Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Office of Evaluation
Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP)
Afghanistan- UTF /AFG/035/AFG
Final Report
November 2012
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Office of Evaluation (OED)
This report is available in electronic format at: http://www.fao.org/evaluation
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Acknowledgements
The evaluation team wishes to thank the staff of FAO OED, in particular Mr Bernd Bultemeier and the administration in Rome and in the FAOR office in Kabul as well and especially, Mr Waleed Mahdi CTA, Mr Sayed Sharif SNTO and all the FAO EIRP / IRDP team in Kabul and the project Regional Offices (especially those in Balkh, Herat and Kabul visited by the team) for the efficiency with which they made arrangements for the mission, in terms of meetings with essential stakeholders and field visits to project sites and the openness with which they responded to all enquiries. Thanks are extended to members of the EIRP / IRDP PUCs and the Ministry of Energy and Water both in Kabul and in the Regions, Provinces and River Basin and sub-basin offices visited by the evaluation team. Thanks are also due to members of other Ministries and Departments of the Afghan administration (in particular MAIL and NEPA), as well as the representatives of consultants, contractors and NGOs including those directly associated with EIRP /IRDP or working on similar or related issues in the same regions as well as villagers and farmer beneficiaries of the project who gave time to answer our questions and queries with unfailing openness and courtesy.
Composition of the Evaluation Team
The FAO team consisted of two independent consultants recruited by FAO OED for the purpose of evaluating the Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP): a. Team Leader: Anthony Fitzherbert MSc Reading University (Great Britain) has a background in general agriculture, crop and livestock production and rural development. Experience of leading projects, programmes, responsible for teams from different disciplines as well as evaluation / review missions for different international organizations, including the FAO. He has had long experience of working in Afghanistan and the neighbouring countries in the region, going back to the late 1960s. He has a command of some of the local languages. b. Team Member:- Irrigation and Water Resources:- Johannes Oosterkamp, MAgrSc from Wageningen, (the Netherlands) has a background in Irrigation engineering and Water Resource Management, with wide international experience in different countries, including considerable experience of working in Afghanistan going back to the early 1990s working for different donors and agencies. He has experience of participating in evaluation and review missions and responsibility for leading agricultural development projects and environmental study projects.
iii Table of Contents
Acronyms and Glossary of Term vii Executive Summary xi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Background to the evaluation 1 1.2 Evaluation purpose and scope 1 1.3 Timing of evaluation 2 1.4 Evaluation methodology 2 1.5 Reference to other final and terminal reports 3 1.6 Evaluation schedule 4 2 Background to the EIRP (Its main components and the role of FAO) 4 2.1 Background to EIRP and FAO’s involvement 4 2.2 Project establishment and the role of FAO 6 2.3 The role of FAO and the EIRP project coordination unit 6 2.4 Summary of the project’s achievements 6 2.5 The completion of EIRP and the start of IRDP 7 2.6 The continuation of FAO TA contract for IRDP 8 2.7 MEW responsibility for the execution of EIRP/IRDP 8 2.8 Explanation as to why EIRP/IRDP is placed in the MEW 9 3 The project 10 3.1 Project budget and expenditure 10 3.1.1 EIRP and FAO components ...... 10 3.1.2 Regarding disbursement of funds ...... 12 3.1.3 Regarding the management of contracts ...... 12 3.2 Partnerships 12 3.3 FAO project management and technical assistance 12 3.4 Present FAO team 13 3.5 Comment on technical backstopping 13 3.6 Observations on FAO team management and style 13 3.7 MEW PCU staffing 14 3.8 General points of management and institutional relations 14 3.9 Evaluators’ observations and comments 15 4 Component A – Rehabilitation of large, medium and small irrigation schemes 17 4.1 Narrative and technical assessment 17 4.1.1 Preliminary note Component A ...... 17 4.1.2 Background and recent history of irrigation and rehabilitation ...... 17 4.1.3 EIRP progress and reported achievements ...... 18 4.1.4 Benefits derived from Component A as reported ...... 19 4.1.5 Large schemes - Summary ...... 21 4.1.6 Large schemes- evaluators’ observations ...... 21 4.1.7 Medium/small schemes - evaluators’ observations ...... 22 5 Component B - Feasibility studies 27 5.1 Lower Kokcha feasibility study 27 5.1.1 Narrative and technical assessment ...... 27 5.1.2 Doubtful cost-effectiveness of the Lower Kokcha scheme ...... 29 5.1.3 Evaluators comments on the LKIHP feasibility study ...... 29 5.2 Small dam development in the Northern Basin (ongoing) after Johannes Oosterkamp’s modification 32 5.2.1 Narrative and technical assessment ...... 32
iv 5.2.2 Small dams - A confusing title ...... 33 5.2.3 Placing an artificial limit on the height of the dams ...... 33 5.2.4 The issue of sediment ...... 34 5.2.5 Assessment of watersheds ...... 34 5.2.6 Premature social engagement with site communities ...... 34 5.2.7 Karstic reservoirs ...... 35 5.2.8 ‘Enclosed basin’ and subterranean flow across frontiers ...... 35 6 Component B2 - Monitoring and evaluation 37 6.1 Narrative and assessment 37 6.1.1 Background ...... 37 6.1.2 The EIRP first baseline survey and assessments ...... 38 6.1.3 Some problems facing the design of baseline survey for EIRP ...... 41 6.1.4 M&E unit staffing and the issue of retaining trained personnel ...... 43 6.1.5 The need to strengthen data base and M&E accuracy for IRDP ...... 44 7 Component C - Institution strengthening and technical assistance 47 7.1 Institutional strengthening 47 7.1.1 Buildings, facilities and equipment ...... 47 7.1.2 Training for the MEW, PCU and other professionals ...... 48 7.1.3 Training for water users (farmers and mirabs) in operation and maintenance (O&M) ...... 48 7.1.4 Summary of trainings completed ...... 50 7.2 Technical assistance 50 7.3 Institutional strengthening and TA: Conclusions 52 8 Component D – Hydro-meteorological network 55 8.1 Narrative and technical assessment 55 8.1.1 Background ...... 55 8.1.2 Summary of project achievements ...... 55 8.1.3 Data collection and analysis ...... 56 8.1.4 Other similar initiatives in addition to EIRP/IRDP ...... 57 9 Environmental and social safeguards sent to JO 21September 60 9.1 Preamble 60 9.2 Practice under EIRP 61 9.3 Increased ESM responsibilities under IRDP 61 9.4 The bureaucratic load for the rehabilitation of traditional schemes 62 9.5 Need for government to work with traditional community management 63 10 The issue of narcotic crops and irrigation 65 10.1 The development of irrigation and the issue of cultivating narcotic crops 65 10.2 Obligations concerning narcotic crops under EIRP operations manual 66 10.3 Conclusion on narcotic crops and Irrigation 67 11 Conclusions and looking to the future 71 11.1 A seamless transfer from EIRP to IRDP in 2011 71 11.2 Rehabilitation of traditional irrigation systems 71 11.3 Monitoring and evaluation 73 11.4 Feasibility studies 74 11.5 The Lower Kokchar irrigation and hydro project 74 11.6 The small dams project 75 11.7 Establishment of a national hydro-meteorological network 75 11.8 Institutional support and technical assistance 75 11.9 Environmental and social safeguards (ESS) within IRDP 76 11.9.1 The issue of narcotic crops and irrigation ...... 77 12 Conclusion 77
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Mission Terms of Reference Appendix 2: Persons and Organizations met on Mission Appendix 3: Mission Itinerary Appendix 4: Bibliography
ANNEXES
Annex 1.1: Organization chart for Ministry of Energy and Water Annex 1.2: Technical consultancies Annex 2: Other irrigation and water resources projects and programmes Annex 3.1: Summary list of large schemes Annex 3.2: Field site visits Mazar-e Sharif and Herat Annex 3.3: Observations and comments on structures - Steel Gates, Concrete, Masonry & Gabions for Canals & River Engineering Annex 3.4: Ajmir Canal, Baghlan - A Case Study Annex 3.5: Quality assurance and quality control Annex 3.6: Design issues. The Pros & Cons of an Official Design Manual Annex 4: Lower Kokcha Feasibility Study Annex 5.1: General technical note on dams with relevance to the Small Dam Project Annex 5.2: Small dams– Site Visits Annex 6: Monitoring and evaluation - Summary of Key Project Outcomes taken from EIRP Monitoring and Evaluation Report 2010-2011 Annex 7: Institutional strengthening and technical assistance ( Extract from FAO EIRP Terminal Report) Annex 8: National Hydro-Meteorological Network Annex 9: Environmental and Social Safeguards Annex 10: Narcotic crops and irrigation
vi Acronyms and Glossary of Term
ADB Asian Development Bank AGLW Previously Land and Water Service (FAO) AIMS Afghanistan Information and Mapping Service-originally supported by the UN now privatized. AISA Afghanistan Investment Support Agency ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy APS Agricultural Prospect Report (Agricultural Crop Forecast) AREU Afghanistan Research & Evaluation Unit ARTF Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund ASE American Society of Engineers ASS Afghan Statistical Service also Agricultural Sector Study BOQ Bill of Quantities CC Climate Change CDC Community Development Council CTO Chief Technical Officer DACAAR The main Danish INGO working in Afghanistan since the 1980s DAIL Department (s) of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (Provincial offices of MAIL) DFID Department For International Development (U.K. International Aid) EC European Commission EIRP Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project ESM Environmental and Social Management ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework ESMP Environment and Social Management Plan ESS Environment and Social Safeguards FAH AA M FAO supported programme in MAIL to develop capacity in agricultural statistical data collection, analysis and reporting- now GOoPP- see below FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN FHWA Federal Highway Administration GIRoA Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan GIS Geographic Information System GoA Government of Afghanistan GOoPP General Office of Policy and Planning – in MAIL supported by FAO GPS Global Positioning System Ha hectare (s)
vii HLP Horticulture and Livestock Project (sup ported by WB with MAIL HQ Headquarters IQC Indefinite Quantity Contract ICR Implementation Completion Report INGO International Non Government Organizations IQC Independent Quality Control IRDP Irrigation Restoration and Development Project ISAF International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) JICA Japanese International Cooperation Agency LKIHP Lower Kokcha Irrigation & Hydropower Project MAAH Ministry of Agriculture & Animal Husbandry (The name of the Ministry of Agriculture until 2006 when changed. – see below) MAIL Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock m. Metre Masl metres above sea level M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MEW Ministry of Energy and Water MIS Mapping Information Service MIWRE Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environment: Until amalgamated with MWP to form MEW with Environment taken over by the newly formed National Environmental Protection Agency- NEPA – see below. MoI Ministry of the Interior MWP Ministry of Water and Power until amalgamated with MIWRE to form the MEW- in 2005 - see below MIS Monitoring Information System MoF Ministry of Finance MRRD Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development MTCE Ministry of Transport and Civil Engineering MTR Medium Term Review NGO Nongovernmental organization (INGO-International NGO) NEPA National Environmental Protection Agency NSP National Solidarity Programme OED Office of Evaluation (FAO) O&M Operation and Maintenance OFWM On Farm Water Management (WB project in MAIL) OSDP Organization for Sustainable Development & Research – Afghan NGO specializing in Rural Survey and Data Collection originally COAR P-ARBDP Panj Amu River Basin Development Programme
viii PCU Project Coordination Unit PDO Project Development Objective PIP Project Implementation Document PMF Probable Maximum Flood PMP Probable Maximum Precipitation PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team (s) QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control QIP Quick Impact Project RCDA Rapid Crop Damage Assessment RO Regional Office SNCWR Supreme N ational Council fir Water Resources SNTO Senior National Technical Officer SUPARCO Satellite Upper Atmosphere Research Commission - Satellite crop assessment facility in Pakistan assisted by FAO RCC Regional Co-ordination Committee R&R Rest and Recuper ation TA Technical Assistance TCI Investment Centre Division (FAO) TL Team Leader TR Terminal Report UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNMACA United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre (Afghanistan) UNOPS United Nations Operations Service UNODC United Nations Organization for Drug Control USAID United States Agency for International Development USDA United States Department of Agriculture USGS United States Geological Survey WB World Bank WFP World Food Programme WL Water Law WAPCOS Water and Power Consultants (New Delhi) (Undertaking Feasibility etc studies for small dams component- IRDP) WAPEC A Water and Power Engineering Co nsultants of Afghanistan WMD Water Management Directorate WMDG Water Management Director General WRD Water Resources Department
ix Glossary of Dari/English Terms (Relating to Water etc) DARI ENGLISH Ab, au water (sometimes referring to the name of a river- e.g. Sokhab- the Red Water) (colloquial) Afghan Referring to a citizen of Afghanistan. But also in its archaic meaning to communities of those who speak Pushto (as for example in Pushtun Zargun- Hirat, or Afghan Doshi- in Baghlan to differentiate them from neighbouring Persian (farsiwan) speaking communities arbab village leader (mainly in north);also –‘boss’ arhat/arhad traditional irrigation from shallow well ashar / hasher / communal labour for public works- free of charge hasher kar band dam, barrier, weir buluk Literally- a block of land (sometimes an irrigation water entitlement) bowari shallow well- mainly in south chah / chah well / deep well amikh charak literally 1/4 th - share- may also refer to 4 ‘pau’ or aprox 1.77 kg chashma, spring (of water) cheshmeh darak/ permanent or semi-permanent water divisions in a channel (she darak- a bi- furcation in a channel) darya In Afghanistan- mainly refers to a river. e.g. Amu Darya (the River Oxus) (in daria Iran ‘darya’. mainly refers to the sea-e.g. Darya Khazar = the Caspian Sea) dehghan / sharecropper / sharecropping dehghani farsiwan literally- Persan speaking (farsi zaban) fasl literally ‘season’ but when referred to as ‘do fasl’ – or ‘seh fasl’ – means two or three crops in a single season. hawz , haus pool of water, tank, small reservoir, night storage basin in some places in central Afg- ‘nawar’ jar temporary dyke jerib unit of land- approx 5 jerib/1 hect. jirga mainly a Pushtun term- for a communal gathering to settled a dispute of importance to the whole community jui irrigation / water channel juft-e gaw unit of irrigated land- derived from a yoke of oxen juft- a pair- gaw (gav) a ox (cow). Most commonly used in n. west Afghanistan. May vary with type of land. karez / also Traditional (ancient) system of tapping alluvial aquifers for water through a qanat (Iran) system of shafts connected by a subterranean galleries – leading the water to the surface for irrigation. karezkan specialists skilled at digging and maintaining karez kazanadar treasurer- some large and ancient canals as in Herat may employ someone to manage a maintenance fund keroyeh Rent required for leased land- usually calculated in a percentage of the potential (estimated) yield in wheat kharwar literally – a donkey load. Varies with locality 80 ‘ser ‘ of Kabul ie 80 x 7 kg- 560kg in Balkh 80 x 14 kg
x Executive Summary
ES1. The Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP) was supported by World Bank IDA funding through a credit of USD 40 million in 2004, followed by three IDA grants totaling USD 86.5 million, the last in 2009. From its inception until project completion in 2011 the project was technically supported by FAO (project symbol UTF/AFG/035/AFG).
ES2. EIRP and its follow-up IRDP (Irrigation Reconstruction and Development Project) are national projects managed by the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) with a presence in all the major river basins of Afghanistan. EIRP was designed primarily as an ‘Emergency’ project, with its main objective, assisting recovery of irrigated agriculture through the rehabilitation and improvement of traditional schemes. Following a WB mid-term review in 2006, the project’s structure was modified to consist of four components: a structure that remained valid until project conclusion in December 2011:
(A) The rehabilitation of ‘large, medium and lesser’ irrigation schemes (main component); (B) The preparation of feasibility studies for future projects, and the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) unit in the EIRP project coordination unit (PCU); (C) Institution building and technical assistance; and (D) The re-establishment of a national hydro-meteorological network.
Information about the evaluation
ES3. This evaluation was implemented as stipulated in the UTF/AFG/035/AFG project document in order to: i) provide accountability for the Government of Afghanistan, the World Bank, UN FAO, and beneficiary irrigation communities with respect to project performance; ii) assess project relevance; iii) determine the effectiveness and sustainability of project results; iv) assess the effectiveness of project processes and support modalities; v) assess the project’s efficiency; vi) discern lessons learned and identify best practices; and vii) provide recommendations that could inform future project design and implementation.
ES4. Because the evaluation was conducted after the completion of EIRP in December 2011, this final evaluation mainly focused on lessons learned and identifying areas for improvement for the immediate use in the planning and implementation of IRDP. The FAO team consisted of two independent consultants: Anthony Fitzherbert (Team Leader), with a background in general agriculture, crop and livestock production and rural development, and a long experience of working in Afghanistan and the neighbouring countries in the region, and Johannes Oosterkamp (Team Member), with a background in Irrigation Engineering and Water Resource Management and considerable working experience in Afghanistan.
ES5. The evaluation took place in Afghanistan from 29 February 2012 to 27 March 2012, followed by a lengthy writing time interspersed with consultations with project stakeholders. Due to a combination of insecurity and time constraints, the evaluation team was only able to spend a total of five days on field visits to see samples of completed irrigation sub-projects, hydrological stations and proposed dam sites in Samangan and Balkh provinces in the north and Herat in the west. Although this enabled the evaluators to gain some idea of the issues and the quality of the work, this sample is recognized as being small compared to the scale of the whole project. Field visits were supplemented by discussions with project staff and stakeholders (unfortunately with very few farmers) and the exhaustive study of the project’s considerable
xi documentation and reports, some of which required further clarification during report writing after the team had left Afghanistan.
Key findings
ES6. Consistency and continuity of FAO’s management from the start of EIRP means the project has had rare stability in an unstable situation. It has been possible to build on experience gained and lessons learned and retain the historical memory of the project intact. The main strengths are as follows:
ES7. FAO’s financial management has been consistently assessed by the WB as having been ‘very satisfactory’; the WB considers EIRP to have been something of a ‘flag ship’ project in Afghanistan; good relations between FAO and MEW counterparts have been maintained; FAO EIRP/IRDP regional teams are headed by Afghans – this approach is likely to ensure an effective and efficient field programme; FAO technical backstopping has been flexible – the main technical backstopping until 2010 was provided by FAO TCI in Rome, then by the FAO Regional Office (Bangkok) as required.
ES8. In terms of results, before the close of EIRP in December 2011, and despite a deteriorating security situation in many provinces, a total of 752 medium/lesser scale projects, and 23 large schemes were designed, approved and awarded of which 710 medium/small schemes and 18 large schemes are reported in EIRP project generated documents as having been completed with the participation of the communities and water users. Work in progress at the close of the EIRP continues under IRDP.
ES9. In addition, a feasibility study for the Lower Kokcha Irrigation and Hydro Power Project was completed and approved in 2009. Further feasibility studies on 22 potential small dams in the ‘enclosed’ Northern Basin were initiated under EIRP to be completed under IRDP. These feasibility studies are referred to in more critical detail in the main report.
ES10. By December 2011, out of a plan for 174 hydrological stations a total of 105 are reported to have been installed. Out of a plan for 40 gauging stations 36 have been installed. A meteorological network of snow stations and weather stations has been only partially completed compared to the original plan.
ES11. Despite continuing staffing problems, a working M&E unit has been established in the PCU supported by FAO. Also, a full set of training initiatives for institutional and technical capacity building at all levels has been carried out, together with the construction of office facilities, laboratories and the provision of equipment and furniture as designated in the project document.
Table 1 Activity Target Progress (%) In USD Component A: Rehabilitation of irrigation schemes 76.4 82% Component B: Feasibility studies and monitoring and evaluation 3.7 100% FAO Terminal Report 2011 6.7 Component C: Institutional strengthening and technical assistance 38.1 99% FAO Terminal Report 2011 35.1 Component D: Hydro-meteorological network 16.3 55%
Total 134.5 82 %
xii ES12. Concerning gender issues: While essentially EIRP and IRDP are concerned with irrigation and hydrological matters that are above specific issues of gender, the necessity of being sensitive to women’s and children’s needs is increasingly emphasized when discussing environmental and social safeguards under IRDP.
Conclusions
ES13. The relevance of EIRP is clear from the importance of irrigation for increased crop production and ultimately national food security. The project and its follow-up IRDP fit well within the current Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and related policy documents. The institutional support and technical assistance provided by EIRP has involved the physical construction and refurbishment of offices and facilities and the procurement of essential furniture and equipment as well as the provision of training, technical support and mentoring.
ES14. After a slow start from 2004 to 2006, the irrigation component of EIRP has been efficiently and effectively managed. The project has been fortunate in having had consistency of senior management, both international and national, since its beginning in 2004. A pilot training programme in post-canal rehabilitation O&M, provided to water users and mirabs and local officials of the WMD has been initiated. Under IRDP, this will be expanded to cover the remaining 40 percent of the completed EIRP schemes under IRDP and will be developed further. Only time will show the sustainable effectiveness of the O&M training particularly where additional maintenance requires a cash contribution from the community.
ES15. Through the rehabilitation and improvement of traditional irrigation systems and the conveyance of irrigation water from head to tail of the systems, the project has had a positive impact and a significant ‘increment’ of annually cropped land reclaimed for irrigated cropping is reported as well as increases in crop yields and crop intensity, O&M labour and time saved and even substantial increases in land values. From observations made in the field by the evaluators (although perforce limited) by and large the engineering work has been competently carried out. Nonetheless there is room for improvement as illustrated in Annex 2 with suggestions where improvements might be made.
ES16. In terms of sustainability, the main advantage of supporting traditional irrigation systems is that the rural communities already have traditional management systems to maintain and manage their irrigation channels and to distribute water. This makes it more likely that the investment made under this project will be managed and maintained by the communities themselves in a sustainable fashion.
ES17. EIRP placed a lot of emphasis on training beneficiaries and mirabs in O&M to help improve local skills in managing their systems and to ensure that the communities concerned are fully aware of their responsibilities once the project’s work is completed. Time will tell how well the rural beneficiaries of the EIRP have grasped these ideas and responsibilities.
ES18. A series of pre-feasibility and feasibility studies on 22 potential ‘small’ dam sites has been initiated under EIRP and is ongoing under IRDP. While the final results of the studies are still outstanding, the evaluators question both the ultimate cost effectiveness of such dams in such locations and fear that excessive sedimentation of relatively small reservoirs is likely to seriously foreshorten the useful life of any small dam constructed in that region. In addition, the definition of what is understood by a ‘small dam’ needs to be clarified. In terms of this sub-
xiii component the definition appears to be at variance with other commonly recognized international terminology.
ES19. A base line survey for monitoring and evaluation and first annual assessment of project progress were carried out between 2006 and 2007 by an independent firm of consultants followed by inputs by two other independent consultants in 2008-2009. However, little was achieved during that time to establish an M&E unit in the EIRP PCU. Finally in 2009 FAO was invited to provide direct TA with establishing an M&E capacity in the MEW PCU. Although considerable progress has been made in this respect since FAO took on this responsibility, the capacity of the MEW PCU continues to be frustrated by difficulties in retaining national staff after they have been trained. The long-term sustainability of any M&E capacity in MEW or even as part of a broader national unit will depend on the ability of the GoA to retain competent staff. At present, the indications are not good.
ES20. In the absence of other facilities, under EIRP the data base and annual assessments although triangulated and double checked as far as possible, were perforce based essentially on farmer and mirab reporting rather than on the exact on-the-ground measurement of irrigated crop land and command areas and comparative crop yields. Although certainly indicative of general impact, they are consequently based on essential weaknesses that left them open to criticism. Under IRDP the basis for such data and M&E assessments is intended to be strengthened through the establishment of an MIS/GIS system for which FAO is providing technical advice. It should be noted that as designed at present the M&E unit in the MEW PCU is undertaking assessments of cropped land and crop yields which are more correctly the responsibility of MAIL rather than MEW. This is an anomaly that will need adjusting.
ES21. At present, university courses are designed only to produce pure civil engineers and graduates purely in agronomy. There is still a need for ‘rural engineers’ who also have an understanding of agronomy, crop production and on-farm water management. Although some longer-term overseas post-graduate type training had to be cancelled, the training programme as scheduled has been mostly fulfilled.
ES22. A significant component of EIRP has been the establishment of a modern national network of hydro-meteorological stations designed to replace the earlier network established in the 1960s and 1970s and which was subsequently lost. An ambitious project for a country such as Afghanistan in its present stage of institutional, political and physical development, this component has met with many teething problems, including logistics, procurement, lack of human capacity and insecurity. FAO has provided technical assistance for procurement and installation; however, the impression gained by the FAO evaluation team, is that the planning for this component was very ambitious for the realities of Afghanistan at this stage in its recovery.
ES23. Under IRDP there is an increased demand to address issues relating to environmental and social safeguards (ESS). The evaluators fear that the demands of ESS, as presently incorporated into procedures, run the risk of creating an unnecessary and unjustifiable burden of bureaucracy that is likely to negatively affect the efficiency, effectiveness and ultimate impact of the project’s main component, the ‘rehabilitation/reconstruction of traditional irrigation systems. As things are under IRDP, each sub-project must undergo an exhaustive ESS assessment. Current rules state that sub-project proposals shall not only be approved by MEW but also by NEPA, backed up by an independent group of 12 assessors drawn from the universities and possibly from elsewhere.
xiv ES24. The issue of interministerial collaboration is recognized as an intractable institutional problem that is beyond the capacity of FAO to solve by itself, most particularly in this instance between MEW and MAIL. It is appreciated that FAO through its presence in both ministries does its best to bridge the divide. It is hoped/expected that the connections between irrigation engineering and ‘on-farm water management’ and crop production will be strengthened as a result of the follow-up IRDP/MEW and complementary WB and FAO initiatives in MAIL.
Recommendations
ES25. The following is a summary of the main recommendations. Recommendations in more detail are provided in the main report under each individual subject-section.
Recommendation 1: Rehabilitation and improvement of traditional irrigation systems under IRDP It should be noted that due to its design, EIRP has concentrated solely on civil engineering issues and on improving the effective and efficient conveyance of irrigation water for crop production. Looking to the future such a project should be linked, where possible and from its inception stage, to other projects and programmes providing other inputs required by farmers for their crop and horticultural production. Social issues should also be taken into account.
Recommendation 2: Interministerial and institutional collaboration under IRDP Under IRDP, renewed efforts are being made by the FAO country programme office in collaboration with the FAO IRDP team to encourage closer collaboration between MEW and MAIL, particularly with respect to OFWM. The evaluators appreciate this initiative, and recommend that this collaboration be done where possible together with the Supreme Water Council. At the regional level close, if informal, relations should be maintained between IRDP and other complementary projects in the field of agriculture, horticulture and related subjects. FAO, as the main provider of TA, should help to facilitate this.
Recommendation 3: Care to be taken that rehabilitation and improvement of one system or in one place is not at the expense or detriment of others Care needs to be taken by project engineers not to increase the capacity of any single canal system to the extent that it deprives downstream systems of their rightful share of the stream/ river’s water, particularly in seasons of low water. (More fully discussed in Section 9 Annex 9 – ESS)
Recommendation 4: Caution regarding improving water supply and increasing the production of narcotic crops - a common sense approach Narcotics crops and irrigation: Whilst increasing the availability of water may increase farmers’ cropping options, this may also lead to an increase in the area cultivated to opium in locations where farmers habitually cultivate opium poppy. Whilst this is already recognized by EIRP/IRDP, some locations are more at risk than others and a common sense approach to this issue is necessary. (More fully discussed in Section 10 and Annex 10)
Recommendation 5: Rehabilitating existing traditional irrigation systems likely to be more cost- effective than small dam construction Until political stability is assured, it is likely to be more cost-effective to invest in the rehabilitation and improvement of existing community systems rather than invest large amounts of money in dam structures and formal irrigation structures that will require their own ‘government’ dependant management infrastructure which in a country such as Afghanistan have proved to be so fragile.
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Recommendation 6: Cautions relating to small dam construction under IRDP Concerning small dams, the definition of the term should be clarified. In addition, the issue of sediment has to be taken very seriously. Throughout Afghanistan most rivers when in full flow or spate carry a heavy load of sediment. This is particularly true of the rivers of the Northern Basin’s Region.
Recommendation 7: Attention should be given to establishing an M&E unit for the MEW rather than specifically for a specific finite project and the direct role of FAO in M&E needs to be re- considered Serious consideration should be given to establishing M&E as a unit within MEW rather than specifically associated to a project with a finite life span such as EIRP or IRDP. (FAO has been of this opinion from the outset as reflected in statements by both the FAO CTA and the technical officer concerned in FAO’s Regional Office.) In addition, something must be done to improve rates of pay and working conditions for technically competent and well trained personnel working for MEW in M&E and other capacities for that matter. FAO’s direct role in assisting the establishment and management of an M&E unit, although justified in view of the previous failure of successive consultants, should be considered as a temporary measure in view of perceived conflicts of interest with its other TA responsibilities and reporting. The M&E unit in MEW PCU is also undertaking assessment work that is more correctly the responsibility of MAIL, an anomaly which at some point needs to be corrected.
Recommendation 8: Broader based courses for rural irrigation engineers To (re-)initiate courses for ‘rural irrigation engineers’ (a transition between agronomist and civil engineer).
Recommendation 9: The establishment of a national centre for data processing and hydrology information There is a need for further expansion of the hydrological network, and there is urgent need to expand and modernize the hydrology organization in the country. A national centre for data processing and hydrology information should be established for compilation, processing, storage and dissemination of hydrology information to user agencies. It should be noted that traditionally meteo data is collected by the ministry of transport.
Recommendation 10: ESS grading under IRDP to be modified from ‘A’ to ‘B’ and ‘C’ to lessen unnecessary bureaucracy The environmental and social safeguards (ESS) should be reviewed by the WB with a view to modifying the blanket ‘A’ grading that presently applies to the whole IRDP. It is suggested that a ‘B’ or even a ‘C’ grading is more appropriate to the situation. ‘A’ grading may be retained for larger projects such as dams where the environmental and social impact may be greater. With traditional systems, it is suggested that ESS issues would be more effectively dealt with by appropriate awareness training for engineers and contractors rather than the imposition of additional layers of bureaucracy.
xvi
1 Introduction
1.1 Background to the evaluation
1. The Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP)-UTF/AFG/035/AFG started in April 2004 and concluded in December 2011. The project was funded by the World Bank (WB) through one credit and three grants provided to the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) for implementation through the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW). The project is supported with technical assistance (TA) provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN). EIRP finished on 31 December 2011 and is succeeded by the, Irrigation Reconstruction and Development Project (IRDP)-UTF/AFG/070/AFG, which is already ongoing with another WB grant. TA support by FAO continues.
1.2 Evaluation purpose and scope
2. This report was prepared as part of FAO’s obligations under its responsibilities for the EIRP in Afghanistan (UTF/AFG/035/AFG) to:
• provide accountability for the Government of Afghanistan, the World Bank, FAO and beneficiary irrigation communities with respect to project performance; • assess project relevance to stakeholder needs and expectations; • determine the effectiveness and sustainability of project results; • assess the effectiveness of processes and support modalities implemented to promote beneficiary ownership through involvement and participation across the project cycle; • assess the efficiency of project resources deployed in implementing the project; • discern lessons learned and identify best practices from EIRP experience, for use in the design and implementation of the follow-on Irrigation Restoration and Development (IRDP) to achieve better results; and • provide appropriate recommendations that could further improve project performance now or for the future, including: refining project design; working methods, procedures, supervision and quality control practices used in restoration works; and capacity building approaches.
3. As EIRP was concluded on 31 December 2011, this final evaluation mainly focuses on lessons learned and identifying areas for improvement for the immediate use in the planning and implementation of IRDP. The follow-up project had already started before EIRP finished.
4. The fact that the evaluation was undertaken several months after EIRP had been concluded means that activities under IRDP had already started several months before the end of 2011. The change-over from one project to its follow-up (IRDP) was conducted, as far as possible, in a seamless overlapping fashion. Where appropriate, comments are also made on the ongoing IRDP.
5. Prior to the start of the evaluation, the question of what should be ‘evaluated’ was discussed at some length. In view of the difficulty in disentangling the role and responsibilities of FAO from the conduct and progress of the project as a whole, it was decided that the evaluation team review the EIRP in its entirety. This has been particularly necessary in so far as
1 from the beginning until the present FAO has been working extremely closely in support of the MEW PCU in almost every aspect of its responsibilities. Even when not actually directly providing a TA input, FAO has been there in the background, if only advising on procurement procedures. Thus it is seen as necessary to consider such things as: the initial phases of establishing an M&E unit before FAO had a direct role; the feasibility study on the Lower Kokcha conducted by Fichtner company and the ongoing small dams component being carried out by WAPCOS which was started under EIRP to be concluded under IRDP. In fact, in the case of all three of these components, the evaluators were requested to have a look at what had happened or what (in the case of the small dams) was in process. Thus observations and comments are also made on these and on certain other activities in which FAO is not necessarily taking the leading role. Wherever relevant the report endeavours to clarify FAO’s position and level of responsibility.
6. Inevitably, due to the complexity and length of the project in its first (EIRP) and ongoing (IRDP) follow-up phase (2004-2012), this report is somewhat longer than might be expected for a normal evaluation report.
7. This evaluation makes a number of specific recommendations directed towards respective stakeholders (Government of Afghanistan-MEW; the World Bank, PCU, FAO and beneficiary communities). Evidence-based analysis and other relevant tools are used as appropriate. In the case of completed work such as the feasibility study for the Lower Kokcha project, or ongoing work such as the small dams feasibility, the consultants have felt it necessary and justified to provide independent professional observations.
1.3 Timing of evaluation
8. This evaluation faces a somewhat unusual situation, insofar as instead of taking place several months prior to the close of the EIRP, it has taken place in the third month after the end of EIRP, and after activities under IRDP had already commenced.
9. The FAO Office of Evaluation (OED) had difficulty in fielding an appropriate evaluation team until early 2012 and the evaluation took place during the month of March. Despite the delay, FAO considered that there was still much value in having a fresh look at the performance of EIRP, whilst IRDP is in its earliest stages there is still an opportunity to provide additional recommendations and observations for its improved performance.
1.4 Evaluation methodology
10. Due to the fact that EIRP had finished before the evaluation team was fielded, the evaluators have had to rely heavily on documents and reports relating to both EIRP and IRDP. These include M&E reports and periodic reviews by the WB which were supplemented by semi-structured informal interviews with various stakeholders, in the interests of triangulation. These included the staff of FAO, the PCU and MEW in Kabul, Balkh/ Samangan and Herat as well as local farmers and mirabs, when encountered. Additional meetings were held with others working in related and complementary projects, ministries and agencies, such as the Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) and the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), consultants, contractors and INGOs, both at the central level and in the three regions visited- Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif (Balkh and Samangan) and Herat. 1
1 See Appendix 2 People Met.
2 11. The mission took place towards the end of an exceptionally cold winter with snow still falling even at the lower elevations in the north. As no construction work was going on in the field, it was not possible to meet any actively working contractors. The evaluators did, however, meet representatives of the Indian firm, WAPCOS, contracted to undertake the pre-feasibility, feasibility study and design work for the small dams component of IRDP. WAPCOS staff were met in their office in Mazar-e-Sharif and on site in Samangan.
12. In Balkh, Samangan and Herat provinces the evaluators, together with provincial FAO and PCU technical staff and engineers, visited a sample of completed works on traditional irrigation channels, hydrological stations, and potential small dam sites. The latter were only visited in Samangan. The districts visited were those deemed to be safe for travel by the local UN security offices. 2Additional visits were proposed for the Kabul Region in Parwan and Kapisa provinces. However, these visits were rendered impractical by the conditions for travel demanded by UN security. 3 Security issues also meant that the evaluators were unable to have a free choice or make a sampling of project sites to be visited as would have been the normal procedure in other circumstances. They were compelled by security regulations and assessments to visit those sites deemed to be secure and as approved through UN security procedures.
13. Nonetheless, and despite these restrictions, it was possible to see a cross section of the project’s physical works in the field in the north and the west and get a good idea not only of the type of work being carried out, but also its quality and usefulness. It was also possible to have first hand experience of the difficulties and hazards of work in Afghanistan at the present time. However, the evaluators are very conscious of the fact that the sample of sites visited was very few compared with the scale of the whole project, which would have been preferable. They were, however, able to complement these site visits by reference to reports and documentation and dialogue and correspondence with project staff and others with their own previous knowledge and experience of the country.
1.5 Reference to other final and terminal reports
14. This FAO internal (OED) evaluation is taking place after the WB had completed its final ‘supervision’ of the project in November 2011 and after its client, the GoA. MEW, had prepared its Implementation Completion Report (ICR) (Draft - dated 5 March 2012). These reports together with the FAO team’s own terminal report (TR) (March 2012), completed prior to the ICR report comprise the most important concluding reference documents for this evaluation. It should be noted that as these reports are in the English language they were effectively both composed by the FAO team with inputs provided by the MEW PCU. At the time of composing this report, the World Bank completion report was in its final stages of preparation. Although expected shortly it was not available to the evaluation team at the time of preparing this report.
15. Where appropriate, lessons learned and recommendations already stated by previous project reviews and reports may be reinforced. Additional observations, lessons and recommendations have been included. Because the mission was fielded after the conclusion of
2 In Balkh – Khulm (Tash Gorgan) district; In Samanghan – Aybak central district; in Hirat- Ghoriyan, Zendajan and Korokh districts. 3 In order to visit Parwan and Kapisa Provinces UN Security in Kabul insisted that the evaluators and their national technical counterparts be escorted by two armoured cars and a platoon of Afghan National Army. This was considered as more likely to raise the risk of being viewed as a target and also to be an unacceptable way to visit villages where work had been done. So the evaluators decided not to take up this suggestion. It should be noted that national staff from MEW/DEW and FAO are generally able to visit project sites, low key and in reasonable security, whilst having to concur with procedures. It is much more difficult for FAO’s international staff for whom security procedures are much more stringent. This can and does make difficulties for the management and monitoring of project activities.
3 EIRP and the start of IRDP it can be said to be an exercise in ‘validation’ as much as an ‘evaluation’.
1.6 Evaluation schedule
16. The mission started on 26 February 2012 - with a two-day briefing visit to FAO headquarters in Rome. Between 1-28 March, the evaluators were in Afghanistan working from the FAO irrigation office in MEW in Kabul. They were able to visit the field in Balkh, Samangan and Herat. Summary of the schedule is given below:
Summary of evaluation mission Dates and days Place and general activities 26 February (Sun) Flew from home bases in UK and the Netherlands to Rome 27 February (Mon) to 29 February (Wed) FAO HQ Rome (including travel) 1 March (Thur) to 6 March (Wed) Kabul- working out of FAO office in MEW 7 March (Wed) to 10 March (Wed) Working out of FAO office in DEW- Mazar-e Sharif and visiting sites in Samangan & Balkh Mar. 11 th (Sat) to Mar. 13 th (Tue) Working out of FAO office in the DEW –Herat and visiting sites in three districts 14 March (Wed) to 27 March (Tue) Kabul- Working out of FAO office in MEW 28 March (Wed) Flew back to home bases in the UK and the Netherlands 29 March to 19 April Total of 6 paid days completing Draft Report in home countries.
2 Background to the EIRP (Its main components and the role of FAO)
2.1 Background to EIRP and FAO’s involvement
17. FAO’s direct involvement in the rehabilitation of traditional irrigation systems started with the withdrawal of the USSR forces from Afghanistan in February 1989 and continued throughout the 1990s. Due to limitations in funding, FAO’s work at that time mainly focused on the eastern provinces, although training responsibilities had a wider reach. 4 This earlier programme, funded by different bilateral donors, was mainly aimed at rehabilitating traditional irrigation systems to assist refugees return to their villages to start farming again. 5
18. By 2002, three FAO projects supported the water sector in the eastern, southern and western regions with funds from Italy, Netherlands and Germany respectively. These projects aimed to build the institutional capacity of irrigation to cope with the future larger infrastructure rehabilitation plans at the national level. The main aim was to ensure local food security and discourage displacement of the vulnerable.
19. Later in 2002 a bridging project (UTF/AFG/033/AFG) was established, supported by the World Bank (WB) with FAO technical assistance (TA) aimed at transferring the national capacity created under the earlier projects and at assisting the preparation of the EIRP. Its
4 FAO’s direct involvement in rehabilitation work between 1989 and 2001 was mainly (but not exclusively) concentrated in Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Khost and Azro (in Logar). Training in design and appropriate engineering was provided to the technical staff of a much wider group of agencies and NGOs working in this sector. 5 By the close of the Soviet engagement in Afghanistan in 1989 it is estimated that there were between 5 and 6 million Afghan refugees mainly in Pakistan and to a lesser extent in Iran. This amounted to approximately 1/3 rd of the pre-war population of the country at the start of the conflict in 1978/79. Thousands of villages had been destroyed and the rural economy seriously disrupted.
4 objective was to help build up the capacity of a PCU and to prepare technical proposals for implementation with WB funding.
20. EIRP (UTF/AFG/035/AFG) was approved in 2003 and started operations in early 2004. It has been supported by WB IDA funding through a credit of US$40 million in December 2003 and three IDA grants: one of US$25 million approved in April 2007, the second of US$28 million approved in June 2008 and the third of US$33.5 million approved in August 2009. It should be mentioned that a proposed contribution to FAO’s irrigation programme from the Afghanistan reconstruction trust fund (ARTF) failed and therefore EIRP required additional funds to keep going.
21. The EIRP is a national project serving all major river basins of Afghanistan classified into six main and one sub region: Kabul, with Bamian as a sub-region 6, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, Kunduz and Mazar-e-Sharif, under the responsibility of the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) 7. The overall objective of the project is to restore irrigated agricultural production in rural areas through improved and reliable water supply to rehabilitated irrigation schemes. Following a WB mid-term review in 2006, the project’s structure was modified and currently consists of four components:
(A) The rehabilitation of ‘large, medium and lesser’ irrigation schemes 8; (B) The preparation of feasibility studies for future projects, and the establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) unit in the EIRP project coordination unit (PCU) in the MEW; (C) Institution building and technical assistance; and (D) The re-establishment of a national hydro-meteorological network.
22. After the WB’s mid-term review, the revised output indicators for the project are:
• increased area under agricultural production, and • an increase in agricultural production in rehabilitated schemes.
23. Such investments and institutional development are entirely consistent with the objectives of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). It also falls in with three significant GoA institutional and policy reforms:
i. The adoption of a river-basin approach to manage water resources; ii. The adoption of a participatory approach involving water user groups in the rehabilitation, as well as O&M of all irrigation schemes, and iii. The creation of a Supreme National Council for Water Resources (SNCWR) represented by all the water sector related government ministries (MEW; MAIL; MRRD; NEPA and the Ministry of Mines. 9 )
6 Originally Bamian was included under the Kabul Region. At the time of the mid-term review in 2006, due to the excessive work load that this placed on the Kabul office which was responsible for 30% of the total project covering 12 provinces (as opposed to between 4 and 6) FAO project management recommended that Bamian be established as a sub-region with its own staff establishment, effectively as a Regional sub-office. At the same time it was also decided that an adjustment be made so that Kabul Regional office be established in its own premises, separate from the HQ FAO project team. This was supported by the WB in the MTR (2006). After these adjustments had been made the progress of the work and its efficiency improved considerably. (documentary information provided by the CTA Waleed Mahdi.) 7 When the EIRP was started this Ministry was titled the Ministry of Irrigation Water Resources and Environment (MIWRE). This was changed in 2006 to the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) to better reflect is present responsibilities. 8 Very small schemes, mainly karez (an ancient system of tapping the subterranean aquifers) and spring fed, were dropped from the project after the WB mid-term review. 9 Responsible for water from deep well drilling ( chah-amikh ).
5
2.2 Project establishment and the role of FAO
24. The MEW, through a PCU, was designated as the implementing agency for the EIRP, by the GoA with the agreement of the WB. The PCU has overall responsibility for the management of EIRP and IRDP. In addition to the main PCU located in the MEW in Kabul, there are five regional offices and two sub-offices. These have responsibility for the oversight and implementation of the project at the local level and are located in Herat, Kabul (with sub-offices in Jalalabad and Bamian), Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz. As part of the PCU, an M&E unit was established in 2006 to monitor and evaluate the project’s progress and evaluate its impact.
2.3 The role of FAO and the EIRP project coordination unit
25. FAO’s main responsibility is to support both the management and the technical responsibilities of the EIRP/IRDP MEW/PIU to achieve the objectives and goals of the project’s main components. The PCU is supported by a team of international and national specialists from FAO. These experts provide technical assistance (TA) in the areas of engineering design, construction supervision, monitoring and evaluation as well as in programme management and procurement services. The FAO specialists are expected to play a key role in developing the capacity of the regional PCUs and provide a substantive input into the development of technical proposals for the rehabilitation of irrigation schemes implemented under the EIRP. FAO is also responsible for assisting with the establishment of an M&E capability in the PCU and the re- establishment of a national hydro-meteorological network. An additional overriding responsibility is to assist capacity building at all levels in the MEW at central and provincial levels as well as at the level of the rural communities. This includes improving the capacity of mirabs 10 and farmers to undertake their own operation and maintenance (O&M) work. It also includes the construction and refurbishment of office buildings, facilities such as laboratories and hydro-metrological stations and procuring the necessary furnishings and equipment.
2.4 Summary of the project’s achievements
26. Before the close of EIRP in December 2011, and despite a deteriorating security situation in many provinces, a total of 752 medium/lesser scale projects, and 23 large schemes were designed, approved and awarded of which 710 medium/small schemes and 18 large schemes are reported as having been completed. Work in progress at the close of the EIRP continues under IRDP.
27. It is claimed that as a result of the irrigation rehabilitation work the project has not only contributed to an increase in the efficiency of water conveyance to existing irrigated land, but also to a substantial increment in previously irrigated crop land reclaimed for production as well as a substantial increase in crop yields. Combined, these benefits are also reported to have lead to a substantial increase in the value of the land itself. The evaluators have no way of disputing the figures as reported, although it is necessary to question the strength of some of the data on which it is based and consequently that of some of the claims. Although there is little doubt that the irrigation rehabilitation component in particular has had a generally very beneficial impact, the exact scale of that impact may not be quite as reported. (Ref Section 6. M&E).
10 Mirab – literally the ‘water master’, water bailiff- generally elected by the village / rural community-land-owners and leading tenant farmers paying rent- (keroyeh or nesb-e kari) - rather than share-croppers (dehqan ) responsible for the water turns and organising the maintenance of the system ( asher/hasher - community labour). In more complicated systems involving several communities and branch canals there may be a hierarchy of mirabs - from the mirab-bashi / wakil /kok-bashi , depending on the region down to the sub mirabs .
6
28. In addition, a feasibility study - for the Lower Kokcha irrigation and hydro-power project - was completed and approved in 2009. Further feasibility studies on 22 potential small dams in the ‘enclosed’ Northern Basin were initiated under EIRP to be completed under IRDP.
29. By December 2011, out of a plan for 174 hydrological stations, a total of 105 are reported to have been installed. Out of a plan for 40 gauging stations, 36 have been installed, plus a meteorological network of snow stations and weather stations also only partially completed against the original plan. This component has been one of the most problematic, but it is still ongoing and will be completed under IRDP.
30. Despite continuing staffing problems, a working M&E unit has been established in the PCU supported by FAO. Also, a full set of training initiatives for institutional and technical capacity building at all levels has been carried out, together with the construction of office facilities, laboratories and the provision of equipment and furniture as designated in the project document.
2.5 The completion of EIRP and the start of IRDP
31. The EIRP was concluded in December 2011, but continuity has been maintained with the follow-up phase IRDP, funded by the WB IDA for an initial period of six years. Total funding amounts to a possible US$148.6 million, made up of US$69 million of fresh grant, US$29.6 million of recommitted funds with a possible additional US$50 million expected from the ARTF. IRDP retains many of the same objectives and the original four components as EIRP with the addition of the ‘small dams’ component, but with improved institutional capacity and strengthened development objectives. These include a stronger role for environmental and social safeguards (ESS). IRDP not only includes a component for new large, medium and lesser irrigation systems, but also for the possible construction of two or three small dams in the ‘enclosed’ Northern River Basin. Pre-feasibility studies on 22 possible sites initiated under EIRP are being continued under IRDP leading to a final selection of two or possibly three for design and construction.
7 See below main differences and additional developments under IRDP from EIRP
EIRP IRDP - Emergency Rehabilitation Project - Developmental Restoration Project - Rehabilitation of traditional canals - Construction of new canals in addition to traditional canal system restoration - Recovery of Pre -Conflict irrigable areas - Development of new areas d/s the dams - No structures above 10m height - Construction of new Dams - Limited Social infrastructure - wider inclusion of Social infrastructure - Limited ESMF & ESMP - Full ESMF and ESMP - No Gender Mainstream Strategy - Gender Strategy included - Investment/ha < $250, - increased to $450/ha, - Stakeholders; farmer beneficiaries - farmer beneficiaries, MEW, WB, CDCs, Women MEW, WB, FAO Affairs Dep., NEPA, MAIL, Land Authority, - Regular technical staff - also Development oriented staff - International Tech Assistance staff - National Tech capacity built to lead in the resident in the Regional Offices Regional Offices
2.6 The continuation of FAO TA contract for IRDP
32. IRDP went through all the due formulation processes with the WB who, together with the GoA MEW, decided to renew FAO’s contract to provide supporting TA on a ‘single source’ basis. The WB and the GoA placed emphasis on there being a seamless process of moving from one phase of the project to the next. The IRDP became officially effective on 15 June 2011 and started to operate before the official closure of EIRP. EIRP assisted by FAO contributed much to this process. Under its auspices FAO assisted with such things as the preparation a new baseline survey to ensure that IRDP started with an established data base for its M&E. Indeed, the progression from the first phase (EIRP) to its follow up (IRDP) has taken place in a seamless fashion with the same FAO management team and for the most part the same MEW/PCU teams in place.
2.7 MEW responsibility for the execution of EIRP/IRDP
33. Below are summarized the responsibilities for the execution of EIRP/IRDP (source - the technical annex of the project document(s)):
• MEW has the overall responsibility for project execution and implementation; • MEW with branches located in five River Basin and two sub-basin regional offices, is responsible for all rehabilitation of irrigation schemes, national water resources planning and O&M of the main irrigation and drainage schemes; • MEW also administers international river systems, water sharing and water quality control; • The Director for Water Management in MEW has overall responsibility for the EIRP/IRDP and for liaison with MAIL and other concerned government agencies such as MRRD and NEPA 11 ;
11 Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development and the National Environmental Protection Agency
8 • The EIRP/IRDP project coordination unit (PCU) is established within the MEW with sub-units located in MEW and the regional and sub-regional offices. 12 It is responsible for coordination with all donor activities, including individual project activities; • The PCU is also responsible for overall project management, including technical/engineering design, construction supervision, financial management, procurement, disbursement, M&E and institutional development in all the regional offices • The PCU teams located in the ‘regions are planned to be the nucleus of future river basin authorities which are in the process of being established; • The PCU is headed by a director with supporting staff located in MEW; and • FAO is responsible for advising and providing close support for the PCU/MEW in undertaking its duties in all its locations.
34. It should be noted that, the FAO CTA and his team share the same office buildings in the MEW compound in Kabul and in the regions. FAO also maintains a team in the Kabul office for dealing with large projects. 13
2.8 Explanation as to why EIRP/IRDP is placed in the MEW
35. EIRP, with FAO as supporting agency providing TA, was established under the responsibility of the MEW rather than under the Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL). The reason for this goes back to the formulation of this WB project in 2002 and 2003 at which time the main responsibility for irrigation matters was vested in the Ministry of Irrigation Water Resources and Environment (MIWRE, as it then was). At that time the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food (MAAF) (as it then was) had no designation for irrigation in its title or its capacity. It was therefore deemed to be logical to lodge EIRP under the responsibility of the MIWRE where there was an irrigation capability. Later, after renaming the two ministries and after the ratification of the revised water law in 2009, it was decided that EIRP and its follow-up phase IRDP should continue to remain the responsibility of the MEW. Thus, it was decided to retain the ‘status quo’. It was argued that this seemed logical in view of the lack of irrigation capacity in the MAIL and the presence of a large number of trained engineers and laboratories and related facilities in MEW.
36. There is no doubt that this remains something of an anomaly leading to disconnections between the conveyance of irrigation water to the farmers, and its ultimate purpose which is to grow field and horticultural crops and fodder. This became more obvious with the ratification of the revised water law in 2009, which for the first time clearly defines the different ministries’ responsibilities.
37. In 2004 and 2005 respectively, the designations of the original MIWRE and MAAF were changed to the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL). At the same time, responsibilities for the environment were moved from MEW and vested in the newly established National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA). In 2008, MAIL was given formal responsibility for that level of the irrigation systems for which the rural communities of farmers are traditionally responsible and for the on- farm management of irrigation water. Whilst MEW has the capacity to improve the conveyance of water from its source along main channels and as far as distribution channels, it has no capacity for the on-farm management of water. However, despite the change in title, MAIL’s capacity in irrigation matters, even at the farmer level, remains weak. Because of this it was
12 Kandahar; Herat; Mazar-I Sharif, Kunduz, Kabul with two sub offices in Jalalabad and Bamiyan. 13 Such as for instance the Band-e Sultan dam etc
9 tacitly decided to leave EIRP/IRDP under the responsibility of MEW where the PCU is already well established. For the life of IRDP it seems unlikely that its ministerial location will be changed.
38. In an attempt to redress the issue of ‘on-farm water management’ it was originally suggested that the WB should fund a component for ‘on-farm water management (OFWM)’ to be jointly managed by MEW together with MAIL. This did not work in practice and the final OFWM project was subsequently given as the sole responsibility of MAIL There is supposed to be close collaboration and coordination between the respective ministries. Although this is absolutely essential it is not so easily achieved in practice and is almost entirely a question of individual personalities. The role of the FAO country programme office in promoting such collaboration is of vital importance and as FAO has a presence in both ministries they are in a good position to help achieve this. It should, however, be noted that OFWM in MAIL has been established away from the main ministry in Badambagh where MAIL also has a horticultural station.
3 The project
3.1 Project budget and expenditure
3.1.1 EIRP and FAO components
39. It is always WB policy for development funds managed under government implemented projects to engage international technical support. In the case of both EIRP and its follow-up IRDP, FAO was selected to provide the main ongoing TA support to the ministry’s (MEW) to the project coordination unit (PCU) and for project implementation.
40. EIRP had four main components as shown below including budgeted targets and estimated percent progress at completion. 14 Work still in progress or uncompleted and such funds as were committed, but still unspent at the time the EIRP finished on 31 December 2011, have been rolled over to be completed under IRDP.
Table 1 Activity Target Progress (%) in US$m Component A: Rehabilitation of irrigation schemes 76.4 82%
Component B: Feasibility studies and monitoring and 3.7 100% evaluation 6.7 FAO terminal report 2011 Component C: Institutional strengthening and technical 38.1 99% assistance 35.1 FAO terminal report 2011 Component D: Hydro-meteorological network 16.3 55%
Total 134.5 82 %
14 Source WB Implementation Support Mission Aide-Memoir - September 2011- showing Project implementation progress as of July 31 2011.
10 41. Please note that, of these, by December 2011 Component A had expended US$77.3 million and was thus slightly over target. 15
42. The project became operational (effective) on 19 March 2004. As a result of subsequent project revisions, the duration of the project was extended to 93 months. The project ended on 31 December 2011 after several revisions, to reach a final amount of US$143.5 million out of which US$27,353,098 was for FAO TA. The total contribution is detailed in Table 2 below. It should be noted that US$28 million has been carried over to IRDP.
Table 2: EIRP funds in summary Project Identification No. : P078936 Credit No. : Cr 3845-AF Implementation Agency : Project Coordination Unit (PCU); Ministry of Energy & Water General Procurement Notice (GPN) : Issued in Development Business No. ‘WB 2029-616/03’ in Development Business dated September 29, 2003 Project approval by the World Bank : Date : December 23, 2003 Signing of Project Agreement : Date : January 20, 2004 Credit Effectiveness : Date : March 19, 2004 Credit Closing : Date : September 30, 2008 Credit/Grant-I/Co-Finance Grant – II Grant - III Project approval by WB : December 23, 2003 June 12, 2008 May 29, 2009 Project Agreement : January 20, 2004 July 15, 2008 July 7, 2009 Credit Effectiveness : March 19, 2004 Sep 12, 2008 August 4, 2009 Credit / Grant Closing : Sep. 30, 2007 (Extended to Dec-31, 2011) Dec 31, 2011 Dec 31, 2011 Project Cost : World US$40 000 000 (Cr 3845-AF) US$28 000 000 US$33 500 000 Bank US$25 000 000 (H2840-AF) (H3980-AF) (H4980-AF) Co- US$35 000 000 (Planned) Finance US$8 000 000 (Actual) Total US$73 000 000 US$28 000 000 US$33 500 000 (US$134 500 000)
43. The initial FAO contract was designed to close on 31 March 2007, but was extended at several stages. Table 3 below summarizes the five amendments of the FAO contract by occasion with key dates and durations.
Table 3: FAO agreement - Summary of amendments
44. The following extracts from the FAO EIRP terminal report are worth including here rather than repeating what has been already written (see boxes below).
15 Source-MEW ICR draft- March 5th
11 3.1.2 Regarding disbursement of funds - The disbursement rate is low at the beginning of each financial year due to lack of budget from MoF. This routine occurrence has to be addressed and clearly displayed in the disbursement plans from the outset. - It is also vital to revisit the lengthy payment processes and shorten the steps that hamper speedy disbursement rates. - It is highly advisable to create a separate post for a national administration specialist to assist the international finance/admin specialist in dealing with hundreds of contracts and multiple payments in addition to administrating the incentives and operational costs.
3.1.3 Regarding the management of contracts - It is essential to establish contact with management section or posts that stretch to all the regions. - Almost all regions are found to be hesitant to penalize non-performing contractors under the given terms and conditions. Therefore, PCU has to have clear stand as to how such incidents should be handled. - It will be vital to think of translating the most key portions of the bid documents and contract conditions into local languages for easy reference. This is believed to have good input in minimizing unnecessary complications during implementation. - It is important to give enough attention to all parameters while fixing the implementation period of a contract; this can minimize time extension requests which are products of poor implementation planning; - Some contractors are awarded more than one project to implement; as a result they have poor performance and serious delays. It is recommended to establish a certain mechanism that can scrutinize the contractor’s capacity before a decision is made to grant him another contract. - Constant feedback from contractors regarding EIRP work procedures is important to address some pitfalls. In view of this, regular workshops are beneficial.
3.2 Partnerships
45. FAO, in its capacity as providing the main technical assistance and capacity building to both EIRP and IRDP, works in very close association with the MEW PCU to which it provides the major support. As stated earlier, FAO and the MEW PCU teams work closely together. From time to time and as required, MEW hires external consultants to provide specific technical inputs to the projects as for instance it has done for M&E and ESM. It is the intention under IRDP that MEW should gradually work increasingly independently of close technical support. However, this is still seen to be necessary for the time being.
3.3 FAO project management and technical assistance
46. Almost uniquely, in the present Afghan experience, FAO has had consistency in senior management almost since the start of the project in 2004. There has been only one change of CTA in 2006, when the original international CTA left and was replaced by the then regional project manager from Herat. He remains the international CTA to date, and is now responsible for IRDP. 16 The senior national technical officer (SNTO) has been with the project since its inception. Indeed, the SNTO has been with FAO’s irrigation programme since he joined officially in 1993. 17 The senior international admin. and finance officer has been with the FAO EIRP/IRDP team since 2004 18 and the senior international engineer, with a short break (2008-
16 John Ratsy FAO EIRP CTA – 2004 to 2005; Waleed Mahdi – FAO EIRP Regional T.L. 2004 to 2005. EIRP CTA- 2005 to 2011. Continues as CTA 2012 for IRDP 17 Sayed Sharif ‘Sobhair’- Joined FA0 1993- Was Senior national Irrigation Engineer until 2004 and continued from 2004 to the present with EIRP / IRDP 18 Ajay Rawat- Int. Finance and Admin. Specialist. Aug. 2004 to Dec. 2011. Continuing for IRDP 2012
12 2009), also from 2004 to the present. 19 Other key staff, both international and national, have served the project over a number of years.
47. It should be noted that each of the six regional and one sub-regional offices is lead by a senior national TL/engineer. The original plan to employ an international as TL in each of the regional offices was found to be impractical for a number of reasons, including: the difficulty of recruiting suitable internationals prepared to be based in provincial Afghanistan: the added administrative difficulties of employing international staff, due to frequent leave allowances (R&R). Not least is the imposition imposed on the smooth management of the field programme by the additional security arrangements required for foreigners and the added burden of risk it places on the national teams.
3.4 Present FAO team
48. The present FAO team under IRDP, which is the same as it was at the close of EIRP consist of a chief technical advisor (CTA) and seven international technical specialists in finance and Admin; large scheme engineering; hydrology; international procurement; and monitoring and evaluation. Supporting a team of national Afghan engineers in the central as well as in the regional offices headed by a national project coordinator and chief engineer based in Kabul. (For details see Annex 1.2.)
49. In addition FAO’s input has been supported by periodic visits from international consultants supporting different key technical aspects of the project including: construction management; capacity building; agro-economist; water resources; social issue; telemetry; environment, plus backstopping visits from FAO headquarters TCI and from the FAO Regional Office in Bangkok. (For details see Annex 1.2.)
3.5 Comment on technical backstopping
50. The most consistent and closely involved technical backstopping of EIRP provided by FAO was by the Investment Centre Division (TCI) at FAO headquarters, Rome. TCI was closely involved with the early development of the project in collaboration with the WB and the GoA in 2002-2003. Subsequently, TCI officers continued to provide regular backstopping for EIRP (April 2005; October 2005; February 2008; and June 2010). The same TCI officer was also involved with the issue of the feasibility study for the Lower Kokcha hydro power/irrigation project. Although other support visits were made by technical officers from the FAO Regional Office in Bangkok, less attention than might have been expected for such a significant irrigation project seems to have been paid to EIRP by the appropriate technical divisions in FAO headquarters (AGLW and its successor) or by the Regional Office. This was possibly the result of the close involvement of TCI, which ceased after the retirement from FAO of the official concerned in 2010. The main source of technical backstopping for IRDP is presently provided by the FAO Regional Office in Bangkok.
3.6 Observations on FAO team management and style
51. As observed during the evaluation, the FAO team works well together and the style of management is suited to good relations between management and team members both international and national as well as between technical and administrative.
19 Fazal Mahmood Khan – Large Schemes Engineer Team Leader – Dec 2004 to March 2008. Chief Design Engineer Oct. 2009 to Dec 2011- continuing for IRD- 2012
13 52. The offices both at the centre (in MEW) and in the three regional offices visited (Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat) are well ordered and keep efficient filing systems from which information and data is easily extracted upon request. The staff are cooperative and open and gave every impression of being dedicated to their work and open to suggestions for improvement. Field visits were well organized and due care was taken of security. Subsequent to the field visits questions and queries arising from further study of the project and requested by email by the evaluators were generally answered cooperatively and efficiently.
3.7 MEW PCU staffing
53. At present, the EIRP/IRDP PCU has a total of 115 staff (all categories) on their establishment including the Kabul headquarters (in MEW) plus five regional offices and two sub-offices (see Table 4 below).
Table 4. Establishment of the EIRP/IRDP PCU Staff all categories Kabul Main Office in MEW 36 Kabul Regional Office 18 Jalalabad- sub-Regional Office 16 Bamian – sub-Regional Office 9 Kandahar Regional Office 8 Kunduz Regional Office 10 Mazar-i Sharif Regional Office 7 Hirat Regional Office 11 Total PCU staff of all categories 115
3.8 General points of management and institutional relations
54. In the observation of the evaluators working relations between the staff of FAO and their counterparts in the various PCU units were good. However, judging by a particular comment made in the FAO EIRP terminal report, difficulties and misunderstandings between FAO staff and the staff of the Water Management Department (WMD) in some regions have been difficult (see box below - extract from FAO EIRP terminal report, March 2012).
55. The following points are made under the heading of ‘Institutional and Management’: - Major misunderstandings have been observed in some regions between EIRP and WMD staff. This has negatively affected the quality of work and construction schedule. Therefore, all regional offices need to closely work with their counterparts in all circumstances. Any difference in opinion should be reported to the main office to seek remedial actions; - The TA procurement has not had the opportunity to make direct correspondence with WB. This has caused some delay in decisions and in some cases issues are left pending for quite some time. It is therefore important to modify the current practice in order to maintain a smooth flow of information; - It is recommended for the future to add sufficient provision for miscellaneous consultancies by internationals through the TA contract as it is normally more flexible and attractive compared to contracts directly engaged with MEW. This will help addressing the several occasions when miscellaneous consultancies were needed to review studies, strengthen work qualities, evaluate trainings, develop training plans, etc.. Most of those were eventually hired under the TA contract on an ad hoc basis; - Periodic procurement of equipment was needed to get a good result in the office as well as in the field to cope with the deteriorated equipment as the project time passes; - Decision making problem has been recognized by WB as a major cause of delays. Thus, the decision making setup must be carefully reviewed to avoid past lapses; - It is therefore highly essential to fill all posts with qualified staff. Good incentive can minimize high turnover of staff;
14 - The change in senior positions from MEW, WB and FAO should be limited if they are performing successfully to avoid any disruption in the smooth progress and management of the project; - It is strongly recommended to relocate the management office of the project (PCU and FAO) to a separate location to ensure higher dedication to the project activities and avoid daily distraction of the management on irrelevant affairs; - There are difficulties during the project in procuring security equipment and vehicles to the UNDSS standards. It is advisable to include in the TA contract some limited procurement provision for similar items; - The security situation in many parts of the country has deteriorated. As a result, PCU supervisors cannot use government vehicles as they can be easily targeted. Therefore, certain provision has to be made to rent vehicles from local market for supervision purposes; - A comprehensive and integrated policy needs to be budgeted and strictly adopted by MEW to address the poor coordination between WMDs at Kabul and provinces in deployment of untrained officials, lack of budgetary support for simple O&M needs (even for charging the battery) which made the progress of hydrology component very slow and difficult to achieve timely results; - The communication system should be improved. Internet facility should be provided to the managers and technical staff. Proficiency of staff in the English language needs to be improved so that capacity building programmes become more effective; - It is recommended to apply transparency in all aspects promoted by the government to reduce all signs of corruption in the water sector. Practising punishment and rewards can yield good improvements. Source: FAO EIRP terminal report March 2012
Please note that the above comments and project management recommendations are noted with respect to the ongoing IRDP.
3.9 Evaluators’ observations and comments
56. Consistency and continuity of FAO management from its early stages in the case of EIRP, has meant that the project has had a rare stability in a very unstable situation. Few projects and programmes in Afghanistan, funded by international donors, have experienced such stable continuity of senior staff. It is not uncommon for internationally funded projects and programmes to change team leadership several times in a single season. This project is an exception; indeed it can be said to be a rarity. This means that it has been possible to build upon experiences gained and lessons learned of how to work, what works and what is less likely to work in the Afghan situation. It has also been possible to retain the historical memory of the project intact, helped by an efficient filing system and well maintained archives that go back to the 1990s and even earlier.20
57. It should be noted that FAO’s financial management has been consistently assessed by the WB as having been ‘very satisfactory’.
58. The WB considers EIRP to have been something of a ‘flag ship’ project in comparison with others in Afghanistan 21 . Confidence in the FAO team was demonstrated by the fact that the WB and MEW wished to retain their services for IRDP on a ‘sole source’ basis.
59. On the whole, good relations between FAO and MEW counterparts have been maintained and in the changing nature of the Afghan political scene such a consistency in management style inspires confidence and by and large has worked well.
20 Mention should be made of the rather exceptional irrigation archive the FAO office has carefully built up including documents going back to the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. A rarity in the Afghanistan of today and a credit, in particular to the senior national technical officer. 21 Quoted by a senior WB official in Kabul to the evaluation team.
15 60. FAO EIRP/IRDP regional teams are now all headed by Afghans, rather than by internationals. This is the result of circumstance rather than policy. 22 This should be applauded. Provided technically qualified national staff with the right character can be identified this approach is more likely to ensure an effective, efficient and sustainable field programme. In the present circumstances of rapidly changing security, the presence of international staff can prove to be a liability.
61. It is entirely appropriate that national staff should be given the opportunity to take this responsibility and this should be properly recognized in a practical fashion. However, it means that even greater attention should be paid to providing additional training for Afghans placed in responsible positions, not only in technical matters, but also in management, administration and the broader aspects relating to social and environmental issues.
62. A dedicated individual in TCI was retained as the main technical support backstopping EIRP through much of its ongoing life. This worked well. However, it may also have led to an initial disconnection between EIRP and the appropriate technical divisions in FAO headquarters and the FAO Regional Office. This has since been rectified for instance by the introduction of the senior NRL GIS officer from FAO headquarters to the WB in Kabul to explain the importance of satellite technology in accurately assessing land crop areas to improve the quality of M&E.
63. Gender issues: Essentially EIRP and its follow-up, IRDP, are concerned with structural irrigation and hydrological engineering matters that are above specific gender issues. They are concerned with irrigation and engineering matters that relate to whole communities, (or at least those households and families with access to irrigated crop land regardless of gender) and the case of hydrological matters with a national requirement that is not gender specific. FAO’s role in providing TA to EIRP or IRDP is about physical and not social engineering. Indeed, it would be likely to endanger the security of the whole programme for FAO to be perceived as being overtly involved in social engineering rather than in providing a purely gender neutral professional input. It is noteworthy, however, to state that in the MEW Kabul regional office the Department of Energy and Water’s (DEW) PCU is headed by an Afghan woman as chief engineer and by another women as senior design engineer, a remarkable enough fact in an Afghan context. The necessity of being sensitive to women’s and children’s needs is emphasized in Section 9 when discussing environmental and social safeguards relating to the repair and rehabilitation of irrigation channels where these concern the lives of village women and children.
22 As was found to be necessary and before downsizing the FAO team in March 2007, a workshop was conducted in January 2007 to coordinate the smooth transfer of responsibilities from staff who were leaving to those that remained to cover their responsibilities. The same workshop aimed to raise the level of independence among staff of the MEW PCU.
16
4 Component A – Rehabilitation of large, medium and small irrigation schemes
4.1 Narrative and technical assessment
4.1.1 Preliminary note Component A
64. - ‘Is designed to restore irrigated agricultural production in rural areas, through improved and reliable water supply to rehabilitated traditional irrigation schemes. This is the core component that contributes to the project development objective’.
65. With one exception 23 , EIRP has been working exclusively with traditional irrigation channels 24 , historically developed by rural communities themselves and managed under traditional community management systems 25 . The rehabilitation of traditional irrigation systems is the most measurably successful component of the EIRP and has undoubtedly provided significant assistance to the rural communities concerned.
4.1.2 Background and recent history of irrigation and rehabilitation
66. The following sub-section is included in order to better understand the place and justification of EIRP in the general scheme of things.
67. According to official sources 12 to 13 percent of Afghanistan’s land space of 652,000 sq. km. is cultivated at some time or other. Of this between 5 and 6 percent is cropped annually on a regular basis (4.8 to 5.8 million ha.) 26 . More than half of this is dependent on irrigation and this is the most potentially productive. The total area cropped fluctuates considerably from year to year dependent on variations in precipitation. In years of exceptionally good rain and snow fall the total area cropped may increase to 7 or even 8 percent with the opportunistic expansion of rain-fed cropping, particularly in the north and northeast. In years of drought, the cropped area contracts sometimes dramatically, especially on the rain-fed land and land irrigated from ephemeral streams and springs. In such times the country’s dependence on irrigated cropping increases proportionately.
68. Despite the development of more formal irrigation systems in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 27 , the majority of Afghan farmers are still dependent on irrigation water conveyed by traditional systems developed over the centuries by the communities themselves and managed according to tradition.
69. It is estimated that in 1978 approximately 3.4 m. ha of crop-land was being irrigated. Over the next 15 years, conflict, social disturbance and the flight of the rural population as refugees led to the neglect of many systems. In the water resources and irrigation annex of the
23 The repair of the Band-e Sultan dam in Ghazni 24 The project has aimed to improve efficiency of traditional irrigation systems and the conveyance of irrigation water to land that is currently being cropped and, where possible, bring back under annual cropping land that has historically been cropped but which for one reason or another (primarily faults in the conveyance of irrigation water), has fallen out of cultivation. It is this land that is assessed as ‘increment’. It has not been the purpose of the project to bring virgin land under cultivation. 25 As distinct from the larger ‘formal’ irrigation systems developed between 1950s, 1960s and 1970s officially managed, under the GoA, by specifically established ‘authorities. 26 Accurate data and statistics are not readily available in Afghanistan, the variation being due to annual fluctuations in the area under rain-fed crops, dependant on highly variable annual precipitation. 27 Notably with external funding in Helmand (USA); Nangarhar (USSR), Kunduz (USSR), and Parwan (China).
17 agricultural sector study (ASS) of 1996, it was estimated that only 30 percent of the land being irrigated in 1978 was still being irrigated effectively (1.02 m.ha), a further 60 percent (2.04 m. ha) was being irrigated less than effectively due to lack of maintenance and/or poor on-farm water management. Approximately 10 percent of the systems (0.34 m. ha) had fallen completely out of commission as the direct result of conflict.
70. Work on the rehabilitation of traditional systems started in the early 1990s, 28 supported by different donors, implemented by a variety of UN and other agencies and NGOs, (including FAO). This led to some improvement in the situation as it was at the time after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in February 1989. However, funds were in short supply, progress was slow and the work of mixed quality. Some was excellent, but much of it not so. 29 Since 2002 the investment in irrigation rehabilitation has been considerably greater than in the 1990s, although the quality of work is still mixed 30 . By late 2007, it was estimated that reasonably well irrigated cropping in Afghanistan had increased from 1.6 to 1.9 m ha. (ANDS report Water Management Sector Strategy 2007).
71. In the early 1990s, irrigation rehabilitation work was mainly aimed at assisting refugees return to a productive life in their villages. 31 This work continues to the present time, although it is now aimed at improving the efficiency and productivity of irrigated crop production and reclaiming previously irrigated crop land for production in the interests of improving food security and rural livelihoods.
4.1.3 EIRP progress and reported achievements
72. EIRP started in 2004 with an ambitious target to rehabilitate large, medium and small irrigation schemes. After a slow beginning the project’s work started to take off in 2005 and was reviewed by the WB in April 2006 32 . As a result of the ‘mid-term’ review the project was restructured. Project development objectives (PDO), work parameters and targets were revised to better reflect reality. In particular, it was decided to cut out the very small schemes (those averaging 100 ha. and costing less than US$50,000 33 ) as not being cost effective per unit. In the revised project implementation document (PID) of 15 January 2007, the definition of project size was changed by reducing the area requirement and combining medium and lesser schemes together in one group with investment costs of under US$300,000. On this basis, it was decided to revise the target to rehabilitate 750 medium/lesser size schemes and ten large schemes. The number of large schemes was later revised to 23, most of which were divided into smaller lots for work under separate sub-contracts.
28 After the departure of Soviet forces in 1989 and gradually increasing thereafter. 29 The ASS of 1996 reckoned that at the (then) rate of progress it would take 200 years to restore the country’s irrigation systems to their pre-1978 efficiency! The ASS also seriously criticized the work being done under so-called ‘Quick Impact Project’ (QIPS) as being ‘unsatisfactory in both quantity and quality’. QIPS were, and still are mainly supported by either / or - food or cash for work projects. QIPS still continue and much the same criticisms still apply. 30 Earlier criticisms of the quality of so called Quick Impact Project (QIPS) which continue to be supported by various donors, remain valid 31 By the time the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 it was estimated that there were more than 6 million Afghan refugees, mainly in Pakistan and Iran. Between 3 and 4 million returned to their villages between 1989 and 1996, while new waves of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) fled the internecine fighting between mujahideen groups, mainly from Kabul, between 1992 and 1996. Others were displaced by conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance or as the result of drought between 1996 and 2001. According to UNHC there are presently still over 3 million Afghan refugees, but as time has gone by it has become harder to differentiate between those who are really economic migrants and those who are genuine refugees. There is much uncontrolled coming and going across poorly controlled frontiers. 32 Reference World Bank – Afghanistan: Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP) Mid-Term Review, March 21- April 5, 2006. 33 Mainly karez and spring fed systems, with very small command areas.
18 73. As reported at the project’s conclusion on 31 December 2011, the following has been achieved under Component A.
74. A total of 23 large (in 51 sub-lot contracts) and 752 medium/lesser irrigation scheme contracts were awarded, valued at US$78 million with an estimated total irrigated command area of 602,000 ha.
75. Of these: 728 schemes (valued at US$87.5 million) had been completed by 31 December 2011 (93.9 percent of target), commanding an estimated area of 716,050 ha. and benefiting an estimated 910,000 rural households. This includes an estimated increment of land brought (back) under irrigated cropping of 145,000 ha. 34 &35 .
76. Of the total schemes, 35 contracts were cancelled because of insecurity or contractors’ failure, mainly the former. A small balance of work in progress at the end of EIRP has been carried forward for completion under IRDP.
77. The various periodic changes in the definition of sub-project (scheme) size give rise to some confusion and raise some questions. After the first rationalization and re-definition of sub- project size in 2007, there was a further revision of the PID of 12 June 2008. In this, an ‘area requirement’ was once again adopted with ‘large’ schemes designated as those having command areas of between 750 and 2,500 ha. (see Annex 1.2) and medium/lesser schemes being those commanding up to, but not exceeding 750 ha. 36
4.1.4 Benefits derived from Component A as reported37
78. It is claimed 38 that Component A has benefited about 910,000 farming households across 34 provinces (six regions and one sub-region, Bamian) and improved the delivery of irrigation water to a total of 802,619 irrigated hectares. If correct, this exceeds the target of 716,050 ha. by 12.09 percent. Of this, 637,796 ha. of existing irrigation is reported to have had the supply of irrigation water improved (exceeding the target by 11.7 percent) with an additional increment of 164,823 ha. of previously irrigated land reported to have been re-claimed under effective irrigated command (113.7 percent of target).
79. Of the large schemes, the second phase of the largest, the re-building of the Band-i Sultan dam on the Ghazni river (in the Khwaja Umari valley), destroyed by floods in March 2005, was terminated due to insecurity. 39
34 Reference: As reported in MEW ICR 5 March 2012 and FAO EIRP Terminal Report, March 2012. Note that the 2011 M&E Annual Report was not available to the consultants at the time of preparing the evaluation draft report and was only provided later. 35 There is some confusion over the definition of estimated command areas- between the annual area of irrigated crops (at its maximum) and the total area of land potentially commanded by a particular irrigation channel, including annually irrigated crop land (at its maximum) and fallow land cropped (as is common practice) over a period of years in a crop / fallow rotation. This is dealt with in more detail under Component C. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). 36 e.g. In the consolidated table of completed projects 33 of those listed have command areas of over 2,500 ha each after project intervention and 7 projects reported to have post-project increments of over 2,500 ha. 37 MEW EIRP ICR-5 March 2012 and FAO EIRP Terminal Report-March 2012 38 Ref-various Annual Reviews and Assessment referred to above. 39 The Band-e Sultan dam was constructed in the early 1900s by German engineers on the site of an older medieval dam constructed on the orders of Sultan Mahmood of Ghazni (ruled 971-1030 AD). An exceptional flood in March 2005 took out the left flank of the dam. In 2007 two German engineers assessing the second phase of reconstruction were abducted when visiting the site in preparation for their firm preparing a bid for the second phase of the dam reconstruction. One died of a heart attack and the other was released after some time, but this incident put an end to attempts to undertake the second phase of reconstruction.
19 80. Other benefits of Component A: Various reports and reviews claim that Component A of the EIRP work has resulted in additional benefits as summarized in the MEW ICR of March 2012) below:
Land utilization: increased from 42.9% to 56.4% Cropping intensity: reported to have increased from 92% to 108% (an increase of 18.3%) 40 Irrigated land value : reported to have increased from US$23,070 to US$32,114 per ha, by an average of 10.4% after rehabilitation, ranging from 6.9 to 15.5% across the five EIRP regions. 41 Increase of access to irrigation water: reported to have improved by an average of 24.6% after the rehabilitation of irrigation structures with regard to the supply of irrigation water, hence the higher change in access. The highest improvement in access to water was registered in Herat (35%) followed by Mazar (34%). Prevention of flood induced agricultural destruction: a significant number of beneficiary farmers are reported to attribute reduction of flood damages to: - good quality of rehabilitation works (76%) - sound diagnosis and design of irrigation structures (64% - Provision of appropriate O&M training for structures (64%) and - carrying out regular maintenance regime(s) - by applying new methods gained from O&M training (61%) Reduction in water related disputes: according to the 65 Mirabs interviewed in the latest survey, water related disputes are reported to have been reduced from about 98 to 44 per year per sub-project, a reduction of 55.8% after EIRP intervention. NB. The above is taken from MEW ICR. Report of March 2012. The M&E Annual report shown in Section 6 Monitoring & Evaluation is for the year 2010 to 2011 with somewhat different figures.
81. It is also claimed 42 that average wheat yields have increased by 50 percent 43 as the result of the more effective conveyance of irrigation water. If this claim is correct, the percentage increase has over achieved by 68.3 percent compared to the 30 percent projected productivity target. Wheat is an important indicator, being the most widespread crop cultivated in Afghanistan. The figures reported for increases in yield for other crops are also claimed as the result of EIRP activity.
82. It should be noted that, although difficult to contradict, the accuracy of the figures as reported are questioned by the evaluators. The evaluators fear that the credibility of a clearly successful project may be undermined by publishing claims for success based on the rather weak foundation of farmer and mirab verbal responses and ‘self reporting’ by the project rather than on more robust independent measurements and assessment.
83. In mitigation of this, it should be noted that according to the FAO EIRP M&E expert, the yield data recorded and reported by EIRP M&E is always triangulated against FAAHM’s data as recorded by MAIL. 44 The reported claims are more fully discussed in Section 6 - Monitoring and Evaluation.
40 It should be noted that rather than assessing improvements in crop production in terms of percentages, if what is meant is actually moving from a single crop in a season to two crops (or more), or from one type of cropping to another, it would be more correct to refer to such changes in land use as changing from one class to another . 41 Note: It is not quite clear how these figures have been reached seeing as there is not a flourishing free market in agricultural land in Afghanistan). 42 Taken from the 2010 M&E and subsequent annual surveys compared to the 2006-2007 baseline survey. 43 Developed by Sheladia Associates Inc in 2006-2007. 44 As reported by Teame Tewolde Berhan M&E expert on the FAO EIRP/IRDP team.
20 4.1.5 Large schemes - Summary
Table 5: (NB it is thought useful to present this table in full here rather than in an annex) EIRP Afghanistan 24 Large Sub-projects (awarded at US$25.92million)
No. Name Region/Province Status 1. Band-e Sultan (stage 1)* Kabul/Wardak Completed (stage 2) ditto Terminated 2. Nahre Afghan in 2 lots Kabul/Kapisa Completed 3. Nahre Shahi in 2 lots Kabul/Logar Completed 4. Nahre Laskari in 3 lots** Kandahar/Nimroz Completed 5. Ateshan Canal in 2 lots Hirat /Pushtun Zargun Completed 6. Combaruq Canal in 2 lots Hirat/Pushtun Zargun Completed 7. Dashte Archee in 2 lots Kunduz / Archee Completed 8. Nahre Kareem in 2 lots Jalalabad / Kunar Completed 9. Gaumali Canal in 3 lots Kunduz / Takhar Completed 10. Khas Kunar in 3 lots Jalalabad / Kunar Completed 11. Dashte Qala in 2 lots Kunduz / Takhar Completed 12. Turkmen in 2 lots Kunduz /Kunduz Terminated 13. Pacha Jui in 3 lots Jalalabad /Laghman Completed 14. Badiulabad in 2 lots Jalalabad / Laghman Completed 15. Khada Khail Jalalabad / Jalalabad Completed 16. Raj in 2 lots Hirat / Fraha Completed 17. Shawicj in 1 lot Hirat /Ghor Completed 18. Mayel Sufla in 2 lots ditto Terminated 19. Safid Khar in 1 lot Kandahar/Urozghan Terminated 20 Yak Linga in 1 lot Kandahar/Urozghan Completed 21. Chardehi in 3 lots ditto Completed 22. Darazgerd in 4 lots Bamyan/ Parwan Completed 23. Gawmali phase II in 2 lots Kunduz/Takhar Completed
* The Band-e Sultan dam repair in Ghazni is an exception to the general rule, falling into a category of its own- taken on by EIRP as an exceptional emergency task under pressure by the GoA. ** The rehabilitation of the Nahr-i Lashkari in Nimroz was the most significant of the larger ‘traditional’ systems rehabilitated under EIRP. A historic canal, it had completely ceased to function due to drifting sand and silt. Lashkari commands between 10,000 and 15,000 ha. of irrigated crop land with the potential of producing up to USD 50 million/year. As such, it is possibly the most potentially cost-effective piece of rehabilitation work completed under EIRP. However, to realize the claimed potential of this canal would require the additional opening up of a number of secondary canals which are not included in this work as well as the establishment of green windbreaks. With respect to the Nahr-e Lashkari note should also be made that problems exist between the GoA and the Government of Iran regarding their respective rights to the waters of the Helmand. The rehabilitation of the Nahr-i Lashkari will inevitably contribute to this. As a traditional system, dating back centuries, rather than a new structure, the rehabilitation of this canal seems to be perfectly legitimate, even though the canal had been out of use for much of the last 30 years. Questions must remain as to how the maintenance and future de-silting of this canal will be funded. Issues are likely to be raised as the result of plans to raise the level of the spillway on the Kajaki dam and the construction of a weir/dam at Kamal Khan on the Helmand/Nimroz border (not part of IRDP). Another issue is the threat to the Hamoun lakes/marshes in the Seistan Basin bordering the two countries. These unique wetlands are the traditional wintering ground for innumerable water fowl of many species and other wildlife. The Hamoun are presently in great peril due to the extraction of Helmand water by both countries. Indeed in years of drought hardly any water now reaches the end of the Helmand. Between 1999 and 2001 for three years during the ‘great drought’ the Hamoun wetlands were quite dry.
4.1.6 Large schemes- evaluators’ observations
84. Some confusion in reporting has occurred as a result of the various changes in definition. For instance, in the large master-table sub-set provided to the evaluation team, some sub-
21 projects have been listed according to contract value and others according to their size after completion and yet others are listed as being the second (lot) phase of an already listed project.
85. Questions of credibility are raised when contracts with values of US$20,000 and US$50,000 as for example is the case for: i) Ajmir Canal, Baghlan; 45 and ii) Archi Canal, Kunduz are credited with 4,000 and 5,000 ha. respectively. This would work out at US$5/ha and US$10/ha. respectively. In both these examples, the command areas under each canal are estimated as being in the order of 30,000 ha. each, as claimed in the master table. The evaluator, taking measurements based on the 1/100,000 US map found these estimations to be over generous. The technical response to this conclusion is given as a footnote. 46
86. The increased areas in both the above cases claimed to have been brought under irrigation as the result of the project’s work, if fully irrigated, would require an extra 6 m3/sec to 8 m3/sec capacity. Increasing canal capacities from say 10 m3/sec is not simply a matter of adding some elevation to the freeboard.
87. Nonetheless, with regard to some of the larger schemes, in particular, impressive amounts of work have been invested in planning design, funding and organizing paid labour. The rehabilitation of the Lashkari canal in Nimroz, which required a considerable investment in dredging and de-silting, is a case in point (see note in box above).
88. In EIRP reporting, no account is taken that many of the irrigation systems included under the project had already been previously (at least) partially rehabilitated by various agencies and NGOs (national and international) going back to the early 1990s. Admittedly this work was of mixed quality. 47 As an example the EIRP work undertaken to rehabilitate the Ateshan canal in Pushtun Zarghun district in Herat carried on work that had already been initiated earlier by the Danish NGO DACAAR 48 , who are recognized as having done good quality work. This also applies to some of the smaller schemes.
4.1.7 Medium/small schemes - evaluators’ observations
89. Under Component A, rehabilitation/improvement work was completed on 728 schemes before the close of EIRP. On each scheme a number of different types of structure have been designed and constructed. 49 These projects vary from the very small, with commands of around 100 ha. (mainly completed prior to the 2006 mid-term review), to medium and larger with investments of up to US$300,000 and more for 2,500 ha. command. 50
45 Ref Annex 3.5 Ajmir Canal 46 In response to this query the FAO technical team responsible provided the following explanation. Quote “ In the initial stage only one structure on the Archee canal was rehabilitated which was in the head-reach of the canal to spill-off excess flow back to the river through gate side sluice. Implementation of the structure saved the community time and resources which they usually divert to protect the canal embankment and the irrigable land from high flows during floods. Therefore, the impact of the rehabilitation was considered on the entire d/s command area. Later-on a follow-on large sub-project was implemented to cover the entire length of the canal. Similarly, for Ajmir canal the investment was on the canal bank protection to ensure full supply of water for downstream command area.” 47 Much rehabilitation work of all kinds, including irrigation channel cleaning and particularly structural work managed particularly under food and cash for work by agencies with scant technical or engineering skills, especially under the now notorious Quick Implementation Type projects (QUIPs) have generally been of inferior quality. In the Agricultural Strategy Document of 1996 such QUIPs were highlighted for the generally low quality of their work and discouraged. Unfortunately since 2002 QUIPs have continued to be supported by donors seeking largely illusionary ‘quick successes’ often inspired by military imperatives. Impact is mainly ephemeral and few leave sustainable benefits. There are exceptions. 48 Even it has to be said under the hand of some of the original DACAAR engineers some of whom are now working for FAO. Some of this earlier work may even have been done under the earlier FAO programme itself. 49 These include intakes, division structures and gates, spillways, flood gates, and flood and bank protection, wash crossings (under and over passes), flumes, canal lining etc as necessary. 50 In the table of large projects there are in fact 13 with values exceeding US$300,000.
22
90. For each scheme and along each water channel EIRP engineers together with community mirabs and members of the shuras identify all sites in need of repair, reconstruction, improvement or strengthening. Designs are prepared, costs estimated, bids invited and contracts awarded according to World Bank rules of procurement. Different types of structure have been designed, built or improved and strengthened, including: construction of retaining walls, bank protection, canal lining, wash-crossings (under passages and aqueducts), flumes, water divisions, control gates, check structures, cross regulators, spillways, weirs and bed drop structures.
91. The aim has been to improve the conveyance of irrigation water from the head to the tail of the channels and thus improve the delivery of water for irrigated crops and orchards. Structures have been designed and built to control water losses, protect the irrigation systems and agricultural land from flood damage. By improving the efficiency of the systems rural communities have been assisted to return previously irrigated land to productive cropping and lessen the work load and time required for repairs and maintenance.
92. From what the evaluators were able to assess from documentary and reporting evidence, procedures appear to have been conscientiously followed. Complete files, including site drawings and maps, pictures, structural designs, contracts and costs for each scheme are maintained both at central level and in the regional offices. These were readily available to the evaluators on demand.
93. The evaluators were able to see examples of completed work in Samangan province, Aybak district, (two canal systems), in Balkh province, Khulm district (two systems) and in Herat province (Ghoryan and Zanda Jan districts, (two systems) and Korokh district (one system). 51 From this (albeit) small sample, it was possible to make an assessment of the type and quality of design and construction work. What was observed was generally of good quality and the objectives of the project have been met.
94. However, there is room for improvement in design and construction and some technical recommendations are made and also illustrated in Annexes 3.2 and 3.3.
95. The absence of an officially approved design manual was brought to the attention of the evaluators by a number of different people. 52 The evaluators believe that confining designs to those set out in an ‘official’ manual is probably too restrictive and the pros and cons of having such an official manual are discussed in more detail in Annex 3.6.
- Traditional irrigation: Relevance
96. As arguably the most significant programme of its kind, operating on a nationwide basis assisting the rehabilitation of traditional irrigation systems, EIRP and the continuing work of IRDP is entirely relevant for the improvement of: • irrigated crop production; • national food security; • prosperity of the country’s rural economy; and
51 As referred to in Section 1. The original plan for the mission was to visit project sites in two additional provinces in the Kabul region (in Parwan and Kapisa provinces) but this was not possible due to security issues. 52 Including the Deputy Minister for Energy (MEW) who had previously been a senior adviser to the EIRP PCU. The pros and cons having an official manual are discussed further in Annex 3.6.
23 • livelihoods of the rural population.53
97. The scale of the work is still enormous and the need for assistance will continue for the foreseeable future.
- Traditional irrigation: Effectiveness, efficiency and impact
98. Initially, the return on investment from the rehabilitation and improvement of traditional irrigation systems (large and small) is likely to be high. Over time the unit return may decrease; however, the present scale of the problem is so great that rural communities throughout Afghanistan will require assistance in reconstructing, rehabilitating and improving their traditional systems for many years to come.
99. After a slow start in its first two years (2004-2005), the irrigation component of EIRP appears to have been efficiently and effectively managed. Project staff and the staff of the regional PCUs (as observed by the evaluation team) know what they are doing and were (by and large) able to answer questions and provide documents and files on different schemes without difficulty. The project has been fortunate in having had consistency of senior management, both international and national since its beginning in 2004.
100. Purely from the point of view of assisting the rehabilitation and improvement of traditional irrigation systems and the conveyance of irrigation water from head to tail of the systems, the project has certainly had a positive impact and as reported, there has been a significant ‘increment’ of annually cropped land reclaimed for irrigated cropping, increases in crop yields and crop intensity, O&M labour and time saved and even substantial increases in land values. Although the beneficial effects of the project are undoubted, the exact scale of the impact in terms of land ‘increment’ and increases in crop yield, etc. reported may be questioned, due to the basic weakness of the data and the prevalence of ‘self reporting’ (see Section 6 M&E).
101. Also, it has to be noted that EIRP has concentrated solely on engineering issues and on improving the effective and efficient conveyance of irrigation water for crop production. An improved supply of water is only one part of what farmers need to improve their crop production. In order to optimize production and exploit impact multiplication factors, farmers require a package of management practices and inputs in addition to improvements in the provision of irrigation water, which is only part of the equation, important though it be. Such a package should include, better management of the water when it reaches the fields, good cultivation practices, good quality seed of improved and appropriate varieties supported by improved systems of plant nutrition, integrated pest, disease and post-harvest processing, management, marketing, affordable sources of credit and the sound integration of crop and livestock husbandry.
102. At the present moment EIRP/IRDP is only focused on one part of this package and the present disconnection between the project and other ministries, agencies, projects and programmes that might provide for other needs of the package as needed by the beneficiaries of
53 Although, the most nationally widespread, EIRP/IRDP is not the only project/programme supporting the rehabilitation and improvement of traditional irrigation systems. Note is made here of the ADB funded ‘Water Management Investment Programme (WMIP) operating in the Northern and Western Region, (met by the evaluation team in Mazar and Hirat); certain aspects of the EC-funded Panj/Amu River Basin in the N.East; various projects supported by USAID/USDA, UK DFID, WFP and INGO projects funded by different donors. Some of these, such as the EC Panj/Amu RB programme is supporting both the rehabilitation of the more formal systems (e.g. in Kunduz/Baghlan ) as well as more traditional systems mainly in the upper catchments. P-ARBP is also supporting projects concerned with improving OFWM and watershed management in the upper catchments of the river basins.
24 rehabilitated and improved irrigation systems remains the project’s most significant weakness. Without the other elements of the ‘package’ it will not be possible to achieve maximum impact.
- Traditional irrigation: Sustainability
103. The main advantage of supporting traditional irrigation systems is that the rural communities already have traditional management systems to maintain and manage their irrigation channels and the distribution of water. This makes it more likely that the investment made under this project will be managed and maintained by the communities themselves in a sustainable fashion. 54
104. However, ‘modern’ engineered infrastructure using improved structural designs in concrete, stone masonry or gabions 55 and the like and provided with steel gates, financed and constructed by the project may not be as easy for rural communities to maintain themselves without continuing assistance. This O&M is likely to require skills not readily available within the communities themselves. For instance, steel gates are not part of traditional management practice and often not well regulated. Realizing this fact, during the mid-term review (2006) FAO proposed establishing an operations and maintenance (O&M) unit by training national O&M trainers to train the beneficiaries on all aspects of O&M relating to the structures that are within their reasonable capability to maintain their systems. Training is always in the local language.
105. EIRP has placed a lot of emphasis on training communities and mirabs in O&E to help improve local skills in dealing with the O&M of their systems; also to ensure that the communities concerned are fully aware of their responsibilities once the project’s work is completed. It remains to be seen and only time will tell how well the rural beneficiaries of the EIRP have grasped their responsibilities regarding the future operation and maintenance of their irrigation systems or whether they have become psychologically dependant and expectant of a paternalistic ‘government’ and/or NGO to provide them with continuing support in this respect.
106. The following two risks and a suggestion should be noted: i. Upstream and downstream: It is not just a question of helping the equitable distribution of water from one end to the other of a single canal system. Great care needs to be taken by project engineers not to increase the capacity of any single canal system to the extent that it deprives downstream systems of their rightful share of the stream/river’s water, particularly in seasons of low water (more fully discussed in Section 9 Annex 9). ii. Narcotics crops and irrigation: While increasing the availability of water may increase farmers’ cropping options in locations where farmers habitually cultivate opium poppy, increasing the availability of water may also lead to an increase in the area cultivated to opium (more fully discussed in Section 10 and Annex 10).
iii. Indefinite quantity contracts: At the EIRP mid-term review in 2006, a general policy of excluding very small schemes was adopted in the interests of cost-effectiveness. Rather than continuing to exclude small schemes, it is recommended that regional IQC facilities are established under which these small but valid community projects and their needs can be
54 This is certainly more likely than for the more formal systems constructed under the aegis of the government with international funding i.e. the larger dams and irrigation systems developed in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s where the government will always be expected to provide the wherewithal to maintain the systems with or without a charge for water being levied on the farmers/landowners. 55 for intakes, flumes, wash crossings, division structures, gates, swill-ways, flumes, aqueducts etc.
25 attended to. This would help to simplify procurement of construction material, transport and possibly machine hours. The WB employs its own terminology for such contracts.
- Traditional irrigation: Recommendations
107. Please see below:
• Under IRDP, renewed efforts are (we believe) being made by the FAO country programme office in collaboration with the FAO IRDP team to encourage closer collaboration between MEW and MAIL, particularly with respect to OFWM where MAIL is engaged on EIRP completed projects; and as applicable between MEW and NEPA and MRRD. The evaluators appreciate that this is not always easy and interministerial relationships remain a serious challenge. Such collaboration should be done together with the Supreme Water Council, although the practical effectiveness of that body was not easy for the evaluation team to assess.
• It is essential that work done on traditional irrigation systems be combined not only with improved ‘on-farm water management’, but also that the farmer beneficiaries be connected with a complete package of technical and material assistance to help them improve their crop, horticultural and fodder production and marketing.
• Collaboration should also be encouraged with other projects and programmes (including those operating with other donor funds by both UN and non-UN organizations and agencies) providing appropriate forms of service, training or inputs whether ‘government’ or independent; particularly when operating in the same geographical area as IRDP sub-projects to help provide project beneficiaries with different parts of the agricultural ‘package’.
• All completed major sub-projects should be reviewed for their need for follow-up activities, including initial repairs and rectifications of previous works, structures and improvements after a season or two of use. It is appreciated that it is planned that O&M trainers visit all completed projects to provide training and guidance to the beneficiaries and to ensure that contractors’ errors are rectified if possible within defect liability periods. Not all works completed during the active life of EIRP have been so visited by O&M teams. This must be completed under IRDP.
• Where applicable, review the need for increased/improved land drainage where irrigation intensity, soil type and land fall are likely to lead to over-irrigation leading to water-logging and increasing salinity.
• It is suggested that regional IQC 56 contracts might be helpful for facilitating small works and to simplify the procurement of construction material.
56 Indefinite Quantity Contract
26
• The evaluators have some recommendations to make with respect to improving design and construction techniques. These are listed below and dealt with in more (illustrated) detail in Annexes 3.2 and 3.3 :
i. intake design; ii. spillway design; iii. division structure and intake gates; iv. use of gabions; v. quality of concrete; vi. concrete samples and the use of the laboratories; and vii. Management of sediment.
5 Component B - Feasibility studies
5.1 Lower Kokcha feasibility study
108. Introductory note: Whilst in FAO headquarters/Rome, the evaluators met with Mr. Walter Klemm (now retired from FAO TCI) who had played an important part in the somewhat drawn out finalization of the Lower Kokcha feasibility study. He provided the team with much background information and relevant documentation. Further information was provided by the FAO team in Kabul. It should be noted that although the main agency contracted and responsible for the feasibility study was the German firm Fichtner GMBH, FAO TCI staff, as well as consultants, have provided technical assistance and supervision to the feasibility study especially in guiding it to its conclusion. As LKIHP has been a significant component of EIRP and the evaluators were asked to give it some attention, their comments and observations made in this report are considered to be a necessary part of this review.
109. Since field work for the evaluation was completed (in March 2012), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has shown interest in funding part of the proposed project and has contracted the firm SNC-Lavalin to undertake some detailed design work of canals and intakes.
5.1.1 Narrative and technical assessment
110. An allocation of US$3.5 million was made in EIRP for feasibility studies of multipurpose projects such as dams for irrigation and hydropower generation. During the WB supervision mission of September 2004, from a list of eight possibilities, and as funds were limited, it was decided, to confine this to a single study of the “Lower Kokcha Irrigation Hydropower Project (LKIHP)”.
111. It should be noted that this study was based on bringing up-to-date an older USSR study and plan for a dam with hydropower and irrigation development on the Lower Kokcha initiated in the 1970s before the Saur (Communist) Revolution of April 1978. Work was even started on the dam site, but this was cancelled in the aftermath of the Soviet military intervention of December 1979 and the project was left in suspension until present times. 57
57 The original plans were made by a large Soviet Consultancy Bureau based in Tashkent that also undertook a lot of studies all over Northern Afghanistan. It is rumoured that plans for the Kokcha were abandoned due to increasing demands for water from the Soviet Central Asian Republics. This could still prove to become an issue if the project as fully conceived were ever to go ahead.
27 112. The present revised proposal is to construct a multipurpose dam on the Lower Kokcha river to provide electrical power and irrigation water for a potential cultivatable 131,902 ha (gross command-141,830 ha) divided into six zones, on the presently partially uncultivated plains on either side of the lower Kokcha river lying along the left (Afghanistan bank) of the Amu Daria River in Takhar and Kunduz provinces.
113. In addition to the potential for diversion of irrigation water it is proposed to install two power houses. No.1. (PH1) with a capacity of 30 MW would be installed at the diversion dam, utilizing excess water not required for irrigation which would be released back into the river to maintain the minimum ecological flow of 4 m³/s. No 2 (PH2) with a capacity of 12.6 MW would be located at the end of irrigation canal 1-2. These two power plants would generate sufficient energy to operate four pump stations raising irrigation water to higher elevations. It is estimated that the flow of the Kokcha River be sufficient to irrigate all the proposed command area. Essentially the dam has been designed as a diversion, with sediment sluicing facilities.
114. The total investment cost of the completed project is estimated at US$789.4 million.
115. History of the feasibility study: On 1 March 2006, a contract was signed with the German firm Fichtner Gmbh of Stuttgart to carry out the feasibility study (FS). After some delays due to insecurity, land mines, outdated maps and other issues, Fichtner started work on the study. An initial draft inception report (IR) was submitted in April 2006 which was reviewed by FAO, modified and re-submitted in August 2006.
116. The initial FS was rejected as being below par (or deemed not to be cost-effective). It was subsequently revised three times. The FS was re-submitted in February 2007 and again in February 2008 and finally after more discussion with MEW and FAO a third amendment was finally submitted, approved and signed on 7 July 2009. There followed months of dispute over payment and other issues. Finally in June 2010, MEW organized a two-day presentation (23-24 June) by the consultants for the donor, the MEW, various line ministries and other interested parties. 58
117. The feasibility study for the Lower Kokcha hydro power and irrigation project was finally concluded and approved in 2010. At the time of the initial evaluation work in March 2012 the project was still awaiting funding. According to information received from FAO, subsequent to the preparation of the first draft of this report (in May 2012), the LKIHP feasibility study has attracted the attention of the ADB who indicated their interest in funding part of what is being proposed. ADB have since then contracted a firm 59 to undertake further studies and design work in preparation of implementing the first phase(s) of the proposed project. As we understand it, this does not (at present) include the dam and the hydro-electric powered pumping stations and is mainly concerned with the rehabilitation and improvement of intakes on the Kokcha and the Amu Darya/Panj. As such it should not be of concern to Afghanistan’s northern neighbours, the ex-Soviet Central Asian Republics. 60
58 Information gained from various EIRP project reports including MEW ICR draft, and in conversation with Mr. Walter Klemm - previously of FAO- project officer responsible for EIRP based in Rome, when the evaluation team where in FAO headquarters, Rome. Copy of the LKRBP feasibility study is part of the documentation for this study. See Appendix 4 .Bibliography. 59 From discussions with Walter Klemm (previously the main technical backstopping officer for EIRP in FAO TCI now retired from FAO.) 60 Since the evaluation team left Afghanistan (end of March 2012), the ADB has shown interest in funding some aspects of the project and has contracted SNC Lovalin to undertake some studies.. It remains to be seen what the outcome will be.
28 118. Should a donor be found to fund the project in its entirety, including the completion of the dam and pumping irrigation water to bring large tracts of currently un-irrigated land under irrigated cultivation, this could well necessitate discussions with the governments of the Central Asian Republics. This is also likely to involve the wider issue of the Aral Basin, which might necessitate Afghanistan being included as more than just an observer, as at present. 61
119. Despite the conclusion of the FS in 2010, it is nonetheless considered by the evaluators to be worthwhile recording their observations and views. These are set out below for the record:
5.1.2 Doubtful cost-effectiveness of the Lower Kokcha scheme
120. Full implementation of the project as proposed in its entirety may never happen as the economic/political viability of such an exercise is recognized by many as being dubious. As the dam is only meant for diversion, the economic and political viability of pumping water to 100 m and more above the valley floor to irrigate ‘virgin’ land where land title could also be a matter of dispute and possible corruption, is economically dubious and fraught with potential problems of a political and social nature. 62
121. It should also be noted that over 100,000 ha. are already being irrigated from existing traditional canals drawing water directly from either the lower Kokcha or the Amu River itself. These have an estimated potential for a 10 percent/yr increase in productivity, continuously over the 5 year duration of the IRDP, provided that other agricultural/crop improvement measures are practised.
122. EIRP has already been involved in the rehabilitation of three important traditional canal systems in this area, a fourth remains to be rehabilitated, work having been suspended because of insecurity. This almost certainly provides a more cost-effective approach to improving the production of irrigated agriculture producing comparatively low-value crops with uncertain markets enormously than the very costly construction of a dam with pump stations and new formal irrigation channels, together with all the ‘formal’ management infrastructure that this would require. The comparatively low cost of rehabilitating and improving traditional community systems not only falls within the main mandate of the EIRP/IRDP, but is much more likely to be both cost-effective and sustainable under existing but improved traditional management systems.
5.1.3 Evaluators comments on the LKIHP feasibility study
- Lower Kokcha: Relevance
123. The Lower Kokcha feasibility study has not formed a “natural” part of the EIRP main objective, which is the rehabilitation of traditional irrigation systems managed by existing rural
61 According a recent paper by FAO chief national technical adviser (EIRP/IRDP) engineer, Sayed Sharif Shobair Page 7 “ In accordance with the Almaty Declaration of 1991, the former Soviet Republics have taken responsibility for all obligations of the Soviet Union and continue with water allocation mechanisms agreed upon during the Soviet period. This follows international standards. Regarding ‘best practice of water sharing’, the situation the situation is different: up to the present day, no multilateral water (and energy) sharing agreement has been reached so far among the five riparian countries sharing the Amu Darya Basin. Water allocation to four countries- Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan - out of five riparian countries are determined by Protocol 566, endorsed by Moscow in 1987. The water allocation quota established by the Scientific and Technical Council of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resource Management of the Soviet Union in this Protocol continue to be applied. 62 Informal discussions with Walter Klemm and others which confirm the concerns of the evaluators.
29 communities. As such LKIHP was always something of an anomaly within the EIRP and owes its inclusion to the strong desire of the GoA to re-activate a number of dam projects proposed in the 1970s during the Government of Sardar Daud Khan. The ensuing years of conflict meant that they were never completed, but in the minds of many Afghans they reflect the aspirations of a lost ‘golden age’ in Afghanistan’s development to which they would like to return. 63 There are also indications that there may be connections to potential landed interests in the ‘virgin’ lands dating back to a previous age that could prove problematic. In the case of Lower Kokcha, the GoA requested the WB to include this feasibility study under the umbrella of EIRP. The proposal was accepted in a spirit of compromise despite not fitting well with the main theme of the project.
124. As things are, once the FS was finally approved in 2010, plans for the further development of the proposal have depended on donors coming forward to fund the project in whole or in part, as now seems to be the case. 64 The LKIHP has little immediate relevance to the current objectives of IRDP unless Lower Kokcha plans overlap with those of IRDP in the rehabilitation of more traditional systems in the area. It is up to any potential donor to make their own agreements with GoA/MEW and this does not involve FAO.
125. The feasibility study does, however, help to highlight a number of important and relevant issues relating to projects of this kind which the evaluators feel are worth mentioning here:
- Cost-effectiveness
126. Even though the FS recommendations tend to concentrate on high input agriculture the evaluators consider that no convincing case is made for the economic justification of such a large investment in the main infra-structure.
127. The feasibility study includes two detailed annexes relating to agriculture and crop production as it is presently practised in those parts of the project area already managed under traditional irrigation systems.
128. An important point stressed in the agricultural annexes of the study is the absolute necessity for the responsible government agencies, in particular the MEW and the MAIL, to work closely together in support of the farmers who must both maintain their irrigation channels as well as manage the irrigation water in the most efficient and effective fashion when cultivating their crops.
- Lower Kokcha: Effectiveness, efficiency and impact
129. This sub-project has had no direct or immediate impact on the effective output of the EIRP and it could be argued that the study cost 3 percent of the EIRP budget that might have been spent more cost effectively on the rehabilitation of traditional systems and that this would have had a greater and more direct impact on assisting crop production, increasing food security and in reclaiming irrigated crop land for productive agriculture. Indeed EIRP actually did work
63 Other examples of this, (not funded under EIRP or IRDP) are the Salma dam being constructed on the Harirud upsteam of the town of Obeh near the historic Sufi shrine ( ziyarat ) of Chesht-i Sharif and the Kamal Khan weir/ dam, planned for construction, to be funded by the GoA itself, on the lower Helmand river on the border between Helmand and Nimroz provinces. In both cases the Government of Iran has expressed concerns that the construction of these two dams may infringe their riparian rights to the waters of the Harirud and Helmand respectively. 64 As mentioned above the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is interested in at least partially funding the Kokcha project. It remains to be seen how this develops.
30 on at least two significant traditional irrigation canal systems in LKIHP command area. Dasht-e Qala and the Dashte Archi canals. Another – the Imam Sahib Canal - was terminated due to insecurity, but may be implemented (security permitting) under IRDP.
130. For one reason or another, the feasibility study took an inordinately long time and much effort and additional expense before being approved. The process initially took three years between March 2006 and July 2009 with a further year of discussions until June 2010 before the final report was accepted. FAO played an important part in helping to bring this piece of work to a conclusion. But, as such, this sub-component of EIRP cannot be rated very highly for efficiency, and ultimate effectiveness can only be assessed on the outcome of the ADB support and that of other possible donors if they come forward.
- Lower Kokcha: Sustainability
131. The sustainability of the ADB-funded part of the LKIHP can only be judged when the nature and scale of the work being funded is better understood. Should seriously interested donors appear, wishing to fund the LKIHP project in its entirety, serious attention will have to be paid to the type of authority that is put in place to manage any ‘formal’ irrigation system that is constructed. One important lesson learned from the last 30 years of Afghan history is the vulnerability to political breakdown of government/parastatal authorities, established to manage large-scale irrigation systems. Examples of how quickly ‘government’ lead irrigation management systems can break down are provided by the two main ‘models’ established by the rival ‘great powers’ in the 1960s and 1970s; the Helmand project on the one hand established by the USA and, on the other, the Nangarhar project established by the USSR. The institutionalized management of these irrigation schemes still remains problematic more than ten years on since the beginning of 2002.
- Lower Kokcha: Recommendations
132. The following recommendations fall into the category of ‘General Principles’ as well as ‘Lessons Learned’. They are set down here by the evaluators as being worth recording.
• The benefits of dam construction cannot be assumed. Effective, basic pre-feasibility work if well conducted can save a great deal of unnecessary expense and time. • Before embarking on planning a dam in Afghanistan, it is essential to have a good understanding of potential transboundary riparian, political and environmental implications. It may be that such issues render the project inappropriate or even politically unsuitable from the outset. • Serious consideration must be given from the beginning as to how such a scheme will be managed and under what type of ‘authority’ it will be organized and what are the likely costs. • Issues of land ownership and users’ rights and future land settlement issues need to be given serious consideration. If it is proposed to bring large areas of previously virgin land into irrigated crop production, as in the case of Lower Kokcha, the whole question of land-ownership needs to be handled with considerable care as this is an area of ‘development’ notoriously prone to political manipulation and economic opportunism by those with influence and power. • The potential for agricultural food and cash crop production needs to be carefully studied in a realistic fashion from the beginning rather than in a spirit of wishful thinking. The cost-effectiveness of such an expensive development with all its social, political, environmental and economic ramifications must be carefully considered.
31 • Potential markets and market chains need to be carefully studied. Issues relating to social services, living conditions as well as agricultural services need to be considered from the outset. • Careful studies need to be carried out with regards to soils, drainage and potential salinity issues. • Until political stability is assured, it is likely to be more cost-effective to invest in the rehabilitation and improvement of existing community systems rather than investing large amounts of money in dam structures and formal irrigation structures that will require their own ‘government’ dependant management infrastructure which in a country such as Afghanistan have proved to be so fragile. • A realistic assessment of opportunities and risks (of all kinds) must be made in order to reach realistic conclusions not marred by an overly optimistic view of the project’s potential and possibilities. It is advisable to apply an initial robust and realistic SWOT analysis. • Potential donors willing and able to support the follow-up project design should (if possible) be identified, before undertaking a feasibility study for a large development of the LKIHP type.
133. Additional comments on the LKIHP feasibility study are provided in Annex 4.
5.2 Small dam development in the Northern Basin (ongoing) after Johannes Oosterkamp’s modification
134. Introductory note: The evaluation team was asked to review the work in progress on the small dams component. This component was initiated during the final stages of the EIRP and continues under the IRDP programme. The company contracted by MEW to undertake the pre- feasibility and feasibility studies for this component are the Indian firm WAPCOS. FAO have not been directly involved with this study. However, FAO assisted in arranging meetings with the WAPCOS team in Mazar-e Sharif and a number of site visits with them. Subsequent to the initial evaluation mission in March 2012, the irrigation engineer consultant on the evaluation team 65 was invited by the World Bank to return to Afghanistan on an assignment to participate in a WB supervision mission and by FAO to undertake a more detailed study of this component, in the form of being team leader of a review team to see the WAPCOS submissions for the pre- feasibility study. At the time of finalizing this report, his work in this capacity is still ongoing. Although this component is not specifically part of FAO’s TA responsibility, but insofar as they are close advisers of the MEW PCU in almost every aspect of their work, they do have an involvement. The evaluation team was asked to review the progress and relevance of this component so that the comments included should be seen as a necessary part of the report. Initial comments and observations have been modified, as necessary, in the light of information obtained subsequent to the evaluation mission and the preparation of the original draft report.
5.2.1 Narrative and technical assessment
135. In order to utilize part of the WB second Grant (US$28 million-2008) MEW decided to finance the services of a consultant - WAPCOS Ltd (a Government of India undertaking) to carry out pre-feasibility and feasibility studies for 22 small dams 66 in the ‘enclosed’ river basin(s) of the Northern Region (Samangan, Balkh, Jawzjan and Faryab). These studies aim at making a final selection of two to three small dams for design and construction. The pre-
65 Mr. Johannes Oosterkamp 66 Originally 44 small dam sites but later reduced to 22.
32 feasibility work was started during the final months of EIRP and continues under IRDP. This sub-component was conceived under EIRP and is being followed up under IRDP, so this section is pertinent to both projects.
136. When visiting Balkh and Samangan (7-9 March), the evaluation team had meetings with members of the WAPCOS team both in their office in Mazar-e Sharif and on the sites of two possible small dams in Samangan Province (7-9 March) (see Annexes 5.1 and 5.2).
137. Although somewhat at variance to the main objective of the original EIRP/IRDP, the adoption of a sub-component in EIRP/IRDP involving the feasibility, design and construction of several small dams came about at the request of the MEW in reaction to popular demand. The construction of dams is commonly a controversial subject particularly in a country such as Afghanistan which acts as a ‘water storage tower’ for its neighbouring countries with whom it shares the waters from most of its rivers. All these countries have their own needs and demands for this water. In order to minimize the risks of transboundary riparian dispute, it was decided to build two/maximum three small dams, if this proves to be feasible, in the least controversial ‘enclosed’ northern river basins where none of the rivers flow freely across frontiers. 67 The location, size and designs of these two (or three) small dams are to be selected after the completion of pre-feasibility on 22 pre-selected potential sites, to be followed by feasibility studies on 10 sites judged to have the best potential. The pre-feasibility/feasibilities were still in progress at the time of the evaluation mission so it is not possible to critically assess conclusions. Whilst having no objections in principle to the concept of this sub-component the evaluators do have some concerns as described below:
5.2.2 Small dams - A confusing title
138. The indicative maximum height of the ‘small’ dams to be designed and constructed under IRDP is put at 20m by the WB in order to frame the studies. Some comment is needed on the definition of a ‘small dam’ because by giving an indication of maximum dam height at 20m this already poses a possible confusion in definition that requires clarification. For instance, the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) defines small dams as having a height of less than 50ft (15.4 m.) and the International Commission for Large Dams (ICOLD) defines large dams as having a height of more than 15m. This means that at 20m the dams being considered fall into the definition of ‘large’ dams. As such, they should meet all the requirements for the construction of ‘large’ dams in terms of planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance and environmental and social impact studies. This classification is clearly spelled out in the WB’s OP 4.37. Thus, the title of this sub-component as presently stated is somewhat confusing.
5.2.3 Placing an artificial limit on the height of the dams
139. The evaluation team would like to emphasize that the size, design, height and strength of a dam should be dictated by a number of factors included among which are the size and outputs of the watershed (catchment), the potential scale, strength and duration of maximum flood and its potential (estimated) burden of sediment.
140. The evaluators consider that it is ill-advised to place a non-technical limit on the size of these dams which must always take the above considerations into account. Placing a limit on the
67 These include the so called ‘blind rivers’ of the Northern Basin, which although they were once tributaries of the Amu Darya which many centuries ago ceased to flow directly into the Amu but exhaust themselves in the northern plains-the Dasht i Shortepe- the Khulm, the Bakhab, the Sar-I Pul and the Shirin Tagab and a number of seasonal spate washes.
33 size may also lead to the selection site(s) that may seriously disadvantage the future construction of a dam more appropriate for the particular watershed (catchment).
5.2.4 The issue of sediment
141. A basic concern is that any dam constructed in the soft, easily eroded, mainly sedimentary geological strata typical of the Northern River Basins where extremely high sedimentation rates can be expected is likely to have a very short effective life. 68
142. It is noteworthy that in the ToR for the small dam sub-component, ‘sediment’ is mentioned only once. The consultants, WAPCOS, however, do make ample reference to the issue of sedimentation in their successful bid and appear to be concentrating attention on potential sedimentation issues. They should be encouraged to continue doing so.
143. However, no mention is made of the expected useful life of each irrigation system based on each of the 22 provisionally pre-selected dam sites, which is clearly a vital issue.
5.2.5 Assessment of watersheds
144. For the purposes of the pre-selection survey, areas of interest have been restricted to a 10km radius centred on the proposed dam sites when determining the area of ‘social interest’. 69 It is understood from FAO management that this diameter was recommended in the preliminary assessment for social and environmental impact rather than for hydrological, geological or catchment characteristics. Even so, placing such geometric restrictions on social and environmental considerations unrelated to geographic, topographic, social or environmental realities is unnecessarily artificial and restricting and likely to lead to misleading distortions and misinterpretations. 70
145. Indeed, the actual size of the watersheds/catchments relating to each of the 22 potential dam sites needs to be checked very carefully. This can, and should have been, easily assessed by reference to each site on the 1/100,000 USA topographical map of Afghanistan.71 It was noted by the evaluators that no maps were available to the WAPCOS field team in Mazar-e Sharif, but were held in the Delhi office.
5.2.6 Premature social engagement with site communities
146. Another issue of concern observed by the evaluators was that project sites had already been visited by the consultant’s social/environmental expert who had started discussions with the local communities prior to the completion of the pre-feasibility. Such discussions were even held during the pre-selection survey.
147. In fact, most of the engineering technical pre-feasibility can be done from the study of maps and satellite imagery, and short field visits without any serious engagement with the communities concerned. The social survey can begin in the feasibility phase, after the pre- feasibility has eliminated most of the least viable sites from the options. Experience shows that
68 Silt has a defined range of size. It is mostly fine material that can be flushed relatively easy. However, it is the coarser bed and jumping load that causes the main problem. In the short steep watersheds under consideration this coarse load has had little chance to break down. 69 i.e. the potential inundation of agricultural land, settlements and habitation upstream of the dam sites and potential beneficiaries or other water users who might be adversely effected down stream of the sites. 70 For instance, the artificial restriction to a 10km radius does not include issues related to downstream common-law water rights 71 Or, if Cyrillic script is not an issue, the 1/50,000 Russian map series for Afghanistan.
34 even without making promises, visits and discussions with rural communities are likely to raise expectations of action. This can and often does unnecessarily lead to problems when the communities concerned feel let down because no action has been taken.
148. This was the way in which WAPCOS chose to conduct their studies, which in the view of the evaluation team was neither correct nor wise and may reflect the inexperience of the WAPCOS team, working in Afghanistan. It should be pointed out that FAO have not been directly responsible for this work. .
5.2.7 Karstic reservoirs
149. It should be noted that the USGS geological map indicates the chance of karstic development leading to underground channels and reservoirs. Further geological research is needed to come to definite conclusions for each of the dam sites having favourable conditions and acceptable watersheds. The lack of surface run-off from the Khulm river watershed gives reason for concern.
5.2.8 ‘Enclosed basin’ and subterranean flow across frontiers
150. There is no doubt that in earlier geological history the rivers of the Northern Basin will have flowed openly into the Amu River. However, for many centuries there has been no free surface flow of water from these rivers into the main regional drain. Each of the rivers in this region ‘peter out’ in the irrigated northern plains of Balkh, Jawjan and Faryab before reaching the frontier. There are no apparent overt riparian issues relating to shared water resources with Uzbekistan with respect to the Balkhab, the Samagan, the Faryab and the other rivers of this region. For political reasons this is why the Northern Basins region has been selected for this dam project. However, there is undoubtedly a subterranean movement of water northwards to the Amu River which here forms Afghanistan’s northern frontier. These and some other issues of an enviro/social/political nature are referred to in more detail in Annex 9, ESS.
- Small dams: Relevance
151. The small dam component was included into EIRP/IRDP at the request of the MEW and follows a strongly held view (not always supported by technical facts), that dams are the answer to many of Afghanistan problems with (lack of) irrigation water. If well conducted, the feasibility studies should eliminate those sites where the construction of a dam is neither appropriate nor economically viable. It is hoped that two or possibly three sites may be identified where the construction of a dam is relevant and will serve a useful, beneficial and economically viable purpose. It is still too early to judge until the feasibility studies have been completed and their quality assessed.
- Small dams: Effectiveness and efficiency
152. It will be easier to judge the effectiveness and efficiency with which this sub-component has been managed, by the project and by the consultants, WAPCOS, once the feasibility studies are concluded.
153. At this stage (March 2012), however, it was observed that it was taking longer to complete the pre-feasibility phase than it should have done. The fact that the field team are working without the appropriate maps, from which much of the pre-feasibility work could have been done as a ‘desk job’ does not bode well.
35
- Small dams: Impact and sustainability
154. It is too early in the process of the feasibility to make any meaningful assessment of this sub-component’s potential impact and sustainability. It is hoped that these issues will become clearer, at least as potentials when the feasibility studies are concluded and a selection of dam sites made based upon sound criteria.
- Small dams: Recommendations
155. Please see below:
• If none of the sites are found to be appropriate, this sub-component should be reviewed and, as appropriate, serious consideration given to the re-allocation of funds to more cost-effective purposes such as the rehabilitation and development of traditional irrigation systems. • Confusing title of ‘small dam’: The definition of what is understood by a ‘small dam’ needs to be clarified. In terms of this sub-component, the definition appears to be at variance with other commonly recognized international terminology. If it confuses the evaluators it may confuse others. • Placing an artificial limit on the size and height of the dams: Watersheds, catchments, flows and configuration of reservoir locations dictate the dimensions required for a dam. These should not be dictated prior to completion of the technical and hydrological analysis of the potential sites. • The issue of sediment: The issue of sediment has to be taken very seriously and cannot be ignored or understated. Throughout Afghanistan, most rivers when in full flow or spate carry a heavy load of sediment. This is particularly true of the rivers of the Northern Basin’s region. The issue of sedimentation is likely to seriously shorten the useful life of dams constructed in these valleys leading eventually to subsequent social problems and the cost of decommissioning. The main cost could be on the social side, or how to deal with the population dependent on the flow when the dam ceases to function. 72 • Definition and assessment of watersheds and possible downstream effects on the feasibility of dams: Site selection and dam design and feasibility cannot (should not) be limited by an artificial diameter of 10km drawn around the possible dam site. The complete geography of the watershed from the upper catchment to an undefined distance downstream of the site must be understood. • Premature social inquiries with possible project site communities: At the pre-feasibility stage of the studies care should be taken not to unnecessarily raise the expectations of the communities concerned. Visits and social inquiry can of itself be mistaken for an implicit promise. • Karstic channels and reservoirs: Due note should be taken of the peculiarities and special features of the geology of the Northern Region when doing feasibility studies and later in design and construction. • Subterranean flow across frontiers: Damming the waters of the Northern Region rivers that have no open surface flow across the northern frontier is unlikely to have the same political repercussions as would constructing dams on any of the rivers flowing freely across frontiers. However, the GoA, WB and FAO should be aware that there is almost
72 Subsequent field visits to the northern rivers by the irrigation engineer consultant confirmed the seriousness of the problems of siltation.
36 certainly subterranean flow of water northwards to the Amu River which forms the frontier.
156. More detailed technical notes on the small dams sub-component are provided in Annexes 5.1 and 5.2
6 Component B2 - Monitoring and evaluation
6.1 Narrative and assessment
6.1.1 Background
157. M&E was not initially given priority by either the WB or the GoA. Although M&E was not initially FAO’s primary responsibility, they did contract an M&E consultant 73 early in the project’s life (January/February 2004) to prepare an M&E framework. However, this was not followed up at that time and no baseline study was conducted at the start of the EIRP from which to measure the impact of the project. Many things needed doing to ‘get the show on the road’. In those first years, the WB does not appear to have given priority to M&E and it was not given serious attention until the mid-term review of 2006.
158. In 2006, MEW contracted the USA-based consultants, Sheladia Associates, to assist the establishment of an M&E unit in the EIRP PCU. Sheladia completed a baseline study (BLS) and a first EIRP seasonal impact assessment study. These were completed simultaneously by April 2007. MEW assisted Sheladia with data collection.
159. As the BLS and the first annual (seasonal) assessment were carried out in tandem there was little in the way of hard or reliable data from earlier years against which to measure impact for this first assessment. Reliance was placed on what was reported verbally to the enumerators by the farmers and mirabs. Physical measurements, using chains, scales and GPS were not taken of either canal command areas, areas under irrigated crop, nor where physical measurements taken of crop yields or water flows.
160. Although it would still be possible for EIRP engineers to calculate reasonably accurately, the total potential area commanded by different irrigation canals using topographical maps and purpose made field-sheets, accurate assessment of annually cropped irrigated land, as opposed to ‘command area’, was not possible with the tools readily available to the Sheladia/PCU team and their survey enumerators. Nor for that matter were these tools available to the FAO engineers. Improvements in data collection were proposed by FAO, but at that time insufficient funds were being spent on M&E.
161. An M&E hiatus followed the end of the Sheladia contract in December 2007 which lasted until August 2009. In August 2009, FAO was given direct TA responsibility for assisting the MEW PCU establish an M&E unit. Since then until the present, FAO has provided the primary TA support to the MEW M&E unit in this sector.
73 Mr Waqar Jehangir (FAO consultant).
37
6.1.2 The EIRP first baseline survey and assessments
162. Since 2006-2007, up until the latest base line survey carried out in 2011, all EIRP reviews, assessments and annual reports used the findings of the Sheladia 2007 baseline survey and 2006-2007 annual seasonal assessment as the basis for their reporting on achievements gained particularly by Component A of EIRP – ‘The rehabilitation of large/medium and small irrigation systems’. Selected, extracts from these reports are included in Annex 6.
163. As described, the Sheladia BLS and assessment data is essentially as reported verbally by the farmers rather than as the result of accurate measurements of land and crop yields. In fact, all through EIRP no physical measurements were taken of command areas, cropped areas or crop yields. As such, figures for cropped areas and crop yields have always been more indicative than absolutely accurate. The accuracy of the data set out in the Sheladia BLS and thus in all subsequent assessments up to the conclusion of EIRP are thus essentially rather weak.
164. Sheladia conducted a second survey for the seasonal assessment for 2007-2008 but never completed the reporting. Although their figures were later tabulated by an M&E consultant contracted by MEW, it was never set out in report form. Sheladia came to the end of their contract time in December 2007, after four changes of team leader and without fulfilling several important aspects of their ToR. They did nothing to assist the PCU establish an M&E unit or train it in M&E skills as had been expected. Nor did they do anything effectively to establish an MIS/GIS system in the PCU. Some preliminary discussions were held with the UN Mapping and Satellite Imagery Unit (AIMS), but these ultimately came to nothing due, in part, to the restructuring of that organization. 74
165. After Sheladia, there followed a year when attempts at establishing an M&E unit in the MEW PCU were repeatedly frustrated by difficulties both in identifying and retaining competent international consultants and national M&E staff. Two international experts were contracted by MEW. Both resigned after a few months.
166. FAO played no direct part in the establishment of an M&E capability in EIRP until August 2009. 75 In 2009, after discussions with the WB and MEW, it was agreed that FAO should, themselves, employ an international M&E consultant to mentor and train a national M&E unit in the PCU and assist the PCU to conduct annual survey assessments. The present incumbent 76 M&E expert was contracted by FAO and took up his position in August 2009, from which point FAO has taken the lead in assisting the establishment of an M&E capability in the EIRP/IRDP PCU. Since then some progress has been made.
167. Despite continuing difficulties in retaining staff, the PCU M&E unit with assistance from FAO has conducted four surveys: i) a third seasonal assessment for 2008-2009; ii) a fourth seasonal assessment for 2009-2010; iii) a fifth seasonal assessment 2010-2011 (completed April 2012, after completion of the evaluation field work) 77 ; and iv) a new baseline survey was carried out in 2011 for the forthcoming IRDP.
74 Effectively the privatization of AIMS which also meant an increase in the costs of their services 75 Apart from the brief consultancy input at the start of the project in 2004 76 Mr Taeme Tewold-Berhan- M&E consultant 77 A copy of which was only received by the evaluation team on 12 June (Ist draft of evaluation report submitted on 1 May 2012).
38 168. Since FAO has taken the TA lead in M&E there has been close collaboration with the FAO team based in the MAIL in order to improve, as far as possible, the quality of the data collection and its analysis through triangulation with the annual crop yield data collected by the FAAHM unit in MAIL as well as comparing data to ‘control group’ irrigation schemes. There is no doubt that since FAO took the lead in providing TA in M&E matters the quality of the M&E has improved.
Summary of M&E reviews, baseline studies and M&E annual assessments
A. The Sheladia Studies 2006-2008
1. EIRP: Baseline Study- 2004-2006- Completed April 2007- by Sheladia Associates. 2. EIRP: First Seasonal Impact Assessment: 2004-2006 - completed April 2007 by Sheladia Associates
These two exercises were conducted simultaneously, without any prior baseline for comparisons.
3. EIRP: Second Seasonal Impact Assessment: 2006-2007-survey completed December 2007 by Sheladia Associates. Data never tabulated or processed. Later tabulated by international expert contracted by the MEW, but no report produced.
C. MEW/PCU/FAO Annual Seasonal Assessments
4. EIRP: Third and Fourth Annual Assessments: 2008-2009; 2009-2010 completed with assistance of Int. Consultant contracted by FAO. 5. EIRP: Fifth Annual Assessment: 2010-2011 is still in final stages of preparation. It was due in February 2012, but has been delayed due to the cumbersome data verification and processing requirements. It was finally completed in April 2012, with the assistance of the FAO M&E consultant 6. EIRP / IRDP: Baseline Survey- Completed in 2011 with assistance of FAO M&E consultant. 78
39 169. A summary of the results of the most recent (5th) M&E annual report according to M&E 2011 project impact survey on 74 sampled sub-projects (see box below): 79
- Land utilization: increased from 53.1 percent before rehab. to 63.4 percent after EIRP = 19.6 percent improvement in land utilization. In contrast land-utilization rate of surveyed control group without projects is 44.5 percent. - Incremental irrigated area : EIRP has achieved 23.5 percent incremental irrigated area after rehabilitation, representing 94 percent of the target 25 percent. This contrasts with the project management report, survey findings being short of target by 6 percent. NB. The survey sample size is about 10.2 percent while the project report covers the incremental area of 728 completed sub-projects.80 - Cropping intensity: reported to have increased from 88 percent to 107.1 percent (an increase of 21.7 percent) as the result of EIRP 81 . - Yield increase: wheat yield increased by 71.6 percent compared to baseline, achieving 41.6 percent over target of 30 percent set during appraisal as the direct result of the more effective conveyance of irrigation water. On average, wheat yield for sampled completed EIRP sub-projects increased by 50.6 percent in the immediate post-rehabilitation harvest season. In 2011, compared to control group schemes, EIRP rehabilitated schemes achieved 38.1 percent higher wheat yield 82 83 - Reduction in water related disputes: according to 74 Mirabs interviewed (2011 M&E survey), water related disputes have been reduced from 68 percent to 43 percent per year per sub-project. A reduction of 56.9 percent after EIRP. - Improved access to irrigation water as the result of project intervention over one year has averaged 32.2 percent. The highest registered was in Kunduz (39.5 percent) the least in Kandahar (17.4 percent) and Mazar (23.4 percent). The highest improvement in access to water, was registered in Herat (35 percent) followed by Mazar (34 percent). - Prevention of flood induced agricultural destruction: a significant number of beneficiary farmers are reported to attribute reduction of flood damages to project intervention. Overall, destruction has been reduced by an average of 45 percent after rehabilitation, ranging from 38.9 percent to 48.5 percent implying also a reduction in hashar community labour requirement. - O&M: On average the number of man/days spent on maintenance has been reduced by 28.7 percent as the direct result of O&M training offered to beneficiary farmers. - Irrigated land value under surveyed sub-projects reported to have increased from US$28,115.60 to US$3,2216.40 per ha. By an average of 14.6 percent ranging from 7.3 percent to 33.6 percent across all EIRP regions. - Increase of access to irrigation water measured in average number of days over one year per household: reported to have improved by an average of 32.2 percent after the rehabilitation of irrigation structures. The highest in Kunduz (39.5 percent) the lowest in Kandahar (17.4 percent) and Mazar (23.4 percent).
170. Until 2012, for the annual assessments the Sheladia baseline was used (with all its weaknesses) as the starting point against which to measure change. The new BL developed with the assistance of FAO in 2011 will be used for monitoring change by IRDP and is expected (hoped) to be an improvement.
171. As reported to the evaluators, as IRDP was coming on stream in 2011, it has become the practice of the project’s survey teams to physically measure and map irrigation command areas using a combination of chains and GPS readings. Although this is an improvement on relying on farmers and mirabs’ reporting, it is to be hoped that a more effective and accurate MIS/GIS system will be put in place as soon as possible, backed up by competent ground-truthing (see below).
79 This has been updated since submission of the 1 st draft of the evaluation report (1 May 2012) on receipt of the 2011 M&E annual report in June 2012. 80 Drought is reflected in the report from Mazar in comparison with Herat and Kandahar. 81 It should be noted that rather than assessing improvements in crop production in terms of percentages, if what is meant is actually moving from a single crop in a season to two crops (or more), or from one type of cropping to another, it would be more correct to refer to such changes in land use as changing from one class to another. 82 Wheat being the most important crop cultivated all over the country at all altitudes where crops are grown, it is an important indicator. Similar significant increases in yield for other crops are also claimed to have increased significantly as the result of EIRP activity. 83 This is qualified in the M&E 2011 report see box quote in Section 6.4 below.
40
6.1.3 Some problems facing the design of baseline survey for EIRP
172. Designing a baseline survey for EIRP was extremely difficult without the tools with which to take accurate measurements. Thus, the accuracy of the data reported has to be open to question, although they may be taken as providing good indicators. This applies to any survey relating to land and agricultural production that relies mainly on what farmers, land-owners and mirabs report rather than on precise measurements.
173. At this point, it should be noted that in Afghanistan it is common for the total area commanded by a particular canal system to be considerably larger than is actually cropped in any one season. This is usually due to the limited availability of irrigation water reaching the fields compared to the potential land available. This situation is more common in the plains and the wider sections of the river valleys than in the upper narrower valleys where water availability is usually proportionately greater than the size of the crop-land being served.
174. It is common for a total command area to be cropped in different sections, in succession, over a period of years on a crop/fallow rotation. Thus, if a particular section is cropped one year this is followed by one, two, three or even four years of fallow, depending on the extent of the total command and the availability of water at the field level. 84 This is most easily organized for a single grain crop such as wheat, rice or even cotton, but even for maize and mung beans which have similar irrigation requirements. This requires the agreement of all the farmers to use one particular section of the command area together in the same season for ease of water management and water turns.
175. As has been shown in Section 4 the rehabilitation of a traditional irrigation system can do much to improve the efficient conveyance of water, from the head to the tail of the system. This not only helps to increase the area under irrigated cropping, but if the water is well managed helps to increase crop yields as well. Yield, however, depends on more factors than water alone, although this is of vital importance. Increasing the availability of water and shortening water turn intervals may indeed help farmers to grow a greater variety of (possibly higher value) crops, such as vegetables. An increase in the availability of water in the summer months may permit the cultivation of a second summer crop where this was not previously possible.
176. The improved conveyance of water from head to tail is likely to alleviate traditional disputes between the tail users, who are habitually starved of water, and those at the head who tend to take more than their needs. Indeed, it has been widely reported that the work of EIRP has helped to alleviate such disputes.
177. Yield and production depend on many things including: the quality of the seed; the varieties cultivated; inputs of fertilizer/manure; cultivation practices and rotations; pest management; and post-harvest management. All are part of the complex package that goes to make up good husbandry practice. To make undue claims for yield increases simply by increasing the flow of irrigation water without taking any of the other factors into account is to open such claims to justifiable criticism.
178. The fact that the area under irrigated crops, in any one year, is often different from the total command area can lead to confusion when recording data and care must be taken in this
84 For the purposes of irrigation management, farmers from a particular community agree which section of the total command area will be cropped in any particular year so that they crop contiguous land in a block rather than in scattered parcels .
41 respect. Account must also be taken of local idiosyncrasies in calculating areas of land cropped and yields obtained. Few farmers in Afghanistan calculate crop yields in terms of kgs or tons per jerib (1/5ha). More often information is provided in terms of the measure of seed sown against the yield of grain or crop successfully harvested and brought to store. Thus, whereas the official unit of agricultural land is the jerib, most farmers calculate their land by the quantity of wheat seed (wheat being the staple crop) sown against the expected yield. The sowing rate is not uniform and varies with the type of land and its fertility, the expected availability of water, the quality of the seed and other factors. The yield at harvest is usually accurately known and measured off the threshing ground after cleaning and is calculated as a return on seed sown. Indeed, this is also how the rental value (keroyeh) of land is calculated. Land area may also be calculated in units of water turn known as ‘jofte-e gaw’ (literally, a pair of oxen) rather than in jerib, as is common in Herat. 85
179. To add to the possibility of confusion different parts of Afghanistan customarily use different units of measurement of weight and volume from those used in Kabul and the central provinces (the 7 kg/ser). This can take the unwary by surprise and lead to strange anomalies when recording data. For instance, different units of measurement are commonly used by farmers in the general areas of Kandahar, Herat, Balkh, Badakhshan and Jalalabad respectively 86, 87 .
180. Since FAO took the lead for M&E matters in 2009, after the hiatus caused by the failure of Sheladia and subsequent M&E consultants to deliver, and based on research carried out by the FAO/PCU in early 2010, the system of inquiry with farmers was improved in order to take the above mentioned local factors into account. 88
181. There is no doubt that the system of data collection and analysis improved considerably after FAO took the lead in 2009-2010. But, in view of the fact that all the above factors and peculiarities of local difference in agricultural weights and measures and land use practice, characteristic of Afghanistan, were already well known before the start of the EIRP programme (or should have been), 89 it does seem a little strange that these things were not factored into the M&E system earlier. Even if FAO did not take the lead in M&E until 2009, they were nonetheless close advisers of the PCU. However, allowance has to be made for the fact that Sheladia seems to have failed to engage productively with the MEW PCU or one has to presume, with FAO.
182. It has to be remarked that a system of M&E that relies on farmer and mirab reporting without accurate measurements of the total command area; areas under irrigated crops; or
85 While the ‘jerib’ (approx 1/5ha) is the officially used unit for land measurement in Herat for instance farmers and land-owners are more likely to calculate their land in ‘joft-e gaw’ (literally, a pair of oxen) a variable measurement relating to allocations of water entitlements not exactly represented by uniform units of area. 86 An interesting indication of the historical weakness of central government to impose uniformity on the country. 87 For instance, the official measurement of weight is the Kabuli ‘ser’ which = 7kg, but in Kandahar the unit commonly used is the Kandahari ‘man’ of 4kg, while in Herat, the Herati ‘man’ of 4.5kg, or the ‘man’ of Balkh (Mazar-e Sharif) of 18kg, or the maund of Jalalabad/Peshawar which is different again. Designers of surveys whether foreign or Afghan have to be aware of these local idiosyncrasies. 88 As reported to the evaluators by the FAO M&E expert subsequent to the submission of the first draft of the evaluation report (1 May 2012). “Farmers and Mirabs are asked to estimate incremental irrigated/cultivated area based on their respective traditional practice in units they use. They are not asked to inform enumerators in hectares. Based on research carried out in early 2010 M&E found out that unit of measurement use for incremental/cultivated irrigated area varied from region to region. Accordingly farmers are asked to estimate in terms of particular amount of seeds they sow and/or in terms of ‘pair of oxen per day’, and then it is converted into jiribs. Further conversion rate of Jjirib into Hectare also varies from one area to another. This variation is also taken care of during data entry. In similar fashion, farmers are asked to give production figures in ‘seers’, which is converted to kilograms, again the conversion rate from ‘Seers’ to kilograms varies from region to region.” 89 In particular by FAO from their long and close connection with Afghan agriculture.
42 knowing the flow rate of the water at the end of the channel before and after the rehabilitation work has serious weaknesses. Crop yield can only be accurately estimated by taking crop yield measurements and depends on many factors in addition to water. Farmer reporting is notoriously and often deliberately inaccurate. Although improvements may be assumed, they cannot be accurately recorded relying only on the verbal reporting of mirabs, farmers and land- owners. It is notable that the latest M&E report for 2011, finalized in April 2011 (but made available to the consultants only in June 2012) is much more cautious in the presentation of its data.
. Quoted from 2011 M&E annual report-April 2012- Executive summary-Key project outcomes Effect of EIRP rehabilitation on major crop yield p.vii. “ Change in yield is, however, a function of many interacting factors, including effective and efficient use of irrigation water across the period of sowing to mature stages specific to individual crops; use of agricultural inputs (improved seeds, fertilizer, pesticides); fertility and suitability of the soil to specific crops and other on-farm activities. In view of the absence of in-depth regional agronomic studies relating to relative contribution of agricultural inputs to yield levels of major crops treated in this evaluation report, it is difficult to identify the effect of EIRP rehabilitation with reasonable precision.
Given these constraints, M&E has attempted to estimate gross effect of rehabilitation by computing the difference between average yield figures for control group (without project) and those sampled EIRP rehabilitated projects (with project) over the same period assuming the use pattern of agricultural inputs for ‘ before’ and ‘after’ rehabilitation scenarios remain the same for both rehabilitated and control group irrigation schemes. …….
This section concludes “ ….. Although it may not be right to conclude that the full difference between the EIRP rehabilitated irrigation schemes and the control group yield figures is attributable to the effects of rehabilitation, (a) substantial part can be attributed to the effect of emergency irrigation work.”
183. The failure of Sheladia and subsequent individual independent consultants to materially assist the MEW PCU establish an effective M&E unit led to FAO being requested to assist in this matter, which has improved the situation. Nonetheless, FAO’s position, providing the main TA to the MEW PCU and thus being directly engaged in project implementation both technically and managerially, is something of an anomaly as is clearly recognized by the FAO Regional Office as quoted in the box below. 90
Quote from response of Mr Puspa Raj Kanal-FAO Regional Office, Bangkok on M&E:
“The need for (a) technically competent M&E unit within the MEW has long been recognized,(and) was also one of the key activities of the EIRP. The idea then was to create a GIS-based MIS system and I personally prepared the M&E framework, and Sheladia was hired for that purpose. Unfortunately, Sheladia’s performance was very poor and FAO had to take responsibility for M&E. As FAO is directly engaged in project implementation both technically and managerially, the M&E should be outside the remit of FAO (except internal monitoring of the process) and it should be kept outside the project framework, as an independent unit within MEW as recommended in the report.”
184. The last sentence in the above quote implies the possible conflict of interest and consequently the danger of FAO through the PCU self reporting on M&E results.
6.1.4 M&E unit staffing and the issue of retaining trained personnel
185. Since 2009 with the close assistance from the FAO EIRP team, an M&E unit was established in the EIRP PCU, (now the IRDP PCU). However, retention of key M&E staff remains a recurrent problem. Once M&E staff have received some training they tend to leave,
90 Response of Mr. Puspa Raj Kanal- FAO Regional Office Bangkok.
43 such is the demand from better paying agencies. For instance, at the present time the IRDP PCU only has data collectors and processing staff. The previous M&E team leader left in December 2011 to take up better paid employment elsewhere and has not yet been replaced. (March 2012).
186. M&E personnel have now been appointed to most of the regional offices, although they still lack experience. At the present time, the MEW PCU employs six M&E staff in the Kabul headquarters - all but one of whom are data entry clerks. One is entitled ‘member of M&E’ with no indication of skill.
187. The regional M&E deployment is as follows: Kabul - 1 M&E coordinator; Jalalabad – 1 regional M&E coordinator; Bamian - no M&E person; Kandahar - 1 regional M&E coordinator; Kunduz - no M&E person; Mazar-e Sharif - no M&E person; Herat - 1 M&E coordinator.
188. For surveys, enumerators are hired on a temporary basis from other agencies and ministry departments such as MRRD.
189. In the FAO establishment in Kabul there is one international M&E consultant who is solely responsible for mentoring the M&E component and for training all staff from the PCU M&E staff in all the regional offices and the MEW, as well as guiding them in other tasks including the design and conduct of surveys. 91 His movements in and around Afghanistan are severely restricted by increasingly stringent UN security regulations. For a period, he had a national assistant, but as with the others, this person also left for better paid employment elsewhere.
190. It has now been agreed in principle by the WB with MEW that salaries for M&E staff (and other key nationals) may be supplemented from project funds. It is hoped that this will improve the situation, although this solution is not sustainable in the long term, while it is supported solely by donor project funds rather than through ministerial budgets generated from internal sources of revenue. The issue of low government staff salaries and the difficulty of competing with the private sector and indeed the international aid sector are intractable problems common to many developing economies and are not peculiar to Afghanistan. This problem is not easily solved and there are no quick or easy solutions. The FAO CTA 92 informed the evaluators that he has already suggested that experiences from other WB projects in other countries might be applied in this case, referring to instances where ‘in kind’ incentives were introduced in addition to cash. This suggestion was not accepted. However, the World Bank with its long international experience of this widespread issue should be the organization best able to draw on its experience to help the Afghan Government address this issue which is much wider than just the M&E unit of the MEW PCU.
191. In spite of these difficulties, the M&E component of the new IRDP is in better shape now than it was prior to the arrival of the FAO expert in late 2009 and it is hoped that for IRDP it will be possible to put in place the GIS MIS systems long recommended by FAO.
6.1.5 The need to strengthen data base and M&E accuracy for IRDP
192. There is little doubt that the rehabilitation of traditional irrigation systems under EIRP has been generally effective and is greatly appreciated. It has had a positive impact on
91 Mr. Taeme Tewolde Berhan 92 Mr. Waleed Mahdi
44 improving the agricultural livelihoods of the rural communities whose irrigation systems and channels have been the target of the project. It has lead to the reclamation of irrigated crop-land (increment) and has improved the flow of water from head to tail, thus helping to alleviate a cause of dispute and increase crop yields. However, the accuracy of the EIRP claims, while they continue to be essentially based on farmer and mirab reporting, lays itself open to criticism. This must not be permitted to continue and the methods of data collection and analysis need to be improved.
193. From discussions with senior staff in both FAO and the WB, there is clearly an acute consciousness and recognition of the weaknesses in the data as recorded at present. On the recommendation of the FAO team, the WB appears to be taking the matter very seriously and active discussions are in progress with the appropriate expertise in FAO headquarters and elsewhere.
194. Serious action is now being taken to establish an effective MIS/GIS capability to meet the new demands of IRDP. Encouraged by FAO, the WB is, currently in serious discussion with the Satellite Mapping Service at FAO headquarters 93 . FAO is currently assisting the Pakistan Government (Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission - SUPARCO) to improve its capability for crop damage assessment and disaster preparation or as it is termed, rapid crop damage assessment (RCDA). 94 The WB is investigating the possibilities of how FAO’s services might assist in strengthening the capacity of the M&E unit of IRDP.
195. There is already collaboration between the FAO EIRP/IRDP team and the FAO project assisting the MAIL on ‘Strengthening Agricultural Economics, Market Information and Statistical Service (GCP/AFG/063/EC) 95 which among other things supports the MAIL in conducting its annual crop assessments. This does not appear to have been the case in the earlier stages of EIRP, but it is the case now.
- M&E: Relevance
196. There is no doubt that effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is an essential management tool for any project of this kind, but the present system of data collection is weak. The demands of IRDP mean that the issue of M&E has to be seriously addressed. There is every indication that the WB and FAO are now working closely together to strengthen this component of the project. The question remains as to the most appropriate place for an M&E unit in the MEW and its mandate.
- M&E: Effectiveness, efficiency and impact
197. Whatever may have been FAO’s professional view, the WB does not seem to have taken M&E seriously until after the 2006 mid-term review as a result of which Sheladia was contracted by the MEW and produced a baseline survey and the initial annual assessment. But this input had problems and did not fulfil the ToR with respect to establishing an M&E unit in the PCU. It was not until late 2009 that FAO was made responsible. Although difficulties continue, particularly with respect to human resources, some progress had been made in establishing a working M&E unit in the PCU. By the end of the project the capacity of the
93 According to the FAO CTA the FAO EIRP team took the FAO’s NRL senior GIS officer, Mr. John Latham, to the WB office in Kabul to brief the WB officer responsible for EIRP on what the FAO GIS unit in headquarters was already doing for FAHAAM in MAIL; since then, the proposal to establish a GIS MIS unit in MEW is getting full WB support. 94 At the time of the evaluation the responsible official from the WB office in Kabul had visited the programme in Pakistan together with technical staff from the FAO IRDP team. 95 Previously FAHAAM
45 EIRP/PCU to collect and assess accurate data, although improved, is still rather weak. Although now showing signs of improvement as the result of FAO’s direct involvement since late 2009 and the WB’s increased commitment to strengthening this component, considered as a whole, M&E has not been one of the most effective or efficient elements of EIRP. However, considerable efforts are currently being made to strengthen this aspect of the project in its IRDP phase when it is hoped its impact will be felt more effectively.
198. Although the exact accuracy of the data may be open to question because of previous inherent weaknesses in the methods of data collection, M&E results have provided an indicative picture of the positive results of rehabilitating traditional irrigation systems.
- M&E: Sustainability
199. Although progress has been made the establishment of a competent M&E unit within the MEW PCU still has some way to go. Serious consideration should continue to be given to establishing M&E as a unit within MEW rather than specifically associated to a project with a finite life span. FAO has been of this opinion from the outset as reflected in statements by both the FAO CTA and the technical officer concerned in FAO’s Regional Office.
200. Although changes in agricultural output and crop yields are at present included as part of the MEW PCU M&E reporting, and as things are there is no easy way round this, it should be understood that crop yields and their measurement are not strictly speaking the responsibility of the MEW. The MEW’s primary responsibility is to evaluate the flow of water along streams and rivers and its distribution over different intakes according to command areas rather than monitoring and measuring changes in crop yield. That is the responsibility of MAIL as is the determination of command areas and cropping patterns. It is understood that FAO assists as far as possible in triangulating the MEW PCU’s findings with the Economics and Statistics Unit in MAIL (originally FAHAAM) which is also supported by FAO. More effective collaborative linkages should be established between the two ministries and their division of responsibilities in this respect. As well recognized, this is a broader institutional issue.
201. The prospects and sustainability of any such unit will be seriously weakened while terms of employment being offered for trained personnel are not competitive on the local job market. The long-term sustainability of any M&E capacity in the MEW or even as part of a broader national unit will depend on the ability of the GoA to retain competent staff. At present, the indicators are not good. Difficulties in retaining trained staff are proving to be one of the most serious and frustrating issues facing this sub-component. Whilst the Afghan Government is almost totally dependant on finite international donations of funds and until it is capable of generating sufficient revenue to pay government personnel competitive salaries, the long-term sustainability of this and other aspects of government staff salaries remain problematic and the solution still seems to be some years off.
- M&E: Recommendations
202. Please see below:
• If possible, something must be done to improve rates of pay and working conditions for technically competent and well trained personnel working for the MEW in M&E and other capacities for that matter. The FAO CTA has already suggested possible options from previous experience working with WB projects which to date have not been accepted. This
46 is recognized as a wider problem facing all government services in Afghanistan for which there are no easy or immediate answers. • Relying on the present data base should not continue under the enhanced requirements of IRDP. Improvements started under EIRP to improve the quality of M&E continue under IRDP. The adoption of more effective MIS/GIS-based systems presently being actively sought for IRDP should be encouraged. To be credible, this will have to be supported by competent ground-truthing. • The aim should be to establish a technically competent M&E unit in the MEW for the MEW as a whole and not solely for the MEW/IRDP PCU. Ideally, this should confine itself to those things that are the primary responsibility of MEW while maintaining close collaboration with MAIL and those things that are MAIL’s responsibility. It is recognized that this is easier said than done (see above).
7 Component C - Institution strengthening and technical assistance
203. This component is best divided into two main parts, the second being itself subdivided.
A. The construction and rehabilitation of buildings and facilities together with the provision of equipment
B.1 Training of MEW, MEW PCU and contractors; and B.2 Training for beneficiary water users (farmers and mirabs) in operation and maintenance.
7.1 Institutional strengthening
7.1.1 Buildings, facilities and equipment
204. By and large the construction and rehabilitation of buildings and facilities scheduled under EIRP was completed (funded from IDA-H4980) together with the procurement of furniture, office equipment and including laboratories (with equipment for control of construction quality and for determination of flows and sediment loads in flowing water, be it canals or streams and rivers), power facilities, vehicles and field equipment for the diverse project activities. Summaries are provided in Annex 7.
205. Quoting from the MEW EIRP ICR (5 March 2012): This has enabled the water sector staff in the various MEW departments, both in Kabul and at the provincial level, to “accommodate new equipment, assure quality of works, fill vacant positions, add comfort in performing duties, provide training space, help in improving staff attendance, add parking space for vehicles, increase safety standards and conditions in the offices and minimize security risks”.
206. Some office buildings are still in the process of being completed, such as the one which now houses the office of the water resource management directorate in Kabul. This is where data collected from the nationwide hydrological stations, is being prepared and processed. 96 Also, as more specifically referred to in Section 4, the delivery and installation of hydro/ meteorological stations and equipment did not proceed quite as efficiently as planned, although progress had been made before the end of the project.
96 Visited by the evaluators on 17 March and again on 28 March.
47 7.1.2 Training for the MEW, PCU and other professionals
207. EIRP has attached great importance to institutional capacity building, through training, for both project implementation and improving the sustainability of its outcomes. The project targeted the following staff for special training: PCU staff in all regions; provincial irrigation department’s staff in all provinces; MEW staff from different departments in Kabul; private sector implementing partners (i.e. mainly contractors) in the provinces where EIRP is operating; university students and lecturers; and FAO staff.
208. EIRP focused on two main categories of training: informal (customized) training and formal (in-country and overseas) training in which FAO has played a key role. Formal training was packaged in two capacity development plans prepared by FAO. The first was implemented between 2006 and 2008; and the second between 2009 and the end of the project in December 2012.
209. In the MTR of 2006, the WB strongly advised that only training likely to have a direct impact on the implementation of the project and the technical ability of the project staff should be selected. For this and other reasons 97 , training originally planned to take place in Europe and elsewhere in the world, including three MSc degrees (in the UK and Italy), was cancelled.
7.1.3 Training for water users (farmers and mirabs) in operation and maintenance (O&M)
210. The programme designed to train the water users (farmers, mirabs and local officials) to carry out the operation and maintenance (O&M) for the rehabilitated and improved canal systems, falls into a category of its own. Initially, it was not included in the early stages of the project and was only introduced at FAO’s suggestion after the WB MTR in 2006. This O&M training is based on the premise that such training will enhance the sustainability of the sub- projects with their improved structures. FAO employed a consultant to help design an appropriate and practical O&M training programme for water users, which is considered to have been a success. Training the actual water users is more likely to be sustainable than training the staff of government institutions. After all, the livelihood of the water users depends on the continuing efficient operation of their irrigation systems. They are not government employees on low salaries who may be tempted to leave after they have been trained.
211. In a short visit with little opportunity to meet and talk to farmers and mirabs, it is difficult for the evaluators to form a first hand opinion of the effectiveness of the O&M training programme. The approach is certainly a good one and, as reported, it seems to have been effective.
212. The report of a consultant employed to review the O&M training (8-31 October 2009)98 states “consistently reviewed as being worthwhile by all stakeholders: community training participants; district and water management staff and national ministry staff and trainers” 99 (summary and specific recommendations included as Annex 7).
213. As reported in the MEW EIRP ICR (March 2012), while endorsing the success of the O&M training programme, as testified by the communities targeted, the MEW acknowledged
97 Due to: problems with the English language, expense, considered too sophisticated for the educational level of the candidates, or running too great a risk of the participants absconding once they reached the selected countries. 98 Renee Crossley 99 First of 8 key points and 6 main recommendations made in Renee Crossley’s report November 2009- EIRP Community-based Operation and Maintenance Training.
48 that 40 percent of all completed sub-projects under EIRP had not received any O&M training. The MEW, in collaboration with the WB, is presently planning to complete this work under IRDP. It is hoped that such a follow-up programme on O&M indeed will be considered as a spill over from EIRP.
214. The FAO CTA has suggested that, in addition to the O&M national trainer, the IRDP should fund two other positions – a national water management trainer and a national agricultural extensionist. To date, these suggestions have not been accepted and such positions should in any case correctly be part of MAIL responsibility. 100
- Comparative labour saving in man/days due to O&M training:
215. The beneficiaries stated that an overall cost saving of 31 percent was realized after receiving the O&M training. Now they claim to have less work in canal cleaning, flood related repairs and in regular maintenance. The following table explains this in figures, which will become more meaningful when five years of experience with operating a canal with improved infrastructure has been assessed.
Table 6: Comparative labour savings in man/days due to O&M training provided to beneficiaries S. Operation and maintenance Average operation and maintenance cost in man/days No per surveyed scheme Before After Savings in overall cost % 1 Cleaning canals 266 168 37 2 Repairing structures destroyed by floods 385 215 44 3 Routine maintenance 331 258 22 4 Repairing canals and fields damaged by 515 405 21 wash water 5 Total cost of labour 1497 1046 31 From FAO EIRP terminal report March 2012
216. An account of O&M training by region is shown below:
Table 7: EIRP community O&M training-region-wise status as at 31 December 2011
Balance O&M % Sub- Sub- O&M O&M S. Sub-project Sub-project progress of Region project project training trainings No approved completed completed submitted awarded conducted yet to be SP conducted
Bamyan 67 67 67 62 53 85.5% 9 1 Kabul 118 118 118 113 44 38.9% 69
2 Heart 114 114 114 104 70 67.3% 34
3 Mazar 96 96 96 96 49 51.0% 47 4 Kunduz 97 97 97 91 66 72.5% 25 5 Jalalabad 158 158 158 145 86 59.3% 59
6 Kandahar 125 125 125 117 65 55.6% 52 Sub – Project 775 775 775 728 433 59.5% 295 Total From FAO EIRP terminal report March 2012
100 In written note from Waleed Mahdi
49 7.1.4 Summary of trainings completed
217. By end December 2011, 658 training sessions had been organized for different target participants for a duration of 3,447 days. Of these, 4,355 participants were from the technical staff and 6,545 were water users (farmers and mirabs) who benefited from O&M training (summarized below in tables extracted from FAO EIRP Terminal Report March 2012).
Table 8: Summary of all trainings conducted No of participations Total Total no Duration trained No Type and place of Engineers/ Mirabs/ (days) (person- trainings technicians farmers days) 1 General trainings 39 153 1,310 0 4,521 2 Overseas training 14 286 180 0 3,180 3 Hydrology 24 121 505 0 2,870 4 Large schemes 2 15 8 0 51 Kabul & Bamyan regional 5 153 845 856 1,458 19,074 team 6 Kandahar regional teams 68 334 207 389 2,750 7 Kunduz regional teams 97 332 316 1,560 5,727 8 Jalalabad regional teams 120 671 337 1,520 10,263 9 Mazar regional teams 53 194 161 807 3,408 10 Herat regional teams 88 496 475 811 6,213 Total 658 3,447 4,355 6,545 58,057
218. The following training impact evaluation is tabulated below:
Table 9: Training Impact Evaluation based on trainee assessment (from FAO EIRP Terminal Report March 2010) Trainee assessments in % Evaluation criteria Fair Good V. Good Excellent 1 Relevant to work requirements 1.5 7.4 68.3 22.8 2 Presentation easily understood 8.5 13.2 65.4 12.9 3 Use of teaching aids and case studies, where 9.6 14.6 69.8 6 appropriate
Table 10: The MEW ICR also states: Of 51 PCU and WMD trainee respondents, for all three evaluation criteria at the level of “Very Good” and “Excellent” respectively: i) 51 percent and 36 percent stated training helped improve their respective work performance; ii) 51 percent and 33 percent enhanced their knowledge and skills; and iii) 54 percent and 40 percent helped improve their motivation.
7.2 Technical assistance
219. The EIRP commissioned a number of studies and contracted expertise to assist the PCU in a number of different ways to help improve organizational efficiency and staff performance (see Annex 1.2, List of FAO EIRP technical consultancies).
220. FAO has provided the core of TA to MEW and the PCU both in the main ministry in Kabul and in all six regions, from the start of the project in 2004. The TA made up 20.3 percent of the FAO budget, inclusive of between 7 and 8 percent PCU administrative costs.
50 221. As well as providing a resident team of experts in finance and administration, procurement, design and structural engineering, O&M, M&E, etc., working closely with the EIRP PCU (now IRDP), FAO has provided regular backstopping by a panel of experts from the Investment Centre Division (TCI, FAO HQ, Rome) and the FAO Regional Office in Bangkok, plus a variety of other technical consultancies by experts hired as needed at the request of the client (GoA MEW). In addition to technical inputs, backstopping has included staff and cost planning, report reviews, technical clearance, approval of training curricula and capacity building plans.
222. In addition to the design and preparation of technical proposals, documents and contracts for 775 irrigation schemes (valued at US$89,850,429 including beneficiary contributions), the FAO TA team, working in close collaboration with the EIRP PCU, has prepared some 29 documents, including training and operational manuals, a project baseline survey, and assisted in the preparation of the ESMF and others (see Annex 9 for details).
223. At the conclusion of the FAO EIRP Terminal Report (5 March 2012), the following summary is made at the end of the section on Component C.
The conclusion can be drawn from the assessment studies which show 66.7 percent and 25.8 percent of the staff stated that training helped to improve their respective work performance; 72.2 percent and 22.2 percent stated that training enhanced their knowledge and skills; and 77.8 percent and 11.1 percent stated that training helped them to improve their motivation; for all three evaluation criteria at the rating of “Very Good” and “Excellent” respectively. Actual improvements made on work performance by respondent trainees in terms of productivity, quality of outputs, timeliness, and degree of executing their respective duties without or less guidance and mentoring support have been corroborated by senior project managers. These results are by and large attributed to mentoring and guidance provided by FAO technical assistance international staff, whose respective terms of reference include building capacity of national staff. At the field level, farmers in EIRP-assisted projects have benefited from much higher yield than those farmers without any technical assistance. Average yield for EIRP sub-projects has been consistently higher than those who do not benefit from similar assistance. The differences in yield shown further confirm the justifications for investment made for the rehabilitation of the EIRP projects as envisaged in the respective sub-project proposals.
51 224. According to the MEW IRD draft, EIRP made moderate achievements in strengthening relevant functions of the water sector and partner institutions. The box below has been copied from the MEW EIRP IRC (draft of 5 March 2012).
• Institutional capacity of PCU/MEW: has improved from 1.2 “Negligible” (Weak) to 3.1 “Moderate (good)”); PCU now has human resources with some experience in the planning and implementation of projects; PCU/EIRP has made some technical contribution in the development of the River Basin Commission. • Engineering staff capabilities and competencies: Improved from 1.4 “Negligible”(Weak) to 3.4 “Moderate” (Good). These functions, relating to survey, design and quality control, have benefited from extensive training, mentoring and on-the-job training and the introduction of PCU staff to the use of modern tools and technology. The outcomes are reflected in the fact that regional offices are now responsible for the survey, diagnosis and initial design; these activities are carried out with less day-to-day guidance and improved performance . Of course, all activities still have to be scrutinized and their quality assured by the technical assistance staff at headquarters. • Project management capacity PCU/MEW: Improved from 1.3 “Negligible” (Weak) to 3 “Moderate” (Good). Sufficient staff have been recruited and relevant training has been organized in project management, project monitoring, project documentation and report writing. However, the staff need further experience in order to gradually take over the independent running of project implementation. For now, MEW is not there yet. • Partner agency institutions: Improved from 1.47 “Negligible” (Weak) to 3.5 “Moderate” (Good). This improvement has been the direct result of training, guidelines and workshops organized for irrigation communities, MEW district and provincial staff and contractors. O&M training addressed: operation and maintenance (routine and emergency); irrigation management; and financial management of community O&M. A survey has indicated that communities have saved on average about 31 percent in terms of man/months as a result of this training. Provincial water management staff have also benefited from training in O&M and in the determination of technical diagnosis in irrigation water management related problems. The MEW recognizes the need for further support for irrigation communities and MEW district staff in O&M. As for irrigation water construction contractors, EIRP provided quality control guidelines and organized one-to-one meetings to monitor and follow up on implementation and also organized workshops to create common understanding on community, project management and contractor expectations, roles and responsibilities, in conformity with the WB and MEW procedures and policies.
225. Although the capacity of the MEW/PCU is recognized as having improved as the result of FAO technical support, the MEW believes that under IRDP it needs to continue to institutionalize the above gains in order to achieve the capacity to implement projects independently. An important aspect of the IRDP is that the MEW/PCU should take increasingly independent responsibility for project implementation including procurement and financial management.
7.3 Institutional strengthening and TA: Conclusions
226. After so many years of poor government and institutional breakdown, there remains a mountain of human ‘institutional and capacity building’ to climb at all levels, in terms of management and administrative skills as well as technical skills. The challenge remains enormous. Although of supreme importance, the progress of human capacity and institution building is notoriously difficult to assess on the strength of a brief visit and not having been involved in the day-to-day operations of the project. Only so much can be gained from meetings with project staff, and lists of training courses completed and study tours and workshops attended only tell part of the story.
227. For this, the evaluators have had little option but to rely on the reports and impressions of others.
228. The difficulty of retaining personnel after they have been trained remains a serious issue. The salary level of government employees is low and many, once trained, leave to seek better
52 paid employment. There may be a general gain for Afghanistan, but it is a net loss for the project. Too often it is a case of ‘keeping running in order to stay in the same spot’. Although some key technical MEW staff are in receipt of salary supplements provided out of project funds, this only partially and temporarily addresses the problem and does not address the issue of long-term sustainability. The evaluators realize that there is no simple solution to this. As referred to earlier in this report, the CTA claims to have suggested non-cash options to help make MEW/DEW and M&E positions more attractive. But, while other better remunerated job options exist in the non-government aid and private sector, the government ministries remain short of cash and the national government is unable or incapable of raising public revenue; this is likely to remain a problem.
229. O&M training for water users themselves, whose lives and livelihoods depend on the operation and maintenance of the irrigation channels, has more inbuilt natural sustainability than training government personnel who are likely to seek better paid employment elsewhere, once they consider they are trained.
230. Technical training and capacity building for MEW and PCU staff, as well as for engineering contractors and O&M training for farmers and mirabs will, it is hoped, be demonstrated by better quality work and more efficiently managed and maintained irrigation systems.
231. Still missing is the additional technical advice, training and support that the farmer/ water users need to improve their skill in managing irrigation water although a start is being attempted with MAIL through the WB ‘on-farm water management project’.
232. Various reviews of Component ‘C’ rate it as having being generally quite successful, within the limitations described above. The training inputs provided by the FAO EIRP team, albeit within the terms of the EIRP, are undoubtedly widely and genuinely appreciated.
- IS and TA: Relevance
233. The provision of appropriate facilities and equipment is also an important aspect of assisting the Afghan MEW to function properly and is entirely relevant.
234. There can be no doubt that supporting the institutional development of MEW and improving the managerial and technical skills of its staff at all levels, is entirely relevant to the social and economic development of Afghanistan. The task is considerable.
235. The technical assistance being provided to the water users for the O&M of their irrigation systems is a very practical way of ensuring that the work undertaken under the project is sustained and as such is particularly relevant.
- IS and TA: Efficiency, effectiveness and impact
236. The obligations under the EIRP project to fund the construction of buildings and facilities and equip them with furniture and appropriate equipment have been fulfilled reasonably efficiently and effectively. This part of Component C was more or less completed by the close of EIRP.
53 237. However, there have been particular problems with the procurement and installation of hydro-meteorological stations (see Section 8). Some facilities not yet installed under EIRP will be completed under IRDP.
238. Although there is no room for complacency, the technical assistance provided by FAO under EIRP is seen by the GoA MEW and by the World Bank to have been pertinent and effective (within the constraints of the situation) and to have made a difference. The problem of retaining trained staff is a serious constraint. The work of the FAO team is generally well considered and FAO EIRP management is respected (see details in Annex 7 for extracts from the FAO EIRP Terminal Report, March 2012).
- IS and TA: Sustainability
239. It will be up to the GoA MEW to maintain the equipment and facilities provided under the EIRP. It is hoped that they will have the funding to do this.
240. The problem of retaining professional and technical staff in government service after they have been trained has been highlighted in several places. It is hoped that the training will benefit Afghanistan as a whole.
241. Inherently more sustainable is the O&M training being provided to the mirabs and farmers. It is hoped that in the future these same rural communities receive the benefit of a broader package of training, assistance provided by other agencies and projects.
- IS and TA: Recommendations
242. Please see below:
• To involve university staff and students more directly with irrigation training; • To (re-)initiate a course for rural irrigation engineers (a transition between agronomist and civil engineer); • To develop a ‘works evaluation’ book in which particularly good and particularly poor rehabilitation works are demonstrated some five years after completion. Should be complete with images, description of actual status and interviews with users; • In part, this should be developed from interviews with colleagues, in part from field visits and/or while traveling for other assignments; • To arrange for farmer visits to project and irrigation system areas in a more advanced stage and with a visibly good degree of success, so they can discuss with local farmers there; • As possible, combine O&M training for water users with training in on-farm water management; • Collaborate with other relevant projects and programmes operating in the same locations as EIRP/IRDP schemes providing complementary farmer training and extension services relating to crop production, horticulture and livestock husbandry and fodder production.
54
8 Component D – Hydro-meteorological network
8.1 Narrative and technical assessment
8.1.1 Background
243. Starting in the 1950s and developed through the 1960s and 1970s, Afghanistan had been equipped with a working hydro-meteorological network, covering at least the main rivers and regions. Up to 1978, records and data were well kept and data from that time is still available. Unfortunately, by 2002, only vestiges of this original network remained. Data ceased to be gathered, recorded and analysed early on in the mujahideen insurgency in the 1980s, since when the country has been deprived of any hydro-meteorological information and data for more than 30 years. The country is thus missing an important tool for planning the development of its water resources.
244. In 2004, the WB decided to provide funds to re-equip and install a new and modern network providing greater coverage than previously. The MEW through EIRP was charged with this task, with guidance and training provided by FAO. The network should consist of a number of hydrometric stations sited along natural rivers and streams plus some snow depth measurement stations and a small number of meteorological stations.
245. Unfortunately, the installation of this network has not progressed as originally planned. It has met with many difficulties ranging from initial targets being set too high, procurement and procedural bottlenecks and delays; difficulty in identifying, training and retaining appropriate personnel to manage the programme, both on site and at the central MEW WMD level; inefficient contractors; the insecurity of some of the selected sites; and simple thieving and looting.
246. The evaluators visited a number of hydrology and meteorology stations in Balkh, Samangan and Herat provinces, in Herat which helped to illustrate some of the problems referred to above.
8.1.2 Summary of project achievements
247. By 31 December 2011, out of a total plan for 174 hydrological stations, 105 had been installed by the conclusion of EIRP and are functioning, some less effectively than others. A few have been looted, mainly those installed in vulnerably remote and insecure locations. 101 Other elements of the programme remain uncompleted. By the conclusion of EIRP, 17 meteorological stations had been installed as well as 10 snow stations. 102 Forty (40) cable ways across rivers are presently in the process of being installed. 103
101 The solar panels and batteries are proving particularly tempting. The evaluators visited one such station on the Korakh river upstream of Hirat city where after the solar panel had been stolen the rest of the equipment was removed and returned to the project’s stores for safekeeping on the orders of the PCU manager. 102 Recently (March 2011) one of these snow stations located in the Salang pass was swept away by an avalanche. 103 WB DCA, dated 20 January 2004: Status of Installation/O&M of hydrology and meteorology stations taken from the MEW ICR draft dated 5 March 2012 shown below and quotation from MEW ICR of 5 March 2012 in box. .
55 Table 11: Status of installation/operation and maintenance of hydrology and meteorology stations (source MEW IRC draft) Installation Status of Remaining Stations Actual Award date up to IS.No Name of contract Total of contract end of During extension of Spill- plan Dec EIRP for hydrology over 2011 component to IRDP
1 S&I of 174 hydrological stations 7-May 174 105 - 69 2a.cableways at 40 gauging 9-Mar 40 36 4 stations - 2 2b.winch cum guard rooms at 9-Mar 40 36 4 cableway sites -
meteorological network 10-Jul 30 10 20 2a. snow survey stations 3 2b.weather stations 26 17 9
2c. guard rooms 30 18 12 installation/commissioning of 6 silt 4 10-Sep 6 6 laboratories -
5 supply of hydrological equipments 11-Jun * - * -
6 O&M of 105 hydrologic stations 11-Jun 105 53 35 17
*Lot 1:60 current meters, Lot 2: 12 Doppler current meters, Lot 3:6 echo sounders, Lot 4:68 sediment samplers, Lot 5: 12 boats,40 taglines etc
Quotation from MEW ICR Draft. 5 March 2012 “There is a considerable discrepancy between the original procurement schedule and actual procurement in the case of some lots. Delivery delays range from 6 to 16 months which has badly affected subsequent activities and installation which can be seriously affected by season, particularly the winter. By the end of the EIRP, O&M had been carried out on only 53 out of the 105 installed stations. It is estimated that at least 17 of the stations cannot be easily visited because of insecurity and many others are located in quite remote sites. Only 36 cable ways have been installed at the 105 sites. There have been problems with data collection inhibiting the calculation of water balance. Installation schedules have sometimes been delayed by between 18 and 20 months - due again to insecurity but also to land- ownership disputes, poor management by local contractors and inclement weather conditions. Local staff to manage the network at all levels have had to trained from scratch as little if anything remains of the pre-1978 skills and experience. As with the M&E component, there has also been a problem in retaining staff, at all levels, once trained. As admitted by the Director of the Water Resource Management Department in Kabul, there have been difficulties with staff over salary levels and terms of employment compared to international agencies and NGOs and in agreement with the WB an incentive programme was introduced in 2006. Although difficulties still remain, and there have been problems with staff in several provinces over new terms of employment, productivity did increase after 2006.”
8.1.3 Data collection and analysis
248. Initially the plan for data collection and analysis was rather ambitious. It aimed at real time communicated upload and download of information utilizing a communication satellite. Later, after facing contracting and implementation problems, the system was simplified to a monthly manual download on USB or other serial device 104 . Raw ASCII data is collected from the stations and sent to the regional offices of the Water Management Directorate General
104 See page 110 of the technical annex of the project proposal, dated 4 December 2003.
56 (WMDG) before being forwarded to the Water Resources Department (WRD) in WMDG in Kabul for elaboration.
249. Raw data, presented like ASCII files, are read into a dedicated statistical program and subsequently transferred basically into printable pages which are similar to the pages in the older yearbooks. At a later stage and when properly stored, data can be re-used for additional analytical work. For the moment, it appears that the hydrology section of WRD is not yet past the stage of simple recording and registering data of the stations. (For further details refer to Annex 8.)
8.1.4 Other similar initiatives in addition to EIRP/IRDP
250. Currently, several institutions are collecting similar data with information needed for their own purposes. For instance MAIL collects agro-meteorological data; the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation collects meteorological data for aviation purposes, etc.
251. Under the aegis of IRDP, a plan is currently being suggested to establish a national centre where data can be stored and made available to the general public, in one form or another. The evaluators believe that such a project with such a wide ranging brief does not fit well within the core activities of IRDP. IRDP has enough to do as it is. In the view of the evaluators, the establishment of such a centre would be more effectively funded and managed as a special dedicated project to be run under the control of the SCWAM 105 (see recommendations).
252. NB. It should also be noted that a very similar support project, focused only on the collection of hydrologic data by the WRD of WMD is in the process of being established with funds provided by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). This is expected to start in July 2012 with the proposed duration of four years.
- Hydro/meteorological: Relevance
253. The relevance of installing a functioning hydro-meteorological service, for a country such as Afghanistan needs no justification. The facility to record and analyse hydro- meteorological data is an essential tool for planning the management not only of a country’s water resources but also for such things as agricultural production and development.
254. Issues stemming from global warming make it even more necessary for the country to be able to track trends and changes in precipitation, the flow of rivers and the melting of glaciers.
255. Afghanistan is a land locked ‘water storage tower’ for all its neighbouring states with whom it shares the waters (whether ephemeral or permanent) flowing from all its river basins and across its frontiers. Even the water from the seemingly ‘enclosed’ northern basins seeps northwards through subterranean aquifers to the Amu river.
256. Political problems and issues arising from riparian entitlements shared with neighbours are likely to become more pressing with the passing of time. Thus, it will become more and more important to be able to support and back up discussions relating to such issues with hard data.
105 Quote “Any information on water and water related activities/projects, available in the individual member ministries of SCWAM, need to be made available for a central database for water resources planning, development and management.” WSS 2008 page 27.
57
257. Despite many initial difficulties the project is in the process of helping Afghanistan achieve this objective, but it is not there yet.
- Hydro/meteorological: Efficiency, effectiveness and impact
258. Due to the various difficulties mentioned above, the hydro-meteorological component of EIRP cannot be considered to have been implemented with great efficiency although mitigating circumstances need to be taken into account. The ultimate effectiveness of the programme remains to be seen. However, bit by bit it is getting there and the main objectives of Component D should be achieved well within the timeframe of the follow-up IRDP.
259. The impact of the hydrological component still remains to be felt and the practical value of this aspect of the project will only start once a series of many years (at least 10) of data have been collected, processed and analysed and a connection is made with the data recorded in the 1960s and 1970s. However, with the main teething problems behind it and with more than half the stations already installed, it can be hoped and expected that the project will begin to have a real impact on the collection and analysis of hydro-meteorological data (from all over Afghanistan) before the close of IRDP.
260. Being ‘wise after the event’, the impression gained by the FAO evaluation team, is that the planning for this component was rather too ambitious for the realities of Afghanistan at this stage in its recovery. In view of the inherently unstable nature of the political situation in this wild and rugged country, with poor roads and physical means of communication, it can even be considered remarkable to have got as far as it has. Nonetheless, it might have been wiser to have planned a more modest initial programme with less sophisticated equipment. It might also have been better to have concentrated, in the early stage, on fewer key sites, in more secure locations on the main rivers and fewer strategically located weather stations with simple equipment that would have been easier and faster to obtain.
261. Having said this, it is also salutary to reflect back to the atmosphere of extreme (if perhaps false) optimism that prevailed in the minds of donors, implementing agencies and many Afghans, alike, that prevailed in the newly ‘liberated’ Afghanistan of 2002, 2003 and 2004 when these decisions were being made.
- Hydro/meteorological: Sustainability
262. As much as anything the sustainability of the hydro/meteorological component of EIRP/ IRDP will depend on a combination of:
• increasing and improving the technical capacity of the MEW WRD services both in Kabul and in the provinces, to manage the system competently; and • on security prevailing in the rural provinces and districts where the stations are located.
263. Clearly the former has to be a high priority under IRDP.
264. The way in which the country’s security situation develops over the next years will be critical. Growing insecurity in many parts of the country must be viewed with dismay. Afghanistan has already experienced the complete collapse of one functioning hydro- meteorological system in the 1980s, because of insecurity, conflict and lack of strong and
58 effective government. The system being established requires at least a certain level of security and competent government to function properly.
- Hydro/meteorological: Recommendations
265. Both the FAO terminal report and the MEW ICR of March 2012 list a number of ‘lessons learned’ and make a number of ‘recommendations’ for IRDP, which, with one exception, the evaluators generally agree. These are summarized below in two boxes:
Component D- Recommendations made in the FAO Terminal Report-31 March 2012
- There is a need for further expansion of the hydro-meteorological network. However, WMO guidelines should be followed in the validation of the existing network and for further expansion of the network. The experience on O&M of the existing stations shows that safety of stations must be ensured before taking up further expansion; - There is an urgent need to expand and modernize the hydrology organization in the country. Visionary and strong leadership is required to expand and modernize the hydrological services; - A national centre for data processing and hydrology information should be established for compilation, processing, storage and dissemination of hydrology information to user agencies; * see note at foot of box. - A national institute of hydrology (NIH) should be established to take care of hydrological research and development and capacity building needs in the water resource sector of the country. The institute should have a well-equipped library, GIS laboratory and all facilities (including a hostel) required for conducting various training programmes. The National Institute of Hydrology should have collaboration with international and foreign institutions on a selective basis to carry out hydrological studies; - Keeping in view the physiographic, climatic and insecure situation in the country, data transmission through telemetry is a preferred option. However, this would require skilled staff for O&M of a telemetry system including for the data receiving and processing centre; - Remote sensing (satellite imagery) and a geographic information system are the modern tools which can be gainfully utilized for hydrological and geomorphologic studies under the prevailing insecurity on ground. Topography, land use and land cover can be accurately quantified and such data shall be immensely useful in a hydrological study of engaged catchments;
* NB – In the view of the evaluators, as already expressed above, it would probably be better to develop a national data processing and analysis centre separately from the IRDP and depending on SCWAM directly, with funds and ToR specifically earmarked and tailored for the purpose.
MEW ICR 5 March 2012 Component D - Recommendations
The MEW recognizes the need for implementing the following recommendation in order to advance the hydro- meteorological service in a sustainable fashion.
In view the physiographic, climatic and insecure situation in the country, data transmission through telemetry is a preferred option. However, skilled staff should be employed for O&M of a telemetry system including for the data receiving centre.
With an increasing number of installed stations, more skilled technical staff (compared to the existing 20 odd staff; only some of whom are semi skilled in hydrology and one director) are required to improve the Water Management Department of MEW capacity to supervise, compile and process the data. The capacity building programme should be expanded and intensified.
59 It is observed that some of the staff leave the organization for better opportunities after gaining experience and receiving training. Hydrology staff should be given adequate incentive to maintain their motivation, improve their performance and encourage them to stay with the organization. The MEW recognizes that there should be an incentive system to reward good staff performance.
Criteria for recruiting staff should be based on appropriate technical qualifications requirement and should be fair. Technical staff undergoing hydrology related training should be posted in WMD. WMD staff should receive priority for participation in the training related to hydrology and water resource management
A National Institute of Hydrology (NIH) should be established to take care of hydrological research and development and capacity building needs of the water resource sector of the country. The MEW/WMD’s recently established Vocational Centre, with accommodation and class room facilities, could be further strengthened and upgraded to gradually assume research and training responsibilities. In the longer term, the institute could create collaboration with international and foreign institutions for capacity building in a planned manner
266. In addition to the above, with which the evaluators generally concur, the following points for attention are noted:
• installation problems and protection of field equipment need to be understood and addressed; • observation station rating curves should be developed; • the proper maintenance of rating curves is strongly recommended (viz. the annual verification for changes in riverbed configuration and correcting the discharge curves if required); • the problems being currently encountered in reading data need to solved; • the capacity of data processing and analyst staff to interpret data needs to be greatly improved; • technical knowledge of and expertise in the following issues need to be greatly improved: i. knowledge of river flows: very low - low – medium – flood – high and extreme flood; ii. knowledge about extrapolation of measured data for un-gauged streams; iii. there is a particular need to improve understanding and technical knowledge concerning the discharge of sediment being washed down from the upper catchments. These points are discussed in more detail in Annex 8.
9 Environmental and social safeguards sent to JO 21September
9.1 Preamble
267. The irrigation rehabilitation work under EIRP and continued under IRDP aims to contribute to the restoration of annually cropped land under irrigation to the same level as is reported to have existed 35 years ago. In the late 1970s, this was thought to have been about 3 million ha. The area of effectively irrigated crop land is presently estimated to be between 2 and 2.5 million ha. 106 . The shortfall is mainly due to years of neglect, lack of maintenance and
106 Depending on how it is estimated and calculated and based on different sources.
60 the consequences of environmental degradation (erosion).107 The Agricultural Sector Study of 1996, Annex 2 ‘Water Resources and Irrigation’ estimated that at the (then) rate of progress of the irrigation rehabilitation programme, it would take 200 years to return the irrigation situation to the point it was at in 1978. With increased resources since 2002 and a number of projects, of which EIRP/IRDP is one of the more effective, better progress is probably being made now than in the 1990s. Certainly more resources have been available. Nonetheless, the task is daunting and it will take many years to accomplish this aim, even at the most optimistic estimations. The situation remains critical and needs to be planned for as such.
9.2 Practice under EIRP
268. Under EIRP, it was possible to approach the environmental and social considerations relating to the rehabilitation of medium and small traditional irrigation systems, and even larger traditional systems, in a comparatively un-bureaucratic and pragmatic fashion, working closely with the communities concerned, their leaders, shuras, water users and mirabs to identify the points of weakness in need of repair and improvement. The main objective continues to be improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the irrigation systems, the equitable flow of water from the head to the tail of the canals. It is not a question of new development or of realignment or of the extension of canal systems to bring virgin land under cultivation. It is simply aimed at rehabilitating what has existed for centuries, but has been degraded due to lack of maintenance, the forces of nature and some cases of conflict.
9.3 Increased ESM responsibilities under IRDP 108
269. Whilst the problems and the objectives for rehabilitating traditional irrigation systems remain essentially the same for IRDP as they were for EIRP, the present project has been given an ‘A‘ grading rather than a ‘B’ grading as was the case for EIRP. This means that although the situation regarding the critical state of traditional irrigation in Afghanistan has not changed, the processes of rehabilitation are now burdened with a considerable increase in bureaucratic procedure relating to environmental and social considerations. Although such considerations may be justified for larger more environmentally and socially intrusive projects such as dam and road construction or urban and industrial or mining development, they are arguably not necessary for the rehabilitation of comparatively small traditional community irrigation systems. Such rehabilitation work mainly involves the construction and improvement of a series of small structures of various kinds down an existing canal or set of canals. It neither involves the displacement of populations, nor the extension of existing channels to develop new crop land. The vital importance of such work being carried out with sensitivity to the needs and requirements of all sections of the communities concerned, including women and children, as well as to any possible environmentally damaging effects of the rehabilitation work, is recognized. However, the evaluators believe that this would be best achieved through awareness training for engineers and contractors rather than adding additional layers of bureaucratic procedure to the process. If necessary, and after awareness training, contractors might be issued with a check list of possible issues to look out for. But, they should also be encouraged to use common sense and sensitivity and not to go mechanically ‘by the book’.
107 Mainly the degradation of watersheds, catchments and rangeland as the result of widespread cultivation for rainfed agriculture and the gathering of deep rooted woody ground cover for fuel (Artemisia sp etc) leading to increased erosion and siltation. 108 Leading up to the start of IRDP a number of consultancy inputs were fielded by MEW to look into considerations relating to environment and social issues. Reports were prepared by Dr Abhash Panda, Dr Elizabeth McCall and Professor Patrick McAuslan on different environmental, social and land (acquisition and resettlement) issues. The present ESM Framework has been developed from these reports and other documents providing guidance like UN Millenium Goals; the Afghan Water Sector Strategy (2008), Water Law (2009), Environment Law (2007 and NEPA interim regulation (2007).
61
270. If unexpected additional requirements of an environmental or social nature should crop up during the process of project implementation, contingencies can be built into contracts to allow for such things. Examples of these might be: the need for a foot bridge; a site to facilitate the women to collect water or wash clothes; safeguards against accidents or possible danger from pollution or any other reason that relates to community relations or the social, economic or environmental aspects of their lives. In any case, such issues should come to light during any well conducted PRA exercise relating to the rehabilitation of any traditional irrigation scheme. If not then they should manifest themselves during the process of design and construction. Community dialogue should be maintained at every stage as, after all, ownership of such traditional systems belongs to the communities concerned.
271. If such rehabilitation involves one or multiple communities all must be engaged in the discussion and at every stage of the process. The communities themselves will usually demand this in any case. 109 Rural Afghans do not usually remain silent when it comes to issues relating to their irrigation water. It is very much a question of having a practical and sensitive approach to such rehabilitation work. The aim should be to solve social problems as they arise in a common sense fashion, rather than trying to get everything agreed upon before hand (which is unlikely in any case) by being compelled to go through a set of costly and lengthy procedures, which may still not solve every issue. 110
9.4 The bureaucratic load for the rehabilitation of traditional schemes
272. The evaluators consider that under the ESS regulations now required for IRDP under its present classification as category ‘A’, there is a serious danger of over burdening the process of simple rehabilitation with excessive bureaucratic procedure. Not only do these involve much more intrusive social inquiry than previously, the ESS process also involves considerably more paperwork (see image below), as well as the time consuming involvement of several administrative bodies. For instance, the process of approving even a small project will now involve not only the MEW, but also the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) and beyond that to the universities who should provide persons for the independent NEPA board to see the through ESS approval for each simple contract. 111 It should be noted, however, that NEPA is primarily concerned with environmental issues rather than social ones.
273. If such heavy bureaucratic procedure is allowed, the present demand for additional social and environmental inquiry will certainly slow down the process of rehabilitation from achieving its objectives. It is not only a question of additional delay in getting the work completed in a timely fashion that is likely to cause irritation. The additional and intrusive nature of the social inquiries is likely to severely and understandably test the patience of the communities concerned. The main wish and need of these rural communities is the effective rehabilitation of
109 It should be noted here that CDCs established to manage National Solidarity Programme (NSP) funds do not necessarily represent the water users. Although the two may coincide, this is not necessarily the case. While the NSP CDC may be treated with respect, care must always be taken that as far as the irrigation channels are concerned it is those who use and manage the water for their crops that need to be represented. 110 The Water Sector Strategy states that “…. a livelihood-centered IWRM approach is required and needs to be implemented in any effective Afghanistan poverty alleviation programme. Poverty alleviation has to be constructed on a broader foundation of stakeholder capacity building, and the emphasis should be to support farmers’ and other poor water users’ desires to achieve sustainable livelihoods.” WSS, 2008, page 3. 111 Under the present ESM requirements for IRDP, before a traditional irrigation rehabilitation scheme can be approved the full ESM appraisal must not only have the approval of the MEW, but also of NEPA and finally of a 12-person independent panel made up of individuals selected for this purpose from universities and such institutions. This procedure has been developed to fit in with the present Environmental Law and Regulations regarding Environmental Impact Assessments. These are certainly necessary for the proposed construction of such things as dams, roads or urban and industrial or mining development, but were not intended for such things as the simple rehabilitation of traditional irrigation channels.
62 their ancient and traditional community irrigation systems to their former efficiency and maximum effectiveness, with the minimum delay. It is on this that their agricultural society, livelihoods and food security depends. 112 Whilst making sure that the work is done effectively and equitably in an inclusive and sensitive fashion it should be as unfettered by bureaucratic procedure as far as possible.
274. A test case of the Shakhab Canal in Kapisa Province has already been in process for more than three months. At the time of the mission (March 2012), it was still with NEPA awaiting the further independent review by 12 persons drawn from the universities and elsewhere. This seems to be a cumbersome procedure for straightforward traditional canal rehabilitation with some additional features such as the need to build 6 foot-bridges to permit easy access across the canal, a design consideration that should not necessitate an additional burden of social inquiry and approval.
275. This issue was brought to the attention of the evaluators at every level of IRDP management in MEW and by the FAO team management, as it was also, and significantly, by the deputy director (technical) of NEPA. The prospect of his department being burdened with having to assess numerous petty traditional irrigation schemes, was not a prospect he welcomes when NEPA has to focus attention on much more significant and potentially environmentally intrusive schemes, requiring ‘environmental impact assessments’, such as those relating to dams, roads, mining and urban and industrial development. This issue was discussed with the WB officials responsible for overseeing the IRDP.
Figure 1: A simple contractors’ contract for an, after all small, works job measures 3/8 inch thick for EIRP (the lower one) but already 3/4 inch for IRDP (the upper one).
9.5 Need for government to work with traditional community management
276. The revised Water Law emphasizes the role of the state regarding the ownership and management of the country’s water resources. The reality of Afghanistan is that almost all rural communities are (de facto) responsible for the management and maintenance of their traditional water channels and irrigation systems and the distribution of water. This has been the case from time immemorial and should remain so. The responsibility is theirs according to ancient and well tried custom and communal values. As the strength of government and the state increases (if it does), it will be a question of combining these well tried elements of traditional custom with the better aspects of government administration to create a workable system.
112 Part of the good record of the EIRP is based on performance related additional income for the staff. It is not the purpose of the IDRP project to create an enormous additional bureaucratic process and the additional time and money that this will cost.
63 277. The population is growing, urbanization and the demand for water is increasing, and the climate is changing, so the role of government is important. But, the most efficient, effective and sustainable way of managing the irrigation for the country’s crops, must remain the primary responsibility of the rural communities themselves as it has for thousands of years.
278. Whilst acknowledging the possibility that the eventual future cumulative effect of rehabilitating many hundreds/thousands of small traditional schemes may have a significant influence on the quantity of water crossing Afghanistan’s borders. It will be up to the WMD and the river basin authorities if any limitation needs to be placed on the in-country diversion of water. But, we are still some way off reaching that point. In the meantime, IRDP has a responsibility to provide the hydrological infrastructure to allow the WMD to fulfil its responsibilities in this respect.
279. MEW IRDP/PCU must collaborate more closely with the activities of MAIL and with other socially oriented ministries like public health, education and MRRD and their provincial departments and related services (private and public). This should be a matter of course, but does not seem to be the case. The FAO country programme office should be a catalyst for this. This is referred to elsewhere.
280. It should be noted that IRDP is still considered to be an emergency project. 113 OP 8.00 has been declared of application in the donation agreement with the World Bank and the Government of Afghanistan.
281. ESM and IRDP – Recommendations:
• IRDP to be broken down into: a. the mass of traditional systems being rehabilitated to be re-categorized as either ‘B’ or ‘C’ depending on size and complexity; and b. only the small dams component to remain under category ‘A’.
282. It should be noted that NEPA also has classifications for different types of proposal ‘1’ and ‘2’ similar to the WB’s ‘A’ and ‘B’. To avoid confusion, it would be better if such re- classification came from the WB itself:
• The WB should consider the possibility of reviewing the blanket ‘A’ category as presently indicated for all components of IRDP; • It is suggested that the mass of traditional irrigation system rehabilitation be downgraded to either category ‘B’ for larger more complex systems and category ‘C’ for the mass of medium/small systems; • Category ‘A’ might be retained for projects involving dams or even for investments of an exceptional size and complexity that require significant social disruption, human displacement or a radical change in land use. To our knowledge and apart from the ‘small dam’ project, no such projects are envisaged at present under IRDP; and • Additional social and environmental awareness training for engineers and contractors
283. To reinforce the above:
113 See the emergency project paper, draft of 18 March 2011: Para 22: Given the country circumstances, all operations for Afghanistan continue to be processed under OP/BP 8.0. The proposed project interventions are key to restoring irrigations systems in the country that are crucial for agriculture recovery and food security.
64 • It is recommended that surveyors and engineers from FAO, the PCU as well as from the contractors be given awareness training in social and environmental awareness; • If these essentially common-sense factors are built into contracts, this should be done in such a way as to avoid the bureaucratic procedures now necessary in order to conform to the demands of Category ‘A’; and • The grouping of small projects and procurements of materials under regional indefinite quantity contracts (IQC).
284. With regard to the above, for the more efficient management of many small projects, for which community generated requests are still being received, serious consideration should be given to providing each regional PCU with an IQC facility to enable them to group a number of small projects together for ease and effectiveness of processing. Likewise, IQCs might be arranged to cope with numerous individual small deliveries of construction material, for instance, such as cement and aggregates, steel structural parts, gabions, concrete sections (for karez reinforcement) or rock for riverbank defenses. (For background, please see Annex 9.)
10 The issue of narcotic crops and irrigation
10.1 The development of irrigation and the issue of cultivating narcotic crops
285. Going back to the design phase of EIRP, the WB Counter Narcotics Guidelines and the EIRP include the issue of narcotic crops, in particular opium poppy, as a cross cutting issue that cannot be ignored when designing and implementing the project’s work. This particularly applies to the rehabilitation of traditional irrigation systems.
286. The core objective of EIRP and now IRDP is “to provide farmers in the project areas with improved, reliable and equitable distribution of irrigation water to increase agricultural productivity and farm income, improve food security and livelihoods, and reduce vulnerability due to droughts”.
287. Improving irrigation systems helps to strengthen and diversify legitimate rural livelihoods. It is hoped that improving livelihoods will enable farmers cultivating opium poppy to change to the production of licit crops. (National Priority No.2 of the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (2006)).
288. EIRP/IRDP is a nationwide programme. The majority of EIRP’s sub-projects (about 70 percent of the total area of irrigated land) have been undertaken in locations where neither opium poppy nor commercial cannabis production is customarily practised to any significant extent. However, under EIRP and now IRDP activities have taken place and are taking place in provinces and districts where these crops are habitually and traditionally cultivated.
289. Between 2004 and the close of EIRP on 31 December 2012, the project had completed a total of 728 sub-projects in all of its seven regions (and sub-regions). These included a number of irrigation schemes located in areas where opium poppy has been cultivated such as Nangarhar, Helmand, Kandahar, Urozghan, Farah and Badakhshan and certain locations in other provinces.114
114 Poppy has also been traditionally cultivated in certain districts and parts of districts in Balkh, but EIRP has not operated in those districts.
65 290. EIRP mainly contributes to the improvement in the agricultural incomes of the owners of irrigated land. Farmers with smaller irrigated plots benefit, in proportion to their landholdings. By improving the conveyance of water down the whole length of an irrigation system, farmers can expect to improve their irrigated cropping, but perversely, increasing the area under irrigation may also provide the opportunity for the farmers/land owners to cultivate even more poppy (or cannabis). It is a ‘catch 22’ situation. To address this, the WB CN Guidelines recommended that sub-projects be developed on the principle of ‘do no harm’ and that ‘irrigation rehabilitation’ be linked (where possible) with other interventions providing agricultural and related assistance, credit and improved marketing and processing. This was built into the design and modalities of EIRP.
291. The poor and landless may benefit during the construction period from wage labour opportunities, although this is often monopolized by the land-owners and by its nature is temporary and not sustainable. Also EIRP has not been a ‘cash for work’ project, but has mainly focused on engineered structures which do not, by definition, require a lot of labour. However, there have been notable exceptions such as the de-silting of the Lashkari canal in Nimroz although the work of desilting this ancient canal was mainly done mechanically and with minimum hand labour (ref. Section 4). If improved supply of irrigation water encourages the more intense production of agricultural crops, this may provide additional opportunities to increase farm incomes and agricultural wage labour, although this depends on the type of crop being produced and the opportunities offered by location.115 Most small-scale agricultural production in Afghanistan employs family labour and larger landowners tend to work their land through arrangements made for sharecropping (dehghan or nesb-e kari.)
292. One of the attractions of opium poppy cultivation is that it provides opportunities for both reasonably profitable share cropping arrangements as well as ample opportunities for reasonably well paid day wage labour, for weeding/thinning and later for the labour intensive and skilled process of scarifying the seed capsules and collecting the opium resin. 116 This is one of its attractions for the landless.
10.2 Obligations concerning narcotic crops under EIRP operations manual
293. Following the WB CN guidelines, the EIRP operations manual requires that discussions on opium (or cannabis 117 ) production take place before signature of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the MEW PCU and the farmer/landowner’s representatives in the community and the mirabs. It also requires the MoU to contain a signed commitment by the farmers/water users/community representatives not to grow poppy on the land benefiting from improvements to their irrigation channels.
294. Conducting such a process, with each and every one of the hundreds of sub-project schemes that have been funded under the EIRP has been quite onerous, especially for engineering teams with rather limited experience in community mobilization or economic and social analysis. It is certainly necessary to ascertain what the history of opium production has been in any particular area, but care should be taken when engaging in such dialogue and
115 Rather depending on the type of crop. 116 Wages for opium harvesting may be paid in cash, when they are often better than what can be earned in construction or other similar work. Opium harvesters are often highly skilled and frequently negotiate their wages in kind in a percentage of opium harvested. 117 Although the production of cannabis is more than often overlooked.
66 discussion with communities in areas that have never cultivated opium nor appear to have any likelihood of doing so. 118
295. Seeking the signature of community leaders on opium related conditionality/ undertaking clauses in the MoD, in the case of communities that have never cultivated poppy nor have much likelihood of doing so, is neither sensible nor wise.
296. The whole question of the efficacy of such a ‘conditionality /undertaking clause’ even in the case of sub-projects located in areas where poppy is traditionally or even occasionally cultivated, is extremely dubious and is certainly not supported by past experience (ref Mansfield 2001: FN 7,8,22,23,29). (See Annex 10)
297. In the early 1990s at the urging of UNDCP (UNODC), the United Nations ruled that all rehabilitation projects should obtain an undertaking, signed by the community leaders, that they would not cultivate opium poppy. As in other drug crop producing countries this has proved fruitless (CND 2005: 14-15; GTZ 2006: 2006: 21-22; Mansfield 2001) (see Annex 10). Despite such undertakings, obtained at great cost of time and persuasion, once a particular piece of work was completed, (whether a school, road or the rehabilitation of an irrigation channel), if the imperatives, economic attraction or credit pressure to continue cultivating poppy have still been there, the farmers have almost invariably continued or reverted to cultivating poppy, whatever undertakings had been signed. (NB ref foot note) 119 . After a few years, this obligation was quietly ignored by most agencies as being ineffectual. Despite this it has remained part of UNODC recommendations and a poppy undertaking/conditionality clause was reintroduced as an obligation for EIRP by the WB. Enquiries into how it has been working in the last few years confirm that it is no more effective now than it was in the 1990s. 120
10.3 Conclusion on narcotic crops and Irrigation
298. In Afghanistan, opium poppy is primarily cultivated as an irrigated crop, most commonly in rotation with wheat as this is the primary food crop and both crops are sown at roughly the same time. Other high value winter crops can compete with poppy, but they tend not to occupy so much land or the market is either limited or problematic.121 The main centres of intensive multiple crop vegetable production, such as the well irrigated districts round Jalalabad, have not cultivated poppy for some years (Mansfield 2011) 122 . Farmers in these districts are making excellent profits from their horticulture 123 . In most locations where poppy is cultivated, the crop is sown in the autumn, although spring sown wheat and poppy are grown in higher altitude locations in Badakhshan and Ghor. Although, very demanding of water in the early
118 Rumours abound of how the idea of cultivating poppy in order to attract assistance has been introduced in this fashion. To what extent such rumours are supported by hard evidence is hard to say, but it remains an often repeated story. 119 Mr Fitzherbert recalls evaluating a UNDCP programme in 1995, in Badakhshan, where a particular NGO programme was building schools with funds provided by UNDCP. Community elders’ signatures had been obtained from each community benefiting from a school building, undertaking that in future they would not cultivate opium poppy. Unfortunately, we came upon several school buildings constructed under this programme surrounded by flowering fields of poppy, with one school in particular actually being used to store ammunition. 120 Almost all the communities in most of the southern districts of Nangarhar where EIRP rehabilitated irrigation canals between 2005 and 2007 and between 2009 and 2010 are reported to be once again cultivating opium in the present season. This includes the districts of Khogiani, Pachir wa Agham; Nazyan; Sherzad; Hesarak; Achin; Chaprahar, Deh Bala; among others. 121 Between 2002 and 2005 one agency (CADG) was able to conclusively demonstrate that it is possible to obtain high yields of high quality oil seed rape (canola) in Helmand. Rape is a winter crop similar to wheat and opium. Unfortunately there are still no processing facilities in Afghanistan and the only market for rape seed was in Pakistan where the conditions of trade were highly unfavourable. 122 See David Mansfield (2011) Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Counter Narctiocs efforts in Nangarhar and Helmand in the 2010-11 growing season. AREU Case Study Series, October 2011. 123 Personal discussion with Mr Tom Brown DAI, Jalalabad-March 2012 .
67 stages of its growth, opium is harvested earlier than wheat and usually gives a better economic return. Thus, it is very attractive to farmers who need to maximize their incomes from a single crop, as is the case in the southern districts of Nangarhar, the upper districts of Helmand where summer water is in short supply, or in Badakhshan because of its high altitude and short growing season. However, poppy can also suit those cultivating a second summer crop, as in the central irrigated districts of Helmand, because it is harvested earlier than wheat which allows farmers to sow their summer crop of maize or beans (for instance) earlier and thus get higher yields.
299. Despite its enormous impact on the economy 124 and the politics of the country, opium poppy actually occupies only 3 to 4 percent of the total annually sown land or between 6 and 7 percent of the irrigated crop land, at its present level. 125,126 The area under effectively rain-fed poppy is insignificant in Afghanistan and confined to a few highland localities in Badakhshan in years of late rainfall.
300. The cultivation of opium poppy spread out across the country in the years between 2002 and 2004 in particular, occurring to some extent in almost every province. This was largely due to exceptionally high farm gate prices in those years and in most places has not been sustained. The crop is mainly concentrated in particular locations even within districts where the crop is cultivated. The reasons for this are varied and usually site-specific and need to be understood (ref. Mansfield and Pain-various studies with AREU, etc.).
301. The situation in any location is context specific and this must be taken into account when planning the rehabilitation of any particular canal system. In fact, the vast majority of Afghan farmers never cultivate opium poppy nor intend to grow it and most EIRP irrigation schemes have been rehabilitated in locations and with communities where opium poppy is not cultivated.
302. However, it is those sub-projects that are located in areas where poppy cultivation is practised, or has been practised in the recent past, that this issue mainly applies. 127 In particularly (but not exclusively), this applies to sub-projects located in the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Urozghan, Zabol and Farah and in the east in the Spingah ‘piedmont’ districts of south Nangarhar, in the north west in certain districts of Badakhshan and also to some extent in Nimroz, Daykundi and Badghis.
303. For a number of reasons, between 2008 and 2010 there was a significant decline in poppy cultivation in some of its traditional locations such as Nangarhar and Badakhshan, whilst at the same time the area under poppy increased and concentrated in the south. However, in the
124 By some estimates more than one third of Afghanistan’s GDP is derived from the production of opium. 125 Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, in terms of cropped area peaked in 2007 at 193,000 ha but has since fallen back to between 123,000 and 160,000 ha. In 2011 it is estimated to have been 131,000 ha (UNODC). N.B. the UNODC figures should also be taken as indicative and there are some differences with US CNC figures. In particular for certain provinces, Nangarhar being a case in point.
127 At the present time opium poppy cultivation is most commonly found in most of the districts of Helmand, Kandahar and Urozghan as well as Farah in the south west. Other traditional poppy growing areas are the Nangarhar districts of the Spingah ‘piedmont’ located away from the perennial waters and better land irrigated from the Kunar /Kabul Rivers and the Nangarhar canal. In the north, certain districts of Balkh and others in Badakhshan. In other provinces poppy cultivation has occurred sporadically in scattered locations when markets and other conditions are favourable, but not habitually. Even in provinces such as Nangarhar poppy cultivation tends to be concentrated in certain districts where economic opportunities are fewer and administrative influence weaker rather than in the districts closest to the administrative centre, and thus to markets and alternative employment. Also in the case of Nangarhar those districts with good land, plentiful perennial water from the Kabul / Kunar river and the Nangarhar canal where intensive vegetable production is more profitable than opium
68 last two seasons, a combination of the high farm gate price of opium resin, increasing rural indebtedness and local disaffection with the authorities, is causing a significant return to poppy cultivation in those same provinces. For instance, there is reported to be a significant increase in southern Nangarhar in the present season and also in parts of Badakhshan.128 This demonstrates the fragile nature and unsustainability of a situation where hard core poppy growing communities are encouraged, persuaded to give up or are restrained from cultivating poppy without the causes of their livelihood or problems with governance being redressed. This seems to be the case in Nangarhar. The predictions are that this resurgence of poppy cultivation in locations where it had previously been entrenched can be expected to continue in the next years (see Annex 10).
304. At present, and in view of the scale of the rehabilitation work still to be undertaken with limited resources, there is no need to consider rehabilitating the irrigation systems of communities who are determined to or at high risk of cultivate illicit crops. It is suggested that the ‘poppy probability maps’ being developed by Alcis using CNC data might be used as a guide for IRDP (see Annex 10 for example of Nangarhar).
305. As emphasized elsewhere in this report, EIRP sub-projects have only involved an engineering component. While the benefits from improved irrigation systems have been considerable, farmers’ livelihoods would be more rapidly and effectively enhanced if this were part of a “package” of measures. Where poppy is habitually cultivated, care has to be taken as to what type of inputs is provided. For instance, improved plant material (seed, fruit tree saplings. Etc.) and market outlets may encourage farmers to switch to higher value crops. But, as with irrigation water, fertilizer can be used for poppy as well as for legitimate crops and will tend to find its way to the higher value crop. 129 This can be a dilemma if improved seed and varieties of field crop are being provided. However, quality budded fruit tree saplings, or an effective IPM programme for the village orchards cannot be used to benefit the poppy crop and should be considered.
306. Market linkages are vital as they alone will reduce farmer risks and create sufficient farmer confidence to encourage a migration from illicit to licit crops.
307. Access to credit for licit cropping that can compete with the credit offered by the opium economy would be another vital encouragement to move out of illicit cropping. This is a real challenge, as the informal credit provided for poppy is very effectively managed and remains one of the main attractions of the crop for the farmers who cultivate it, provided they continue to be able to service their debt!
- Narcotic crops and irrigation: Recommendations
308. The modalities relating to the issue of opium poppy and irrigation already built into the design of EIRP and included in the IRDP (see Annex 10) and based on the WB CN Guidelines of 2007, require all WB-financed projects to address the causes of opium poppy cultivation. These are referred to here with comments where necessary:
• Discussions on opium issues:
128 Mansfield forthcoming report for AREU. 129 In the early 1990s it was FAO policy that fertilizer would not be provided to farmers in villages where poppy was being cultivated even if wheat or other crop seeds were. Experience showed that farmers would use the fertilizer on whichever crop was seen to give the highest return. The same experience has been seen during the implementation of the Helmand Food Zone. (See Mansfield 2012 'Briefing Paper 3: Central Helmand in the 2011/12 Growing Season', Footnote 3
69 Discussions on the issue of illicit crops should be confined to communities located in areas where the cultivation of opium (or commercial cannabis) is or has recently been cultivated or is likely to be cultivated. This should become clear during the process of ‘risk assessment’ (NB which includes the presence of land mines and IEDs and issues relating to security).
The situation is ‘site’ and ‘case’ specific. In the case of communities that have never shown any inclination to cultivate opium (or commercial cannabis), in-depth discussions on the subject are neither necessary nor desirable.
• Monitoring and evaluation are necessary in order to: - identify in advance the schemes where opium is produced, which ones are vulnerable or susceptible, and to track key indicators illustrating the changing role of opium poppy in livelihood strategies over the duration of the programme.
The M&E component under EIRP has had its problems (as discussed in Section 6). It is hoped that the M&E capacity under IRDP will be greatly improved once an appropriate MIS/GIS system with supporting ground truthing is established. Reference to sources such as the Alcis CNC ‘poppy probability’maps is recommended. Both CNC and UNODC use satellite imagery systems for their assessment work backed up by ground- truthing. 130 Also reference to the work done by AREU.
It is recommended to avoid rehabilitating irrigation systems in locations where the population is committed or likely to cultivate narcotic crops unless part of a comprehensive development package, addressing the agricultural, economic and security needs of the community. There are more than enough traditional schemes to rehabilitate as it is.
• Conditionality undertakings signed by water users and community representatives are:
- unnecessary for communities where there is no history or likelihood of poppy cultivation; - for communities that habitually cultivate opium, experience has shown such signed undertakings to be generally worthless.
• IRDP sub-projects should be linked, to other support programmes, projects and services assisting farmers to adopt profitable and sustainable legitimate livelihoods. This is a general recommendation made in several places in this report (and others). It is based on the fact that, irrespective of the opium issue, crop production and rural livelihoods are not just a matter of improving the efficiency of canal systems and the delivery of water, important though this is. For the most part, EIRP has remained a stand- alone irrigation engineering project with little direct collaboration with programmes and projects impacting on other aspects of crop production or rural livelihood.
• Farmers require a package of assistance: FAO must encourage the MEW to: (1) collaborate with MAIL extension services and with other donor projects and NGOs providing complementary support services, vocational training, essential agricultural inputs and acceptable credit; (2) work closely with MRRD and the appropriate national programmes such as NSP, MISFA and the
130 It is worth noting that CNC and UNODC tend to come up with somewhat different results.
70 national area development programme, and other appropriate programmes that are helping to broaden access to production and credit and promote agro-processing.
• Endeavour to maximize the impact of direct contracting and of community labour and, where possible, time such work to compete with the labour demands of poppy. In reality, if the farm gate price of opium is high, it is difficult for other forms of day labour to compete. EIRP has not ‘per se’ been a ‘cash for work’ project, but has been mainly engaged in engineering structures that have not required large quantities of labour.
11 Conclusions and looking to the future
11.1 A seamless transfer from EIRP to IRDP in 2011
309. Having started in 2004, EIRP concluded in December 2011 having merged seamlessly into IRDP during the second half of 2011. FAO has assisted EIRP from its conception and continues to provide the main TA support to the MEW and the PCU under IRDP with a full team of professionals in Kabul as well as in the regions supported by visiting consultants. Continuity of management has assisted the smoothness of the transition. This has been a considerable asset in the troubled and changing world of Afghanistan.
310. Starting in the latter part of 2011 and overlapping with the conclusion of EIRP, IRDP continues with a fresh grant from the WB plus some ‘rolled over’ funds from EIRP. Whilst many of the core elements of IRDP remain much the same as EIRP, an additional ‘developmental’ element has been added. For instance, allowance is provided for the construction of new or extended canals (where justified) in addition to the rehabilitation of existing traditional irrigation systems. Under IRDP, provision is made to strengthen institutional capacity and collaboration and there is a significant element for enhanced ESS. A component for a small dam feasibility study in the northern region is included. There is the prospect of additional funding from the ARTF for IRDP.
11.2 Rehabilitation of traditional irrigation systems
311. The design of EIRP was the responsibility of the donor, with FAO TCI providing a significant TA input. EIRP was designed as an ‘emergency’ engineering project with the primary objective of rehabilitating traditional irrigation systems. The project has been the responsibility of the MEW, which has no official responsibility beyond the conveyance of water to the ends of the channels.
312. The main component of EIRP was the ‘Rehabilitation of Traditional Irrigation Systems’. The project provided improved engineering skills and funds to undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction work which has been carried out with the participation of the communities concerned and the water users themselves. The EIRP completed work on 728 traditional schemes, (large, medium and small) and by so doing is reported to have greatly improved the conveyance of water from the head to the tail of the systems and significantly reduced the time spent in maintenance and repair work. Not only has irrigation water been made more available to grow crops, improve livelihoods and food security, crop choices and yields are reported to have been improved and land lying fallow due to scarcity of water has been reclaimed for crops. It is also reported that disputes between water users at the tail and the head of canal systems have been reduced and the land itself is reported to have increased in value.
71 313. Whilst there is no doubt that this aspect of the project has had a beneficial impact, the details of its achievements, as reported, should be treated as indicative rather than precise in view of the fact that the data, although triangulated and checked as far as possible, is based primarily on the verbal reports of farmers and mirabs rather than on more robust, exact measurements and independent assessment (see M&E) and to date without the aid of a GIS/MIS system. It is expected that such a system will be established under IRDP and efforts are being made in this respect.
314. There is little doubt that this, the main component of EIRP, has been generally effective and is greatly appreciated. Mainly as a result of this component, EIRP is seen by the WB as having achieved something worthwhile and sustainable, in a situation where many other projects and programmes have failed. EIRP is considered by the WB to have been something of a ‘flag ship’ project for Afghanistan.
315. The rehabilitation of traditional irrigation systems remains the main component of the follow-up IRDP which, with the experience of EIRP behind it, is hoped will be more effective, provided it is not hampered by excessive bureaucratic procedures to fulfil ESS obligations (as referred to above in Section 9).
316. By and large, the engineering work carried out under EIRP is reported to have been competently carried out. Observations made in the field by the evaluators, (although perforce somewhat limited) confirm this. Nonetheless, (as observed) there is room for improvement and some suggestions are made in this respect in the main report and in Annex 2.
317. EIRP placed a lot of emphasis on training communities and mirabs in O&E to help improve local skills in dealing with the O&M of their systems; also to ensure that the communities concerned are fully aware of their responsibilities once the project’s work is completed. It remains to be seen how well the rural beneficiaries of the EIRP have grasped their responsibilities regarding the future operation and maintenance of their irrigation systems or whether they have become psychologically dependant and expectant of a paternalistic ‘government’ and/or NGO to provide them with continuing support in this respect.
318. It is understood that the irrigation rehabilitation programme was designed primarily as an engineering exercise improving the conveyance of water and thus had no direct or formal connections with those agencies, projects and programmes having responsibility for all the other things that farmers need to: improve their on-farm water management; crop husbandry practices 131 ; address environmental issues; post-harvest storage; marketing or credit. Whilst the efficient and reliable provision of irrigation water to farmers, and the equitable conveyance of water from top to bottom of the systems are fundamental, productive crop and horticultural production has additional requirements.
319. Comparatively recently, EIRP and now IRDP have been more formally linked to the WB supported HLP pilot farms 132 and the recently initiated WB OFWM project managed by the MAIL, which is expected to work with hundreds of farmer beneficiaries of EIRP. Additional farmer needs are the responsibility of other ministries and government agencies such as MAIL; MRRD and NEPA and FAO project management has done its best to collaborate where needed. However, problems relating to lack of interministerial collaboration are a chronic institutional problem.
131 Including: cultivation and rotation practices; seed and plant material quality; plant nutrition; pest control and harvesting. 132 The comparatively limited WB Horticulture and Livestock Project (HLP) which is more specifically focused on piloting drip irrigation and household poultry production for which USD 1.0m was allocated.
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320. It is appreciated that the problems of interministerial lack of collaboration 133 are beyond the capacity of FAO to solve by itself. However, FAO does have a significant and influential presence in both MAIL and MEW and every effort should be made to encourage interministerial collaboration wherever possible. It is, nonetheless, the primary responsibility of the Government of Afghanistan (encouraged by the donor) to ensure that institutionally irrigation and the on- farm agricultural/crop production requirements of the farmers are met in an integrated fashion.
321. It is recognized and appreciated that the FAO/EIRP and now the FAO/IRDP team have made and are making every effort not only to collaborate with the FAO country programme and projects in MAIL as well as with other related ministries and agencies including MRRD, NEPA (ESS), MoI, MoWA and the MoJ; also, with other UN agencies such UNODC and UNMACA 134 , organizations such as AIMS and AREU 135 , as well as with ISAF PRTs. In the regions, the FAO teams take part in RCC meetings and coordinate with other irrigation rehabilitation programmes with links to MEW such as those funded by the ADB and the EC, which are also overseen out of MEW.136
322. However, it should be borne in mind that there are also many other agricultural and rural development projects and programmes operating in Afghanistan, funded by various bilateral donors 137 supporting projects and programmes, implemented by different contractors, IPs and INGOs. Many of these are substantial projects outside the direct responsibilities of either the GoA Minstries or the UN Agencies which are providing complementary inputs to the farmer beneficiaries in much the same locations as EIRP /IRDP.
323. Collaboration at the regional and provincial levels is essential, although not always easily achieved. There are supposed to be government lead co-ordination mechanisms such as the RCCs which the FAO regional teams work with although it is recognized that these do not always operate as effectively as they should. Such local collaboration can be informal and should not require additional bureaucracy. No doubt such informal collaboration at the regional and provincial levels does take place although there is not much evidence of this from EIRP M&E reporting.
324. IRDP, with its additional ‘development’ objectives will need, where possible, to help the farmer beneficiaries of the project to be connected to other projects and programmes that can assist them receive as complete a package of agricultural assistance as possible. This should be possible at a local level in an informal and unbureaucratic fashion. The revised Water Law clarifies the respective responsibilities of MEW and MAIL, in particular. Although it has not proved easy to get different government agencies and ministries to work effectively together, the FAO country office, overseeing as it does projects in both MAIL and MEW is in a better position than most to act as a catalyst for this.
11.3 Monitoring and evaluation
325. Work on establishing an M&E capacity in EIRP to measure the impact of the project over time and evaluate its progress started in 2006-2007 when MEW contracted a firm of
133 Encountered in many countries. 134 United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan 135 The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit - a multi-donor funded organization devoted to supporting ‘applied research’ studies in different aspects of the Afghan-socio/economy-both rural and urban. 136 For example, the ADB funded irrigation project based on Heart and the EC-funded the Panj-Amu River Basin Development Programme in the North East. 137 USAID/USDA; UK DFID; the EC; JICA etc
73 consultants (Sheladia) for this task. Although a baseline survey and first annual assessment of project progress were carried out during those two years little was achieved by way of establishing an M&E unit in the EIRP PCU until 2009 when FAO was invited to assist with M&E. Although considerable progress has been made since FAO took on this TA responsibility, the M&E capacity of the MEW PCU continues to be frustrated by difficulties in retaining staff after they have been trained.
326. The baseline established in 2006-7 and subsequent annual assessments show the irrigation system rehabilitation programme to have been very effective. A more recent baseline for IRDP was established in 2011. The data base on which the assessments are calculated needs to be strengthened and this is well recognized by FAO management. The figures given for command areas, land annually under crop, crop yields and increments have until recently been mainly based on the verbal reporting of farmers and mirabs rather than on independent or robust measurement. The IRDP programme must achieve a much stronger capacity in M&E based on a reliable MIS/GIS system combined with well conducted ground-truthing. This is well recognized and WB and FAO are presently working together to find an appropriate solution.
327. It is appreciated that for practical reasons the MEW EIRP PCU and now the IRDP PCU have been and still are establishing databases and monitoring and evaluating such things as changes in land use, cropping systems and increases in yields and crop production. But, it needs to be pointed out that such things are not correctly within the remit of the MEW and should be the responsibility of MAIL. FAO (EIRP/IRDP) has been and is doing its best to triangulate such data with the FAO supported programme assisting the Department of Agricultural Statistics (formally FAHAAM), but this is an anomaly that in the future needs to be sorted out or at least improved by more effective collaboration between MEW and MAIL. MAIL is the ministry with primary responsibility for baseline data relating to cropping command areas, changes in agricultural land use and cropping systems as well as crop yields and their causes.
328. It is also something of an anomaly that FAO has been so closely drawn into the effective design and management of an M&E system which was brought about by the failure of other outside agencies and consultants to deliver what was required. As admitted by the relevant technical desk officer in the FAO Regional Office in Bangkok:138 “As FAO is directly engaged in project implementation both technically and managerially, the M&E should be outside the remit of FAO (except internal monitoring of the process) and it should be kept outside the project framework, as an independent unit within MEW as recommended in the report.”
11.4 Feasibility studies
329. EIRP includes two sub-components that involve feasibility studies for dam construction. The motivation for these initiatives stems from a deeply held belief going back to the 1960s and 1970s that dams are the answer to the country’s water problems. Experience shows this premise to be questionable, except in favourable locations. Dam construction in Afghanistan is fraught with potential problems, including competing riparian claims by the countries that share most of the rivers, and the practical issue of silting.
11.5 The Lower Kokchar irrigation and hydro project
330. Under the auspices of EIRP, one large feasibility study was undertaken between 2005 and 2009-10 by the German firm Fichtner of Stuttgart, for a proposed dam for irrigation and hydro power on the Lower Kokchar River in Takhar Province. The study was finally approved
138 Mr Puspa Raj Kanal
74 in 2009. FAO TCI were brought in to help finalize this work, which awaited an interested donor until April/May 2012 when the ADB showed interest in funding part of the proposed Lower Kokcha project. ADB has contracted the firm SNC-Lavalin to undertake further studies. The evaluators’ view expressed in this report, is that completion of the full project as designed with dam and hydro-pumping stations and new sets of canals, is probably not cost-effective and is likely to raise issues of sustainable management and land-ownership of newly developed land and possible issues relating to transboundary water use. There is also likely to be problems of siltation. The results of the ongoing ADB/SNC-Lavalin studies are awaited.
11.6 The small dams project
331. The second feasibility exercise, which started in the latter stages of EIRP and continues under IRDP, is a series of pre-feasibility and feasibility studies on 22 potential ‘small’ dam sites in Afghanistan’s only ‘enclosed’ 139 set of small river basins in the Northern Region. The plan is to select between two and three sites for dam design and construction. This exercise is progressing under IRDP as the responsibility of the Indian contractor (WAPCOS). It remains to be seen what the final results will be. Without pre-judging the final outcome of these studies, the evaluators question the ultimate cost-effectiveness of dams in such locations based on the comparatively low-value crops that might be cultivated and in view of the excessive silting from the heavily eroded catchments in the Northern Region which are likely to shorten their useful life. Since raising these doubts with WB and FAO in March 2012, the irrigation engineer consultant on the evaluation team 140 , at the request of the WB and FAO, made two missions to Afghanistan to review the ‘small dams’ project and work in progress in more detail. His report is currently under preparation.
11.7 Establishment of a national hydro-meteorological network
332. A significant project component has been the establishment of a modern national net- work of hydro-meteorological stations to replace an earlier network lost in the years of turmoil following the Saur Revolution of 1978. This has been an ambitious project for a country such as Afghanistan in its present stage of institutional, political and physical development. This component has met with many problems related to logistics, procurement, lack of human capacity and resources as well as the intrinsically insecure nature of the country. That Afghanistan needs such a network is not in question as the collection, processing and analysis of hydro-meteorological data is an essential tool for planning the development of the country’s water resources. Despite the problems, progress has been made. With hindsight, it might have been better to have started with a less ambitious target. However, work not completed under EIRP will now be completed under IRDP.
11.8 Institutional support and technical assistance
333. Underlying every aspect of both EIRP and IRDP is the component for institutional support and technical assistance. This has involved the physical construction and refurbishment of offices and facilities and the procurement of essential furniture and equipment as well as the provision of training, technical support and mentoring. Despite many problems, FAO’s input is considered to have been positive and is well appreciated by both the MEW and the WB. Particularly sustainable has been a pilot training programme in post-canal rehabilitation O&M being provided to water users and mirabs. This will be expanded to cover more of the completed schemes under IRDP and may be developed further. Apart from some longer-term overseas
139 i.e. these rivers do not cross Afghanistan’s frontiers but finish in inland ‘delta’ within the borders of the country. 140 Johannes Oosterkamp
75 post-graduate type training that was cancelled, the training programme was fulfilled as scheduled and has been appreciated. Under IRDP this component will be continued and where possible strengthened.
334. A serious, issue effecting all sectors and levels, particularly certain sections of the project such as M&E, is the difficulty of retaining professional personnel in government employment after they have received training. Many leave to seek employment elsewhere because of low pay. Some help is now being given from project funds to supplement certain professional salaries directly associated with the project, although this is unsustainable in the long run. This remains one of the most intractable problems when it comes to improving the professional capacity of the MEW. It remains part of a wider problem of civil service employment in Afghanistan.
11.9 Environmental and social safeguards (ESS) within IRDP
335. Under IRDP, environmental and social issues as they relate to irrigation and other possible engineering projects, such as small dams are given much more weight than previously under EIRP. IRDP has been given a category ‘A’ rating by the WB in this respect.
336. The problems facing traditional irrigation systems remain unchanged from the time of EIRP and the scale of the problem means that this work will be needed for years to come. This component is concerned with restoring the situation to what it was and is not involved with schemes that require the movement of people, the extension or realignment of canals or bringing virgin land into irrigated cultivation. The evaluators believe that the demands of ESS, as incorporated into IRDP procedures for rehabilitating traditional systems, are in danger of creating an unnecessary burden on bureaucracy. It is feared that this will have a negative effect on the efficiency and effectiveness of this component that may adversely affect its ultimate impact.
337. It is recommended that this aspect of IRDP be reviewed by the WB with a view to modifying the present blanket ‘A’ grading as applied to the whole IRDP regardless of the nature of the component. It is suggested that the rehabilitation/reconstruction of traditional irrigation channels, which effectively remains unchanged in its objectives or the nature of the problem, be downgraded to ‘B’ or even to ‘C’ status. An ‘A’ grading might be retained for larger projects such as dams, whenever the environmental and social impacts are likely to be greater than in the case of traditional systems.
338. In the case of traditional systems, it is suggested that such ESS issues would be more effectively dealt with by awareness training for engineers and contractors rather than the imposition of additional layers of bureaucracy. Such issues as arise in the course of work should be dealt with in a sensitive and common sense fashion and contracts should allow sufficient flexibility for this, without imposing further layers of intrusive social inquiry. At present these involve not only MEW but other agencies such as NEPA and even the universities.
339. It is important that particular attention is given to the possible social and environmental negative effects of increasing the capacity of any particular canal system causing problems for systems further downstream.
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11.9.1 The issue of narcotic crops and irrigation
340. The issue of narcotic crops (particularly opium poppy) and its correlation with irrigation is an issue well recognized by EIRP and now IRDP and is part of WB guidelines.
341. In Afghanistan opium poppy is primarily cultivated under irrigation. Improving access to irrigation water may broaden cropping possibilities for farmers, but equally it is just as likely that additional water may be used to irrigate poppy (or cannabis), particularly in locations prone to cultivating these crops. At present, all rural communities involved with irrigation schemes under EIRP/IRDP are required to sign undertakings that they will not cultivate poppy, regardless of whether there is a history of poppy cultivation in the area or not.
342. Only 7 or 8 percent of Afghan farmers cultivating irrigated crops actually cultivate opium poppy and these tend to be concentrated in certain districts and locations. Also, there is no historical evidence to show that signing such undertakings has ever worked. In fact, experience over the years has demonstrated that the reverse is the case.
343. Whilst not ignoring it, it is suggested that a more rational approach is taken to this issue. It is recommended that such signed undertakings are discontinued as they are almost invariably ignored. It is also recommended that communities and locations habitually cultivating opium poppy or susceptible to cultivating the crop should be avoided. In view of limited funding and the scale of the task of rehabilitating traditional irrigation channels there is no shortage of communities and traditional schemes to assist in each region without dealing with those most prone to cultivate narcotic crops. The principle of ‘doing no harm’ applies.
344. However, it should, be borne in mind that merely providing additional water without the other elements of an agricultural/rural development assistance package is unlikely to dissuade farmers who wish to cultivate opium poppy (or commercial cannabis) from doing so.
12 Conclusion
345. EIRP is considered by the WB as having being one of the more effective projects in Afghanistan with respect to the rehabilitation of traditional irrigation channels. This should remain the main focus of IRDP’s endeavours as being the most cost-effective and sustainable way of improving the country’s irrigation.
346. However, improvements in the conveyance of water to farmers under IRDP should not just remain as a ‘stand alone’ engineering project as in the past, but should be part of a more complete package of assistance provided to the farmers/water users, if the full potential of the work is to be achieved. This requires active and positive collaboration with both public and private agencies that are able to provide the other elements still missing from that package in the locations where IRDP is working. This is one of IRDP’s objectives that will require the active collaboration with other projects and programmes providing these other elements.
347. Accurate assessment of the project’s impact can only be achieved through developing a much more robust M&E capability assisted by the appropriate tools and training. An appropriate MIS/GIS is presently being actively sought by WB with FAO.
77 348. However, for the future the M&E unit would be better established at ministerial rather than project level. Also, close collaboration should be maintained with the economic and statistical unit in the MAIL which is the official unit responsible for agricultural statistics and data and such things as the annual crop assessments.
349. Capacity building and appropriate training at all levels including farmers and water users must be continued and solutions found to the problem of retaining personnel in the positions for which they have been trained through improvements in terms of employment.
78 APPENDIX 1
Terms of Reference of EIRP Evaluation Mission
Final Draft 26 January 2012
Joint Evaluation Mission
Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP) (Cr 3845-AF), UTF/AFG/035/AFG
FINAL EVALUATION
1. Background
The Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP) was developed to contribute to the objectives of the transitional Government of Afghanistan national strategy for economic development articulated in its National Development Framework (NDF, April 2002). The NDF recognizes the economic importance of both agriculture and irrigation in transforming the rural economy, improving food security, reducing vulnerability and expanding livelihood opportunities for the rural population.
The NDF accords a high priority to the recovery of the agricultural sector for it to be able to serve as the engine of pro-poor economic growth and poverty reduction, of which one of the most important components is the rehabilitation of the national irrigation system. The NDF also underlines that rehabilitation should be carried out in a way that does not adversely affect the traditional norms of collective responsibility of local communities for the operations and maintenance of the centuries-old traditional irrigation system, which constitutes 90 percent of the national irrigation system.
In response to the Government of Afghanistan request for rehabilitating the national irrigation system, the World Bank Board approved The Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) to support the NDF in March 2003. The TSS has been designed to support transition from short-term emergency support to a long-term development support focusing in four areas, one of which has been “ Improving livelihoods : employment generation community development, and rural development, including management of national water resources.
The Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP) was, therefore, designed to improve livelihood opportunities in the rural areas through a rehabilitated irrigation system and improved management of national water resources. EIRP was approved on 23 December 2003 and started on 19 March 2004.
1.2 Project objectives On approval of the project, the overall objective of the project is to provide Afghan farmers with improved, reliable and equitable irrigation water deliveries to increase agricultural productivity and farm income improve food security and livelihoods and reduce vulnerability to drought. This development objective was, however, later revised to “restore irrigated agricultural production in rural areas, through improved and reliable water supply to rehabilitated traditional irrigation schemes”. The EIRP development objective was to be achieved by: (i) rehabilitating and improving existing dilapidated irrigation infrastructure;
79 (ii) restoring and modernizing the hydro-meteorological network for better monitoring, planning and management of water resources including contingency planning for drought and flood; (iii) restoring and building new infrastructure and institutional capacity for monitoring, managing and planning sustainable use of water resources; and (iv) Developing the capacity of public sector institutions, enhancing role of community organizations and farmers for operating and maintaining irrigation system in a sustainable manner. This was to reduce poverty in the rural areas and accelerate transition to sustainable agriculture and dynamic rural economy in Afghanistan.
1.3 Project components EIRP includes following four components: A. Rehabilitation of small, medium and large irrigation schemes; B. Rehabilitation of the national hydro-meteorological network; C. Feasibility studies of large irrigation schemes and monitoring; D. Institutional strengthening and technical assistance.
1.4 Implementation arrangements A Programme Coordinating Unit (PCU) has been established in the MEW Kabul, whose main functions are the coordination of all activities throughout the country concerning the implementation of the project. The PCU staff consists of several specialists from the MEW, as well as FAO national and international staff. In each of the six Regions, a Regional Office (RO) has been established to take charge of coordinating and implementing all project activities of the respective region.
1.5 FAO consultancy services Upon invitation of the Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environment (MIWRE), FAO signed the project document for UTF/AFG/035/AFG, for carrying out Consultants Services for the EIRP on 17 June 2004 . The agreement covers the provision services provided for the overall management of the project, including not only engineering services but also technical assistance to the MIWRE and its Program Coordination Unit for: (i) assistance to MIWRE for implementing the EIRP project; (ii) procurement planning and processing and ensuring compliance with FAO’s (for budget in Appendix VII) and World Bank’s procurement guidelines (for MIWRE Credit from World Bank) at all stages (receipt of bids, evaluation and award of contracts); (iii) managing procurement process for procurement of goods, works and services required under the project; (iv) maintenance of consolidated project accounts and arranging for timely annual audits; (v) preparation of consolidated annual work plans for all project components; (vi) preparation of annual budgetary requests; (vii) establishment of a MIS, and preparation of periodic progress reports and project implementation completion report; (viii) preparation and implementation of training programs;
80 (ix) recruitment of auditors for carrying out project audit; (x) preparation of detailed terms of reference for studies and consultant recruitment; (xi) preparation of project supervision plans for the Government; (xii) organization of a tripartite review; and (xiii) preparing for and organizing a Monitoring and Evaluation mission. (xiv) country-wide coordination of water resources and irrigation (WRI) projects.
2. Purpose of the final evaluation
The following are the specific objectives of the project evaluation:
• Provide accountability for the Government of Afghanistan, the World Bank, UN FAO, and beneficiary irrigation communities with respect to project performance; • Assess project relevance to stakeholder needs and expectations; • Determine the effectiveness and sustainability of project results; • Assess the effectiveness of processes and support modalities implemented to promote beneficiary ownership through involvement and participation across the project cycle; • Assess the efficiency of project resources deployed in implementing the project; • Discern lessons learned and identify best practices from EIRP experience, for use in the design and implementation of the follow-on Irrigation Restoration and Development (IRDP) to achieve better results; • Provide appropriate recommendations that could further improve project performance now or for future, including refining project design; working methods, procedures, supervision, quality control practices used in rehabilitation works; and capacity building approaches.
This Final Evaluation exercise will mainly focus on identifying areas for improvement for the immediate use in the planning and implementation of the follow-on IRDP. The evaluation will come out with specific recommendations directed towards respective stakeholders (Government of Afghanistan – MEW-, the World Bank, PCU, FAO and beneficiary communities) using evidence-based multi-faceted SWOT (Strengths and Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis and other relevant tools.
3. Scope of the final evaluation
The evaluation will assess the project as follows: a. Its relevance to: national development priorities, needs of the population; FAO Global Goals and Strategic Objectives/Core Functions and other aid programmes in the sector; b. Robustness and realism of the theory of change 141 underpinning the project, including logic of causal relationship between inputs, activities, expected outputs, outcomes and impacts (against specific and development objectives) and validity of indicators, assumptions and risks; c. Quality and realism of the project design, including: Duration; Stakeholder and beneficiary identification. Institutional set-up and management arrangements; Approach and methodology; d. Financial resources management, including:
141 As expressed in the logical framework matrix, if applicable.
81 Adequacy of budget allocations to achieve outputs; Coherence and soundness of Budget Revisions in matching necessary adjustments to requirements of implementation; Rate of delivery and budget balance at the time of the evaluation. e. Management and implementation, including: Effectiveness of management, including quality and realism of work plans; Efficiency and effectiveness of operations management; Gaps and delays if any between planned and achieved outputs, the causes and consequences of delays and assessment of any remedial measures taken, efficiency in producing outputs; Effectiveness of internal monitoring and review processes; Efficiency and effectiveness of coordination and steering bodies (if any); Coordination with other projects active in the same sector Quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by FAO; and Timeliness, quality and quantity of inputs and support by the Government and resource partner. f. Extent to which the expected outputs have been produced, their quality and timeliness. 142 g. Extent to which the expected outcomes have been achieved. h. Use made by the initiative of FAO’s normative products and actual and potential contribution of the initiative to the normative work of the Organization. i. Assessment of gender mainstreaming in the initiative. This will cover: Analysis of how gender issues were reflected in project objectives, design, identification of beneficiaries and implementation; Analysis of how gender relations and equality are likely to be affected by the initiative; Extent to which gender issues were taken into account in project management. j. The prospects for sustaining and up-scaling the initiative's results by the beneficiaries and the host institutions after the termination of the initiative. The assessment of sustainability will include, as appropriate: Institutional, technical, economic and social sustainability of proposed technologies, innovations and/or processes; Perspectives for institutional uptake and mainstreaming of the newly acquired capacities, or diffusion beyond the beneficiaries or the project. Environmental sustainability: the initiative’s contribution to sustainable natural resource management, in terms of maintenance and/or regeneration of the natural resource base. k. Overall performance of the project: extent to which the initiative has attained, or is expected to attain, its intermediate/specific objectives and FAO Organizational Result/s (impact), and hence, to the relevant Strategic Objectives and Core Functions; this will also include the identification of actual and potential positive and negative impacts produced by the initiative, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. The mission will also evaluate if project resources were efficiently used to support the overall project objective given the overall adverse factors during project life.
Based on the above analysis, the evaluation will draw specific conclusions and formulate recommendations for any necessary further action by Government, FAO and/or other parties to ensure sustainable development, including any need for follow- up action. The evaluation will draw attention to specific good practices and lessons of
142 Key outputs should be listed for the evaluation team to assess. The evaluation team may add to the list as appropriate.
82 interest to other similar activities. Any proposal for further assistance should include specification of major objectives and outputs and indicative inputs required.
4. Evaluation methodology
Under the overall guidance of the FAO Office of Evaluation:
• The evaluation will adhere to the UNEG Norms & Standards; • The evaluation will adopt a consultative and transparent approach with internal and external stakeholders throughout the evaluation process. Triangulation of evidence and information gathered will underpin the validation of evidence collected and its analysis and will support conclusions and recommendations; • The evaluation will make use of the following tools: review of existing reports, semi- structured interviews with key informants, stakeholders and participants, supported by check lists and/or interview protocols; direct observation during field visits; surveys and questionnaires; the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) framework for assessment of project results. • In particular, the evaluation will make use of the following tools:
- Review of existing reports (including, TECHNICAL ANNEX, WB Report No. T7608-AF, Regular quarterly and annual project reports, World Bank supervision reports and related aide memoires, Specific Consultant Reports produced and used to support project implementation of project components, Annual EIRP M&E Impact Assessment Reports). - Structured interviews with key informants, stakeholders and implementation partners (e.g. contractors) - Direct observation during field visits to rehabilitated irrigation schemes. - Surveys and questionnaires • The Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) framework for assessment of project results.
5. Consultation process
• The evaluation team will maintain close liaison with the FAO Office of Evaluation, project management, the LTU and Task Force members at regional, sub-regional or country level, and all key stakeholders. Although the mission is free to discuss with the authorities concerned anything relevant to its assignment, it is not authorized to make any commitment on behalf of the Government, the donor or FAO. • The evaluation briefing and debriefing process will include the Government, the resource partners, the FAO Representation and other relevant actors • The team will present its preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations to the key stakeholders, to obtain feedback from them. • The Team Leader bears responsibility for finalization of the report, which will be submitted to FAO within four weeks of mission completion. FAO will submit the report to Government(s) and donor together with its comments. • The draft evaluation report will be circulated among key stakeholders for comment before finalization; suggestions will be incorporated as deemed appropriate by the evaluation team.
83 6. Evaluation team
The mission will comprise experts/expertise to handle different components.
• Rural Development Specialist (expertise in agricultural and conservation activities , including community development and river basin development projects) with a minimum of 10 years experience and strong institutional/organizational management expertise (Team Leader); • Expert in Irrigation Engineering (expertise in irrigation engineering and agricultural irrigation design; good understanding of irrigation economics) with a minimum of 10 years experience (Team Member) • Monitoring and Evaluation officer: Representative of MEW, Government of Afghanistan. • The mission will be supported by local expertise.
Mission members will be fully independent who have not been directly involved with the project formulation, implementation or backstopping. However, they should be familiar with the socio-political situation of Afghanistan.
7. Reporting
The evaluation report will illustrate the evidence found that responds to the evaluation issues, questions and criteria listed in the ToR. It will include an executive summary. Supporting data and analysis should be annexed to the report when considered important to complement the main report. The recommendations will be addressed to the different stakeholders and prioritized: they will be evidence-based, relevant, focused, clearly formulated and actionable. The evaluation team will agree on the outline of the report early in the evaluation process, based on the template provided in Annex I of this ToR. The report will be prepared in English, with numbered paragraphs. The team leader bears responsibility for submitting the final draft report to FAO within four weeks from the conclusion of the mission. Within three additional weeks, FAO will submit to the team its comments and suggestions that the team will include as appropriate in the final report within one week.
Annexes to the evaluation report will include, but are not limited to: • Terms of reference for the evaluation; • List of Persons Met, including job titles; • Itinerary of the evaluation team mission; Data collection instruments (e.g. copies of questionnaires, surveys – if applicable).
84 APPENDIX 2
Persons Met on Mission (or contacted regarding EIRP) 28 February to 28 March 2012
Name & Organization Position 1. FAO HQ ROME Bob Moore Director OED Bernd Bultemeier Programme Officer OED Walt er Klemm Consultant – ex Technical Officer EIRP Samuel Kugbei Agricultural Officer (Seed Security) Ex CTA Seed Development,Afghanistan Aziz Arya Food Security Officer TCSF Charlotte Darfour Nutritionist – ex FAO Afghanistan Abdul Razaq Ayazi Afghan Representative to FAO Ex Service Chief PBEE Sarah Jaff & Heather Young Admin. OED 2. FAO REPRESENTATION KABUL Ousmane Guido FAO Representative, Afghanistan Mohammad Aqa Assistant Representative Yagyash Gautam CTA Strengthening Agricultural Economics, Market Info and Statistics. Tim Vaessen CTA Emergency Moeen Ud Din Siraj National Operations Officer Sayed Walid Nat. Assist. Security Officer 3. FAO EIRP & IRDP Waleed Mahdi CTA EIRP / IRDP Sayed Sharif Shobair Nat. C/CE Ajay Rawat Int. Admin / Finance Officer Dr Umesh Chaube Int. Hydrologist Taeme Tewolde Berhan Int Monitoring & Evaluation Consult. Fazal Mahmoud Khan Chief Design and Supervisory Eng. Abdul Sattar Khan Int. Procurement Specialist Sanju Upadhyay Int. Senior Survey Specialist Hemat Nezami Int. Economic Analyst Consultant Eng Sardar Mohammad Nat. Team Leader/Chief Engineer-Large Schemes Ahmad Fawad Rasouli Admin Assist Saeeda Shaafi Secretary / Trainer Sayed Hamid Hashemi Nat. Hydrologist Mohammad Samin Moneb Nat. IT Assistant Mir Wais Sahibhan NRESD Faisul Haq Senior Nat. Irrigation Desigfn Eng. Ahmad Saeed Shinwari Nat. Media Assist Hashmatullah Omid GIS Specialist Mohammad Qasim NCMS Noorullah MIS Specialist Abdul Wahed Store Keeper 4. FAO KABUL REGION EIRP / IRDP Barialai Halimi Senior Nat. Design Engineer OiC Assadullah Anwar Admin Assistant Enysatullah Seerat Senior Nat. Design Eng. Mohammad Sadiq Naziri NRCM Qality Control Eng. Haji Shib Zaki Sami Nat. Irrigation Design Engineer Mohammad Taqi Nat. Irrigation Design Engineer FAO Irrigation Project- Bamiyan & Parwan (Japan –JICA- Funded)
85 Paul Schlinke Int. Project Coordinator / CTA MINISTRY OF ENERGY & WATER H.E. Shoauddin Ziaie Deputy Minister of MEW. Eng. Ghulam Farouk Qazizadah Deputy Minister –Energy- & adviser to IRDP PCU Eng. Mohammad Farhad Noorzai Director of Irrigation MEW (ex Director of EIRP PCU) Mohammad Akbar Sidiqqi Assistant Officer Adviser for MEW on Water Resources (JICA) Sultan Mahmood Director Water Management Dept. MEW Dr. Jahangir Bakhteri Senior Advisor (ARDS) EIRP / IRDP PCU- Kabul & Central Region Mirwais Mirzad Director IRDP PCU Fahima Azim Acting DD – Kabul Region S’gul Mohammad Supervisor – Kabul Region Mohammad Kazim Supervisor – Kabul Region Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Animal Husbandry- Kabul H.E. Asif Rahimi Minister of MAIL Nasser Faiz Director of Irrigation MAIL On Farm Water Management Project WB with MAIL Habib Khan Project Director On Farm Water Management Project Theo van den Berg Consult ant Advisor to OFWMP NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (NEPA) Eng. Ghulam Mohammad Malikyar Deputy Director General / Technical WORLD BANK KABUL Jun Matsumoto Senior Water Resources Management Specialist Johannes (Hans) Jansen Senior Agricultural Economist Tawfiq Ahmed Procurement Officer Mohammad Abdullah Sadeque International Procurement Specialist Eng. Mir Ahmad Operations Officer NORTHERN REGION MAZAR-e SHARIF FAO NORTHERN REGION EIRP / IRDP Ghulam Sediq Nat. Team Leader Bashir Ahmad Mawlawizada Nat Admin / Finance Assist. Mohammad Yasin Senior Nat. Irrigation Design Engineer Nessar Ahmad Khuram Nat. O&M Specialist / Trainer CWIDA Mohammad Arif Siar NRCM / Quality Control Eng. Zabiullah Esmati Deputy Director PCU Department of Agriculture (DAIL) Khateb Shams Director of DAIL Mazar-e Sharif WAPCOS team- Mazar-e Sharif Doing Feasibility Studies for Small Dams in Northern Basins S.K. Garg Team Leader Y.P. Singh Dam Expert Dr A.K. Sharma Environment Expert Ram P. Mony Social Expert V.K. Yadav Survey M.K. Shukla GIS Expert & P.R. ADB Water Management Project Northern River Basins Eng Bashir Construction Specialist Qadratullah Social Specialist Eng. Ahmad Construction Supervisor USAID – IDEAS New- ACDI VOCA Agricultural Development Programme Based in Mazar-e Sharif Andrew Harvey Project Manager
86 Peter How Agricultural Program Director (International Inc Joint Development Associates. Horticulture & Livestock Project (HLP) WB Funded Project Khairullah Shinwari Project Direcrtor - Mazar FAO Backyard Poultry Project Mazar -e Sharif FAO Backyard Poultry Project Mazar -e Sharif Dr Jaffar Emal Acting head of FAO Coordination Office in absence of Zia Arya- covering 5 N. Provinces WESTERN REGION HEART FAO REGIONAL OFFICE Habib Rasul Hemat NRM / MDGF-SAISEM Acting FAO OiC FAO WESTERN REGION, HERAT EIRP/IRDP Ahmad Shah National Team Leader (met in Kabul) Sayed Jamal Ahmady Admin / Finance Assistant Ahmad Hamed Fariwar Senior Nat. Irrigation Design Eng. Wahidullah Lodin Senior Nat. Irrigation Design Eng. Hamayoon Qaderian Nat. O&M Specialist / Trainer CWIDA Khalid Paiman MRCM / Quality Control Engineer UN Security- Herat Temirbek Musaev UN Security Officer- Heart Department of Energy and Water DEW Hirat Sayed Hassan Director Western River Basins Ahmad Shah Director of Lower Harirud Sub basin EIRP / IRDP PCU Hirat Ahmed Ratep Nassimi Deputy Director Herat PCU Mahdi Design Engineer Herat PCU Abdul Nasser Supervisor Abdul Khalil Surveyor Homayoon Suveyor Ali Ahmad Admin & Procurement Nasir Ahmad M&E Assistant ADB Western Basins Water Resources Mohammad Yasin Project Director. Project Management Unit (PMU)-Western Basins Water Resources Mangmt. Project Abdullah Qadir Deputy Project Director John Davenp ort Sheladia Associates - Consultants - Team Leader Department of Agriculture DAIL Hirat Faqir Ahmad Bayangar Director of DAIL, Hirat Mohammad Tareq Mohtasebzadah General Mangr.of Planning and Programs Others Met in Kabul and elsewhere Working for Irriga tion, Agriculture, Horticulture and related Projects, UN, INGOs and others Michael Keating Deputy Head of United Nations Mission- Afghanistan Olivier Cossee UNDP-Programme Officer for Afghanistan (N.York) Nancy Hatch Dupree Central Library, Kabul University- Exec. Dir Massimo Bonannini T.L. Panj / Amu R.B. Programme Eng Nigel Bright T.L. Khanabad Irrigation Scheme Rehabilitation- with Mott MacDonald Jelle Beekmar Senior Consultant; Landell Mills (UK) -ex T.L. EU/MEW- Panj / Amu River Basin Programme Bram Schreuder Director Dutch Committee For Afghanistan - Veterinary Programme Raymond Briscoe Country Directror- DCA-Veterinary Programme John Woodford Advisor- MAIL- Animal Health Policy Michael Turner Seed Policy Consultant for EC/FAO-Seed Development Project- with MAIL
87 Patrick McAuslan Professor at Law- Birkbeck University of London- Consultant with FAO on Land Issues. Peter Grunewald FAO – for Livelihoods Project Baghlan Giuliano Masini T.L. EC/ MAIL Perennial Horticulture Project- (PHP) Gregory Cullen Consultant and ex TL- PHP Andrew Billingsley Consultant- NRM Aga Khan Development Foundation-Afg. Andrew Scanlon Protected Areas Expert- UNEP-Afg. Made Ferguson Assistant Country Director Concern Worldwide Takhar Province Peter Stevenson Directror of Programmes - Mercy Corps - Afghanistan Janneke Roos Public Health Adviser -Consultant - Min of Health Lindsay Sales Public Health Adviser -Consultant - Min. of Health Peter Cross IDEAS- Consultant Adviser Min. of Health David Mansfield (Contacted by e.mail) Expert on Opium Poppy Issues
88 APPENDIX 3 Mission Itinerary 27 February to 19 April 2012
Day and Date Place Comments Sunday 26/02/12 UK and Netherlands pm flew from UK and Netherlands to Rome to Rome (Italy) Sunday 26/02/12 to FA O HQ Meetings and Briefings Tuesday 29/02/12 Tuesday 29/02/12 Rome to Dubai Evening flew from Rome to Dubai Wednesday 01/03/12 Dubai to Kabul (Afghanistan) Flew Dubai to Kabul First meetings with EIRP FAO team Wednesday 01/03/12 to Kabul Working out of FAO EIRP/IRDP office in MEW- Tuesday 06/03/12 Kabul Meetings and Briefings With FAO, MEW, and other relevant people Wednesday 07/03/12 Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif am Flew to Mazar-e Sharif Wednesday 07/03/12 to Mazar-e Sharif Working out of FAO EIRP / IRDP Regional office Saturday 10/03/12 in Mazar Meetings with relevant Government & Non Government agencies, organizations and contractors Visited irrigation and dam sites in Samangan (Aybak) and Balkh (Khulm) Saturday 10/03/12 Mazar -e Sharif to Kabul pm flew Mazar to Kabul Sunday 11/03/12 Kabul to Herat am flew Kabul to Herat Sunday 11/03/12 to Heart Working out of EIRP/IRDP Regional Office in Tuesday 13/03/12 Herat Meetings with relevant relevent Government & Non Government agencies and organisations Tuesday 13/03/12 Herat to Kabul pm flew Herat to Kabul Tuesday 13/03/12 to Kabul In Kabul working out of FAO EIRP /IRDP office Monday 19/03/12 in MEW Meetings with relevant government and non government agencies and organisations including EIRP FAO and PCU teams, MEW, MAIL, NEPA and other relevant people and stakeholders.
Tuesday 20/03/12 to ‘Nowruz’ New Year Holiday In Kabul working in Guest House Friday 23/03/12 Kabul Reading, Research and Writing Saturday 24/03/12 to Kabul In Kabul working out of FAO EIRP/IRDP Office Wednesday 28/03/12 in MEW-Kabul Final meetings with relevant organizations and stakeholders Windup debriefing meetings with FAOR’s office; MEW;WB and EIRP/IRDP FAO & PCU teams Together with Bernd Bultemeier (FAO OED) Wednesday 28/03/12 Kabul to UK and Neth erlands Evaluators returned home to the UK & the Netherlands Thursday 29/03/12 to UK & Netherlands 6 Paid Working Days Thursday 19/04/12 Completing Draft of EIRP Evaluation Report Total 33 days including travel days plus 6 days desk work in home country
89 APPENDIX 4
Bibliography and References
ANDS Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board Secretariat, February 2008 ANDS Water Resources Management 1387-1391 (2007/08-2012/13) volume 11 Pillar iii, Infrastructure AREU Irrigation Systems (Water Management Livestock and the Opium Economy) Afghanistan Ian Anderson 2006 AREU Community Management and Survival Strategies in Social Water Management (WMLOE) Jonathan Lee 2006 AREU How the Water Flows: A Typology of Irrigatin Systems in Afghanistan (WMLOE) Bob Rout AREU Issues relating to Opium Poppy: Various Applied Research Papers by David Mansfield AREU Issues relating to Opium Poppy: Various Applied Research Papers by Adam Pain Charlotte De Bruyne Itay Fischhendler: “Rge Adoption of Conflict Resolution in Water Managements: A Transaction Cost Approach FAO Agricultural Sector Study: Promotion of Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Programmes – Water Resources and Irrigation-Nov. 1996 By Walter Klem et al FAO Various FAO Backstopping-Back to Office Reports- Depeche 2004; Klemm 2005; Berney 2005; Facon 2006 FAO Yield Responses to Water FAO media Section Rebuilding Afghanistan’ Irrigation Network-February 2012 FAO EIRP EIRP Community Based Operation and Maintenance Training-Study Report- October 2009 by Renee Crossley-Consultant FAO/EIRP Summary of Activities and Progress December 2011 FAO/EIRP Compliance with Social Safeguards Requirements in the Emergency Rehabilitation Project Review of Social Management Framework-EIRP-October 2010- Dr. Elizabeth McCall-Consultant FAO/EIRP FAO / PCU Roles- Power Point Presentation FAO/EIRP Environment and Social Management Plan (ESMP) for Shakhab Canal Phase III- IRDP November 2011-by Dr E. McCall-Consultant FAO/EIRP Terminal Report. EIRP UTF/AFG/035/AFG Based on the work of Waleed Mahdi- CTA March 2012 FAO/EIRP/PCU Various Tables of Completed, Terminated and Works under construction FAO /EIRP 15 Progress Reports between Aug 2005 and Feb 2010 Fichtner Gmbh Lower Kokcha Irrigation and Hydro-power Study of Stuttgart Florida Department of Transportation, 2011. Project Management Handbook, Part 1 Issues Common To All Project Management Page 1 of 7. Chapt. 16 Quality Assurance and Quality Control GoA-Min of Justice Gazette No. (980) Revised Water Law (2009) – Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (unofficial English Translation) GoA Water Resource Management Sector Strategy (2007/8-2012/13) Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) MEW / EIRP Baseline Study of EIRP – by Sheladia Associates Inc MEW / EIRP First Seasonal Impact Assessment: 2006-April 2007- by Sheladia Associates Inc MEW EIRP/PCU EIRP 2010 Monitoring & Evaluation Annual Report MEW/EIRP/PCU EIRP Third Seasonal Impact Assessment, Final Report,2010. MEW/EIRP/PCU EIRP Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Draft- March 5 2012
90 MEW /EIRP/IRD/PCU IRDP Base Line Study June 2011 MEW/EIRP/PCU Various Monthly Progress Reports 2011 MEW/EIRP/PCU Opium Poppy-Summary of Analysis and Recommendations (2005/2006) MEW/EIRP/PCU IRDP Operations Manual Sultan Mahmood Mahmoodi Journal of Developments in Sustainable Agriculture 3:9-19 (2008) USAID/IRD Jim Dexter: Kabul 2005. Panshir River Road Flood Data Study (includes an evaluation of the magnitude of the May-June 2005 Flood WAPCOS Small Dams Feasibility- Preliminary ESA WAPCOS Revised Inception Report World Bank EIRP Mid Term Review, March 21-April 5, 2006 World Bank Emergency Irrigation Project (IDA/r2003-0229) Technical Annex World Bank Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (|EIRP) and Irrigation Restoration and Development Project (IRDP)- Aide Memoir IS Mission September 5-11 2011 World Bank Negotiation Draft- Emergency Paper on Proposed Grant for IRDP March 2011 World Bank Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet EIRP Nov 2003 USGS Data Series 529 Scott A Olson and Tara Williams-Sether, Virginia, 2010 Stream Flow Characteristics at Streamgages in Northern Afghanistan and Selected Locations UNODC/UNDCP Afghanistan Opium Surveys 1994 to 2011 David Mansfield Various Papers
91 ANNEX 1.1
Organization Chart for Ministry of Energy and Water
92 ANNEX 1.2
Technical Support Services and Consultancies
Dates of Service Name Function Starting Date Concluding Date Ian Andersen Construction Management Aug 2005 Aug 2005 Consultant Melvyn Kay Capacity Building Consultant Dec 2005 Jan 2006 Jul 2009 Aug 2009 S. Selvarajan Consultant, Agro-economist, Jan 2009 Feb 2009 Kabul Karen Gregorian Water Resources Consultant (one Nov 2009 Feb 2010 month home based)
Elisabeth McCall Social Consultant 16 Mar 2011 22 Mar 2011
Francesco Sabatini Telemetry expert 15 Jun 2011 21 Jun 2011
Jaindra Karki Environment Consultant (three Jul 2011 Nov 2011 months home based) James Oliver NRLW Technical Officer 16 Aug 2005 23 Aug 2005
Walter Klemm TCI Technical Officer, Kabul Apr 2005, Oct With other 2005, Feb 2008, inputs from Jun 2010, HQ Thierry Facon LTU Technical Officer, 11 Feb 2006 24 Feb 2006 Apr 2006 Mar 2006 With other inputs from RAP Zhijun Chen LTU Technical Officer, 15 Nov 2007 24 Nov 2007 With other inputs from RAP David Colbert TCI Technical Officer 10 Mar 2009 24 Mar 2009 With other inputs from HQ Robert Rout TCI Technical Officer Nov 2010 Dec 2010
Puspa Raj Khanal LTU Technical Officer, Aug 2011 Sep 2011 With other inputs from RAP From FAO EIRP Terminal Report- March 2012
93 ANNEX 2
Other Irrigation and Water Resources Projects and Programmes
Significant ongoing projects and programmes in the water resources and irrigation sectors in Afghanistan at the present time
A. (1) Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (just completed) / Irrigation Rehabilitation and Development Project (just started). WB/MEW/FAO (2) Western Basins Water Resources Management Project: ADB/MEW/ Sheladia (3) Panj-Amu River Basin Programme. EC/MEW/Landell Mills (4) Afghanistan Water Resources Development Project. WB/MEW/Landell Mills (5) Rural Recovery through community-based Irrigation Rehabilitation. ADB/MRRD (6) On Farm Water Management Project WB/MAIL-At present self managed by MAIL with two international consultants, but soon with TA provided by NESPAK (Pakistan) (7) Improvement of Irrigation Systems and Construction of Micro-power in Kabul / Parwan and Bamiyan. JICA/MEW/FAO (8) Pyanj River Basin Flood Management ADB/MEW-being planned
B. Some other projects- mainly dams
(1) Shakardarrah-Parwan- Shab-o Ruz Canal- from GoA Budget (2) Shakardarrah dam- Parwan-dam financed by GoA with Indian contractors. JICA/MEW- for the proposed irrigation system to be developed. (3) Salma dam- Chesht-i Sharif- middle Harirud- Indian Government/MEW/ Indian Contractors (WAPCOS)- Under construction. Power first then irrigation. (4) Machelgu dam- Sayed Karam, Pakhtia GoA budget- Afghan contractors- under construction (5) Qaisar- Faryab- GoA/Azizi Bank/Azarbaijan contractors. Under construction (6) Kamal Khan barrage / diversion dyke on the Helmand River, Nimroz- irrigation & power. GoA budget with Iranian contractors. (7) Dasht-I Gambari- Lower Kunar / Laghman-Diversion Weir on the Kunar River- (Nurgel) being developed. Iranian contractors (8) Upper Kokcha-Feasibility study in progress. GoA with Indian contractors (9) Kunar power- Kama ? NO information (10) Farah Rud- GoA with Indian Contractors (11) Keloghai- Baghlan dam- now stopped by the Ministry of Finance
94
ANNEX 3.1 SUMMARY LIST of LARGE SCHEMES List of EIRP large projects (>2,500 ha and/or >$300,000 contract value)
Code Location Name Type Contract Value Increment Total area Serial area after 1 H018 Ht/Zanda Jan Deh Surkh Intake improve protect works 64,000 1,242 2,575 2 H023 Ht/Ghor/ Pozelich Canal Dahane Merza Ibrahim Turn-out 204,552 1,000 2,500 3 H024 Ht//Obeh Sahra Parda Canal Qalae Kohna ( canal protection) 148,855 2,400 6,400 4 H035 Ht//Karokh Maloma Irrigation Canal Box Super passage with drop 190,052 1,000 2,500 5 H043 Ht Mamizak Canal 96,000 500 2,500 6 H057 Ht/Goryan Goryan Main Canal Escape structure with gate at site no 1 241,828 1,875 5,000 7 H073 Ht/Gozara Gozara Main Canal Gated out let structure with culvert 69,367 1,160 5,000 8 H088 Ht/Farah Naw bahar main canal Intake Structure with bank 425,274 800 2,800 9 H101 Ht/Farah Yazdih Canal Site Intake 289,459 500 2,500 10 H110 Ht/Badghis Larha and Awlad Musa Site Intake 399,800 300 800 11 H112 Ht/Badghis Zardnasir Site Intake 357,574 300 800 12 K001 Kl/Kapisa Nahre Khuja Canal Sanjan Sai Wash Bank Protection 105,040 2,000 6,000 13 K015 Kl/Kapisa Rig-e-Rawan Irrigation Rehabiliation / Construction of Intake Structure 216,163 2,000 6,000 14 K018 Kl/Kapisa Naw Abad Canal Wash Culvert (box type)in Sanjansai location 43,127 200 5,000 15 K028 Kl/Shakardara Intiafat Canal Intake of Canal 76,898 200 2,500 16 K068 Kl/Charikar Mahigeer Canal Construction rehabilitation of spillway 84,609 1,750 6,750 17 K093 Kl/Bagram Bagram Canal Construction/Rehabilitaion of retaining wall/spil 78,915 100 2,500 18 K171 Kl/Kapisa Khuram Canal Intake Improvement 229,856 1,000 7,000 19 K172 Kl/Kapisa Khuja canal phase 3 Intake Improvement 230,321 1,000 1,000 20 KL3 Kl/Ghorband Chardihi Canal Intake Improvement 376,200 200 1,000 21 LH1 Ht/Pashtun Ateshan Canal Canal control structure with canal bank protection 845,019 1,800 6,800 22 LH2 Ht Kamboraq Canal Intake improvement 520,266 2,150 5,000 23 LH3 H/Farah Raj main canal 208,611 1,000 3,000 24 LJ1 J/Mehterlam Nahre Karim Intake rehabilitation and 63 hydralic structures 203,919 600 3,000 25 LJ2 J/Kunar Khas Kunar Upper and Lo Intake Improvement 375,066 200 3,200 26 LJ5 J/Sherzad Khada Khil Irrigation Canal Intake Improvement 463,438 500 2,500 27 LQ1 Kr/Nimruz Nahree Lashkaree Offtake structure 1,839,537 13,800 15,000 28 LQ3 Kr/Uruzgan Yaklinga Canal 655,769 1,500 4,000 29 LU1 Kz/Dasht Archi Dasht Archi Canal Intake Rehabiliation and hydarolic structures 529,879 4,000 24,000 30 LU2 Kz/Takhar Gaumali Canal 309,127 1,000 12,000 31 LU3 Kz/Takhar Dashti-e-Qala canal Side intake 972,307 5,000 7,000 32 Q029 Kr/Dand Panjab Canal Protection wall 74,043 3,240 11,880 33 Q044 Kr/Daman Murghan Kicha Canal Intake &Protection Wall 53,035 1,241 4,457 34 Q075 Kr/Arghandab Nagahan Canal Construction of Protection Wall 21,003 6,150 20,959 35 Q089 Kr/Arghandab Minar Canal Protection wall 82,762 1,300 3,900 36 Q135 Kr/Uruzgan Karbala Canal 301,662 1,080 2,700 37 Q136 Kr/Nimruz Nahree Lashkaree Phase 2 174,839 - - 38 U001 Kz/Center Gul Tapa Irrigatioon Sc Retaining Wall Construction at Chainage 0+050 62,530 600 2,000 39 U002 Kz/Taloqan Shahrawan Irrigation Sc Retaining Wall Construction at Chainage 6+00 27,750 500 9,900 40 U002b Kz/Taloqan Sharawan Supplementry Structure 85,422 - - 41 U003 Kz/Center New Gul Tapa Canal Retaining Wall and embankment, Wash Drop 48,585 1,000 4,200 42 U014 Kz/Badakhshan Sari shahar Canal 9,103 1,080 3,180 43 U016 Kz/Baghlan Ajmir Irrigation Scheme Bank Protection Wall at chainage 17+00 20,361 4,000 30,000 44 U019 Kz/Archi Archi Irrigation Canal Construction of Spillway 47,908 5,000 29,000 45 U035 Kz/Takhar Kafatr Ali Irrigation S Bank protection and Side spillway at Km0+00 42,956 270 5,400 46 U040 Kz/Takhar Juye Daraz Canal Construction of bank protection and check structu 75,810 500 2,500 47 U045 Kz/Center Qalacha Canal Construction of spillway 27,983 350 3,000 48 U046 Kz/ali Abad Omar Khail Canal 25,687 400 2,600 49 U060 Kz/Takhar Khawja Hafiz Canal 249,266 350 3,000 50 U064 Kz/Pul e Khomri Qamaroq Canal Side intake 136,806 50 3,375 51 U068 Kz/Taloqan Tash guzar Canal side intake 296,282 200 2,700
Total 12,714,621 78,388 301,376
95 ANNEX 3.2
Field Site Visits Mazar-e Sharif and Herat
3.2 A Visit to Mazar – Samangan (Aybak) and Balkh (Khulm) (8-9 March 2012)
See the small dams special notes for the report :
Proposed damsite Bato Babo (E 68.0769 and N 36.2286 Watershed size: medium Proposed damsite Shamar (E 68.2219 and N 36.2349) Watershed size: small Proposed damsite Chasma Dara (67.6739 and N 36.4943) Not visited Watershed size: large Proposed damsite Tangi Shadyan (E 67.1419 N 36.3584 Z 820) Not visited 15 km South of Mazar city Watershed size: medium
Visit to irrigation canals
The text and map images below are only meant for the record of the trip.
Table as received from the Mazar regional office, after having received several corrections. . Code on Mazar Project Map GPS Coordinate No Name of Project masterlist Structure No: Code NEH No presence Found No-1 36 68 132 67 69 301 429 1 Sert Canal MI-739 No-2 36 68 690 67 69 451 421
M-090 Found No-1 36 66 259 67 69 593 506 No-2 36 66 186 67 69 587 505 2 Ganda Baghat Canal MI-727 No-3 36 66 053 67 69 567 510 No-4 36 66 496 67 69 451 490 No-5 36 67 646 67 69 158 482
M-087 Found No-1 36 20 918 68 06 673 1050 3 Sufiha Canal MI-720 No-2 36 21 864 68 05 082 1025
4 MI-721 M-081 Opposite Sufiha No-1 1050 Nava Dasht-e-Mazar 36 20 851 68 06 743
5 Qanjugha Canal MB-106 M-003 Found No-1 36 25 702 68 05 107 1011 Opposite 5b MI-730 M-096 No-1 Mulla Aka Qanjuga 36 26 353 68 02 911
Below, in the description of the Serth Canal, some hydrologic points about irrigation projects along the Samangan river have been raised.
96 Field-day 1, Thursday, 2012 March 08, to Aybak (Samangan)
Intake shape; gate problems on both sides of the river; gabion problems.
Project M-081 Nava e Dasht Mazar (E 68.06743 and N 36.20851) Right side of the river, opposite Sufihah Canal. See map above. Intake 1 km South of Darrah-i-Zendan The project was on the overside of the river. No close view up was made.
The cross beam supporting the hoist stem looks quite weak and apparently is too weak. The gate leaf may have been stuck and too much force applied to raise the gate, which bent the hoist beam.
Project M-087 Sufihah Canal (E 68.06673 and N 36.20918)
97 Left side of the river, opposite Nava-e-Dashte Mazar. See map above.
Responsibility for the gate was part of community responsibility with disastrous results. Gates should always be the responsibility of the project engineers and contractor’s responsibility. .
Application of gabion, especially when poor quality wire is used, is not to be recommended.
98 Field-day 2, Friday, 2012 March 09, to Khulm, capital of Samangan Province
Project Serth Canal (E 67.69301 and N 36.68132) South of Kholm. See map above.
The project was selected in coordination with the HLP (Horticulture Livestock Project) (another WB funded project). Coordination between the two projects was intended to provide a more secure supply of water for a drip irrigation plot to be installed by HLP for an orchard in the command area. See a separate note about drip irrigation.
The project has reinforced the canal intake and provided a wash-crossing. The intake is across a river with a watershed of 8,300 km2. (IWMI, 2002) The wash-crossing structure leads over the canal, designed for the discharge of a roughly 50 km2 watershed.
Following Creager, the wash-crossing during once in 20 year flood may require a capacity of 100 m3/sec. With a width of 6 m during a flood and a velocity of flow of over 4 m/sec, the
99 depth would be 4 m. This implies that the bridge (built previous to the EIRP) would run almost full to overflowing about once in 20 years. The mud (flood) markings on the abutments are clearly visible to a depth of some 3 m. (The higher stains may be caused by splashing). The cross-drainage structure, built by the EIRP would spill over its sides and consequently require the canal to be cleaned and repaired after each such big flood. However, in most years the capacity will suffice
The intake is on the Samangan river, supposedly draining 8,200 km2. Samangan river is squeezed between Balkh and Kunduz rivers and drains in Northerly direction, originating in the mountains North of Bamyan.
USGS has taken down the Hydrological yearbooks. See extracts below::
100
Observations in Sayad started in 1965. As mentioned in the above figure: “ Data does not fit Log-Pearson Type III curve, use with caution.
A 20 year flood for this river (8,200 km2) would be over 1,000 m3/sec according to Creager. This differs considerably from the short records given above and further analysis is necessary.
The river is constricted between two walls at the point of the intake. With a width of about 8 m and a flow velocity of 4 m/sec this would mean a depth of 30 m with a flood of 1,000 m3/sec. This depth of flow of course is not possible. But, it implies that flooding will be very serious and wide spread. In addition to checking the old hydro-metric registers it would be necessary to check the memories of older villagers. The Dartmouth flood register mentions extreme floods for Northern Afghanistan and Kabul in 1988, implying flood damage of about 260 $ M. (NB . In 1991 there was severe flooding in the S and SE of the Hindu Kush mountains.)
IWMI mentions a discharge of 60 M m3 of water per year. A discharge during an average year of 100 mm over the watershed of 4,500 km2 would be 450 M m3.
Hydrology has to be sorted out . This very simple type of analyses would have to be refined and improved for any case of a structure to be built in a river, stream or wash. It also indicates the need for such analysis for a more generalized for country-wide, applicability.
Note i: Harza’s analysis for the probable maximum flood for Kajaki dam resulted in the order of 18,000 m3/sec. This coincides with a Creager number of C-60. For the present 20 year flood in the Samangan river at Aybak with a Creager C=10 equivalent to a discharge of 0.12 m3/sec/km2 of watershed would result in 1,000 m3/sec.
Note ii: Sometime ago an advertisement for a recalculation of floods for design of road crossings in the KRBP working area has appeared, as all previous designs resulted to be sub- estimations of floods occurred.
Note iii: Between 1980 and 2005 all road bridges and culverts between the Ring-road and Kajaki dam were destroyed by floods. The return period could not be determined, but they were very much present. The 100 year flood of 1991 may been the (exclusive?) cause.
101 Creager curves
100.00
10.00
C=60 C=30 1.00 C=10 C=3
0.10 Unit discharge Unit discharge m3/km2/sec
0.01 1 3 10 30 100 300 1,000 3,000 10,000 30,000 100,000 Photo: Nematullah Karyab/IRIN Watershed km2 Floods killed tens of people and destroyed thousands of houses in 2007, according to ANDMA
Irrigation from the river is during low river flow, that is in the late winter and during high river flow, which starts after Now Ruz (March 21), coinciding with snowmelt and lasting until early summer. Winter irrigation is seldom practiced. Spring and summer irrigation is partly from normal river flow and partly dependant on flood-water having the characteristics of spate irrigation. The Water-atlas (2004) mentions 37,600 ha irrigated with surface water and another 5,700 ha with groundwater.
As mentioned in other parts of the evaluation report, these figures have to employed with due care. For example 60 M m3 per year of discharge (as mentioned by IWMI) implies an average annual flow of 2 m3/sec, which may be sufficient for 3,000 ha land under full time double cropping irrigation. See the copy below: At Tashgurghan 75 M m3/year has been recorded on average (but only between 1970 and 1978.)
102
The gate frame, leaf and hoist for the intake still are missing. As has pointed out elsewhere in the present report, gates and hoists are often lost or mismanaged. This fact is recorded from a number of places.
The river side walls ought to have been built in an inclined fashion. In case of erosion and undercutting, they should fall back towards the land side and not fall forward into the water where the broken masonry will obstruct the river, as has been observed in a number of cases
Pictures: First three: Serth Canal intake across Samangan river .
Serth canal underneath a cross drainage structure and a pre-project bridge for a secondary road to Aybak.
103
104 3.2 B Field Site Visit to Herat (Ghorian, Zenda Jan and Korokh) (12 March 2012)
Morning, Monday, 12 March 2012, to the downstream side of Herat, along Harirud .
Hydrology Station Pul e Hashimi on the Harirud
The station was visited and gave the impression of working normally. Near to the station is a simple staff gage, mounted against one of the piers of the local bridge across the Harirud (on the left side, looking downstream, right side of the image).
With hindsight: If this staff had been placed here in 2003 (at the time of initial project discussions) and arrangements made to pay an observer, it might have been possible to have at least 8 years of data by now. Perhaps not perfect, but interpretable. In that way some 12 bridges could have been identified for this purpose. An opportunity lost perhaps.
Note: A few other such bridges might have been: Kajaki, Lashkargah and Darweshan on the Helmand; Kunar in Behsud-Kama; Kabul in Lashkargah; one across the lower Kokcha and another in Faizabad; one across the Kunduz on the road to Mazar, just downstream of Pul e Khomri; possibly some other tributaries would have presented acceptable crossings as well.
Not sure if the Harirud station’s observer was the owner of the car .
105 Note: The other station visited in the afternoon on the Jui Naw (Korokh) in a standard setting. The battery and solar cell had been stolen. The remaining equipment had been removed for safekeeping.
Visits to several water control structures downstream of the Pul e Hashimi along the left bank of the Harirud:
Ghoryan Main Canal (#s H-99 and HI-718) :
106
Proportional distributor. Note how the farmers have ‘improved’ on the design so as to re- arrange distribution between canals according to their liking. They have put collapsible elevations on the weir crowns, made of inexpensive material (fertilizer bag) that will not be stolen.
Note the silt laden water: There is a need for a proper de-silting set-up based on hydraulics and the constant return of sediment laden water. Handy use of siphons would be appropriate. During the flood season water for that purpose is available. Note the large quantities of silt that have been removed from the canal over the years.
107
The same, looking upstream.
Some gabion, placed by someone .
Cross drainage structure.
The erosion control downstream of the impact basin is made from a large stone. Stone can be quarried at a location within 10 km distance and costs US$10,00/m3 to put in place. Gabions would cost US$40.00/m3, and are not suitable in flowing and abrasive water, particularly when the quality of the wire is poor, as it usually is in Afghanistan.
108 Afternoon, Monday, 12 March 2012, to upstream side of Herat along Harirud
Juy Now (#s H-78 and HH-727) The intake was seen, a number of wash crossings and an aqueduct.
This canal has a long history. It is said (fact uncertain) to have been initiated by the Persian Poet/Sufi Philospher Nur ad-Din And ar-Rahman Jami (Jami) (1414-1492), while at the Temourid court in Herat. Its management is governed by a code of practices drawn up at that time, of which a manuscript copy is still available (see image). The canal is 30 km long and traditionally requires large amounts of Hashar labour for regular maintenance and cleaning.
The canal presently serves an area of 1,350 ha according to project information.
Juy Now, intake location on the topo map: E 62.8898, N 34.5289 and Z 1,660 masl According to the project 1,719 masl (DMA, 100,000. The grid square is 1 km * 1 km.)
The Google image of the area is quite restricted in resolution and does not provide support for design.
Watershed and floods
Location of the intake: E 62.8898, N 34.5289 and Z 1,660 masl
The canal draws water from the Karukh river, a tributary of the Harirud. The Karukh River is quite steep, 2.3 percent for the first 15 km going upstream from the intake and then even steeper. The watershed has an area of 250 – 300 km2 and a length of some 25 km. The intake is located at 1,670 masl and the top of the watershed at 2,781 masl. (Info from DMA map, 1:100,000) A rough estimate for the 20 year flood is 250 m3/sec; for the 100 year flood is 750 m3/sec. (Following Creager method. Alternatively an estimate of the precipitation for different durations and return periods can be made and a flood routing be calculated.)
109 Creager curves
100.00
10.00
C=60 C=30 1.00 C=10 C=3
0.10 Unit Unit discharge m3/km2/sec
0.01 1 3 10 30 100 300 1,000 3,000 10,000 30,000 100,000 Watershed km2
With 250 m3/sec and a river cross-section of about 50 m wide the river depth will be 1.66; just not overtopping the retaining walls. With a larger flood the situation will become more critical.
The water depth over the weir across the stream is indicated as 0.64 m and the weir is shown to be up to 15.00 m wide. If the cross weir is taken to be free flowing (not being drowned out even during flood). The depth over the weir for a discharge of 250 m3/sec would be about 4 m and for a discharge of 100 m3/sec it would be over 2 m. The depth of 0.64 m corresponds with 16 m3/sec.
Design
110
Slope in the concrete canal downstream of the intake is 0.002. The initial part of the canal is 2.30 m wide and 2.20 m deep. 2 intake control gates are provided with dimensions of 1.00 * 1.10 m.
Further downstream the canal is controlled by a left side retention wall with a bottom width of 2.00 m. The wall is 1.50 m high. The other side is inclined and not lined.
The depth for different discharges in the canal would be as given below:
There was evidence of a spillway, including a bottom sluice gate near to the intake takes surplus water (laden with sediment) back to the river. This could not be seen on the drawings nor in the field. (The visit was too hurried due to the time of day and security to allow for close inspection.) There is step down of the canal wall shortly after the intake.
111
For the first few kms below the intake, the Jui Now canal is constructed along the side of a steeply sloping hillside where there is a danger, during heavy rainstorms, of run-off spilling into and over topping the canal causing damage to the canal and eroding the slope. There is a need for structures in several places to safely take the storm run off over the canal and safely to the river without causing damage.
The competence of the river at the location of the intake may be quite high, possibly up to 0.25 m3 pieces of boulder may be moved about and maybe even of larger diameter.
During a flood the river will be heavily laden with sediment in suspension, jumping and rolling. Part of the turbid current will enter the canal and, while losing speed due to the flatter slope, will immediately start depositing the coarser sediment in the channel. As presently designed it will be necessary to clean the canal manually.
… because all mud-floods and some mud-flows are turbulent, with velocities as high as 8 m/s. Even flows considered as mudflows with concentrations up to 40 percent by volume can be turbulent (O'Brien 1986).
Hyper-concentrated flows--flows with concentrations greater than 40 percent by weight [of solid material](20 percent by volume)(after Beverage and Culbertson, 1964). USGS
A flow of only 2 hours duration with a discharge of 2 m3/sec into the canal (gates halfway closed and entry velocity of 2 m/sec under the gate) and containing only 5 percent of sediment that is not in suspension, will deposit 720 m3 of solid material into the canal.
112 Works
The construction work, which was quite nice, provides for a larger potential discharge capacity of the canal and for a better continuity of flow. The intake is placed at a location where the river is still quite steep and carries an enormous amount of sediment. Even at the time of the visit (in March) when discharge flow still was relatively small, the water was heavily laden with silt and sand.
A study of the drawings revealed that:
- the design of the gates has not been detailed and apparently has been left to the contractor; and - the design required peer review to improve on detail.
Comments
It is feared that due to the nature of the solid intake designed by EIRP and the need for cross- drainage works, the demand for hashar 143 labour for canal cleaning will not be reduced even if the demand for labour for intake repair may have been reduced (see below).
The mouth of the Jui Naw intake faces straight into the current with undershot gates. Due to the lateness of the hour and security fears it was not possible to do a proper inspection. But, a few observations are necessary here.
A potential problem is that this intake is over 10 kms upstream from the village of Korokh and there is no one on the spot to regulate the gates. Unless the mirab has his own transport it is unlikely that he will come up to adjust the gates in anticipation of a flood. If a sudden flood comes and the gates are open there is nothing to stop a surge of water flooding straight into the canal and possibly damaging it. It is hoped that excess water will flow back into the river over a spillway, but it is certain that a great deal of silt will be deposited in the canal itself. This will have to be cleaned out by hand. It would have been better to have designed the mouth of the intake to face parallel with the current rather than facing straight into it.
Traditional intakes diversion weirs made with brushwood, sods and rubble operate automatically and although rather labour intensive they do have some advantages. Big floods and spates wash them away, but this acts like a safety valve preventing excess flood water washing down the canal and destroying it. The hashar labour required to repair such traditional intake/weirs makes a heavy demand on a village’s labour force, especially if the spates come at busy times in the agricultural year, as they often do, taking the farmers away from tending their crops.
So installing a fixed structure has many attractions. The necessity of gates that have to be manually operated is something of a trade off. Unfortunately, too often the system breaks down when the operation of the gates is not managed as it should be.
The aqueduct and wash-crossings already constructed provide for improved continuity of flow in the canal. But, it remains to be seen what will happens when/if storm run-off from the hill slopes above the upper length of the canal clogs up the canal, causing local erosion damaging the canal bank and the canal itself. Broken up wash crossings can also serve as automatic evacuation routs for unwanted excess canal water.
143 hasher- Traditional community labour required to undertake certain types of public work-such as the maintenance and repair of irrigation channels. Also for such things as building a mosque. 113 The increased canal capacity, as allowed for example by the critical capacity of the new aqueduct, still has to be realized by the excavation (widening and/or deepening) of the canal section and/or increase of a stable freeboard.
Recommendations
Sediment management: In the IDRP (or employing the services of any other project) the canal-works have to be retaken with the following purposes:
- At station 500 approximately, a sedimentation tank should be incorporated. At that location the canal is already located well above the river and a bottom sluice gate for a ‘return-to-the-river’ can take care of the coarser sediment which jumps and rolls along the bottom of the canal. The size and shape of such a tank has to be determined. - The diversion weir at the intake should be reviewed in order to serve as the foundation for a collapsible weir. The collapsible part will have to be reconstructed after every serious flood, which will require hashar labour. But, this is the price to be paid for an improved and larger system. If the foundation is provided with some anchoring loops made of 24 mm rebar then sandbags etc can be tied down and repair work becomes easier. - The intake inlet should be provided with a vertical grating made of 24 mm rebar with opening slots 50 mm wide so that stones being rolled during flood may be prevented from entering the canal. The stones that accumulate in front of the grating will block the intake and reduce flow to a minimum. It is easier to remove a small volume of stones deposited against the grating than to clean out the canal which has a high riverside bank over a considerable length. Smaller gravel passing through the grating may fall into the sedimentation tank, where it is not a difficult job to clean it out. The plane of the grating should be placed parallel with the river. - In case there is a IDRP imposed cutoff regarding budget minimum and/or other administrative restrictions to eliminate small projects, then a (creative) solution has to be found. - Peer review of the design has to be an integral part of the project.
114 A page of the Jui Now canal governing codex, formulated around 1550 PE . (If so after Jami’s death)
Juy Now, intake
115 The undershot gates of the intake have been closed, in order to allow hashar maintenance cleaning of the canal further downstream.
116 The concrete bridge on the downstream side of the wash was built by the project, in substitution for the previous metal bridge.
117 ANNEX 3.3 Observations and Comments on Structures Some Issues
From SiteVisits To Samangan, Balkh and Herat – with illustrations
Steel Gates, Concrete, Masonry & Gabions for Canals & River Engineering
1. Steel gates for irrigation canals Functions, design, construction, operation and management
General Comment No modern designs for canal gates have been introduced in Afghanistan until now. In previous times there were a number of workshops managed by the departments of irrigation and local water authorities in Helmand and Jalalabad for instance. For the most part, these are no longer operational. However, metal working skills exist in all the regions of Afghanistan. Local metal workers if provided with training, the right designs and the right quality metal may be employed or contracted to make suitable gates to order. This has been done successfully by various aid programmes such as Gtz and IAM. While skills in metal working exist, skills in working with other materials such as elastomers and fibre reinforced plastics are not so easily found and if such materials are to be used training and the supply of material would need to be organized.
Whenever the installation of steel gates is being considered as part of the design for the rehabilitation/reconstruction of traditional irrigation systems, the likelihood of theft and vandalism must be taken into account.
There is no excuse for poor design work as information on gate design and installation is readily available on the internet free of charge.
Operations Traditional intakes and cross drainage passages, made of stones, sods and brushwood automatically release excess water and in times of heavy spate are likely to collapse and require rebuilding once the water has subsided. This is labour intensive but also acts as a ‘safety valve’ that prevents excess water entering the irrigation channel and destroying it. Under EIRP a significant aspect of the ongoing canal rehabilitation has been focused on replacing traditional collapsible intake structures with hard concrete structures, often with gates with which to control the intake of water.
Hardened intakes with gates may appear to be an improvement over traditional structures and in theory anyway to be labour saving. However, they have a number of disadvantages when installed under local community management. The gates being used are exclusively vertical sliding, under shot gates, which preferably require adjusting prior to events such as spates and floods. The problem is that for the most part this goes against local management culture which tends to wait until an event is already occurring, by which time it is too late and the damage is done. There is also a tendency to neglect maintenance work to keep gates properly protected against corrosion and the lifting mechanism greased and in good working order.
As observed during the mission (and elsewhere) the structural strength of many gates, even when new, are not strong or robust enough to stand up to the rough treatment and even vandalism they receive. Care must be taken of this. 118
It was also noted when visiting EIRP sub-projects in the field that in a number of cases the manufacture and installation of the steel gates had been assigned as part of the ‘community contribution’. Invariably this had been a mistake as the quality of the gates in these cases was below par and the installation work shoddy. Gates must be part of the project’s and the contractor’s responsibility. It is too important to be left to villagers who have negligible engineering skills or experience.
Functions The function of irrigation canal gates can be summarized as follows:
- To control and regulate the amount of water diverted into a canal at its intake or at points of diversion and bifurcation (division structures) down the length of the canal. The gate(s) should be easily adjusted (lifted or dropped) so as to regulate the flow of water between full design flow to complete stoppage; - To distribute water into different branch canals; - To reduce the flow of sediment (especially sand and coarse gravel) into the canal to a minimum; - To check of water levels in different sections of the canal, upstream or downstream from a control-section; and - To allow surplus water in a canal to be spilled out at specially designated points. This surplus water may originate from surface water flowing in to the canal from the surrounding land or hillsides or from the mismanagement of an inlet or distribution gates. In addition to gates, uncontrolled overflow spillways and self-starting siphons can be used for the purpose. The site will dictate which is most appropriate.
Types There are two types of basic gate: undershot or overflow. They may be sliding, radial or hinged (flapgates and lay-flat gates). Special (temporary) gates can be made from wooden stop-logs or drop-boards which may be placed either horizontally or vertically.
There is no need for most canal diversion gates to be completely water tight, as long as more than 95 percent of the flow can be stopped. However, diversion gates for water distribution and off-take gates to tertiairy channels and fields should be designed and constructed to be as tight as possible. If required diversion gates can be temporarily sealed in a provisional way by any means.
Movement Gates are usually adjusted by hand using simple lifting handles, operating spindles or stems with hand-wheels and operating cable winches. They may be electrically driven but this is unlikely for the type of work being done by EIRP/IRDP. In some cases hydraulic jacks or floating devices combined with ballasting can be used. When gates are wide and double cable or spindle arrangements are used, care must be taken that the movement at both ends is synchronized, otherwise the gate will jam. A wide gate installed with a single cable or spindle will jam anyway.
It cannot be assumed that a gate will drop completely to the bottom by its own weight, because of water pressure or other reasons. When designing gate structures, and lifting and dropping mechanisms this should be taken into account as should the weight of the gate and the use of ballast (for example blocks of concrete) and/or mechanisms that can also push the gates down.
Hydraulics Flow passing undershot gates is governed by orifice formulas and by sharp weir formulas in case of overflow gates. It can be advantageous to place two or three concrete orifices in a row, only one provided with a gate, in order to control unattended flow to some extent. 119
Measurement of flow Gates can be combined with flow measuring and regulation. For overflow and undershot gates different devices are available. Overflow gates can be sharp-crested or be provided with a special weir crest so they become long-crested. Constant head double gates can be used for regulation and measurement.
Trash-racks Trash- and debris-racks, in combination with other contraptions, are required to keep coarse sediment and floating dirt out of canals. In the case of rivers were spates are frequent the presence of both will increase. If a trash-rack is not regularly cleared it will soon get blocked. Some some sort of automatic shutter intake might be recommened for an intake. Cleaning should be attended to after every flood in order to allow the clear flow of water into the canal to be reinitiated.
Design There are well formulated design rules and procedures relating to: capacity, structural strength and durability and ease of operation. Gate casings, made of masonry or concrete, require sufficient stability against sliding and turning-over. Foundations must be secure.
Some instructive images from field visit illustrating some issues with canal gates
Improvements in the daily management of gates and the control of water are clearly required.
When the steel deck beam (gear support cross member) is under-designed (as in this case?) or the operator applies too much force trying to open a (stuck ?) gate, the beam is likely to buckle (see right above).
120 When a gate is built without proper design it will not last. Responsibility for the above had been assigned as part of the community contribution with consequent poor results and wasted money.
Picture on the right side: the gate still is missing, In the bulkhead a slot for it is has been prepared .
Hand wheel is broken out of control. This is a pre-EIRP construction but might as well have been rectified as part of the sub-project .
In the event of a sudden flood this canal will fill with stones and sand.
121 2. Concrete and masonry for river engineering and irrigation canals Design, and construction
Concrete Concrete is relatively easy to design, provided there is proper equipment for the analysis of materials and access to a good concrete laboratory. Also, mixing and making concrete need not be difficult, provided the basic materials are of good quality (cement, sand, aggregate)and there is the equipment and know how for testing (Quality Assurance. See Annex 3.4)
However, it is also not difficult to get it wrong. Water is the cheapest ingredient and it is tempting to mix in too much water, which as well as making the concrete less expensive makes the preparation of concrete cheaper and easier to mix and to pour but will make weaker concrete.
Motorize vibrating concrete is necessary to ensure that all air-pockets and honeycombs are removed, also between the rebar. In case of shoddy, sloppy concrete it can even be done by “rodding” with a stick or piece of rebar. Curing concrete is necessary but adds another small cost. Lack of curing is not normally visible at least within usual guarantee periods and is another way that contractors can cheat on costs.
When setting and drying, all the space within the concrete that was taken by excess water is replaced by air. The consequent porosity weakens it and promotes permeability of the concrete. The presence of humid air in the cavities and pores in the concrete will lead to the corrosion of steel rebar. The consequent flakes of corrosion from the rebar swell and will force an inherently weak concrete cover from its location, allowing even more water to circulate.
It is not uncommon for concrete structures to be faced with plaster in order to give it a good appearance. This is often done to conceal faults and deficiencies such as honeycombs. Plaster habitually is cured even less than concrete. There is no need to plaster fair-faced concrete that has been well shuttered. This may require some extra expense but should be done correctly. (see image below)
When wet plaster is applied to concrete surfaces that have not been thoroughly wetted before the application the humidity in the mortar will be drawn into the concrete before it has had enough time to react chemically with the cement. There will be poor chemical binding with the concrete and the plaster will eventually not stick in place. Insufficient curing (required is over one to two weeks) will cause the plaster age prematurely and start flaking.
Two conditions, commonly found in Afghanistan, must be specially watched out for:
i. concreting at sites where saline ground water flows across the structure; and ii. concreting with fine aggregate containing certain volcanic materials.
In both cases special cement may be required, Type V and Type IP respectively.
The above warnings means that contracts need to be carefully worded and that construction must be carefully supervised. Good concrete structures require quality assurance and supervision requires quality control (see Annex 3.4). For QC, standard samples of concrete can be taken at the mixing drum or at the pouring location, cured and crushed after 7 or 28 days. Core diamante drills can be used to cut a cylinder out of the structure so it can be inspected. This appears threatening to a contractor because samples made for testing cubes or cylinders can be tampered with but core cylinders cannot. Schmidt hammers may be used to measure the hardness of concrete. New developments for testing, using one sort of radiation or
122 another, and ultra-sonic methods are now being developed. Proper inspection procedures must be included in all construction contracts.
Image taken from an example observed during field visits and illustrates what should not be done. Note the flaking plaster.
Mortared stone masonry Masonry as practised by architects and contractors designing and building houses differs from masonry for civil engineers and contractors building hydraulic structures. Hydraulic masonry must not contain any voids or hollows. This rule MUST be strictly adhered to! Stones/rock must be bedded on fresh mortar and all voids between stones must be fully filled with mortar. Structurally there is a similarity with mass concrete that contains, larger rocks and ‘plums’ . Stone masonry work often looks very nice from the outside, it may be nicely pointed with walls capped with up to 50 mm thick covering. Too often this hides an interior that is full of holes and gaps. This is not too easy to detect as it requires destructive investigation, that requires making a hole in such a wall. Not only a technical accountant need be so drastic. (N.B. Modern investigation methods are available.)
Stone masonry needs curing even more conscientiously than concrete. The stone may be porous and if not well saturated before being placed, the porosity will suck the water from the mortar, even before setting has started.
Stone masonry wall (not from EIRP). The quality behind the nice pointing is not visible .
,
123 3 Gabions for river engineering and in irrigation canals
These notes are restricted to observations made in the field during visits to EIRP sub-projects in Samangan, Balkh and Herat. It is recommended that project experience ‘self-training’ is introduced. It would be appropriate for project engineers to visit EIRP projects where gabion work has been used to evaluate the results. These visits should include interviews with residents to enquire about the floods that have occurred since the gabions were installed and an estimation of coarse sediment.
It has become popular in Afghanistan for irrigation rehabilitation projects managed by NGOS and others including larger projects such as EIRP to use gabion wire for river engineering and for various structures associated with irrigation canals. It is also popular to organize gabions weaving women in order to create a sense of female community participation. The wire selected for this type of work is often rather thin and weak so that it can indeed be handled by women thus rather defeating the viability of the gabions themselves. This smacks more of ‘political correctness’ than practicality.
Indeed, in Afghanistan it is extremely difficult to find galvanized wire of the required quality with which to weave good quality gabions. Gabion wire of the appropriate strength cannot be woven properly by hand. There are special machines to do a good job.
Quoting from ‘Bridge Scour and Stream Instability Counter-measures: Experience, Selection, and Design Guidance-Third Edition Design Guideline 10 Gabion Mattresses’
“Due to the potential for abrasion by coarse bed load, gabion mattresses are not appropriate for gravel bed streams and should only be considered for use in sand- or fine-bed streams.”
The above quotation should be taken as a recommendation not to use gabions for a long lasting solution.
In much of Afghanistan, there is no shortage of large-sized rocks and stones. This is often available free and close to sub-project sites or within comparatively easy distance and may be picked up with a loader or excavator, placed on a dump-truck and put in place on site with the help of a foreloader. Otherwise, it is usually easy to find a quarry or stone pit within a close distance. 144
Poor quality gabion wire ‘baskets’ stored in an MEW store
144 There are, however, locations, as for instance in the middle lower Helmand and amu Darya valleys where good stone is not readily available, where it must be brought in by truck from some distance away. 124
A long gabion protective wall along the right side of the stream. (near Aybak, Samangan )
Same site, near Aybak, Samangan. A gabion weir across the stream. Behind the same gabion wall as in above image.
125 Same site: Piece of weak gabion, about to break up when a stiff flood comes by .
Piece of gabion already broken-up
Bed erosion control structure made of gabion (topped with 100 mm PCC?). How long will it last? How many years or how many floods. The river is quite steep and its competence considerable. Big stones are carried along .
i
126
See the stretch of river bank built up with stones to support a road (center of lower image). A mid-sized loader is all that would be required to re-arrange big stones from the stream bed along the right bank of the river (left side on the image) to strengthen the road protection. No need for lengthy discussion. This is NO place for a gabion structure.
127 ANNEX 3.4
Ajmir Canal Baghlan- A Case Study
Code Location Contract Increment Total Value area area Serial Name Type after U016 Kz/Baghlan Ajmir Bank Protection Irrigation Wall at chainage 20,361 4,000 30,000 43 Scheme 17+00
The canal would serve 30,000 ha with partial irrigation and after the improvement. If half the area served with irrigation, then at least during the spring wheat growing period there ought to be flowing some 20 m3/sec in the canal if the conveyance, distribution and application of water were super-efficient.
Any problem for water diversion at the intake Yes If yes give the reason Every year diversion problem is created Length of main canal 82km Total previous command area 32000ha Total existing command area 32000ha Irrigated command area 26000ha None irrigated command area 6000ha
Ajmir irrigation scheme main cultivated crops Without project With project
Crops wheat cotton potato rice mung- sesame wheat cotton potato rice mung- sesame bean bean Crops 18000 6000 2000 8000 6000 4000 2000 7500 2500 900 6500 4500 Area 0 0
Ajmir Canal. Image EIRP
128 A “proportional divider” August 2005 Image Johannes
Estimated Canal Discharge Maximum: 18.58 m3/sec Normal: 9.69 m3/sec
Social Data Share Main non Estimated Estimated Land owning Total farm cropping agro total beneficiary Village name households households households employment population households Jaghory 8200 8500 8500 500 54000 8500
Naqsha 7350 7800 7800 200 48000 7800
Baghlan centre 8500 9100 9100 900 60000 9100
Charshanba tapa 1850 1930 1930 70 12000 1930
Jari Khwshk 3100 3150 3150 150 19800 3150
Total 29000 30480 30480 1820 193800 30480
129 Agricultural Data (existing situation)
Winter/Spring Summer Name of main Crops ha / sown Yield / ha ha / sown Yield / ha
Total cultivated area 32000ha
Present irrigated area 26000ha Wheat 18000ha 3.0T/ha Cotton 6000ha 2.2T/ha Potato 2000 24.5T/ha Rice 8000 3.2T/ha Mangbeen and Sesame 10000 1.8T/ha Total cropped area (ha) 26000ha 18000ha Cropping intensity 190%
Note: Cultivated area can include rainfed and fallow land
Ajmir area Google Earth. Horizontal line is 9.01 km long; vertical line is 6.66 km long. The rectangle covers 60 km2, which is 6,000 ha. The white speck 2 km WSW of N36.13 is the sugar factory
130 The grid measures 1 km on the side. The map is from the late 1970s. A similar rectangle of 6,000 ha (10 km * 6 km on the sides for example) can be laid over the map. The smaller canals between the road and the river have their own intakes along Baghlan River.
Layout of the area that was colononized after the construction of the canal or of construction of a strong increase of capacity of an existing traditional canal. That increase would have been some time after the construction of the hydro powerplant II in Pul e Khomri.
131 The entire map below is some 20 km wide and 30 km tall, encompassing 60,000 ha . The area of impact of the Ajmir canal is claimed to be 30,000 ha, including rain-fed and fallow land. Considerable areas between the road and river right side bank area are irrigated by the Jangaroc canal (intake near to the extreme lower left corner of the map below) and other canals, one with the intake further upstream and others with intakes further downstream.
132 Jangaroc intake. Image of 5/4/2004. Note how the river just bypassed the “ improved” intake. What has been done since to control the river? One contractor put a barrage of lightweight stones sometime during or after 2006. Near to the location is a presence of numerous large stones (0.25 – 1.00 m3 a piece) that can easily be picked up by a large loader and dumped in the river to make a permanent flood-proof barrage. Of course, a hydrological and hydraulic study and engineering design are required but it seems quite feasible.
Wash and slope covered with large stones. 3 km along a road to the south of Jangaroc. $10.00/m3 to pick- up, transport and deposit on location across the river.
133 End of Pul e Khomri powercanal, coming from south, hydro-power plant and beginning of the Ajmir canal going north. Going west is a discharge canal back to the river. Google image dated 8/28/2011
134 ANNEX 3.5
Quality Assurance and Quality Control
Definition from Mosaicinc:
• Quality Assurance: A set of activities designed to ensure that the development and/or maintenance process is adequate to ensure a system will meet its objectives (by the contractor). • Quality Control: A set of activities designed to evaluate a developed work product (by the client). • Testing: The process of executing a system with the intent of finding defects. (Note that the "process of executing a system" includes test planning prior to the execution of the test cases.)
The terminology seems to have originated in the software industry.
From the WB MTR 2006: - FAO team establish a quality assurance group to manage construction quality and O&M aspects of component A to address sustainability issues. (Action by 2006 September.)
From the EIRP Terminal Report (draft 2012 March) - The Quality Assurance Group (QAG) was established as agreed at the project MTR, to work in the regional offices reporting directly to the QC officer to help in establishing a systematic scrutiny and control system on the application of construction standards in the field and support the quality performance of PCU during the construction management and supervision.
From the annexes of the MTR
Annex 6 of the MTR provides more detail regarding the item of construction quality.
QA/QC is a concept to be applied to any relationship supplier – client. In the present case: - contractors (including consultants) to their client EIRP/PCU; - EIRP/FAO to both its clients: MEW/PCU and WB; - the relationship PCU/FAO design office – PCU director and FAO team leader’s office. In this case, it may suffice to apply peer reviews of the designs to be delivered.
In short: Each contractor needs to ‘self-assure’ that he provides quality materials and workmanship and the client has to verify that, to control. In the ultimate case, the contractor
135 has to be able to prove his workmanship, if being sued by the client for lack of quality of required deliverables.
Especially the production of M20 and M25 quality concrete, durable under permanently humid conditions, in case concrete can be classified that simply, is a technically complicated issue.
Under EIRP, a start has been made to apply a QA/QC system throughout its regional offices. In the follow on IDRP, where contracts will be over US$100,000 each, this will have to be carried out, more conscientiously as a daily routine on each job. However, paraphrasing Florida Department of Transportation:
“Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) are processes used to ensure project deliverables meet project objectives and are of appropriate quality. Perfection is difficult to achieve and the cost of a perfect product would be prohibitive. However, defined standards must be met on (client) projects. Quality frequently comes into conflict with the schedule. The project manager (PM) is responsible for meeting both quality and schedule objectives. Poor quality work should not be accepted just to meet a schedule. The contractor and client PM use the terms “QA” and “QC” somewhat differently. However, both target quality in project delivery. When the client PM and technical team members take the pro-active approach of reviewing work in progress, the result is usually higher quality submittals. Problems can be identified and solutions worked out before submittals. The team also will have a better understanding of major issues and what to expect in the submittal. The same holds true for the internal review of design work. Comments by reviewers should be categorized as fatal flaws, errors, suggestions or personal preferences. The primary purpose of the reviews should be to resolve engineering issues.”
Laboratory for testing of materials quality
The EIRP project has funded the provision of laboratories for the testing the quality of construction materials. The laboratory rooms in Kabul, Mazar and Herat were visited by the evaluators. Each laboratory contains a regular set of equipment for the basic tests: grain-size screens; cubic concrete molds; presses; containers with soil-tampers; crushing presses; drying oven; etc. One type of hydraulic press with electronic controls may be difficult to repair locally in case of malfunctioning. The type other was more basic: a hand pump to drive a piston with a simple pressure observation dial.
Since the EIRP construction season was over and the IDRP construction phase had not yet started, the laboratory rooms in Herat and Mazar gave the appearance of not being used. Also signs of previous use were hardly visible with only the remnants of a few crushed concretes cubes dumped outside behind the labs.
In Kabul some ongoing activity was visible and there was a large deposit of uncrushed cubes. As such, the presence of uncrushed cubes is a useful sign since they can be used, crushed, at a later stage in presence of arbiters/mediators when there are disagreements between contractor and client and where it may be necessary to do testing in the presence of legal authorities when arbitration cannot solve a case of disputed quality.
Rules and regulations
The relevant rules regarding materials testing, must be applied for each and every IRDP construction contract, were reviewed and suggestions for change (improvement?) have been added.
136 Suggestion for edit changes are made below. Concrete design is a particularly complicated issue and entire reference manuals have been written about it.
The following are extracts taken from the general conditions of contract to which have been added suggestions for modification:
- Page 7: Definitions: ‘Equipment is the contractor’s machinery and vehicles brought temporarily to the site to construct the works’ and materials’ testing instruments and supplies”
- In the case of Project J-156 “Jaizy canal” the contractor budgeted US$500 (Afs 25,000) for testing of materials and workmanship as part of a US$100,000 contract Question: Is this amount sufficient for a daily routine testing programme?
- Page 9: Personnel: ‘It may be convenient to declare the presence of a person undesirable and in the case have him retire instantly:’ Suggestion: Keeping people who have been dismissed on the premises causes trouble.
- Page 10: Safety: It is recommended that an additional sentence be added regarding the obligation for provision of safety clothing to workers.
- Page 13: C. Quality control: Quality control is treated very calually: e.g. ‘Tests are to be carried out only when the manager suspects deficiencies.’ Observations : The carrying out of routine tests is not mentioned in the (technical) specifications. There is no mention of routinely taking samples of concrete for quality verification. The contractor ought to have concrete testing moulds (cubes or cylinders, whatever is mutually agreed, signed for) on site for the preparation of samples. A sample is to be taken for testing for every X m3 of concrete. The sample is to be cured similarly as the concrete which is to be poured in the forms. Labeled samples shall be assembled in the PM’s office. Some for crushing immediately (after 7, 14 or 28 days), others for the purposes of testimony in case disputes develop.
Special conditions of contract: No specifics are added regarding quality control.
Technical specifications:
- Page 34: Workmanship and materials : ‘… and shall comply wherever possible with the current issue of the appropriate standard published by the British Standard Institution, or equivalent standard proposed by the contractor and approved by the Engineer. (Engineer is used here in lieu of project manager.) - This paragraph requires more clarification and more precise definition. Based on this open ended paragraph no work can be disqualified. The BS may not be the most common standards in use in the country and probably there will be no copy of the BS in the country available for public perusal.
- Page 36: Units of measurement: The metric system shall apply. - Observation: Referring to the above it seems logical to use the International Standards (IS) as well and fill in with well known standards of other origin when the SI Standards are not available/applicable.
- Page 39: 90% AASHTO: For the project files: All external technical specifications that are referred to, are to be present in hard copy in the project office for consultation by contractors. If necessary, these may be photocopied or soft-copied for use in their own offices. Note should be made that there may be copyright issues in this respect.
137 - Page 42: Cement: Sulphate resisting cement to be used for foundations . Where can such cement be found in Afghanistan? (Type V cement.) Moreover, it appears that the entire area upstream of Balkh and Samangan provinces is volcanic. This means that sand and aggregates taken from the local rivers may lead to cement/alkali reaction when permanently saturated. This alkali reaction is one of the causes of a particular type of concrete rot. In that case, pozzolanic cement should be used (Type IP cement). Where is such cement to be found or from where can it be imported? - Page 42: Concrete aggregates. Fine aggregate shall pass sieve #4, 4.75 mm mesh. Coarse aggregate shall be retained on the same sieve. Once aggregate sources have been cleared visually, hardness has to be verified. - Page 42: Concrete: In the case of concrete of good quality, resistance to pressure M20 and M25, the paste should be hard and adhere to the aggregate to the extent that, when crushed, the aggregate will crack right through and the paste will not disengage from the aggregate. - Page 44: Concrete composition: 400 kg of cement per m3 (8 bags!) seems to be excessively high to obtain M20 concrete. - Page 44: Consistency of concrete. Recommendation: The contractor shall have available on site a slump cone of approved dimensions to carry out slump tests, in the presence and also in the absence of the client’s supervisor and keep the record of tests completed. - Page 44: Mixing: Recommendation: Concrete is always to be mixed by machine, not only to ensure proper mixing but also to rub off all coatings present on the aggregate. - Page 46: Vibration: FAO may provide needle vibrators. Recommendation: Vibrators shall always be part of the contractor’s on-site equipment and shall always be used. - Page 46: Curing is also required for concrete plastering and is always neglected. Plastering of hydraulic works is meant to hide poor concrete and should not be part of any design. Especially on low-quality porous concrete the mixing water of the plaster is quickly sucked away from the cement mortar and proper setting and hardening cannot take place. Water being the cheapest ingredient of concrete is easily mixed in excess; it causes high slump concrete which easily can be handled but in reality is sub- standard. It will allow air and water to circulate and cause accelerated oxidation of rebar steel. - Page 49: End of Part 3: In this chapter, no mention is made of spacers to guide rebar in its proper location during casting. Only it is to be kept secured in exact position in the forms (page 43). Rebar placed near to the surface and being oxidized due to circulation of oxygen and water in porous concrete expands and will push off its concrete cover. - It is no wonder that so many high rise buildings come tumbling down during earthquakes. Also that concrete removed from demolished construction sites can be broken so easily by hand using a sledge-hammer. One seldom sees whole concrete columns and beams where the rebar has stretched of snapped due to a quake. It is always the concrete which is sub-standard. Proper concrete requires heavy duty machinery to be removed or reduced in size.
A comprehensive list of construction manuals and specifications needs to be assembled in such a practical way that they can be imposed on small contractors and be understood by them, as some are start-ups and have no clue.
138
Some pictures illustrating points made above .
Figure 2: Outside and inside the Kabul construction quality control laboratory
Figure 3: Special request for samples being packed to be taken along for testing in Delft labs. (At Kabul airport they were abandoned again, because of a suspicion by security officials that they were containing veins of gold. “Where are the export documents?” was the question and there were none.
Figure 4: High tech hydraulic press and other equipment
139 Figure 5: Some left over and a crushed cube.
Figure 6: Some equipment as required for hydrological evaluations of streams
140 ANNEX 3.6
Design Issues The Pros & Cons of having an Official Design Manual
During the evaluation a number of people mentioned the fact that EIRP has been operating from the beginning without an official design manual for the project engineers to refer to. In the opinion of some there should be such an official manual for the project.
On enquiry it appears that the project’s design engineers use a variety of sources from which to draw their ideas and have adapted them to suit the different sites and the purpose of the structures. 145 In view of the vastness of the subject and the wide variety of situations that face the project’s engineers and contractors, it is probably no bad thing to be able to draw on as many sources as possible for the purpose. It can be argued that this serves the purpose of the project better than being restricted to the inevitable limitations of one official manual. This is the view of the evaluators. What might be more practical is to draw up a list of various recommended sources of design and related subjects appropriate for rehabilitating of the type of medium-/small-scale traditional community owned irrigation systems that is the focus of the project and make this available to all, instead of leaving each design engineer to seek out their own solutions. Designs and materials are always changing (for instance, new materials such as reinforced plastic or fibre reinforced concrete, different models of steel gate or availability of galvanization services) and it is better to remain flexible rather than being tied to one official manual.
Given time, such a list of relevant handbooks, manuals and programmes can be compiled. Some are likely to be very large files. Perhaps a set of DVD writable disks might be employed for this purpose. Such a list would need to be constantly brought up to date and added to. Someone should be responsible for this. But in the meanwhile individual engineers should be encouraged to seek new sources.
It has also been suggested that the project should be working together with the communities themselves to do what is termed as ‘participatory design’. This is not easy to do with people, who, although they know a lot about working in traditional materials to build traditional structures, know little about the techniques of working with modern materials to modern designs. Under the more stringent demands of IRDP, quality assurance of design and structures is going to be more important than under EIRP and this will need to be taken into account. That is not to say that part of community O&M training should not include training in certain basic skills such as the correct way to mix concrete, fill gabion baskets, or construct stone masonry walls and possibly more sophisticated work for those with the aptitude for it.
It is important to be working continuously and closely with the communities all through each sub-project and community participation is important for certain aspects of the work to give them a the communities a sense of ownership of the work. There are, however, certain investments and activities for which few rural communities have the necessary resources or the technical skills and which should remain the responsibility of the professional engineers and not be left to the communities to undertake themselves, unless closely supervised.
An example of this was observed in the Herat schemes visited by the evaluators in Ghoryan and Korokh where the intake and division structure gates had been left as part of the
145 Among these, have been the design manual prepared under the auspices of the FAO Irrigation Programme based in Peshawar for Afghanistan for the guidance of NGOs involved with irrigation rehabilitation work, manuals drawn from India, from Pakistan and from various web sites. 141 community responsibility to procure, manufacture and install. The result was some very poor gates which were not serving their purpose well and which would have been better included under the project’s share of responsibility.
Something that always has to be borne in mind is that once the rehabilitated canals with their various improved structures are completed they are handed over to the community for future management and the continuing operation and maintenance of the systems must be within the capacity of the community members.
It is as well to remember that the work of EIRP and IRDP is concerned with the rehabilitation and improvement of old traditional irrigation systems. Doing such work on existing dilapidated systems is often much more difficult and requires more improvization than designing and building a new irrigation system from scratch. These traditional systems have a character and idiosyncrasies of their own and are part of the history of the villages they serve. Every piece of land, every tree, even those planted along the canal, has an owner, every twist and turn in the channel has its own logic and life. The engineers working with such systems must be sensitive to these things. When necessary they must be prepared make compromises that are somewhere less than what might be thought of as ideal from a technical point of view.
EIRP has done a lot of extremely useful and practical work and has undoubtedly greatly assisted the improvement of traditional irrigation systems in many locations in Afghanistan. There is, however, still room for improvement and the following issues listed below require attention:
- Determination of water flows and floods and related sediment discharges; - Hydrologic, hydraulic and structural design, especially in view of construction and manufacturing capabilities; - Manufacturing, especially of steel structures in provincial settings; - Galvanization of structural elements; - Operation and maintenance; - Durability of structures and materials; - Design of concrete mixes and fiber reinforced concrete mixes; - Design of fiber reinforced plastic (pipes, experimental gates, measurement flumes); - How to replace automatic functioning as commonly found in traditional structures (are we willing to evaluate advantages and disadvantages of automatic collapse of intakes when the supply has started flooding?); - How to reduce the paternalistic attitude versus owners of irrigation systems - on :
Typical design issues to be solved at relatively short notice: - Gates (use of different types, not exclusively undershot leafgates, determination of lifting device, size of parts and material strength); - Use of gabion (quality of material, comparison with substitutes); - Determination of floods in streams for design of intakes and for design of cross drainage structures; - Intake and management of sediment (different types, in reservoirs, in canals, control in watersheds); - Sizing of canals and required freeboards; - Need for flow measurement and how; and - Use of trash-racks for intakes.
What modern technology can offer to traditional communities of irrigation farmers without creating dependency. This part of the work is not appropriate as part of the community share and responsibility: - Design for engineered structures; 142 - Drilling equipment and explosives for the passage of rock faces that otherwise force canals to lose elevation; - Reinforced concrete structures of all sorts (aqueducts, inverted siphons, flumes, bridges, cantilevered balcony type canals to pass rock faces); - Heavy dump-trucks and loaders to transport heavy boulders for protection walls and riverbank control (for example instead of gabions and/or dry stone masonry); - Transport of heavy material in general; and - Steel structures for gates and siphons.
A final suggestion for consideration
For teaching purposes, in order to train a corps of hydraulic engineers and technicians, it would be best if a ‘hydraulic modeling’ training centre were to be established in-country. Thought should be given to the possibility that there may be between US$5 and US$10 billion worth of hydraulic work to do in Afghanistan over the next 20 years. 146 Even if only 10 percent of contracts are in studies and design work, (maybe US$50 m. per year required to pay for technically qualified work), it would be worthwhile establishing educational and training facilities so that engineers can receive the most appropriate and imaginative training to enable them to arrive at appropriate low-cost solutions. A laboratory where students can learn by actually ‘doing’ as opposed to learning theory by rote in a classroom, would be more effective. The work of EIRP, as observed in the field by the evaluation team in Samangan, Balkh and Herat was sufficient to demonstrate that there are plenty of opportunities for reducing costs, as well as of improving the functionality of structures through improvements in engineering design. This would require closer study than was possible during this visit. The possibility of the WB financing the establishment of such a training centre (or centres) in one or other or more of the Afghan universities is worth considering.
146 Provided the country does not fall back into disorder. 143 ANNEX 4
Lower Kokcha Feasibility Study
The feasibility study was completed by FICHTNER Consulting Engineers of Stuttgart, Germany with supervision provided by FAO and consultants.
Definition: A pre-feasibility study is a study during which different alternative solutions are compared and tested in order to identify what is likely to be feasible. The next stage is to test the feasibility of the proposal against a detailed and disciplined study against well recognized criteria. At this stage it is normal for potentially interested source(s) of funding to have been identified with which to develop and complete the proposed project, provided the feasibility of the proposal is shown to be positive. In the case of construction projects, according to one school of contracting, the completed and approved feasibility study is then opened for bids by construction contractors to make the final designs, construction drawings and the proper constructions. According to another school the final design and construction drawings should be elaborated separately and be included in the bidding package. In some cases, as for instance with NEPA (US) an environmental impact analysis is required as part of the feasibility report and which is to be approved by NEPA. http://www.usbr.gov/recman/drafts/cmp09-02webdraft.pdf
Comments on the 2010 March report of the LKIHP:
The project layout is shown in Drawing No. FS-10-001, FS-10-002 and was chosen after comparison of several alternative layouts and approval of the client.
On page 8-2 it is mentioned that design for Imam Sahib intake could not be completed yet.
The project alternative which has been selected provides irrigation for net 132,000 ha of land and about 100 Gwh/year of energy for the market. This power is valued at US$6,000,000/yr. Net profit of intensively irrigated land may be US$1,000/h/yr or US$132,000,000/yr. The study mentions US$251,300,000 per year. 147 The required investment is US$789,400,000. At 15 percent/yr the capital, operation and maintenance cost would be US$118,400,000/yr.
In order to increase farmers’ net profits to more than US$1,000/ha/yr, it will be necessary for support in terms of extension, advice, training and the provision of inputs and credit to the Lower Kokcha farmers, to be of the highest order. This will require MAIL and associated private agencies to not only be working with far greater effectiveness and efficiency than they are at present, but also that they should concentrate their efforts on this particular locality, which might well mean spending less time and attention for farmers elsewhere.
In order to achieve its agricultural goals the economic viability of the LKIHP will also require that:
- farmers and their working family members be fully literate and educated at vocational farming schools; - public health be functioning in order to comply with export rules for packing quality; - housing and farming facilities and machinery, including processing, be funded and in place; - farming research and validation be full fledged and operating effectively; - on-farm distribution and application of water be funded and in place; - cropping rotations and farming systems be adequate to enhance or at least maintain soil fertility.
It has been assumed that power for pumping of water is provided to the farmers by the project at no cost. However, once the project has been completed the authorities may decide to privatise the power plants who would then be likely to charge the farmers to cover the cost of electricity for pumping irrigation water. This would mean that the farmers who receive pumped water would have to pay cash for it at about 100 Gwh/yr for which they would have to be charged not less than $0.06/kwh. This is the
147 Net and gross: the difference is always between which costs and which benefits are included or excluded. 144 present calculation value. However, this rate is likely to double or triple, which would imply an annual bill of possibly around US$10,000,000. Although this might not seem too much overall it has to be recognized that charges for pumped water would only apply to the farmers in Zone IV (28.500 ha); (Zone V (11.300 ha) and Zone VI (17.700). Much of the land in these three zones is not presently irrigated, particularly Zone IV and is presently mainly used either for rain-fed cropping (mainly wheat) or as winter pasturage for nomad flocks. This would mean the creation of disparities between those farmers receiving irrigation water by gravity, presumably free of charge, and those receiving pumped water who will have to pay. Such differences might well lead to local discontent.
Official ‘authorities’ established to manage such dam / irrigation/power facilities tend to have an authoritarian and paternalistic relationship with the farmers receiving water from the facility. The investment as well as the continuing management costs are likely to be high and in the situation presently prevailing in Afghanistan it is likely to be difficult to justify such costs from agriculture and crop returns, even disregarding the costs of pumping irrigation water and the operation and maintenance of the facility.
The feasibility has given little attention to the need for drainage from large main canals to the field level. This is despite the high cultivation intensity and the generally flat terrain especially towards the Amu River.
Before any further development in the field of studies and designs will be undertaken, it seems necessary to review the agricultural production part. Including all additional and associated activities and an estimate has to be made for the required investments to produce at high levels and bring produce successfully to the market. There are a number of risks involved, like farmer training, marketing, pest and disease control, soil salinization, lack of drainage, etc.
If any impact is to be derived from the study then it is the conclusion that over 100,000 ha already are irrigated within the LK command area. With the study in hand improvement of agricultural production conditions can be pursued, possibly at a far better return than implying the large project with a dam which essential is no more than a power dam and functions as well as a diversion weir.
The quote below indicates about the potential of improvement.
For the purpose of the study the area has been distributed in zones. • Zone I: 56.600 ha, under irrigation (Amu River left side intake and canal: Imam Saheb canal) • Zone II: 33.000 ha, partly under irrigation (Lower Kokcha left side intake and canal: Dashte Archi Canal) • Zone III: 19.000 ha, mainly under irrigation (Lower Kokcha right side intake and canal) • Zone IV: 28.500 ha, mainly non irrigated • Zone V: 11.300 ha, non irrigated • Zone VI: 17.700 ha, non irrigated TOTAL: 166.100 ha, of which already irrigated 108,600.
On page 6-1 of chapter 00 of the study report more detail regarding the irrigation zones has been provided.
145
Within the scope of the present study, data on current agricultural practice were collected by local monitors armed with questionnaires who interviewed local farmers in September and October 2007. The main results regarding cropping areas and yields are shown in Tables 6-1 and 6-2, below. A detailed description of existing crop production is given in Annex 4 (Crop Production Report).
146
See tables 6-1 and 6-2 below.
147 ANNEX 5.1
General Technical Note on Dams With relevance to the Small Dam Project
Some of the main characteristics of the small dam project have been considered and some comments are listed below:
- The consultant (WACOS) has already started its social research work with the communities living within the bounds of possible future reservoirs and downstream of possible dams, before any conclusive technical information has been assembled or corresponding recommendations have been made. This is likely to create expectations that it will probably not be possible to fulfill. In the evaluators’ view the social research should only be started after the pre-feasibility is concluded and a short list of serious possibilities drawn up. - The consultant is concentrating attention on potential sedimentation issues. This is to be aplauded and they should be encouraged to continue doing so. - The USGS geology map indicates that there is a possibility of karstic development in the ground beneath the reservoirs. This needs to be given serious attention. Further research is needed to come to a conclusive statement for the foundation conditions present at each of the proposed dam sites to ensure that the terrain is suitable and the watersheds acceptable.
The following recommendations are presented:
It should part of general design rules that: - spillways be designed for safe passage of a probable maximum flood (PMF); - in case of concrete or masonry dams, spillways should only be guided over the top of the dam; - non-flexible concrete and masonry dams shall only be built on solid live rock foundations and abutments; - in the case of flexible compacted earth or rock-fill dams, the spillway shall be built on natural ground and at a safe distance away from the dam; - the volume of the reservoir shall contain at least one year of average watershed run off in order to have space for coarse sediment; - the different outlets of the dam shall be designed and made such that all efforts shall be facilitated to pass sediment through the reservoir; - all management measures shall be incorporated to facilitate density flowing, flushing, sluicing and purging of as much sediment as physically possible.
An indicative dam maximum height of 20 m has been given by the WB in order to frame the studies. This indicated height should, however, have no influence on pre-selection or conceptual design, which must be dictated by the characteristics and requirements of the site and its watershed.
N.B. USBR defines a small dam as having a height of less than 50 ft (15.24 m) and ICOLD defines large dams as those with heights of more than 15 m. The 20 m limit suggested by the WB therefore falls into the category of ‘large’ dams. They are thus required to conform to all the technical requirements for planning, design, construction and operation and maintenance demanded for this category. This classification is clearly spelled out in WB’s OP 4.37.
EIRP documents. ToR for the prefeasibility and feasibility studies (2010, October) states:
“Dam studies will be carried out with a view of sizing the optimal dam regards reservoir, watershed and downstream land conditions. It must be stated that limiting a dam height, because of certain non- technical conditions, will cause a dam-site to be occupied and cause disadvantages to a future development of a dam which has more relevance to the size of the watershed.“
However, it is mentioned in the TOR for the prefeasibility and feasibility studies that the optimization process shall be irrespective of dam height for each location.
148 A fundamental issue of major concern is the duration of useful life for each of the reservoirs to be created, taking account of the expected high sedimentation rates.
In the ToR sediment is only mentioned once: (page 4)
The expected duration of Phase 2 is six months and the tasks to be undertaken by the Consultant are as follows: i ii Sediment analyses and design of dead storages iii …
Sedimentation is not mentioned in the final preliminary environmental and social assessment report (2011 January) Data for watershed, reservoir, dam and agricultural areas have been presented in this report and been used by the WB for preparation of its proposal for the IRDP. It appears that watersheds, for the purpose of determination of area of social interest (inundation of agricultural land upstream of a dam and beneficiaries downstream of the same), have been cut off at a 10 km radius from the proposed dam site. This should be rectified. The size of watershed areas referred to should be carefully cross checked.
Figure 7 “Circular” watersheds
In the case illustrated a 10 km radius has been drawn round the potential Shamar dam site. The watershed areas have been cut off because of a pre-determined 10 km radius around each dam-site, to be used for social analysis. Location 36.2349 and 68.2219. The “round watershed” has a diameter of 10 km. Moreover, (it should be noted) in this particular case the watershed has been drawn at the wrong side, downstream of the dam-site.
Sedimentation is been mentioned in several places in the Bid as prepared by the consultants (WAPCOS) (2011 May) for the pre-feasibility (for 22 pre-selected locations) and feasibility studies (for 10 most suitable locations out of the 22).
149
Page 4.4: Bed load and silt which is much higher can often be removed hydraulically, thus requiring smaller silt storage behind the dam. … water availability, bed load and silt, will be carefully studied to evolve suitable layout and technical parameters of each scheme like the available storage potential, height and type of structure, ….
Page 4.8: Sediment particulars like suspended load, bed load and natural soil conditions including catchment characteristics shall be collected.
Page 4.13: Apart from water availability and design flood studies, due to high percentage of bed load and silt in hilly regions, the extent of its retention in the reservoir will be considered in fixing the sill level of intake and fixing the normal of full reservoir level and storage capacity,
Page 4.19: Sedimentation studies would be conducted to assess quantity of silt, its abrasiveness, shape and size of particles to decide requirements of silt removal, civil design and electro-mechanical features. The hydraulic design of the dam, spillway and non overflow sections, energy dissipation arrangements, etc shall be done as per international practices. Foundation levels, crest levels, flow levels, cut-off trench levels and stability analysis shall also be done as per design practices being followed internationally.
Page 4.27 Gender issues: For sustainability of the project, the extent of women participation in the project shall be examined.
The WAPCOS Inception report of 2012 January mentions the following about sedimentation: Page 3-12: If river sediment inflow measurements are lacking experience of actual silting in reservoirs in mountainous streams elsewhere will be used to assess the total sediment load and trapping efficiencies. The commonly used Empirical Area Reduction Method will be used to predict the total silt deposition at the intake site (New Zero Elevation) and reservoir area-capacity curves at the end of chosen design life.
In the feasibility study there will be a Chapter 4.6: reservoir sedimentation. There is no mention of the expected useful lifetime of the irrigation system based on each of the 10 pre- selected dams. Other items were already mentioned in the Bid proposal.
Geology. Main formations in the watershed area south of Samangan:
Figure 8: General geology (USGS): KP1ld Limestone, Dolomite (Paleocene, late Cretaceous) (Presence of karstic formations?) N1csl Clay and siltstone (early Miocene) Q1a conglomerate, sandstone (early Pleistocene)
150 Figure 8: General geology (USGS)
151
Watershed review. In one case reviewed, Dara e Negaar , N 35.7522 and E 67.8833, the main feeding river towards the reservoir is about 35km km long and has a watershed of about 700 km2. The average annual discharge flow might be in the order of 70 M m3 with assumed only 100 mm net discharge from the watershed.
The watershed of the area consists of a very deep loess type soils, underlain by soft, unstable and fractured rocks. Erosion is of a deep gully type and very strong. The watershed might loose around or even more than 2 mm depth of soil per year. Poor soil management, the uncontrolled cultivation of large areas of hill slopes for rain-fed crops, which were previously seasonal pasture stabilized by deep rooted perennial plant cover has increased the rate of erosion.. The process of climate change is tending to in crease rain-fall in place of winter snow with rainstorms tending to become more intense, leading to an increase in the rate of erosion.
A large part of the soil cover (possibly up tp 2 mm depth?) is being eroded annually. Even when proper remedial measures for sediment flushing are taken, silt will accumulate in the reservoirs at the possiblye rate of as much as 1,400,000 m3/year. In the case of an annual discharge of 70 M m3 of water carries an average sediment content of 2%, the result is 1,400,000 m3/year as well.
A single (exceptional) multiday storm of 20 M m3 (28 mm average depth of water over the entire watershed) with run-off with a sediment content of 5% would produce in the order of 1,000,000 m3 of sediment.
Figure 9: Creager curve
Creager curves
100.00
10.00
C=60 C=30 1.00 C=10 C=3
0.10 Unit Unit discharge m3/km2/sec
0.01 1 3 10 30 100 300 1,000 3,000 10,000 30,000 100,000 Watershed km2
The PMF is roughly estimated to be between 1,500 and 3,000 m3/sec, based on the size of watershed and a Creager number of 30 to 60. See Figure 9: Creager curve. PMF indicates the peak of the flood. The 24 hour volume of such a flood may be in the order of 50 Mm3. De concentration of sediment of such a flood will be far higher than in the case of the multi day storm mentioned above.
Even though the PMF may never occur (it is of asymptotic value) it must be used for the design of a dam’s spillway as a safety measure. Ninety percent of dam failures are caused by of lack of capacity of the spillway, or because of malfunctioning in case of a gated spillway and absence of an emergency non-gated spillway. In many cases, the failure of a dam leads to loss of human life and serious damage to dwellings and crop land. 148
For a dam to have sustainability and an economically justifiable lifetime, the volume of its reservoir should at least hold an annual average flow.
148 N.B. A recent example of this was the failure of the Band-e Sultan dam in the Khwaja Umari valley in Ghazni, which had been constructed by German engineers in 1901, but breached in March 2005 as the result of an exceptionally heavy rain-storm in the surrounding mountains and consequent exceptionally violent flood. EIRP was called in to undertake the emergency reconstruction of which only the first phase was completed. (see section 4.1- reference Large Projects.)
152 The case of large dams with multibillion m3 storage reservoirs, as for example Kajaki, is slightly different because of the relatively lesser quantity of coarser sediment. The fines to some extent get easier flushed out, downstream, because of density flows.
The typical loess soils that dominate much of the hill slopes in the North and North West of the country have their own characteristics regarding easy erodability and distribution between fine and coarse sediments.
About the same quantities of coarse sediment will be deposited in a reservoir at a certain location, irrespective of it being a large reservoir with a large dam or a small reservoir with a small dam. In the (hypothetical) case of the proposed Dara a Negaar dam a 20 m high dam would contain a 908,000 m3 reservoir. This would be filled with sediment in one, at most two years and, follow the fate of the recently built Hezarak dam in the Safid Kooh mountains. See Figure 12 below.
Purpose of presenting the previous information. The purpose of the providing the previous information is to underline the need for a thorough analysis of sedimentation in each of the reservoirs. For management of the reservoirs and in the interest of securing longevity and sustainability advantage should be taken of any conceivable engineering possibility for the evacuation, purging or flushing of sediment by means of gravity flows that wash the sediment away from the reservoir through a suitable bottom level sluice.
In addition, it might be possible to empty a reservoir annually and use the first floods to scour the reservoir. If possibly, special drainage pipe conduits might be constructed to catch the sediment in the more upstream parts of the reservoir and flush it out. The design of the bottom sluice should be such that in case of neglectful management, it should not get stuck when sediment is deposited against it (see Figure 12 below). These management measures have to be seen in the light of the controlling flood water, with regards to power generation and most significantly for irrigation.
Decommissioning of dams is a sad and costly process that has to be postponed as long as possible and actually should be necessary. From an economic point of view, a useful lifetime of 30 or 50 years should be established,. Dams having a shorter potential life span are probably not worth constructing. Consideration needs to given to rural populations whose agricultural livelihoods become dependant on reservoir water, but who are then required to move when the dam ceases to function and has to be decommissioned.
The following sequence of activities is required for a feasibility study:
- Terms of reference for pre-qualification of consultants - Terms of reference for pre-feasibility - Bid proposals - Inception Report - Pre-feasibility Report for 22 locations - Terms of reference for feasibility study - Feasibility study for 10 locations - Pre-selection of one or two dams for further design - Detailed design of pre-selected (multi-purpose) dams - Preparation of O&M procedures, operation algorithms and manuals - Construction of 1 or 2 dams including operation and management equipment and the respective irrigation systems. - Handover to the interested party. (Is that the local representation of MEW or of the Water User Association or similar body?)
The document used for the purpose of the Small Dams Feasibility Study misses several important points : - It does not include an important preliminary phase involving an initial ‘reconnaisance study’. This has lead to premature engagement with local communities before there is any concrete idea of whether a dam is actually technically possible, thus running the danger of unnecessarily raising expectations. - Also missing is the underlying political purpose for constructing dams and reservoirs.
153 - No explanation is given why the term “small dams” has been introduced when in fact the dam height suggested actually falls into the category of ‘large dams’. - Also missing are pre-established criteria for successfully identifying and selecting the locations proposed for design and construction.
Hydro power. In the TOR for the (pre-)feasibility studies mention is made of the need to study the potential for power generation. Power can be generated at the foot of the dam (respecting the risk of inundation of the powerhouse during flood) and taking into account that the dam is not always full. Alternatively, a powerhouse can be placed at the foot of a penstock located at the end of a length of canal which has a slope flatter than that of the discharge river.
Steady, day and night, release of water from a dam for irrigation during a period of for example 6 irrigation months, 15,000,000 seconds, for a dam with net available contents of 15,000,000 m3 will be 1 m3/sec.
Power generated from a source with only 10 m head of water will be some 70 kwatt net for each 1 m3/sec of flow. In the example above the plant at the foot of the 20 m high dam (with 10 m design head available for power) will produce 70 kw only. The gross value of 70 kw during a day is about US$100 to US$200, according to the kwh unit value and during the 6 months period of discharge (for irrigation) it will be US$18,000 to US$36,000.
Irrigation water during that same period may have a value of US$400,000 to US$800,000 (US$0.025 to 0.05 per m3).
The analysis above requires far more detail and precision in assumptions.
Special interest. Items of special interest to be reported on in the feasibility study for each of the 10 locations:
- Foundation regarding underground and abutments - Probable maximum flood and determination of design flood - Determination of discharge curve of the spillway system - Sedimentation of the reservoir - Measures to reduce inflow of sediment (watershed management) - Measures to increase outflow of sediment (purging) - Procedures for reservoir and dam management (operation and maintenance and dam safety procedures) - Decommissioning of the dam - Environmental and social impact of the proposed construction - Economic and financial analyses
Dam safety and WB. The WB describes its requirements for design, construction, O&M of dams in OP 4.37, corresponding BP and annex.
Dam decommissioning and WB. In OP 4.37 no mention is made of decommissioning. In the document the WB refers to the owner, irrespective of the funder, where full responsibility for the safety of the dam is to be placed. It is proper to think through, already in the pre-project social, economic and financial evaluations, the entire process of funding, owning and decommissioning and include social costs related to decommissioning.
Sedimentation rates. Losses of soil from the watershed vary in general from: 140 to 1,400 t/km2/yr, which are equivalent to 100 to 1,000 m3/km2/yr which is equivalent to 1 to 10 mm/yr mm of soil over the watershed area. Trap efficiency of the reservoir is depending on sediment size and reservoir management: 50 to 100%.
The difficulty in the present case is determination of local conditions. All efforts are to be made to have a sampling station at the outlet of at least one of the watersheds being studied.
154 Location of 22 possible dam-sites as given in the 22 dam-site proposal : Dam coordinates Serial Name North East Serial Name North East 1 Shamar 36.2349 68.2219 12 Darz Aab Dam 36.0038 65.3646 2 Quran dara 36.4225 68.1596 13 Fayz Abad Dam 36.4897 66.345 3 Bato Baba 36.2286 68.0769 14 Shah Abdullah 36.0072 67.5854 4 Chashma Dara Reservoir 36.4943 67.6739 15 Anbar 35.7306 68.0348 5 Shiraba Dam 36.1425 66.1514 16 Jahil Kala 35.6147 67.1318 6 Masjet Sabz 35.8469 66.325 17 Tangi Shadyan 36.5684 67.1419 7 Gudara Dam 35.8288 66.3826 18 Pasha Dara 35.8858 64.8083 8 Pascha Dam 36.3437 67.4389 19 Dahane Dara 35.8261 64.865 9 Shakrak 35.3272 64.5792 20 Kol e Rehmat 35.5500 68.0067 10 Yati Quluq 35.6231 64.3439 21 Dara e Negaar 35.7522 67.8833 11 Toi Mast Dam 35.589 64.2548 22 Ab e Keli 35.8728 67.9467
155 Table taken from the WB: Page 166/176 110108 Final draft ESMF Main Report
156 Page 167/176 110108 Final draft ESMF Main Report
157 Figure 10: Page 13/176 110108 Final draft ESMF Main Report
158 Figure 11: From PCI, 2005 Balkh Groundwater
159 Figure 12 Hezarak 2009. After completion only 2 discharge seasons were required to almost fill the reservoir with sediment. Still, much of the fine sediment has escaped over the dam, this implies a low trapping efficiency. P7280032.jpg
P7280044.jpg
160 Pictures below: Engr Saleem
Hezarak: Quality of steel work. The service outlet and the bottom sluice. Because of weak construction and pressure the sluice gate started bulging because of sediment and water load and has been completely jammed. Corrosion will weaken it more and eventually it will burst out, downstream..
Figure 13: Surkh Ab Dam in Logar. Someone started trucking sediment from Surkh Ab Dam in Logar and gave up soon; budget was finished. An endless task.
161
Surkh Ab in Logar. Google image, with water hiding the sediment below the surface.
162 Figure 8: Band-e Sultan Dam in Ghazni
Before (2004) and after breach (2005) with EIRP Contractors starting Phase 1 of Reconstruction. (Images by Anthony Fitzherbert (2004 & 2003)
Band-e Sultan Dam in 2003,constructed 1901 Crest of the 11 th century dam of S. Mahmood
. After the breach of March 2005 (October 2005)
EIRP Contractors starting Phase1 of Reconstruction-2005
163
ANNEX 5.2
Small Dams in the Northern Basin Dam site visits Samangan Province, 8 March 2012
PMF Probable Maximum Flood PMP Probable Maximum Precipitation (a concept used for safe dam design, causing PMF) masl meters above sea level
Introduction. In the Hindukush floods are frequently caused by rain falling on already melting snow. In this case the estimates for floods require special analysis to determine the PMP for each location.
Two potential dam-sites in Samangan Province were briefly visited by the evaluators: Bato Baba and Shamar. A third site was suggested, Chashma Darrah, but time and security regulations did not permit a site visit. All three are referred to here as they illustrate a number of important points that the evaluators would like to emphasise.
In the general ‘Note about Dams’ in Annex 6, some comments regarding the initial selection of dam- sites have been provided.
The potential of Bato Baba reservoir, presented below, depends in the first place on the correct determination of the watershed area; secondly on the stage volume curve.
To do the first exercise: using the 1/100,000 USA topographical Map takes under an hour to develop a first approximation, and also of the dam-site and reservoir configuration. A further day in the field with a staff-less total station is all that is required to obtain a more accurate estimation of the dam and reservoir. To obtain an understanding of the surface geology also takes about a day of field inspection by an experienced engineering geologist who has knowledge and experience of the structural side of foundations and of geo-hydrology.
Based on the technical results obtained, and only if these are positive, should some initial and absolutely non-committal contact be made with the community (ies) who may be effected by the construction of a dam. It is unnecessary and ill advised to do so until these initial estimations and calculations have been made and conclusions drawn from them.
Bato Baba ( N 36.2286 and E 68.0769). Aybak, Central District : Comments and Observations from Site Visit. The width of the canyon in which the proposed dam site is situated is about 250 m. The foundation rock on the sides of the canyon does not seem very favourable, but the geology is typical of the entire region being almost entirely made up of soft sedimentary rock. The depth of the alluvium fill on the bottom on the floor of the canyon is not known. The watershed may cover 200 km2 and produce 30 M m3 during an average year (150 mm run off per year). The bottom slope of the reservoir may be 0.1 to 0.5 %. The demand for irrigation water is considerable because of nearby Samangan city and its surrounding crop land.
An initial estimate for a stage volume table has been prepared and a stage volume curve can be derived from it. 30 M m3 would require a storage dam of 33 m net height at the spillway elevation. A reservoir with about 7 km length would cross the main road and as a result the main road would have to be relocated. A second estimate, for a less favourable configuration of the reservoir, indicates the need of a dam of 50 m high. As mentioned above, a day’s field work with a total station (one without need of a reflector staff) would indicate a dam and reservoir configuration better adjusted to reality.
Watershed length would be 25 km, from 2,600 masl on the Southern side to 1,100 masl at the dam-site with a resulting slope of 6%. On the Northern side the watershed is slightly more gentle. A Creager value of C=30 would result in a PMF of 1,000 m3/sec and a more conservative and disadvantageous hydrologic condition with Creager of C=60 would result in 2,000 m3/sec.
164 In case of a stone gravity dam (masonry or concrete) a spillway should be guided over the top of the dam. With a width of 150 m, the required head for PMF routing (@ Creager C=60) over the spillway would be 3.5 m. The volume, as temporarily present in the reservoir, contained in the 3.5 m depth of water over the top of the dam during the peak of the flood, would be slightly over 8.3 M m3 and shall be taken along in case of a calculation for flood routing based on a PMP and corresponding run-off from the watershed.
In case of a compacted earth or rock-fill dam, the spillway should be excavated in the side of the canyon possibly producing low quality construction stone for a rock-fill dam. A shorter spillway with higher design head might be another option in that case. However, the flood caused by the PMF in that case would have to be brought down from the elevation of the spillway’s crown to the valley bottom which would require a major design and construction job.
If the foundation material is not considered to be sound enough for a solid stone or gravity dam, then it appears that he project should be shelved, because of the high cost of the spillway.
Figure 14: Bato Baba damsite location, estimate of dam height and reservoir Reservoir volume D Depth m Bato Baba BW Bottom Width m D BW LS SS TW DF LR VR LS Longitudinal Slope 10 250 0.005 0.3 317 2,833 2,000 2,266,667 SS Side Slopes 20 250 0.005 0.3 383 6,333 4,000 10,133,333 TW Topwidth Crown length m 30 250 0.005 0.3 450 10,500 6,000 25,200,000 33 250 0.005 0.3 470 11,880 6,600 31,363,200 DF Dam face m2 36.5 250 0.005 0.3 493 13,566 7,300 39,612,233 LR Length Reservoir m 40 250 0.005 0.3 517 15,333 8,000 49,066,667 VR Volume Reservoir m3 50 250 0.005 0.3 583 20,833 10,000 83,333,333 60 250 0.005 0.3 650 27,000 12,000 129,600,000 70 250 0.005 0.3 717 33,833 14,000 189,466,667 80 250 0.005 0.3 783 41,333 16,000 264,533,333 90 250 0.005 0.3 850 49,500 18,000 356,400,000 100 250 0.005 0.3 917 58,333 20,000 466,666,667
Figure 2: Bato Baba damsite location, less favourable estimate of dam height and reservoir Reservoir volume Bato Baba D BW LS SS TW DF LR VR 10 200 0.01 0.5 240 2,200 1,000 880,000 20 200 0.01 0.5 280 4,800 2,000 3,840,000 30 200 0.01 0.5 320 7,800 3,000 9,360,000 40 200 0.01 0.5 360 11,200 4,000 17,920,000 50 200 0.01 0.5 400 15,000 5,000 30,000,000 60 200 0.01 0.5 440 19,200 6,000 46,080,000 70 200 0.01 0.5 480 23,800 7,000 66,640,000 80 200 0.01 0.5 520 28,800 8,000 92,160,000 90 200 0.01 0.5 560 34,200 9,000 123,120,000 100 200 0.01 0.5 600 40,000 10,000 160,000,000
Investment and benefit. A dam roughly 40 m high at spillway elevation and including foundation depth, made of masonry and/or mass concrete, constructed across the width of the location in Figure 1 above and figure 3 below (the more optimistic case) would make available a reservoir of 30 M m3. For practical purposes and considering sedimentation only 20 M m3 will be assumed available on average and on the longer run. With the water applied @ 10,000 m3/ha/yr (during a 6 months summer season) an area of 1,500 ha could be irrigated quite effectively. For a second crop (autumn sown wheat etc), sufficient water could be made available from the left over in the reservoir. Alternatively an estimated 15,000 ha of existing irrigation (round Aybak town) could be supplemented and enhanced with 1,000 m3/ha/yr of additional irrigation water. It is assumed such land is presently available downstream of the planned dam and that it requires some rehabilitation to use such water adequately.
Including the spillway and energy impact basin the construction of the dam may require in the order of 230,000 m3 masonry and of 10,000 m3 quality reinforced concrete. For a grout foundation some 10,000 m3 cement mortar mix might be needed. Depending on the location of good construction 165 material (stone, sand, fine and coarse aggregate)and its distance from the site the unit price may be $80/m3 for masonry and mass concrete; US$160/m3 for grouting; $160/m3 for reinforced concrete. All 3 positions including placement. Structural steel to the amount of 100 ton would be needed, @ of US$2,000/ton. Overhead for definitive studies, including flood modeling, final and construction design, including scale modeling for maximum sediment purging; supervision; instrumentation; O&M facilities; etc., would be 50 percent. Construction costs would be US$21,800,000 + 50% = US$32,700,000. To be added: rerouting of like 10 km of highway, including purchase of right of way: US$5,000,000; construction of a 1,500 ha irrigation system @US$1,000/ha or rehab of 15,000 ha @US$100/ha resulting in US$1,500,000. The total required investment would be then US$39,000,000. The resulting annual costs (capital, O&M) would be around US$6,000,000/yr for an irrigated area of 1,500 ha; which is equivalent to US$4,000/ha/yr.
Figure 3: Bato Baba dam-site location, looking upstream
Figure 4: The proposed reservoir location
166
Figure 5: Shamar proposed damsite. Looking upstream and downstream.
167 Figure 6: Proposed Shamar damsite and its watershed.
168 Chasma Dara ( N 36.4943 and E 67.6739). A third potential dam-site, Chasma Dara was not visited, but some information about it is presented below. A rough estimate of the watershed is around 1,000 km2 and the annual discharge passing the potential dam-site is estimated to be around 150 M m3. The slope of the stream at the dam-site is approximately 0.5 percent and the elevation is at about 630 masl. The watershed is about 40 km long and has a highest elevation of 2,000 masl, resulting in a slope of 3.4 percent. The reservoir for this dam-site has a more favourable shape as the one pre-selected for Bato Baba, as it is bifurcated. Based on a table with estimated dam height and reservoir volume data, a very first estimate for a dam height would be 55 m in order to be able to control the annual flow from such a comparatively large catchment and provide a capacity large enough to provide for a decent number of years of useful life.
Investment and benefit. The ‘calculations’ regarding cost and benefits would be similar to those used for Bato Baba. Calculating a dam height ratio of 55/40 could be proportional to a power between two and three (it is about dam height; width at the foot, crown length and a larger PMF). If the foundation conditions are similar, then the required investment would be about US$100 M for 5 times as much water. However, the O&M will also be five times as great as would be problems related to management of sediment.
If the cost of irrigation water from Bato Baba would cost US$4,000/ha/yr then in the case of Chasma Dara it would be in the order of US$2,000/ha/yr.
Even in this more positive case the funds required for the construction of this dam, if used for the rehabilitation of existing traditional irrigation channels, would have a far higher return and be a far more cost- effective way of spending development money.
Conclusion and Recommendation. The evaluators would like to suggest that as there is only US$30 M of IRDP funding available for investment in ‘small’ dams, the entire exercise is unlikely to contribute anything very significant to the increase of irrigated agriculture. Whereas, should this money be spent on the rehabilitation of existing traditional systems the beneficial and sustainable impact on crop production is likely to be far greater.
169 Figure 7: Chasma Dara potential dam-site The location is just South of Pir Nakhchir.
170 Figure 8: 1:250,000 map around Khulm to Aybak showing general topography.
171 ANNEX 6
Monitoring and Evaluation
Summary of key project outcomes according to EIRP Monitoring and Evaluation Report 2010-2011 Annual Seasonal Assessment –March 2011
KEY PROJECT OUTCOMES Increase in wheat yield: In 2010 M&E Annual Survey, average wheat yield has increased by 50.5 percent compared to project baseline. This percentage increase has over achieved by 68.3 percent compared to the 30 percent projected productivity target in EIRP appraisal. Wheat, being by far the most important crop in Afghanistan, accounting for 83 percent of cereal consumption (Afghanistan 2009-2010 Statistical Year Book), the increase in its productivity, suggests that EIRP intervention has promising potential contribution to improved food security and poverty alleviation in Afghanistan.
Chart 1: Increase in Wheat yield compared to Baseline in %
As shown in Chart 2, the 47.2 percent increase in wheat yield achieved by EIRP rehabilitated sampled sub-projects confirms reported continuing pattern of increase in past impact assessment reports.
Chart 2 - Wheat Yield in Kg/Ha achieved after rehabilitation
According to the current survey results, wheat yield for sampled EIRP rehabilitated sub-projects (2845 Kg/ha) is 39.2 percent higher than for surveyed control group irrigation schemes.
172 Chart 3: Wheat Comparative Yield 2010 Survey: Sampled Sub-projects against Control Group
Increase of yield for major crops: With regard to other major crops, maize, cotton, onion and potato, yield has increased by 44.4 percent 117.9 percent, 197.7 percent and 65.4 percent respectively compared to baseline.
Chart 4: Increase of Yield for Major Crops
INCREMENTAL IRRIGATED AREA
Total area benefited from EIRP rehabilitation: Total area benefited from EIRP rehabilitation compared to target is higher by 18.14 percent, representing a significant achievement with apparent contribution to overall increase in crop production.
Chart 5: Total Irrigated Area benefited from EIRP
173 Incremental irrigated area: Overall, according to 2010 M&E impact assessment survey, EIRP surveyed sub-projects have achieved 23.18 percent incremental irrigated area after rehabilitation. This achievement represents 92.7 percent of the baseline target of 25 percent. Compared to that of 2009 finding (22 percent), the current incremental irrigated area is higher by 12 percent. Increase in irrigated area has occurred, in varying degrees, across the whole stream ranging up to an average of 12 percent, 19 percent and 28 percent around the head, mid and tail end of the schemes respectively.
Chart 6: Incremental Irrigated Area
INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES
LAND UTILIZATION After rehabilitation, land utilization rose from 42.9 percent to 56.4 percent, representing 31.26 percent increase of which 23.18 percent can be directly attributed to incremental irrigated area as a result of EIRP intervention. While EIRP rehabilitated sub-projects cultivate 56.35 percent of cultivable land, control group schemes cultivate only 39.56 percent, comparable to the level of utilization of sub-projects before EIRP assistance (42.93 percent).
Cropping intensity: Cropping intensity for all crops, for surveyed sub-projects, has increased from 92 percent to 108.8 percent (an increase of 18.3 percent) as a direct result of EIRP intervention. Jalalabad ranked highest with increase from 95 percent to 107 percent and Herat and Mazar ranked lowest, with increase from 81 to 85 percent and 83 percent to 87 percent respectively, the modest increase in the latter two regions is attributed to lesser availability of water.
Irrigated land value: Irrigated land value under surveyed sub-projects has increased (from US$23,076 to US$32,114 per hectare) by an average of 10.4 percent after rehabilitation, ranging from 6.9 to 15.5 percent across EIRP regions . Value of irrigated land in control schemes is, on the other hand, on average 12.7 percent less compared to that of EIRP assisted sub-projects.
Increase of access to irrigation water: Access to irrigation water, measured in average number of days over one year per household weighted to irrigated area, has on the average improved by 24.6 percent after rehabilitation of irrigation structures. The highest improvement in access to water, was registered in Herat (35 percent) followed by Mazar (34 percent), the reason being access to water is normally lower in these regions, as they are the least endowed EIRP regions with regard to supply of irrigation water, hence the higher change in access.
Prevention of flood induced agricultural destruction: Overall, number of floods causing destruction has reduced by an average of 61 percent after rehabilitation for all schemes surveyed. Significant percentage of beneficiary farmers attributed reduction of flood damages to: i) good quality of rehabilitation works (76 percent); ii) provision of appropriate O&M training offered (70 percent); iii) sound diagnosis and design of irrigation structures (64 percent); and iv) carrying out regular maintenance regime by applying new methods gained from O&M training (61 percent).
Reduction in water related disputes: According to the 65 Mirabs interviewed in the survey, water related disputes have been reduced from about 98 to 44 per year per sub-project, a reduction of 55.8 percent, after EIRP’s intervention. Mirabs also testify that improvement made on irrigation systems has promoted cohesion and collaborative climate within irrigation communities. 174
Training evaluation: Results of a survey carried out among 59 trainees to evaluate training impact show positive results. Of the 59 PCU and WMD trainee respondents, 66.7 percent and 25.8 percent stated trainings helped improve their respective work performance; and 72.2 percent and 22.2 percent enhanced their knowledge and skills; and 77.8 percent and 11.1 percent helped them improve their motivation; for all the three evaluation criteria at the level of rating of “Very Good” and “Excellent” respectively. Actual improvements made on work performance by respondent trainees in terms of productivity, quality of outputs, timeliness, and degree of executing their respective duties without or less guidance and mentoring support has been corroborated by senior project managers. These results are by and large attributed to mentoring and guidance provided by FAO technical assistance international staff, whose respective terms of reference include building capacity of national staff.
O&M training efficacy: On average, the number of man/days spent on maintenance has been reduced by 31 percent compared to the situation before rehabilitation of surveyed schemes, as a direct result of training. Overall beneficiary farmers are appreciative of O&M training. Of the 195 interviewed farmers, 145 (74.3 percent) find training content as practical and 158 (81 percent) affirm that training is relevant to their needs. O&M’s importance to strengthening sustainability of project outcomes was similarly identified as one of the four key result indicators beneficiary farmers attach the most value.
Level of community involvement in project processes: EIRP promotes beneficiary ownership in project development and implementation process: Substantial number of respondent Mirabs confirm reasonable degree of involvement: i) 89 percent of Mirabs state that communities get involved in the crucial first steps of sub-project identification stage, when outcomes the community wants to achieve are explained and perceived problems hampering those objectives are outlined; ii) 85 percent in the articulation of current irrigation problems in greater detail, including, for example, weak intake structures, low conveyance, lack of flood protection structures and maintenance skills, etc; iii) 76 percent in the determination of location and mix of irrigation structures required; and finally iv) 73 percent of Mirabs confirmed that EIRP responds positively to design changes requested by the community.
RECOMMENDATIONS (according to M&E Third Seasonal Assessment 2010-2011)
• Providing O&M Training for the remaining 268 completed sub-projects will be a challenge considering the limited time of only 12 months left for project completion. At the rate of training has been organized since 2007, it is impossible to provide for the remaining communities in 268 completed sub-projects without increasing resources. Therefore, an urgent mitigation measure should be developed and implemented.
• It is recommended that PCU and FAO-EIRP may need to impress upon the MEW/WMD to initiate a new O&M training follow-up programme for rehabilitated EIRP sub-projects; as it is apparent that it might not be possible to provide O&M training for all completed sub-projects by the time the project is scheduled to complete. As testified by communities who took the training, such a programme could improve sustainability of EIRP outcomes, and gain good value for money invested.
• The project document provides modalities for beneficiary participation in project planning and implementation in order to ensure relevance of project design and community ownership. Survey findings indicate that EIRP has complied with these requirements, as confirmed by interviewed Mirabs. However, contractors often complain that beneficiaries take it as an open- ended right, to raise such demands even after completion of work previously agreed upon. The current mode of practice should be revisited, rectified and clarified to both beneficiaries and contractors. The exercise should address issues such as when in the rehabilitation process, community requests can and cannot be entertained. Clarity on these issues could help ensure the desired end result of community participation.
• EIRP should introduce a policy requiring trainees and trainers to complete feedback at the end of every training course organized for its staff. Appropriate format will be prepared by the M&E unit. Copies of all handed in training feedback forms are then shared with M&E for use
175 in impact evaluation of same trainings, every six months or year as deemed useful to project management.
• It is recommended for EIRP and thereby for IRDP introduce a system of “self-evaluation” reporting by key functions, including the regions. “Self evaluations” are summary assessments made by regional team leaders on quarterly progress of sub-project implementation, quality of outputs accomplished, activities undertaking and outstanding, key problems encountered and mitigation measures taken. Copies of “self-evaluation” reports are shared with the M&E unit for further analysis and project-wide reporting.
• On the basis of a synthesis of “self-evaluation” reports, prepared by the M&E unit, in close consultation with senior EIRP and IRDP project management, a workshop could then be organized to discuss identified recurring problems and key issues affecting project progress and outcomes with the participation of senior management and relevant staff from the regions, including: surveyors, designers, project supervisors, project proposal developers and O&M trainers, M&E staff and environmental and social safeguard officers as appropriate.
• The final outcome of the workshops is to identify project-wide: key problems and areas for improvement, determine mitigation measures, and lessons learned and best practices for all regional offices to emulate. These workshops would provide opportunity to consolidate experience gained in EIRP implementation for use by IRDP and other similar MEW projects.
• PCU and WMD, in collaboration with MAIL, introduce project beneficiaries to agricultural practices that improve the efficient use of irrigated water to further increase yield and irrigated areas. While the physical rehabilitation and O&M training have gone a long way to improve yield and incremental areas, assisting farmers in how much water to use and when to use for particular crops would ensure collective optimum use of available irrigation water. These services would further improve the rate of return of investment.
• Trainees have particularly identified a recommendation for the need for more refresher and advanced courses, particularly courses that ensure keeping up with new methods and appropriate technologies and organizing study tours to widen their knowledge and learn from others through exposure.
176
ANNEX 7
Institutional Strengthening and Technical Assistance (E xtract from FAO EIRP Terminal Report March 2012)
1. Construction and rehabilitation of buildings
Table 17 summarizes the rehabilitation and construction of premises.
Table 17 – Summary of buildings constructed and rehabilitated Item Number Value (US$) Remarks Construction contracts completed 15 1 378 888.36 Construction contracts in progress 6 2 436 149.30 1684311.70 for WAPICA Rehabilitation contracts completed 2 99 949.24 Silt labs (all completed) 6 299 318.18 Total 29 4 513 623.26
The project intervention in building new premises and rehabilitation of some existing ones was coupled with procurements of furniture, office equipment including laboratories and power facilities, vehicles and field equipment for the diverse types of project activities. This has enabled the water sector staff in MEW departments at Kabul and provincial levels to accommodate new equipment, assure quality of works, fill vacant positions, add comfort in performing duties, provide training space, help in improving staff attendance, add parking space for vehicles, increase safety standards in the offices and minimize security risks.
COMPLETED CIVIL WORKS OF OFFICE BUILDINGS
Estimated Actual Expected / Description of works Region construction cost award cost actual Comments (US$) US$ award date
Construction of 2nd Completed at Jalalabad 50,000 39,567 23-Dec-04 FloorPIDBuilding (Jal.) US$44,763 Construction of S Wall/Septic Completed at Jalalabad 50,000 59,379 23-Dec-04 Tank/Store US$55,870 Construction of PIDBuilding Completed at Herat 250,000 231,860 10-Jul-05 (Herat) US$231,291 Construction of Roof Completed at Kabul 20,000 13,259 27-Dec-04 Rehabilitation Wing B US$15,788 Construction of PIDBuilding Completed at Kabul 280,000 280,948 24-Apr-06 (Kabul) US$301,962 Construction of S Wall/Guard Completed at Kabul 40,000 86,860 07-Aug-07 Room Afs.5,323,331 Construction of S Wall/Guard Completed at Herat 40,000 34,025 02-Jul-07 Room Afs.1,957,412
177
Additional office rehabilitation and construction works with the allocation from IDA-H4980 at various locations Award value Description of works Location Comments (Afs.) Rehabilitation of WMD Building Badakhshan 2,177,132 Completed at Afs. 1,821,865 Construction of WMD Building Kunar 8,191,965 Completed at Afs. 9,036,620 Construction of WMD Building Noristan 11,490,825 70% Completed Construction of Boundary wall WMD Laghman 3,083,262 Completed at Afs.2,932,681 Rehabilitation of WMD Building Jalalabad 3,459,855 Completed at Afs.3,175,597 Construction of WMD Building Zabul 9,050,085 Completed at Afs.8,984,944 Construction of Boundary wall WMD Kandahar 4,079,230 Completed at Afs. 2,146,179 Construction of WMD Building Panjsher 8,028,491 Completed at Afs. 2,687,672 Construction of Boundary wall WMD Daikundy 3,149,315 Completed at Afs. 893,029 Construction of Boundary wall WMD Bamyan 2,738,800 Completed at Afs. 2,498,850
Construction of Boundary wall WMD Pakteka 2,498,490 68% Completed Construction of WAPECA Building Kabul 84,215,585 64% Completed Construction of Kabul WMD VS Kabul 7,167,455 65% Completed Construction of External Rd. Jalalabad 2,014,750 81% Completed Construction of WAPECA Addl. Kabul 14,420,360 66% Completed
Buildings for silt laboratories of hydrological purposes at each region Award value Description of works Location Comments (Afs.) Construction of silt laboratory Kabul 2,949,380 Completed at Afs. 2,871,781 Construction of silt laboratory Kandahar 2,556,250 Completed at Afs. 2,556,250 Construction of silt laboratory Jalalabad 2,175,000 Completed at Afs. 2,175,000 Construction of silt laboratory Kunduz 2,988,490 Completed at Afs. 2,978,747 Construction of silt laboratory Mazar 2,508,550 Completed at Afs. 2,473,814 Construction of silt laboratory Herat 1,833,600 Completed at Afs. 1,910,317
Trainings: EIRP has two main categories of trainings, the informal (customized) trainings and the formal (in-country or overseas). The formal trainings have been packaged in two capacity development plans prepared by FAO. The first was prepared in 2006 and implemented until 2008; the second was approved in 2009 which is implemented till the closing day of the project. MEW requested the WB to initiate a follow-on phase that would undertake upscaled irrigation and water infrastructure. Relevant subjects were undertaken in the second plan for domestic and overseas trainings. The target groups under current trainings by EIRP are as follows : - PCU staff in all regions; - provincial irrigation department’s staff of all provinces; - ministry staff from different departments in Kabul; - local communities and Mirabs; - private sector implementing the EIRP sub-projects in different provinces of Afghanistan; - university students and lecturers; and - FAO national staff.
178 As at end September 2011, 571 trainings were imparted to different targets of participants for a total of 2,827 days. Out of these trainings, 2,327 technical staff participated and 6,067 farmers and Mirabs mainly in O&M trainings.
Table 18 –Statistical summary of all trainings at end of September2011 Participants Duration Region Trainings Mirabs/ in days Eng/Tech Farmers Kabul & Bamyan 153 845 856 1,492 Kandahar 68 334 207 389 Kunduz 94 299 309 1,428 Jalalabad 117 667 319 1,198 Mazar 53 194 161 773 Herat 86 488 475 787 Total – Sep 2011 571 2,827 2,327 6,067
Table 19 –Summary of formal trainings Remaining Trainings Completion Remaining Training type trainings (as at completed value (US$) value (US$) Sep 30, 2011 In country 23 273,550 4 13,290 Overseas 12 579,942 6 150,790
The conclusion that can be drawn from the summary tables below; the latest M&E report of 2010 shows that most of the trainees rated “Very Good” the understanding satisfaction, trainings relevance to work requirements and teaching methods.
Table 20 –Training Impact Evaluation based on trainee assessment Trainee Assessments in % Evaluation Criteria Fair Good V Good Excellent 1 Relevant to work requirements 1.5 7.4 68.3 22.8 2 Presentation easily understood 8.5 13.2 65.4 12.9 3 Use of teaching aids and case studies, where 9.6 14.6 69.8 6 appropriate
The first seasonal report of 2007 shows that trainings were satisfactory, but technical assistance (TA), resources, on-the-job training, resources and specialists were more than satisfactory as in the chart below.
179
Chart 15 –Capacity Building Impact Assessment as per first seasonal study in December 2007
1=Unsatisfactory, 2=Moderately Satisfactory, 3=Satisfactory, 4=Substantially Satisfactory, 5=Highly Satisfactory/ Exceeds Expectations
The rating feedback is consistent with the work progress and achievements which were acknowledged by MEW and the donor agency. This helped in supporting the momentum of work progress and the capacity that was built up, but most importantly attending the needs of the farmers, creating higher level of irrigation reliability and improving water management to meet the development objectives eventually.
The beneficiaries stated that an overall cost saving of 31 percent was realized after receiving the O&M training. Now they inherit less labour in canal cleaning, flood related repairs and in the regular maintenance. The following table explains in figures.
Table 21 –Comparative labour savings in man/days due to O&M training provided to beneficiaries S. Operations and maintenance Average operations and maintenance No Cost in man/days per surveyed scheme Before After Savings in overall cost % 1 Cleaning canals 266 168 37 2 Repairing structures 385 215 44 destroyed by floods 3 Routine maintenance 331 258 22 4 Repairing canals and fields 515 405 21 damaged by wash water 5 Total cost of labour 1,497 1,046 31
180 3. Technical assistance
TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERVICES AND CONSULTANCIES
Dates of Service Name Function Starting Date Concluding Date
Ian Andersen Construction Management Aug 2005 Aug 2005 Consultant Melvyn Kay Capacity Building Consultant Dec 2005 Jan 2006 Jul 2009 Aug 2009 S. Selvarajan Consultant, Agro-economist, Jan 2009 Feb 2009 Kabul Karen Gregorian Water Resources Consultant (one Nov 2009 Feb 2010 month home based)
Elisabeth McCall Social Consultant 16 Mar 2011 22 Mar 2011
Francesco Sabatini Telemetry expert 15 Jun 2011 21 Jun 2011
Jaindra Karki Environment Consultant (three Jul 2011 Nov 2011 months home based) James Oliver NRLW Technical Officer 16 Aug 2005 23 Aug 2005
Walter Klemm TCI Technical Officer, Kabul Apr 2005, Oct With other 2005, Feb 2008, inputs Jun 2010, from HQ Thierry Facon LTU Technical Officer, 11 Feb 2006 24 Feb 2006 Apr 2006 Mar 2006 With other inputs from RAP Zhijun Chen LTU Technical Officer, 15 Nov 2007 24 Nov 2007 With other inputs from RAP David Colbert TCI Technical Officer 10 Mar 2009 24 Mar 2009 With other inputs from HQ Robert Rout TCI Technical Officer Nov 2010 Dec 2010
Puspa Raj Khanal LTU Technical Officer, Aug 2011 Sep 2011 With other inputs from RAP
The above findings and analysis show that the project has achieved its outcomes, compared to those set in the project appraisal and project baseline. The level of increase in irrigated land, crop yield, agricultural land utilization and crop intensity clearly justify EIRP’s investment. Particularly compared to those irrigation schemes, which do not benefit from external technical assistance; reveal that a difference can be made in the lives of beneficiaries through increased production and yield with modest investment in emergency rehabilitation programmes in Afghanistan. The FAO contract was signed on 14 June 2004 and amended on five occasions March 2007, July 2007, November 2008, December 2009 and April 2011. The amendments were made due to the allocation of 181 additional funds or additional scope. The original contract was signed for an amount of US$8,480,000 reaching US$27,353,098 in the last amendment against a total project investment value US$134,500,000 of which the TA services constitute 20.3 percent (inclusive 7 to 8 percent PCU administration cost) which is reasonably fair compared to other development or emergency projects in Afghanistan. The TA services of FAO have charged only 6.2 percent for the project support costs. FAO TA comprised regular backstopping missions, a panel of experts from the Investment Centre Division and other consultancies hired on a work-need basis in request of the client and in agreement with the donor agency. The project backstopping included staff and cost planning, report reviews and technical clearances, clearing work scope and consultants’ TORs, approving training curricula and capacity building plans in addition to interventions as and when requested by the project CTA. The TA team of FAO produced several documents on different topics to assist the PCU in the project planning, management, implementation and supervision. Among the documents prepared for EIRP the following can be mentioned:
1- Design and preparation of technical proposals for 775 irrigation schemes with a total value US$89,850,429 (including the contribution of beneficiaries at least 10 percent); 2- Project operational manual; 3- Two capacity and institutional development plans in 2006 and 2009; 4- Third, fourth and fifth M&E seasonal reports for 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively; 5- Staff incentive scheme; 6- Hydrology service for MEW; 7- Financial management manual; 8- Construction management manual; 9- O&M manual for trainers; 10- O&M manual for farmers (with translation in two local languages); 11- Technical proposal template for small, medium and large irrigation schemes; 12- Preparation and review of 775 technical proposals for irrigation rehabilitation; 13- Design aided tools for hydraulic structures; 14- Technical specifications for civil works; 15- Technical specifications for hydro-meteorological stations, flow measurement equipment and silt laboratories; 16- Procurement and bidding documents for all contracts of civil works, consultancies equipment and goods supply; 17- Provided financial management for all contacts’ payments beside administrating PCU incentives and project administration using computer aided software and various financial templates; 18- Monthly and quarterly progress reports; 19- Sub-projects progress monitoring tools; 20- Established MIS for component A; and 21- TOR of all project staff and consultants.
182 The TA team also assisted MEW in the preparations for the follow-on phase of IRDP with the documents below that constituted the readiness package for IRDP:
1- Design and preparation of technical proposals for 73 irrigation schemes with a total value US$28,876,731; 2- Project operational manual; 3- Financial management manual; 4- Project baseline survey; 5- Preliminary environment and social assessment for 22 dams and 10 represented dams using remote sensing technology; 6- Procurement of three consultancies for MEW pertaining preparation of land acquisition and resettlement policy framework, environmental and social safeguard studies for the preparation of the ESMF; 7- Assisted in the preparation of the ESMF; 8- Gender mainstreaming and inclusion strategy; and 9- TOR of various planned project consultancies and staff.
The assessment studies which show 66.7 percent and 25.8 percent of the staff stated that trainings helped to improve their respective work performance; 72.2 percent and 22.2 percent stated that trainings enhanced their knowledge and skills; and 77.8 percent and 11.1 percent stated that trainings helped them to improve their motivation; for all the three evaluation criteria at the level of rating of “Very Good” and “Excellent” respectively. Outputs, timeliness, and degree of executing their respective duties with less or without guidance and mentoring support have been corroborated by senior project managers. These results are by and large attributed to mentoring and guidance provided by FAO technical assistance international staff, whose respective terms of reference include building capacity of national staff. At the field level, farmers in EIRP-assisted projects have benefited from much higher yields than those farmers without any technical assistance. N.B. below. 149 Average yield for EIRP sub-projects has been consistently higher than for those who do not benefit from similar assistance. The differences in yield shown between both further confirm the justifications for investment made for the rehabilitation of the EIRP projects as envisaged in the respective sub-project proposals.
Table 22 –Major crop yield of surveyed sub-projects compared to others without TA Yield kg/ha M&E 2010 Survey % Major crops EIRP Sub-projects Control Group Schemes Difference (with technical assistance) (without technical assistance) Wheat 2,845 2,044 39.2 Maize 2,561 1,812 41.3 Rice 4,518 2,921 54.7 Onion 13,845 9,743 42.1 Potato 10,632 8,818 20,6 Cotton 1,421 763 86.2
149 It should be noted here that under EIRP- TA provided to farmer beneficiaries meant the rehabilitated irrigation systems, the improved conveyance of water and O&M training it did not include training in ‘on farm water management’ or ‘ agricultural extension’.
183 ANNEX 8
National Hydro-meteorological Network
1.0 Hydrology – Date processing and analysis
1.1 Comments on ASCII data
Data from each hydrological station is collected manually on a USB or other serial device 150 . Raw ASCII data is collected from the stations and sent to the WMDG regional offices before being forwarded to the Water Resources Department (WRD) in the Water Management Directorate (WMD) in Kabul for elaboration.
The raw data, presented like ASCII files, are read into a dedicated statistical program and subsequently transferred basically into printable pages which are similar to the pages in the older yearbooks. At a later stage and where properly stored, data can be re-used for additional analytical work.
Sample of an ASCII file: Station Name ADRASKAN 06/16/2008,15:15:00,Precip Int,0,mm,B 06/16/2008,15:15:00,Precip Acc,0,mm,B 06/16/2008,15:15:00,AT,176.4,C,G 06/16/2008,15:15:00,RH,100,%,G 06/16/2008,15:15:00,Level,0.000,mtr,G 07/02/2008,09:15:00,Precip Int,0,mm,B 07/02/2008,09:15:00,Precip Acc,0,mm,B 07/02/2008,09:15:00,AT,30.5,C,G 07/02/2008,09:15:00,RH,15,%,G
Transforming raw ASCII data into a more usable form is still at its very beginning. It may take a year or more of constantly providing assistance and technical support to the WRD to iron out all kinks and problems and get their team ‘up to speed’.
It will then be essential to ensure that the WRD team is capable of transforming basic data into a useful form for engineering purposes.
Analyses revolve around river and stream flow prognostics and should be available for presentation at the request of users or at the initiative of WRD itself for more general use.
1.2 Observations made when visiting the MEW WMD Water Resource Section
A number of issues became apparent during the evaluators’ visit to the WMD Water Resources Section where the data are located and processed:
- Elevation/discharge rating curves are being determined from single river cross sections and velocity measurements; - For the larger rivers, cableways are required. Forty such cableways will be provided and installed in 2012 in the course of the coming months. An additional number are in the plan; - Cableways will also be required for the smaller rivers when in spate or flood in order to obtain measured data to determine the velocity of flow; - Even smaller rivers cannot to be crossed by foot during flood with a flow metre in hand; - The flood water of the larger rivers are often rich in coarse sediment that can damage delicate velocity metres when suspended from a cableway;
150 See page 110 of the technical annex of the project proposal, dated 4 December 2003 . 184 - It is recommended to consider the possibility of surveying cross-profiles along suitable stretches of a river, of about 400 m length close to where the observation station is located. Then use an appropriate system of formulae and/or software to develop the ‘stage discharge curve’, based in basic hydraulic discharge relations; - Sections of each station must also be evaluated at low water after the main flood season to obtain changes in configuration; - In the course of time river X sections may alter due to changes in the bed of the river due to erosion, meanders, braiding, removal of trees along the banks etc. Therefore rating curves will always have to be re-verified, ratified and updated; - USACE has developed HEC-RAS software for this purpose. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) has a very illustrative book depicting different flow situations with corresponding (rugosity) values. Such methods and materials can be used in un-gauged streams as well.
See Listing 1: Recommended literature on page 187 of the present.
1.3 Difficulties created by the date reading program supplied to MEW WRD
It should be noted that the data reading program provided to the MEW WRD by the equipment installation company is not capable of reading the data files correctly that are provided on CDs by the 50 stations. This is causing problems that are proving difficult to solve. The program in question is called XPertLogImport.
When the same files are loaded in a simple text reading program, a field with text data shows up on screen quite normally. It should be possible to put this into any statistical program capable of receiving ASCII type, comma separated data. In such a case, a dedicated start-up program may have to be developed in order to filter data at first level. However, the equipment supply company (Sutron Company) should be able to rectify these problems.
The evaluator observed that the hydrology section of MEW WRD has not yet developed its capacity beyond the stage of simple recording and registering data received from the stations.
1.4 The allocation of water between different consumers
WMD, together with each of the five river basin authorities, are charged with the task of allocating water resources to the different consumers. These are: agriculture, hydropower, domestic, industrial, the natural environment and across Afghanistan’s frontiers. It seems, therefore, only correct that staff of the hydrology department of WRD in the WMD should formulate the technical rules and formulae.
The same is true for the ‘operation of reservoirs’ where conflicting objectives and targets have to be taken into account in order to achieve the optimal use of discharge capabilities. Usually, ‘computer- aided decision systems’ are used for these complicated tasks. Descriptive algorithms are input into a program and need to be regularly updated to allow for changes in priorities. Mastering the art of allocating water between the various users requires much more experience and skill than the collection and interpretation of data. Interpretation of data gives statistical meaning to the past, but the distribution of water has to be mindful of the future, even when that is ‘tomorrow’.
2.0 Further points for discussion
2.1 Measurement of sediment
Measurement of sediment is rarely done in Afghanistan and very few reports on this subject are available. The USGS did prepare a study for the Kajaki reservoir in 1968 (ref. 1968, Perkings and Culbertsen). This was updated in 2008.
However, the MEW/WMR has been equipped with basic sediment laboratories under EIRP. It is recommended that laboratory staff are selected and trained and in place with full sets of instructions on the use of the equipment, together with operation funding during the forthcoming snowmelt season. 185
Available information
The USGS Westphall document of 1969 provides interesting information about Afghanistan when a national hydrological observation network was started. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA523633 Childers 1969 report about the Afghanistan sediment measurement program is recommended as well. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA523604
Examples of surface soil loss, erosion and siltation: A normal high range of loss of surface soil is considered to be 1 to 3 mm/year measured over a watershed. However, 10 mm/year is also mentioned in the FAO global data base. http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/sediment/index.asp
Below are set out some figures taken from the 1960s and 1970s as presented by FAO Aquastat. Apparently at that time a project was implemented for measuring sediment.
However, from the data shown it is not possible to evaluate the class of sediment suspended. It is only possible to establish the total load.
Data for Afghanistan, obtained from one year’s measuring campaign 1962-63 give results that are in the order of 0.15 to 0.3 mm/yr.
Most of the mountain ranges in Afghanistan have steep slopes forming small sub watersheds and catchments that produce surprisingly high flood and sediment discharge rates. The mountain ranges are geologically comparatively young formations with high erosion levels. The competence 151 of the rivers to carry large boulders when in spate can be very high as can be observed everywhere in the countryside where the rivers and washes debouch into the valleys and plains. The problem is the difficulty in predicting the frequency and rate of discharge where the competence level is being reached or even exceeded.
Some mountain ranges are less steep but many of these, particularly on the northern slopes of the ranges in north and north eastern Afghanistan where the foot hills consist mainly of deep extremely fine soiled loess formations, are extremely prone to erosion. Elsewhere, even in the high mountains, much of the geology consists of easily eroded soft sedimentary formations, conglomerate and mud stone.
Erosion has a strong impact on the sustainability of reservoirs. It is not cost effective to construct reservoirs that only have short effective working lives before they have to be de-commissioned and abandoned; thus leaving the population that has grown to depend on the reservoir for their irrigated agriculture worse of than they were previously.
Techniques for dealing with heavily silted reservoirs have not yet been developed very effectively.
Hydraulic flushing to remove silt from reservoirs is still a poorly developed technique that is comparatively undeveloped.
Another possible technique which may be developed for dealing with heavily silted reservoirs is to combine the application of density flows together with bulldozing of dry reservoir floors.
151 Competence is a term used to express the capacity of a stream to carry large stones, boulders, etc. 186
Rivers that discharge from small watersheds/catchments often have a large percentage of coarse sediment which is even more difficult to remove.
In order to quantify sedimentation it is also necessary to consider the impact of the progressive degradation of a watersheds’ surface quality.
It is also necessary to take into account the impact of climate change resulting in a snow/rainfall ratio which is less favourable for controlled runoff, i.e. an increase in heavy rainfall over snow fall.
Some recommended literature relating to this subject Below some documents have been listed for the purpose of consultation:
Listing 1: Recommended literature
USGS: Measurement and Computation of Streamflow: Volume 1. Measurement of Stage and Discharge Volume 2. Computation of Discharge USGS: Guide for Selecting Manning's Roughness Coefficients for Natural Channels and Flood Plains United States Geological Survey Water-supply Paper 2339 Metric Version http://www.sutron.com/downloads/DownloadsUpdates/Xpert2%20User%20Manual.pdf
Xpert2 Data Logger Operations and Maintenance Manual Part No. 8800-1173 Rev 3.9 February 29, 2012 Sutron, Corporation 22400 Davis Drive Sterling, Virginia 20164 TEL: (703) 406-2800 FAX: (703) 406-2801 WEB: http://www.sutron.com/
For stream flow calculations and establishment as well as maintenance of stage discharge relations:
USACE-HEC-Ras programme and documentation .
187 IMAGES ILLUSTRATING THINGS MENTIONED IN THE MAIN TEXT-Section
Figure 15: A standard hydrological station (2009, Kunar River downstream of the Kama bridge) Figure 16: A similar station in Heart, first broken into and then officially dismantled Figure 17: A page from the old pre-1980 yearbooks
188 ANNEX 9
Environmental and Social Management and Related Issues
This annex on environmental and social management considers ESM as viewed by the World Bank in the context of the IRDP project.
Application of BP 8.00 and its associated rules and regulations (R&R) require “due diligence” and additional oversight from the World Bank in order to, amongst other, satisfy safeguard requirements.
ANNEX 9.1: SOME GENERAL POINTS
1. In the case of small dams , the technical aspects of each potential dam site and associated reservoir have to be considered before anything else, in order to evaluate the technical and economic feasibility of the proposed dam and its possible environmental impact. Only after this has been done, and once the technical feasibility of the dam is confirmed, should the social issues and needs of the communities concerned be considered and evaluated. If, as a result of the pre-feasibility work, the proposed dam site is technically and environmentally unsuitable no further action need be taken. As social engagement with the communities concerned by those conducting the feasibility is liable to raise expectations this should not take place before the technical and environmental studies have shown that the dam is, at least, a strong possibility.
2. In the case of traditional irrigation channels: Social and environmental problems may arise if improvements in conveyance and an increase in capacity resulting in less water being returned to the river/stream leads to a reduction in the water available to communities further downstream. There is no doubt that the project has improved the efficiency of many irrigation systems and has helped to reduce water losses along the systems. This is not necessarily damaging, but there is a potential problem that project engineers need to be keenly aware of. When designing the flow capacity of individual canal systems, due account must always be taken of the needs of downstream users, particularly in times and seasons of low water.
The flow of water in the streams and rivers themselves must be taken into account because of the possibly damaging environmental impact that may be caused to the aquatic life (fishes, etc.) that inhabit them by drawing out too much water, or constructing barriers across them.
An example of such a situation is the large Parwan canal with a capacity designed for 27m3/sec. This canal is sited on the right bank of the Panjsher River and crosses both the Salang and the Ghorband Rivers (by aquaducts) in the direction of the central Shomali Plain. There had been an earlier plan to extend this canal by means of a pumping station to take water as far as Kabul city itself. It is just as well that this has never been followed up. If this canal were to draw water to its full capacity, it would be capable of completely drying up the Panjsher River, in years of drought or in dry seasons. If this were to happen, the negative effect would be felt as far as Jalalabad and the Nangarhar canal.
189 ANNEX 9.2: WORLD BANK CATEGORIES FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
1. WB OP 8.00 Rapid Response to Emergency
For the IRDP, the WB has declared continued validity of OP 8.00. 152
IRDP clearly has coverage under points 4 a); b); c); d); e) and f). That implies all sub-points mentioned under 4.
Under point 7 of the OP 8.00, the following is mentioned: a) are processed under accelerated, consolidated, and simplified procedures and are subject to streamlined ex- ante requirements (including in fiduciary and safeguards areas); b) involve a different balance between ex-ante and ex-post controls and risk mitigation measures compared to regular operations, including on issues of fraud and corruption, requiring intensified supervision support to address such risks;
Based on these points, the government may request the WB to distinguish for the IRDP two levels of application of safeguard policies: category A (high risk) for the small dams component and B (medium risk) or even C (low risk) for the normal rehabilitation and reconstruction work of existing irrigation facilities and re-categorize the project accordingly. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ECAEXT/Resources/258598-1289768521871/7554517- 1289768544275/OverviewOfSafeguardPoliciesRF.pdf
2. OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Screening
The Bank classifies a proposed project depending on the type, location, sensitivity and nature of environmental impacts:
152 Webster Definition of DUE DILIGENCE 1- the care that a reasonable person exercises to avoid harm to other persons or their property 2- research and analysis of a company or organization done in preparation for a business transaction (as a corporate merger or purchase of securities) 190 From OP 4.01:
(b) Category B : A proposed project is classified as category B if its potential adverse environmental impacts on human populations or environmentally important areas—including wetlands, forests, grasslands and other natural habitats—are less adverse than those of category A projects. These impacts are site-specific; few if any of them are irreversible; and in most cases mitigating measures can be designed more readily than for category A projects.
The scope of EA for a category B project may vary from project to project, but it is narrower than that of category A EA. Like category A EA, it examines the project’s potential negative and positive environmental impacts and recommends any measures needed to prevent, minimize, mitigate or compensate for adverse impacts and improve environmental performance. The findings and results of category B EA are described in the project documentation (project appraisal document and project information document). (See note 11 below.)
(c) Category C : A proposed project is classified as category C if it is likely to have minimal or no adverse environmental impacts. Beyond screening, no further EA action is required for a category C project.
Note 11- When the screening process determines, or national legislation requires, that any of the environmental issues identified warrant special attention, the findings and results of category B EA may be set out in a separate report. Depending on the type of project and the nature and magnitude of the impacts, this report may include, for example, a limited environmental impact assessment, an environmental mitigation or management plan, an environmental audit, or a hazard assessment. For category B projects that are not in environmentally sensitive areas and that present well defined and well-understood issues of narrow scope, the Bank may accept alternative approaches for meeting EA requirements: for example, environmentally sound design criteria, siting criteria, or pollution standards for small-scale industrial plants or rural works; environmentally sound siting criteria, construction standards, or inspection procedures for housing projects; or environmentally sound operating procedures for road rehabilitation projects.
ANNEX 9.3: EXTRACTS FROM THE IRDP NEGOTIATIONS DRAFT WITH EVALUATORS’ COMMENTS
1. The proposed Irrigation Restoration and Development Project (IRDP) would scale up the programme’s impact and will fund: (a) rehabilitation of irrigation systems covering about 300,000 ha of irrigated areas; (b) the design and construction of a limited number of multi-purpose small dams and appurtenances, and associated irrigation conveyance and distribution systems in closed river basins; (c) …
Evaluator’s comments:
The wording of the above paragraph requires some explanation:
Does “irrigated land” imply ‘irrigable land’ i.e. land capable of being irrigated, or ‘previously irrigated land’? Does the purpose of the project imply the restoration of complete irrigation on the same? Does 15 percent increase of irrigated land imply 15 percent of 300,000 ha = 45,000 ha? Would that imply 100 percent of 45,000 ha being actively irrigated each year? Is irrigated land meant to be the total land that is under canal command including areas managed under a crop/fallow rotation? Land may be managed under a crop/fallow rotation 153 for a number of reasons including: shortage of irrigation water compared to the land available; in order to restore soil fertility or not to overcharge the natural drainage capacity.
153 Private pumping of groundwater for irrigation is not part of EIRP’s working area but it may be a spin-off of improved agricultural performance due to irrigation and perceived shortages of canal water. 191
The expected outcomes of the project include: a. About 15 percent increase in irrigated area; b. At least 20 percent increase in crop yields in rehabilitated schemes; and c. At least 30 percent decrease in water related disputes in rehabilitated schemes.
Evaluator’s comments
Is it implied that the 20 percent increase in yield is going to be purely the result of the improved supply of irrigation water? This appears to take no account of all the other factors that are required for, and involved in, productive agriculture. In order to obtain good crop yields many things are required in addition to water, including effective agricultural extension, improved cropping systems and cultivation practices, soil fertility and crop rotation, good seed and crop varieties, disease and pest control, marketing and processing. Water is, of course, important but it is neither sufficient by itself without the rest of the package nor will it be the only cause of improved yields. It is not possible or reasonable to claim improvements in the provision of irrigation water as the sole cause of increases in crop yields. No allowance appears to be given to this.
If fertilizers and agro-chemicals are being applied incorrectly they may contaminate groundwater and cause serious environmental damage.
It is understood that social and environmental safeguards, even for the small dam component of the project, are relatively simple. Some of the dam sites are in the valleys of ephemeral streams or even washes that are effectively dry for most of the year. However, all the valleys in the Northern Region are subject to periodic floods and spates caused by snow melt and rainstorms.
In the case of perennial rivers account should be taken of the aquatic life and the possible effect of constructing a dam including the possible seasonal migration of fish.
ANNEX 9.4: EXTRACT FROM ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
1. The Environment and Social Management Framework and IRDP
The IRD project would build upon and scale up activities supported under the ongoing Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP). In addition, it would also support MEW in making a modest start towards developing Afghanistan’s water resources for irrigation comprising a small dams development programme in closed river basins that are free of transboundary riparian issues. While the bulk of the project investment will be in rehabilitation of existing irrigation systems, the small dams component and large rehabilitation schemes may involve land acquisition and resettlement. The project has, therefore been categorized in Environmental Category A. Since the precise scope and design of large schemes and small dams is not yet known an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) has been prepared in lieu of an environmental and social assessment. The ESMF includes a Resettlement Policy Framework that would be applied to prepare site/scheme specific resettlement action plan (RAPs) if land acquisition and/or resettlement are involved. In addition baseline surveys for pre-selection of 22 potential dam sites have been prepared through remote sensing using remote sensing technology and digital elevation modeling and some site visits and contacts with farming communities to make a preliminary assessment of the social and environmental impact.
Scaling up rehabilitation activities still involves land areas which have been irrigated in the past. It also includes crop/fallow rotational sequences. Land acquisition when rehabilitating a traditional system is likely to involve minimal areas of land, usually involving only a few square metres of land due for example to widening a right of way for a canal or constructing a 192 sedimentation tank. Extensive realignment of traditional canals is seldom necessary and there is no intention under IRDP to extend the present established length of the channels or expand the area irrigated to take in previously virgin land. On occasions (as in the case of the Shakhab canal) work on canal banks may require cutting bankside trees.
Such issues should and can be dealt with according to traditional community processes.
Because of the programme approach, the IRDP project would be better off if it were split into different categories in order to abide by the WB rules: Sub-projects involving the rehabilitation of traditional irrigation systems would be best classified under either category ‘B’, or preferably category ‘C’. The small dams project would also probably be better classified under category ‘B’ but in case of doubt might remain under category ‘A’ depending rather on the outcome of the WAPCOS feasibility studies. 154
2. Some issues of general concern
1. Issues related to rivers systems that cross frontiers and involve transboundary riparian water rights and needs. 2. Issues related to the excessive extraction of irrigation water upstream that deprives downstream users of water. 3. Issues associated with 2. involving the excessive extraction of water for upstream irrigation (or industrial or urban development) that not only may deprive downstream water users but may even dry up perennial or ephemeral (seasonal) rivers and streams. 4. Problems associated with excessive irrigation and poor drainage on flat plains leading to salinization. 5. Contamination of groundwater due to the excessive or incorrect use of fertilizers and agro-chemicals 6. Issues related to falling water tables caused by excessive extraction (wells and pumped water) of subterranean water. This is a common cause of causing the failure of traditional karez systems. 155
The environmental, social and political consequences referred to are not specifically related to the individual sub-projects of IRDP but to irrigation development as a whole.
Due care must be taken in each sub-project that downstream users are not adversely affected by the improved conveyance of water resulting from the project’s rehabilitation work
But, both donors and the GoA and particularly MEW and its WMD must remain very sensitive to all the issues mentioned above particularly those involving plans for dams and large irrigation developments and even the larger rehabilitation projects. Serious thought needs to be given to developing more stringent management rules for ‘water resource management’. This is a task for WMD and associated organizations.
154 NB This supports the recommendation made by the evaluators 155 Private pumping of groundwater for irrigation is not part of EIRP’s working area but it may be a spin-off of improved agricultural performance due to irrigation and perceived shortages of canal water. 193 3. From draft ESMF Main Report, page 19:
Projects on international waterways (OP/BP 7.50). Since most major rivers in Afghanistan on which the IRD sub-projects would be located cross international boundaries, this policy is triggered. However, IRD essentially involves rehabilitation of existing irrigation systems. It does not involve works and activities that would exceed the original scheme, change its nature, or alter or expand its scope and extent to make it appear a new or different scheme. The small dams will be located on closed basin rivers that are not international waterways. Therefore, given the nature of works envisaged under the proposed project: (a) the project will not adversely affect the quality or quantity of water flows to other riparians; and (b) it will not be adversely affected by other riparians' water use. Therefore, the Project falls within the exception to the notification requirements of OP 7.50, set forth in paragraph 7(a) of OP 7.50. A waiver for notification under OP 7.50 was obtained in the context of EIRP processing and a waiver will be sought in the context of IRD as well.
Evaluator’s comments
The claim that the project will not alter the country’s main water management has to be seen in the light of climate changes since the demise of the Daud Government in 1978 which was a turning point for irrigation development in Afghanistan. The reduction in the size of ice fields and glaciers and the associated reduction in snow-melt water together with an increase in rainfall induced erosion negatively influences irrigation regimes.
Although this issue should not be blamed on individual comparatively small traditional canal systems there is a need for a coherent national irrigation policy, which requires discussion with neighbouring countries. The basis for such discussions is a functioning hydro-metric network and, the interpretation of past data against current data in the light of changing climatic conditions. In recent times, there have been some series of years of serious drought such as between 1998-99 and 2001-2002 followed by years of greater precipitation. 2008 was a comparatively dry year, followed by 2009 and 2010 which were years of good precipitation (particularly 2009), but followed by 2011 which was another year of rather severe drought.
For instance, there have been years of drought when the Darweshan diversion intake on the Helmand has taken the last drop of water from the river leaving downstream users only drainage water and river accretion to feed traditional irrigation diversions in a haphazard fashion. 156 The WB/RVP’s signature under paragraph 7 of OP 7.50 may have been too optimistic.
Plans to increase the capacities of the Kajaki and Dahla reservoirs on the Helmand and Arghandab Rivers, may increase the problems of downstream users in lower Helmand and Nimroz and also in Iran, as well as the already threatened Hamoun wetlands in the Seistan Basin.
4. From draft ESMF Main Report and some comments:
1) Tree felling: for each tree felled two will be planted. 2) “It has been concluded that for the 10 dam sites analysed, environmental and social impacts due to submergence may be considered as nil or negligible, except for Masjet Sabz dam.” 3) “The existence of barren lands in the catchment area of all dam sites would require a thorough review of impact on sedimentation in the proposed storage reservoirs. This aspect would be studied in detail during the pre-feasibility/feasibility stage. The watershed area estimates when compared to storage volumes of impoundments for an assumed 20 meter dam height are at least two orders of magnitude higher. This indicates availability of water would not be an issue.” (page 13)
156 It may well be that the over 20 m3/sec Lashkari Canal upstream of Zaranj, capital of Nimruz Province, will be without any water during drought years. The Kamal Khan dam, currently under construction slightly upstream of the canal’s intake, may bring some relief during such years but not all needed. 194 Evaluator’s comments:
Ad 1) Planting of trees under irrigation makes common sense because it is useful and good business; (firewood and roof-beams) and (poles, fuelwood and timber). Fruit and nut trees can bring in a good income and old trees are a source of firewood. Poplar and other trees planted along canals are an investment and when mature are cut and sold by the “owner”. When water logging and agro-chemical run-off are to be dealt with, the project ought to enlist the services of MAIL or one its public or private dependencies to deal with such matter. MEW is a ministry of civil engineers with little or no agricultural knowledge.
Ad 2) The physical details for the other 22 sites can be expected quite soon and depending on the conclusions arrived at it might be possible to reclassify the small dam component of the IRD project as ‘B’ with the applicability of LARPF and re-classify the rehabilitation component as ‘C’.
Ad 3) The problem of erosion and silting has been well demonstrated in the case of other small dams already constructed. Even if water is plentifully available a heavy load of sediment will quickly bring the useful life of a reservoir to an end. Once the pre-feasibility is finished it should be possible to quickly reject the unsuitable cases before the local communities have their expectations unnecessarily raised. However, it is feared that WAPCOs may already have contacted many of the downstream communities, regardless of whether their location will be selected or not.
It should made part of government policy that the height of a dam is always determined according to the condition prevailing and not in an arbitrary fashion. These include the potential maximum water flow, the size of the watershed and the catchment, the steepness of the run-off behind the dam and the size and shape of the reservoir. The formula for design will also be determined and adjusted to other physical conditions. 157
It should also be made policy of the government that when planning a dam it should provide a long-term sustainable livelihood for any population that is dependant on its water. In view of the very high rates of erosion all over Afghanistan, this is becoming an issue which is difficult to solve. This implies that a reservoir should contain at least a complete year of watershed discharge in order to have some spare space for depositing sediment. Moreover, all measures possible to promote sluicing and purging of sediment from the reservoir should be installed, maintained and operated. Every affordable measures should be taken to conserve and improve the condition of the watershed so as far as possible to minimize the effects of erosion and silting.
5. From page 17 of the ESMF framework a list of requirements is given for each of the 220 sub-projects that are to be reviewed, checked and complied with. Required forms to be dealt with are given in Annexes 1 -17 of the ESMF.
Annex 1: page 44 of the ESMF. Annex 16: page 103. Many of the annexes contain checklists that have to be filled. All annexes have to be mastered by the staff of the IRDP main office and of the different regional offices.
157 The 20 m dam height rule, provisionally handled by the IRDP, seems to be arbitrarily decided or it is a rounding of 50 feet as handled by the US Bureau of Reclamation for the definition of small dams. However, there are 6 m high dams with contain a reservoir with half a billion m3; there are 15 m high dams in highly tectonic areas; there are 12 m high dams with a large probable maximum flood; there are 14 m high dams with a very complex foundation condition; etc. ICOLD considers dams of over 15 m high to be large dams. 195 ANNEX 9.5: SELECTED EXTRACTS OF THE ESMF COMPLIANCE REPORT BY DR ELIZABETH MCCALL
Para 3. Overall the consultant found that while sub project proposals gave the appearance of compliance with social safeguards, in practice regional PCU/FAO staff have only very limited knowledge of ESSF requirements and their application at the design, construction and operation phases of a project. Very few staff are involved in developing sub project proposals at regional level and those with some involvement in the process confirmed that the completion of the safeguard sections tends to be more of a formality than based on a thorough understanding of the issues. None of the regional staff interviewed was aware of the five attachments to the Environmental and Social Safeguards Framework contained in Appendix 7 of the project proposal which provide detailed guidance on implementing and monitoring the safeguard provisions.
Para 3.1 No resulting conflicts were mentioned to the consultant and farmers said that the increased irrigable land as a result of the project more than compensated for the loss of the land contributed voluntarily. However, a number of PCU community water development assistants (CWDAs) report dealing with disputes related to voluntary land donations.
Para 3.2 In addition to availability and distribution of water several farmers and regional office staff highlighted two other perceived inequities in the EIRP: inequity in access to employment opportunities during the construction phase (tail enders have fewer opportunities than head enders) and maintenance of canals with head enders perceived as contributing less labour than farmers at the tail end. For example, at Qala Sorh village located at the tail end of the Balawdan canal in Kabul region farmers complained that upstream villages benefited disproportionately from employment opportunities created during the construction phase of the project. They also stated that farmers from tail end villagers provided most of the voluntary labour for canal maintenance.
Para 3.3 The Afghan government’s commitment to addressing gender equality principles in social and economic development is evident in the Water Sector Strategy and the Afghan national Development Strategy (ANDS). Using established community structures to involve women meaningfully in the new IRDP project will be a challenge and will need to be approached with renewed effort and imagination. Working with women can be done only with female staff and currently there are no female CWDAs employed in the programme. Programme Management may wish to revisit incentives to attract suitably qualified women to the project and/or explore collaborative ventures with local NGOs which enable access to women. Women’s CDCs should be explored as a possible vehicle for increasing women’s participation in the project.
Para 3.4 The first seasonal impact assessment report on the EIRP project mentions ‘improved health through provision of better quality domestic water’ but no details are provided. The most recent assessment report suggests that increased consumption of fruit and vegetables enhances nutritional and health status of households but no information is provided on the incidence of water borne diseases in the project area.
196 Below follow some selected parts of the ESMF Compliance Report on the Shakhab Canal
Para 2 The average land holding is between 2 to 3 jeribs with the value of one jerib estimated between 500,000 Afghanis (approximately US$10,500) and 700,000 Afghanis (approximately US$ 15,000) depending on location and quality of land.
The project is located within an irrigation network comprising a 22 km main canal, 30 km of branch canals with an adequate number of related structures such as spillways, outlets and canal lining. These canals are functioning well except for the flood damage at two locations, which this project seeks to address.
The possibility of floods damaging agricultural land and homes and destroying crops and livelihoods will be significantly reduced by the construction of spur dikes and bank protection at the head reach of the canal. The rehabilitation measures will also minimise the disruption of irrigation facilities and will reduce water losses through seepage along the canal. In addition the planned improvements should bring about a reduction in canal maintenance costs.
This [the works] may lead to a reduction of flow for down stream users. However, the water right for each canal has been established and the Shakhab canal will draw a maximum of only 5 m3/sec during wet months and up to 1 m3/sec during dry months of discharge in accordance with their agreed water rights. Consequently, the potential impacts on downstream users should not be significant. The mitigation measure will ensure that the diversion of water from the source river will be limited to levels within the established water rights. Meetings were held with representatives from mid and downstream villages together with Water Management Department representatives in which they confirmed their agreement to the proposed sub-project activities
Evaluator’s comments on the Shakhab study- Phase III project
At the present time there is no way to seriously and if needed continuously measure water flow. Real time river discharges are impossible to obtain and none of the traditional canals are equipped to measure intake flow. As a result, any discrepancy between users relying on different intakes drawing water from either side of a river must be resolved through traditional negotiation.
An example is provided below with a series of satellite images of the Panjsher River as it flows across the Shomali Plain between the Gulbahar gorge in the north to the next gorge at Baghdara, where a dam with associated large power plant are being planned. For the communities along either side of this 20 km stretch of the river, maintaining equitable arrangements concerning the extraction of water for their irrigation is no mean feat.
No doubt, when they find themselves short of water farmers and land-owners will try and supplement effectively free river water by digging wells and buying pumps. But this is an expensive way to irrigate comparatively low value crops and only if they are able to go in for higher value produce such as fruit and vegetables a profitable agriculture and/or horticulture can be sustained.
The management of water along a river is a delicate business that can all too easily be disturbed.
The main benefit of the Shakhab Project Phase III is to reduce the danger of the entire canal canal system being destroyed if the river floods and changes its course. For certain, if the farmers of Shakhab are happy with the work of EIRP/IRDP they will come back with more requests for assistance, as they have done now on two occasions.
Taking Shakhab as a model, it may be possible to develop a blanket proposal for all rehabilitation projects applying measures as have been proposed in Elizabeth McCall’s report that might be adopted as a general policy for project planning and implementation. This would require a larger piece of work for social and gender organizers more specialized in community
197 issues and development. This might also serve to establish linkages with other ministries such as MAIL, Education and Public Health.
In line with the above, the DDG/Technical of NEPA favours a blanket authorization from his board to handle incoming requests for clearance of rehabilitation projects at the level of NEPA’s own DG Technical.
In the event of the ‘small dams’ pre-feasibility finding that none of the proposed 22 sites in the Northern Basin are acceptable 158 , it would neither be desirable nor appropriate for the IRDP to maintain its presently designated category A. The funds so saved from the small dam component might then be added to the traditional irrigation component which would anyway be better classed as category ‘B’ or even ‘C’.
It must be hoped that the ongoing hydro-meteorological component of IRDP will soon be capable of providing some general rules for analysing extreme flood discharges from ungauged streams, including class and content of sediment. For the moment this task is expected from WAPCOS.
Reference has already been made in Section 9 of the main report concerning the considerable additional burden of bureaucracy and additional cost created by the introduction of ESMF documentation which might be more usefully spent on improving the technical preparation of sub-projects.
ANNEX 9.6: SATELLITE IMAGES OF THE PANJSHER RIVER AND THE SHAKH AB CANAL IN DIFFERENT SEASONS
Image taken in October 2004, when the Panjsher River was very low. It looks as if the Shakh Ab intake (on the left bank of the river, right side of the image) is taking almost all water from the river with the result that down stream of the Shakh Ab intake the river is almost completely dry.
158 Either because the catchments are too large requiring dam heights in excess of what is laid down and/or because of generally high levels of erosion. 198 The same location in 2004 July, towards the end of the snow melt season.
At canal station 1+000 the river is coming dangerously near to the canal. This problem is the subject of Shakh Ab Phase III project.
199 Copy of the DMA 1:100,000 map (a square covers 1km*1km) of 35 years ago. In that time already the area was densely populated and subsisting on intensive irrigated agriculture.
200 ANNEX 10
THE OPIUM ISSUE AND IRRIGATION
ANNEX 10.1
1. Extract from the opening of World Bank Guidelines:
Treating the Opium Problem in World Bank Operations in Afghanistan A Strategic Approach
The opium problem. Reducing opium production is one of the greatest challenges facing Afghanistan. Opium is central to the macroeconomy , contributing one third of GDP and significant support for aggregate demand and the balance of payments. In the rural economy , opium is a key livelihoods coping strategy for as many as 350,000 farm families, most of them poor. In the area of security , opium is fuelling warlordism and terrorism, and in governance the illegal economy is capturing or undermining state building efforts at all levels.
Government strategy. Government’s strategy to reduce and ultimately eliminate opium from the Afghan economy comprises essentially three elements. The first is to improve governance and the rule of law , strengthening public institutions and mechanisms to control drugs, together with the development of responsible governance structures and the “social contract” at all levels from the community up. The second is to raise the general level of economic activity and services, improving living standards and providing social protection. The third is to emphasize in development programs specific components that can have a significant impact on farmer behavior , with a focus on poorer farmers, laborers, and more vulnerable areas.
World Bank approach. The World Bank’s working approach to the opium problem is:
• to factor considerations of the opium problem into analysis and dialogue at all levels, including the macroeconomic dimension • to support and engage in analytical work on the development dimensions of the drug problem in Afghanistan and associated options for addressing it • to help support the development elements of the Government’s strategy through Bank-financed programs as appropriate • to ensure that the activities supported by the Bank do not inadvertently contribute in any way to the opium economy
Screening. Under this approach, the Bank proposes to screen all its activities in Afghanistan, both operations and analytical and advisory work, to ensure that counter-narcotics aspects are treated consistently and in a way that can make the maximum contribution to the national effort against drugs. The screening process will demonstrate to what extent the operation or activity:
1. Contributes to the governance agenda 2. Maximizes synergies to deliver broad livelihoods impacts at the community and household level 3. Maximizes more specific counter-narcotics impacts by geographical area coverage and by addressing the poorer target groups, with components which strengthen and diversify legal livelihoods 4. Identifies risks and develops an approach to ensure that Bank support “does no harm” and does not create risks to the Bank’s reputation. 5. Contains a monitoring and reporting capability that can effectively track outcomes related to the opium economy.
201
2. The case against the ‘Conditionality Clause’. (some extracts from papers and reports)
Extract from gtz discussion paper “Development in a Drugs Environment: A Strategic Approach to ‘Alternative Development’. Eradication and Conditionality pp 21-22 Indeed, the relationship between comprehensive development programmes eradication and those development to promote alternative, licit livelihoods. interventions aimed at reducing illicit drug Where such alternatives exist, farmers crop cultivation continues to be the most who persist with drug cultivation can be intractable problem for the development pushed by eradication towards legal community. It is this area, more than any livelihoods. Where alternatives do not 64 other, which has made many from the exist, eradication is rarely cost-effective development community decidedly and can create perverse incentives for nervous. Whilst the United Nations farmers to grow more drugs. Enforced General Assembly Special Session on the eradication where alternatives do not exist World Drug Problem indicated that 65 eradication is not appropriate until can also fuel violence and insecurity, ‘alternative income opportunities [have hostility to national authorities and 60 displace cultivation to less accessible been created]’ eradication has been 66 conducted prior to these conditions being locations and ultimately undermine long- term efforts to change the conditions that met. Furthermore, applied work has raised 67 questions over whether ‘an income promote drug crop cultivation. approach’ is appropriate given the integral Making development assistance role that illicit drug crops play improving conditional on reductions in illicit drug crop access to natural, social, human, physical, cultivation also causes the development and financial assets. Again, the lack of community concern in particular because clarity over this important aspect of most agencies have remits (some based alternative development would seem to lie on domestic legislation) focused on with a poor understanding of the different poverty reduction and are generally unable variables that influence household drug to withhold development assistance on the crop cultivation and what combination of basis of communities continuing drug crop 61 actions might best affect them. cultivation. There is also little evidence to Advocates of eradication (typically those suggest that conditionality works. In without development experience) ahead of particular, crude community-based the provision of development assistance conditionality does not reflect the uneven tend to assume that alternative livelihoods nature of the development process and already exist or that development that the motivations and factors that agencies can create them quickly. In influence opium poppy cultivation differ practice neither assumption has proved across socio-economic groups. Instead, it true. As we have seen illicit drug crops are expects all farmers to reduce opium poppy typically grown in a small number of and coca cultivation at the same pace unstable, high-risk places where there are regardless of how dependent they are on few viable alternatives. Developing the crop for their livelihood. More alternatives requires resources, time and importantly the limited duration and scope the trust of households and local of the development interventions that have communities. Destroying the crops of imposed this kind of conditionality have those most dependent on them for their done little to address the causes of illicit livelihood prior to them having a viable drug crop cultivation nor provided the long- alternative does little to establish the firm term donor foundations required for long term 21 development nor does it help establish the social contract between state and community that is so critical to eliminating 62 illicit drug crop cultivation. Yet, this should not be interpreted as ruling eradication out. Eradication can play an important role when carefully phased 63 with other drug control measures. However, it works where preceded by 202 commitment required to obtain buy-in from farmers. Indeed, in the past, conditionality has led to a deterioration in the relationship between implementing agencies and local communities, with implementers complaining that communities have failed to meet drug control targets and either, 69 closing projects early or ignoring the very conditions that they imposed in the first place, and, on the other side, communities complaining of shortfalls in donor funds and that development assistance has not manifested in 70 improvements in lives and livelihoods on the ground. Moreover where assistance is tied too closely to elimination schedules there is evidence of communities threatening to grow poppy if development assistance does not continue or neighbouring villages starting to grow poppy to attract assistance. …………………………………………………………….
In Afghanistan there has been a shift away from this kind of community based conditionality that is not only informed by what has worked but that is acceptable to the bulk of the development community. Here, emphasis is being placed on identifying milestones by which the various stakeholders, and in particular the provincial authorities, involved in the delivery of provincial development plans, in which counter narcotics objectives are mainstreamed, can be judged. Indeed, within the context of mainstreaming, community level conditionality makes little sense as many of the interventions operate at a bigger scale, be that at a policy level in attempting to create an enabling environment for good governance and economic growth, or at an operational level where many interventions aimed at generating non farm income opportunities may not even be implemented within a specific rural community. Even this provincial level ‘conditionality’ does not seek to hold a province to ransom each season over its level of opium poppy cultivation. Instead, it should seek to set clear progress indicators in areas such as corruption, disarmament, security, counter narcotics and administrative reform by which progress can be assessed. Where sufficient achievements have not been made the authorities and other stakeholders will be asked to explain. It is not intended that funding will automatically be curtailed but that a dialogue will ensue that will assess what more can be done, over what time frame and with what kind of technical support. ………………………………………………………………………. 22
Eradication and conditionality: Quotation from William Byrd and Christopher Ward ‘Drugs and Development in Afghanistan, Conflict Prevention and Social Reconstruction’ Paper 18 (Washington DC, the World Bank, 2004),p.13
“At the production level, a key lesson is that eradication of illicit narcotics in the fields alone will not work and is likely to be counterproductive, resulting in perverse incentives for farmers to grow more drugs, displacement of production to more remote areas, and fueling of violence and insecurity, which in several cases forced the eradication oilicy to be reversed and led to adverse political outcomes. Neither does the approach of making eradication a condition of development assistance work-without alternative livelihoods already in place, premature eradication can alienate the affected population and damage the environment for rural development”
Extract from UNODC ‘ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT A GLOBAL THEMATIC EVALUATION Final Synthesis Report pp 14-15
“ Voluntary eradication, also problematic, involves some form of ‘conditionality’, typically stated as a written agreement with communities or households. The sequencing of alternative development and eradication enters here, that is, whether eradication should precede alternative development, happen at the same time or occur only when sustainable alternatives allow a viable income…………
Extracts from David Mansfield 2001 Failure of ‘Quid Pro Quo’
1. “In farmers’ minds. Conditionality tends to associate alternative development with law enforcement. This association can be fatal for alternative development: the two functions must always remain separate. It has been argued that eradication can succeed if coordinated with alternative development, but the record on coordination is poor”. (i.e. in practice) .
2. “The project was based on an approach of conditional development, where a given amount of assistance was provided on the basis that opium poppy would be eliminated from the target districts over a four year time period. This was formalised in the Drug Control Action Plans (DCAPs) that were signed by the local authorities and representatives of the local communities. In an attempt to ensure that the local authorities
203 and communities honoured their commitment, future project assistance was made contingent on phased schedules of reductions in opium poppy cultivation, which were detailed in the DCAPs.
Based on the level of opium poppy cultivation in 1997, the year in which the project began, Shinwar experienced a 12% reduction in opium poppy cultivation between 1997 and 2000, Ghorak a 60% reduction, Maiwand a 22% reduction, and Khakrez an 11% increase in opium poppy cultivation. According to the revised DCAPs, which used 1998 as a base year, all four districts witnessed a reduction in opium poppy cultivation between 1998 and 2000: 5% in Shinwar, 49% in Ghorak, 60% in Maiwand, and 61% in Khakrez. Unfortunately, the final review concluded that the results in the three districts in Qandahar province were attributed to the drought and not to the efforts of C28. i”
3. “More recently, Mercy Corp International, a US based NGO, has implemented a number of interventions aimed at reducing opium poppy cultivation in Helmand province. Initially, these interventions were cast in the form of crop substitution. However, with increased USG support in 1998, MCI began a two-year project that combined crop substitution with rehabilitation work on the Boghra Canal. Unfortunately, despite a commitment from the local population to abandon opium poppy, cultivation increased in the target area in 1999. Consequently, the USG ended its support for the project earlier than planned. “
From foot notes in the same paper:
1 ‘It would appear that in the absence of law enforcement, placing “conditions” on “development” issues can in fact be counter-productive and lead to what has come to be termed “reverse conditionality”, whereby the Afghan community starts to make its own demands, which if not met will lead then to grow poppy . There is a danger that the whole question of relationships between the UN and the Afghan communities concerned being reduced to a fruitless round of demand being countered by demand. Sufficient evidence exists of this occurring, to warrant a complete review of the whole issue.’ See UNDCP, Assessment Strategy and Programming Mission to Afghanistan, May-July 1995 , p. 24. (NB. this was an extract from Anthony Fitzherbert’s contribution to this Assessment Strategy Report-1995) Gebert (2000) concluded that ‘Poppy conditionality clauses which are not based on livelihood analyses and which are not based on the reality of the most opium dependent socio-economic groups, cause more harm than good. They are observed in breach ’ (p. 27). (p. 15) Whilst Sloane concluded that ‘In pursuit of the conditional development approach, the project drew up DCAPs with specific area reduction targets and clauses to the effect that assistance would be withdrawn if the targets were not met. These plans were endorse by the presumptive authorities. However, despite evidence that the area reduction targets have been clearly breached in every year, no assistance has ever been withdrawn. There is no evidence that the project was rigorously or consistently linked its development inputs to farmers individually or collectively reducing poppy plantings. Neither is there any evidence to suggest that had the project withdrawn its assistance that communities would have responded positively in poppy reduction terms ’ (p. 27) . ‘Opium poppy reduction was significantly reduced in all project target districts in the 1999-2000 winter season, particularly in Qandahar. However, it is the severe drought in these areas which has been the major influence on the fall in planted area and yield. ’ Sloane, 2000, p.3.
204
ANNEX 10.2: EIRP/IRDP in NANGARHAR
Example of current ALCIS CNC POPPY PROBABILITY MAP NANGARHAR (light green and yellow higher probability of poppy cultivation)
205
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