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Afghanistan- UTF /AFG/035/AFG Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Office of Evaluation Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP) Afghanistan- UTF /AFG/035/AFG Final Report November 2012 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Office of Evaluation (OED) This report is available in electronic format at: http://www.fao.org/evaluation The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by FAO in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. The views expressed in this information product are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of FAO. © FAO 2013 FAO encourages the use, reproduction and dissemination of material in this information product. Except where otherwise indicated, material may be copied, downloaded and printed for private study, research and teaching purposes, or for use in non-commercial products or services, provided that appropriate acknowledgement of FAO as the source and copyright holder is given and that FAO’s endorsement of users’ views, products or services is not implied in any way. All requests for translation and adaptation rights, and for resale and other commercial use rights should be made via www.fao.org/contact-us/licence-request or addressed to [email protected] . For further information on this report, please contact: Director, OED Viale delle Terme di Caracalla 1, 00153 Rome, Italy Email: [email protected] Acknowledgements The evaluation team wishes to thank the staff of FAO OED, in particular Mr Bernd Bultemeier and the administration in Rome and in the FAOR office in Kabul as well and especially, Mr Waleed Mahdi CTA, Mr Sayed Sharif SNTO and all the FAO EIRP / IRDP team in Kabul and the project Regional Offices (especially those in Balkh, Herat and Kabul visited by the team) for the efficiency with which they made arrangements for the mission, in terms of meetings with essential stakeholders and field visits to project sites and the openness with which they responded to all enquiries. Thanks are extended to members of the EIRP / IRDP PUCs and the Ministry of Energy and Water both in Kabul and in the Regions, Provinces and River Basin and sub-basin offices visited by the evaluation team. Thanks are also due to members of other Ministries and Departments of the Afghan administration (in particular MAIL and NEPA), as well as the representatives of consultants, contractors and NGOs including those directly associated with EIRP /IRDP or working on similar or related issues in the same regions as well as villagers and farmer beneficiaries of the project who gave time to answer our questions and queries with unfailing openness and courtesy. Composition of the Evaluation Team The FAO team consisted of two independent consultants recruited by FAO OED for the purpose of evaluating the Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP): a. Team Leader: Anthony Fitzherbert MSc Reading University (Great Britain) has a background in general agriculture, crop and livestock production and rural development. Experience of leading projects, programmes, responsible for teams from different disciplines as well as evaluation / review missions for different international organizations, including the FAO. He has had long experience of working in Afghanistan and the neighbouring countries in the region, going back to the late 1960s. He has a command of some of the local languages. b. Team Member:- Irrigation and Water Resources:- Johannes Oosterkamp, MAgrSc from Wageningen, (the Netherlands) has a background in Irrigation engineering and Water Resource Management, with wide international experience in different countries, including considerable experience of working in Afghanistan going back to the early 1990s working for different donors and agencies. He has experience of participating in evaluation and review missions and responsibility for leading agricultural development projects and environmental study projects. iii Table of Contents Acronyms and Glossary of Term vii Executive Summary xi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Background to the evaluation 1 1.2 Evaluation purpose and scope 1 1.3 Timing of evaluation 2 1.4 Evaluation methodology 2 1.5 Reference to other final and terminal reports 3 1.6 Evaluation schedule 4 2 Background to the EIRP (Its main components and the role of FAO) 4 2.1 Background to EIRP and FAO’s involvement 4 2.2 Project establishment and the role of FAO 6 2.3 The role of FAO and the EIRP project coordination unit 6 2.4 Summary of the project’s achievements 6 2.5 The completion of EIRP and the start of IRDP 7 2.6 The continuation of FAO TA contract for IRDP 8 2.7 MEW responsibility for the execution of EIRP/IRDP 8 2.8 Explanation as to why EIRP/IRDP is placed in the MEW 9 3 The project 10 3.1 Project budget and expenditure 10 3.1.1 EIRP and FAO components ............................................................................... 10 3.1.2 Regarding disbursement of funds ....................................................................... 12 3.1.3 Regarding the management of contracts ............................................................. 12 3.2 Partnerships 12 3.3 FAO project management and technical assistance 12 3.4 Present FAO team 13 3.5 Comment on technical backstopping 13 3.6 Observations on FAO team management and style 13 3.7 MEW PCU staffing 14 3.8 General points of management and institutional relations 14 3.9 Evaluators’ observations and comments 15 4 Component A – Rehabilitation of large, medium and small irrigation schemes 17 4.1 Narrative and technical assessment 17 4.1.1 Preliminary note Component A .......................................................................... 17 4.1.2 Background and recent history of irrigation and rehabilitation ........................... 17 4.1.3 EIRP progress and reported achievements .......................................................... 18 4.1.4 Benefits derived from Component A as reported ................................................ 19 4.1.5 Large schemes - Summary ................................................................................. 21 4.1.6 Large schemes- evaluators’ observations ........................................................... 21 4.1.7 Medium/small schemes - evaluators’ observations ............................................. 22 5 Component B - Feasibility studies 27 5.1 Lower Kokcha feasibility study 27 5.1.1 Narrative and technical assessment .................................................................... 27 5.1.2 Doubtful cost-effectiveness of the Lower Kokcha scheme ................................. 29 5.1.3 Evaluators comments on the LKIHP feasibility study ........................................ 29 5.2 Small dam development in the Northern Basin (ongoing) after Johannes Oosterkamp’s modification 32 5.2.1 Narrative and technical assessment .................................................................... 32 iv 5.2.2 Small dams - A confusing title ........................................................................... 33 5.2.3 Placing an artificial limit on the height of the dams ............................................ 33 5.2.4 The issue of sediment ........................................................................................ 34 5.2.5 Assessment of watersheds .................................................................................. 34 5.2.6 Premature social engagement with site communities .......................................... 34 5.2.7 Karstic reservoirs ............................................................................................... 35 5.2.8 ‘Enclosed basin’ and subterranean flow across frontiers ..................................... 35 6 Component B2 - Monitoring and evaluation 37 6.1 Narrative and assessment 37 6.1.1 Background ....................................................................................................... 37 6.1.2 The EIRP first baseline survey and assessments ................................................. 38 6.1.3 Some problems facing the design of baseline survey for EIRP ........................... 41 6.1.4 M&E unit staffing and the issue of retaining trained personnel .......................... 43 6.1.5 The need to strengthen data base and M&E accuracy for IRDP .......................... 44 7 Component C - Institution strengthening and technical assistance 47 7.1 Institutional strengthening 47 7.1.1 Buildings, facilities and equipment .................................................................... 47 7.1.2 Training for the MEW, PCU and other professionals ......................................... 48 7.1.3 Training for water users (farmers and mirabs) in operation and maintenance (O&M) .......................................................................................................................... 48 7.1.4 Summary of trainings completed ........................................................................ 50 7.2 Technical assistance 50 7.3 Institutional strengthening and TA: Conclusions 52 8 Component D – Hydro-meteorological
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