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Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran

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Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Support RAND Purchase this document TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. The Next Supreme Leader Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran Alireza Nader, David E. Thaler, S. R. Bohandy Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H- 06-C-0002. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nader, Alireza. The next supreme leader : succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran / Alireza Nader, David E. Thaler, S. R. Bohandy. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-5133-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Heads of state—Succession—Iran. 2. Iran—Politics and government—1997- I. Thaler, David E. II. Bohandy, S. R. III. Title. JQ1786.N33 2011 320.955—dc22 2011002805 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover photo: Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran to deliver a speech, with a picture of the late spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, on the wall behind (AP). © Copyright 2011 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/ permissions.html). Published 2011 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface As the commander in chief and highest political authority in Iran, the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has played a criti- cal role in the direction of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This has never been more true than during the tumultuous 2009 presidential elec- tions, the outcome of which was determined by Khamenei’s decisive support of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Only two men have held the position of Supreme Leader since the Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979: Khamenei and his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. These two leaders are char- acterized by widely disparate personalities, leadership skills, and politi- cal instincts. Khomeini was scholarly, iconic, and charismatic, creating and sustaining the position of Supreme Leader through his personal standing. In contrast, Khamenei has relied on alliance-building, patronage, and the vast bureaucracy controlled by the Supreme Lead- er’s office to maintain and expand his influence. As Khamenei ages, and as rumors of his ill health intensify, U.S. policymakers and ana- lysts need to consider the various scenarios for what may follow after he passes from the scene. The eventual outcome—what the office of the Supreme Leader looks like in Khamenei’s wake—will determine the Islamic Republic’s direction. The research documented in this report identifies three key fac- tors that will shape succession of the next Supreme Leader and outlines alternative scenarios for the post-Khamenei era. For each of the factors, it provides a set of indicators that observers can use to assess the most important trends. It situates all of this within the context of the June iii iv The Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran 2009 election. The study, which assumes a working understanding of the Islamic Republic’s system of government and some of its history, should be of interest to analysts, as well as policymakers and other observers of Iran.1 This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the Intelligence Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secre- tary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on the RAND Intelligence Policy Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/about/intel.html or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). 1 For background on Iran’s political system, see David E. Thaler, Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerrold D. Green, Charlotte Lynch, and Frederic Wehrey, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Cor- poration, MG-878-OSD, 2010. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Summary .......................................................................... xi Acknowledgments .............................................................. xxi Abbreviations .................................................................. xxiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 The Official Procedure for Selecting Iran’s Supreme Leader Is Laid Out in the Iranian Constitution ..................................................... 3 In Actuality, the Next Succession Is Likely to Occur in a Much Different Way .................................................................. 4 The Factional Balance of Power ................................................ 4 The Prevailing View ofVelayat-e Faghih ...................................... 6 Khamenei’s Personal Network ................................................. 6 Other Potential Factors Are Not as Relevant if the Succession Happens in the Near Term ................................................................. 7 The Trajectory of the Next Succession Will Hinge on How the Three Principal Factors Are Configured at the Time of Khamenei’s Departure ...................................................................... 8 Methodology ....................................................................... 9 Roadmap of the Report ..........................................................10 CHAPTER TWO Factor 1: The Factional Balance of Power ...................................11 The Factional Landscape in Iran ................................................11 v vi The Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran The Islamist Right ..............................................................12 The Islamist Left (Reformists) .................................................15 Since the Islamic Revolution, Factionalism Has Been More Influential Than Constitutional Process in Decisionmaking and Policymaking Within the Iranian Political System .......................................16 Khomeini Was Able to Keep Factional Jockeying Largely in Check .......17 Since Khamenei Came to Power in 1989, Factional Competition Has Grown Markedly in Both Intensity and Influence .......................18 CHAPTER THREE Factor 2: The Prevailing View of Velayat-e Faghih ........................21 The Absolute View ofVelayat-e Faghih ........................................ 23 The Democratic View ofVelayat-e Faghih
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