SYRIANS IN TURKEY Guests without a future? Bitte Hammargren 2020SYRIANS IN TURKEY 1 EDITORIAL NOTES Researcher and writer: Bitte Hammargren English language editing: John Roux, Ordbildarna AB Layout: Viera Larsson, Ordbildarna AB The report has been developed as part of the Resilience in Local Governance project, funded by the Swedish Government and managed by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) and its affiliate SKL International. PREFACE ABOUT TWO YEARS HAVE PASSED since the The researcher also draws on earlier field Swedish Association of Local Authorities and trips to Turkey, including during the early days Regions (SALAR) and its affiliate SKL Interna- of the Syrian refugee influx. Sources interviewed tional (SKL I) started the Sida-funded Resilience outside the RESLOG programme include Syrians in Local Governance (RESLOG) Project in who have moved from Turkey to EU countries, Turkey and Lebanon. In Turkey, RESLOG works Turkish academics, foreign correspondents in partnership with two regional unions of reporting on or from Turkey, European diplomats municipalities – Marmara Municipalities’ Union and experts on Turkey, and Turkish journalists in and the Çukurova Union of Municipalities. exile. Together with partner unions and member This study aims to have a down-to-earth focus. municipalities, RESLOG organises knowledge However, Syrian migration to Turkey must be development processes in the area of local understood in a wider context, encompassing the governance and migration, engages in migration war in Syria and Turkey’s current financial and policy advocacy, and implements local service im- health crises. The study thus starts with a brief provement projects. Most significantly, RESLOG geopolitical overview. has facilitated the development of municipal The Covid-19 Pandemic presents a challenge Migration Master Plans in 12 municipalities, for RESLOG project implementation, and for field linked to their official 5-year strategic plans. interviews. Nevertheless, the author visited two Since the start of the project, the situation in RESLOG project regions in October. these partner countries and in Syria has changed The report does not include municipalities in dramatically, and continues to do so. This study east or southeast Turkey run by the pro-Kurdish aims to provide a more solid understanding of the party HDP, whose mayors have been detained current situation in Turkey, especially in regard and replaced by government-appointed caretak- to Syrian migration. The findings will be used as ers, as these are not in RESLOG pilot regions. input for RESLOG conceptualization and future The geopolitical situation in the Eastern work, as project plans for continued implementa- Mediterranean, Syria and the wider Middle tion need to be reformulated. East is volatile, and sudden policy changes and This report draws on the RESLOG feasibility unpredicted moves by non-state actors cannot be study and project proposal, and investigated excluded, which may ultimately affect Turkey, the RESLOG areas of operation. In October 2020, people of Syria and Europe. the author conducted a field study in the Istanbul municipalities of Sisli and Sultanbeyli, and in Adana City and Province, including Sarıçam Municipality. Meetings were also held with the Marmara Municipalities’ Union, the Regional Union of Çukurova Municipalities, the Gover- nor’s office in Adana, and with members of local Citizens’ Assemblies, NGOs and Syrian com- munity members. Interviewees included experts, stakeholders, practitioners and individuals from both Turkish host and Syrian immigrant com- munities. SYRIANS IN TURKEY 3 SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 1. Given the uncertainties and destruction in Syrians that municipalities host. Syrians are Syria, millions of Syrian refugees are likely thus widely seen as an economic burden by to remain in Turkey, but the government their host municipalities and local popula- still deals with the issue on an ad hoc basis. tions. Perceived cultural differences add to the Nevertheless, at the local level officials are problem. often aware that Turkey is undergoing a 8. In the absence of a national strategy for Syri- transformation involving a new type of ans in Turkey, politicians at both national and multiculturalism, with Syrian Arabs as a new local level are afraid to talk about the Syrian element in the demographic, cultural and ‘guests’ from a rights perspective. social mosaic. 9. A source of distress for Syrians is their lack 2. The temporary protection system applied to of work permits. Without a permit, Syrian Syrian refugees in Turkey constitutes a major workers cannot benefit from the government’s obstacle for building social cohesion. While Covid-19 package if they are fired from jobs Syrians in Turkey have access to public health in the large informal sector. The scope of the care and basic education, they are prohibited Covid-19 Pandemic is widely considered to be from travelling outside their provinces of downplayed by the central authorities. residence, or to family reunions with loved 10. Structured trade unions are largely absent, ones still in Syria or elsewhere. especially in sectors where competition for 3. The situation resembles the way the Syrian low-skilled jobs is high, such as agriculture regime has treated Palestinian refugees for and textiles. decades, according to a highly educated Syrian 11. Police roundups in the summer of 2019, with who once fled to Turkey but now lives in an ID checks of Syrians in major urban centres, EU country. stoked fears of future deportations. Stories of 4. As long as the Syrian refugees have neither forced return to Syria, though hard to verify, guaranteed residence nor equal rights in the circulate widely among Syrian migrants in labour market, it is unlikely that they (mostly Turkey. Sunni Arabs) will integrate in Turkey society, 12. Many Turkish workers blame Syrians for like many Muslim immigrants before them. depressing wages, and ethnic tensions between 5. Most Syrian children are in Turkish schools, in workers in low-skilled jobs is a concern. integrated classes, and this new generation of 13. Turkey has no intention of amending its Syrian children consider Turkey their home- exceptions to the 1951 Geneva Refugee land, in spite of their temporary protection Convention, whereby only Europeans can ask status. However, due to poverty, hundreds of for asylum. Concerned experts see a need to thousands of Syrian children have dropped change the legal status of Syrians, but political out of school, only to become child labourers leaders are afraid to discuss the issue for fear or, if girls, possibly forced into early marriages. of losing votes. 6. Solid data is often lacking. The central govern- 14. With the insecure status for Syrians in Turkey, ment does not normally share demographic a ‘brain drain’ has taken place over the past data on Syrians in Turkey with the municipali- years. Intellectuals, university graduates and ties, which hampers their urban planning. people who could serve as bridge-builders, 7. The central government is not allocating extra local leaders and role-models have largely left budget funds according to the number of the country. 4 SYRIANS IN TURKEY 15. Arabic-speaking Turkish citizens are unwilling ABBREVIATIONS to function as bridge-builders due to sec- tarianism. Syrian refugees are mostly Sunni Arabs, in contrast to the Arabic-speaking citizens in south Turkey who are often Alawite, the same sect as Syria’s President Assad. 16. Among Syrians in Turkey there is a noticeable lack of associations, and those that exist often lack structural ties to local governments and Turkish civil society. AFAD The Disaster and Emergency Manage- 17. Syrian women in particular suffer from ment Presidency isolation, due to conservatism within many AKP Justice and Development Party extended families, but also due to language (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) difficulties and joblessness. Cooperatives, so- CHP Republican People’s Party cial entrepreneurship programmes, improved (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) infrastructure, sports activities and cultural CMU Çukurova Region Municipalities clubs could enhance social inclusion of Syrian Union females from conservative families. DGMM Directorate General for Migration 18. Domestic violence in Syrian families is mostly Management ‘under the radar’. Law enforcement agencies ESSN Emergency Social Safety Net also lack training on gender issues, which HTS Hayat Tahrir al-Sham affects women of all ethnicities. For Syrian IDP Internally Displaced Person women, the language gap is an extra barrier. ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, also 19. Polygamy among Syrians in Turkey appears called IS (Islamic State), or Daesh, not to be criminalized, even though polygamy a derogatory Arabic acronym is forbidden by Turkish law since the early MHP The Nationalist Movement Party 1900s. (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi), a far-right, 20. At the local level, many observers claim that ultra-nationalist Turkish political anti-Syrian sentiments are on the rise. party 21. The combined effects of a dwindling econo- MMU Marmara Region Municipalities my, mass unemployment, competition over Union low-skilled jobs and the Covid-19 Pandemic, NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization aggravate ethnic tensions, which may lead to PKK The Kurdistan Workers’ Party social unrest when the pandemic is over. (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdis- 22. Turkey cannot exclude a new mass influx of tanê, Turkish: Kürdistan İşçi Partisi) Syrians