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PP8 Kibaroglu RCS Water Web.Pdf Middle East Institute September 2016 Regional Cooperation Series Natural Cooperation Facing Water Challenges in the Middle East Aysegül Kibaroglu MEI Policy Paper 2016-8 © 2016 The Middle East Institute The Middle East Institute 1761 N Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 Follow MEI: @MiddleEastInst /MiddleEastInstitute /user/middleastinstitute MEI Policy Paper 2016-8 Natural Cooperation Facing Water Challenges in the Middle East Aysegül Kibaroglu Middle East Institute Regional Cooperation Series Abbreviations D.o.P. Declaration of Principles F.o.E.M.E. Friends of the Earth Middle East I.P.O.E. International Panel of Experts ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria J.T.C. Joint Technical Committee MENA Middle East and North Africa N.B.I. Nile Basin Initiative N.G.O. Non-governmental Organization S.A.D.C. Southern African Development Community Contents 1 Introduction 2 Existing Key Water Disputes 7 Where Are We Today in Terms of Regional Water Cooperation? 13 Where will the Region be in 2030 without Cooperation? 16 The Benefits of Regional Cooperation 20 Where Could the Region be in 2030 in a Scenario Involving Significant Regional Water Cooperation? 24 Endnotes Summary he Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is regarded as one of the most Twater-challenged regions in the world. The destabilizing impact of its resource constraints is compounded by the fact that some 60 percent of the region’s water flows across international borders, generating and exacerbating political tensions between states. Water insecurity will increase in the MENA region if the current situation of minimal water cooperation persists under the disabling conditions of political volatility, economic disintegration, institutional failure, and environmental degradation. Experiences from around the world demonstrate that countries that have achieved regional water cooperation have prospered together and kept the threat of conflict a remote possibility. It is time for the countries in the Middle East to realize that there is no alternative to sustainable water cooperation. Key Findings Water management is an important instrument for the prevention of conflict If MENA countries continue to pursue uncoordinated water-based development policies, the region may face severe food shortages by 2030- 2040 Historical examples show that there is a close relationship between peace and water cooperation and vice versa MENA has yet to witness a full-scale war over water, but it has proven to be a multiplier of factors causing conflict Lesson to be learned from Syria’s civil war, where the severe drought for 2006-2010 had a catalytic effect Introduction he vital importance of water for human security and sustainable development Thas received worldwide attention. Much emphasis has been placed on the global status of water, namely water scarcity and a lack of access to clean water and sanitation. Certain regions are far weaker than others in terms of shared surface and groundwater resources between two or more countries. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is regarded as one of the most challenged regions in this regard. In addition to the constraints of its natural water resources, “Half of the MENA region’s MENA suffers from an population lives under abundance of issues that compound water security, conditions of water stress.” including a rapidly growing population, disparate economic development, limited amounts of irregularly distributed water supply, negative impacts of climate change and variability, and poor water management and allocation practices both within and between states. The geopolitical importance of the region, and the conflicts that have consequently resulted, aggravate the usual problems of sharing water in a variety of MENA settings, such as in the transboundary river basins of the Jordan, the Euphrates-Tigris, and the Nile. While MENA covers 4.9 percent of the total area of the world and contains 4.4 percent of its population, its water resources, which total 484 km3, are only about 1.1 percent of the total renewable water resources of the world. Moreover, large differences exist between MENA’s countries and its sub-regions. Globally, the average per capita water availability is close to 7,000 m3/person/year, whereas in MENA, only 1,200 m3/person/year is available. Half of the region’s population lives under conditions of water stress.1 Moreover, with the population expected to grow from 300 million today to 500 million in 2025, per capita water availability is expected to halve by 2050, with serious consequences for the region’s already-stressed groundwater and natural hydrological system.2 Some 60 percent of the region’s water flows across Natural Cooperation 1 international borders, complicating the resource management challenge. Every major river in the region crosses one or more international border, and 50 percent of MENA’s population depends on water flowing from another sovereign state. Political considerations of individual states exert pressure on water policies and often lead to policies that have unforeseen and serious consequences on populations and states downstream. In addition to being one of the most arid regions in the world, MENA experiences high natural variability in precipitation. With global warming and climate change, variability and aridity are both likely to increase. Researchers have identified an increasing “50 percent of MENA’s population tendency in annual depends on water flowing from and seasonal drought intensity another sovereign state.” corresponding with an increasing number of dry days in the rainy season.3 There is evidence that climate change is already beginning to influence droughts in the area by reducing winter rainfall and increasing evapotranspiration at rates higher than can be explained by natural variability alone. Recent climate simulations all indicate growing water- related risks from higher temperatures, increased evaporative water demands, reductions in future runoff levels, and changes in the timing of runoff.4 Existing Key Water Disputes All the major transboundary river basins in MENA are in sub-regions that have experienced severe political tensions. These political circumstances have aggravated past water disputes, which otherwise might have been solved had the political climate been more favorable. In other words, water disputes were overlaid, or at least influenced, by multifaceted interstate conflicts involving disputes over security, borders, and other issues.5 2 Kibaroglu Jordan River Basin The Jordan River system includes Israel, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Syria and Lebanon. Total water availability in the Jordan basin is very limited. The riparians of the Jordan system place it among the countries with the lowest per capita water availability in the world. To complicate this harsh hydrological setting, the region has been the locus of a protracted political struggle.6 Since 1967, “resource capture” has been a cause for water disputes in the Jordan basin. Its occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights gave Israel almost total control over the headwaters of the Jordan River and its tributaries, as well as control over the major recharge region for its groundwater aquifers. Hence, much of the tension over water between the Palestinians and the Israelis relates to discrimination in water allocation, pricing, and delivery systems.7 Water consumption by Israeli settlers in the West Bank is roughly eight to ten times that of the Palestinians.8 With rapid population growth (3 percent per year), declining water availability in the West Bank is a tightening constraint on Natural Cooperation 3 agriculture and human use.9 To illustrate, water became a bone of contention between Israel and Lebanon in 2002. The Lebanese initiative to divert water from the Wazzani River— the main source of the Hasbani River, which contributes approximately 25 percent of the Jordan River’s water—deepened the rift between Israel and Lebanon. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had described the project as a casus belli, arguing that Israel could not allow the project to proceed. A hot conflict between two states was averted through U.S. mediation.10 Hence, the water dispute in the Jordan basin is a distribution conflict embedded in a protracted political (Arab-Israeli) conflict, displaying all the characteristics of a zero-sum game. Nile River Basin In the late 1920s, under the full control of Britain, colonial water-sharing agreements were concluded throughout the Nile basin. Following the wave of independence in Africa in the 1950s, all upstream riparian states declared those agreements void, including the most important one, the 1929 Nile Water Agreement. This was later replaced by the still legally binding 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, under which the two riparians agreed to share the water with 75 percent and 25 percent for Egypt and Sudan, respectively.11 The 1959 agreement has never been accepted by any of the upstream riparians, remaining a cause for recurring tensions. Egypt, so heavily dependent on the Nile waters, has used its “Water became a bone of military might and hegemonic status to threaten any upper contention between Israel and riparian, primarily Ethiopia, from undertaking any projects Lebanon in 2002.” that would risk Egypt’s share of the Nile.12 Challenging this historical status quo, in March 2011, the Ethiopian government announced plans to construct a hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which is expected to generate approximately 6,000MW of electricity, becoming Africa’s largest power plant. Concerns have been raised over the dam’s impact on Egypt. Tensions over the dam increased in May 2011 when Ethiopia temporarily diverted the flow of the Blue Nile as part of the construction process. After exchanges of harsh rhetoric 4 Kibaroglu between the heads of states, the foreign ministers of Egypt and Ethiopia met and agreed to hold further talks on the construction of the dam in June 2011.13 The current water dispute in the Nile basin intimately relates to the unfair clauses in the historical bilateral sharing agreements.
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