Closure of Accounting Fraud in the Federal Republic of Germany – a Study on the Effectiveness of the Legal Guidelines for Preventing and Disclosing Accounting Fraud
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FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS Y DE LA EMPRESA Departamento de Ciencias Sociales, Juridicas y de la Empresa Black Sheep on Green Pastures – Prevention und Dis- closure of Accounting Fraud in the Federal Republic of Germany – A study on the effectiveness of the legal guidelines for preventing and disclosing Accounting Fraud Thomas Myslisch Prof. Dr. Jens M. Schmittmann Prof. Dr. Gonzalo Wandosell Fernandez de Bobadilla Elsdorf, 18 April 2014 3 4 THOmas MysLISCH Table OF COntents 5 Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………… 9 Register OF IllustratiOns ………………………………………………………… 11 List OF Tables …………………………………………………………………………… 12 List OF AbbreViatiOns ……………………………………………………………… 13 1 IntrOductiON ……………………………………………………… 17 1.1 ReleVance …………………………………………………………………………… 19 1.2 ObjectiVE …………………………………………………………………………… 24 1.3 THE Study’S Structure……………………………………………………………… 26 2 AccOunting Fraud ……………………………………………… 27 2.1 AccOunting Irregularities in THE COnteXT OF WHite-COllar Crime ……………………………………………………………… 28 2.2 Factual Findings OF AccOunting Fraud …………………………………… 32 2.3 EXplanatOry MOdels FOR THE Act OF Manipulating AccOunts ………………………………………………………… 36 2.3.1 Fraud Triangle / Fraud DiamOnd …………………………………………… 36 2.3.2 ApprOacHes TO FurtHer DEVELOpments …………………………………… 43 2.3.2.1 THE LeipZiger PROgressiON MOdel OF WHite-COllar Crime ………… 43 2.3.2.2 THE Offenders MOtiVes FOR COmmitting WHite-COllar Crime ………………………………………………………………… 49 2.3.2.3 PROfiles OF WHite-COllar Criminals ………………………………………… 50 2.3.3 LOOKing at THE AccOunting Fraudster …………………………………… 55 2.3.4 THE Principle OF SHareHOlder Value ……………………………………… 58 2.4 Results OF AccOunting Irregularities …………………………………… 60 2.4.1 ImplicatiOns FOR COmpanies …………………………………………………… 60 2.4.2 ImplicatiOns FOR COmpany Owners, INVestOrs and SHareHOlders 62 2.4.3 ImplicatiOns FOR THE PerpetratOR …………………………………………… 63 2.4.4 ImplicatiOns FOR SOciety: State, COnsumer, ECONOmy ……………… 66 3 CatalOgue OF measures TO strengtHen COmpanies’ integrity and TO prOtect INVestOrs …… 69 3.1 PersOnal Liability OF EXecutiVE BOdies …………………………………… 72 3.1.1 Liability TOwards THE COrpOratiON ………………………………………… 73 3.1.2 Liability TOwards TO SHareHOlders ………………………………………… 89 3.1.2.1 InfOmatec-DecisiOns ……………………………………………………………… 90 3.1.2.2 THE Cases COmrOad and EM.TV ………………………………………………… 92 3.1.2.3 EXternal Liability OF THE BOard Pursuant TO § 826 BGB ……………… 93 6 THOmas MysLISCH 3.1.2.4 BOard Members’ Internal Liability Pursuant TO FurtHer Claims Based ON TOrt …………………………………………… 98 3.1.2.5 A Bill: THE Act GOVerning Liability FOR Capital MarKet InfOrmatiON ………………………………………………… 99 3.1.2.6 THE German Capital MarKets MOdel Case Act (KapMUG) …………… 102 3.1.2.7 COnclusiOn …………………………………………………………………………… 116 3.2 German COrpOrate GOVernance ……………………………………………… 121 3.2.1 COrpOrate GOVernance ………………………………………………………… 121 3.2.2 THE German COrpOrate GOVernance COde (DCGK) …………………… 124 3.2.3 COntent and CHanges Made TO THE German COrpOrate GOVernance COde (2013) due TO THE CatalOgue OF Measures TO StrengtHen COmpanies’ Integrity and TO PROtect INVestOrs 128 3.2.4 ImpOrtant CHanges Made in THE German COrpOrate GOVernance COde Dated 26.05.2010 COmpared TO THE VersiON Dated 18.06.2009 …… 138 3.2.5 FurtHer ImpOrtant RegulatiOns OF THE German COrpOrate GOVernance COde …………………………………… 141 3.2.6 COnseQuences FOR EVeryday WORK …………………………………………… 146 3.3 FurtHer deVELOpment OF AccOunting Standards and its adaptiON TO internatiOnal accOunting principles ………………… 148 3.3.1 THE (German) AccOunting RefOrm Act …………………………………… 148 3.3.1.1 EXercising THE DecisiON RigHts FOR THE Separate Financial Statement ……………………………………………………………… 149 3.3.1.2 EXtended Detail OF NOtes ………………………………………………………… 151 3.3.1.3 EXtended Management RepOrt ………………………………………………… 151 3.3.1.4 EXercising THE DecisiON RigHts FOR THE GROup AccOunts ………… 153 3.3.1.5 ABOlitiON OF THE COnsOlidatiON PROHibitiON Pursuant TO § 295 HGB …………………………………………………………………………… 154 3.3.1.6 EXtensiON OF THE Items WitHin THE COnsOlidated Financial Statements …………………………………………………………… 154 3.3.1.7 EValuatiOn …………………………………………………………………………… 154 3.3.2 THE German Act TO MOderniZE AccOunting Law (BilMOG) ………… 157 3.4 StrengtHening THE ROle OF THE Independent AuditOR ……………… 174 3.4.1 THE Principle OF Independence ………………………………………………… 175 3.4.2 InternatiOnal Auditing Standard ………………………………………… 178 3.4.3 THE DeclaratiON OF COmpliance and COrpOrate GOVernance Statement ………………………………………… 179 3.4.4 THE RespOnsibilities OF THE GROup AuditOR ……………………………… 180 3.4.5 SeparatiON OF Independent Audits and COnsultatiON …………… 180 3.4.6 AppOinting THE EXternal AuditOR and RepOrting OF THE AuditOR ………………………………………………… 186 3.4.7 EXternal Versus Internal AuditOR ROtatiON ………………………… 189 Table OF COntents 7 3.4.8 Public DisclOsure OF Fees ………………………………………………………… 194 3.4.9 EXtensiON OF Liability ……………………………………………………………… 196 3.4.10 CHanges TO THE PROfessiOnal SuperVisiON ……………………………… 198 3.4.11 COnclusiOn …………………………………………………………………………… 203 3.5 MOnitOring THE legality OF specific COmpany accOunting by an independent SOurce (“EnfOrcement“) ………… 206 3.5.1 THE German Financial RepOrting EnfOrcement Panel (DPR/FREP) …………………………………………………………………………… 207 3.5.2 THE Federal Financial SuperVisOry AutHOrity (BAFin) ……………… 214 3.5.3 AN EValuatiON OF THE German EnfOrcement System ………………… 217 3.6 ElectrOnic PublicatiON OF A COmpany’S AccOunts …………………… 222 3.7 ENHancing THE PROtectiON OF INVestOrs ………………………………… 234 3.7.1 Insider Trading LegislatiON Pursuant TO THE INVestOR PROtectiON ImprOVement Act …………………………………… 234 3.7.2 AD-HOC Public Releases AccOrding TO THE INVestOR PROtectiON ImprOVement Act …………………………………… 239 3.7.3 TransactiON RepOrting REQuirements FOR Members OF THE Management Pursuant TO THE INVestOR PROtectiON ImprOVement Act …………………………………… 243 3.7.4 THE PROHibitiON OF Rate and MarKet Price ManipulatiON Pursuant TO THE INVestOR PROtectiON ImprOVement Act ………… 245 3.8 POint Nine and Ten OF THE GOVernment’S CatalOgue OF Measures 249 4 Structure OF THE ResearcH Design ……………………… 251 4.1 MetHODOLOgy applied TO THE empirical Study ………………………… 254 4.2 Assessment OF THE RegulatiOns by THE COmpanies POlled ………… 262 4.3 EValuatiON OF THE usefulness OF POssible COncrete measures by THE COmpanies POlled ………………………… 270 4.4 THE POlled COmpanies’ EValuatiON OF THE COst-benefit ratiO ………………………………………………………………… 273 4.5 Assessing THE OutcOmes ………………………………………………………… 278 5 COnclusiON ………………………………………………………… 285 Table OF EnclOsures ………………………………………………………………… 293 BibliOgrapHy …………………………………………………………………………… 327 8 THOmas MysLISCH Abstract 9 ABSTRACT According to a study of KPMG in 2010 the share of companies regarding white collar crime as a serious problem for economy increased by nine percent in 2006 to 2010. Blue chips companies even valued this problem at ninety percent. It was assumed that the extend of economy crimes will increase further. The German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation stated that white collar crime is responsi- ble for more than 4 Billion €, which exceeds fifty percent of the total damage for the year 2011. Criminal offences in financial statements, the topic of this investigation started in spring 2011, are mainly carried out without being realised. Therefore it is impossible to furnish reliable figures in undetected crimes; however according to appropriate literature it is estimated up to 80 percent. The reasons for this are seen in insufficient regulations of legal guidelines by a number of authors. The focus should especially be directed to the question how the measures of detection and prevention of accounting fraud are presented by the government and how their efficiency is estimated. Therefore the “Catalogue of Measures to Strengthen Companies´ Integrity and to Protect Investors” of 2003 and the result- ing legitimation are the central point. The issue of this investigation is to find out how the companies registered in the DAX, MDAX, SDAX and Tec-DAX estimate the efficiency of the Catalogue of Measures of the government in regard to its intention. Hereby the estimation of the efficiency of individual points is reflected and is listed in a ranking by the companies. In addition companies are asked for the estimation of further appro- priate and possible measures and the evaluation of the cost-benefit-ratio of the measures taken by the companies. The results of the investigation presented in the following are based on the evaluation of questionnaires sent to 160 companies reg- istered in the four DAX segments in the time of the end of April to the beginning of December 2012. 10 THOmas MysLISCH The results show that the representatives of the companies assess the legal regulations concerning the disclosure and prevention of accounting fraud on the whole as helpful. The majority of the companies claim that the legal implementa- tion of the “10-Point-Program” of the government can be considered sufficient for their own company with regard to disclosure and prevention of accounting fraud. Only one of five possible suggested measures for the prevention and disclosure of accounting fraud was accepted. Concerning the cost-benefit ratio the majority of the companies state that the costs overweigh the benefits. Whereas the effect of legal measures is differently discussed in the litera- ture, the evaluation by big companies can be defined as sufficient concerning legal regulations but companies even criticise them with regards to the costs. The given results of the survey correspond to KPMG´s research dated 2012, which state, that concerning white-collar-crime-affected companies the number