Introduction: Matter and Perception – Interactions Between Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Natural Philosophy

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Introduction: Matter and Perception – Interactions Between Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Natural Philosophy _full_journalsubtitle: A Journal for the Study of Science, Technology and Medicine in the Pre-modern Period _full_publisher_id: ESM _full_abbrevjournaltitle: Early Sci. Med. _full_ppubnumber: ISSN 1383-7427 (print version) _full_epubnumber: ISSN 1573-3823 (online version) _full_issue: 6 _full_issuetitle: 0 _full_alt_author_running_head (neem stramien J2 voor dit article en vul alleen 0 in hierna): 0 _full_alt_articletitle_running_head (rechter kopregel - mag alles zijn): Introduction _full_is_advance_article: 0 _full_article_language: en indien anders: engelse articletitle: 0 Introduction Early Science and Medicine 25 (2020) 537-542 537 www.brill.com/esm Introduction: Matter and Perception – Interactions between Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Natural Philosophy Doina-Cristina Rusu Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands [email protected] While the concept of ‘matter’ has received much attention from scholars of early modern philosophy, this is not the case with ‘perception,’ and is even less so when it comes to a consideration of the relationship between the two. One reason might be the fact that by ‘perception’ we usually understand sense-per- ception, and we think of the empirical theory according to which we acquire knowledge about the world through our senses, when these capture the sensi- ble qualities of external objects. But what about Leibniz’s claim that monads, simple immaterial beings, have perception, and that sensation is a more com- plex type of perception?1 According to Leibniz, the sufficient reason of change and (mechanical) motion in the material world is to be found in the percep- tion of monads: Moreover, we must confess that the perception, and what depends on it, is inexplicable in terms of mechanical reasons, that is, through shape and motions. […] Furthermore, this is all one can find in the simple substance – that is, perceptions and their changes. It is also in this alone that all the internal actions of simple substances can consist.2 For Leibniz, the mechanical interactions of material bodies will ultimately be accounted for in terms of the non-mechanical actions of simple substances, namely, the perception of monads. Perception and appetition – the monads’ tendency to go from one perception to another – are their two characteristics and the principles of change. As principles of change, they are the causes of all 1 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, The Principles of Philosophy, or, The Monadology, in Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, ed. and trans., Philosophical Essays (Indianapolis, IN, 1989), 215. The same idea is explained in The Principle of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, ibid., 208. 2 Leibniz, Monadology, 15; italics in the original. © Doina-CristinaEarly Science and Rusu, Medicine Groningen, 25 (2020) 2020 | doi:10.1163/15733823-00256P01 537-542 Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 01:17:05PM This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC-BY 4.0 license. via free access 538 Rusu motion in the created world. This is to say that, at the basic level, the building blocks of the world, the monads, are purely perceptive beings, and perception cannot be accounted for in terms of something else, as it is foundational. The context in which Leibniz talks about the perception of monads is a metaphysical one, while the aforementioned empirical discussion of acquiring knowledge about external objects though sense-perception pertains to an epistemological context. Of course, the two contexts are closely connected. According to Leibniz, sensation is a special kind of perception, specific only to animals and humans because, for these beings, perception can be accompa- nied by memory. Through perception, simple substances represent other sim- ple substances; through sense-perception, composed substances represent other composed substances.3 Leibniz’s metaphysical account of perception needs to be seen against a rich Renaissance background. One of the first authors to make perception foundational for bodies and natural phenomena was Bernardino Telesio, in his De rerum natura (first edition in two books, 1570; second edition in nine books, 1596). In Giglioni’s paraphrase, Telesio defines perception or sentience as “the ability present in active principles (heat and cold) to recognise similarities and differences while they proceed to shape matter through movements of pursuit and avoidance.”4 As for Leibniz, Telesio’s account of perception is transforma- tive, but contrary to Leibniz, Telesio’s perception is corporeal, as it presupposes physical interaction. By positing sensation or perception at the basic level of material interactions, Telesio avoids the need for an immaterial entity, such as substantial forms of the scholastics, in order to explain activity in general and life in particular. To be perceptive means to be active, and thus, given that eve- rything is perceptive of its surroundings, everything is alive, animated, vital. Of course, there is a difference between a stone, a plant, and an animal; but this difference is one of degree and not of kind. 3 For Leibniz there must be continuity between the level of monads and that of composite beings. In a letter to Lady Masham, he clearly expresses the connection between perception at the two levels: “[M]y entire Hypothesis comes down to recognizing in imperceptible and unobservable substances something proportional to what can be observed in those things within our reach. Hence, assuming for the moment that there is in us a simple Being endowed with Action and Perception, I find that Nature would be scarcely unified if the particle of matter making up human bodies were the only one endowed with features that make it infi- nitely different to the rest (even physically) and completely heterogeneous with respect to all other known bodies.” (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz to Damaris Masham, May 1704, in Jacqueline Broad, ed., Women Philosophers of Seventeenth-Century England: Selected Correspondence(New York, 2020), 197). 4 Guido Giglioni, “The First of the Moderns or the Last of the Ancients? Bernardino Telesio on Nature and Sentience,” Bruniana & Campanelliana, 16 (2010), 69-87, 72. Early Science and MedicineDownloaded from 25 Brill.com09/24/2021(2020) 537-542 01:17:05PM via free access Introduction 539 Several natural philosophers in the second half of the sixteenth and the sev- enteenth centuries followed Telesio’s naturalist approach and used matter’s perceptivity to explain a wide range of phenomena. One of the most promi- nent is no doubt Tommaso Campanella, Telesio’s advocate. In his On the Sense of Things and on Magic (Del senso delle cose e della magia, 1604), Campanella makes perception the principle of identity: through perceiving the surround- ing bodies, each body becomes aware of its own existence, at the same time as it recognises similitudes and differences in the other bodies. Every action is thus a reaction to the act of perception: bodies accept or reject other bodies depending on whether the latter help or hinder their self-preservation.5 Fran- cis Bacon, Jan Baptista van Helmont, Francis Glisson, Anne Conway, and Mar- garet Cavendish, to name a few authors before Leibniz, make use of the concept of perception in a metaphysical context, and they all promote a vitalist matter theory, in some cases as a clear counterpart to the mechanical philosophy, which presents matter as dead and inert. Two of the papers in this thematic issue deal with this metaphysical aspect. While Dana Jalobeanu shows how Bacon creates instruments able to measure the subtle perception of bodies, the ontological interpretation which Laura Georgescu offers of Cavendish’s approach to perception seems to imply that the intimate knowledge of the other bodies’ perceptive actions is not a matter of measurement, but of interacting with these actions and experiencing them. Moreover, Georgescu’s paper argues that for Cavendish, metaphysical per- ception cannot be understood in analogy with sense-perception, since they are completely different. In this metaphysical context, matter perceives and is being perceived, which is to say that in perception, there is no active and passive body, as there is activ- ity everywhere. This rejection of the active-passive distinction becomes more problematic in the epistemological context: Are the senses active or passive? Is the perceived object active or passive? These questions received different an- swers depending on the tradition to which the authors discussed in this the- matic issue belonged. The answer depended on the status of the perceived entity, this is to say, on the underlying matter theory.6 5 See Guido Giglioni, “Senso, linguaggio e divinatione nella filosofia di Tommaso Campanella,” Rivista di Storia della Filosofia, 64 (2009), 309-320. 6 For an overview of different answers to the issue of active sense perception, see Jose Felipe Silva and Mikko Yrjonsuuri, eds., Active Perception in the History of Philosophy. From Plato to Modern Philosophy (Cham, 2014). On sense perception, see Simo Knuuttila and Pekka Kärkkäinen, eds., Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy (Dordrecht, 2008). Early Science and Medicine 25 (2020) 537-542 Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 01:17:05PM via free access 540 Rusu For Aristotelian-scholastic authors, bodies have primary qualities (heat, cold, moisture, and dryness), secondary qualities (depending on the combina- tions of the primary qualities) and tertiary or occult qualities (which depend on their form). Primary and secondary qualities depend on matter, but the act of perception does not always involve material entities. Many authors used explanations in term of immaterial species emitted by the objects and received by the senses.7 In the mechanical philosophy, which became prevalent in the seventeenth century, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities changed drastically. Secondary qualities now referred to the sensory qualities and were dependent on the perceiver. At the same time, they remain reducible to the primary qualities, the size, shape, motion, solidity, and texture of the particles of matter. The act of sense-perception itself will be nothing more than matter in motion.
Recommended publications
  • Perception Is Truth
    Perception is Truth... WHEN IT COMES TO LEASING AND SHOPPING REPORTS What is the truth? This age old question has some very deep implications that go way beyond the point of this training tip. Yet, the question reminds us that two people can experience the same incident and walk away with completely different perceptions of what actually happened. Sometimes, just like beauty, "truth” is in the eye of the beholder. It is a matter of perception. Shopping report information is a vivid example of the fact that perception is reality. Occasionally, an EPMS shopper remembers a specific leasing presentation somewhat differently than the on-site professional who was shopped and later evaluated in a written format. The shopper reports that the leasing consultant was a bit distracted and indifferent, not very friendly, or “didn’t seem interested in meeting my needs”. Yet, that individual’s supervisor cannot believe that this very friendly and warm staff member could ever come across in any way but delightful, enthusiastic and professional! “Everyone loves her!” the supervisor explains. Sometimes the gap between what the leasing professional believes about her presentation and what the shopper describes comes down to perception. Regardless of what really (or not really!) happened, the perception of the shopper – and that of the typical rental prospect – is the only “truth” that really matters! Leasing is all about perception, isn’t it? Fellow onsite associates may say, “He is the friendliest guy you’ll ever meet! We love him!” But if this “friendliest guy” is perceived as unfriendly, to that prospect he is unfriendly! “You know, Sara is really nice once you get to know her!” This may be “true”; but the reality is the prospect is unlikely to spend enough time “getting to know” Sara to override their initial impression.
    [Show full text]
  • Studies on Collingwood, History and Civilization
    Studies on Collingwood, History and Civilization Jan van der Dussen Studies on Collingwood, History and Civilization Jan van der Dussen Heerlen , The Netherlands ISBN 978-3-319-20671-4 ISBN 978-3-319-20672-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20672-1 Library of Congress Control Number: 2015951386 Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifi cally the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfi lms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specifi c statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Printed on acid-free paper Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www. springer.com) Acknowledgements The following four essays are reproduced from their original publication.
    [Show full text]
  • Perception and Law Enforcement
    Perception and Law Enforcement Lt. Norman Hale White County Sheriff Department School of Law Enforcement Supervision Session XXXII Criminal Justice Institute Introduction Since the beginning, perception has been used by everyone. When man first said I am naked, I need clothing. The perception was I am naked. Without understanding why things are the way they appear man was fearful of the world around him. Superstitions overwhelmed man and his thoughts. It was an effort to explain the unexplainable. This is the perception of man and his surroundings. Early man worshiped nature in an attempt to change what was happening. At one time, it was believed that a man lived in the moon. This was based on the face seen on the moon. More resonantly, many believed there was or had been life on Mars, because of a photo taken as a satellite passed Mars showing a face on the surface (face on mars). This raised a large stir among people and the scientific community. It was not until some time later when a new photo was taken by a passing satellite, that the face on Mars proved to be a mountain and the face was formed by shadows cast across the surface of the mountain (face on mars). The attempt to understand how things are perceived goes back before the Egyptians were building pyramids. Modern man has devoted an extensive amount of time to studying perception and how it affects man. As the understanding of perception increases, the mystery that caused many superstitions is solved and man is no longer fearful.
    [Show full text]
  • Perceptual Causality, Counterfactuals, and Special Causal Concepts
    OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 19/10/2011, SPi 3 Perceptual Causality, Counterfactuals, and Special Causal Concepts Johannes Roessler On one view, an adequate account of causal understanding may focus exclusively on what is involved in mastering general causal concepts (concepts such as ‘x causes y’ or ‘p causally explains q’). An alternative view is that causal understanding is, partly but irreducibly, a matter of grasping what Anscombe called special causal concepts, con- cepts such as ‘push’, ‘flatten’,or‘knock over’. We can label these views generalist vs particularist approaches to causal understanding. It is worth emphasizing that the contrast here is not between two kinds of theories of the metaphysics of causation, but two views of the nature and perhaps source of ordinary causal understanding. One aim of this paper is to argue that it would be a mistake to dismiss particularism because of its putative metaphysical commitments. I begin by formulating an intuitively attractive version of particularism due to P.F. Strawson, a central element of which is what I will call na¨ıve realism concerning mechanical transactions. I will then present the account with two challenges. Both challenges reflect the worry that Strawson’s particularism may be unable to acknowledge the intimate connection between causa- tion and counterfactuals, as articulated by the interventionist approach to causation. My project will be to allay these concerns, or at least to explore how this might be done. My (tentative) conclusion will be that Strawson’sna¨ıve realism can accept what interventionism has to say about ordinary causal understanding, and that intervention- ism should not be seen as being committed to generalism.
    [Show full text]
  • Unity of Mind, Temporal Awareness, and Personal Identity
    UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE THE LEGACY OF HUMEANISM: UNITY OF MIND, TEMPORAL AWARENESS, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY DISSERTATION submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in Philosophy by Daniel R. Siakel Dissertation Committee: Professor David Woodruff Smith, Chair Professor Sven Bernecker Associate Professor Marcello Oreste Fiocco Associate Professor Clinton Tolley 2016 © 2016 Daniel R. Siakel DEDICATION To My mother, Anna My father, Jim Life’s original, enduring constellation. And My “doctor father,” David Who sees. “We think that we can prove ourselves to ourselves. The truth is that we cannot say that we are one entity, one existence. Our individuality is really a heap or pile of experiences. We are made out of experiences of achievement, disappointment, hope, fear, and millions and billions and trillions of other things. All these little fragments put together are what we call our self and our life. Our pride of self-existence or sense of being is by no means one entity. It is a heap, a pile of stuff. It has some similarities to a pile of garbage.” “It’s not that everything is one. Everything is zero.” Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche “Galaxies of Stars, Grains of Sand” “Rhinoceros and Parrot” ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v CURRICULUM VITAE vi ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION xii INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I: Hume’s Appendix Problem and Associative Connections in the Treatise and Enquiry §1. General Introduction to Hume’s Science of Human Nature 6 §2. Introducing Hume’s Appendix Problem 8 §3. Contextualizing Hume’s Appendix Problem 15 §4.
    [Show full text]
  • Imperfect Perception and Vagueness
    Imperfect Perception and Vagueness Giri Parameswaran∗& Timothy Lambie-Hansony March 27, 2016 VERY PRELIMINARY & INCOMPLETE Abstract This paper investigates the epistemic approach to vagueness that the source of vagueness is the speaker's inability to perfectly perceive the world. We study a standard communication game and show that imperfect perception is insucient to render vague communication about the world as perceived by the sender. However, if the receiver interprets the sender's message as a true statement about the world, rather than merely how it appears to the sender, then language becomes vague. We show that this vagueness is characterized by probability distributions that describe the degree to which a statement is likely to be true. Hence, we provide micro-foundations for truth- degree functions as an equilibrium consequence of the sender's perception technology and the optimal, non-vague language in the perceived world thereby unifying the epistemic and truth-degree approaches to vagueness. ∗Department of Economics, Haverford College, Haverford, PA 19041. Email: [email protected] yDepartment of Economics, Haverford College, Haverford, PA 19041. Email: [email protected] 1 1 Introduction Language is vague when the receiver cannot be certain of which `states' the sender of a message seeks to invoke. For example, although we routinely describe people or things as tall, heavy, fast, and so on, we would, in most cases, struggle to identify the boundary between tall and short, or between fast and slow. Indeed, vagueness is often associated with a `blurring of the boundaries' between the meanings of words. Many theories seek to explain the nature and source of vagueness.
    [Show full text]
  • Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality
    3 Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality Daniel W Smith Aesthetics since Kant has been haunted by a seemingly irretractable dualism. On the one hand. aesthetics designates the theory of sensib­ ility as the form of possible experience; on the other hand, it desig­ nates the theory of art as a rdl ection on real experience. The first is the objective element of sensation. which is conditioned by the a priori Conns of space and time (the 'T ranscendental Aesthetic ' aCthe en"rique of Pure Reason); the second is the subjective element of sensation, which is expressed in the feeling of pleasure and pain (the 'Critiqu e of Aesthetic Judgment' in the Critique of Judgment) , Gilles Deleuze ar­ gues that these two aspects of the theory of sensation (aesthetics) can � reunited only at the pric e of a radic al recasting of the transcenden­ tal project as form!Jlated by Kant, pushing it in the direction of what Schelling once called a 'superior empiricism': it is only when the conditions of experience in general become the genetic conditions of experience that they can be reunited with the structures of works real of an. In this case, the principles of sensation would at the same time Constitute the principles of composition of the work of art, and conver­ sely it would be the structure of the work of that reveals these conditions. I In what follows, I would like to examinean the means by �'hich Deleuze anempts to overcome this duality in aesthetics. follow­ this single thread through the network of his thought, even if in tramgcin g this line we sacrifice a cenain amount of detail in favor of a nain perspicuity.
    [Show full text]
  • Perception and Representation in Leibniz
    PERCEPTION AND REPRESENTATION IN LEIBNIZ by Stephen Montague Puryear B.S., Mechanical Engineering, North Carolina State University, 1994 M.A., Philosophy, Texas A&M University, 2000 M.A., Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 2004 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2006 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY This dissertation was presented by Stephen Montague Puryear It was defended on December 5, 2005 and approved by Nicholas Rescher University Professor of Philosophy Robert B. Brandom Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy Stephen Engstrom Associate Professor of Philosophy J. E. McGuire Professor of History and Philosophy of Science Dissertation Director: Nicholas Rescher University Professor of Philosophy ii Copyright °c by Stephen Montague Puryear 2006 iii PERCEPTION AND REPRESENTATION IN LEIBNIZ Stephen Montague Puryear, Ph.D. University of Pittsburgh, 2006 Though Leibniz’s views about perception and representation go to the heart of his philosophy, they have received surprisingly little attention over the years and in many ways continue to be poorly understood. I aim to redress these shortcomings. The body of the work begins with an exploration of Leibniz’s proposed analysis of representation (Chapter 2). Here I argue that on this analysis representation consists in a kind of structural correspondence— roughly an isomorphism—between representation and thing represented. Special attention is given to the application of this analysis to the challenging cases of linguistic and mental representation. The next two chapters concern what I take to be the central issue of the work: the nature of distinct perception.
    [Show full text]
  • The Value of Perception
    This is a repository copy of The Value of Perception. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/138062/ Version: Published Version Article: Allen, Keith Malcolm orcid.org/0000-0002-3219-2102 (2019) The Value of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. pp. 633-656. ISSN 0031-8205 https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12574 Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Philosophy and Phenomenological Research doi: 10.1111/phpr.12574 © 2019 The Authors. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Philosophy and Phenonmenological Research Inc. The Value of Perception KEITH ALLEN University of York This paper develops a form of transcendental na€ıve realism. According to na€ıve realism, veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational. According to transcendental na€ıve realism, the na€ıve realist theory of perception is not just one theory of perception amongst others, to be established as an inference to the best explanation and assessed on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis that weighs performance along a number of different dimensions: for instance, fidelity to appearances, simplicity, systematicity, fit with scientific theo- ries, and so on.
    [Show full text]
  • Managing Reality Truth Or Perception?
    Managing Reality Karen Natzel, Business Therapist, K Communications Truth or Perception? As a philosophy student in college, I recall my professor putting forth the notion that perhaps this table in front of us didn’t actually exist. I remember thinking, “This guy is nuts.” At the time I didn’t fully appreciate the value of my philosophical studies. Now I see that the exercises trained my brain for critical thinking and challenging reality – necessary skills for navigating our dynamic and complex world. Perception is the lens through which we view reality – ourselves, others and the world. It’s a cognitive process by which we select, organize and give meaning to environmental stimuli. Reality is the state of things as they actually exist, rather than as they may appear or are interpreted. We often collapse the two – we assume our perceptions are the truth – without even realizing we are doing it. The bumper sticker I encountered captures it well: Don’t believe everything you think. What’s this got to do with your organization’s health? Perceptions drive people’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviors. They can impact whether or not people embrace change, trust leadership, and actively engage and collaborate. Perceptions shape the very culture of your organization, thereby driving performance. Organizational Health Assessment. Often when I start working with a new client we begin with an organizational assessment. I conduct interviews and surveys and examine communication channels; I observe how meetings are run and how teams work together; I review strategic plans, organizational charts, job descriptions, etc. When I deliver my report and recommendations, some of the feedback unveils insights that can be difficult to hear.
    [Show full text]
  • How Reliable Is Perception?
    1 How reliable is perception? Gary Lupyan Department of Psychology University of Wisconsin-Madison Prepared for the Epistemology and Cognition Conference in Honor of the 30th Anniversary of Alvin Goldman’s Publication of Epistemology and Cognition. College of William and Mary, Sept 9-10, 2016 To Appear in Philosophical Topics Gary Lupyan University of Wisconsin-Madison 1202 W. Johnson St. Madison, WI 53706 [email protected] 2 Abstract People believe that perception is reliable and that what they perceive reflects objective reality. On this view, we perceive a red circle because there is something out there that is a red circle. It is also commonly believed that perceptual reliability is threatened if what we see is allowed to be influenced by what we know or expect. I argue that although human perception is often (but not always) highly consistent and stable, it is difficult to evaluate its reliability because when it comes to perception, it is unclear how one could establish a fact of the matter. An alternative to thinking of perception as being in the business of truth, is thinking of it as being in the business of transducing sensory energy into a form useful for guiding adaptive behavior. On this position, perception ought to be (and, as I argue, is) richly influenced by some types of knowledge insofar as this knowledge can aid in the construction of useful representations from sensory input. 3 1. Introduction As I am assured by those who know more than I, many philosophers believe that perception is in the business of providing us with facts of the matter.
    [Show full text]
  • A Deterministic Model of the Free Will Phenomenon Abstract
    A deterministic model of the free will phenomenon A deterministic model of the free will phenomenon Dr Mark J Hadley Department of Physics, University of Warwick Abstract The abstract concept of indeterministic free will is distinguished from the phenomenon of free will. Evidence for the abstract concept is examined and critically compared with various designs of automata. It is concluded that there is no evidence to support the abstract concept of indeterministic free will, it is inconceivable that a test could be constructed to distinguish an indeterministic agent from a complicated automaton. Testing the free will of an alien visitor is introduced to separate prejudices about who has free will from objective experiments. The phenomenon of free will is modelled with a deterministic decision making agent. The agent values ‘independence’ and satisfies a desire for independence by responding to ‘challenges’. When the agent generates challenges internally it will establish a record of being able to do otherwise. In principle a computer could be built with a free will property. The model also explains false attributions of free will (superstitions). Key words: free will; Determinism; Quantum theory; Predictability; Choice; Automata; A deterministic model of the free will phenomenon 1. Introduction We challenge the evidence for indeterminism and develop a deterministic model of our decision making which makes new predictions. The relation between free will and physics is contentious and puzzling at all levels. Philosophers have debated how free will can be explained with current scientific theories. There is debate about the meaning of the term free will, even leading to questions about whether or not we have anything called free will.
    [Show full text]