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CHAPTER TWO Regional security structures: Pre- and post-apartheid

The development of Southern Africa’s regional security arrangements as well as that of the social-political and economic context predates decolonisation. Jakkie Cilliers examines these efforts from the 1950s, during which period the emphasis was on co-operation in “decolonisation and ending minority regimes in the former , South West Africa and South Africa”.1 It will be shown that the political difficulties that were experienced by the sub-regional security apparatus were characterised by the aggressive foreign policy projections of apartheid South Africa, the settler colonies of Angola, and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and reactive policies by other African-ruled states in the region. In this regard, the chapter describes and analyses policies and structures that are designed to create inter-state security arrangements. In the investigation of collaborative efforts in security for the region, the chapter looks at the African Charter associated with South Africa’s Prime Minister DF Malan of the National Party, which contrasted with General Jan Smuts’s ‘British-centric Commonwealth’. Smuts visualised a collaborative arrangement that acknowledged independent states, racial segregation, and the supremacy of the ‘white’ race,2 the Simonstown Agreement and the African Defence Organisation—all closely associated with South Africa. Other South African-led initiatives include Prime Minister Vorster’s détente, Prime Minister PW Botha’s Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), and the Total Strategy. Another initiative that requires examination is the British-sponsored Central African Federation (CAF) of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Other structures associated with the newly independent states of the period include the East and Central African States (ECAS), the Mulungushi Club, and the FLS alliance. All these structures have been efforts at collaborative security arrangements. All faced challenges, which affected the attainment of the envisaged objectives.

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This coverage shows that there are two sets of structures, which are evidently racial in composition, namely ‘white’ and ‘black’. The ‘African Charter’, Simonstown Agreement, African Defence Organisation, CONSAS, Total Strategy and the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland may be closely associated with the ‘white’ racial categorisation, while the East and Central African group of states, the Mulungushi Club and the FLS are linked to the ‘black’ racial grouping. This fits well with Willie Breytenbach’s model of collective security in the region, in which he adopted Cantori and Spiegel’s concepts of “black and white blocs” in reference to the two power blocs that emerged in the Southern African region.3 Breytenbach explains that, prior to 1974, the ‘white’ bloc comprising South Africa, Portugal4 and Rhodesia, behaved as an alliance at both regional and international levels.5 Breytenbach identified the ‘black’ bloc as the FLS and the liberation movements in the

Figure 2: ‘White’ and ‘Black’ bloc up to 1975 Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 79

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Southern African region. He further stipulated that the development of the ‘white’ and ‘black’ blocs was largely due to colonialism and apartheid, consequently signifying the critical role of both South Africa and the Western states. Figures 2 to 5 show the ‘white’ and ‘black’ blocs. This section describes and analyses the events in the region from this dichotomous dimension (i.e. white and black) of security alliances, which prior to the end of apartheid were designed to mitigate the insecurity through establishing some form of structures. This section evaluates these efforts.

THE ‘WHITE’ BLOC The ‘white’ bloc thesis is premised on a common understanding arising from a perception of threat against the gains achieved by the settler

Figure 3: ‘White’ and ‘Black’ bloc up to 1980 Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 80

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communities in the region, and therefore the need for a security arrangements that ensured the preservation of their ‘civilisation’.6 Such a security arrangement clearly needed a concept that would be accepted by all the members of the bloc. The common understanding in the ‘white’ bloc took the form of policies and activities, which entailed a search for a common security structure that would bring about sustainable security through pooling efforts by South Africa, Northern and Southern Rhodesia as well as Nyasaland and the Portuguese- controlled Mozambique and Angola, and the South Africa–controlled South West Africa. Although the ‘white’ bloc would appear to indicate a preoccupation with the ‘white’ race, this did not imply non-association of other races, as can be seen from such initiatives as Botha’s CONSAS. The inter-racial engagement was at both sub-regional and regional levels. Prime Minister Malan’s argument may be seen in this light.

Figure 4: ‘White’ and ‘Black’ bloc up to 1990 Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 81

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Nolutshungu writes that in 1949 Malan argued that, while Africa required economic development, it also required “protection and guidance”.7 Other political leaders in the ‘white’ bloc supported his views, as these conformed to the mission to ‘save’ the ‘white’ community from the hostile intent of the ‘black’ bloc and its supporters. Several issues associated with the ‘white’ bloc in general and South Africa in particular, and which showed efforts to form inter-state structures that pointed towards the enhancement of some common good (however skewed), include a number of initiatives stretching from the 1930s to the late 1970s. However, only some of the later ones, particularly those that had a significant impact on developments in the sub-region, will be discussed in detail.8 The drive towards a form of regional security arrangement may be traced to the time of Jan Smuts when, as prime minister of South Africa,

Figure 5: ‘White’ and ‘Black’ bloc after 1990 Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 82

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he championed the British Commonwealth idea and was not opposed to the idea of a larger South Africa which would have included such territories as Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa (present-day Namibia), with a view to protecting the interests of South Africa and the white people in particular: ‘whites’ in big business, “empire loyalists”, and liberals who were keen to prevent the isolation of South Africa. This conformed to Lord Passfield’s doctrine: “where white and black interests conflict, white interests must be paramount”.9 Nolutshungu argues that it is upon this policy that Malan’s ‘African Charter’ was premised. The concept of an African Charter was later used in reference to what James Mayall defined as the “endorsement of the territorial status quo, and its explicit denunciation of subversion and political assassination and intervention in the domestic affairs of other states”.10 This ‘true’ African Charter was signed in May 1963. Closely associated with the ‘African Charter’ are the Simonstown Agreement, Defence of Africa and the African Defence Organisation. It is therefore these policies that provide the groundwork for the ‘white’ bloc’s drive towards an inter-state security structure, which could appropriately be discussed in the framework of Malan’s ‘African Charter’.

THE ‘AFRICAN CHARTER’ Malan’s ‘African Charter’ refers to what he termed “African Powers” as the two primary actors, namely colonial powers and those powers with possessions on the continent. A significant component of the policy is its proclamation for the preservation of Western European Christian civilisation and the ‘safeguarding’ of the continent for European civilisation, as well as its defence against communism from Simonstown to Suez.11 This led to what is referred to as the Simonstown agreement, in which Britain gave its naval base of Simonstown on the Indian Ocean coastline (in eastern Cape Town) to South Africa but its usage to the African Powers, who, particularly the UK, were to continue in exchange with the defence of the Southern African region. This accord facilitated South Africa’s acquisition of such military hardware as “frigates, helicopters and long-range aircraft designed to improve the country’s capacity to patrol the seas around the Cape”.12 Britain terminated the Simonstown agreement in 1975. It is evident that the policy for the defence of Africa was to South African politicians an “extension of the defence of South Africa”.13 Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 83

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Nolutshungu further makes the point that South Africa yearned to both check African armies and become conversant with military progress on the continent. Related to this is what Pettman describes as South Africa’s policy in the 1960s to find its “natural sphere of influence” in the application of a ‘Monroe Doctrine’ for Southern and Central Africa, directed at the continent and at the West. In respect of the continent, the policy was to destabilise the OAU and in that way reduce the likelihood of African countries directing their efforts towards South Africa. In respect of the West, the aim was to show Britain and the US that intervention in the region would be dangerous. The Monroe Doctrine, premised on the 1823 doctrine that proclaimed that the US would not approve any intervention in the American continents by a foreign power, implies that there ought not to be any intervention by an external actor. Portugal’s former Minister Nogueira stressed this point when he called for talks with African states “within a purely African framework and excluding powers alien to the continent”.14 The prime aim was clearly that of serving South Africa’s interest by refocusing the independent African states by destabilising them while at the same time making it clear to the Western states that they could not attempt to intervene on the African continent. The problem with this arrangement was that it was premised on the acquiescence of the African states but achieving it through destabilisation alone meant that it could not be sustainable. Yet another focus by South Africa was an effort by the state to develop a regional security arrangement between the ‘white’ settler regime and the Western powers on the basis of cultural similarities premised on shared identities and norms associated with the historical and racial linkage with ‘white’ regimes of the West. Malan describes the ‘African Charter’ as follows:

… we shall have to get together all the powers that have interests in Africa and that have territory and possessions here in Africa … we must have a pronouncement that Africa must be preserved in its development for the Western European Christian civilisation … For example, the powers that have interests in Africa can agree that the native population should no longer be used in the battle fields of the world, and that they will not be given military training or be armed so that they will not constitute a danger to each other and to other nations in Africa.15 Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 84

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Evidently, South African politicians had some ‘real’ fears of Africans and were therefore intent on ensuring that such a threat never arose. But, as Nolutshungu writes, there was a realisation that the country’s relatively small ‘white’ population could not meet the internal security demands, especially following the demobilisation of ‘native corps’ which had served in the Second World War. It was in fact this factor that brought about the South African initiative of an ‘African Defence Organisation’ promoted by Malan in 1951.16 The idea of the African Defence Organisation, aligned to the ‘African Charter’, was of an alliance between South Africa and the states with colonies on the continent and with links to NATO. The idea failed to gain any support. He advocated “the notion of regional co-operation, but always subject to values, interests and principles contained in his charter”.17 The ‘African Charter’ was an apparent response to the Atlantic Charter. The Atlantic Charter of 1941 was an innovation by President FD Roosevelt of the US and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Britain, mooted aboard a warship in the mid-Atlantic. Its major components were “the Four Freedoms’ (freedom from fear and want, freedom of speech and religion) which to them formed the basis of the Allied cause. Evans and Newnham identify the other principles linked to these to include “self-determination, freely elected government, economic collaboration, freedom of the seas, renunciation of the use of force-force in disputes and the post-war establishment of a permanent system of global security”.18 The ‘African Charter’ ran into problems largely because of the reluctance of African powers to accept South Africa’s “outlook on race relations” and its anxieties over the communist threat.19 It may be observed that the similarities between the two charters do not go beyond the nomenclature and the fact that a few people undertook by themselves to seek answers for the greater majority. While the Atlantic Charter was designed to put in place a democratic and peaceful environment, Malan’s ‘African Charter’ was anything but, given its bias towards racial discrimination. Nolutshungu argues that the charter “represented the aspirations and interests of a distinct section of the white population of South Africa”.20 In an effort to salvage the ‘African Charter’, South Africa sought to promote conditional acceptance of ‘black’ states on the continent but insisted that ‘white’ people continue to be its “urgent preoccupation”. This it did through co-operation between South Africa, Rhodesia and South West Africa, for what Prime Minister Eric Louw of South Africa regarded as “their common interest and for their common security”.21 Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 85

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Such a relationship would appear to show that this was indicative of a collaborative arrangement such as a security community. The nature of this collaborative arrangement is a matter that begs interrogation.

NATURE OF COLLABORATIVE ARRANGEMENT The nature of the alliance22 among the ‘white’ states in the region during the period under review could only have been made more interesting with statements by two past South Africa’s Heads of States who are agreed on the nature of the relationship between the ‘white’ states in the region. Prime Minister Vorster denied the existence of any formal alliance when he argued that:

We are good friends with both Portugal and Rhodesia and good friends do not need a pact. Good friends know what their duty is if a neighbour’s house is on fire. I assure you that whatever becomes necessary will be done.23

Later, President PW Botha reiterated this position when, in a similar manner, he declared: “True friends need no signed treaties.”24 Botha acknowledged the country’s interest in the events in Mozambique, Rhodesia and Angola and worked with the states’ leadership as an entity, but evidently did not consider the necessity of a ‘formal’ alliance. Writing on the relationship of the ‘white’ states in the region, Gwendolene Carter and Patrick O’Meara state that no “formal white alliance” existed as such but rather some sort of solidarity between the countries of the region. By implication, therefore, this suggested that the South African government did not consider the formality of an alliance as necessarily more important than a situation of informality. Evidently this suggests that as long as people regarded themselves as sharing some commonalities and had good regard for one another, there was no need for the relationship to be reduced to a formalised agreement. In this sense, such co-operation was based on trust and goodwill, and premised on, amongst other things, compatible values such as their tied past to Europe. Questions which arise in this respect include whether the contacts between the ‘white’ states in the region were indeed at informal levels, and whether any subsequent relations between them could have occurred at such informal levels. The meetings between the South Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 86

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African government and the Portuguese government officials at each other’s capitals25 and meetings between the Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and South Africa’s Prime Minister John Vorster,26 were official meetings and, by nature of government occurrences, formal and secretive like the later security arrangements between Lesotho and Swaziland.27 The co-ordination between Portugal and South Africa at the UN was just as formal as the security co-operation among the two states and Rhodesia. While the relationship between the ‘white’ states in the region was an apparent factor, formal or otherwise, a similar alliance with the Western powers appears to have been in existence. Despite the lack of support for Malan’s ‘African Charter’, it would appear that there was nevertheless a close affinity between the ‘white’ regimes in the Southern African region and the Western powers, which were entirely ‘white’ in racial classification. However, while the racial aspect was an important consideration for the Western powers, described by Colin Legum as its “natural sense of kinship with the white communities who mostly originate from the west”, it was not the only one.28 The Western policies were also driven by their own economic and defence interest given the tremendous economic potential provided by the availability of such valuable minerals as diamonds and gold and the need to maintain control over the sea route to the Indian sub-continent. The ‘white’ regimes were considered “a virtual outpost of the West”. While it may be concluded with some certainty that the security arrangement between the Western powers and their African outpost was informal and secretive in nature, that of the ‘white’ regimes themselves could not have been. Furthermore, the intense desire by the minority regimes to maintain a grip on power in the region gives credence to the view by Kenneth Grundy that “[t]he three governments see their futures militarily intertwined”.29

THE PRETORIA–LISBON–SALISBURY AXIS The existence of a Pretoria–Lisbon–Salisbury axis, as described by Kenneth Grundy, further elaborates the ties between South Africa, Rhodesia and the two Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. South Africa was observed to be seeking a dominant role by “co- ordinat[ing] greater military co-operation in planning and practice, with their regional white neighbours”.30 Given the strategic and geographical location of South Africa as well as its linkage with the Western powers, including its relative wealth, which has had a strong bearing on its Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 87

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relative military superiority, this would appear to have made South African officials regard the state as a natural leader. A similar view was apparently taken by ‘black’-led states, especially in respect of South Africa’s Prime Minister, John Vorster:

... there is no doubt at all that the southern African minority regimes are really led by Mr Vorster … one must understand that [he] has got his constituency and it is a big and complex one where there are both supporters as well as opponents of current developments … we know that Mr Vorster is playing some important role in so far as the minority regimes are concerned.31

The initiatives by Vorster, commonly referred to as détente, were an ‘outward’ policy that aspired to develop peaceful relationships with neighbouring states.32 Arising from this policy, the South African Prime Minister and President Kenneth Kaunda of met at the Zambia–Rhodesia border at Victoria Falls in what may be called ‘railway coach diplomacy’. The détente was, however, not without political problems. Describing the policy as an “imaginative and not risk-free venture”, Brian Pottinger refers to the very nature of the then existing domestic policy which entrenched discrimination on the basis of race and was consequently unacceptable to the ‘black’ bloc, the rest of the African region and most of the states in the world. The official government policy, apartheid, was legislated by the South African NP government, which applied and refined Afrikaner theorists in the 1930s and 1940s.33 Vorster’s policy of détente also received considerable opposition from within the government circle, particularly by some members of the right wing who found his meeting with President Kaunda and establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi particularly objectionable,34 as well as the general conflict that existed within the state as a direct result of opposition against the apartheid system by mostly the ‘black’ population. Other contributory factors to the failure of Vorster’s ‘outward policy’ include the collapse of the Vorster/Kaunda initiative to settle the Rhodesian problem, the military incursion into Angola by South Africa, and the “[h]igh level of threat perception … [and] [n]arrow and primitive understanding of functional co-operation”.35 Evidently the desire to establish a form of collaborative arrangement not only received opposition from the opposing bloc but also from within the blocs themselves, and was evidently problematic. Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 88

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The Pretoria–Lisbon–Salisbury axis came into existence in the late part of the 1950s or the early part of the 1960s, comprising then South Africa, Portugal and the CAF. The CAF was formed in 1953 and dissolved in 1963 after protracted opposition by ‘black’ African nationalists mostly in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Later, with the dissolution of the CAF, the trio of South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia came to be referred to as the ‘unholy’ alliance. It is, however, the CAF that as an entity formed the only clear form of ‘white’ formal alliance. Formed in 1953 at the agreement between the “whites in both Southern and Northern Rhodesia and the compliance of the British Conservative government”, the body showed a desire by the ‘white’ bloc to formulate a form of security community that whilst an entity on its own also formed a part of the wider Pretoria–Lisbon–Salisbury axis.36 While the formation of CAF could be taken as signifying an effort to form a security community, the sharing of CAF assets at its dissolution appeared to indicate a new dimension to the nature of the region’s ‘white’ bloc. The rejection by the British government, a position supported by its American counterparts, of the “African protests against transferring all air and land weapons to ‘white’-ruled Rhodesia”, it could be argued, showed an intention to keep the ‘white’ regime economically and militarily stronger than its potential adversaries and in effect to keep it in the ‘white’ bloc.37 It may even be argued further that giving such support to a government “committed to ‘white’ supremacy” and later on vetoing a UN resolution on 13 September 1963 to block the transfer of the military assets to the ‘white’ regime, shows even more clearly the British closeness to the ‘white’ bloc in the region. A further argument may be made that another dimension of the ‘white’ bloc is an enlarged variant with the Western powers, particularly Britain and the US, despite their token actions against the bloc in the UN. However, both the US and UK publicly declared their rejection of the racist policies in South Africa and other settler states, particularly Rhodesia. Although the axis appeared to be firmly rooted along racial lines, with a strong desire for self-preservation and supported by a seemingly superior military, it was dogged by a number of problems, the biggest being South Africa’s policy of apartheid. While South Africa was intensely committed to the ideals of apartheid, Rhodesia and Portuguese Mozambique and Angola were driven by a “racial partnership and multiracialism”,38 policies considered by South Africa to be representative of “weakness”.39 The partnership popularised by the ‘white’ federal government of the CAF was said to be that of the ‘horse and the rider’, a Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 89

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formulation of Godfrey Huggins.40 This metaphor was quickly seized upon the ‘black’ nationalists as signifying a black horse and a white rider. In this respect, therefore, the relationship was considered to be inherently exploitative, not a well co-ordinated relationship, which the propagators of the symbolism had intended it to be. Yet another area of conflict in the ‘white’ bloc would appear to have been the ‘bad blood’ premised on the historically rooted differences between the English-speaking and Afrikaner-speaking Rhodesians and the Afrikaner-dominant South Africa, going back to the time of the Anglo- Boer War and the Second World War, during which period some Afrikaners were interned because of their closeness to Nazi Germany. According to Kenneth Grundy, the fact that in Rhodesia the English- speaking ‘whites’ dominated the Afrikaners was a cause of conflict. The reference to ‘white’ Rhodesian politicians by the South African politicians as “second-rate political hacks” could not have helped relations in the least.41 A seemingly lesser point is the difference on religious grounds, the Afrikaners being largely Calvinist with little regard for Catholics, and the Portuguese being largely Catholic. Kenneth Grundy’s view that “the various European groups in the region have a low opinion of each other’s intellectual and political maturity” sums up the sort of relationship that existed in the ‘white’ alliance—a group of actors who, despite being connected through some common values and a yearning to perpetuate their privileged positions relative to the dominant indigenous populations in the region, still came into conflict with each other.42 Notwithstanding the difficulties in the period of the ‘white’ bloc, Kenneth Grundy argues that South Africa and Portugal generally demonstrated their “emotional, economic, and strategic interests in Rhodesian white rule” and in respect of Portuguese Mozambique and Angola, South Africa’s expression of collaboration was in terms of “military assistance, economic co-operation and investment, and technical association”.43 This was particularly evident in its innovation of the constellation of states.

THE CONSTELLATION OF STATES The concerted efforts by the ‘white’ bloc to create a security arrangement were not just constrained by factors indigenous to the actors alone. Exogenous factors such as the ‘black’-led states in the region which refused to recognise the legitimacy of the ‘white’-led states Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 90

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not only withheld their recognition of the minority regimes but also encouraged and supported the nationalist movements seeking to overthrow these regimes. To mitigate the mounting threat, the ‘white’ bloc leader, South Africa, continued to put in place several policies. Of particular importance was the ‘total national strategy’ of which the constellation of states (CONSAS) was a critical input. Deon Geldenhuys defines the total national strategy as a means to the “mobilisation of South Africa’s total physical and human resources in a national endeavor to thwart the onslaught” of the communist powers.44 It was formally launched on 21 March 1980 in the South African parliament. According to James Barber and John Barratt, General Malan saw it as “an ideologically motivated struggle” whose aim was “the implacable and unconditional imposition of the aggressor’s will on the target state … not only in terms of ideology, but also as regards the political, social, economic and technological areas”.45 The internal dimension of the strategy was a response to the industrial and political unrest in the mining and manufacturing sectors in the 1972 to 1975 period, as well as a response to an upsurge in civil disobedience which culminated in the Soweto uprising of 197646—in effect what the South African government perceived as a “total onslaught”, which was believed to be “communist-inspired and orchestrated from Moscow”.47 Davies and O’Meara also identify the external dimension as a response to the worsening regional security situation characterised by the fall of Portuguese colonialism and the birth of détente, regarded as a “hasty reformation of regional strategy on the part of the Vorster regime in 1974”.48 The total national strategy was therefore a response by the South African government to sustained challenges from both internal and external factors. Prime Minister PW Botha and his foreign Minister Roelf (‘Pik’) Botha mooted the formulation of a ‘constellation’ of Southern African states in 1979. The aim of the policy was to seek strictly regional solutions to political, economic and security problems from among regional states, while purposefully marginalising the West. In establishing a constellation of up to ten states in the region, designed to comprise a maximum of 40 million people, the South African government believed it was setting up a “sub-continental solidarity” movement, designed to bring peace and stability in the Southern African region through “collaborative efforts in the political and security areas, as well as close economic links” under “international secretariats” as a regulatory mechanism.49 Members of the prospective constellation in 1979 included South Africa and its three Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 91

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Bantustans (Bophuthatswana, Transkei and Venda), Zimbabwe- Rhodesia, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. The South African–sponsored constellation took the form of rings designed to work as buffer zones for the South African state and its ‘homelands’. The inner circle comprised South Africa and its ‘homelands’, followed by one comprising Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) in Namibia, which in turn was followed by yet another outer ring, consisting of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Mandaza places Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in what he refers to as the “inner periphery”, which in our characterisation would be the ‘inner circle’.50 The real difference, however, is that we place South Africa and its Bantustans in the ‘inner periphery’ while Mandaza’s starting point is that immediately outside South Africa and its Bantustans. The outermost ring was itself placed in two categories of “moderate and tractable” states and “radical and hostile” states. Malawi and Zambia were placed in the former category, while Angola, Mozambique and the Seychelles were placed in the latter. Notable in the ‘white’ South African idea is that, as argued with the Pretoria–Lisbon–Salisbury axis, this too was considered ‘informal’ and as “a group of states with common interests in developing mutual relationships and between which a clear desire to extend areas of co- operation exists”.51 This was in fact South Africa’s way of drawing states in the sub-region into a security alliance premised on what Pottinger calls the ‘Botha doctrine’, in which South Africa considered itself a regional superpower, and under which the entire region would be turned “into a security commonwealth which [would] ensure the integrity of South Africa’s borders, the safety of the domestic population and the perpetuation of white and Nationalist rule”.52 Whether this can reasonably be regarded as an informal arrangement is questionable, since evidently a concerted effort to establish a practical, and in that sense a formal, security arrangement was in process. Jan Pettman reads the South African “‘constructive’ policy of rapprochement with black Africa” as being designed to “promote stability among regional neighbours, distract attention away from Southern Africa, and reduce any justification for external interest and intervention”, in this way applying the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ for Southern Africa.53 Correctly, Pettman argues that this would entail ‘friendly’ regional neighbours who in essence form buffer states to secure the South African territorial boundaries. Pettman identifies the ingenious application of “material advantages of co-operation with South Africa” Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 92

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as a means of luring the economically depressed states with the promise of prosperity through a co-prosperity sphere. A co-prosperity sphere— an alliance of ‘black’-ruled and ‘white’-ruled states—because of the economic assistance flowing from the latter and the security provided by the former through their new neighbourly policies, would bring about a generally prosperous regional environment. The argument is that, as the states flourished, they would become less vulnerable to communist subversion and set in place a ‘Truman Doctrine’ for the region, a process which would create a Southern African common market—a development that would serve South Africa’s economic interests. The Truman Doctrine, derived from US President Truman’s speech to a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947, is a policy designed to support “free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures”.54 In this sense, the sole enemy is identified as communism, and South Africa saw itself as having a ‘moral’ duty to ‘deliver’ the people of the region from this ‘evil’ to the prosperity provided by a regional common market. South Africa’s policy of a co-prosperity sphere “combin[ed] a multitude of aims, political, economic, ideological and military”.55 South Africa’s economic interests included (as they probably continue to do today) development of the country’s accessibility to the region’s consumers and labour market, with the latter providing a cheaper source for the country’s industries. This appears to have remained South Africa’s interest in the sub-region and beyond, to the extent that there have been some concerns from the neighbouring states as to whether the country is not using its wealth and power in an unfair manner, hence endangering the formation of a stable, peaceful and prosperous region. The country’s determination to operationalise the policy of co- prosperity saw it reward, punish and threaten states in the region in what may be viewed as a ‘carrot and stick’ policy, an approach that in the end failed to sustain the overall idea of a constellation. Brian Pottinger describes it more pointedly as the “talk and thump” policy. The policy attracted limited support from the Bantustans but failed to gain any meaningful support from members of the other states in the sub-region, who in fact became even more determined to stand their ground over the destruction of the apartheid policy.56 Robert Jaster argues that the constellation scheme was flawed in a number of areas, which included the lack of consultation with the prospective members regarding the alliance’s form or willingness to participate, and the complete rejection of apartheid and South Africa’s Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 93

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Bantustans by such states as Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. The other reasons for the failure of constellation were the rejection by Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the so-called BLS countries) of a closer association with South Africa and the decision by the FLS to form the SADCC. Jaster further argues that it was really Robert Mugabe’s election victory in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in 1980 that dealt the death blow to the constellation because of its immediate structural effect on the constellation. However, Mandaza holds the view that it was the bringing into the SADCC of Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi that “contributed significantly to the death of the CONSAS idea”.57 As regards the constellation, Jaster writes that the ‘shrunken constellation’ did not stop the desire by South Africa to maintain the buffer states by now referring to a ‘confederation’ whose interest, according to PW Botha, was “co-ordinated action on interstate political relations, economics, social affairs and security”.58 Botha’s comments were made in an address at the opening ceremony of the summit meeting of the constellation in Pretoria on 23 July 1980.

THE ‘BLACK’ BLOC The election loss by the ‘white’-led government in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia not only meant that the ‘white’ bloc became smaller but that its ‘black’ counterpart grew bigger. However, the extent to which this bloc developed into a regional security structure is a matter of interest that this section wishes to explore. As has been seen from the developments in the ‘white’ bloc, the ‘black’ bloc could not have been unaffected. This part of the chapter seeks to interrogate the evolution of the ‘black’ bloc as a security structure, taking particular care to determine whether the development was along the lines of a security community or indeed a security community itself. It is an undisputed fact that the policies of the ‘white’ bloc, and particularly South Africa’s policy of total national strategy, left in their wake huge losses in life, injuries, vast destruction of infrastructure and loss of millions of dollars in lost revenues, whose effects are still being felt by the states in the region today, more than a decade later.

DEVELOPING A CO-OPERATIVE SPIRIT The reaction to the policies of the ‘white’ regimes in the region took two dimensions. On the one hand, there was a combination of a defensive Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 94

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and offensive posture by the ‘black’-ruled states and nationalist movements operating both internally in the ‘white’ bloc and externally in the ‘black’ bloc and beyond. On the other hand, there was some willingness by some ‘black’-ruled states and some of the nationalist movements to seek a form of accommodation with the minority regimes. Commencing with the search for a peaceful resolution to the impasse in the region, Zambia took the front-line position.59 The state undertook a peaceful approach to the problems facing the Southern African region through offers of diplomatic relations in January and April 1964 to South Africa, later withdrawn in August 1965 following the rejection by the former. Jan Pettman writes that in 1967 and 1968, South Africa “put out ‘feelers’ to Zambia” in an effort to get the Zambian government’s co- operation in seeking a settlement over Rhodesia, in controlling ‘terrorism’, and in fields of commerce, industry and trade”.60 Communication between the two countries through letters between Kaunda and Vorster, which the latter attempted to make appear as made in bad faith in an effort to show up the former as ‘double dealing’, led President Idi Amin of Uganda to describe him as “the greatest two-faced double-dealer of our continent”.61 The late Vice President of Zimbabwe, Joshua Nkomo, then a leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), a nationalist movement in Rhodesia, had attempted to have direct talks with Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister—a move which received much opposition from other actors in the region, particularly Robert Mugabe, then leader of the other major nationalist movement, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The two movements had formed a common front called the United African National Congress (UANC). While Zambia appeared genuine in its efforts at a peaceful resolution to regional problems, it was apparent that South Africa sought peace only strictly on its own terms:

What the world and Africa in particular today need, are leaders who mind their own business and govern their countries in the interests of their subjects in co-operation with their neighbours in a spirit of friendship and helpfulness.62

As will be argued later, the differences over the approaches in the strategy against the ‘white’ bloc caused some uncertainties but did not disable the overall goal of forming a unified mission on the matter. Earlier efforts to resist the offensive drive by the minority regimes in the region were succeeded by attempts at seeking a linkage of the ‘black’- Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 95

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ruled states with other states further north in the East African Community, to which Zambia formally applied for membership in December 1967.63 Zambia’s motivation for seeking membership of the East African Community (EAC) was seen by Kaunda as “an embryonic form of wider union, both politically, facilitating close inter- governmental co-operation and domestic and especially foreign policies, and military, to ensure common defences against South Africa”.64 Kaunda argued that the strength of the small and weak states evidently depended on pooling their resources and Zambia’s membership of this community provided that sort of comfort, imperfect as it may be. Pettman acknowledges the value of “technical and economic advantages of interstate co-operation, and political and military weakness” which he argues would have continued in the east and central Africa region, a region related to the Economic Commission for Africa’s east and central African (ECA) sector.65 The east and central Africa region includes Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire (now the DRC) and Zambia. The ECA regional headquarters is in . Several of the states within the generally accepted ambit of Southern Africa—such as Malawi, Tanzania and Zaire—were members of this sector, a grouping that placed on its agenda such problematic issues as Rhodesia, and “good neighbourliness as the basis of member states’ relations with each other”.66 While including on the group’s agendas economic development issues such as resolution of technical and economic problems, it emphasised adherence to “non-intervention in other African states, together with closer intergovernmental co-operation”. The prime purpose of the ECA, “policy co-ordination and mutual support in areas of shared concern” given the group’s sense of insecurity as a result of aggressive policies and the conduct of the ‘white’ bloc,67 reflects the serious early intentions to develop a regional security structure.68 Timothy Shaw and Douglas Anglin regarded the ECA as a new regional grouping linking social, diplomatic, military, communication and economic linkages premised on a dyad (i.e. combination of two vectors) which would incorporate Angola, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe and the BLS states subjected to a strangle-hold by South Africa.69 Possibly the most significant event in the development of the ‘black’ security structure was the fifth summit of the ECA in April 1969, which offered both an ‘olive leaf ’ to the ‘white’ bloc and an emphatic indication of a concerted resolve to support nationalist movements’ Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 96

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missions to change the minority regimes forcibly, in what is commonly referred to as the Lusaka Manifesto. The Manifesto, described by Gilbert Khadiagala as the “primary African approach to southern Africa”, offered the minority regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa dialogue “if peaceful progress to emancipation were possible … even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change”,70 on condition that they accepted the inevitability of majority rule as well as the demise of racialism, and that should they fail to comply, there would be concerted support for liberation movements.71 Endorsed by the OAU summit in 1969, the Lusaka Manifesto was seen by South Africa to imply that there was a desire by the ‘black’ bloc to co-exist whilst ignoring the threat it had so clearly posed to the minority regimes in the region.72 The Lusaka Manifesto, described by the late Julius Nyerere as “a statement of principles, not an outline of strategy”,73 certainly represented a firm, unified and coherent standing by the ‘black’ bloc and showed a willingness to deliberate difficult issues whilst also being prepared to undertake hostile activity against the minority regimes. These early displays of unified action on regional security issues, which also included informal monthly meetings between a small number of leaders—initially just between Kaunda and Nyerere74 and later including Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and Milton Obote of Uganda in a grouping referred to as the Mulungushi Club in the mid-1960s75—served as the basis of yet another regional structure for the ‘black’ bloc—the FLS.

THE FRONTLINE STATES: AN ALLIANCE OF ‘WAR’? Of all the regional security structures, it is the FLS alliance that “was the most important and indeed most recognised structure to emerge in the mid-1970s at a time when the anti-colonial struggle was the most important in the region”.76 Comprising a fairly small group of heads of states commencing with presidents Kaunda and Nyerere and later with the Botswana president followed by presidents Machel, Mugabe and Dos Santos of Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola, in that order, the FLS formed a relatively small, and some would argue, informal group, which was considered manageable and responsive, and which meant that meetings could be hastily organised, as in the case of the Mulungushi Club before it. The matter of informality is questionable. Abdilla Omari, describing the operations of the FLS, refers to them as “partly informal and partly Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 97

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formal”.77 The fact, however, is that government meetings are by nature formal; they may sometimes be conducted in a casual environment but will always need to be formalised. Jakkie Cilliers, writing on the Mulungushi Club and the FLS, said the former was an informal group and that “its relatively small size allowed it to meet frequently and at short notice [a factor that was] carried over to the FLS alliance”.78 There was no uniformity in defining the FLS and instead it took on economic and geographic dimensions as emphasised by the differing states. Describing the FLS alliance, the late President Nyerere said it comprised “economically independent countries79 stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic, that would be a really powerful challenge and deterrent to South Africa”,80 while Austin Chakaodza defined the alliance as “those countries which, because of geographical proximity and for diplomatic, political and security reasons were involved in efforts to achieve majority rule in Zimbabwe”.81 Blumenfeld saw the FLS as the establishment of a “strategic, political and economic alliance” aiming at the decolonisation of Angola and Mozambique.82 The differences in emphasis, rather than exhibiting contradictions, show the all-encompassing manner of the alliance. Faced primarily with two problems, namely South Africa’s total strategy and apparent changes in Western preoccupation, which Khadiagala refers to as the “realignment of Western interests”, the FLS was inter alia concerned with regime stability, ‘black’ majority rule and the creation of regional economic institutions to reduce their dependence on South Africa. The raison d’être of the alliance was nevertheless to enable the acquisition of majority rule in the Southern African region.83 Showing the inter-relationship of countries in the region, the FLS alliance linked the conflict in Angola to Namibian independence, and in conformity with this prioritised the instability in Angola and Mozambique. While peace in Angola was correctly expected to facilitate the nationalist movement in Namibia, with Angola providing a dependable rear base, so was Mozambique dependent on both Rhodesia and South Africa. The FLS perception of security, particularly that of regime stability and the development of regional economic structures, explained the accurate identification of threats facing the region. The establishment of the ISDSC to meet the security threats which faced the region, and of the SADCC which was designed to meet the development challenge, shows the determination by the ‘black’ bloc to adequately meet the challenges posed by the ‘white’ bloc and South African–led ‘outward looking’ policy. Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 98

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The SADCC was officially launched on 1 April 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia and was charged with the following objectives: reduction of dependence, establishing a network for “equitable integration”, harmonisation of “national, interstate and regional policies” and combining efforts to “secure international co-operation within the framework of the strategy for economic liberation”.84 In respect of the challenges posed by the ‘white’ bloc, the ‘black’ bloc addressed the issues of regime stability and the region’s economic dimensions. The ISDSC with its direct impact on regional security and its role in the creation of a conducive environment for economic integration, played a critical role in the overall FLS strategy. The ISDSC’s regional security role has been identified by Omari as co-ordinating liberation development and the defence and security of the members of the FLS at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. The ISDSC co-ordinated military activities, especially in respect of aircraft movements and exchange of intelligence at both bilateral and multilateral levels, and provided valuable information that facilitated efforts at protecting economic targets like bridges which had become consistent targets of the ‘white’ bloc. The destruction of the Luangwa bridge linking Malawi to the Zambian capital of Lusaka, the Chambeshi bridge, an important nodule for traffic to and from the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, and other bridges caused immense economic hardship to Zambia and other members of the FLS. The link between regional trade and the political- military dimension is evident and highlights the necessity of the broadening of the security agenda. Formed in 1975, membership of the ISDSC was not open to all members of the FLS. The limitedness of the membership showed that although all the ‘black’-ruled states in the region were subjected to the ‘white’ bloc’s aggressive policies and conduct, albeit unequally, the ability to make an effective impact at the least opportunity cost appears to have been the yardstick employed in determining the membership to the ISDSC. Security concerns were probably the primary consideration for membership of the ISDSC. This may explain the absence from the group of such countries as Malawi, whose friendly attitude to the ‘white’ bloc in general and to South Africa in particular would have made its participation highly unlikely, due to the “security-oriented and sensitive[ity] of the Committee” viewed correctly as considerably higher than the FLS gatherings by Omari.85 The organisation’s general objectives included the prevention of Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 99

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aggression from within the region and beyond, as well as the promotion of regional stability and peace and the enhancement of regional development.86 An assertion is made here that membership of the ISDSC during this period reflected, not only relative compatibility of values but a sense of community during periods of insecurity. The relationship among the members of the ISDSC was very good, especially between the founding members of Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique (cited in an interview with President Kaunda). While it would not be denied that the ‘black’ bloc’s reaction to the minority regimes in the region is not without some problems in the alliance, the fact that nationalist movements carried out operations along the entire stretch of the border is an indication of unity among the membership of the ISDSC. Although all ‘black’-led states in the region were members of the SADCC, this did not follow in the case of the ISDSC. While there were nine members of the SADCC until 1983 (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), only seven of these (excluding Malawi and Swaziland) were members of the ISDSC.87 Richard Weisfelder observes that Lesotho “appear[ed] ambivalent about the nature of its contribution and the probability of attaining tangible benefits” due to fears that this would have reduced donor support to its development programmes. This concern was probably unnecessary because the region had “attracted massive assistance from various western governments and institutions (as much as US$800 million over the next five years)”.88 Grundy held the view that the SADCC’s planning and activities showed serious intent by the organisation to reduce South Africa’s economic dominance.

PULL AND PUSH FACTORS: THE CHALLENGE OF AN ALLIANCE Efforts to evolve policies and develop structures designed to create inter- state security in the ‘black’ bloc, as would be expected, were met by a number of challenges which this section will discuss in the form of ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors. The one factor that had an immense effect on the FLS and therefore on all ‘black’-led states in the region was the Nkomati Accord. The Nkomati Accord, signed in March 1984 between Mozambique (at the encouragement of the West) and South Africa by presidents Machel and Botha, at the insistence of the latter, was an undertaking by both states not to allow each other’s territories to be used for “acts of war, aggression, or violence against the other”. A Joint Security Commission was established for the purposes of monitoring the Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 100

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agreement.89 Mozambique was coerced into the agreement following a destructive, punitive and sustained civil war which resulted in the maiming or death of a large part of the population, and in which the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) rebel movement received logistical and other military assistance from the South African Defence Force (SADF). The Accord brought into the open consternation among members of the bloc, which led to some strains in the alliance. President Machel saw the Nkomati Accord as a “victory for African diplomacy … a triumph over the forces of violence and militarilism”,90 while President Nyerere dismissed it as a resounding defeat: “There is nothing to be gained by pretending that a defeat was in fact a victory.”91 Since the late President Nyerere was one of the two founding members of the FLS (the other being President Kaunda) and Tanzania one of the fronts for President Machel’s Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) to launch its guerrilla campaign against the Portuguese colonial forces, this reaction constituted major disapproval of the Accord, thereby giving an indication that, on this issue, the Mozambican leader had not sought consultation from all the regional security structures. Another significant factor is that the Angolan government supported the action by its Mozambican colleagues. The fact that both states were colonies of Portugal and experiencing similar internal strife, although not sharing a common border, appears to show solidarity on account of their common history and official language. The general reaction within the FLS was, however, one of appreciation of the difficult situation Mozambique was in. Then Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, said of the independent states in the region: “too weak to provide the ANC [African National Congress] with the external bases it needed.”92 It was apparent that this general reaction, also echoed by President Kaunda and the ANC, was a desire to seek some sort of consensus in the regional structure.93 Such a consensus was indeed arrived at the March 1985 summit where the six heads of state attending, decided in view of the deteriorating security situation in Mozambique due to the failure by South Africa to keep to their end of the agreement, that Mozambique would receive “all necessary support” it could get. The setting aside of differences during a crisis appears to be characteristic of FLS operations.94 As regards Zimbabwe’s viewpoint, it is likely that the time Robert Mugabe and his ZANU comrades spent in Mozambique during their independence struggle against the ‘white’ settler regime in Rhodesia, bonded the two states. Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 101

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The role of leadership in the region’s ‘black’ bloc is a fairly significant phenomenon. Peter Manning and Reginald Green argue that the FLS was essentially the result of a personal relationship between presidents Kaunda and Nyerere. Shaw and Anglin also stipulate that the “close and comprehensive” bilateral relationship between Zambia and Tanzania was a reflection of the “warm ties between presidents and state houses”.95 Pettman described this relationship as being one of “functional co-operation” which “helped to forge political links between [the] countries to promote and hasten the liberation process in Southern Africa”.96 The development of the railway line between Lusaka and Dar es Salaam—a project designed to give Zambia an alternative route to the sea, following the unreliability of the traditional southern one which depended totally on the ‘white’ bloc’s goodwill and which had been ruled out by the British government as “impossible”—was a result of the closeness of the two leaders and assistance from the Chinese government. Not only has the Lusaka–Dar es Salaam corridor been of value to the bilateral economic development of the two states but also conformed to the development ideals of SADC. Functional co-operation was exhibited by opening up training and refugee camps for the nationalist movements and, in the case of Zambia, providing transit camps for the guerrilla forces. It was nevertheless the modus operandi of the FLS that gave its most ardent critics avenues for criticism. The regional structure was largely regarded to have operated through consultations in ad hoc summits without a basic legal instrument, which therefore meant that it had “no formal status in international law [and was essentially an] informal forum”.97 Taken without dispute, this viewpoint can only strengthen the argument that the ‘black’ regional structure was driven by solidarity amongst political leaders who held a common vision. However, what Pettman referred to as a “lack of power, and unequal commitment”98 by the states to liberation, as well as the communication gap made reference to by O’Meara, are expected to have had a negative effect on the success of the ‘black’ bloc. In arguing this point, O’Meara uses as an example the secret meeting in Zambia on 14 August 1978 between Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo, the leader of ZAPU and member of the Patriotic Front (PF), Brigadier Joseph Garba, a former commissioner of external affairs of Nigeria, and President Kaunda. O’Meara stipulates that not only had the late Nkomo not informed his counterpart in the PF, Robert Mugabe, of such a meeting, but “President Kaunda had not discussed it with other front- Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 102

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line presidents”.99 He further notes that a subsequent FLS meeting on 1 September 1978 after Mugabe’s consultation with presidents Nyerere and Machel over the matter stipulated that it was “opposed to Nkomo’s meeting”. Mugabe’s mistrust of Kaunda is well documented in the ‘Mugabe Diary’: The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia due to the secret diplomacy between John Vorster and Kenneth Kaunda on the release of detainees from Rhodesian prisons. The military imbalance in favour of the ‘white’ bloc is shown clearly by the inability of the FLS to counter effectively the onslaught by the settler regimes in the south. However, the bloc did not capitulate but instead strengthened as new members joined the alliance as they acquired their independence.100 This led to stronger solidarity among the states, as exhibited through further augmentation of the regional structures such as the ISDSC and the SADCC.

CONCLUSION This chapter has looked at policies and structures that evolved for the purposes of inter-state security among the states in the Southern African region. The chapter identifies two blocs—one ‘white’ and the other ‘black’—which articulated conflicting polices with regional implications during the colonial and post colonial era. The ‘white’ bloc may be best described as the Pretoria–Lisbon–Salisbury axis, with Pretoria occupying a dominant position. The bloc, while regarded as an ‘informal’ arrangement, nevertheless took on a detailed structure which showed strong solidarity among settler communities with significant support from the West, particularly the UK and US. The central issue the chapter examines is that the desire to develop a regional security structure was not the sole preserve of the dominant ‘black’ region as can be seen in such policies as the ‘African Charter’, and South Africa’s Total Strategy with its aspects of both a ‘constructive’ and ‘destructive’ nature. CONSAS evolved as the most developed output of the ‘white’ bloc for the Southern African region. However, the apartheid policy of the lead state, South Africa, together with the determination by the ‘black’ bloc to make these efforts fail, proved to be major political obstacles to the success of the undertaking of this bloc to set up a sustainable security arrangement. The chapter also argued that, like the ‘white’ bloc, the ‘black’ bloc was resolute in its desire to create a regional security structure, and depended extensively on regional solidarity to overcome obstacles put in its way by Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 103

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the ‘white’ bloc and to some extent by the West, principally the UK and US, on account of a democratic deficit by the Zimbabwe government. It was shown that the ‘black’ bloc’s efforts to form a regional structure to mitigate the security concerns of the region could be taken back to a time when only Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania comprised the Southern African region and their association with the EAC and the ECA to serve these concerns. It has also been discussed that, following the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto which provided the policy towards the Southern African region, structures that evolved such as the FLS, ISDSC and the SADCC were to a significant level the creation of political elites holding common views over regional security matters. The chapter also argued that a sense of solidarity and friendship among the SADCC leadership overcame obstacles such as the Nkomati Accord, the desire to address exclusively ‘national’ interests (as in the case of Malawi), and leadership differences over the manner of engaging the ‘white’ bloc. Overarching in the events and issues covered by the chapter is the intertwining character of security and developmental issues and institutions.

NOTES

1 J Cilliers, The evolving security architecture in Southern Africa, African Security Review 4(5), 1995, p 3. 2 General Smuts of the United Party visualised a collaborative arrangement that acknowledged independent states, racial segregation, and the supremacy of the ‘white’ race. For details, see A du Pisani, Ventures into the interior: Continuity and change in South Africa’s regional policy (1948-1991), in A van Nieuwkerk & G van Staden (eds), Southern Africa at the crossroads: Prospects for the political economy of the region, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1991. 3 IJR Cantori & SL Spiegel, The international politics of regions: A comparative approach, Prentice Hall, Engelwood Cliffs, 1970. 4 I speak of Portugal in this context, not its colonial possessions, Angola and Mozambique, since the settlers there were virtually under the control of the Portuguese government. 5 Breytenbach writes about the collaboration of South Africa and Portugal during the UN debates on Southern Africa and the opposition by such institutions as the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth. See W Breytenbach, Conflict in Southern Africa: From Frontline States to collective security, The Arusha Paper 2, 1995. 6 Andre du Pisani quotes Barber & Barratt as stating that all South African governments prior to 1994 were united in their desire for “the maintenance of a white minority dominated state”. See J Barber & J Barratt, South Africa’s Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 104

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foreign policy: The search for status and security 1945-1988, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p 1. 7 SC Nolutshungu, South Africa in Africa: A study in ideology and foreign policy, Manchester University Press, 1975. 8 A total of eight initiatives are identified: the African Charter, African Defence Organisation, Oswald Pirow’s idea of a federation series in the 1930s from South Africa to the Sudan, General Smut’s 1943 colonial groupings, Prime Minister Verwoerd’s 1960s Southern African Common Market (a co- prosperity sphere), Prime Minister Vorster’s détente of the 1970s, Prime Minister Botha’s Constellation of Southern African States, and his Total Strategy of the late 1970s. For details, see M Plaut, E Unterhalter & D Ward, Can the Frontline States escape apartheid’s stranglehold? The struggle for Southern Africa, War and Want and Liberation, London, 1981. 9 Nolutshungu, op cit, p 43. 10 J Mayall, Africa: The Cold War and after, Elek Books, London, 1971, p 30. 11 Nolutshungu, op cit. 12 RS Jaster, The defense of white power: South African southern policy under pressure, Macmillan, Hampshire, 1988, p 13. 13 Nolutshungu, op cit, p 48. 14 J Pettman, Zambia Security and Conflict, Julian Friedmann Publishers, Sussex, 1974, p 164. 15 Cited in Nolutshungu, op cit, p 46. 16 Pretoria News, 9 June 1951; Minister of Defence in Ass. Deb., vol. 87, Cols. 1261-2, cited in Nolutshungu, op cit, p 49. 17 Du Pisani, op cit, p 191. 18 G Evans & R Newnham, The Penguin dictionary of international relations, London, Penguin, 1999, p 37. 19 See Nolutshungu, op cit, pp 71-73. 20 Ibid, p 39. 21 Ibid, p 73. 22 An alliance is in international relations considered to be a “formal agreement between two or more actors—usually states which collaborate together on perceived mutual security issues”. By definition an alliance ought to have some agreement on how to respond to particular events. It may also be deduced that the nature of alliances will be defined by the size of states, economic and military capabilities. Thus, the stronger the states in such factors, the more dominant they are likely to be in an alliance. See Evans & Newnham, op cit, p 15. 23 ARB, IV, 845C, September 15, 1967 cited in KW Grundy, Economic patterns in the new Southern African balance, in G Carter & P O’Meara (eds), Southern Africa: The continuing crisis, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1973, p 222. 24 This was a statement written in 1967 by the then Minister of Defence, PW Botha, in News from South Africa, August 1967, recorded in G Carter & P O’Meara (eds), Southern Africa: The continuing crisis, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1973, p x. Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 105

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25 See Grundy, op cit. 26 See Barber & Barrat, op cit; D Geldenhuys, The diplomacy of isolation: South African foreign policy making, Palgrave Macmillan, Johannesburg, 1984. 27 See Barber & Barrat, op cit, pp 294-295 and 320. 28 C Legum, International rivalries in the Southern African conflict, in Carter & O’Meara, op cit, p 5. 29 Grundy, op cit, p 223. 30 Ibid, p 222. 31 Kenneth Kaunda, quoted in Legum, op cit, p 17. See also RE Gordon & CJ Talbot, From Dias to Vorster: Source material on South African history 1488–1975, National Book Printers, Goodwood, nd, p 432. 32 See B Pottinger, The imperial presidency: P.W. Botha the first 10 years, Southern Book Publishers, Johannesburg, 1988, p 201. See also Gordon & Talbot, op cit, p 431; Du Pisani, op cit, pp 199-203. 33 For details see D Robertson, The Penguin dictionary of politics, Penguin Books, London, 1993, pp 18-19; JP Brits, Concise dictionary of history and political terms, Penguin Books, London, 1995, p 16. 34 For details see Pottinger, op cit. 35 Du Pisani, op cit, p 201. 36 Carter & O’Meara, op cit, p 22. 37 Arthur Garshon observed that “[i]f those air force plans and army weapons had been shared equally among all three partners, the white Rhodesians, who soon rebelled against British rule, would not have been able to sustain themselves militarily as they did for fourteen years from 1965”. See A Garshon, Crisis in Africa: Battle ground of East and West, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1981, p 154. 38 The notion of multiracialism propagated by the Portuguese was premised on a policy of racial assimilation. 39 Grundy, op cit. 40 Carter & O’Meara, op cit. 41 Grundy, op cit, p 256. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid, pp 257-258. 44 Geldenhuys, op cit, pp 37-38. 45 Barber & Barratt, op cit, p 254. 46 Davies & O’Meara, op cit. 47 Barber & Barratt, op cit, p 254. 48 Davies & O’Meara, op cit, p 67. 49 Cited from The Star (Johannesburg), 12 April 1979; see Jaster, op cit, p 82. 50 I Mandaza, Southern Africa in the 1990s: Resolving the South African (national) question, Southern African Political and Economics Monthly, May 1991. 51 Address by Prime Minister PW Botha, Carlton Centre, Johannesburg, 22 November 1979. 52 Pottinger, op cit, pp 201-202. 53 Pettman, op cit, p 161. Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 106

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54 R Scruton, A dictionary of political thought, Macmillan, London, 1982, pp 558-559. 55 Pettman, op cit, p 162. 56 Interview with President Kenneth Kaunda of the Republic of Zambia. 57 Robert Jaster (op cit) writes that the ‘shrunken constellation’ did not stop the desire by South Africa to maintain the buffer states by now referring to a ‘confederation’ whose interest, according to PW Botha was “co-ordinated action on interstate political relations, economics, social affairs and security”. Botha’s comments are in the address at the opening ceremony of the summit meeting of the constellation in Pretoria on 23 July 1980. 58 Jaster, op cit, p 88. 59 In an interview with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, it was noted that Zambia’s policy to participate in Vorster’s détente and subsequent talks with some of the ‘white’ bloc political leaders was with the knowledge of the OAU. 60 Pettman, op cit, p 158. 61 Times of Zambia (Lusaka), 23 April 1971. 62 John Vorster, cited in Pettman, op cit, p 158. Zambia was evidently viewed as a relevant country by South Africa. Minister Muller of the latter was quoted in The Star (Johannesburg) of 26 June 1968 as viewing the former as “[t]he really valuable ‘conquest’ and the one which would consolidate the bloc and make it almost impregnable”. Zambia was then considered to be the wealthiest of the African states. 63 See Pettman, op cit, p 226; Times of Zambia, 5 August 1965, 18 August 1967 and 18 October 1967. 64 Pettman, op cit, p 228. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid; See ‘Z’ Magazine (Lusaka), June 1969, p 5. 67 Rhodesia and South Africa’s outward-looking policies were of major concern to the states in the region. 68 Pettman, op cit, p 229. 69 TM Shaw & DG Anglin, The crises of liberalism, in Carter and Meara, op cit. 70 See African Recorder, 1969, pp 2312-2314 for full text; cited in Africa 45, May 1975, p 12; Pettman, op cit, p 229. 71 MG Khadiagala, Allies in adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African security 1975-1993, Ohio University Press, Athens, 1994, p 24; Jan Pettman states that the Lusaka Manifesto was largely due to Kaunda’s influence. 72 See also Shamuyarira, The Lusaka Manifesto, East African Journal, November 1969, pp 25-27; Makiwane, Lusaka Manifesto buried, Anti Apartheid News, April 1970, p 7. 73 Cited in Daily News (Dar es Salaam), 8 April 1974. 74 V Mwaanga, The other society: A detainee’s diary, London, Fleetfoot, 1986; interview with the author. 75 Khadiagala, op cit, p 24; AH Omari, The rise and decline of the Frontline States of Southern Africa: 1975-1990, unpublished PhD thesis, Dalhousie University, 1991. 76 Cilliers, op cit, p 4. Prospects13.qxd 2005/07/13 01:22 PM Page 107

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77 Omari, op cit, p 83. 78 Cilliers, op cit, p 4. 79 To regard the ‘black’-ruled states as “economically independent” was certainly stretching the facts since all these states were heavily dependent economies. Economic independence was one of the alliance’s prime objectives. 80 Interview with Julius K Nyerere, Third World Quarterly 6 October 1984, p 836; G Khadiagala, Allies in adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African security, 1975-1993, Ohio University Press, 1994, p 133. 81 B Chakaodza, Communication policies in the African context, Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, Harare, 1990, p 66. 82 J Blumenfeld, Economic interdependance in Southern Africa: From conflict to co-operation, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1991, pp 44-45. 83 Khadiagala, op cit. 84 SADCC Handbook, 1980, p 4. See also Khadiagala, 1990; CB Thomson, The Frontline States in the Liberation of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1985. 85 Omari, op cit. 86 RS Shikapwashya, Presentation on the aim, roles, functions and organisation of the Standing Aviation Committee of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee for the Southern African region, paper presented at the Air Power Conference, Pretoria, 3 October 1995. 87 SADCC Handbook, 1984; Cilliers, op cit. 88 Grundy, op cit, p 312. 89 Legum, op cit, p 95; Khadiagala, op cit. 90 Cited in JG Liebenow, SADCC, Challenging the ‘South African’ connection, Universities Field Staff International, 1984, p 2. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 Maganya argued, not without good reason, that Mozambique was the weakest link in what he referred to as the “FLS Association”. Quoted in ISR Msabaha & TM Shaw (eds), Confrontation and liberation in Southern Africa: Regional directions after the Nkomati Accord, Westview Press, Boulder, 1987. 94 There was also an undertaking by Tanzania that should South Africa overthrow Mozambique’s government, it would once again provide Frelimo with a rear base. 95 Shaw & Anglin, op cit. 96 Pettman, op cit. 97 Ibid; Cilliers, op cit, p 84. 98 Pettman, op cit. Malawi took the sole decision to dissent on the matter of waging hostilities on the ‘white’ regimes. The state was subsequently the only ‘black’ state to establish diplomatic relations with the apartheid South African government. 99 O’Meara, op cit, p 46. 100 Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia, in that order, joined the FLS, ISDSC and the SADCC as they became independent states from Portugal, the UK and South Africa, respectively.