.80 3 As three top Iran-contra watchers wrote in December, Bush is "one man at the center of The virtual silence of the Iran-Contraevents" who "got away unscathed" in the Committees about the abuses of theReport (Conason, Ridgeway, and Waas, 1987: counterterrorism apparatus, and about the use 17). of OSG and FBI to help silence a whistle-blower on contra support illegalities, is a clear sign 4 I have found in the Report only two passing, that the FBI is at least as unlikely as the CIA to unexplained references to the Operations Sub- be publicly criticized by Congress. Members of Group (R 247, 287), and none to the Office to Congress show little appetite to investigate a Combat Terrorism. The Majority Report's bureau which, as they well know, has been Summary and Findings mention neither, talking busy over the years investigating them. only of a "small group of senior officials," who "believed that they alone knew what was right" But the example of the Vietnam War reminds us (R 11). This emphasis (like that of the Tower that, if Congress will not lead a resistance to Report) on departed individuals and their covert power, it may respond to one. Before beliefs only protects the aberrant surviving that happens to the powers of theinstitutions in their ongoing activities. counterterrorist apparatus, the press must give the people a much better picture of them, and 5 The only official reference I have seen to of the extent to which they have been actually NSDD 207 is in a letter of April 17, 1987, from used against critics of the administration's FBI Executive Assistant Director Oliver B. policies in Central America. Revell to Senator David Boren, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Notes explaining some of the contacts which he and the FBI had had with Oliver North. It is worth 1 "According to a survey by the Conference on quoting at some length: Issues and Media, the Iran arms fiasco got major coverage during the primaries -- more than 74 minutes on CBS, NBC and ABC during At the time [April 19861, Col. the first three months of this year -- but has North was the NSC official generated only 5.2 minutes of news time since charged by the President with the (Marin Independent Journal, September 6, coordination of our national 1988). The New York Times, which once counterterrorist program. He was editorially called Iran-contra a 'political crime' responsible for working closely (February 9, 1987), ran stories on Bush and with the designated lead agencies Iran on 18 days in January, 3 days each in and was responsible for February and March, and 4 in April. In May and participating in all interagency June, after Bush had emerged as a certain groups, maintaining the national official candidate, there were no more such programming documents, assisting stories; the teflonizing had begun" (Scott, 1988: in the coordination of research and

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development in relation to leaked at that time that OSG had been by- counterterrorism, facilitating the passed on the Iran arms sales deal, though it is development of response options clear from PROF notes in the Tower Report and overseeing the implementation that the meetings with the Iranians were of the Vice President's Task Force discussed in OSG (Washington Post, December on Combating Terrorism 8, 1986; Tower Commission Report, 1987: 372). recommendations. This description Frank Carlucci and the other new men in the of Col. North's position is set forth Reagan-Bush entourage contributed to the in the public report of the Vice masking of continuity by announcing deceptive President's Task Force on cosmetic changes. Shortly after becoming Combating Terrorism, February, National Security Advisor, Carlucci abolished 1986. There is an even more the NSC's Office of Political-Military Affairs, detailed and comprehensive which North had used to pursue his extra- description of Col. North's position constitutional activities before the Task Force in the classified National Security recommendations were adopted in early 1986. Decision Directive No. 207 issued After that date, as North's assistant Robert Earl by the President on January 20, explained. North continued to be 1986 (see Washington Post, February 17, 20, and 22, 1987; described as Deputy Director for Political- Wall Street Journal, February 20, Military Affairs… in the wiring diagram. But 1987). that wasn't where he really worked. He really worked for Admiral Poindexter direct, with no intervening office, director, or other layer 6 Robert Earl Deposition (May 30, 1987: 98-99; within the NSC. And that was for deliberate 35). reason of cover and protection for those who were working the counter-terrorism problem, 7 Presidential address to nation of March and the same reasoning that we on the task 4,1987; Bush press release of June 2,1987. force chose not to put a little sign out in front of your office that said “Vice-President's Task 8 Bush press release of June 2,1987. Force on Combatting Terrorism" (Earl Deposition, May 2,1987, pp. 21-22 [Iran-Contra 9 Earl Deposition, May 30, 1987, p. 33-37 Affair, Appendix B, Volume 9, 573-74]). (investigations); May 15, 1987, pp. 117-121 (Channell and Miller); May 15, 1987, pp. 131, The cover device was used to deceive even 119 (right-wing contributors). other, allegedly unreliable, elements in the National Security Council itself. In these 10 Wall Street Journal (February 20, 1987). See circumstances, to abolish the cover office, and Woodward (1987: 61-62; 394; 405; 411-12). not the super-secret Office to Combat Terrorism and Operations Sub-Group behind it, 11 Re-reading the Reagan and Bushwas an action significant only on the level of acknowledgments of last December that"credibility" or public image. "mistakes were made," one is struck that, even then, Bush's perception of the problem was 12 See Draper (1987: 47). that the administration's "credibility has been damaged," while Reagan's concern was "not to 13 It can be argued that these men were not undercut our policy of antiterrorism" New( only accomplices of North in the execution of York Times, December 4, 1986;Washington the controversial Iran arms sales, but also the Post, December 7, 1986). A report was even true authors of the counterterrorism gambit

27 9 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF which led a Marine Lieutenant Colonel to act in 20 R 169; George Testimony, August 5, 1987, such defiance of official U.S. policy. See below, pp. 277-281. George also testified that Casey "Bush, North, and the Development of Secret told him in September 1985 that he had just Domestic Powers.” heard from McFarlane about the Israeli- Ledeen-Ghorbanifar initiative. and that "the 14 The counterterrorist network's eagerness to Israelis have one demand: CIA not be informed" deal with Iran for hostages arose partly from (p. 23). The Israelis presumably knew that their concern for the fate of William Buckley, there was already a CIA bum notice on the kidnapped CIA Station Chief in Beirut. Ghorbanifar from July 1984, antedating North testified that Buckley, also, was "an George's. expert on terrorism" and was involved in another program "of extraordinary sensitivity" 21 The result was to create a Mossad (Israeli ([Oliver North], Taking the Stand: Theintelligence) link to the CIA's counterterrorism Testimony of Lt. Col. Oliver North, 1987: 505). (CT) component under Allen, by-passing the The Agency's traditional concern for one of its Middle East area desk officers, which was own was here compounded by the concern for highly reminiscent of the situation before 1974, the highly classified secrets that he was likely when Mossad had a similar relationship to the to yield under torture. Even after he was known CIA's Counter-Intelligence (CI) staff under to have died, the CIA needed urgently to know James Angleton. ("When Angleton was liaison what secrets he had revealed. This explains the with Mossad there had been no need for a attention paid in the late stages of the Iran separate station in Tel Aviv, Mossad having arms negotiations to obtaining a copy of a 400- produced Middle East intelligence for both page "debrief' of Buckley by his tormenters services" [Winks, 1987: 433-434].) (see R 255, 258; North, 1987: 505-506). The 22 Vice President, in his bitter exchange with Dan Casey may even have given Clarridge a Rather on the "CBS Evening News," explained counterterrorism assignment in order to repeatedly that he acquiesced in the Iran arms insulate him from the critical oversight of sales policy for "the same reason the President George and McMahon, and give him a direct signed on to it": he "wanted Mr. Buckley out of access to North’s operations. Clarridge himself there" ("CBS Evening News," January 25, 1988, testified that he became Chief of the CIA's Transcript, pp. 13-14; cf. p. 9). Counterterrorism Task Force in mid-February 1986 (Clarridge Testimony, p. 5; cf. p. 153); 15 Newsweek. October 21, 1985, p. 26. and that he had "never met Charlie Allen" before North sent Allen to him on November 22 16 Earl Exhibit #3-8, May 30, 1987 (Bates No. N (according to the Tower Report. p. 162) or 23 1823) [Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix B, Volume (according to the committees' Report, R 183), 9, 1144]. 1985 (Clarridge Testimony, p. 33).

17 Quoted in Kornbluh (1987: 61). 23 R 181, 183; Clarridge Exhibits DRC-2, DRC-3; Clarridge Testimony, August 4, 1987, pp. 18 In answer to the question, "Who Was 13-14,33-35. Responsible" for the lran-contra operations, the Report lists six names (North, Poindexter, 24 Clarridge Exhibit DRC 1-4; Incoming CIA McFarlane, Casey, Secord, and Hakim), all of Cable No. 9088770 of November 22, 1985, whom were out of the government (R 20). from Lisbon, p. 1; emphasis added.

19 George Testimony. August 5-6,1987, pp. 25 Clarridge Exhibit DRC 1-5; Outgoing CIA 277-280, 9-21. Cable No. 625792 of November 22, 1985, from

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Lisbon, p. 1. received any proceeds derived from the sale of arms to Iran" (R 99). It did not mention that 26 Tower Report. pp. 246. 537. IBC -- which worked with Channell on targeting the home districts of Congressmen "considered 27 Stanley Sporkin, the long-time Caseyat the core of the key 'swing vote' on Contra associate whom Casey appointed to be CIA funding" (Channell Dep. Exh. 1. in R 98) – did Counsel, was the man who inserted the receive at least $1,000 (Shultz Exh. GPS-86) doomful two words "third parties." He testified from Gulf Marketing, one of the three that the term did not refer to Secord but to "collecting companies" in the North-Secord Ghorbanifar and other Iranian intermediaries arms-sales Enterprise (R 334). (R 208; Sporkin Testimony, p. 153). 32 See Oliver North (1987: 741). 28 Clair George Testimony, August 5, 1987, p. 277. This exclusion of the Operations33 Ibid. Directorate conformed with the Israeli desire (as expressed by McFarlane in September 34 Ibid.: 740. 1985) and Ledeen's desire as expressed in 35 January 1986, to keep CIA out of the operation: Top Secret White House Memo of May 14, see George Testimony, August 6, 1987, p. 23; 1982. Subject: Crisis Pre-Planning (Bates No. N Tower Report, p. 204. Both Israel and Ledeen 29464); New York Times. April 12, 1981. were anxious to protect Ghorbanifar from his 36 CIA detractors. It is interesting that North, the Testimony of Fawn Hall. June 8, 1987 pm. p, man who had schemed so effectively to keep 15-1.

Ghorbanifar's operation despite George's burn 37 notice, agreed in his testimony with the New York Times, January 28. 1988, p. 1: "The assessment of "the CIA people I talked to" that bureau's campaign began in 1981 and included Ghorbanifar was an Israeli agent (North, pp. the use of undercover agents. informants. and 89. 150. 307; cf. R 163). surveillance of peace demonstrations around the country." It is possible that the Times has 29 Speaking to the first estimate, George exaggerated the number of groups surveilled testified that "I found it a foolish debate. I felt under terrorist guidelines. since the FBI Iran was engaged in terrorism …. There was an documents it refers to are apparently all drawn example of a desperate attempt to try to sort of from the FBI file on CISPES, the Committee in prove something was happening to make the Solidarity with the People of EI Salvador. policy look good, and it wasn't" (George Nevertheless, that file shows that when the Testimony, August 6. 1987. p. 128). Phoenix FBI Field Office said it would close its investigation of a local human rights group 30 Ironically, the only CIA careers to have been which it had determined to be nonviolent and terminated by February 15, 1988, as a result of educational, a countering reply document from the Iran-contra affair (apart from the disputed FBI Director William Webster ordered Phoenix and unclear case of Joe Fernandez. the CIA In "to consider the possibility that the 'Tucson Chief in Costa Rica), were those of Robert Committee for Human Rights' (TCHR) may be a Gates and of Clair George, the two top men front organization for the CISPES," because of who the counterterrorism cabal excluded from information "that CISPES offices were often the policy-making process. contained in, or operated from offices of other similar-type organizations or front offices" 31 For example, the Report assured its readers (Airtel of January 6. 1984 from FBI Director that none "of Channell's political action groups Webster, FBI HQ File 199-8848).

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38 North (1987: 643; 732-33). By the end of 1957, the battle of Algiers had been very decisively 39 Miami Herald, July 19.1987. p.17A. won. All leading revolutionaries were either dead, in jail, or abroad. 40 North (1987: 574-75);San Francisco However, although the Chronicle, December 14, 1987; January 14, governments of the Fourth 1988. Republic had given General Raoul Salan full civil and military powers, 41 Earl Deposition. May 2, 1987. pp. 22-23; Coy they had not ceased to criticize the Deposition, March 17. 1987, pp. 24-25. conduct of operations, notably the use of torture in interrogations 42 Memo of September 15, 1986, from during the battle of Algiers. More Immigration and Naturalization Service significantly, the constant talk of a Assistant Commissioner Robert J. Walsh, search for a negotiated solution quoted in Mideast Monitor 4,4 (1987: 2). The angered many in France and ABCC was formally established on June 27, nearly all Europeans in Algeria. 1986, by former Deputy Attorney General D. Most important, the recurring Lowell Jensen. government crises lent an atmosphere of indecision quite 43 Memo of October 1, 1986 from Immigration inconsistent with the firm policy and Naturalization Servicebeing pursued on the scene. Assistant Commissioner Robert J. Walsh, p. 2, quoted in Mideast Monitor 4,4 (1987: 2). 51 R 98-99; cf. Kornbluh (1987: 205-210); 44 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Cockburn (1987: 243-245); Earl Deposition, Investigations Division, "ALIEN TERRORISTS May 15, 1987, pp. 131, 119 (right-wing AND UNDESIRABLES: A Contingency Plan" contributors).

(May 1986), pp. ii. 19, 25; partially quoted in 52 North (1987: 752-753). Mideast Monitor 4,4 (1987: 2). 53 Ibid. 643. 45 Bush (1987: 242-243). 54 Deposition of FBI Executive Assistant 46 The preceding information is from those Director Oliver B. Revell, July 15,1987. p. 11; North diary pages reproduced in ShultzU.S. Congress (1987),Iran-Contra Affair, Exhibits GPS-74-78, pages 3321-27, 3405-06, Appendix B, 22, 943. 3329-34, 3412-15, 3337. 55 Deposition of FBI Executive Assistant 47 North (1987: 345). Director Oliver B. Revell, July 15, 1987, p. 20; Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix B, 22, 952; 48 Ibid.: 269-70. Deposition of Kevin W. Currier, May 5, 1987, pp. 6-7, 26. 49 George Tanham, counterinsurgency expert, at a conference on Low Intensity Conflict; 56 Deposition of Kevin W. Currier, Executive quoted in Kombluh (1987: 159). See Lewy Session. May 5, 1987, p. 6. (1978: 435-436); Gelb (1972: 466). 57 Three of the ten founding members of CORU 50 Codevilla (1974: 219). Cf. p. 213: have been linked by the press to the contra

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"southern front" in Costa Rica: Juan Pérez the earlier Teletype of July 18(?), 1986 Iran-( Franco, Armando Lopez Estrada, and Frank Contra Affair, Appendix A, 1, 821-23). The Iran- Castro. A fourth founding member, Luis Posada Contra Report also misdates the interview, as Carriles, was with Felix Rodriguez and Rafael "July 15" (R 112). Quintero at Ilopango air base in EI Salvador. 63 See Marshall, Scott, and Hunter (1987: 42-44). Poindexter Deposition Exhibit 44 (Memorandum for John M. Poindexter from 58 FBI Washington Field Office Teletype of June Oliver L. North, "Terrorist Threat: Terrel[l]," 11, 1986; Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix A, 1, July 17, 1986), p. 1. 802-05. 64 "Notes on J. Terrell," Unaddressed Memo 59 FBI Washington Field Office Teletype of June [from Glenn Robinette], July 17, 1986. 11. 1986; Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix A, 1, 65 802-03; Deposition of FBI Executive Assistant Poindexter Deposition Exhibit 44 Director Oliver B. Revell. July 15. 1987, pp. (Memorandum for John M. Poindexter from 49-51; Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix B, 22, Oliver L. North, "Terrorist Threat: Terrel[l]," 981-83. July 17,1986), p. 1. The relationship between the two July 17 memos, Robinette's and 60 Robinette memo of July 15. 1986; Iran-Contra North's, is confirmed by their document and Affair, Appendix A, 1, 832. page (Bates) numbers as released to the Select Committees. North's memo was numbered 61 Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix A. 1.843, cf. document 14042 for the committees, with 880, 823. Bates page numbers N 45918-19; Robinette's was numbered document 14043, with Bates 62 Deposition of FBI Executive Assistantpage numbers N 45920-21. Both documents Director Oliver B. Revell, July 15. 1987, p. 28; were released by the administration on June Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix B, 22, 960 ("July 22, 1987, the day before Robinette's testimony. 15”). 66 Poindexter Deposition Exhibit 45 63 FBI Washington Field office Teletype of July (Memorandum from John M. Poindexter to the 17, 1986; Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix A, 1, President, drafted by Oliver L. North, "Terrorist 823; FBI interview of Oliver North. July 22, Threat: Terrell," July 28, 1986), p. 2. 1986. Appendix A. 1, 880; Deposition of FBI Executive Assistant Director Oliver B. Revell, 67 Poindexter Deposition Exhibit 45 (Memo from July 15, 1987, p. 28;Iran-Contra Affair. John M. Poindexter to the President, July 28, Appendix B, 22, 958. The FBI seems to have 1986, drafted by Oliver L. North, July 25, 1986, been embarrassed by its actions in response to "Terrorist Threat: Terrell," pp. 1-2). Robert North's concerns about the Christic Institute Oakley told Bob Parry of Newsweek that OSG- case. An FD-302 report of its July 17 interview TIWG (which he co-chaired with North) "never with Robinette is falsified, apparently to discussed Terrell" (Newsweek, September 21, conceal North's role. The date is twice given 1987, p. 7). But Revell testified (under oath) falsely as July 16; and the original Teletype’s that he believed he did discuss Terrell's reference to "NSC officials" (i.e., North) is "threat" at the OSG (Deposition of FBI suppressed, as is the presence of the book Executive Assistant Director Oliver B. Revell, excerpts about the Pastora plots among the July I5, 1987, p. 36;Iran-Contra Affair, documents on Terrell supplied by Robinette to Appendix B, 22, 968). the FBI. Compare the FD-302 of July 25, 1986 (Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix A, 1, 829-31) with 68 Deposition of FBI Executive Assistant

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Director Oliver B. Revell, July 15,1987, p. 34; Appendix A, 1, 861; emphasis added. Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix B, 22, 966. 77 An example is the Report's studied avoidance 69 Deposition of FBI Executive Assistantof the Enterprise's activities in Africa. An Director Oliver B. Revell, July 15.1987, p. Enterprise chart of its own operation and other 36; Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix B, 22, 968. companies shows that one of its “collecting” companies, Dolmy Business, Inc., was 70 FBI Teletypes of July 22, 1986, July 23,1986; designated to operate in Africa. TheReport Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix A, 1, 865, 869-71. transmits without rebuttal Albert Hakim's [As I subsequently described in Cocaine Politics uncorroborated claim that "Africa was included ([Berkeley: University of California Press, because Secord said -- allegedly in jest -- 'who 1991], 180-81), I was myself a Senior Fellow of knows, if we do a good job, the President may the ICDP at this time, supplying research to the send us to Angola’” (R 333). But Dolmy staff of Senator Kerry’s Subcommittee looking Business was no jest: it was Dolmy which into Contras and drug trafficking. Thus I obtained the ship Erria on short order for a personally witnessed the disclosure of some of North African operation (R 368); in addition, the events described here.] Dolmy had an offshore subsidiary chartered in

71 Liberia, which is shown in censored form on Three ICDP employees were interviewed the chart (R 334; unnamed company “F”), but directly by the FBI -- Melinda Rorick about a about which the Report is silent (Hakim Cuban, Bill Loker about a Soviet Embassy Testimony, June 3, 1987 pm;Los Angeles employee, and David MacMichael aboutTimes, January 21, 1987). There are other Nicaraguan Embassy employees. A fourth ICPP indications, not developed by the committees, employee, Margarita Suarez, was not located that the Enterprise may have been active in by the FBI, who instead interviewed her Africa. In 1984 and 1985, theErria , already roommate about a Cuban. controlled by men close to Secord (Thomas Parlow and Thomas Clines) "was used to run 72 Hull's letter enclosed affidavits from Carr and weapons to the Persian Gulf and then to Glibbery "retracting some of their Nigeria and Central America" (R 367). prior statements regarding gun-running and Southern Air Transport planes flew repeatedly Contra support" (R 109). In August Terrell had to Angolan war zones while the company was helped persuade Glibbery not to play along also flying arms for the Enterprise; the pilot of with John Hull's offers to get him out of Costa the downed Hasenfus plane (Wallace Sawyer) Rica in exchange for retracting his earlier personally made scores of trips to the Angolan statements about gun-running. Glibbery then war zone before transferring to Central repudiated his own retraction. America (Miami Herald, October 19, 1986). 73 Kellner Deposition, pp. 60-64; cf. Richard North himself met with the rebel Angolan Deposition. pp. 87-90. leader Jonas Savimbi in Washington (Shultz Exhibit GPS-74-78); and allegedly once 74 For background on some of these men, see introduced himself at a meeting of United Marshall, Scott, and Hunter, pp. 129, 134-136. Methodist Church leaders as a "veteran of two wars -- Vietnam and Angola" Philadelphia( 75 FBI Teletype of July 1986; Iran-Contra Affair, Inquirer, March 15, 1987). Appendix A, 1, 863: "Terrell is believed to be a 78 star witness in a civil suit naming Secord." The Pike Report, based largely on the CIA internal "family jewels" memo of CIA 76 FBI Teletype of July 1986; Iran-Contra Affair, illegalities, which had been prepared for

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Director William Colby, was leaked extensively Report and Bush's Narrow Escape." Village to the press; and much of it appeared, just Voice (December 1). before its official release, in the Village Voice (New York Times, February 12, 1976, p. 14). In Codevilla, Angelo the midst of the concomitant furor, the House, in an action without precedent, voted to 1974: Modern France. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court. withhold the Report until the executive branch Draper, Theodore had censored it (New York Times, January 30, 1976, p. 1). At the time, Otis Pike told the 1987: "The Rise of the American Junta." New House that the CIA special counsel told his York Review of Books 34,15 (October 8). committee staff director, "Pike will pay for this, you wait and see -- we'll destroy him for this." Gelb, Leslie H. He also repeated an earlier charge that the CIA "could have been" the source of the leaks (New 1972: "The Essential Domino: American Politics York Times, March 10,1976, p. 1; cf. February and Vietnam." Foreign Affairs 50. 14, 1976, p. 12). There is no need to imagine CIA officers were directly involved in Pike's Kornbluh, Peter electoral defeat; other powerful and affluent groups in the covert operations lobby were 1987: Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention. available for the job. The CIA liaison to the Pike Washington: Institute for Policy Studies. Committee staff was Donald Gregg, later national security advisor to Vice President Lewy, Guenter George Bush; Gregg denies any involvement in the leaking of the Report, but attributes the 1978: America in Vietnam. New York: Oxford congressional suppression of it to "outrage" at University Press. "a sloppily researched piece of work" Marshall, Jonathan, Peter Dale Scott, and Jane (Telephone conversation, February 19, 1988). Hunter 79 Shultz Exhibit GPS-82, p. 2. 1987: The Iran-Contra Connection. Boston: 80 Kornbluh (1987: 198). South End Press.

References North, Oliver

Bush, George (with Victor Gold) 1987: Taking the Stand: The Testimony of Lt. Col. Oliver North. New York: Pocket Books. 1987: Looking Forward: An Autobiography. New York: Doubleday. Scott, Peter Dale

Cockburn, Leslie 1988: "George Bush: The Teflon Candidate," Extra! [The Newsletter of FAIR: Fairness and 1987: Out of Control. New York: Atlantic Accuracy in Reporting] 2.2 Monthly Press. (September/October),

Conason, Joe, James Ridgeway, and Murray Tower Commission Waas 1987: Tower Commission Report. New York: 1987: "The Right's Stuff: The Iran-Contra Bantam.

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U.S. Congress Winks, Robin W.

1987: Report of the Congressional Committees 1987: Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair. 100th War, 1939-1961. New York: William Morrow. Congress, 1st Session, H Rept. No. 100-433; S. Rept. No. 100-216 (November). Woodward, Bob

1987: Veil. New York: Simon and Schuster.

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