Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Volume 1 Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability

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Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability

Oran R. Young Paul Arthur Berkman Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Editors Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Volume 1 Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability

Series Editors Paul Arthur Berkman Science Diplomacy Center Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University Medford, MA, USA Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Department of International Law MGIMO University Moscow, Russia Oran R. Young Bren School of Environmental Science & Management University of California Santa Barbara, CA, USA This Springer book series – Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability – offers a roadmap for humankind to address issues, impacts and resources within, across and beyond the boundaries of nations. Informed decisions operate across a ‘continuum of urgencies,’ extending from security time scales (mitigating risks of political, economic or cultural instabilities that are immediate) to sustainability time scales (balancing economic prosperity, societal well-being and environmental protection across generations) for nations, peoples and our world. Moreover, informed decisions involve governance mechanisms (laws, agreements and policies as well as regulatory strategies, including insurance, at diverse jurisdictional levels) and built infrastructure (fixed, mobile and other assets, including communication, research, observing, information and other systems that entail technology plus investment), which further require close coupling to achieve progress with sustainability. International, interdisciplinary and inclusive (holistic) engagement in this book series involves decisionmakers and thought leaders from government, business, academia and society at large to reveal lessons about common-interest building that promote cooperation and prevent conflict. The three initial volumes utilize the high north as a case study, recognizing that we are entering a globally significant period of trillion-dollar investment in the new Arctic Ocean. Additional case studies are welcome and will be included in the book series subsequently. Throughout, to be holistic, science is characterized as ‘the study of change’ to include natural sciences, social sciences and Indigenous knowledge, all of which reveal trends, patterns and processes (albeit with different methods) that become the bases for decisions. The goal of this book series is to apply, train and refine science diplomacy as an holistic process, involving informed decisionmaking to balance national interests and common interests for the benefit of all on Earth across generations.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16420 Oran R. Young • Paul Arthur Berkman Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Editors

Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Volume 1 Editors Oran R. Young Paul Arthur Berkman Bren School of Environmental Science Science Diplomacy Center and Management Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy University of California Tufts University Santa Barbara, CA, USA Medford, MA, USA

Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Department of International Law MGIMO University Moscow, Russia

ISSN 2662-4516 ISSN 2662-4524 (electronic) Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability ISBN 978-3-030-25673-9 ISBN 978-3-030-25674-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover map illustration: Oldest and longest continuous satellite record of ship traffic in the Arctic Ocean from 1 September 2009 through 31 December 2016, produced by the Arctic Options and Pan-Arctic Options projects to facilitate “Holistic Integration for Arctic Coastal-Marine Sustainability” with international, interdisciplinary and inclusive (holistic) collaboration from Canada, China, France, Norway, Russia and the United States. As introduced with the NASA Earth Observatory image of the day on 12 April 2018 (Shipping Responds to Arctic Ice Decline), the centroid of ship traffic north of the Arctic Circle has “moved 300 kilometers north and east—closer to the North Pole—over the 7-year span.” The satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) data was provided by SpaceQuest Ltd. with big-data analyses and map production by Greg Fiske at the Woods Hole Research Center (for additional details, see Chapter 11: Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments in this book).

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability

Abstract This is the opening preface for a new book series – Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability – published by Springer. Utilizing the Arctic Ocean as an initial case study with its diverse dimensions – within, across, and beyond national jurisdictions – this book series will reveal insights, lessons and precedents to apply, train, and refine with science diplomacy, considering local- global relevance with synergies of education, research, and leadership. The initial three volumes are:

Volume 1 – Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Volume 2 – Building Common Interests in the Arctic Ocean with Global Inclusion Volume 3 – Pan-Arctic Implementation of Sustainable Infrastructure

The first volume involves the Russian Federation as a common denominator with either Norway (oldest multilateral region in the Arctic) or the United States (sharing with Russia the longest maritime boundary in the world) to interpret changes with connected biophysical and socio-economic systems that underscore decisions across a “continuum of urgencies” from security to sustainability time scales. The second and third volumes will emerge from presentations during the annual Arctic Frontiers Conferences in Tromsø, Norway, starting in January 2020. Volume 2 will consider circumstances associated with areas beyond sovereign jurisdictions from Arctic and non-Arctic perspectives, recognizing the international community has unambiguous rights and responsibilities in the Arctic High Seas under the law of the sea. Volume 3 is intended to synthesize insights on a pan-Arctic scale, analogous to the world ocean across all sea zones, involving decisions to achieve ongoing progress with sustainability, coupling governance mechanisms and built infrastructure. Throughout this book series, which we expect to expand beyond the Arctic, science diplomacy will be applied as an international, interdisciplinary, and inclusive (holistic) process, facilitating informed decisionmaking to balance national interests and common interests for the benefit of all on Earth across generations. With holistic integration, this book series will reveal skills, methods, and theory of informed decisionmaking that will continue to evolve, contributing to balance, resilience, and stability that underlie progress with sustainability across our home planet.

v vi Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability

Introduction to the Book Series

This is the opening preface for a new book series – Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability – published by Springer. This book series emerges from fruit- ful collaborations between the editors, who convened the first formal dialogue between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian Federation (Berkman and Vylegzhanin 2012), demonstrating the capacity of observers to contribute as participants by convening dialogues with allies and adversaries alike to build common interests. The enduring outcome of that historic dialogue in 2010 at the University of Cambridge, co-convened with MGIMO University (Moscow State University of International Relations), is a precedent of science diplomacy that can be applied to the sustainable, stable, and peaceful development of our world. Utilizing the Arctic Ocean as an initial case study with its diverse dimensions – within, across, and beyond national jurisdictions – this book series will reveal insights, lessons and precedents to apply, train, and refine with science diplomacy, considering local-global as well as global-local relevance with synergies of education, research, and leadership. The initial three volumes are:

These three volumes will build on each other, addressing shared challenges and solutions that operate across contrasting Arctic marine regions with Pan-Arctic interconnections of associated and dependent biophysical and socioeconomic systems. This volume (Volume 1) involves the Russian Federation in shared marine regions with either Norway or the United States, respectively, in the Barents Sea (oldest regional multilateral governance complex in the Arctic) and Bering Strait (longest maritime boundary between two nations in the world), recognizing Russian coastlines surround nearly half of the Arctic Ocean. Volume 2 will consider circumstances associated with areas beyond sovereign jurisdictions from Arctic and non-Arctic perspectives, recognizing the international community has unambiguous rights and responsibilities in the Arctic High Seas under the law of the sea, to which the eight Arctic states and six Indigenous peoples organizations “remain committed.” Volume 3 is intended to synthesize insights on a pan-Arctic scale, analogous to the world ocean across all sea zones, involving decisionmaking with governance mechanisms and built infrastructure as well as their coupling to achieve ongoing progress with sustainability. Herein with Volume 1, starts this journey to reveal, define, integrate and apply the puzzle pieces (highlighted) of informed decisionmaking as the engine of science diplomacy, helping to achieve sustainability with Arctic and global relevance onward. This three-volume series is inspired by two intertwined projects with scope across Arctic regions in a global context, sharing the subtext of Holistic Integration Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability vii for Arctic Coastal-Marine Sustainability (Table 1). HOLISTIC is the unifying puzzle of science diplomacy with the shape of international, interdisciplinary, and inclusive that facilitates convergence (Roco et al. 2013), which is further revealed by accelerating knowledge co-production. For example, the Arctic Options and Pan-Arctic Options projects enabled synergies to produce the Baseline of Russian Arctic Laws (Berkman et al. 2019), introducing transparency to promote cooperation and prevent conflict with the authentic English translation of all Russian laws since the early nineteenth century. Similarly, considering options (without advocacy), holistic engagement was introduced to support implementation of the 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (Arctic Science Agreement 2017; Berkman et al. 2017; Arctic Science Agreement Dialogue Panel 2019). An outcome of these two projects also is the Science Diplomacy Center through the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The central goal of Arctic Options and Pan-Arctic Options involves development of a holistic process, revealing informed decisionmaking as the engine of science diplomacy, characterized as an holistic process, involving informed decisionmaking to balance national interests and common interests for the benefit of all on Earth across generations.

Table 1 Intertwined projects involving Holistic Integration for Arctic Coastal-Marine Sustainabilitya Project name Aspects Arctic options Pan-Arctic options Duration 2013–2019 2015–2020 Conceptual Decision-support process to integrate stakeholder perspectives, evidence and scope governance mechanisms to reveal options that contribute to informed decisionmaking for sustainable infrastructure development in the Arctic Ocean Geographic Arctic High Seas, Barents Sea Region Pan-Arctic (defined as north of the scope (BaSR), Bering Strait Region (BeSR) Arctic Circle + Bering Strait Region) Options Governance Mechanisms Governance Mechanisms and Built Infrastructure Funding United States, France United States, Russian Federation, nations Norway, France, China and Canada Funding ArcSEES Belmont Forum program (Arctic Science, Engineering, and (Arctic Observing and Research for Education for Sustainability) Sustainability) www.nsf.gov/pubs/2012/nsf12553/ https://www.belmontforum.org/ nsf12553.htm cras/#arctic2014 Funding $2,000,000+ €1,000,000 aGoal Design, develop, and demonstrate a holistic process to enhance the effectiveness of governance with built infrastructure for sustainable development in Arctic coastal-marine systems. Objective 1 Aggregate Arctic coastal-marine data from the natural and social sciences in an efficient and flexible manner for diverse decisionmaking purposes. Objective 2 Apply analytical tools and strategic planning concepts to reveal plausible scenarios about Arctic coastal-marine development over diverse spatial and temporal scales. Objective 3 Generate infrastructure and policy options through international, interdisciplinary, and inclusive dialogues responding to Arctic coastal-marine opportunities and risks. Objective 4 Share the options resulting from Objectives 1–3 with members of the policy community in view of current Arctic governance issues viii Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability

• How does science diplomacy balance national interests and common interests? • What is informed decisionmaking and how does it operate? • How do we facilitate inclusion in a world filled with exclusion?

This book series is designed to address these questions with examples and lessons, insights and inspiration, contributing to progress with local-global as well as global- local sustainability.

Globally-Interconnected Civilization

The reality of human civilization is that we are now globally interconnected (Fig. 1). This fact is revealed simply by the concept of “world wars,” which happened for the first time in the history of humankind only in the last century. For perspective, the oldest continuous annual calendars still in use record nearly 6000 years – with the past few centuries like years in a life-span of sixty centuries – demonstrating that we are still in our infancy as a globally-interconnected civilization. Moreover, timing of the past few centuries coincides with ACCELERATING increase in global human population size, which is orders of magnitude larger than at the dawn of the nation-state with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

Fig. 1 Globally-Interconnected Civilization, viewed on a planetary scale with our human population (Durand 1977; Worldometer 2019) multiplying by billions (yellow dots) and increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (USEPA 2019) – across Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) eras – recognizing “correlation alone does not mean causation” Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability ix

At the scale of the Earth, carbon dioxide levels in the global atmosphere also are accelerating (Fig. 1). Without trying to explain this global atmospheric phenomenon or even predict any changes, it is clear that there is a symbiosis between human population and Earth’s climate, which is by definition a planetary process (i.e., Jupiter and other planets in our solar system each have their own unique climates). Underlying all such discussions is the fact that human population size on Earth is increasing expo- nentially, which is the root cause for considering climate change “as a common concern of humankind” since the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC 1992). The challenge for humankind is to address solutions on a planetary scale, in a dynamic system that changes over decades to millennia (Roberts and Westad 2013), requiring societal processes that operate in a holistic manner. Working from first principles – on Earth, there are areas within the boundaries of nations as well as areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), established under international law as international spaces to promote peace after World War II. These two generalized categories of jurisdiction reveal our fundamental challenge as a globally-interconnected civilization (Figs. 1 and 2) – to balance national interests and common interests for the benefit of all on Earth across generations, recognizing that nations will always first and foremost look after their national interests. With perspective, the law of the sea provides a pedagogical framework to illustrate our fundamental challenge within, across, and beyond national jurisdictions, considering legal zones that apply across the Earth (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2 Law of the Sea Zones, from coastal baselines into areas beyond national jurisdictions (ABNJ), namely, the high seas and area of the deep sea, across a gradient from national interests into common interests (adapted from USGPO 1985). The sea zones are applied under customary international law (as by the United States) and through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) with nearly 160 signatories. Provisions of UNCLOS are for “strengthening of peace, security, co-operation and friendly relations among all nations” with central applications for Marine Scientific Research (UNCLOS 1982) x Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability

Negotiated over centuries, at least since 1609 when Mare Liberum was crafted by Hugo Grotius (Bull et al. 1992), the zones in the ocean underscore the pull and push (as well as ebb and flow) of nations with TRANSBOUNDARY issues, impacts, and resources. Moreover, these transboundary considerations shift over time due to our changing Earth system, but also involving political cycles with government leaders in office over years, even decades, some in nations and regions that have recorded histories extending across centuries and a few with heritages over millennia.

Science as the “Study of Change”

In our transboundary world, applications with science diplomacy originate and operate inside as well as outside of government with connections that exist at all scales on Earth, revealing two cross-cutting questions. How does science enable allies and adversaries alike to build common interests? How can science promote cooperation and prevent conflict? From our industrial and digital revolutions into the future with STI (Fig. 1), these questions underscore the stimulus for science diplomacy as a holistic process to address issues, impacts, and resources across time and space in our globally-interconnected civilization. With international and interdisciplinary inclusion, SCIENCE is the “study of change” (symbolized by the Greek letter delta, ∆, as in mathematics), including the natural sciences and social sciences as well as Indigenous knowledge. Across time and space – all “sciences” involve rigorous training with inquiry skills and strategies to characterize patterns, trends, and processes (albeit with different methodologies) that become the bases for decisionmaking. STI contributes to measurements, assessments, and responses as well as impacts with our civilization across the Earth, as we have seen from the industrial revolution to the digital revolution (Fig. 1). In relation to current decisionmaking, it is easier to understand security issues because urgencies are here and now. Sustainability, on the other hand, involves urgencies across time into the future, which is uncertain. Nonetheless, the starting point and momentum of humankind are known today, without predictions on a planetary scale (Fig. 1). Moreover – underlying diverse decisions – it is understood that human impacts are related to populations, affluence, and technology (Ehrlich and Holdren 1971; Holdren 2008). But, with all kinds of biophysical and socioeconomic “evidence” for decisions from diverse stakeholders, how do we make informed decisions? How can uninformed decisions be detected and corrected? To avoid jar- gon, as a proposition, informed decisions operate across a “continuum of urgencies” (Fig. 3), introducing a scalable framework that applies across tactical and strategic time scales as well as diverse regional scales to address issues, impacts, and resources. Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability xi

As a hypothesis, informed decisionmaking is scalable to the person, institution, system, region, situation, and world, involving the two generalized arenas of decisions that require close coupling to achieve progress with security as well as sustainability (Berkman 2015):

• GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS (laws, agreements, and policies as well as regulatory strategies, including insurance, at diverse jurisdictional levels) • BUILT INFRASTRUCTURE (fixed, mobile, and other assets, including communication, research, observing, information, and other systems that require technology plus investment)

We are entering a world with 8 billion people this decade. Human generations now are aligned with change on a planetary scale, recognizing human-population size has skyrocketed over 400% just in the lifetimes of our oldest living relatives (Fig. 1). Crossing thresholds unlike any in human history – considering Our Common Future (UNWCED 1987) – there is great responsibility for decisions that operate in the face of change, considering immediate instabilities as well as balance across generations on Earth (Fig. 1).

Pedagogy of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals

Children and even young adults living today will be alive in the twenty-second century, underscoring the “continuum of urgencies” for humankind (Fig. 3). The context of these urgencies is further revealed in view of human population growth, which began to accelerate on a planetary scale over the past few centuries, introducing the nation-state as the basic administrative unit with sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction across geographies (Fig. 1). The metronome is across generations, central to the concept of sustainability, from Maximum Sustainable Yield in fisheries to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) of our world (Fig. 4).

Fig. 3 Theory of Informed Decisionmaking (Berkman 2019a, b) that an INFORMED DECISION operates across a continuum of urgencies (Vienna Dialogue Team 2017) as a scalable proposition for nations and peoples across the Earth (Fig. 1) from security time scales (mitigating risks of political, economic, cultural, and environmental instabilities that are immediate) to sustainability time scales (balancing economic prosperity, environmental protection, and societal well-being across generations). For each of us as individuals, the continuum of urgencies is like driving on any road, constantly adjusting to the surrounding vehicles and circumstances while being alert to the red lights ahead and traffic behind xii Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability

For humankind, the generalization of Thomas Robert Malthus (1798) at end of the eighteenth century still is correct. Human populations are controlled by war, famine, and disease. Fortunately, as a globally-interconnected civilization, our understanding of these risks has matured with increased granularity into an evolving set of development goals for humanity (Fig. 4). Because they are inclusive, the SDGs can be applied with flexibility by governments and businesses as well as civil society more broadly, where all individuals can contribute to decisionmaking. Moreover, for each of the seventeen SDGs, there is integration with generations across a “continuum of urgencies” (Fig. 3) that involves decisions to achieve stability, balance, and resilience as underlying attributes of sustainability (Table 2). The pedagogy of the Sustainable Development Goals to build common interests is further revealed with increased granularity, involving the indicators and targets for each SDG that are elaborated by many nations in their Voluntary National Reviews. Unlike any time in human history – with necessity as the spice of innovation (Fig. 1) – the clarity of common interests with the SDGs is visionary to address issues, impacts, and resources at local-global as well as global-local scales on Earth across generations.

Fig. 4 The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), crafted in a holistic manner for the benefit of all on Earth across generations (UN 2030 Agenda 2015) Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability xiii

Table 2 Attributes and global-local characteristics of sustainability Attributes Global-local characteristics Balance Environmental Protection + Economic Prosperity + Societal Well-Being National Interests + Common Interests Resilience Present Generations + Future Generations Governance Mechanisms + Built Infrastructure Stability Promoting Cooperation + Preventing Conflict Peace + Survival

Informed Decisionmaking as the Engine of Science Diplomacy

Informed decisions start with questions (Fig. 5). Questions arise in view of systems, defined by their boundaries, providing frameworks to interpret internal and external dynamics. The interpretations of associated and dependent patterns, trends and process begin with questions for any research project, independent of the scientific focus. For human systems, questions also represent the least-complicated stage to build common interests among diverse actors when investments of time, effort, and resources are minimal. Importantly, for diplomacy, questions introduce a framework to reset dialogues when there is minimal progress with conflict resolution in human systems, involving boundaries with biophysical and socioeconomic components.

Fig. 5 Pyramid of Informed Decisionmaking, as the underlying methodology to apply, train, and refine across a “continuum of urgencies” (Fig. 3) that is self-selected, involving stages of research and action with outcomes of common-interest building and enhanced capacities across levels of holistic integration. (Adapted from Berkman et al. 2017) xiv Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability

Inquiry is a powerful methodology (Berkman 2002) for turning observations into questions that illuminate answers that become new questions in an ever- growing cascade of insight. When there are QUESTIONS OF COMMON CONCERN (Fig. 5), progress with common-interest building is revealed by application of appropriate methods to generate answers. With biophysical and socioeconomic systems, the ANSWERS INVOLVE DATA generated in an interdisciplinary manner. “Big data” and “open data” (Kitchin 2014) are continuously emerging, increasingly as public goods (ISC 2018), creating opportunities for service industries to help build an economy based on knowledge (Ackoff 1999). However, to operate across a “continuum of urgencies” with the SDGs (Figs. 3 and 4), there is more than research with questions and data. In addition, actions are required with evidence and options (without advocacy) for decisions, recognizing DATA IS NOT EVIDENCE (Fig. 5). Data are for answering questions whereas evidence is for decisionmaking, reflecting their different purposes and origins. EVIDENCE emerges with integration of data and questions in contexts of the decisionmaking institutions (The Royal Society 2018; Donnelly et al. 2018), involving perspectives and agendas of diverse stakeholders (Fig. 6). Yet, evidence only compels decisionmakers to act, but without specifications of what, when, where, or how to act with governance mechanisms and built infrastructure. In this sense, evidence-based decisionmaking is incomplete as well as redundant, in that all decisions involve some form of evidence. Recognizing that competing agendas engender political dynamics, is evidence being considered selectively by decisionmaking institutions? How can decisionmaking institutions be optimized to consider evidence inclusively?

Fig. 6 Decision-support process to integrate options (without advocacy) that contribute to informed decisions (Figs. 3 and 5). (Adapted from Berkman et al. 2017) Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability xv

Ultimately, the diplomacy comes from OPTIONS (without advocacy), which can be used or ignored explicitly, avoiding the political complications that commonly arise when there are different agendas. In this manner, options (without advocacy) are tendered with respect for the roles and responsibilities of the decisionmakers to produce informed decisions as the apex goal (Fig. 5). Informed decisionmaking is the engine of science diplomacy underscoring a holistic process that starts with questions to “connect the dots” in dynamic biophysical and socioeconomic systems with diverse stakeholders and agendas. The key puzzle piece with informed decisionmaking is “holistic” – international, interdisciplinary, and inclusive – at the center of sustainable development, with common- interest building and knowledge co-production across research-action stages for the benefit of all at global-local scales (Figs. 3, 4, 5, and 6 and Table 3).

Table 3 Categories of questions to apply, train, and refine with science diplomacy and its engine of informed informed decisionmaking (Figs. 3, 5, and 6) to implement the 17 sustainable development goals (Fig. 4) on EARTH across generations (Fig. 1) Holistic dimensions to consider Question category for decisionmakinga,b International Interdisciplinary Inclusive Science as an essential gauge of changes over time X X X and space Science as an instrument for Earth system X X X monitoring Science as an early warning system. X X X Science as a determinant of public policy agendas. X X X Science as an element of international legal X X X institutions. Science as a source of invention and commercial X X X enterprise. Science as an element of continuity in our global X X X society. Science as a tool of diplomacy to build common X X X interests. aDecisions involve governance mechanisms and built infrastructure, coupled for sustainability bElaborated from Berkman et al. (2011)

Transforming Research and Action

Skills are required within and between levels of the Pyramid of Informed Decisionmaking (Fig. 5) to apply, train, and refine with holistic approaches, delivering informed decisions (Fig. 3). Among the levels, enhancing capacities across the DATA-EVIDENCE INTERFACE between research and action with decisionmakers and scientists among other stakeholders (Fig. 6) will be transformative. The primary skill upward and downward across this decisionmaking interface involves xvi Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability individuals as both observers and participants, facilitated by curiosity and a sense of responsibility to address key questions (Table 3) with science diplomacy and holistic integration for sustainable development (Table 2) at all scales. Observers are scientists, studying change by recognizing as well as interpreting patterns, trends, and processes of systems at local-global and even galactic and ele- mental scales. Such observation skills involve curiosity, which is encouraged with the SOCRATIC METHOD, asking and answering questions to stimulate critical thinking with dialogue. In this broader sense, an effective education is revealed when individuals can teach themselves with questions and life-long learning. Observation skills require rigorous training as provided through the natural sciences and social sciences as well as Indigenous knowledge, studying and managing the home (“eco”), as represented by ecology and economics, respectively, as well as ecopolitics (see Volume 1, Chap. 1). Applying insights about trends, patterns, and processes, it is then possible to contribute to informed decisionmaking for sustainable development with actions taken by participants who design and implement governance mechanisms as well as built infrastructure. The opportunity is to train a next generation of informed decisionmakers, serving as observers and participants who also would be contributing to a KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, where research is transformed with action and vice versa (Fig. 5). Questions provide the foundation for informed decisionmaking and, at its core, science diplomacy stimulates inquiry to identify, answer and refine the questions that apply across all SDGs (Fig. 4 and Table 3). Where do the questions arise for sustainable development at local-global scales? Who is responsible for addressing questions that impact our sustainable development? Thought leadership can come from anywhere, where individuals can be observers and participants with informed decisionmaking (Fig. 3), building from the stage of questions with research and action to informed decisions (Figs. 3 and 5). Beyond symbolism of science as the “study of change” (Δ), the TRIANGULATION OF SCIENCE underlies a skill with holistic integration to accelerate knowledge co-production across the Pyramid of Informed Decisionmaking (Fig. 5). Integration skills also are implied across the learning hierarchy from data and information to knowledge and wisdom, a complementary pyramid that is known widely. In addition, triangulation is involved with diverse pyramids, triads, and trinities, inspiring synergies that are revealed literally by architectural applications with geodesic domes (Fuller and Applewhite 1975). More basically, triangulation reflects indivisible first principles, as with colors and prime numbers to integrate (Fig. 7). Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability xvii

Fig. 7 Co-production of knowledge – with science as the “study of change” symbolized by Δ – illustrating triangulation with: (left) holistic integration and (right) science-diplomacy features that apply together at each level of the Pyramid of Informed Decisionmaking (Fig. 5)

Triangulation as a skill can come from anywhere, beyond the responsibilities of decisionmakers alone, enabling leadership with research and education (Fig. 7). From research to action with informed decisionmaking (Fig. 5), triangulation comes with the natural sciences and social sciences as well as Indigenous knowledge. The resulting knowledge co-production is reflected literally with the 17 SDGs (Fig. 4), opening doors for a knowledge economy empowered by the capacities of our digital revolution (Fig. 1). Applying SCIENCE AS A PUBLIC GOOD (ISC 2018) synergies are evolving with informed decisionmaking, as revealed in a global context with the International Science Council (ISC 2019) that evolved in 2018 from the International Council of Science (ICSU) and International Social Sciences Council (ISSC). Within the ISC, science diplomacy is championed by the International Network on Government Science Advice (INGSA), closely collaborating with the Foreign Ministry Science and Technology Advice Network (FMSTAN 2019) that originated in 2016. On the Pyramid of Informed Decisionmaking (Fig. 9), INGSA represents the action stages with other ISC bodies, such as the Committee on Data (CODATA) or the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), representing the stages of research. How can research and action stages of informed decisionmaking (Fig. 5) be triangu- lated (Fig. 7) to produce synergies for our sustainable development (Fig. 4)? Synergies emerge from holistic dialogues that seek to integrate knowledge. At strategic time scales, syntheses can be integrated to co-produce knowledge with a sense of legacy, as with the 2009 Antarctic Treaty Summit that resulted in the first book on Science Diplomacy (Berkman et al. 2011) as well as the 2009 Wilton Park meeting that resulted in the widely referenced SCIENCE-DIPLOMACY TAXONOMY: Science in diplomacy, diplomacy for science, and science for diplomacy (The Royal Society 2010). Lessons and observations from these meetings translated in 2010 into the first formal dialogue between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian Federation regarding security in the Arctic (Berkman and Vylegzhanin 2012), operating across the continuum from security to sustainability time scales (Fig. 3). xviii Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability

At tactical time scales, holistic dialogue also can be the source of knowledge co- production to transform observations into actions that contribute to informed decisionmaking (Vienna Dialogue Team 2017; Talloires Dialogue Team 2018). For example, the 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation mandated a first-year review of its implementation, involving diplomatic as well as scientific communities to make progress, when options (without advocacy) and syntheses would be helpful (Berkman et al. 2017; Arctic Science Agreement Dialogue Panel 2019). In the context of this book series on Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, for Volumes 2 and 3 at least, the Arctic Science Agreement will have a central role at the data:evidence interface (Fig. 5) with Pan-Arctic sustainability and associated decisionmaking (Fig. 8). To illustrate holistic integration, the ARCTIC OCEAN SYSTEM offers a case study (Fig. 9) with the inclusive natural boundary of the Arctic Circle, crossing land and sea without being human-imposed, relating to the horizon for sunlight defined by tilt of the Earth’s axis at 66.5° North latitude (Fig. 9a). In this pan-Arctic region, the Arctic Ocean extends within, across, and beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of the surrounding states (Fig. 2) with Indigenous peoples who have lived in the high north for millennia among other residents (Larsen and Fondahl 2014).

Fig. 8 Institutional Interplay with the Arctic Science Agreement and other circumpolar Arctic governance mechanisms adopted after 2009 (Berkman et al. 2019), closely coupled with the international framework of the Law of the Sea, to which the eight Arctic States and six Indigenous Peoples Organizations “remain committed” (Arctic Council Secretariat 2013)

Open water and diminished sea ice (Fig. 9b) allow more light to penetrate, stimulating algal production (Arrigo and van Dijken 2015) and available biomass to consume at higher trophic levels throughout the food web (Fig. 9c). Similarly, with warmer waters, southern species are beginning to invade the Arctic marine ecosystem (Vermeij and Roopnarine 2008), illustrating internal and external dynamics with the Arctic Ocean (Fig. 9d), which is undergoing an environmental state-change with its sea surface boundary (Berkman and Vylegzhanin 2012). Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability xix

Fig. 9 The Arctic Ocean System with boundaries, inputs and outputs, and internal dynamics. (a) Geographic boundaries north of the Arctic Circle in view of surrounding land boundaries with national jurisdictions and Indigenous peoples among other residents, involving connections to the North Atlantic and North Pacific (Berkman 2015). (b) Changes in the surface boundary from per- petual multiyear sea ice to seasonally open water, as measured by satellites since 1979 (NASA 2012). (c) Illustration of ecosystem interactions among dependent and related species (ACIA 2004) without showing humans and their many connections and (d) Water masses and currents, illustrating internal and external dynamics with the North Atlantic and global ocean (Carmack et al. 2015)

Balancing National Interests and Common Interests

In our globally-interconnected civilization (Figs. 1 and 2), international peace and security transcend boundaries beyond the capacities of nation-states alone, recognizing that sustainability on a planetary scale operates across a SPECTRUM OF JURISDICTIONS. The central jurisdictional unit on Earth since 1648 is the nation-state, which will always look after its interests first and foremost. The larger jurisdictional unit is international, which emerged with the League of Nations and United Nations after the “world wars” of the twentieth century, leading into an era of building common interests among nations (Fig. 10). The smaller jurisdictional unit is subnational, recognizing the emergence of “megacities” with more than 10 million people (UNESA 2014) and wealth of associated regions (CBS News 2018), xx Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability even businesses (Office of Denmark’s Tech Ambassador 2019), surpassing the economic capacity of many nations. With establishment of international spaces (Fig. 10), regions on Earth provide opportunities to develop precedents and learn lessons about balancing national interests and common interests. With the Arctic Ocean System as an initial case study, representing common interests – the High Seas surrounding the North Pole in the waters above the sea floor are unambiguously beyond Exclusive Economic Zones and sovereign jurisdictions (Fig. 2). In contrast, representing national interests – on and in the sea floor – the Continental Shelf and deep-sea Area in the Central Arctic Ocean are seen as extensions of land areas, where there are recognized sovereign jurisdictions with rights that can be extended under UNCLOS (1982). Balancing between national interests and common interests in the Arctic Ocean will be the focus of Volume 2 of the book series on Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability.

Fig. 10 Balancing national and common interests over time on a planetary scale during the twentieth century, applying international environmental treaties as data (Fig. 5) to address sustainability questions (Table 3) about our globally-interconnected civilization (Fig. 1), with international legal establishment of areas beyond national jurisdictions (ABNJ in yellow) that cover nearly 70% of planet surface (plus outer space) to build common interests and minimize risks of conflicts over jurisdictional boundaries on Earth. (Adapted from Berkman 2002)

The juxtaposition of international legal zones in the Arctic Ocean – on the sea floor and in the superjacent waters (Figs. 2 and 11) – illustrates balancing between national interests and common interests, where questions (Table 3) can be used to stimulate knowledge co-production as the basis for informed decisionmaking (Figs. 3, 4, 5, and 6 and Tables 2 and 3). The questions and progress to build common interests in the Arctic Ocean are reflected by the emergence of binding legal Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability xxi agreements (Fig. 8), which further involve decisionmaking for built infrastructure and emerging markets in this “$1 trillion ocean” (Roston 2016). With global relevance, the Arctic Ocean is a special responsibility for humanity with the North Pole as a “pole of peace” and “burning security issues” surrounding the region (Gorbachev 1987). These observations in the 1987 Murmansk speech by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev were accompanied with introduction of the “Arctic Research Council,” becoming the Arctic Council in 1996 as a high-level forum with its six scientific working groups to address “common Arctic issues” (Ottawa Declaration 1996), that evolved with informed decisionmaking into a suite of binding agreements after 2009 (Fig. 8). Considering the pan-Arctic agreements that were signed in 2011 and 2013 as examples, while they are important and forward looking, they also are hollow in the absence of effective built infrastructure for their implementation. Who are the decisionmakers to couple governance mechanisms and built infrastructure? How will the investment mature to achieve progress with Arctic sustainability? Such infrastructure questions (Table 3) are an ongoing focus of the Arctic Economic Council that was established through the Arctic Council in 2015, fostering circumpolar business partnerships. Principles for business development in the Arctic also have emerged through the World Economic Forum (2016): “to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth in the region that furthers community well-being and builds resilient societies in a fair, inclusive and environmentally sound manner.”

Fig. 11 Balancing national interests and common interests over space with the law of the sea (Fig. 2) in view of the Central Arctic Ocean from the: (left) sea floor with sovereign areas and outer Continental Shelf claims into the currently defined Area of the deep sea (different colors) and (right) overlying water column with the High Seas (dark blue) as an unambiguous international space surrounded by Exclusive Economic Zones (light blue). National interests are seaward in contrast to common interests landward with perspective from the North Pole. (Adapted from Berkman and Young 2009) xxii Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability

With sustainable development as a “common Arctic issue” (Ottawa Declaration 1996), there is an opportunity for decisionmakers to operate across a “continuum of urgencies” (Figs. 3, 4, 5, and 6). The world well knows discussions at security time scales. There also are holistic dialogues that are emerging in view of sustainability time scales with built infrastructure across the twenty-first century (Peoples Republic of China 2015). Developing toward Volume 3 with Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, what are the investment phases in the Arctic (Fig. 12) as well as elsewhere on Earth to couple infrastructure with governance (e.g., Fig. 8), achieving progress with sustainability across generations?

Fig. 12 Concept of Investment Phases that are operating in parallel today to address a “continuum of urgencies” (Fig. 3) in the Arctic Ocean, as a globally-relevant case study with governance mechanisms (Figs. 2, 8, 10 and 11) and built infrastructure (NORDREGIO 2011) to develop as well as integrate for sustainable development across generations (Figs. 1, 3, 4 and 5; Tables 2 and 3). Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability xxiii

Public-private partnerships (World Bank 2019) with informed decisionmaking at tactical and strategic time scales (Figs. 1, 3, 4, 5, 10 and 11) are necessary to balance economic, environmental, and societal considerations (Tables 2 and 3). In view of trends, patterns and processes revealed with research and addressed with action (Fig. 5), this book series is intended to empower personal capacities with science diplomacy and its engine of informed decisionmaking as a holistic process for the benefit of all on Earth across generations.

Tufts University Paul Arthur Berkman Medford, MA, USA University of California Oran R. Young Santa Barbara, CA, USA MGIMO University Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Moscow, Russia

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UN 2030 Agenda (2015) Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. United Nations General Assembly, New York UNCLOS (1982) United Nations convention on the law of the Sea. Signed: Montego Bay, 10 December 1982; Entry into Force: 16 November 1994 UNESA (2014) World urbanization prospects. The 2014 Revision. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York. https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/publications/files/ wup2014-highlights.pdf UNFCC (1992) United Nations framework convention on climate change. Signed: Rio de Janeiro, 9 May 1992; Entry into Force: 21 March 1994 UNWCED (1987) Our common future: from one earth to one world. Report transmitted to the general assembly as an annex to resolution A/RES/42/187. United Nations, World Commission on Environment and Development, New York USEPA (2019) Global atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration data. United States environmental protection agency. https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-08/ghg-concentra- tions_fig-1.csv. Accessed 28 May 2019 USGPO (1985) Third conference on the United Nations convention on the law of the Sea. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC Vermeij GJ, Roopnarine PD (2008) The coming Arctic invasion. Science 321:780–781 Vienna Dialogue Team (2017) A global network of science and technology advice in foreign ministries. Science Diplomacy Action 1:1–20 World Bank (2019) Infrastructure and public-private partnerships. http://www.worldbank.org/en/ topic/publicprivatepartnerships. World Economic Forum (2016) Arctic investment protocol. Guidelines for responsible investment in the Arctic. World Economic Forum, Davos Worldometer (2019) Data on the size of the human population on Earth from 1600 to the present. http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/?#table-historical, with compilations by the United Nations since 1950. http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/. Accessed 28 May 2019 Acknowledgments

We are pleased to acknowledge the contributions of numerous individuals, organizations, and funding agencies that allowed us to carry out the work reported in this volume and to develop ideas about informed decision making for sustainability providing the broader context for our thinking about governing ecopolitical regions. We initiated the work that gave rise to this volume in 2013 under the terms of a grant awarded by the US National Science Foundation. This initial grant covering research on “Arctic Options: Holistic Integration for Arctic Coastal-Marine Sustainability (HIACMS)” was awarded under NSF’s Science, Engineering, and Education for Sustainability (SEES) Program (Award No. 1263678 initially at the University of California Santa Barbara and then Award No. 1263819 at Tufts University for the period 1 September 2013–31 August 2019); the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) provided supplemental funding to support French participation in the project. Known subsequently as Arctic Options, the project’s stated mission was to identify governance strategies and infrastructure options that balance economic, social, and environmental interests in Arctic coastal-marine systems through international, interdisciplinary, and inclusive processes of analysis. A subsequent grant awarded under the auspices of the Belmont Forum and entitled “Pan-Arctic Options: Holistic Integration for Arctic Coastal-Marine Sustainability” allowed us to bring this book effort to a successful conclusion, supported primarily by NSF (Award No. 1660449 for the period 1 November 2015–31 October 2019). The Belmont Forum project involved collaborations supported initially by: Canada (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council - SSHRC); China (Natural Science Foundation of China -NSFC); France (French National Research Agency - ANR); Norway (Research Council of Norway - RCN); Russia (Russian Foundation for Basic Research- RFBR); and United States (NSF). We began this work with the objective of exploring the application of what are widely known as decision support tools to complex policy choices relating to marine systems and associated coastal margins in the Arctic. To provide an empirical focus for our work, we selected the Bering Strait Region and the Barents Sea Region as initial cases for detailed examination. As the overall preface for our book series with Springer, Informed Decision making for Sustainability (included in this volume), makes clear, work on this project has followed a dialectical process in which general

xxvii xxviii Acknowledgments ideas about informed decision making have proven helpful in analyzing issues arising in the empirical cases, while work on the cases has contributed to the development of our thinking about the practice of informed decision making. What has arisen from this dialectic is an understanding of the importance of an end-to-end relationship between practitioners and analysts marked by cooperation in the identification and framing of questions, the co-production of knowledge, the development of options without advocacy, and the monitoring of results to improve decision making in subsequent iterations of the process. Broadly speaking, we have come to understand that this process works best when it is holistic in the sense of being international, interdisciplinary, and inclusive. More specifically, our work on Governing Arctic Seas has produced the concept of ecopolitical regions and an understanding of the need to balance common interests and national interests in the creation of institutions and construction of associated infrastructure to be successful in meeting the challenges of governance arising in these regions. This effort has proceeded hand-in-hand with the growth of the practice of science diplomacy. Starting with the Antarctic Treaty Summit, an inclusive dialogue held at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC, in December 2009 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, and continuing with the 2010 NATO Advanced Workshop on Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean held at Cambridge University, we have worked to identify and clarify the roles that science and scientists can play in the realm of informed decision making for sustainability. Now the focus of a dynamic global enterprise, science diplomacy has played an important role in the evolution of our thinking about Governing Arctic Seas. The result, reflected in this volume, is the development of a process in which practitioners and analysts can work together to address constructively a set of challenges that will determine our ability to govern human-environment interactions in a sustainable manner not only in well-defined regions but also on a planetary scale. A particularly notable feature of our work on Governing Arctic Seas has been the development of a productive ongoing collaboration between Russian and Western team members. There can be no real progress in informed decision making for sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions without active engagement on the part of individuals from both communities. An element of the production of this volume that we have found deeply satisfying has been the growth of an effective partnership in this realm, reflected not only in the composition of the editorial team but also in the authorship of the individual chapters that make up each of the three main sections of the volume. It is a distinct pleasure to acknowledge the contributions of a sizable collection of individuals and organizations that have played important roles in the development of the work reported in this volume. To carry out some of the work of the NSF-funded project, we organized a research collaborative, including the: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; Marine Science Institute at the University of California Santa; University of Alaska Fairbanks; and the National Snow and Ice Data Center at the University of Colorado. The participation of Lawson Brigham, Olivia Lee, and Julie Raymond-Yakoubian was supported by the University of Alaska Fairbanks. The Acknowledgments xxix

University of Colorado supported the participation of Peter Pulsifer. Oran Young’s participation was supported by the University of California Santa Barbara. Tufts University provided support for the contributions of Paul Berkman, Molly Douglas and Greg Fiske. Diwakar Poudel participated in the project as a postdoctoral fellow at the Norwegian Polar Institute funded by the Research Council of Norway. Katia Kontar participated as a postdoctoral fellow at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy funded by the US NSF. Fraser Taylor’s contributions to the project have been supported by the Geomatics and Cartographic Research Centre at Carleton University funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Valeriy Kryukov’s participation was funded by the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences within a project on the evolution of forms of economic activity in the Russian Arctic. Support for Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv’s work came from the NordForsk-funded Nordic Centre of Excellence Project (Award No. 76654) on Arctic Climate Predictions: Pathways to Resilient, Sustainable Societies (ARCPATH), and the Research Council of Norway-funded NORRUSS Project (Award No. 257644) on Challenges in Arctic Governance: Indigenous Territorial Rights in the Russian Federation. The National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis (NCEAS) in Santa Barbara, California, hosted our 20–24 October 2014 Workshop on “Integrated Policy Options for the Bering Strait Region.” This workshop, supported with funding from the US NSF Award No. 1263678, generated the information included in Table 5.1 of this volume. We are grateful to Frank Davis and Ben Halpern of NCEAS for their contributions not only to the success of the workshop but also to the early stages of the Arctic Options project supported under NSF Award No. 1263678. SpaceQuest Ltd. played an important role in our analysis of Arctic ship traffic, providing access to a unique dataset containing the oldest continuous record of satellite observations of ships operating in Arctic waters. The Arctic Options/Pan-Arctic Options Team met for extended working sessions in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. The participants in these workshops heard progress reports and provided extensive feedback at every stage in the development of the research reflected in Governing Arctic Seas. The workshops were hosted in chrono- logical order by the Norwegian Polar Institute in Tromsø, Norway, the Université Pierre et Marie Curie in Paris, France, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in Moscow, Russia, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts, USA. We asked experts in the relevant fields to peer review drafts of the individual chapters included in Governing Arctic Seas. We are grateful to them for agreeing to play this role on a voluntary basis and for providing input leading to significant improvements in the finished products. Those who assisted in this way include: Claudio Aporta, Carolina Behe, Steven Cole, Peter Fox, Jacqueline Grebmeier, Alf Håkon Hoel, Noor Johnson, Paula Kankaanpää, Timo Koivurova, Daniella Liggett, Peter Oppenheimer, Mark Parsons, Alexander Pelyasov, Rebecca Pincus, Karen Pletnikoff, Gunnar Sander, Koji Sekimizu, Alexander Shestakov, Olaf Schram Stokke, Dennis Thurston, and Stein Tronstad. xxx Acknowledgments

Our relationship with Springer has developed from strength to strength during the course of our work on this volume. We are especially grateful to Annelies Kersbergen and Margaret Deignan of Springer for constructive and enjoyable participation in our collaboration. Already, this collaboration has borne fruit in the form of the publication by Springer early in spring 2019 of: Paul Arthur Berkman, Alexander N. Vylegzhanin, and Oran R. Young, Baseline of Russian Arctic Laws, the first compendium of Russian laws relating to the Arctic available in English translation. We are delighted that Governing Arctic Seas will now take its place as Volume 1 in the Springer series Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability. Work is already underway on Volume 2 in this series, and we look forward to continuing our cooperation with colleagues at Springer. During the course of our work on this volume, we have laid the foundation for ongoing cooperation between the Springer book series and Arctic Frontiers, a major conference held annually in Tromsø, Norway. This cooperation, expected to continue as we work on additional volumes in the series, is formalized in a memorandum of understanding dated 25 September 2018 between Akvaplan-Niva on behalf of Arctic Frontiers and the Science Diplomacy Center at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University on behalf of Arctic Options/Pan-Arctic Options. The production of a highly integrated volume like Governing Arctic Seas is a lengthy and complex process. We are grateful to all those who participated in this process for sticking with us to the end to produce an excellent product.

Oran R. Young Paul Arthur Berkman Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Contents

Part I Volume 1: Introduction 1 Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions �� 3 Oran R. Young, Paul Arthur Berkman, and Alexander N. Vylegzhanin

Part II The Bering Strait Region 2 Ecosystems of the Bering Strait Region �� 25 Olivia Lee, Jon L. Fuglestad, and Lyman Thorsteinson 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region �� 47 Gunnar Knapp and Valeriy Kryukov 4 Sociocultural Features of the Bering Strait Region �� 75 Julie Raymond-Yakoubian and Eduard Zdor 5 Governing the Bering Strait Region �� 95 Oran R. Young, Paul Arthur Berkman, and Alexander N. Vylegzhanin

Part III The Barents Sea Region 6 Ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region �� 119 Jon L. Fuglestad, Rasmus Benestad, Vladimir Ivanov, Lis Lindahl Jørgensen, Kit M. Kovacs, Frode Nilssen, Hein Rune Skjoldal, and Julia Tchernova 7 Economies of the Barents Sea Region �� 143 Valeriy Kryukov and Diwakar Poudel 8 The Barents Sea Region in a Human Security Perspective �� 165 Ole Øvretveit, Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, Maria Goes, Elena Kudryashova, Rauna Kuokkanen, and Maksim Zadorin

xxxi xxxii Contents

9 Governing the Barents Sea Region �� 185 Alexander N. Vylegzhanin, Oran R. Young, and Paul Arthur Berkman

Part IV Crosscutting Themes and Analytic Tools 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea �� 207 Ellen Øseth and Oleg Korneev 11 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments �� 241 Paul Arthur Berkman, Greg Fiske, Jon-Arve Røyset, Lawson W. Brigham, and Dino Lorenzini 12 Information Ecology to Map the Arctic Information Ecosystem �� 269 Peter L. Pulsifer, Yekaterina Kontar, Paul Arthur Berkman, and D. R. Fraser Taylor 13 Mapping and Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic �� 293 Julie Raymond-Yakoubian, Peter L. Pulsifer, D. R. Fraser Taylor, Camilla Brattland, and Tero Mustonen 14 Building Capacity: Education Beyond Boundaries �� 321 Molly B. A. Douglas, Yekaterina Kontar, Malgorzata Smieszek, Allen Pope, and Inna P. Zhuravleva

Part V Conclusion 15 Informed Decisionmaking for the Sustainability of Ecopolitical Regions �� 341 Oran R. Young, Paul Arthur Berkman, and Alexander N. Vylegzhanin

Index �� 355 About the Authors

Rasmus Benestad is Senior Climate Scientist at the Norwegian Meteorological Institute and a coordinating lead author of the chapter on physical and socioeconomic environment in the AACA perspectives from the Barents area. He has a D.Phil. in physics and long experience with statistical modeling. He has brought these two disciplines together in joint analyses of observations and climate model simulations. He also has led the development of a popular tool for climate analysis and empirical-statistical downscaling and is a member of the team behind www. RealClimate.org.

Paul Arthur Berkman is Director of the Science Diplomacy Center and Professor of Practice in Science Diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His international and interdisciplinary background has ranged from leading international expeditions to Antarctica to training science diplomacy in national diplomatic academies with informed decisionmaking to balance national interests and common interests for the benefit of all on Earth across generations.

Camilla Brattland is Associate Professor in the Institute of Social Sciences, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway. She focuses on coastal Sami culture and small- scale fisheries, with a particular emphasis on documentation and mapping of traditional marine use and local ecological knowledge.

Lawson W. Brigham is a Polar Institute Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, and a researcher at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. As a career US Coast Guard officer, he commanded icebreakers on the Great Lakes and in Arctic and Antarctic waters. He served as chair of the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) and as a US delegation member to the IMO during the development of the Polar Code. He is a member of the Polar Research Board of the US National Academy of Sciences.

Molly B. A. Douglas is an independent researcher and consultant on science, technology, and innovation in sustainable development and international affairs. She holds degrees from the Fletcher School and the Walsh School at Georgetown University. Her background is in international development.

xxxiii xxxiv About the Authors

Greg Fiske is a Senior Geospatial Analyst at the Woods Hole Research Center in Woods Hole, Massachusetts. He has more than two decades of experience working with large geospatial datasets. Trained as a cartographer, he spends a great deal of time thinking about how best to represent the results of complex geospatial analyses.

Jon L. Fuglestad is Senior Advisor in the Department of Climate and Polar Research at the Research Council of Norway. Formerly, he was the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme with responsibility for the project on Adaptation Actions for a Changing Arctic (AACA). He has chaired the Oslo-Paris Commission’s group on inputs to the marine environment.

Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv is Professor of Critical Peace and Conflict Studies at UiT – The Arctic University of Norway. Her areas of research are international relations with a focus on security studies, particularly human security with intersectional approaches to security. She was among the first cohort of Fulbright Arctic Initiative Scholars and has been the Nansen Professor at the University of Akureyri in Iceland.

Maria Goes is Research Affiliate at the Barents Institute at UiT – The Arctic University of Norway. She has an MA in peace and conflict transformation and a PhD in political science. Her current research deals with critical security, Russian politics, and environmental policy.

Vladimir Ivanov is Leading Research Scientist in the Geography Department of Lomonosov Moscow State University and in the Ocean-Air Interaction Department of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute. He has participated in 18 marine research expeditions in the Arctic Ocean and is the author or co-author of more than 150 publications relating to physical oceanography and polar and climate studies.

Lis Lindahl Jørgensen is Senior Scientist at the Institute of Marine Research (IMR) in Norway and chair of the Flagship “Climate Change – Fjord and Coast” at the Fram Centre in Tromsø, Norway. She is Co-chair of the Ecosystem Approach Group within the Arctic Council’s PAME Working Group and an engaged scientist in the CBMP marine benthic group of the Arctic Council. Her scientific work focuses on bringing the ecology of the benthos into a wider ecosystem perspective within management and vulnerability assessments.

Gunnar Knapp is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Alaska Anchorage. He has conducted extensive research on the Alaska economy and the Alaska seafood industry. A Russian speaker, he was actively involved in early efforts to develop relationships between Alaska and the Russian Far East. About the Authors xxxv

Yekaterina (Katia) Kontar is Postdoctoral Fellow at the Science Diplomacy Center, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. She holds a PhD in science communication and policy from the University of Alaska Fairbanks and subsequently was a Belmont Forum Science Diplomacy Postdoctoral Fellow at the Science Diplomacy Center at Tufts University. She conducts interdisciplinary research on physical and socioeconomic drivers and impacts of disasters. Her earlier work involved fostering scientific literacy among K-12 students and promoting Antarctic research and discovery at the Antarctic Geological Drilling Program.

Oleg Korneev is Deputy Head of the Federal State Budgetary Institutions North- West Administration of Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring in St. Petersburg, Russia. He has participated in developing a management plan for the Russian part of the Barents Sea.

Kit M. Kovacs is Leader of the Biodiversity Section at the Norwegian Polar Institute and is Professor II at University Studies on Svalbard. She has worked in the polar regions with marine mammals for several decades. She is the author of over 250 primary journal publications as well as 15 books and many book chapters and scientific reports. Her primary research interests are population ecology and conservation biology.

Valeriy Kryukov is Director of the Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk. He is a Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and a member of the Norwegian Academy of Polar Research. He has been involved in extensive multidisciplinary research on the natural-resource-based economies of Siberia and the Russian Arctic. He is a professor and founder of the first MA program on natural resource economics and management at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow.

Elena Kudryashova is Professor and Rector of the Northern Arctic Federal University named after M.V. Lomonosov in Archangel. She is a member of the Association of Polar Explorers, the Working Group on Higher Education and Science of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, and the Interagency Working Group on Coordination of the Monitoring and Implementation of the Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.

Rauna Kuokkanen is Research Professor of Arctic Indigenous Studies at the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi, Finland. From 2008 to 2018, she was Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Indigenous Studies Program at the University of Toronto. Her newly released book Restructuring Relations: Indigenous Self-Determination, Governance and Gender (Oxford University Press) is an Indigenous feminist investigation of the theory and practice of Indigenous self- determination, governance, and gender regimes in Indigenous political institutions. xxxvi About the Authors

Olivia Lee is Assistant Professor at the International Arctic Research Center, University of Alaska, Fairbanks. Her research includes collaborative partnerships with indigenous coastal community members in the Bering Strait Region focused on tracking changes in sea ice and observed impacts on marine mammals, birds, and other subsistence species. She also co-leads the Sea Ice Collaboration Team of the US Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee and serves on the board of the Arctic Research Consortium of the United States.

Dino Lorenzini is President and CEO of SpaceQuest, Ltd., a satellite development and manufacturing firm in Fairfax, Virginia. He has more than 45 years experience in the development and management of complex space systems. A graduate of the US Air Force Academy, Lorenzini rose to the rank of colonel and held senior management responsibility for several major space development projects during a 22-year career in the US Air Force. As a DARPA Program Manager, he directed the development of a Precision Pointing and Tracking System for a High-Energy Space- Based Laser. As Director of the SDI Pilot Architecture Study, he led the technical efforts of over 75 leading scientists and engineers in the conceptual design and analysis of a National Ballistic Missile Defense System. Lorenzini earned his MS and PhD in aeronautical engineering from MIT. He also holds an MBA from Auburn University.

Tero Mustonen is President of Snowchange Co-op, an independent cultural and research organization for the Circumpolar Indigenous and traditional communities. Founded in 2000, Snowchange works in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Sami and Finnish communities, and the Russian Arctic. Mustonen is a winter seiner and head of the Kesälahti fish base. He is currently serving as a lead author for IPCC AR6.

Frode Nilssen is Professor at the Nordlund University Business School’s High North Centre for Business and Governance and has experience leading Norwegian- Russian scientific collaboration in the food sector over 25 years. He has been a researcher and research director at the Norwegian Institute for Fisheries and is currently head of the Department for Marketing, Strategy and Management at the Bodø Graduate School of Business where he leads a large project on Search and Rescue in the Arctic. Nilssen’s research interests relate to economic behavior, governance, and politics in the exploitation of natural resources.

Ellen Øseth is Head of Environmental Management Section at the Norwegian Polar Institute in Tromsø, Norway. Her expertise is advising Norwegian authorities on management in polar areas. She has participated in the management planning process in Norway. About the Authors xxxvii

Ole Øvretveit is Director of Arctic Frontiers, a major annual conference in Tromsø, Norway, that sets the agenda linking policy, business, and science for sustainable development in the Arctic. He received an MSc in political science from the University of Bergen in 2010 and has studied in Berlin, Moscow, and Reykjavik. Before joining Arctic Frontiers, Øvretveit worked with business development commercial productions.

Allen Pope is Executive Secretary of the International Arctic Science Committee and Research Scientist at the US National Snow and Ice Data Center. He works to bring together Arctic researchers across disciplinary and national boundaries and to advocate for the importance of Arctic science. He also studies Earth’s frozen regions with satellite data, does field work to make sure the satellites have it right, and com- municates Arctic science on Twitter @PopePolar.

Diwakar Poudel is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Norwegian Polar Institute in Tromsø, Norway. His research focuses on developing methods and instruments for managing variable environmental values in the Arctic. Prior to starting work on the Pan-Arctic Options project at the Polar Institute, he participated in several environmental management projects, including, most recently, work on ecosystem-based fisheries management in the Barents Sea.

Peter L. Pulsifer is Research Scientist at the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), University of Colorado at Boulder, where he leads the Exchange for Local Observations and Knowledge of the Arctic project (ELOKA, http://eloka- arctic.org). His research addresses questions related to the use of geographic information with a particular focus on supporting interoperability, the ability of information systems to share information or operations. He has focused on theory and practice in the context of polar information management. For more than 10 years, he has worked closely with members of Arctic communities to facilitate the sharing of local observations and Indigenous knowledge.

Julie Raymond-Yakoubian is an Anthropologist and the Social Science Program Director at Kawerak, Inc., an Alaska Native Tribal Consortium for the 20 Tribes of the Bering Strait Region of Alaska.

Jon-Arve Røyset holds an LLM in International Maritime Law from the IMO International Maritime Law Institute and an Executive Master’s Degree in Shipping and Logistics (EMBA) from Copenhagen Business School. Since 2003, he has worked at the Norwegian Coastal Administration where he currently holds the position of Senior Advisor. Røyset heads the extensive shipping-related work in the integrated management plan for the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. He currently serves as co-lead of the Arctic Shipping Traffic Data (ASTD) project of the Arctic Council. xxxviii About the Authors

Hein Rune Skjoldal is a Scientist at the Institute of Marine Research (IMR) in Norway. He has led work on Arctic assessments, including the AMAP Assessment of Oil and Gas Activities in the Arctic and the AMAP/CAFF/SDWG AMSA IIC Report. Skjoldal is a co-lead on the Ecosystem Approach Expert Group in the Arctic Council and the ICES/PICES/PAME Working Group on Integrated Ecosystem Assessment of the Central Arctic Ocean.

Malgorzata Smieszek is a Researcher at the Arctic Centre at the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi, Finland. She has co-chaired the IASC Action Group on Communicating Arctic Science to Policymakers and represented IASC at meetings of the Arctic Council. She is a research fellow of the Earth System Governance alliance and a co-founder of the nonprofit association “Women of the Arctic.”

D. R. Fraser Taylor is Chancellor’s Distinguished Research Professor of International Affairs, Geography and Environmental Studies and Director of the Geomatics and Cartographic Research Centre at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. He has worked extensively with Northern communities for many years.

Julia Tchernova is a Biologist contributing to bilateral and multilateral environmental management projects in the Barents Sea Region. She has worked with the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme with a special focus on the AACA project dealing with the Barents area.

Lyman Thorsteinson formerly a United States Geological Survey Staff Member is known for his research on marine fishes in the northeast Pacific and Arctic Oceans. His studies focused on species-environmental relationships addressing ecological effects of planned offshore oil and gas development, effects of climate change, and restoration of altered aquatic habitats.

Alexander N. Vylegzhanin is Professor and Head of the Program of International Law at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). He is Vice- President of the Russian Association of International Law, Vice-President of the Russian Association of the Law of the Sea, and an elected member on the Committee on the Arctic and Antarctic of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament. He is Editor-in-Chief of the Moscow Journal of International Law and has written widely on legal issues, especially relating to the law of the sea.

Oran R. Young is Professor Emeritus at the Bren School of Environmental Science and Management at the University of California (Santa Barbara). He has devoted his career to analyzing the roles institutions play in meeting needs for governance, with applications to the Arctic going back to the 1970s. About the Authors xxxix

Maksim Zadorin is Associate Professor in the Department of International Law and Comparative Law of the Northern Arctic Federal University named after M.V. Lomonosov in Archangel. An expert on legal issues of Arctic development, he is also the independent legal expert of the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North.

Eduard Zdor is a PhD candidate in the Department on Anthropology, University of Alaska, Fairbanks. He studies the sociocultural patterns of the Indigenous peoples of the Bering Strait Region, with a focus on subsistence-oriented activities and traditional ecological knowledge.

Inna P. Zhuravleva is a Lecturer on Arctic Law in the Department of International Law at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). She holds a PhD in law and has previously worked as head of the Directorate for WTO Affairs at the Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation. Acronyms

AACA Adaptation Actions for a Changing Arctic ABSR Alaska Bering Strait Region ACIA Arctic Climate Impact Assessment ACW Arctic Coastal Water AEWC Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission AIS Automatic Identification System AMAP Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme AMSA Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment ASOC Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition ASTD Arctic Ship Traffic Data BaSR Barents Sea Region BEAC Barents Euro-Arctic Council BeSR Bering Strait Region CBD Convention on Biological Diversity CDQ Community Development Quota CKE Central Kola Expedition DBO Distributed Biological Observatory EBM Ecosystem-Based Management EBSAs Ecologically or Biologically Significant Areas EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone EWC Eskimo Walrus Commission GDP Gross Domestic Product GIS Geographic Information Systems GRP Gross Regional Product HFOs Heavy Fuel Oils IHO International Hydrographic Organization IMO International Maritime Organization ICES International Council for the Exploration of the Sea ICRW International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling IUU Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing IWC International Whaling Commission KMMC Kola Mining and Metallurgical Company LME Large Marine Ecosystem

xli xlii Acronyms

LNG Liquified Natural Gas MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships MMSI Mobile Marine Service Identify MPAs Marine Protected Areas MPC Maximum Permissible Concentration NANA Northwest Alaska Native Association NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEAFC North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission NMCE Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NPI Norwegian Polar Institute NSEDC Norton Sound Economic Development Corporation NSIDC National Snow and Ice Data Center NSF National Science Foundation NSR Northern Sea Route OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic PAG Pacific Arctic Group PAME Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment PSSAs Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas RBSR Russian Bering Strait Region RUSALCA Russian-American Long-term Census of the Arctic SAON Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea STCW International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers TAC Total Allowable Catch UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea UNEP UN Environment Programme WTTC World Travel and Tourism Council WWF World Wildlife Fund Part I Volume 1: Introduction Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea 1 Regions

Oran R. Young, Paul Arthur Berkman, and Alexander N. Vylegzhanin

Abstract Some regions defined in biophysical terms are subject to shared authority and responsibility with regard to matters of governance. When such regions lie outside or beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, they constitute international spaces. Where they are subject to the jurisdiction of two or more states, they constitute shared spaces. Together, international spaces and shared spaces make up the domain of ecopolitical regions. Focusing on marine shared spaces, which we describe as regional seas, this book addresses issues of governance broadly defined, with a particular emphasis on the achievement of sustainability regarding human activities occurring in regional seas. We treat the Bering Strait Region and the Barents Sea Region as cases studies for an in-depth examination of this topic. In the process, we seek to contribute to understanding regarding the pursuit of sustainability in regional seas and ecopolitical regions more generally.

This chapter draws on Berkman, Vylegzhanin, and Young 2016 and Vylegzhanin, Young, and Berkman 2018.

O. R. Young (*) Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA e-mail: [email protected] P. A. Berkman Science Diplomacy Center, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. N. Vylegzhanin Department of International Law, MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 3 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_1 4 O. R. Young et al.

1.1 An Introduction to Marine Ecopolitical Regions

Some regions whose boundaries follow the configuration of physical and biological systems are subject to shared authority and responsibility in dealing with a variety of needs for governance. We treat the universe of cases belonging to this category as ecopolitical regions. Achieving sustainability in such regions requires cooperation on the part of all those who share authority and responsibility to establish governance systems and build supporting infrastructural arrangements that promote cooperation at the regional level, provide mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of conflicts among users of resources located in these areas, address interactions with the outside world, and contribute more generally to the achievement of outcomes that are sustainable over time.1,2 Ecopolitical regions are scalar; they range from the micro-level to the macro- level in spatial terms. At the international level, which is our focus in this book, it is helpful to divide ecopolitical regions into two subsets. One subset of these regions, which we call international spaces, includes areas featuring shared authority and responsibility arising from the fact that they lie wholly or largely in areas beyond national jurisdiction (Young 2013a). Prominent examples include the high seas and outer space. The second subset, which we call joint spaces, includes areas that fall within the jurisdiction of two or more states by virtue of the fact that they are bisected by recognized jurisdictional boundaries. Prominent examples include fish stocks and deposits of hydrocarbons that straddle or cross the boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of coastal states. This book focuses on joint marine spaces. This class of ecopolitical regions includes what the law of the sea characterizes as “states with opposite or adjacent coasts.”3 Opposite States are those whose coasts face one another in spatial terms. The territorial seas, Exclusive Economic Zones, or continental shelves of these opposite states often overlap forming joint spaces. The case of the Russian Federation and the United States in the Bering Sea exemplifies this situation. Adjacent states are states whose maritime boundaries extend from a fixed point on their common

1 Because the key actors in the ecopolitical regions we analyze in this book are states, governance requires international or intergovernmental cooperation. But analogous issues arise when the relevant actors are subnational units of governance or other units including Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations. 2 For a general discussion of the use of the terms sustainability and sustainable development in the work of the Pan-Arctic Options Project, see the Series Preface included in this volume. 3 The terms “opposite” and “adjacent” were introduced in the final report on the law of the sea prepared by the International Law Commission in 1956. These terms were used in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958 (Art. 12) and in the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958 (Art. 6). The terms are used in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) in Arts. 15 (“Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”), 74 (“Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”), and 83 (“Delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”). Whether coasts are “opposite” or “adjacent” depends on the configuration of the relevant coasts and their geographical position in relation to one another. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was opened for signature in 1982 and entered into force in 1994. 1 Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions 5 coastline through the outer limit of their jurisdiction, as in the case of Norway and the Russian Federation in the Barents Sea. To address needs for governance in such areas effectively, the relevant opposite or adjacent states must agree on the delimitation of their common boundaries or, in the absence of mutually accepted boundaries, on procedures for managing interactive activities in the disputed areas. In this book, we refer to marine ecopolitical regions belonging to the subset of joint spaces as regional seas subject to the jurisdiction of two or more sovereign states. Many regional seas are shared by just two states. But as the cases of the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Caribbean Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the North Sea make clear, some regional seas include areas under the jurisdiction of a number of states. Cases in which a single coastal state has jurisdiction over all of a marine region (e.g. the White Sea along the Arctic coast of the Russian Federation) do not raise issues of coordination across international boundaries and are not addressed in this analysis of regional seas.4 In some cases, such as the Beaufort Sea shared by Canada and the United States, there are disagreements regarding the location of boundaries or the extent of the jurisdiction of the relevant coastal states (Byers 2013, Ch. 3). Governance in such cases may involve efforts to reach agreement on the resolution of jurisdictional differences (e.g. the Norwegian-Russian Treaty of 2010 delimiting an agreed boundary between the two states in the Barents Sea). But there also are cases in which governance systems are created to manage matters of common concern without resolving existing jurisdictional disputes (e.g. the arrangement for the so-called gray zone in the Barents Sea prior to the 2010 boundary delimitation treaty) (Stokke 2012). Although regional seas are predominantly marine systems, they also encompass the adjacent coastal fringes, including coastal communities and the estuaries of major rivers. They also may include islands (e.g. St. Lawrence Island in the case of the Bering Strait Region; the Svalbard Archipelago in the case of the Barents Sea Region). Accordingly, analysts must consider the near-shore and adjacent coastal areas as well as any significant islands when addressing needs for governance in these regions. While regional seas are predominantly joint spaces, they may include enclaves beyond the reach of the authority of any coastal state in addition to areas under the sovereign control (internal waters, territorial seas) or jurisdiction (EEZs, continental shelves) of coastal states. The Barents Sea, for example, includes areas of high seas (e.g. the “loophole”) as well as areas under the jurisdiction of Norway and the Russian Federation. What is known as the “doughnut hole” in the central Bering Sea lies outside the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the United States as the relevant coastal states. Nevertheless, regional seas lie largely within the jurisdiction of the relevant coastal states.5

4 While developed independently, our use of the term “regional seas” is compatible with the usage of the phrase in UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme to refer to what are described as “shared seas” with an emphasis on transboundary issues relevant to sustainable management and use. 5 UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme includes thirteen marine areas, but none of these is in the Arctic. 6 O. R. Young et al.

1.2 Governing Regional Seas

The term “ecopolitics” shares with the terms “ecology” and “economics” a common root in the Greek word for home. The three terms refer to the analysis of systems featuring more or less complex forms of interplay among their constituent elements as well as interactions between these elements and the broader settings within which they are situated. Ecological systems or ecosystems are composed of two or more species of organisms (including Homo sapiens) that interact with one another and with the biophysical setting in which they are situated. Economic systems comprise producers and consumers of goods and services who engage in exchanges through market transactions, barter systems, and various forms of sharing that generate more or less well-structured and predictable outcomes of a collective nature measurable in terms of indicators like gross national product or social (in)equality. For their part, ecopolitical systems are composed of various types of actors and the social institutions they develop, either spontaneously or through conscious actions, to foster public order in socioecological systems, to make collective decisions about matters of common interest arising in such systems, and to handle relations with outside actors. When these systems are well-defined in spatial terms, it is appropriate to characterize them as ecopolitical regions. In our analysis of governing regional seas, we draw a clear distinction between the idea of ecopolitics and the older concept of geopolitics. Geopolitics is the study of the spatial determinants of the sources of power that can be brought to bear in dealing with conflicts of interest and of the outcomes of interactions involving the exercise of power (Stavridis 2017). Ecopolitics, by contrast, is the study of needs for governance and the role of common interests in the creation and implementation of governance systems capable of addressing the three main pillars of sustainable development.6 Governance is a social function involving efforts to steer human activities toward collectively desirable outcomes (e.g. sustainable harvests of living resources) and away from collectively undesirable outcomes (e.g. the destruction of stocks of living resources) (Young 2013b). In ecopolitical regions, including both international spaces and joint spaces, the challenge is to find ways to address needs for governance in the absence of any overarching government or, as we generally put it, to provide governance without government (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Some needs for governance arising in regional seas involve matters that individual states are in a position to address. Our concern in this book, however, centers on matters that transcend jurisdictional boundaries and require cooperation on the part of two or more states in order to craft effective responses. It is helpful in this connection to differentiate among four subcategories of these needs for governance arising in regional seas. Some needs are intra-sectoral in the sense that they pertain to a single human activity. Needs to manage fisheries to avoid the depletion of

6 Though sustainable development is notoriously difficult to define precisely, there is general agreement on the proposition that it requires balancing the pillars of economic development, sociocultural well-being and environmental protection (Sachs 2015). 1 Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions 7 stocks or to introduce vessel traffic schemes to avoid collisions in busy seaways illustrate this subcategory. A second subcategory of needs for governance encompasses inter-sectoral issues that arise from interactions between or among two or more distinct human activities. Efforts to minimize ship strikes on marine mammals or to prevent oil spills harmful to marine life exemplify this category. A third subcategory arises from interactions between local or intra-regional activities and international or extra-regional forces. Clashes between aboriginal subsistence whalers and international environmental groups calling for the termination of all killing of whales constitute a dramatic example of this category. The fourth subcategory includes efforts to address regional impacts of larger and even global developments. Regional issues arising from the recession and thinning of sea ice attributable to global climate change exemplify this category. Although it is helpful to distinguish analytically among these subcategories of needs for government in order to understand their origins and assess options for responding to them, we recognize that two or more of these types of needs for governance can and often do arise at the same time in a given regional sea. Managing the harvest of fish while addressing the effects of marine pollution provides a clear example. A common result is the need to think about interplay between or among responses to individual needs for governance. Collectively, we refer to efforts to meet these needs as governance for sustainability. Governance systems (often called regimes) developed to address needs for governance are institutions in the sense that they are social practices established through formal or informal processes involving key actors in affected areas. Analysts who think about these systems pay attention to (i) regime formation or the processes involved in the creation of governance systems, (ii) implementation or the transition from paper to practice, (iii) effectiveness or issues pertaining to the performance of regimes, and (iv) institutional dynamics or the evolution of social practices over time. Given the nature of regional seas as we have defined them, the leading actors involved in responding to needs for governance are states. But it is important in this connection to take into consideration the dynamics of interactions across levels of governance from the local to the global as well as the roles of nonstate actors including corporations, environmental nongovernmental organizations, and Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations (Delmas and Young 2008).

1.3 Regional Seas in the Arctic

Two of the most prominent shared marine areas located in the Arctic are the Bering Strait Region (BeSR) and the Barents Sea Region (BaSR). These regional seas exhibit similarities that make it interesting to analyze them comparatively in thinking about issues of governance. They are both high latitude marine ecopolitical regions that are dynamic in biophysical terms and subject to growing interest on the part of a variety of current or prospective human actors, including important players located outside the region. Two countries are the dominant players in both regions; in each case, one of these countries is the Russian Federation and the other is a 8 O. R. Young et al. western NATO member. In both cases, there are other actors (including Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations like the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Saami Council and others) that have interests and (sometimes) possess recognized rights that differ from those of the relevant nation states, though it is important to note as well that there are unresolved issues relating to the status of Indigenous peoples and their rights in both regions. This provides a basis for comparing the two regions in thinking about issues of governance and about institutional arrangements and associated infrastructure that have been or could be created to address needs for governance arising in these regional seas. At the same time, the two regions differ substantially (sometimes dramatically) from one another both in terms of important biophysical features and in terms of major characteristics of their human populations and the social, economic, and political circumstances of these populations. Table 1.1 sets forth in tabular form those similarities and differences that we regard as most relevant in considering needs for governance in the two regions and options for addressing these needs. Both the BeSR and the BaSR are subject to the impacts of rapid biophysical changes and of rising levels of human activities. Our challenge in this book is to identify emerging needs for governance in these Arctic regional seas and to explore options available for meeting these needs in such a way as to enhance sustainability. We analyze biophysical, economic, and sociocultural developments relevant to addressing needs for governance in these seas. We then consider options relating both to suitable governance systems and to the infrastructure required to implement these systems effectively under the circumstances prevailing today and likely to arise during the foreseeable future. In the process, we endeavor to generate insights that may be of interest to those concerned with the sustainability of regional seas throughout the world as well as to those with a particular interest in the future of the Arctic.

1.3.1 An Overview of the Bering Strait Region (BeSR)

The only gateway between the Arctic and Pacific Oceans is the Bering Strait, an essential migration corridor for marine mammals and sea birds and a place where mixed ocean currents from the Pacific normally stream to the north (if not changed under the influence of winds). The Bering Strait itself, together with the southern Chukchi Sea (to the North) and the northern Bering Sea (to the South) and their associated coastal zones, constitutes the area we treat as the Bering Strait Region or BeSR (Fig. 1.1). Polygon of the Bering Strait Region (BeSR) as defined in this volume showing the maritime boundary between the United States and Russian Federation based on their Exclusive Economic Zones meeting between Little Diomede Island and Big Diomede Island at the middle of the Bering Strait. The northern boundary is adjacent to Point Hope (68°N); the southern boundary is adjacent to Mys Navarin 1 Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions 9

Table 1.1 Comparing the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions Bering Strait Region Feature (BeSR)a Barents Sea Region (BaSR)b Boundary Russian Federation – Russian Federation – Norway nations United States Geography Fig. 1.1 Fig. 1.2 Area 416,355 km2 2,918,053 km2 Northern limit 68°N 84°N Southern limit 62°N 65°N Western limit 160°W 3.8°W Eastern limit 176°E 45.5°E International Table 1.2 Table 1.3 law Boundary year 1990 2010 Multilateral 10 13 laws Regional laws 8 9 Bilateral laws 15 9 Physical system Major Ocean Pacific Ocean Atlantic Ocean access Adjacent seas Bering Sea (south), Greenland Sea/Norwegian Sea (west and Chukchi Sea (north) south), Kara Sea (east) Average depth 41 m (based on Chukchi ~230 m Sea) Maximum 49 m ~3500 m depthc Sea ice Seasonal ice-cover Annual open water (south), seasonal ice-cover and annual ice-cover (north) Social system Cities Anadyr Murmansk, Tromsø Indigenous Inupiat, Siberian Yupik, Saami, Nenets Yu’pik. Chukchi Marine Hunting, fishing Limited fishing subsistence Population size 50,000+ 1,600,000+ Economic value Commercial Limited World class, huge aquaculture fishing Hydrocarbons Exploration only Initial production Vessel traffic On the rise Substantial and growing Tourism Early stage but on the rise Substantial aBerkman et al. (2016) bVylegzhanin et al. (2018) cJakobsson (2002) 10 O. R. Young et al.

Fig. 1.1 The Bering Strait Region

(62°N), extending from the 160°W to 176°E. The BeSR encompasses the coastal- marine systems in between, south of the Chukchi Sea and north of the Bering Sea. So defined, this region is a well-constrained area for analyses of institutions and associated infrastructure needed to manage human uses of this critical gateway to the Arctic on a sustainable basis.7 The area covered by this map corresponds closely to the transboundary region across the Bering Strait proposed by the United States and Russian Federation (National Parks Service 2012). The pivot of the BeSR – the Bering Strait – is a vital marine area between the continents of Eurasia and North America and between the Russian Federation and the United States. The Bering Strait is the only sea waterway connecting Europe – through the Arctic Ocean – with China, Japan, Korea, and other economically strong Far Eastern countries. As the only marine route from the Pacific to the Arctic Ocean, the Bering Strait is increasingly important in economic terms, taking into account that already in the 1980s transpacific trade equaled transatlantic trade and that in recent decades transpacific trade has surged. Although the volume of commercial traffic passing through the Bering Strait is small, it is growing steadily and may rise more rapidly in the future.

7 Sustainable infrastructure development involves the “combination of fixed, mobile, and other built assets (including communications, research, observing and information systems) and regulatory, policy, and other governance mechanisms (including insurance)” (Berkman 2015). 1 Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions 11

According to the Sailing Directions, the Bering Strait is 47 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation 1999, pg. 147). It is in this part of the Strait that Big Diomede Island (also known as Ratmanova Island) belonging to the Russian Federation and Little Diomede Island (also known as Krusenstern Island) and Fairway Rock belonging to the US are located (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation 1999, pg. 166). Some authors do not mention Fairway Rock in describing the Bering Strait (Molenaar et al. 2013, pg 384; Hartsig et al. 2014). In legal terms, however, it is appropriate to include Fairway Rock. According to applicable international law (UNCLOS, Art. 121), though rocks do not have exclusive economic zones or continental shelves, they do have the territorial sea adjacent to each side of the rock. The breadth of the territorial sea is established by the relevant coastal state up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles (UNCLOS, Art. 3). This means in legal terms that in the Bering Strait, the Russian Federation has the territorial sea adjacent to its mainland (Chukotka Peninsula) and Big Diomede Island; the United States has the belts of the territorial seas adjacent to Little Diomede Island, Fairway Rock, and the North America continent (Seward Peninsula). The distance between Russian Big Diomede Island and American Little Diomede Island is only about two nautical miles. Here the international boundary between the United States and the Russian Federation is delimited according to two bilateral treaties: the 1867 Convention Ceding Alaska to the United States and the Agreement on the Maritime Boundary of 1990. The distance between Little Diomede Island and Fairway Rock is 7.8 nautical miles (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation 1999, pg. 149). Due to the configuration of the two islands and one rock lying in the Bering Strait there are, in effect, four geographic channels all covered by the general term Bering Strait: (1) between the Russian mainland and Big Diomede Island, (2) between Big Diomede Island and Little Diomede Island, (3) between Little Diomede Island and Fairway Rock, and (4) between Fairway Rock and the US mainland.8 None of these channels includes an area of high seas. Therefore, the legal regime for the high seas is not applicable to any of the four channels. Though the entire Bering Strait at its narrowest point is the territorial sea of either the Russian Federation or the US, the two states are obliged under applicable international law to respect the right of transit passage of all ships and aircraft through this strait (UNCLOS, Art. 38) as well as the right of innocent passage in the waters of the BeSR more generally (UNCLOS, Art. 17).

8 In this context, the description of the Bering Strait as “three navigational channels” suggested earlier does not seem to be accurate: “At the mid-point of the strait there are two islands – Big Diomede (Russia) and Little Diomede (United States) – effectively creating three navigational channels: Bering Strait – East, which lies between Russian mainland and Big Diomede Island; Bering Strait – West, which lies between the US mainland and Little Diomede Island; and the Diomede Channel, which is a channel separating Big Diomede and Little Diomede Islands” (Molenaar et al. 2013, pp. 384–385). 12 O. R. Young et al.

During the last ice age (until ~10,000 years BP), the Bering Strait Region was above water, forming a great plain often called the Bering Land Bridge and providing the principal pathway for the peopling of the New World.9 This land area, commonly referred to as Beringia, was a great plain hundreds of kilometers wide at its narrowest point. Sea level rise resulting from the melting of glaciers following the last ice age submerged this terrestrial system, transforming it into a relatively shallow marine system. In recent times, the BeSR has been a remote area ice-covered during much of the year. But rapid biophysical changes in the Arctic in recent years, such as changes in sea ice extent and thickness have brought increased attention to the region. The number of ships transiting through the Bering Strait is rising (Fletcher et al. 2016). The growth of shipping along the Northern Sea Route (e.g. LNG tanker traffic to and from the port of Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula) is already accelerating this trend. The region is also the homeland of several groups of Indigenous peoples, provides important habitat for marine mammals, and is a seasonal home for migratory animals and birds. The Indigenous peoples of the region, especially the Yupik living on both sides of the BeSR, are closely related and have (moral if not legal) rights arising from the facts that they have long regarded the region as their homeland and that they constitute the bulk of the region’s permanent human residents. Addressing emerging needs for governance in the BeSR, therefore, will require not only international cooperation but also careful consideration of the ecological, economic, and sociocultural features of the region (considered in Chaps. 2, 3, and 4). In thinking about these issues (discussed in some detail in Chap. 5) it is important to start with the observation that a network of existing global, regional, and bilateral international legal arrangements already applies to the BeSR (Table 1.2). Efforts to address needs for governance in this ecopolitical region must treat this network of arrangements as a point of departure, adjusting existing arrangements or adding new ones as needed.

1.3.2 An Overview of the Barents Sea Region (BaSR)

The Barents Sea Region as defined in this volume includes both the Barents Sea and parts of the Norwegian Sea around the Lofoten Islands. The Barents Sea itself is one of a number of marginal seas that together make up a large portion of the Arctic Ocean. According to the International Hydrographic Organization, the Barents Sea covers the marine region situated to the south of straight lines connecting the northernmost points of the coasts of Greenland, Svalbard, and Franz Josef Land. To the north of these lines lies the Central Arctic Ocean (International Hydrographic Organization 1953). Since the publications of international organizations are not

9 The phrase “land bridge” hides the fact that Beringia was a wide plain (Hopkins 1967; Hoffecker and Elias 2007). 1 Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions 13

Table 1.2 Key Environmental and Maritime Agreements/Arrangements with Application (+/−) to the Russian Federation (RF) and/or the United States (US) in the Bering Strait Region (BeSR) Year Title of agreement US RF Key global agreements with application to the BeSR 1946 International convention for the regulation of whaling + + 1972 Convention for the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes + + and other matter 1973 Convention on International Trade In Endangered Species of Wild Fauna + + and Flora (CITES) 1973/ International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, + + 1978 as modified by the 1978 Protocol Relating Thereto (MARPOL 73/78) and as amended by Polar Code, 2015 1974 International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) as amended by + + Polar Code, 2015 a 1979 Convention on the conservation of migratory species of wild animals + − 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) +a + 1989 Basel convention on the control of Transboundary movements of hazardous − + wastes and their disposal 1992 Framework convention on climate change + + 1992 Convention on biological diversity − + Key regional agreements/arrangements with application to the BeSR 1973 Agreement on the conservation of polar bears + + 1996 Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic council + + 2002 International maritime organization. Guidelines for ships operating in + + Arctic ice-covered waters 2008 Ilulissat declaration, Arctic Ocean conference + + 2009 International maritime organization. Guidelines for ships operating in + + polar waters. Resolution A.1024(26) 2011 Agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime search and + + Rescue in the Arctic 2013 Agreement on cooperation on marine oil pollution preparedness and + + response in the Arctic 2017 Agreement on enhancing international Arctic scientific cooperation + + Bilateral agreements/arrangements with application to the BeSR 1867 Treaty concerning the cession of the Russian possessions in North America + + by his majesty the emperor of all the Russias to the United States of America 1972 Agreement on cooperation in the field of environmental protection between + + the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1989 Uniform interpretation of rules of international law governing innocent + + passage 1989 Agreement between the USSR and the USA concerning cooperation in + + combating pollution in the Bering and Chukchi seas in emergency situations 1989 Agreement between the government of the United States of America and + + the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning mutual visits by inhabitants of the Bering Straits region (continued) 14 O. R. Young et al.

Table 1.2 (continued) Year Title of agreement US RF 1989 Agreement between the government of the United States of America and + + the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the Bering Straits regional commission. 1990 The agreement between the United States of America and the Union of + +a Soviet Socialist Republics on the maritime boundary, with annex 1991 Shared Beringian heritage agreement + + 1993 Agreement between the government of the Russian Federation and the + + government of the United States of America on scientific and technical cooperation 1994 Agreement between the government of the United States of America and + + the government of the Russian Federation on cooperation in the field of protection of the environment and natural resources 2000 Agreement on the conservation and Management of the Alaska-Chukotka + + Polar Bears Population 2005 Memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the areas of + + meteorology, hydrology and oceanography between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the Department of Commerce of the United States of America and the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of the Russian Federation 2011 Joint statement of the president of the United States of America and the + + president of the Russian Federation on cooperation in the Bering Strait region 2012 Joint statement of secretary of state Hillary Clinton and Foreign minister + + Sergey Lavrov on cooperation in the Bering Strait region 2013 Memorandum of understanding between the government of the United + + States of America and the government of the Russian Federation symbolically linking National Parks in the Bering Strait region atreated as law, but not necessarily ratified recognized as a source of international law under the terms of Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, however, Norway and the Russian Federation as the coastal states of the Barents Sea are not required to adhere to this definition. Some Russian geographers simply refer to the Barents Sea as part of the Arctic Ocean (Russian Short Encyclopedia 2000, vol. 2, pg. 1404). More importantly for our purposes, however, both Norway and Russia describe the Barents Sea as a shared marine area bounded by:

–– the lands of the Eurasian continent, specifically the land territories of Norway and Russia; –– the Svalbard Archipelago under the sovereignty of Norway, subject to stipula- tions of the 1920 Paris Treaty; –– the islands of Novaya Zemlya under the sovereignty of Russia, and, –– the Franz Josef Land islands also under the sovereignty of Russia. 1 Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions 15

Fig. 1.2 The Barents Sea Region

These waters – at least those of them adjacent to the mainland – were designated in ancient maps as “Murmanskoie More” (The Murmansk Sea). The name Barents Sea, after the Dutch navigator Willem Barents, originated in the sixteenth century (Academy of Sciences of the USSR 1949, pg. 69 et seq.). For the sake of clarity and for purposes of analysis, we will focus in our discussion of the BaSR on the area enclosed within the solid lines of Fig. 1.2.10 In contrast to the unresolved issue between Canada and Denmark relating to sovereignty over Hans Island located in the Nares Strait between Ellesmere Island and

10 There is no objective way to assign precise boundaries to marine ecopolitical regions. The area we designate as the BaSR encompasses a portion of the Norwegian Sea in the west and overlaps with two Arctic LMEs identified by the Arctic Council in 2004 in Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs) of the Arctic Area. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/61. The BaSR also encompasses some but not all of the areas covered by the OSPAR Convention and the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission. Our analysis pertains explicitly to issues of governance arising in the area delineated in Fig. 1.2. 16 O. R. Young et al.

Greenland, Norway and Russia have no unresolved claims pertaining to land located in the BaSR. This circumstance facilitated the success of the 2010 Norwegian- Russian Treaty (which entered into force in 2011) delimiting their marine boundary. Due to the effect of the North Atlantic Current, much of the Barents Sea Region is ice-free allowing for year-round shipping to Norwegian and Russian ports along the southern coast of the Barents Sea, including the Norwegian ports of Tromsø and Kirkenes and the Russian port of Murmansk. This feature has differentiated the Barents Sea Region from other parts of the maritime Arctic for centuries (Lenton 2012).11 For this reason Soviet/Russian legislation dealing with the Northern Sea Route (NSR) applies formally only to the area east of the Kara gate; it does not cover those parts of the Northeast Passage located in the Barents Sea. This feature also facilitates economic activities (e.g. oil and gas development) in the BaSR and explains the military and political sensitivity of the Barents Sea not only for Russia and Norway but also for other western states and for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It follows that findings regarding the governance of human activities in the BaSR are not immediately applicable to the rest of the Arctic. Nevertheless, as the recession of sea ice makes other parts of the maritime Arctic increasingly accessible, experience relating to the treatment of shared marine resources in the Barents Sea Region is likely to become a focus of increasing interest to those concerned with other parts of the Arctic (Tedsen et al. 2014; Wadhams 2017). Unlike the BeSR, the Barents Sea Region has sizable cities, with populations up to ~300,000 in the case of Murmansk, and a flourishing regional economy. But at the same time, it is a homeland for the Saami. The BaSR features world-class fisheries and a higher level of shipping than other parts of the Arctic. It is also a dynamic region. Fish stocks are shifting in response to biophysical changes; some oil and gas production is occurring already with more anticipated in the future; rising ship traffic along the NSR is likely to lead to a growth in commercial shipping in the BaSR. It is already clear that future needs for governance will highlight the importance of finding ways to incorporate and accommodate the interests and rights of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. Ensuring compatibility among arrangements arising to deal with sector-specific issues will be a major concern. A network of existing global, regional, and bilateral legal agreements is applicable to the Barents Sea Region (Table 1.3). Any discussion of initiatives aimed at meeting emerging needs for governance in the BaSR must take this network of agreements as a point of departure, considering ways to make use of existing agreements and exploring how new arrangements would fit into the existing network.

11 Some analyses of the impacts of climate change raise the possibility of sharp changes in the thermohaline circulation in the North Atlantic, a development that could produce profound changes in the physical setting of the BaSR. See Timothy Lenton, “Arctic Tipping Points,” Ambio, 41 (2012): 10–22. 1 Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions 17

Table 1.3 Key international treaties/instruments applicable to the Barents Sea Region № Title Norway Russia 1. Key multilateral treaties 1. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 + + 2. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, − + 1958 3. Convention on the High Seas, 1958 − + 4. Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958 + + 5 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Conditional + 1946 adherence since 23 Sep.1960, no ratificationa 6. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by + + Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 7. Convention on International Trade In Endangered Species + +b of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 1973 8. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution + + from Ships, 1973, as modified by the 1978 Protocol Relating Thereto (MARPOL 73/78) and as amended by Polar Code, 2015 9 International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea + + (SOLAS), 1974 as amended by Polar Code, 2015 10. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of + − Wild Animals, 1979 11 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary + + Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 1989 12 UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 + + 13 1992 UN framework convention on climate change + 2. Key regional treaties and other arrangements 1 Treaty concerning the archipelago of Spitsbergen, signed at + + Paris, February 9, 1920 2 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, 1973 + + 3 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, + + 1996 4. Agreement between the Government of Iceland, the + + Government of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning Certain Aspects of Co-operation in the Area of Fisheries, 1999 5. Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, 2008 + + 6. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime + + Search and Rescue in the Arctic, 2011 7. Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, + + Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, 2013 8 Agreement between the Governments in the Barents + + Euro-Arctic Region on Cooperation in the Field of Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response, 2008 9 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific + + Cooperation, 2017 (continued) 18 O. R. Young et al.

Table 1.3 (continued) № Title Norway Russia 3. Bilateral treaties (Norway-USSR; Norway-Russia) 1 Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet + + Socialist Republics and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on Co-operation in the Fishing Industry, 1975 (is in effect on temporary basis) 2 Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet + + Socialist Republics and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway concerning Mutual Relations in the Field of Fisheries, 1976 3 Soviet–Norwegian Communiqué of 16 March 1978 + + 4 Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet + + Socialist Republics and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on joint control of marine fisheries, 1978 (as amended) (superseded by 2010 Treaty) 5 Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union/Russian + + Federation establishing a Joint Norwegian-Russian Commission on Environmental Protection, 1988/1992 6 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning cooperation on searchers for missing persons and the rescue of persons in distress in the Barents Sea, 1995 7 Agreement between the Government of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation on environmental cooperation in connection with the dismantling of Russian nuclear powered submarines withdrawn from the Navy’s service in the northern region, and the enhancement of nuclear and radiation safety, 1998 8 Memorandum of Understanding between the of the Russia and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway Relating to Search and Rescue, as well as Prevention of Incidents, 2000 9 Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian + + Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, 2010 ahttps://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280150135; http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/191051.pdf bIt is provided at the official site: «continuation»; «ratification» is not needed: the CITES Convention was ratified by the USSR and the Russian Federation, according to its National Law, continues to be a party to the Conventions to which the USSR was a party. https://cites.org/eng/ disc/parties/chronolo.php?order=field_country_official_name&sort=asc

1.4 Plan of the Volume

As we noted at the outset, needs for governance in regional seas involve coordination between or among states to manage human uses of shared natural resources, ensure protection of the environment from unintended side effects of human activities, manage conflicts among different human activities, and promote the overall 1 Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions 19 sustainability of human-environment interactions on a regional scale. Although the regional states are the most important actors in these areas, efforts to promote sustainability often require engagement of non-regional states whose actions have consequences for regional sustainability as well as nonstate actors that have (moral and sometimes legal) rights as well as interests likely to be affected by the creation and implementation of governance systems. Like all marine systems, regional seas are three-dimensional, opaque, and dynamic, a combination of features that makes developing the knowledge base required to assess needs for governance arising in these areas and to explore options for meeting these needs especially challenging (Eikeland 1993).12 This is particularly true in the Arctic, a part of the Earth system that is undergoing a state change due most prominently to rapid reductions in the extent and volume of sea ice attributable largely to climate change (Wadhams 2017). This state change is not only triggering a cascade of biophysical shifts (e.g. shifts in the distribution and movement of major fish stocks) but also opening up the area to new or enhanced human activities (e.g. commercial shipping) (National Research Council 2015). This means that the effectiveness of any institutional arrangements created to address issues of sustainability involving Arctic seas will depend on an ability to respond to changing circumstances in an agile or nimble manner, while at the same time maintaining a commitment to basic principles and ensuring that participants pay attention to them. Regional seas like the BeSR and the BaSR are also tightly connected to broader systems, a fact of considerable importance in thinking about issues of governing Arctic seas. The number of ships transiting the Bering Strait is increasing rapidly, for example, but this is a consequence of developments in the outside world rather than developments in the BeSR itself. Similarly, there is growing interest in developing the hydrocarbons located in the BaSR, but this is not driven by the needs of the region’s residents. Depending upon the details of specific situations, such interactions may produce either positive or negative impacts on the sustainability of regional seas. It follows that any consideration of the governance of the BeSR and the BaSR must be alert to interactions between these ecopolitical regions and the outside world. The sections of the book dealing with the BeSR and the BaSR include chapters addressing the three main pillars of sustainability – ecological integrity, economic prosperity, and sociocultural well-being – followed by a chapter focusing specifically on issues of governance and reflecting the analyses provided in the sectoral chapters. In identifying needs for governance, we focus on interactions and linkages among the pillars of sustainability. In the case of the BeSR, for example, we look to biophysical changes (e.g. the recession and thinning of sea ice) that may make economic activities (e.g. commercial shipping) increasingly attractive, producing impacts on subsistence resources important to local residents (e.g. marine mammals) and triggering feedbacks affecting the region’s ecosystems (e.g. the

12 One approach that some find helpful in this connection is to treat these regions as Large Marine Ecosystems or LMEs. See, for example, Per Ove Eikeland, “Distributional aspects of muiltispecies management: The Barents Sea Large Marine Ecosystem,” Marine Policy, 1993: 256–271. 20 O. R. Young et al. introduction of invasive species). The sustainability challenge centers on efforts to address a variety of matters arising from these complex interactions. Our purpose is to illustrate the operation of what we treat as informed decisionmaking for sustainability, as described in the Series Preface, rather than to present an exhaustive account of all the needs for governance likely to arise in the BeSR and the BaSR during the foreseeable future. In the first two sections of the book, we highlight several of the most critical issues arising in the two regions at this time and show in each case how the process of informed decisionmaking works, starting with the formulation of questions and progressing through the collection of information and the assemblage of evidence to the identification of options available to relevant decisionmakers. Our goal throughout is to identify and explore options rather than to become advocates for specific options. In the third section of the book, we turn to crosscutting themes and analytic tools. This section contains chapters on integrated ocean management, satellite observations making use of automatic identification systems, new methods for developing and using databases, and Indigenous mapping procedures that may prove helpful in providing a basis for informed decsionmaking in regional seas like the BeSR and the BaSR. This section also includes a discussion based on our study of governing Arctic seas that explores insights pertaining to education and training needed by those desiring to be well-prepared to engage in the development and application of cross-disciplinary decision support tools in the work of the Pan-Arctic Options project and other similar projects. The volume concludes with a brief chapter summarizing our substantive insights relating to governing Arctic seas and discussing insights relating to informed decisionmaking for sustainability arising from this project.

References

Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1949) Documents of the Great Novgorod and Pskov (in Russian). Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow-Leningrad Berkman PA (2015) Institutional dimensions of Sustaining Arctic Observing Systems (SAON). Arctic 68(Supplement 1):89–99 Berkman PA, Vylegzhanin AN, Young OR (2016) Governing the Bering Strait Region: current status, emerging issues and future options. Ocean Dev Int Law 47:186–217 Byers M (2013) International law and the arctic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Delmas M, Young OR (eds) (2008) Governance for the environment: new perspectives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Eikeland PO (1993) Distributional aspects of multispecies management: the Barents sea large marine ecosystem. Mar Policy X:256–271 Fletcher S et al (2016) Bering Sea vessel traffic risk analysis. Report prepared by the ocean conservancy Hartsig A et al (2014) Arctic bottleneck: protecting the Bering Strait region from increased vessel traffic. Ocean Coast Law J 18:35–87 Hoffecker JF, Elias SA (2007) Human ecology of Beringia. Columbia University Press, New York Hopkins D (1967) The Bering land bridge. Stanford University Press, Stanford International Hydrographic Organization (1953) Limits of Oceans and Seas, Special Publication No. 23, 3rd ed. IHO, Monte Carlo 1 Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions 21

Jakobsson M (2002) Hypsometry and volume of the Arctic Ocean and its constituent seas. Geochem Geophys Geosyst 3(5):1028. https://doi.org/10.1029/2001GC000302 Lenton T (2012) Arctic tipping points. Ambio 41:10–22 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (1999) The sailing directions for the Western part of the Chukchi Sea, Bering Strait and north-western part of the Bering Sea (in Russian), Moscow, Ministry of Defense, p 147 Molenaar EJ et al (2013) The law of the sea and the polar regions. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston National Parks Service (2012) Proposed United States/Russia Transboundary area in the Bering Strait region, www.nps.gov/akso/beringia/about/pressroom/ProposedTransbounday_ EnglishTranslation_Version2.pdf National Research Council (2015) Arctic matters: the global connection to changes in the Arctic. National Academies Press, Washington, DC Rosenau JN, Czempiel E-O (eds) (1992) Governance without government: order and change in world politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Russian Short Encyclopedia (2000) The Arctic Ocean (in Russian), vol 2, Moscow Sachs J (2015) The age of sustainable development. Columbia University Press, New York Stavridis J (2017) Sea power: the history and geopolitics of the world’s oceans. Penguin, New York Stokke OS (2012) Disaggregating international regimes: a new approach to evaluation and comparison. MIT Press, Cambridge Tedsen E et al (2014) Arctic marine governance: opportunities for transatlantic cooperation. Springer, Berlin UNCLOS (1982) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. www.un.org/depts/los/con- vention_agreements/texts/unclos_e.pdf Vylegzhanin AN, Young OR, Berkman PA (2018) Governing the Barents Sea region: current status, emerging issues and future options. Ocean Dev Int Law 49:1–27 Wadhams P (2017) A farewell to sea ice: a report from the Arctic. Oxford University Press, Oxford Young OR (2013a) Governing international spaces: Antarctica and beyond. In: Lang PABMA, Walton DWH, Young OR (eds) Science diplomacy: Antarctica, science, and the governance of international spaces. Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, Washington, DC, pp 287–294 Young OR (2013b) On environmental governance: sustainability, efficiency, and equity. Paradigm Publishers, Boulder Part II The Bering Strait Region Ecosystems of the Bering Strait Region 2 Olivia Lee, Jon L. Fuglestad, and Lyman Thorsteinson

Abstract The Bering Strait Region is an important gateway linking the Pacific Ocean and the Arctic. Changes in this region include impacts from climate change with rapid rates of sea ice loss, coastal erosion and ocean acidification. As a seasonally ice-covered region, the dynamic environment supports areas of rich marine biodiversity including hotspots in species diversity, and important breeding and foraging habitat. Numerous resident and non-resident Arctic species transit through the Bering Strait which is part of an important seasonal migratory route, emphasizing the need for international policies to manage species that cross international borders. Currently, management of natural resources including fisheries, and marine mammal subsistence harvests in U.S. and Russian waters follow guidance from national policies, and it remains challenging to implement an ecosystem-based approach to management. As accessibility through the Bering Strait region increases, there is potential for growing ship traffic, new ecosystem threats from invasive species introductions, noise disturbance, vessels collisions, and potential oil spills and marine pollution from vessels. This chapter provides a brief introduction to our current understanding of the ecosystem with an emphasis on emerging issues that may soon require new policies for natural resource management.

O. Lee (*) University of Alaska Fairbanks, Fairbanks, AK, USA e-mail: [email protected] J. L. Fuglestad Norwegian Research Council, Oslo, Norway L. Thorsteinson Retired, United States Geological Survey, Reston, VA, USA

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 25 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_2 26 O. Lee et al.

2.1 Introduction

The Bering Strait region between the United States and Russia bounded by the latitudes 62°N and 69°N is an important gateway linking the Pacific Ocean and the Arctic (reference map in Chap. 1). Changes in this region including impacts from climate change may also provide insight on whether significant ecological changes already observed in the Bering Sea may become more widespread farther north. As a seasonally ice-covered region, the dynamic environment supports areas of rich marine biodiversity including hotspots in species diversity, and important breeding and foraging grounds that are known to persist over decades (Grebmeier et al. 2015). Numerous resident and non-resident Arctic species transit through the Bering Strait which is part of an important seasonal migratory route, emphasizing the need for international policies to manage species that cross international borders. As accessibility through the Bering Strait region increases along with the potential for growing ship traffic, new ecosystem threats from invasive species introductions, disturbance by ships including collisions, additional underwater noise pollution, and potential oil spills and marine pollution from vessels will require cooperative efforts to curb negative ecosystem impacts. This chapter provides a brief introduction to our current understanding of the ecosystem with an emphasis on emerging issues that may soon require new policies for natural resource management, and explores how future change may result in new threats and opportunities for successful ecosystem based management.

2.2 Physical Environment

The Pacific Ocean has a strong influence on the Bering Strait region and it plays an important role in distinguishing this unique Arctic seascape. Characteristic of this region is a seasonal sea ice cover, and a distinct inflow shelf region where there is a bottom-up influence on marine food webs (Carmack and Wassmann 2006). During winter and spring a predictable pattern of polynyas and leads influences the distribution of marine species, and may affect primary productivity. The northern Bering, Chukchi and East Siberian seas are comprised of continental shelves that are relatively shallow. The northern Bering Sea, defined as north of St. Matthew Island to Bering Strait, has an average depth of ~50 m. North of Bering Strait lies the shallow Chukchi sea shelf (average depth ~80 m) and the wide and shallow East Siberian Sea shelf (average depth ~52 m). Distinct shelf regions have been identified which link the physical environment with marine ecosystems that takes into account similarities in sea ice, and advection and stratification of water masses. The northern Bering and Chukchi seas have been described as inflow shelves, whereas the East Siberian and Beaufort Seas consist of interior shelves (Carmack and Wassmann 2006). The Bering and Chukchi Sea shelf waters are a distinct source of deep Arctic Basin waters that also provide a source of heat (Woodgate et al. 2010, 2012), nutrients (Walsh et al. 1989), biogenic material, and freshwater (Aagaard and Carmack 1989) into the Arctic. The water from the Pacific is relatively fresh compared to 2 Ecosystems of the Bering Strait Region 27

Atlantic waters, and contributes to water stratification, wherein the formation of a cold halocline layer helps to insulate sea ice from warmer Atlantic waters below (Shimada et al. 2001; Steele et al. 2004). Freshwater from Arctic rivers also have a significant influence on the seasonal outflows on interior shelves (Carmack et al. 2015) with substantial freshwater riverine input in the spring associated with snow- melt that may also include terrestrial sediment transportation.

2.2.1 Circulation

Pacific water enters the Arctic through the narrow Bering Strait with a mean annual volume of approximately 0.8 Sv (Fig. 2.1) (Woodgate et al. 2015). Flow transport through the strait shows strong seasonal and interannual variability that are not always predictable from changes in the wind (Woodgate et al. 2012). Typically flow

Fig. 2.1 Ocean circulation with major currents and water masses linking the Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea with the Arctic. The approximate ice edge locations in March and September are also shown. (Source: Adapted from AMAP 2017; Moore and Stabeno 2015) 28 O. Lee et al. is along-channel through the strait, with northward flow occurring under north winds or light south winds. The northward flow through the strait is primarily driven by sea level differences between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans (Barber et al. 1994; Weingartner 1997). However, anomalies of ocean water transport in the Bering Strait have been observed and may be related to changes in atmospheric circulation (Danielson et al. 2014). Mechanisms which drive atmospheric circulation such as the Arctic Oscillation, and the Beaufort High and Aleutian Low also influence circulation patterns. During the summer, inflow through the strait is greatest, which facilitates the transfer of low-salinity water, heat, nutrients and plankton towards the Chukchi and Beaufort seas (Moore and Stabeno 2015; Woodgate et al. 2015). The most nutrient- rich waters flowing through Bering Strait occur in Anadyr waters that flow northwards along the Russian coast. These waters are typically colder than the Alaska Coastal Water (ACW) in the east that flow along the Alaska coast, but may be warmer than the waters in the middle of the strait. A salinity gradient exists with greater salinity in the west and fresher waters towards the east (Woodgate et al. 2015). Mid-channel waters include Bering Shelf waters that are less nutrient-rich. These waters may mix with Anadyr water as it flows northward before branching out east and west once it reaches north of Bering Strait. The predominant water mass in eastern Bering Strait is ACW which is relatively warm, and fresh. Typically the ACW is found close to the Alaska coast, but instances of ACW variability can occur due to variable winds which brings warm, fresh water farther west into the strait and away from the coast. This westward movement of ACW may occur in relation to stronger south winds. Waters over the Chukchi shelf are well mixed from fall to spring, but in summer it is stratified with the warmer waters of the ACW. The Eastern Siberian Sea is relatively small in terms of volume, and contains waters of Pacific origin entering from the east, Atlantic origin water from the west, and freshwater from Siberian rivers (Carmack and Wassmann 2006). Water temperatures stay close to freezing during winter and only warm several degrees during summer.

2.2.2 Sea Ice

Despite Arctic-wide trends of significant declines in sea ice extent, and longer open water seasons, the Bering Sea region has been a notable exception where sea ice extent has not shown significant declines (Frey et al. 2015; Laidre et al. 2015) (Fig. 2.2). At smaller scales, the trends of greater sea ice persistence occurs primarily in the southern Bering Sea. By comparison, areas north of St. Lawrence Island and the narrow Bering Strait show trends of declining sea ice persistence that is between 0 and 3 days shorter per decade (Frey et al. 2015). Sea ice forms during winter and advances southward and usually covers the Chukchi Sea by December reaching a maximum extent over the Bering Sea by late March. In spring, sea ice cover begins to decrease and the Bering Sea becomes ice-free in late May-early June. The Chukchi Sea can become ice free in late July-early August as solar 2 Ecosystems of the Bering Strait Region 29

Fig. 2.2 Sea ice concentration in March in September in 1985 and 2015. (Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center) radiation increases, and warm water from Bering Strait is advected north. The spatial patterns of sea ice retreat have been related to atmospheric patterns that influence ocean circulation, freshwater pathways and the movement and melting of sea ice (Moore and Stabeno 2015). Extensive landfast ice along the coast is also a key feature that supports coastal marine species, travel and subsistence hunting activities in coastal communities. The extent of coastal landfast ice can vary a lot by year, with minimal landfast ice noted in some locations even during winter months. The presence of stable landfast ice is important for protection against coastal erosion particularly against winter storms. Loss of Arctic sea ice has been linked to increased storm surge frequencies that can impact coastal ecosystems and enhance erosion (Lesack and Marsh 2007). At shallow depths where grounded ice may occur, sea ice may play an important role in impacting marine benthic ecosystems through the scouring effect of grounded 30 O. Lee et al. ice. Ice scouring effects on benthic communities can act to remove less-mobile epi- benthic species, and resuspend sediments and associated nutrients. These newly scoured areas are available for recruitment once sea ice retreats, allowing changes to benthic community composition through recolonization of the newly freed space. This effect may be particularly important in the shallow stamukhi zone, that marks the boundary between the moving pack ice and stable coastal ice, at depths of 10–30 m (Macdonald et al. 2015). An unprecedented lack of winter and spring sea ice was observed in 2017–2018 which was related to persistence of heat in the ocean, and atmospheric circulation patterns that did not promote ice growth (Fig. 2.3). Significant impacts of this lack of winter sea ice include severe winter storms that affected coastal communities with loss of power, impacts to communication lines, and for isolated communities such as Little Diomede, severe disruptions to travel related to the inability to build and maintain the seasonal ice runway to support transportation of people, goods and services. The low sea ice also likely affected the seasonal migration of marine mammals and subsequent timing of subsistence hunting activities. For example, the community of Gambell was able to harvest bowhead whales in winter, and some

Fig. 2.3 Unprecedented low sea ice in winter 2017-spring 2018. (Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center) 2 Ecosystems of the Bering Strait Region 31 bowhead whales were detected far north, in Utqiagvik in winter when most individuals are typically in more southern waters.

2.2.3 Polynyas and Shoreline Leads

During winter the formation of sea ice and the production of cold saline water often occurs within polynyas when there is significantly greater ice cover. In the shallow Bering Sea waters these polynyas can have local circulation patterns where cold, saline waters interact with sediments on the shelf seafloor, which in turn supplies nutrients that support ecosystem productivity (Codispoti et al. 2005; Hioki et al. 2014). Polynyas are also important wildlife habitat and sites of subsistence hunting. Several active and large polynyas occur in the Bering and Chukchi seas including: south of St. Lawrence Island, in Norton Sound, in the Anadyr Gulf, and along the coast of northern Alaska. The Anadyr Gulf Polynya is one of the most active polynya areas in the Arctic, and is the source of Anadyr Water, whose transport contributes to the high primary and benthic production in these regions (Stirling 1997; Frey et al. 2015). The coastal leads that first open up the sea ice cover along the Alaska coast in spring affects the migration routes of marine mammals, and provides access to migrating whales and walruses for coastal subsistence hunters.

2.3 Biology of the Bering Strait

2.3.1 Lower Trophic Levels: Plankton

Seasonal peaks in productivity are driven by light, stratification, and nutrient availability. One component of productivity in the region involves ice-associated algae which may be responsible for as much as 10% of annual primary productivity in the Bering Sea (McRoy 1974). A diverse assemblage of ice-associated algae and plankton have been identified in the Bering Sea (Szymanski and Gradinger 2016), but few species are endemic to the region. These phytoplankton communities contribute an important source of carbon to benthic and pelagic food webs (Alexander 1992). Currently, tight coupling to benthic ecosystems involves export of organic matter to support benthic organisms and benthic-feeding predators. However, changes in sea ice in the form of thinning sea ice cover, and increasing prevalence of melt ponds on the ice, have been linked to earlier occurrences of phytoplankton blooms. These earlier phytoplankton blooms may support a larger standing stock of zooplankton grazing that cycles through pelagic food webs instead of allowing a net sink of organic matter to support benthic communities (Grebmeier et al. 2006b). Since the Bering Sea is typically seasonally ice-covered, reductions in multiyear ice and increased upwelling that changes dynamics from ice-edge productivity to increased under-ice productivity is less of a contribution in this region compared to farther north in the Arctic. Phytoplankton and sea ice algae represent major food sources for larger zooplankton, but the microzooplankton (microbes and protists) may also 32 O. Lee et al. be important for zooplankton consumption particularly when the population or quality of phytoplankton stocks are low (Cota et al. 1996). Zooplankton community composition has been well studied in the Eastern Bering Sea where the abundance and types of zooplankton observed differs greatly during prolonged warm and cold years (Stabeno et al. 2012). Although there is strong interannual variation, fewer large copepods and euphausiids occur over the shelf on warm years compared to cold years. Internannual changes in key zooplankton species in turn affects the distribution of predators that forage on this prey base. In contrast, there was no apparent variation in small crustacean zooplankton taxa during warm or cold years (Stabeno et al. 2012).

2.3.2 Lower Trophic Levels: Benthos

The productivity of benthic ecosystems in the northern Bering and Chukchi Seas could be significantly altered by changes in the physical environment and the vertical flux of organic carbon to the seafloor. This in turn could affect a transition to a more pelagic ecosystem (Grebmeier et al. 2006b). At present benthic invertebrates form an important base of marine food webs that support fish, birds and marine mammals (Divine et al. 2015; Moore and Stabeno 2015). The terrestrial and freshwater influence on benthic invertebrate communities is greatest along the coast and in lagoon systems (Dunton et al. 2012), and have less influence on offshore benthic communities of the Bering Strait region. In general, benthic abundance patterns across the northern Bering and Chukchi shelf shows the highest benthic biomass occurs in the west, and declines eastward towards the Alaska coast (Grebmeier et al. 2015; Grebmeier et al. 2006a). Throughout the region, important energy-rich prey species such as bivalves show different trends in abundance. Warmer surface waters and earlier sea ice retreat may be responsible for the observed trends of reduced bivalve biomass (Lovvorn et al. 2003; Grebmeier et al. 2006b), but this trend is not apparent throughout the northern Bering Sea. More nutrient-rich regions in the Gulf of Anadyr have shown increasing trends in bivalve biomass (Nadtochiy et al. 2008). Tunicates, echinoderms and crustaceans are relatively abundant in the region, as well as benthic amphipods. Changing amphipod distributions were observed to affect annual differences in the distribution of foraging gray whales (Moore et al. 2003; Nadtochiy et al. 2008). Similarly, changes in the abundance and distribution of other benthic prey species such as bivalves are likely to influence the distribution of benthic-feeding marine mammals, such as bearded seals and walruses. Snow crabs (Chionoecetes opilio) were also found to be abundant in patches in the region, but it is unlikely this region will be able to support a commercial fishery (North Pacific Fisheries Management Council 2009). Observations of increasing ocean acidification associated with continued sea ice loss, particularly in the top 50 m of the Arctic, threatens planktonic and benthic calcifying organisms (Yamamoto-Kawai et al. 2009). In addition, hard- shelled invertebrates such as crabs and clams are known to be negatively impacted by increasing acidification in the form of reduced growth rates, or 2 Ecosystems of the Bering Strait Region 33 death (Mathis et al. 2015). As increasing water temperatures drive temperate species northwards, calcifying species may face increased difficulty with northward range shifts into more acidified waters. The specific effects of ocean acidification can be different for individual species and life history stages, and not all effects are well-known. However, since many calcifying species are also important prey species it is likely that ocean acidification will impact food webs and species beyond those that face direct physiological impacts. Invasive species to the region are currently not significant threats to marine or terrestrial ecosystems in the region with only a few highly invasive species identified (Gotthardt et al. 2015). Several potential invasive marine species in Alaskan waters such as the European green crab (Carcinus maenas) and tunicates (Didemnum vexillum) may be introduced from ship hulls and vessel ballast water, but establishing populations could be challenging in the colder waters of the northern Bering Sea. However, given the potential ecosystem impacts from increased competition by invasive species, difficulty in first detecting invasive species populations, and the high costs of eradication of invasive species known from other coastal areas (McNeely et al. 2003) it would be wise to focus efforts on the prevention of introducing invasive species.

2.3.3 Fish

Over 400 species of fish have been identified in the Bering Sea which acts as large potential source of colonizing species into the Arctic (Thorsteinson and Love 2016). Trawl samples of fish species in the northern Bering Sea and U.S Chukchi Seas show that species abundance can also vary significantly between years, and the effects of a changing climate is likely to influence dominant fish species and distributions. One particular feature known to have a strong effect on fish species distributions is a subsurface cold pool of water (<2 °C) in the middle shelf domain (depths of 50–100 m) of the Bering Sea. This cold pool varies in size and duration of persistence each year depending on sea ice, winter air temperatures, currents and bathymetry. During warm years walleye pollock (Gadus chalcogrammus) were more broadly distributed over the shelf, whereas Arctic cod (Boreogadus saida) were only found within the cold pool (Wyllie-Echeverria and Wooster 1998). Such observations highlight how conditions that affect the formation of the cold pool can influence potential barriers to northward migration of species into Arctic waters. In the northern Bering Sea the fish are relatively small in size and found at low densities, potentially indicating that species here live at the biological and environmental thresholds limits of their range (Thorsteinson and Love 2016). North of Bering Strait U.S. groundfish surveys for potential commercial species show the most abundant species in terms of highest biomass are Arctic cod and saffron cod (Eleginus gracilis) (Council 2009). Other common fish in the northern Bering and Chukchi seas include cods (Gadidae), sculpins (Cottidae), eelpouts (Zoarcidae) and flounders (Pleuronectidae) (Barber et al. 1994; Norcoss et al. 2013). Chum salmon (Onchorynchus keta) and pink salmon (O. gorbuscha) are abundant in the Norton Sound area, although 34 O. Lee et al. other salmon species can also be found in smaller numbers. The anadromous life- cycle of harvested species such as salmon make them important species that link terrestrial freshwater and marine ecosystems. Changes in temperature that affect freezing conditions impact over-wintering and spawning habitat for many arctic fish. There is a nearshore commercial chum salmon fishery in Kotzebue Sound which also supports subsistence fishing use. Other fish abundant nearshore include Arctic cod, Pacific capelin (Mallotus catevarius), Arctic sand lance (Ammodytes hexa- pterus), and least cisco (Coregonus sardinella). Fish communities in the Eastern Siberian Sea also tend to be small and patchy. Benthic species (e.g., eelpouts, sculpins, and Pacific sand lance) are common on the offshore shelves, but the more pelagic Arctic cod is also abundant. Dominant inshore species include Arctic char (Salvelinus aplinus), Dolly Varden (S. malma), least and Arctic ciscos, and broad (Coregonus nasus) and humpback whitefish (C. pidschian) (Mecklenburg, Mecklenburg et al. 2016), and many of these species are locally important subsistence harvest species to coastal communities.

2.3.4 Birds

Most marine birds in the region are only seasonally present with most species migrating into the Bering Sea or farther north to reach breeding and foraging habitat. Spring migration for most migratory birds takes place between late March and late May with many birds timing their arrival to coincide with open water along shoreline leads off northwest Alaska, eastern Chukotka, and Amundsen Gulf. Large nesting colonies are found throughout the region (Fig. 2.4). Of the 12 large

Fig. 2.4 Identified seabird breeding colonies in the Bering Strait Region (Source: Hyrenbach et al. 2013) 2 Ecosystems of the Bering Strait Region 35 mixed-species colonies that contain half of Alaska’s breeding seabirds four colonies are found within the U.S. coastal waters of Bering Strait (Stephensen and Irons 2003). Cliff nesting habitat is important for breeding seabirds such as auklets, but the region also provides important transit areas for waterfowl and sea ducks that migrate in large numbers to coastal lagoons and nesting grounds in Alaska, Russia, and the Canadian Arctic. River deltas, such as the Yukon-Kuskokwim delta in the U.S. and the Kolyma and Indigirka deltas in Russia also support important habitat for species of national and international concern such as Spectacled eiders (Somateria fischeri) and Steller’s eiders (Polysticta stelleri). The most numerous planktivorous species in the Eastern Bering Sea include crested auklets (Aethia cristatella), least auklets (Aethia pusilla), and petrels, such as Leach’s storm petrel (Oceanodroma leucorhoa). The distribution of summer breeding habitat for planktivorous species is influenced by areas of high productivity, and zooplankton abundance. The northern Bering Sea seabird populations may be supported by the influx of plankton from shelf waters that gets advected north into the central Chukchi Sea (Piatt and Springer 2003). As mobile predators, seabirds have some adaptability to respond to changing patterns of plankton distributions, but nesting birds may need to account for both energy expended to travel large distances, and the quality of plankton prey in adapting foraging strategies to find food (Obst et al. 1995). Forage fish species are also an important prey base for many seabirds in the region. Abundant piscivorous species include murres, such as thick-billed murres (Uria lomvia) and common murres (Uria aalge), puffins, kittwakes and gulls. The coastal or wetland summer breeding habitat also allows many species to take advantage of freshwater or anadromous fish species as prey. Despite the considerable diving ability of some birds in the region such as yellow-billed loons (Gavia adam- sii) most diving birds feed predominantly on pelagic fish rather than species found near the seafloor. One instance of shifting diet to demersal fish species in black guillemots (Cepphus grille mandtii) had a negative effect on chick survival rates. This shift to feeding chicks demersal species was observed to occur as sea ice receded and Arctic cod availability decreased (Divoky et al. 2015). Only a few species, such as spectacled eiders, forage on benthic molluscs and crustaceans during the non-breeding season. Such winter habitat use by eiders occurs only in shallower waters typically associated with polynyas which emphasizes the importance of tracking seasonally available habitat and prey resources.

2.3.5 Marine Mammals

The distribution of marine mammals in the region is greatly influenced by the seasonal presence of sea ice. These spring and fall migrations are important seasonal events to coastal subsistence hunting communities where marine mammals form an important contribution to the diet, culture and economy (see Chap. 4). Bowhead whales (Balaena mysticetus) and beluga whales (Delphinapterus leucas) are resident cetacean species that are also important subsistence species to indigenous 36 O. Lee et al.

Fig. 2.5 (a) Bowhead whale seasonal distribution and general migration pattern (Source: Smith et al. 2010), (b) MODIS imagery of seasonal spring lead on the Alaska coast on April 19, 2017 (Source: NASA Worldview). (Data: Alaska Ocean Observing System) coastal residents. The spring migratory route of bowhead whales brings them in relatively close proximity to the Alaska coast and coastal subsistence hunting communities, as spring leads consistently provide open water along the eastern Chukchi Sea (Fig. 2.5). Individuals may continue traveling into the Canadian Arctic to reach prey-rich summer foraging grounds. The fall migration for bowhead whales is farther offshore, and many individuals may travel along the eastern Siberian and Chukotka coast before heading south into the Bering Sea (Moore and Reeves 1993). This migratory pattern is illustrative of the trans-boundary migratory routes of most marine mammals that take advantage of U.S. and Russian coastal waters. 2 Ecosystems of the Bering Strait Region 37

Resident pinniped species include ringed seals (Pusa hispida), bearded seals (Erignathus barbatus), spotted seals (Phoca largha), ribbon seals (Histriophoca fasciata) and the Pacific walrus (Odobenus rosmarus divergens). Common seasonal residents include gray whales (Eschrichtius robustus) and killer whales (Orcinus orca) that are usually only in the region when there is enough open water to avoid instances of getting trapped in surrounding sea ice. Recently there have been reports that the number of killer whale sightings in the north is increasing (Springer et al. 2006), which may make other marine mammals more vulnerable to predation or attacks in the future. Harbor porpoises (Phocoena phocoena) and sea lions are seasonal visitors to Bering Strait but are not common north of the strait. When sea ice is present to facilitate travel to coastal areas in the south it is also possible to find polar bears (Ursus maritimus) seasonally present in the Bering Strait region. Only rare observations of more temperate species such as fin (Balaenoptera physalus) and humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangliae), and minke whales (Balaenoptera acutorostrata) have been reported. The population sizes of most Arctic marine mammal stocks have been difficult to reliably assess (Laidre et al. 2008; Laidre et al. 2015) which makes it difficult to implement management policies to mitigate threats to marine mammal populations. As apex predators, marine mammals play a critical role in Arctic and sub-Arctic ecosystems. Bowhead whales are large consumers of zooplankton, particularly copepods and euphausiids, and feed throughout the water column, including near the seafloor. Benthic-foraging marine mammals in the region include gray whales, walruses and bearded seals (Highsmith et al. 2006; Dehn et al. 2007). In addition to their role as benthic predators, these benthic foraging marine mammals may play an important ecosystem function as bioturbators of sediment (Ray et al. 2006). Midwater fish species such as Arctic and polar cod are important prey for beluga whales, ringed seals, spotted seals and ribbon seals (Laidre et al. 2008). Changing sea ice conditions are likely to have a large impact on marine mammal populations. Some assessments suggest that species such as bowhead whales show an improved body condition that is linked to summer sea ice loss and corresponding increased productivity and prey abundances (George et al. 2015). However, for most species, the loss of sea ice habitat would reduce available platforms for hunting, molting, and whelping young, especially for resident ice-associated seals, walruses and polar bears. Bering Strait coastal subsistence hunters describe the importance of pack ice to access marine mammals such as walruses, spotted seals and bearded seals during the spring migration. Since marine mammal migrations are influenced by the northward retreat of sea ice, an earlier sea ice retreat may change the phenology of species (Moore and Huntington 2008), potentially allowing marine mammals to move north earlier, while also altering the available window for spring subsistence hunts. Other warming trends that may affect marine mammals include reduced landfast ice stability and snow cover that may impact the ability of ringed seals to maintain birthing lairs that are built under snow drifts over landfast ice (Furgal et al. 1996). Warming trends may also increase exposure of Arctic marine mammals to algal toxins from harmful algal blooms that are known to have detrimental impacts on marine mammal health, and have been linked to increased inci- dences of marine mammal strandings (Lefebvre et al. 2016). 38 O. Lee et al.

2.4 Shared Natural Resources

2.4.1 Fisheries

Since the end of commercial whaling activity for bowhead whales in the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Seas in 1914 there has not been any commercial fisheries in the offshore waters of the northern Bering Sea or adjacent waters in the Chukchi Sea. There is a small commercial fishery for chum Salmon in Kotzebue that takes place close to shore, and is relatively small-scale compared to the Bering Sea commercial fisheries in the south. Nearshore fisheries in the United States are managed by the State of Alaska, and includes some regulations for subsistence fishing for Alaska residents, and still requires a permit. In Russia, the Chukotka Commission for anadromous species sets fisheries quotas to regulate commercial, and traditional fisheries within the Chukchi Autonomous area for smelt, char, cisco and salmonid species. There may also be provisions in fisheries management for special quotas for some small enterprises and individuals. The need for a better understanding of Arctic marine fish stocks and their ecosystems has been used as justification for the current moratorium on commercial fishing activity in U.S. offshore waters (Hoag 2017). However, as reductions in summer sea ice make the region more accessible to vessels with longer open water seasons there may be renewed interest in commercially valuable fish stocks. The effects of climate change on fish distributions may also begin to shift key areas of current commercial fishing activity in the Bering Sea such that more temperate species such as walleye pollock may become more established farther north in the future. Without consistent monitoring of species abundance and distributions in the region it would be difficult to assess how current fish stocks might support future commercial fisheries. However, fish species known to be abundant in the area, such as Arctic cod are important prey species for a large number of other fish, bird and marine mammal species, and exploitation of Arctic cod, or northerly shifts in their distribution could have considerable impacts to predator populations.

2.4.2 Marine Mammal and Bird Subsistence Harvest Species

Marine mammals and some migratory bird species are also important subsistence resources for coastal communities on both sides of Bering Strait. Efforts to protect the shared cultural value of subsistence species are innate in species co-management arrangements. Many species that migrate through the region use habitat in U.S. and Russian waters throughout their migratory route, following the influence of sea ice and prey distributions. Strong site fidelity to breeding and feeding grounds helps to bring individuals back to predictable locations year-after-year. A deep understanding of these migratory patterns has allowed indigenous coastal communities to establish traditional knowledge on the timing and location of migrating species, and helps shape the seasonal aspect of subsistence hunting activity. However, climate 2 Ecosystems of the Bering Strait Region 39 change impacts to sea ice and prey distributions, as well as noise disturbances from increasing vessel traffic and human activity may disrupt the phenology of migratory species, use of preferred feeding areas and impact the accessibility of marine mammals to subsistence hunters. Existing co-management responsibilities between natural resource agencies and indigenous hunters is an important mechanism for cooperative information sharing and shared decision-making for species management.

2.4.3 Protected Areas

A relatively pristine coastal environment attracts a growing eco-tourism and adventure tourism industry (see Chap. 3). Iconic arctic marine mammal and bird species are often used to attract nature photographers and tourists, and is an important draw for the tourism cruise industry that is very successful in south-central and southeast coastal Alaska. Wildlife and nature may also be an important draw for the growing tourism industry on the Russian Bering Sea region. The summer peak tourist season in Alaska coincides with the most northern distributions of many marine mammal species, although many populations may be more dispersed in open water during summer, which may make them more difficult to see. An exception to the typically small groupings of animals is the large breeding seabird colonies and the recent occurrence of large coastal walrus haulouts in Point Lay, Alaska. These walrus haulouts are extremely sensitive to human activity and noise disturbances. The current lack of large port infrastructure in the region may help to limit tourist visitors to remote coastal sites and subsequently limit direct impacts to fragile coastal breeding grounds. At present there are no offshore commercial oil or gas extraction activities in the Chukchi Sea north of Bering Strait that might affect the visual appeal of the landscape, or pose a threat of oil spills. However, increased vessel traffic might still be a source of a significant oil spill in the region. The risk of vessel-related oil spills and other potential vessel-related environmental impacts might be mitigated through the implementation of the Polar Code (See Sidebar 5.1), and the expanding cooperation between US Coast Guard and Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) for addressing specific safety measures in the Bering Strait region. An assessment of areas of heightened ecological significance were identified in a follow-up to the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (Table 2.1). The range of habitat uses by resident and migratory fish, birds and marine mammals emphasize the importance of the Bering Strait region for maintaining ecosystem function across species and trophic levels. Some specific US efforts to mitigate ecosystem impacts from shipping activity include recommendations for vessel transit routes from the US Coast Guard Port Access Route Study (Document number 2017-03771; 82 FR 11935) and increasing cooperation and coordination of activities among local stakeholders through the Arctic Waterways Safety Committee that works to promote safe, efficient operating practices. 40 O. Lee et al.

Table 2.1 Areas of heightened ecological significance within identified Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs) including information on the extent of the area and its use by fish, birds and marine mammals Extent Area of heightened ecological (thousand Marine LME interest km2) Fish Birds mammals Bering St Lawrence Island (including 43 B F W W FSt Sea St Lawrence polynya in the Mi south) Bering Strait (St Lawrence 68 Sp B F F Mi Island north to the Diomede Islands) Gulf of Anadyr 86 Sp F St B F Mi W Northeastern coast of 29 Sp W Kamchatka and offshore areas Chukchi Northeast coastal area (Alaska) 41 Sp F B F St Mi F Mo Sea Mi Mo Mi Southeastern Chukchi Sea 60 Sp F B F St B F Mi (Chukchi bight, Kotzebue Mi W Mi sound area) Source: AMAP (2013) B breeding, F feeding, Mi migration, Mo molting, Sp spawning, St staging, W wintering

2.5 Information Needs for an Ecosystem-Based Management Approach

An ecosystem based management approach provides a framework that considers tight linkages between biotic and abiotic components. The Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group identified implementation of such an approach that includes six elements:

1. Identify the ecosystem 2. Describe the ecosystem (biological and physical characteristics) 3. Set ecological objectives 4. Assess the ecosystem (including an integrative assessment of cumulative human impacts) 5. Value the ecosystem (including economic, social and cultural value of ecosystem services) 6. Manage human activities

As part of the strategy to identify ecosystems, the PAME working group defined and revised the boundaries of 18 Large Marine Ecosystems (LME) that considers regions at scales of 200,000 km2 or larger. At these large scales, the northern Bering and Chukchi Seas can be considered part of a single LME whose boundaries are defined based on ecological criteria, bathymetry, hydrography, productivity and linked populations (Fig. 2.6) (PAME 2013). The ecosystem-based management (EBM) concept for LMEs considers key aspects focused on productivity, fish and 2 Ecosystems of the Bering Strait Region 41

Fig. 2.6 Map of Large Marine Ecosystems throughout the Arctic. (Source: PAME 2013) fisheries, pollution and ecosystem health, socioeconomics, and governance. The socioeconomic and governance aspects important to consider for EBM are addressed in Chaps. 3, 4, and 5. Consideration of ecosystem productivity, future fisheries and ecosystem health and sustainability all require consistent monitoring to detect long-term trends that are distinct from interannual variability that might be reflected in short-term studies. Description of the current status of ecosystems (EBM element 2), and assessment of the ecosystem (EBM element 4) also require ongoing research and monitoring to successfully implement and evaluate the effectiveness of an EBM approach. Differences in sea ice persistence, nutrients, and characteristics of key water masses flowing through Bering Strait emphasizes the need for observations, scientific cooperation, and species management in U.S. and Russian waters to monitor ecosystem health, particularly since observations from only one side of the strait cannot be 42 O. Lee et al. interpolated broadly. Given the need for long-term monitoring data to support an EBM approach it is important to maintain collaborative international research programs that have government support in order to reliably track changes in natural resources. The Russian-American Long-term Census of the Arctic (RUSALCA) program is an example of a cooperative joint U.S. and Russian research program developed from a Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Russian Academy of Sciences. Since 2004 research expeditions have yielded significant findings about physical and chemical oceanography, primary productivity, and the distribution and migration patterns of species in the Bering and Chukchi Seas. The suspension of the RUSALCA program in 2016 has resulted in more limited opportunities for a rigorous research program with joint sampling on both sides of Bering Strait. Other international research programs for monitoring ecosystem change in the Pacific Arctic have developed from a bottom-up, research collaboration approach. Joint international research efforts such as the Distributed Biological Observatory (DBO), includes research support from Arctic and non-Arctic nations that have established research protocols and data sharing that would allow comparable data analysis among individual research collaborators (Moore and Grebmeier 2018). The Pacific Arctic Group (PAG), originally organized by the International Arctic Science Committee, but now independent, helped to facilitate the coordination and development of the DBO program. However, currently DBO is supported by US national and international research programs on a short-term (2–5 year basis), but since PAG is a non-governmental organization there is no guarantee or commitment of resources to sustain long-term research that could be used to monitor ecosystem change, despite the potential value of such information for decision-making. The valuation of ecosystem services that considers economic, social and cultural values was identified as a core element for EBM. However, this can be particularly challenging to implement as it is difficult to identify what type of information is needed to support the ecosystem valuation process. Estimating the economic value of a commercial fishery in the region would require a better understanding of the current status and trends of fish stocks which are difficult to assess with the very limited research that has been done to assess fish stocks. Ongoing, coordinated research efforts and data sharing across the U.S. and Russia in the Bering Strait region is also needed to evaluate the value of essential fish habitat outside of key fishing areas (e.g. nursery habitat), and to monitor how impacts from predators and human activities could affect the future economic value and sustainability of fish stocks that regularly cross national boundaries. Data sharing should go beyond the sharing of data and information among key scientists who are involved in a specific collaborative research project. Even though most research programs require final deposition of findings into data archives after a set period of time, they should also allow early accessibility of data to integrate the broader modeling community, and encourage collaborative development of geospatial tools to monitor marine resources and potential impacts. The process of valuation for hotspots in marine biodiversity, or the cultural value of ecosystem services to support sustainable subsistence harvests can also be a complex issue where the loss of such resources is incalculable, and the intrinsic value exceeds any exploitable economic value. Hence, 2 Ecosystems of the Bering Strait Region 43 caution should be exercised when using an ecosystem valuation approach to prioritize the development of policies to protect ecosystem services or key ecosystem components (e.g., areas, species).

2.6 Summary

The Bering Strait region is part of the larger Chukchi Sea LME, and is an important gateway between the Pacific and Bering Seas to the Arctic. Management of natural resources in U.S. and Russian waters including fisheries, and marine mammal subsistence harvests follow guidance from national policies, but it remains challenging to implement an ecosystem-based approach to management. North of the Bering Strait, an international agreement maintains a precautionary approach that prohibits fishing in the high Arctic until more information is available. However, the Bering Strait region is experiencing significant environmental change that may affect the entire ecosystem, while also providing new opportunities for economic growth (e.g., greater shipping access through Bering Strait with longer open water periods). Climate change impacts manifesting in the form of decreased sea ice cover, ocean acidification, and winter storms will continue to affect marine and coastal ecosystems and resilience of coastal communities. Strong international and bilateral cooperation to improve scientific research to track changes from an ecosystem, and societal perspective will be important to support sustainable development of the region (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Summary of key observations, drivers and conditions affecting sustainability in the region Observation Driver Condition (current and future manifestation) Sea ice Climate Changing seasonal sea ice impacts marine and coastal change change; ecosystems by affecting the timing and magnitude of warmer air and primary productivity, marine and coastal species seasonal sea surface migrations, and the magnitude of carbon export to benthic temperature ecosystems. Late freeze-up and early sea ice melt affects coastal shoreline erosion rates where winter storms erode coasts not protected by landfast ice, and also impacts subsistence hunting activities. Longer open water periods may also potentially allow more ship traffic year-round with reduced ice hazards. Ocean Sea ice loss, Low sea ice concentration in the cold waters of the Arctic acidification calcium contribute to increasing ocean acidification. This in turn carbonate affects the ability of benthic and planktonic organisms to mineral build calcium carbonate structures (e,g, tests, shells) which saturation state could severely impact ecosystems and fisheries that rely on calcifying organisms as an important base in the food web. Uncertainty in Insufficient Complex ecosystem interactions make it difficult to predict fish stock research or how various Bering Sea fisheries will respond to climate populations fisheries survey change. The potential for species range shifts farther north effort would increase the pressure to start opening fisheries in the Arctic where there has been very limited research on existing fish populations, making it particularly challenging to set fisheries limits. 44 O. Lee et al.

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Abstract Historically, extreme remoteness and cold have left the Bering Strait region sparsely populated and economically undeveloped. Costs are very high and infrastructure is minimal. Economies are undeveloped, and based primarily on mining and government. Population densities are very low. A high proportion of residents are Natives for whom subsistence hunting and fishing remain important sources of food. In the future, environmental, economic, political and technological factors are likely to bring increased economic activity to the region— although the timing and scale of future economic change are difficult to predict. Economic activities most likely to grow include marine transportation; onshore and offshore mineral and hydrocarbon development; land-based and cruise ship tourism; commercial fishing; and government services and infrastructure needed to support economic and population growth. The nature, timing and scale of growth will depend on a wide range of factors including change in ice conditions, the extent of future resource discoveries; and the extent to which governments make development of the region an economic and strategic priority. Significant economic activities in the Bering Strait region for which shared governance issues are currently or likely to become important include marine subsistence, marine transportation, offshore oil and gas development, commercial fishing, and cruise ship tourism.

G. Knapp (*) University of Alaska Anchorage, Anchorage, AK, USA e-mail: [email protected] V. Kryukov Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russia

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 47 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_3 48 G. Knapp and V. Kryukov

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the economies of the Bering Strait region (BeSR), focusing on economic activities for which shared BeSR governance issues exist or may arise in the future, as well as economic factors that may affect efforts to implement governance systems addressing BeSR issues. For the purpose of this discussion, we define the “Bering Strait Region” as the waters between latitudes 62°N and 68°N as well as the adjacent land areas near the Russian and Alaska coasts, as illustrated by the rectangular area in the center of Fig. 1.1. Neither the land nor the maritime parts of this specific region correspond directly to Russian or American political, administrative or resource management units, which are generally the basis for reporting economic data. Where necessary we rely on economic data for larger regions within which land or marine parts of the BeSR are situated. We begin this chapter with brief overviews of the economies of the Russian and Alaska parts of the Bering Strait region. After initial summary observations, we discuss the Russian and Alaska parts separately, in part because of political and economic differences, and in part because most available economic data are not directly comparable. We distinguish between “local” and “non-local” economic activities occurring within the Bering Strait region. “Local” economic activities are those in which residents of the region are engaged and from which they derive their income, while “non-local” economic activities—particularly commercial fishing and marine transportation, are those which occur within the region but which may have limited links to the local economy (ADHR II 2014). This distinction is important for our discussion, because it highlights the fact that for both Russia and the United States, Bering Strait resources, economic activities and governance issues are not only local but also regional and national in economic importance and impacts. Local interests are not necessarily the same as regional and national interests, further complicating the politics of shared governance. We then discuss in greater detail five economic activities for which Bering Strait region shared governance issues appear most likely to arise: marine subsistence, commercial fisheries, marine transportation, marine tourism, and offshore energy development. Chapter V builds upon this discussion with more detailed discussion of these issues, as well as prospects and challenges for addressing them.

3.2 Economies of the Bering Strait Region

In general, the economies of the Russian and Alaska parts of the Bering Strait region exhibit many characteristics and trends similar to those of other parts of the Russian Arctic, the United States (Alaska) Arctic, and other Arctic regions. These have been 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region 49 described in detail in a number of recent international reports (AMAP 2017; ADHR II 2014; ASI 2010; SLICA 2007; SLICA 2015) as well as numerous detailed Russian and Alaska studies. Our focus in this chapter is on those economic activities for which shared BeSR governance issues exist or may arise in the future, as well as economic factors that may affect efforts to implement governance systems addressing BeSR issues. As we will discuss, these are not necessarily the activities of greatest significance to the local economies of the region or the well-being of local residents. It is useful to begin our discussion of the economies of the Bering Strait Region with several summary observations, which are developed in greater detail below. Historically, extreme remoteness and cold have left the Bering Strait region sparsely populated and economically undeveloped, like many other Arctic regions. Defining characteristics of the Bering Strait Region include its cold climate and extreme remoteness from national and international economic and population centers. Reflecting these characteristics, on both sides of the Bering Strait, costs are very high and infrastructure is minimal. Economies are undeveloped, and are supported primarily by government and mining. Population densities are very low. A high proportion of residents—particularly of smaller communities—are Indigenous peoples for whom subsistence hunting and fishing remain important sources of food (SLICA 2007). There are significant similarities between the Russian and Alaska Bering Strait economies, reflecting similar resource bases, climate and remoteness. However, there are also significant differences, reflecting differences both in local geography and resources as well as in historical and current political and economic conditions in the two regions and countries. At present, there are relatively few direct economic linkages between the Russian and Alaska parts of the Bering Strait region: although the regions are physically close, almost all economic interaction is with the national economies of the respective regions. In the future, environmental, economic, political and technological factors are likely to bring increased economic activity to the region—although the nature, timing and scale of future economic change are difficult to predict. Economic activities most likely to grow include marine transportation; onshore and offshore mineral and hydrocarbon development; land-based and cruise ship tourism; commercial fishing; and government services and infrastructure needed to support economic and population growth. The timing and scale of different kinds of growth will depend—to varying extents—on how rapidly and significantly summer and winter ice conditions change both within the region and in the Arctic; the extent of future resource discoveries; and the extent to which the Russian and American governments make development of the region an economic and strategic priority. The potential for future economic change means that priorities for shared governance should not necessarily be based on current economic activities and current issues, but rather on the activities and issues which may arise in the future. 50 G. Knapp and V. Kryukov

3.2.1 Economy of the Russian Bering Strait Region

The Russian Bering Strait Region (RBSR) comprises approximately the eastern third of the Chukotka Autonomous Territory.1 Chukotka is administratively divided into six districts. For the purposes of this chapter, we define the land portion of the Russian Bering Strait region (RBSR) as including Chukotsky District and Providensky District (approximately the northern and southern halves of the Chukchi Peninsula, respectively) as well as coastal communities in the eastern parts of Iultinsky District and Anadyrsky District from Mys Schmidta in the north to Beringovsky in the south (Fig. 3.1, Table 3.1). The RBSR includes 23 communities with a total population in 2016 of about 33,000. The largest community is Anadyr, the capital of Chukotka Autonomous Territory, with an estimated population of about 15,000, or about half of the RBSR. Of the other communities, 5 have populations between 1000 and 4000 (Ugolnye Kopi, Provideniya, Egvekinot, Lavrentiya, and Lorino) and the remaining 17 have populations of less than 1000. Relatively little economic data is available for individual communities or districts of the RBSR. Thus some of the remainder of this discussion is based on data for all of Chukotka. Note however that economic data for Chukotka are not

Fig. 3.1 The Russian and Alaska Bering Strait Regions

1 In the remainder of this chapter, for simplicity we use the terms “Chukotka” and “Kamchatka” to refer to the Russian political regions formally known as Chukotka Autonomous Territory and Kamchatka Territory. 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region 51

Table 3.1 Population of the Russian Bering Strait Region as of January 1 2016 District Communities Population Russian Bering Strait region Total 33,292 Chukotsky Total 4344 Lavrentiya 1345 Lorino 1046 Uelen 651 Neshkan 637 Inchoun 374 Enurmino 291 Providensky Total 3714 Provideniya 2082 Sereniki 376 Novoye Chaplino 362 Enmelen 299 Yanrakynnot 298 Nunligran 297 Iultinsky (eastern part) Total 3661 Egvekinot 2815 Konergino 334 Uelkal 191 Vankarem 166 Mys Shmidta 155 Andyrsky (eastern part) Total 5672 Ugolnye kopi 3736 Beringovsky 837 Kanchalan 494 Menypilgino 353 Alkatvaam 252 City of Anadyr Anadyr 14,899 Source: Chukotka autonomous Okrug territorial branch of the Federal State Statistics Service. Численность постоянного населения Чукотского автономного округа по муниципальным образованиям на 1 января 2016 года archived august 16, 2016, at the Wayback machine. (in Russian) necessarily representative of the RBSR, as there are significant differences between the major economic activities of western Chukotka (gold production); southern Chukotka (light metals and coal), and eastern Chukotka (fishing and traditional subsistence activities). About 29% of the population of Chukotka are indigenous Northern ethnic groups, of which the two largest groups are Chukchi (about 13,000, living throughout Chukotka) and Yupik Eskimos (about 1500, living primarily in eastern Coastal settlements).2 Native people comprise about 85% of the population of Chukotsky District (Chukotsky District Wikipedia entry).

2 Except where otherwise cited, data and descriptions of the Chukotka economy in the remainder of this sessions are from Chukotka Autonomous Okrug Wikipedia entry and Dudarev et al. 2013. 52 G. Knapp and V. Kryukov

180,000 160,000 140,000 120,000 Other 100,000 Ukrainians 80,000 Russians 60,000 Yupik 40,000 Chukchis & Chuvans 20,000 0 1959 1970 1979 1989 2002 2010

Fig. 3.2 Chukotka population by ethnic group. (Source: Wikpedia article for Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chukotka_Autonomous_Okrug). Original source: Russian census data archived at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/ perepis_itogi1612.htm)

Like many regions of the Russian Arctic, Chukotka experienced a dramatic decline in population during the 1990s, as state support decreased substantially and many activities became economically unprofitable. As shown in Fig. 3.2, the population decline occurred primarily among Russians and Ukrainians, while the population of indigenous Chukchi and Yupik continued to grow gradually—reflecting the fact that indigenous peoples were less likely to leave in response to economic decline. Most of the urban population of Chukotka (including the city of Anadyr) is employed in mining, administration, construction, cultural work, education, medicine and other occupations. In contrast, most of the rural population (including most of the rest of the RBSR) is engaged in traditional activities of reindeer herding, marine mammal hunting and fishing, both as organized commercial activities and as traditional subsistence practices. Reindeer breeding is particularly important. As of July 1, 2008, Chukotka’s reindeer livestock stood at 223,900 head, and the region’s reindeer herd was Russia’s second largest after that of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District (Kopin). During the early 2000s, international researchers cooperating on the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) project conducted detailed interviews, using a consistent survey instrument, with adult indigenous residents of numerous Arctic regions, including Eastern Chukotka (SLICA 2007; SLICA 2015). The survey results document that traditional economic and cultural practices remained important for indigenous residents. For example, 82% of Eastern Chukotka respon- dents engaged in fishing; 82% engaged in hunting sea mammals; 91% learned a Native language as a child, and 31% lived in homes with cold running water. The Russian Bering Strait Region has very few roads; most transportation is by sea and river (during the half of the year when ports are ice-free) and air. The largest ports are at Anadyr, Provideniya, Egvekinot, and Beringovsky. These ports primarily serve to receive cargo for the local region. The largest airports are at Anadyr, 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region 53

Provideniya and Beringovskiy. Most air transportation to smaller communities of the region is by helicopter. Chukotka has large reserves of oil, natural gas, coal, gold and tungsten. Production of mineral and raw materials resources, particularly gold, accounted for more than 45% of gross regional product (GRP) in 2015. Largely because of its mining industry, Chukotka’s Gross Regional Product (GRP) per capita ranks fourth among Russian Federation territories (after oil-extracting Tyumen and Sakhalin Oblasts and Moscow). However, remoteness and poor infrastructure are significant economic challenges to further development of the region’s mineral resources. Although mining is the most important economic activity for Chukotka, it is relatively far less important for the RBSR. Most of the Chukotka’s gold mining (including the Kupol, Dvoinoe, and Mayskoe gold fields) occurs in the western Bilibinsky and Chaunsky regions. Coal and natural gas are produced in Anadyrsky region for local consumption, and coal production for export to Asian markets is under development near Beringovsky south of Anadyr. As discussed more below in Sect. 3.3.2, limited commercial fishing occurs within the marine waters of the Russian Bering Strait region. However, most of this fishing is undertaken by vessels from other regions of the Russian Far East, particularly Kamchatka Territory and Primorye Territory, and plays a limited role in the “local” economy. Similarly, significant marine transportation occurs in Russian waters of the Bering Strait Region, including shipments of supplies to the region and mineral products from the region, vessels transiting the region to and from other parts of the Russian North and vessels following the Northern Sea Route. Most of these vessels are based in other regions, and while providing vital transportation services to the Russian Bering Strait Region, play an otherwise limited role in the “local” economy. Revitalizing of the Russian military presence in the Russian Bering Strait Region, including reconstruction of the port of Provideniya and the air base at Anadyr, may play a limited future economic role in the RBSR. These units are relatively small (up to 200 people). The Strategy for the Socio-Economic Development of the Chukotka Autonomous District up to 2030 envisages consistent implementation of the following priority tasks:

• development of transport and energy infrastructures using federal budget funds, and large-scale geological exploration; • inviting private investments into promising ore mining projects, for instance, in the Baim ore zone and the Bering coal basin; • emphasis on increasing mineral resource production by private companies; • preservation of ethnic identity, natural and cultural environment, and traditional economic activities of the indigenous people of the Chukotka Autonomous District. 54 G. Knapp and V. Kryukov

3.2.2 Economy of the Alaska Bering Strait Region

Most of the land portion of the Alaska Bering Strait Region (ABSR) lies within the Northwest Arctic Borough and the Nome Census Area, two geographic subdivi- sions of northwestern Alaska (Fig. 3.1). For purposes of this discussion, we use available data for these two areas to describe the economy of the region. Most of the land area of the ABSR is managed by government agencies including the US Bureau of Land Management and the US National Park Service. About one-fifth—including most of the area along the coast—is owned by Alaska Native Corporations created by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971 (National Park Service, Alaska Region). Different landowners have different management objectives ranging from economic development for profit to preservation for wilderness values to protection of subsistence hunting and fishing opportunities. These different objectives are reflected in different past and potential future land-based economic development. The ABSR is similar demographically and economically to other remote rural regions of western and interior Alaska. Important characteristics of the region include:

• The region is very sparsely settled. • The majority of the population are Alaska Natives.3 • Most of the population lives in small, isolated villages and a few larger communities (Nome, Kotzebue, and Unalakleet) which serve as regional hubs for government, transportation and services. • Most transportation is by water (freight) and air (passengers and freight). There are very few roads and very little land transportation except by snowmachine4 in winter. • Many people continue to engage in traditional subsistence hunting and fishing activities, which are important sources of food and are culturally important. • Government—particularly local governments and schools, which depend primarily on federal and state funding—is the largest employer. • Government sponsored health care and social services are also important sources of employment. • Government transfers, including Alaska Permanent Fund dividends, provide a significant share of cash income. • The Red Dog Mine, north of Kotzebue, is a very large zinc mine and a major employer and contributor to local government revenue. Some other mining occurs and is locally important as a source of employment and local government income. • Commercial fishing provides seasonal income for some residents. • Support industries such as trade, services and finance are relatively undeveloped. A large share of income is spent outside the region.

3 The term “Alaska Natives” is commonly used in Alaska to refer to Indigenous peoples of Alaska. 4 The term “snowmachine” is commonly used in Alaska for what residents of other states and Canada generally refer to a “snowmobile.” 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region 55

• Average incomes are low and unemployment is high compared with urban Alaska and other states. • Costs are high. • Most higher-paid professional jobs are held by non-Natives from outside the region.

Below, we provide more details on the demographic and economic characteristics of the region summarized above. Relatively limited economic data are available for many economic activities, either because data are not collected or are aggregated across broader regions. The estimated population of the ABSR in 2016 was 18,024, of whom (76%) were Alaska Natives, primarily Iñupiat Eskimos (Table 3.2). The two largest communities, Nome (3777) and Kotzebue (3295) accounted for 40% of the population. Of the remaining 28 communities, 9 had populations between 500 and 999, and the rest had populations of less than 500. The region is very sparsely settled, with a population density of slightly over 0.1 persons per square kilometer. A large share of the ABSR population, particularly those who are Native and/or residents of smaller villages, engage in and/or derive a significant portion of their

Table 3.2 Alaska Bering Strait Region: selected demographic data Total: Alaska Nome Bering Straits Census Northwest Arctic Source Region Area Borough Total land area, square a 151,603 59,471 92,133 kilometers (a) Estimated population, 2016 a 17,590 9917 7673 (a) Population per square 0.12 0.17 0.08 kilometer, 2016 Alaska native share of a 78% 76% 80% population, 2016 Largest communities Nome Kotzebue Population of largest b 7072 3777 3295 communities, 2016 Share of population in 40% 38% 43% largest communities Number of other communities, by population (2016) 500–599 b 9 5 4 250–249 b 11 6 5 100–249 b 6 4 2 < 100 b 2 1 1 Sources: (a) U.S. Census Bureau, American fact finder, land area and persons per square mile, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/meta/long_POP060210.htm; (b) Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development, “Alaska population estimates by borough, census area, City, and census designated place (CDP), 2010–2016, http://live.laborstats.alaska.gov/pop/index.cfm 56 G. Knapp and V. Kryukov food from subsistence fishing and hunting for land and marine mammals. For the Nome Census Area, estimated total harvests of wild resources for home use (usable weight) in 2014 were 399 pounds per capita, of which 50% were marine mammals, 17% were salmon, 10% were other fish, and 14% were land mammals. For the Northwest Arctic Borough, estimated total harvests were 368 pounds per capita, of which 12% were marine mammals, 13% were salmon, 35% were other fish, and 36% were land mammals (Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Subsistence 2017). Subsistence harvest patterns reflect the relative local abundance of different subsistence resources. In general, larger and higher-income households—those most able to invest in subsistence equipment and fuel—account for the largest share of subsistence harvests, which are broadly shared with other members of the community. Management of subsistence resources is complex. In general, subsistence harvests are limited to “traditional and customary uses.” Under the US Marine Mammal Protection Act, only Alaska Natives may hunt marine mammals. Wage and salary employment and earnings data provide one indicator of the scale and structure of the land-based cash economy of the ABSR. In 2016, average annual total employment, including both residents and nonresidents, was 6668 and total wage and salary income was $365 million. Government accounted for 45% of reported employment and 33% of earnings. The share of government in employment and earnings was significantly higher for the Nome Census Area (45% and 41%) than for the Northwest Arctic Borough (38% and 25%), reflecting the importance of the Red Dog Mine in the NWAB economy (Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development 2017). Resident worker data (Table 3.3) provide another indicator of the structure of the ABSR economy. Unlike the average annual wage and salary employment and earnings data cited above, these data count only individuals who both resided in and worked in the region, regardless of how long they worked for. Local government employed by far the largest share of resident workers (40%), followed by Education and Health Services (16%) and Trade, Transportation and Utilities (11%). Natural Resources and Mining accounted for only 3% of resident employment for the ABSR region, but 6% for the Northwest Artic Borough where the Red Dog Mine is located. Note that total earnings of resident workers in 2015 ($245 million) were considerably smaller than combined earnings within the region in 2016 of both residents and nonresidents ($365 million). This indicates that non-residents—many of whom likely work at the Red Dog mine—account for a significant share of total earnings in the ABSR region. Commercial fishing is not included in Alaska employment and worker statistics such as the data shown in Table 3.3. Currently, limited commercial fishing occurs within Alaska waters of the Bering Strait region. This area is the northernmost part of and accounts for only a small share of the very large commercial fishery resources and harvests of the Alaska waters of the Bering Sea. The most significant fisheries, in volume and value of landings, are for salmon, crab and halibut. These fisheries differ significantly from each other in how they are managed, where and how fish 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region 57

Table 3.3 Alaska Bering Straits Region: resident workers by industry, 2015 Total: Alaska Bering Nome Census Northwest Arctic Straits Region Area Borough Worker characteristics Number of residents age 16 11,275 6475 4800 and over Number of residents 7556 4475 3081 employed % of residents age 16+ 67% 69% 64% employed Total wages earned ($ 245.9 140.0 105.9 millions) Share of workers, by industry Total 100% 100% 100% State government 4% 5% 3% Local government 40% 42% 37% Natural resources and 3% 1% 6% mining Construction 4% 3% 4% Manufacturing 4% 6% 1% Trade, transportation and 11% 11% 11% utilities Educational and health 16% 15% 17% services Other services 15% 11% 21% Other 4% 7% 1% Source: Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development. Alaska local and regional information. http://live.laborstats.alaska.gov/alari/ Note: Data include only residents of the region who received permanent fund dividends (PFDs). Federal workers, military, commercial fishermen, and the self-employed are not included are harvested, and who participates in and profits from the fishing. In 2015, total gross commercial fishing earnings of ABSR residents totaled less than $6 mil- lion5—less than 2% of total wage and salary earnings in the region. The ABSR economy benefits significantly from the Community Development Quota (CDQ) program, under which quotas for approximately 10% of the fishery resources of the Bering Sea are allocated to groups of Bering Sea coastal communities, which may fish for or lease the quotas. Revenues earned from fishing or leasing quotas may be used to promote economic development of the communities, particularly fisheries related development (NOAA Fisheries, Alaska Regional Office). The Norton Sound Economic Development Corporation (NSEDC), based in Nome, is the CDQ organization representing fifteen Alaska Bering Strait region coastal communities, from Norton Sound to Kotzebue Sound. NSEDC is a significant

5 Calculated from Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission data for Permit & Fishing Activity by Year, State, Census Area or City. https://www.cfec.state.ak.us/gpbycen/2015/ MenuMain.htm 58 G. Knapp and V. Kryukov economic contributor to the region. In 2015 it had $49 million in revenues, employed more than 600 people (full-time and part-time) and paid more than $12 million in wages (NSEDC 2016). Note that while NSEDC communities are located within the Bering Strait region, a significant share of NSEDC’s revenues are from Bering Sea fisheries located south of the region. The first significant non-Native settlement of the Alaska Bering Strait region was driven by the discovery of gold at Nome in 1899, which led to a gold rush that brought thousands of miners in the first decade of the twentieth century. Although gold mining continues today in the Nome area, it is on a much smaller scale. By far the largest resource development in the region is the Red Dog zinc/lead mine, situated in the DeLong Mountains about 82 miles north of Kotzebue and 46 miles from the Chukchi Sea coast. The mine is located on land belonging to the NANA Corporation within the Northwest Arctic Borough and is operated as a joint venture by Teck Alaska (a subsidiary of Teck Resources Limited headquartered in Vancouver) and the NANA Corporation. The mine has been in operation since 1989 and is the world’s largest source of zinc and a significant source of lead. Ore from the mine is trucked on a 53-mile haul road from the mine to the coast, where it is stockpiled throughout the year and shipped south via bulk carriers during the brief ice-free navigation season (Alaska DNR). The mine employs almost 700 people, of whom more than half are NANA shareholders (NANA Corporation, Haley and Fisher 2012). The transportation infrastructure of most of the Alaska Bering Straits Region is very limited. There are no road or railroad connections out of the region. Other than local roads in and around communities, the only roads are between Nome and the Seward Peninsula villages of Teller and Council. Airports at Nome, Kotzebue and Unalakleet have regularly scheduled jet service. Most other communities have small airstrips, often unpaved, with passenger and freight flights on smaller planes from the jet airports in the larger regional centers. Maritime transportation in US waters of the Bering Strait Region includes vessels supplying communities of the region (much of it tugs pulling barges), vessels shipping ore from the Red Dog mine, supply vessels passing through the region to supply Alaska North Slope communities and the North Slope oil industry, and relatively small numbers of government vessels, research vessels, and tourism vessels. The largest port of the region, at Nome, has three docks offering −22.5 feet mean lower low water (MLLW) located on a 3000 foot causeway. The port handles shipments of freight, fuel and gravel, shipped primarily by barge. Typically about one- third of refined products brought through the port are redistributed to other communities or used to fuel vessels; about 40 percent of inbound freight is redistributed to smaller communities. The port serves as a staging ground for operations north of the Bering Strait. The port is typically closed by ice 6 months of the year (McDowell Group 2016). In 2015, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Alaska Department of Transportation released a study tentatively selecting the Port of Nome as the site for development of a deep-draft port for the Arctic region. However, the project was put on hold in October 2015 following Shell’s announcement that it was ending its Arctic offshore exploration program. At present it remains uncertain what kind of 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region 59 deep draft port development may occur at Nome or elsewhere, when it might happen, and how it would be funded (Hutchins 2017; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2015; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District 2015). There is no hydrocarbon potential in US waters of the Bering Strait Region. As discussed below, there are significant potential offshore energy resources in US waters of the Chukchi Sea, considerably farther north, where Shell undertook an unsuccessful exploration effort. However no exploration or development efforts are currently underway, and no offshore energy development has occurred to date.

3.3 Economic Activities Raising Shared Governance Issues

Table 3.4 provides a typology of significant economic activities in the Bering Strait Region, with the authors’ judgment about the current economic importance of different activities to residents of the region, their non-local economic significance, their medium-term potential for future growth, and the significance of potential shared governance issues which they might cause or be affected by. The various ratings are highly subjective, based on considerations discussed in more detail below, and the reader is encouraged to consider how his or her own ratings might differ. Most potential shared governance issues are associated with five economic activities which utilize the marine environment in various ways: marine subsistence, commercial fisheries, marine transportation, marine tourism, and offshore energy development—all of which use the marine environment, in various ways. We focus our subsequent discussion on these activities, and in particular on how they may

Table 3.4 A typology of significant economic activities in the Bering Strait Region

Note: Significance ratings are subjective and based on authors’ judgement. Shading indicates activities for which shared governance issuses are greatest ∗some, ∗∗moderate, ∗∗∗high Russia/Alaska (where different) 60 G. Knapp and V. Kryukov change in the future. A common theme across all of these activities is uncertainty: while significant and potentially dramatic change is possible, it is difficult to predict what changes may occur or when they may occur. Note that with the important exception of marine subsistence, the marine activities which are most likely to raise shared governance issues tend to be of relatively greater non-local economic significance, with a relatively greater share of labor, investment and control coming from outside the region than from within the region. In contrast, the most important current economic activities for the local economies on both sides of the Bering Strait are land-based and are unlikely to raise shared governance issues. These activities include, for example, government and local services such as health care, which account for a large share of employment and income.

3.3.1 Marine Subsistence

Marine subsistence was historically the most important economic activity of the Bering Strait region and remains very important for Native peoples on both sides of the Bering Strait, for both economic and cultural reasons. As discussed above, Native peoples in both Chukotka and Alaska engage in extensive hunting for marine mammals including seals, walrus and whales, although the organization of subsistence activities differs. Among relatively few directly comparable measures of the importance of marine subsistence in the Russian and Alaska Bering Strait regions are the results of the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLICA) summarized in Table 3.5. These demonstrate that participation in subsistence fishing is very high in both regions, and that participation in or helping with sea mammal hunting (seal, walrus, and whale), while smaller, is also significant in both regions. The future of marine subsistence in the Bering Strait Region is difficult to project. It will be affected by a wide range of inter-related factors, including but not limited to resource abundance, ice conditions, local population trends (and the wide range of factors affecting local population), wildlife management regulations,

Table 3.5 Responses of adult Indigenous residents about participation in selected subsistence activities Eastern Chukotka Alaska NANA region Alaska Bering Straits region Fish 82% 86% 75% Hunt sea 17% NA NA mammals Hunt seal or ugruk NA 23% 53% Hunt walrus NA 6% 24% Help whaling 37% 15% 25% crews SLICA results tables, pages 50 & 51. Accompanying document to Poppel et al. 2007. www.arcticlivingconditions.org 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region 61 alternative income and employment opportunities and the extent to which future generations continue long-held cultural traditions associated with subsistence. In general, it seems unlikely that marine subsistence activities will significantly increase, as they will be limited by the size of indigenous populations and the extent to which they choose to and are able to engage in marine subsistence hunting and fishing. Depending on the above factors, they could remain relatively stable or could decrease.

3.3.2 Commercial Fishing

The Bering Strait region is located at the northern edge of the Bering Sea, one of the most productive fishing areas of the world. Almost all (92%) of the Bering Sea lies within the 200-mile economic zones of Russia or the United States, with the exception of an area of international waters located in the center referred to as the “Doughnut Hole.” Bering Sea fisheries resources and catches are clearly of great economic importance for both countries. However, only a very small share of these catches occur in the waters north of 62°N which we have defined as the Bering Strait region. Commercially valuable species, including Alaskan pollock, cod, prawn, and crab, breed in the Chukotka shelf zone. Pacific salmon also spawn in the rivers of Chukotka. However, Russian fisheries in the Bering Straits region are relatively small. The total catch of fish and seafood in Chukotka is less than 12,000 tons per year, or close to 2% of the total Russian Bering Sea catch. Bering Straits region fish catches are from two fishing zones—the Western Bering Sea and Chukotka. In 2016 fish catches for these two regions were 525,000 tons and 11,000 tons, respectively. Both zones are fished exclusively by ships from other areas. Fish catches in the Chukotka zone also include coastal fishing, mainly by indigenous people and “local” fisheries, which are quite small. The number of local fishing ships in 2016 was 2 “own vessels” and 13 “leased vessels” (Rosrybolovstvo 2016). Alaska fisheries in the Bering Straits region are also relatively small. As noted above, the most significant fisheries are for salmon, crab and halibut. Salmon fisheries are very small scale compared to other Alaska salmon fisheries, with harvests in 2017 of about 6400 metric tons metric tons valued at $9.2 million, or about 1.4% of the total volume and value of Alaska salmon harvests (Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Commercial Fisheries Division 2017).6 In 2015 Norton Sound red king crab fisheries had a total landed volume of 1900 metric tons valued at $2.2 million, or about 0.5% of the volume and 0.9% of the value of total Alaska Bering Sea crab harvests (Alaska Fisheries Science Center 2016, Table 1). No commercial fishing occurs in US federal waters of the BeSR north of the Bering Strait. In August 2009, the United States imposed a moratorium on commercial fishing in federal waters of the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas located within its EEZ, through adoption by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce of the Fishery

6 Harvest data are for the Yukon, Norton Sound and Kotzebue areas combined. 62 G. Knapp and V. Kryukov

Management Plan for the Fish Resources of the Arctic Management Area (North Pacific Fisheries Management Council 2009). The plan prohibits commercial fishing in these waters until more information is available to support sustainable fisheries management. (The moratorium does not preclude subsistence harvesting on the part of residents of the coastal communities located within this area, or commercial fishing for salmon in state waters.) A moratorium was implemented in 2008 on bottom trawling in the Northern Bering Sea Research Area—an area including parts of the BeSR south of the Bering Strain but extending farther south—until more could be learned about resources of the area. Prior to this moratorium very little bottom trawling had occurred, and the fishing industry had expressed little urgent interest in the area. Limited available data from past research indicates that “few species are present in the NBS with the abundance and distribution to be of commercial interest.” Resource abundance is far higher in waters of the Eastern Bering Shelf, farther to the south, where most US Bering Sea groundfish harvests occur (NOAA NMFS Alaska Fisheries Science Center 2012). It is unclear what the prospects for fishing in the vicinity of the Bering Strait and north of the Strait are likely to be in the foreseeable future. The impacts of climate change are affecting the marine environment in this region and could result in the development of commercially significant stocks of fish in the Bering Strait Region and in some parts of the Arctic Ocean. Similarly the importance of this region for juvenile fisheries development and reproduction could increase. Most fisheries biologists are skeptical regarding the likelihood of any such development, at least during the next several decades (Loeng 2013, Hollowed et al. 2013). They point to a variety of factors (e.g., the depth of the Arctic Ocean) likely to impede the northward movement of commercially important species. Nevertheless, the uncertainties surrounding such matters are profound. There are some indications that sizable stocks of specific species (e.g., polar or Arctic cod) may begin to show up in the Arctic Ocean sooner rather than later. Currently the United States moratorium on commercial fishing in US federal waters of the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas ensures that no significant harvesting efforts will get underway in waters under United States jurisdiction north of the Bering Strait. The Russian Federation has not imposed a similar moratorium on commercial fishing in its area of the Chukchi Sea. As a result, there is currently a significant asymmetry in the regimes governing commercial fishing in the eastern and western segments of the BSR.7

7 In November 2017 Russia, the United States, Norway, Denmark and Canada (the five nations with Arctic shorelines) as well as South Korea, China, Japan, the European Union and Iceland (which operate ocean trawling fleets) signed a draft agreement which would impose a moratorium on fishing in newly ice-free international waters of the central Artic ocean for 16 years or until a plan for sustainable fishing is in place. Although this agreement would not affect fishing in the Russian and U.S. waters of the Bering Strait region, it reflects a recognition by these countries of the potential risks of fishing in newly ice-free waters for which ecosystems are poorly understood (Kramer 2017). 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region 63

3.3.3 Marine Transportation

Marine transportation in the Bering Strait raises a wide variety of current and potential future shared governance issues. Some relate to preventing or mitigating potential adverse impacts of shipping, such as oil spills or disturbance to marine mammals. Others relate to coordination and support of marine shipping such as vessel traffic control, search and rescue, ice-breaking and port facilities. In considering these potential shared governance issues, it is important to understand both the kinds and extent of marine transportation which presently occur in the Bering Strait region, as well as how marine transportation in the region may change in the future. A wide range of marine transportation currently occurs in the Bering Strait region. Small freighters as well as tugs and barges deliver supplies and fuel to communities on both sides of the Bering Strait region. The Strait is transited by ships supplying Russian Arctic ports and Alaska developments like the oil fields at Prudhoe Bay and elsewhere along the North Slope of Alaska, and bulk carriers transporting ore from the Red Dog Mine in northwestern Alaska.8 Russian and US coast guard vessels and naval vessels (including nuclear-powered submarines) have also been transiting the Bering Strait on a regular basis. By 2012, the number of total recorded transits of the Bering Strait was approaching 500 per year, doubling the number from 2008. In recent years, between 18 (2015) and 28 (2017, of which 8 were under foreign flag) vessels have transited the Russian Northern Sea Route, and small numbers of cruise and other vessels have transited the Northwest Passage. Note that in recent years these vessels have accounted for a relatively small share of total vessel traffic in the Bering Strait region. A recent study9 analyzed vessel traffic analyzed Automatic Identification System (AIS) data from 2013–2015 for the Bering Strait region to derive detailed information about the kinds of vessels currently operating in the Bering Strait region and the corresponding potential exposure to oil spills that they represent. The study found that while fishing vessels were most common, tankers and bulk carriers made up most of the larger deep draft vessels (Table 3.6). Due to the extensive use of barges to serve ports on the U.S. side, tugs are far more prevalent there than in Russian waters. Similarly, fishing vessels are more common on the Russian side where there is less sea ice coverage and different fishing rules. What is most relevant for shared governance concerns is not how many vessels operate in the Bering Strait region, but how long they are there, what they are doing, what kinds of cargo and fuel they are carrying, and other factors affecting the risks they may pose (such as for oil spills), the enforcement needs that they may represent

8 Among the more extraordinary visions for the region are recurrent suggestions for a rail link between Asia and North America using a tunnel, bridge, or some combination of the two to cross the Bering Strait. 9 The study, conducted by Nuka Research for the Ocean Conservancy, analyzed tracks of 532 unique vessels operating for a total of 18,321 days in the area, combined with data about the characteristics of the vessels (Fletcher et al. 2016). 64 G. Knapp and V. Kryukov

(such as for commercial fishing), and other support needs that they may pose (such as for search and rescue). The above-mentioned study estimated the weighted oil exposure (based on the volume and type of oil carried by different vessels and the time they spend in the region) as shown in Table 3.7. Note that tankers delivering fuel to US ports account for a much higher percentage of estimated “weighted oil exposure” than other vessels operating in the region. There is significant international attention to and interest in the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR is administered by the Russian Federation and subject to Russian policies regarding the terms and conditions applicable to ships desiring to use the NSR. The NSR has been used for various purposes, including resupply of remote communities located along the Ob-Irtysh, Yenesei, and Lena Rivers, since the mid-twentieth century. In fact, the volume of shipping plying the NSR was higher in Soviet times than it is today. Nevertheless, Russia is interested in increasing the volume of traffic making use of the route in the foreseeable future and there is a lively debate about the prospects for commercial shipping along the NSR within the international community of ship-builders and commercial operators (Gunnarsson 2013).

Table 3.6 Numbers of vessels operating in the Bering Strait Region, 2013–2015 Cargo: Cargo: Area of operation Activity bulk other Tankers Total Vessels operating in the Russian fisheries 143 16 159 Russian zone Calling at Russian 31 1433 326 1790 ports Transiting 29 270 135 434 Total 60 1846 477 2383 Vessels operating in the US Serving red dog 668 6 76 750 zone mine Calling at U.S. 840 641 1481 ports Transiting 3 100 9 112 Total 671 946 726 2343 Note: Data exclude tugs, barges and military vessels Source: Fletcher et al. (2016)

Table 3.7 Estimated “weighted oil exposure” attributed to Bering Strait marine shipping, 2013–15 Percentage of overall weighted oil Type of vessel activity exposure Tankers calling at U.S. ports or lightering to barges 46% Vessels calling at Alaska red dog mine 19% Vessels transiting through the study area 13% Cargo vessels calling at Russian ports in study area 5% All other vessel activity (including cargo vessels calling 10% at U.S. ports) Source: Fletcher et al. (2016), page vi 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region 65

What can be said about the prospects for commercial shipping along the NSR during the near future and what are the implications for needs for governance in the BSR? Under any circumstance, much of the shipping along this route will involve the resupply of communities in northern Russia. Such activities will not lead to a sizable increase in transits through the Bering Strait. A prominent focus of attention among those interested in the NSR is the fact that the route offers a significantly shorter passage between Europe and the Far East than through the Suez and Panama Canals, possibly becoming an attractive option for commercial shippers engaged in international commerce. The prevailing view today, however, is that shipping companies (e.g., Maersk) that operate large container ships will not find the NSR attractive during the foreseeable future. There are several reasons for this, including the fact that the:

(i) NSR cannot accommodate the very large container ships (those capable of carrying 10,000–20,000 TEUs) now becoming the mainstays of the industry; (ii) sea and weather conditions in the NSR make it difficult to adhere to strict delivery schedules; and (iii) container ships normally call at ports to drop off and pick up containers located along their normal routes (Brigham 2013).

This leaves the prospect of bulk carriers transporting oil and gas or minerals from the Russian Arctic to international destinations as the use of the NSR most likely to produce a growing number of transits of the Bering Strait. The prospects for this sort of traffic are difficult to foresee because they are subject to market forces (e.g., fluctuations in world market prices for oil), they are affected by the impact of geopolitical developments (e.g., relations between Russia and China regarding the production and shipment of oil), and there are alternative means of transportation (e.g., pipelines) that may affect the demand for marine transportation in some cases. Even so, there is reason to anticipate some increase in transits through the Bering Strait arising from the extraction of energy resources. It is realistic to expect that Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) tankers, carrying natural gas from the new port of Sabetta located on the Yamal Peninsula in northwestern Siberia to destinations in East Asia, will ply these waters during the summer and fall within a few years (Pumphrey 2015). It is possible that energy resources extracted from reserves located farther to the east in Siberia will be transported by tanker during within the next couple of decades. All in all, it can be expected that LNG and oil tankers will transit the Bering Strait in increasing numbers during the foreseeable future, though the totals will be well below what would be expected if the NSR were to become attractive to container ships. Another potential source of future growth in Bering Strait region shipping is mining within the region as well as farther north, east and west in the Russian and American Arctic. The mineral deposits located in northwestern Alaska and the Russian Far East are substantial. Still, the actual effects of mining on the BSR and the resultant needs for governance are just as difficult to anticipate as they are in the case of oil and gas development. 66 G. Knapp and V. Kryukov

As discussed above, the most significant mining operation currently underway in the Bering Strait region is the Red Dog mine. Ore from the mine is stockpiled at the coast throughout the year and shipped south via bulk carriers during the 3-month navigation season Every ship engaged in this effort passes through the Bering Strait twice, once enroute to the site and again loaded with ore, and these ships represent a significant share of total Bering Strait shipping and “weighted oil exposure” (Tables 3.7 and 3.8). There has been considerable discussion of expanding the current operation, depending on trends in world demand for zinc and lead and on the prospect that diminishing sea ice in the area will increase the length of the navigation season in the BeSR. A more elaborate port facility located on the coast is a possibility. However, there are no immediate plans for expansion of the mine or the port (Conley et al. 2017). It is clear that the Russia Far East is another source of substantial deposits of valuable minerals (Kryukov 2014). Efforts are underway to develop some of these deposits, but none of these minerals are being extracted currently in commercially significant quantities, due to the complicated regulatory regime covering such activities as well as to the uncertain state of world market prices for some of the relevant minerals. It is also unclear what role bulk carriers would play in transporting these commodities, even if large-scale development does go forward. Nevertheless, the movement of minerals from the Russian Far East could become another source of increased activity in the BSR, even though the actual mine sites are unlikely to be located in the region itself. In 2015, the U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS) released a 10-year projection of maritime activity in the U.S. Arctic Region (Azarra et al. 2015). The study reviewed a wide variety of factors which might affect future Bering Strait transits, including the extent of potential future Arctic mineral and oil and gas development, global shipping growth, and the potential for diversion of international shipping to Arctic routes from the Suez and Panama Canal routes, and made assumptions about how these factors might affect the number of vessels operating in and transits of the Bering Strait. Table 3.8 summarizes these projections.

Table 3.8 Projections of Bering Strait Vessels and Transits in 2025 Other assumptions 2013 baseline Diversion assumptions∗ Low Medium High Transits 440 No 877 1337 1774 Yes 1093 1876 2637 Vessels 239 No 420 640 849 Yes 523 898 1262 Transits % change No 150% 325% 500% Yes 100% 200% 300% Vessels % change No 75% 170% 255% Yes 120% 275% 430% Source: Azarra et al., A 10-Year Projection of Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region (2015) aAssumptions about whether diversion of Suez and Panama canal shipping to Arctic routes does or does not include container ships 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region 67

Under even the most conservative combinations of assumptions, the number of vessels and transits is projected to nearly double by 2025. However, the report cau- tions that “the probability of any of these combinations [of assumptions] occurring in the next decade is unknown and depends heavily on economic factors, policies, and investment for both natural resources and shipping as well as environmental and climate factors.” Another recent study of shipping in the Arctic and the Bering Strait region reached a similar conclusion: “The future of destination and trans-Arctic shipping through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Bering Sea region remains unclear and largely dependent on global commodity prices and lack of regional infrastructure, which drives transport costs. Despite these rational economic realities, state-driven economic development of the region combined with Asian markets hungry for new energy and mineral resources will continue to test usage of the NSR, necessitating improvements in safety and domain awareness in the Bering Strait” (Conley et al. 2017).

3.3.4 Marine Tourism

Until very recently, there had been little ship-based tourism in or transiting the Bering Strait region. Cruise ship tourism was limited by a combination of factors, ranging from ice to the absence of port facilities and search and rescue capacity. Most cruise ships operating in the region have been smaller “expeditionary vessels” carrying only a few hundred passengers. Large cruise ships without ice-strengthened hulls had not generally operated in these waters. The northernmost point of interest for ship-based tourism in the western Arctic had been St. Matthew Island, an unin- habited island with abundant wildlife populations, lying somewhat to the south of the southern boundary of the BSR. Between 2006 and 2015, the number of cruise ship port calls at Nome—the largest port in the Alaska Bering Strait region—ranged from 2 to 8, with the number of total passengers ranging from 308 to 1218 (McDowell Group 2016). What is the potential for future growth in marine tourism in the Bering Strait region? Recent voyages have demonstrated that it is technically feasible for even large cruise ships to travel through the Bering Strait. In August and September of 2016 Crystal Cruises’ luxury cruise ship Crystal Serenity, carrying about 1000 passengers and 600 crew, transited the Northwest Passage from west to east, escorted by the icebreaker RRS Ernest Shackleton (chartered from the British Antarctic Survey) (Lovitt 2014). The ship returned for a second, similar cruise in 2017 (Crystal Cruises 2017). Regent Seven Seas canceled a planned 2017 cruise, citing potential delays due to ice conditions that might affect other later-season cruises (Silverstein 2016). However, it is somewhat hard to envision significant growth of marine tourism attractions and visits in and north of the BSR itself, even if changing ice conditions lengthen the navigation season and make the area safer for larger vessels. Obstacles include high costs (and resulting high prices); lack of ports and other infrastructure; risks associated with lack of search and rescue capacity and the infrastructure to support search and rescue operations, and lack of opportunities to see charismatic 68 G. Knapp and V. Kryukov wildlife or visit communities. The North Atlantic offers more varied, developed and easier access to the Arctic, in Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Norway and Russia. Thus it seems likely that marine tourism in the region will grow relatively slowly and will remain a relatively small share of total vessel traffic in the region (Ortner 2016).

3.3.5 Offshore Energy Development

Another source of potential future increased ship transits through the Bering Strait, along with other shared governance issues, involves the prospect of energy development in the Chukchi Sea and (perhaps less likely) in the Beaufort Sea (Macalister 2015; Myers 2015). The well-known 2006 assessment carried out by the United States Geological Survey assigned a high probability to the discovery of large recoverable reserves of oil in the offshore area adjacent to the North Slope of Alaska (U.S. Department of the Interior 2006). Since then, planning for the exploration and potential development of these reserves, and a major exploratory effort by Royal Dutch Shell, have become a focal point of controversy between those who favor development and a wide range of environmental groups both within the United States and beyond. The authority to make decisions regarding the opening of this area for exploration lies with the United States federal government. The United States has held lease sales in parts of the Chukchi Sea and Beaufort Seas and has authorized the initiation of exploratory efforts, subject to a range of regulatory provisions relating to the equipment to be used in this effort and the rules regarding offshore activities in this area. So far, Royal Dutch Shell has been the principal corporate player in this realm and the Chukchi Sea has been the principal focus of attention regarding exploratory work. Within the area under United States jurisdiction, Shell resumed its effort to locate large-scale reserves of oil in the Chukchi Sea during 2015, following an abortive effort in 2012. However, in September 2015, Shell announced that it “will cease exploration in Arctic waters off Alaska’s coast following disappointing results from an exploratory well backed by billions in investment and years of work” (Joling 2015, Krauss and Reed 2015, Johnson 2015). According to a company spokesman, while the company “continues to see important exploration potential in the basin, and the area is likely to ultimately be of strategic importance to Alaska and the US,” it would “cease further exploration activity in offshore Alaska for the foreseeable future. This decision reflects both the Burger J well result, the high costs associated with the project, and the challenging and unpredictable federal regulatory environment in offshore Alaska” (Macalister 2015; Krauss and Reed 2015). It is worth noting that even an exploratory effort such as that undertaken by Shell has profound consequences for the BSR. In preparation for its 2015 program, for example, Shell assembled a flotilla composed of two large drill rigs, 28 support vessels, and 7 aircraft (Bradner 2015). Both drill rigs and all support vessels must transit the Bering Strait at least twice, once going north to reach the exploration site 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region 69 and again going south at the end of the season. Should problems arise with individual vessels or resupply become necessary, the number of transits of the Bering Strait would increase. This level of traffic pertains only to the exploration stage of development. Should the effort proceed to the production stage in the Chukchi Sea and/or the Beaufort Sea, vessel traffic in the BSR would increase substantially. What is the likely trajectory of this development during the foreseeable future? Shell paid around $2 billion for oil leases off the north coast of Alaska. It has spent around $5 billion on efforts to locate oil in this area (Pagnamenta 2015). Even for a company the size of Shell, this represents a major stake, especially during a period characterized by sharp declines in the world market price of oil. The lead time between exploration and production of oil to be transported to southern markets can be as long as 10–20 years. In addition, it is likely that any oil produced in this area would be transferred by subsea pipeline to Prudhoe Bay and then shipped south via the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. Numerous factors affecting the future of oil development in this area are at play. The State of Alaska, heavily dependent on oil revenue, is a strong advocate of offshore development in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. Some local governments (e.g., the North Slope Borough in Alaska) relying heavily on revenue derived from oil development while at the same time being sensitive to impacts on subsistence resources and cultural integrity, are deeply divided regarding the issue. The United States federal government is conflicted regarding offshore oil development. The Obama Administration approved Shell’s plans in general terms, but specific agencies (e.g., the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM)) have insisted on a rigorous application of relevant regulatory requirements to Shell’s efforts. In the meantime, the environmental community (ranging from local “kayakivists” in Seattle to major international environmental non-governmental organizations) expressed outrage at this development and targeted Shell as a focus of opposition. The world market for oil, which is highly volatile in the short run, is impossible to forecast with any confidence over the next 10–30 years. As of early 2018, 2 years after Shell’s announcement, political and economic winds affecting U.S. offshore Arctic energy development had shifted again. The Trump administration had directed the Interior Department to lift a temporary ban on Arctic oil and gas leasing imposed by the Obama Administration (Dennis and Mufson 2016; Eiperin and Dennis 2017), and oil prices were rebounding. However, the huge costs and long timelines associated with offshore Arctic development suggest that the industry is unlikely to respond with significant new exploration efforts in the Chukchi Sea unless they are confident that these political and economic shifts will be long-lasting, which remains uncertain. Thus, the scale and timeline of future offshore energy development for the BSR are difficult to foresee with any precision. The scale of Shell’s exploratory effort is not only significant in its own right; it also provides clear evidence that offshore energy development north of the Bering Strait could have profound effects on the extent and variety of human activities taking place in the BSR. At the same time, Shell’s decision to terminate its exploratory drilling may mean that there will be no offshore energy development north of the BSR for years to come. 70 G. Knapp and V. Kryukov

3.4 Conclusions

Historically, extreme remoteness and cold have left the Bering Strait region sparsely populated and economically undeveloped. Defining characteristics of the Bering Strait Region are its cold climate and extreme remoteness from national and international economic and population centers. Reflecting these characteristics, costs are very high and infrastructure is minimal. Economies are undeveloped, and based primarily on mining and government. Population densities are very low. A high proportion of residents are Natives for whom subsistence hunting and fishing remain important sources of food. Environmental, economic, political and technological factors are likely to bring increased economic activity to the region—although the timing and scale of future economic change are difficult to predict. Economic activities most likely to grow include marine transportation; onshore and offshore mineral and hydrocarbon development; land-based and cruise ship tourism; commercial fishing; and government services and infrastructure needed to support economic and population growth. The timing and scale of different kinds of growth will depend—to varying extents— on how rapidly and significantly summer and winter ice conditions change both within the region and in the Arctic; the extent of future resource discoveries; and the extent to which the Russian and American governments make development of the region an economic and strategic priority. Significant economic activities in the Bering Strait region for which shared governance issues are currently or likely to become important include marine subsistence, marine transportation, offshore oil and gas development, commercial fishing, and cruise ship tourism. These industries vary significantly in the nature of the shared governance issues they give rise to. Some (particularly offshore oil and gas development and marine transportation) are potential sources of environmental pollution. Others (particularly marine subsistence and commercial fishing) could potentially be affected by environmental pollution. For some (particularly commercial fishing and marine transportation) there will likely be increasing need for management of shared living resources. For almost all there will be growing potential to benefit from cooperation in resource management enforcement, safety, disaster response and/or logistical support. Table 3.9 summarizes major potential future economic drivers, their causes, and resulting shared governance issues in the Bering Strait Region, listed in approximate order of likelihood and significance. Although shared governance issues are important for the Bering Strait region, they are not the only or necessarily the most important issues facing the region or affecting its economic future. The marine activities which are most likely to raise shared governance issues tend to be of relatively greater non-local economic significance, with a relatively greater share of labor, investment and control coming from outside the region than from within the region. In contrast, the most important current economic activities for the local economies on both sides of the Bering Strait are land-based and are unlikely to raise shared governance issues. They include, for example, government and local services such as health care, which account for a 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region 71

Table 3.9 Major potential economic drivers of shared governance issues in the Bering Strait Region Economic drivers and causes Resulting shared governance needs Increased marine transportation due to growth in Cooperation in vessel monitoring, Northern Sea Route shipping, resource development search and rescue, and environmental in and north of the Bering Strait, and growth within enforcement the region Increased commercial fishing as fishery resource Allocation of shared fishery resources abundance increases and access improves Cooperation in regulatory enforcement, search and rescue, and research Increased offshore and onshore resource Allocation of offshore resources development in and north of the region driven by Cooperation in environmental growing global demand, improved access, and monitoring, regulation of air and water technological change pollution, and oil spill response Increased tourism due to improved access, improved Cooperation in infrastructure infrastructure, and growing demand for adventure development, marketing, and search tourism and rescue large share of employment and income. On both sides of the Bering Strait, future economic development will continue to be driven primarily by national, regional and local economic and political choices which will have minimal direct or indirect effects on their neighbors across the Bering Strait. As they have for most of the past century, these regions will likely continue to have relatively limited economic interaction, either directly or indirectly as a result of the resources they share.

References

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Julie Raymond-Yakoubian and Eduard Zdor

Abstract The Bering Strait Region is the homeland and current home to Inupiaq, Yu’pik, St. Lawrence Island Yupik, Siberian Yupik and Chukchi people, as well as the contemporary home to non-Indigenous residents. The traditional subsistence practices and Traditional Knowledge of the region’s Indigenous people are key factors in the maintenance of cultural identity and food security. Climate change, vessel traffic, research activities, tourism, co-management, and infrastructure are among the many challenges and opportunities faced by region communities today. In particular, the loss of sea ice is a current and growing problem that contributes to food insecurity and creates risks to the health and well-being of Indigenous communities. Governance actions should support the maintenance of healthy communities, ecosystems and economies; should actively assist in promoting access to subsistence resources; and should enhance the ability and capacity of Tribes and Indigenous communities to enact self-governance.

4.1 Introduction

The Bering Strait region is a culturally and biologically diverse area that has been used by humans for millennia. This region is the setting for massive marine mammal migrations throughout the year and is seasonally covered with sea ice. The Bering Strait region is also the homeland and current home to Inupiaq, Yu’pik, St.

J. Raymond-Yakoubian (*) Social Science Program, Kawerak, Inc., Nome, AK, USA e-mail: [email protected] E. Zdor Department of Anthropology, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Fairbanks, AK, USA

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 75 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_4 76 J. Raymond-Yakoubian and E. Zdor

Fig. 4.1 Map of communities

Lawrence Island Yupik, Siberian Yupik and Chukchi people, as well as the contemporary home to non-Indigenous residents (Fig. 4.1: Map of communities). People have occupied and moved through the Bering Strait region for over 10,000 years (e.g. West 1996; Hoffecker and Elias 2003). Bowhead whales, ice seals, walruses, birds and other animals live in and travel through the Strait (see Chap. 2) and are important components of the cultural traditions and ways of life of region residents. The Bering Strait region includes the major islands and navigational features of Big Diomede Island, Little Diomede Island, King Island, Sledge Island, St. Lawrence Island, and Fairway Rock.

4.2 Bering Strait Region of the United States

There are 20 year-round occupied coastal communities on the U.S. side of the Bering Strait (see Fig. 4.1), all within the State of Alaska. From north to south these communities are: Point Hope, Kivalina, Kotzebue, Deering, Shishmaref, Diomede, Wales, Brevig Mission, Teller, Koyuk, Nome, Golovin, Elim, Shaktoolik, Gambell, Savoonga, Unalakleet, St. Michael, Stebbins, and Nunam Iqua. Several other communities are located just inland from the coast in this area. There are a vast number of fish camps, hunting camps, berry and plant gathering areas, shelter cabins and other frequently used locations along the coast, as well. Over 50% of the residents 4 Sociocultural Features of the Bering Strait Region 77

Fig. 4.2 Spring seal hunting off the coast of Alaska. This hunter is beginning to process an ugruk (bearded seal). (Credit: Brandon Ahmasuk) of each of these communities are Alaska Native1, 2. In most communities at least 90% of the population is Alaska Native (DCCED 2017) (Fig. 4.2). There are three distinct areas within the Bering Strait; a portion of the Northwest Arctic Borough, the Nome Census Area (unincorporated), and a portion of the Kusilvak Census Area (unincorporated). Nome and Kotzebue are the largest communities in the region, each with over 3000 residents. They are ‘hubs’ for transportation, healthcare, and other services. Unalakleet (population 680) is a sub-regional hub for transportation, education and other services. Outside of the larger hub communities, villages in the region range in size from approximately 100 people to approximately 680, with many having approximately 300 residents (DCCED 2017). The Bering Strait region of Alaska is remote and most communities are difficult to access. None of the region communities are reachable by road from outside the region and must be accessed by passenger jet (Kotzebue and Nome) from Anchorage, or via small plane from one of the regional hubs. Intra-region transportation is primarily via small planes, snowmachines, or small boats, and also via helicopter

1 Alaska Native people are the Indigenous people of Alaska. Non-Alaska Native people do not have Indigenous heritage in Alaska. 2 U.S. Census data does not separate out Alaska Native from American Indian, but rather has a category of “American Indian and Alaska Native Alone” (US Census Bureau 2017). The census also reports on individuals that checked more than one ethnicity as “Two or More Races.” In most communities in the Bering Strait the numbers from these categories represent individuals with Alaska Native heritage. 78 J. Raymond-Yakoubian and E. Zdor for the community of Diomede. Some villages have water and sewer infrastructure, others do not have running water and residents must haul their own drinking water and use “honey buckets.” Medical services are limited in the smaller communities to village clinics, while Nome and Kotzebue have larger hospitals and more medical and behavioral health staff. Most commercial goods, including gasoline and home heating fuel, are delivered via small barges during the ice-free summer months. Connections between Russian Federation communities in Chukotka and Alaskan villages in the U.S. are deep. Communities exist across borders through family ties and cultural connections (e.g. Kawerak 2009). Physical visits between relatives are infrequent (due to cost of transportation, among other factors), though visa-free travel now exists for Indigenous residents of the region (under the Intergovernmental Agreement Concerning Mutual Visits by Inhabitants of the Bering Strait Region). Regular communications between communities in Chukotka and Alaska are also relatively infrequent. Nome has one radio station that transmits some programming in Russian and their broadcasts reach Chukotka. Organizations like the Inuit Circumpolar Council and its member organizations (e.g. in Alaska and Chukotka) have semi-regular contact. Many individuals also, of course, try to maintain contact with family members across the border in various ways (e.g. email, social media, telephone, written correspondence). In Alaska, there are 229 federally recognized Tribes. All of the communities noted above are affiliated with at least one federally recognized Tribe. Federally recognized Tribes have a government-to-government relationship with the United States and have Tribal sovereignty as granted by various treaties, acts of Congress, Executive Orders, federal administrative agreements and court decisions.

4.3 Distinctive Cultural Features of the US Side of the Bering Strait

Alaska Native residents of the Bering Strait region are primarily Inupiaq, Yup’ik and Saint Lawrence Island Yupik people. These three distinct cultures all call the region – its marine waters, islands and mainland – their homeland. Each culture has its own language and local dialects, its own traditions of spirituality, and its own relationship to the land and animals, though there are also many shared beliefs, experiences, and practices across cultures and communities. An important way that Alaska Native individuals and communities maintain their nutritional, economic, spiritual, and cultural well-being is by long-term, sustained interactions with ecosystems, through subsistence practices. Activities that may interrupt or disrupt these interactions and connections have the potential to cause extreme harm. Subsistence hunting, fishing and gathering remain key aspects of contemporary life in Alaskan Bering Strait communities (Fig. 4.3) (e.g., Raymond-Yakoubian 2013; Kawerak 2013a, b; Oceana and Kawerak 2014, B. Raymond-Yakoubian et al. 2014a; J. Raymond-Yakoubian et al. 2014b; Kawerak 2014; Raymond-Yakoubian and Raymond-Yakoubian 2015; Raymond-Yakoubian 2019). Alaska Native people harvest a variety of marine mammals such as bowhead whales, beluga whales, 4 Sociocultural Features of the Bering Strait Region 79

Fig. 4.3 Spring hunting in changing environmental conditions. These Nome-area hunters are walking on ice that has been flooded by spring melt water. (Credit: Brandon Ahmasuk)

bearded seals, spotted seals, polar bears, and others. These traditional harvests and practices are permitted under the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Communities also harvest large amounts of fish and invertebrates from marine waters including salmon, halibut, clams, crab and numerous other species. Other marine resources such as seaweed, sea peaches and other species are gathered in nearshore waters or on beaches. Fall (2016) has recently estimated the per capita amount of wild foods harvested across Alaska, including the Bering Strait area. As one example, Northwest Arctic Borough residents harvest approximately 104 pounds of marine mammals per capita, Nome Census District residents harvest approximately 226 pounds of marine mammals per capita, and the residents of the Kusilvak Census District harvest approximately 37 pounds of marine mammals per capita (Fall 2016). The right and ability to practice unique subsistence ways of life is critical to the identities, well-being, and sustainability of Alaska Native people and communities in the Bering Strait. It is also crucial to the intergenerational transmission and practice of Traditional Knowledge. Subsistence can be understood as encompassing “hunting and gathering related activities which have a deep connection to history, culture, and tradition, and which are primarily understood to be separate from commercial activities” (Raymond-Yakoubian et al. 2017: 133). Traditional knowledge can be defined as 80 J. Raymond-Yakoubian and E. Zdor

a living body of knowledge which pertains to explaining and understanding the universe, and living and acting within it. It is acquired and utilized by indigenous communities and individuals in and through long-term sociocultural, spiritual and environmental engagement. TK is an integral part of the broader knowledge system of indigenous communities, is transmitted intergenerationally, is practically and widely applicable, and integrates personal experience with oral traditions. It provides perspectives applicable to an array of human and non-human phenomena. It is deeply rooted in history, time, and place, while also being rich, adaptable, and dynamic, all of which keep it relevant and useful in contemporary life. This knowledge is part of, and used in, everyday life, and is inextricably intertwined with peoples’ identity, cosmology, values, and way of life. Tradition – and TK – does not preclude change, nor does it equal only ‘the past’; in fact, it inherently entails change (ibid.).

Traditional Knowledge, and all that it encompasses, is of value to the communities that produce and maintain it, and is also of great value to humanity as a whole. Because of its long-term and place-based nature, Traditional Knowledge can and has provided valuable insights into the functioning of large ecosystems, for example. Traditional Knowledge can teach us about the various components of ecosystems and what can happen if the links between those components are broken or otherwise disturbed. This information is crucial when considering how, for example, increased vessel traffic and marine noise may impact marine mammal populations. In Alaska villages, there are typically three bodies with governance authority; the City Council, Village Corporation Board, and Tribal Council. Each community operates differently and the distribution of power between these bodies can vary. Tribal Councils frequently are considered the authority on matters relating to subsistence and culture. Village corporations, established under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, are the owners and managers of land surrounding most villages. City Councils typically govern matters associated with utilities, elections, and road maintenance, for example.

4.4 Issues of Interest for the Indigenous Residents of the US Side of the Bering Strait

This section focuses on some of the many issues that are of concern and interest to the Indigenous, Alaska Native residents of the US side of the Bering Strait. Achieving and maintaining food security is a chief concern for Bering Strait communities. The Inuit Circumpolar Council-Alaska (ICC-Alaska) has defined food security through work with some of the communities in the region. Food security can be defined as

the natural right of all Inuit to be part of the ecosystem, to access food and to care-take, protect and respect all of life, land, water and air. It allows for all Inuit to obtain, process, store and consume sufficient amounts of healthy and nutritious preferred food – foods physically and spiritually craved and needed from the land, air and water, which provide for families and future generations through the practice of Inuit customs and spirituality, languages, knowledge, policies, management practices and self-governance (ICC-Alaska 2015:31). 4 Sociocultural Features of the Bering Strait Region 81

Food security, as defined by ICC Alaska is holistic and includes concepts such as sharing, connections to culture and identity, relationship to place and decisionmaking power. As this definition illustrates, food security is a multi-dimensional and complex concept that is closely connected to issues of ecosystem health and sustainability. Maintenance of healthy ecosystems is of high priority for Indigenous residents of the region (e.g. Gadamus 2013). There are many factors or ‘drivers’ that can lead to or contribute to both food security and insecurity (ICC-Alaska 2015). Vessel traffic in the Arctic is a major issue of interest for Indigenous Bering Strait residents. Vessel activity, from commercial shipping activities, research vessels, pleasure vessels, fuel delivery barges, oil and gas exploration, and other activities, has the potential to greatly impact the marine ecosystem and the communities that rely upon it. Specific concerns relate to pollution, oil or other hazardous materials spills, noise and its impact on marine mammals, interactions between large vessels and small boats, communication and monitoring systems, among others (Kawerak 2015, 2016, 2017; Raymond-Yakoubian and Raymond-Yakoubian 2017). Communities are also concerned about these same vessel traffic issues on the Russian Federation side of the Bering Strait. These concerns are directly tied to food security. For example, noise from vessel traffic has the potential to shift behavior patterns in marine mammals. This could cause animals to avoid places they have traditionally been found and harvested and instead move further away from communities making subsistence hunting much more difficult. Communities also feel as though they have little ability to control or effect vessel traffic or the regulations that govern it. There is also great anxiety about the ability of local governments, the Federal government, and the State of Alaska to effectively and quickly respond to any kind of spill or emergency. There is a lack of vessel-related infrastructure in the region to, for example, provide basic marine services. Increased vessel traffic may bring positive economic benefits to larger communities, like Nome, for example. Nome has an existing port and may upgrade its facility to handle larger ships as well as ship waste. Smaller communities will not have similar opportunities. Tourism, including vessel-based tourism is growing throughout the Arctic (AMSA 2009), including in the Bering Strait region of Alaska. The Port of Nome has had an increasing number of ‘dock calls’ in recent years, including increasing numbers of ‘pleasure vessels’, which includes cruise ships (personal communication, Port of Nome staff). In 2016 Nome was a stop on the tour of the vessel Crystal Serenity, the first cruise ship to transit the Northwest Passage. During its time in Nome, the vessel generated economic activity (though this has not been formally quantified) through local tours, a craft show scheduled specifically for ship passengers, and other purchases made while on land. It is very rare for other communities in the region to experience cruise ship or other significant tourist traffic. Nome also sees influxes of tourists during the birding season and during the Iditarod Sled Dog Race. The majority of the benefits from such tourism are localized in the Nome economy. These types of tourism have been generally welcomed, though concerns remain about cruise ships, in particular. Research activities, vessel-based or otherwise, are also a growing concern for Bering Strait residents. Research activities related to resource development, climate 82 J. Raymond-Yakoubian and E. Zdor change, fisheries and any number of other interests take place in the Bering and Chukchi Seas and adjacent coastal areas. Indigenous communities have long expressed their desire, and right, to be involved in research processes from the earliest stages of developing research questions through production of research projects, the use of research results, and research data policies (e.g. Raymond-Yakoubian and Raymond-Yakoubian 2017). Scientific collaborations already exist between some US and Russian Federation institutions, and these should be fostered and new ones should be developed. The US National Park Service’s Beringian Shared Heritage Program is one example of a program that encourages such research relationships (including community collaborations). The current status of formal co-management in the Bering Strait region of Alaska is disputed and in need of improvement. There are various marine mammal species that are managed under co-management agreements between Federal agencies and Alaska Native co-management bodies such as the Eskimo Walrus Commission and the Ice Seal Committee. Relationships between these agencies and co-management bodies are often tense because funding for the Alaska Native co-managers is frequently insufficient, equity in decision-making is lacking, and Traditional Knowledge is often not valued in the management process. Information about species harvest, health, and management (critical to co-management activities) can also often be difficult to obtain from the Russian Federation. Co-management of marine areas does not currently exist in the US waters of the Bering Strait, though there are a variety of specially-designated areas in the region. Region communities, including the Tribal governments of the region, have had very little involvement in the development, establishment and management of these areas (e.g. Raymond-Yakoubian 2016). In 2016 President Obama created, via Executive Order, the Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area (NBSCRA) (Federal Register 2016), which was later revoked by President Trump (Federal Register 2017). The NBSCRA had provisions for Tribal co-management of the Area, which would have been a large step forward in the acknowledgement of Tribal sovereignty, food security, and that the Bering Sea is the traditional territory of the Tribes living on its shores. Alongside co-management (of species or areas), the government-to-government consultation relationship between Tribes and the federal government is also considered to be poor, in most circumstances. Consultation is not always conducted, even when specifically requested by Tribes, and is often not carried out under the spirit or intent of Executive Order 13175 (Federal Register 2000) and other guidance. Consultation is required when federal actions may impact Tribal interests (see, e.g. ELI 2015, 2016). The concept of free, prior and informed consent should be utilized (as outlined in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and elsewhere) (UNGA 2007; UNFAO 2016) for all activities and actions that impact or may impact Indigenous people and communities. The Bering Strait, and areas adjacent to it, have been and are likely to be in the future, the site of great interest from offshore oil and gas exploration companies as well as land-based resource extraction entities. Red Dog mine, one of the largest 4 Sociocultural Features of the Bering Strait Region 83 zinc mines in the world, is located on the mainland of the region. Concerns related to resource development are very similar to concerns about vessel traffic; pollution, disturbance to animals that could impact subsistence harvests, responses to spills or other accidents, and related issues. The effects of climate change are being experienced in real-time by Bering Strait communities. Several communities in the region are planning or considering relocation efforts because of extreme erosion along their coastline that is damaging infrastructure and threatening the safety of residents. There have not been any full-scale community relocations conducted to-date. What the long term success and sustainability of such moves would be, from a social and cultural perspective (among others), remains unknown. Climate change is, of course, the driver that is facilitating heightened interest in and access to the Bering Strait region. Reduced sea ice cover and extent has allowed more and larger vessels into the region, has created a longer exploration and development window in marine waters, and has led to the expansion of habitat northward for some fish and animal species (e.g. Lauth et al.2017 ), as well as other changes. The northern portion of the Bering Strait is part of the Arctic Management Area (NPFMC 2009), where commercial fishing is currently prohibited. The southern portion of the Bering Strait is within the boundaries of the Northern Bering Sea Research Area (NMFS 2008), which currently prohibits bottom-trawl fisheries. However, with the drastic changes being experienced and predicted, currently prohibited commercial fisheries may try to gain access to these areas. Changes to climate, ecosystems, and management and policy regimes are having and will continue to have impacts to Alaska Native communities in the Bering Strait. For example, vessel conflicts with subsistence hunts have already been documented; pollution from unknown sources has been encountered on many occasions, including oiled wildlife; Endangered Species Act-related management actions have increased; exploration and development activities have resulted in safety concerns; and numerous and far-reaching ecosystem changes in sea ice, animals, and weather have been observed. In many cases, these changes have had negative impacts on Alaska Native people and communities or have, at minimum, raised grave concerns. In some cases, short-term employment has been generated by some of these developments (e.g. communications center jobs with Shell during their exploration work). While employment opportunities are welcome in a region that has some of the highest unemployment rates in the state (DLWD 2017), many opportunities are not long term or sustainable, and may not match local values.

4.5 Steps to Enhance the Sustainability of Alaskan Communities

There are steps that have been taken and which can be taken to enhance the sustainability of communities, and particularly of Indigenous communities, in the Bering Strait region of Alaska. For communities in the region, protection of the resources they rely on for subsistence, and protection of the marine ecosystem, are of the utmost importance. 84 J. Raymond-Yakoubian and E. Zdor

In terms of vessel traffic and safety issues, Bering Strait Tribes (and other Indigenous people and communities) need representation at the International Maritime Organization (IMO). No Indigenous organizations currently have status at the IMO; though Alaska Native organizations have brought Indigenous representatives to that body through collaborations with conservation organizations. The IMO is the most important international rule-making body for maritime safety and vessel operating standards. Organizations like Kawerak3 now have staff dedicated to vessel traffic issues, have begun to attend and participate in vessel traffic-related meetings (at all levels), and are documenting and addressing Tribal concerns about vessel traffic and associated issues. Tribal organizations have proposed Areas To Be Avoided during comment on the Port Access Route Study for the Bering Strait. One of these areas (in the Strait itself) approaches the International Dateline, the other surrounds Saint Lawrence Island and could be extended further west into Russian Federation waters for further protections. Indigenous communities in the Russian Federation have not had the opportunity to be part of a similar process. A proposed “Two-Way Routes and Precautionary Areas in the Bering Sea and Bering Strait” document, jointly prepared by the US and Russian Federation, has also been recently submitted to the IMO (Russian Federation and United States 2017). Indigenous organizations were not involved in the creation of this document. Tribes have an active and vested interest in greater involvement in research activities that take place on or in their traditional lands and waters, which have the potential to impact their communities or resources, or which involves their Tribal members or knowledge (e.g. Raymond-Yakoubian and Raymond-Yakoubian 2017). All bodies that conduct research (scientists, agencies, funders, others) should include Indigenous people at all stages and levels of their research activities. Tribes should have clearly defined roles regarding the review and approval of research activities. Scientific cooperation across borders is also crucial, and Indigenous people on both sides of the Bering Strait have expressed their and their respective country’s needs to have access to scientific data about the region. The 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation is an important step in this process (as is ensuring that it is carried out). The Agreement provides opportunities for cooperation and collaboration with Indigenous communities. Improvement of co-management relationships, and improvement of the government-to-government consultation relationships between Tribes and the federal government is required for sustainable communities. This would enhance Tribal and community sustainability by providing Tribes with additional control over decisions that impact their members, communities, traditional lands and waters, and resources. True, and equitable, decision-making power is difficult for Tribes to execute without formal recognition and without the government honoring the status of Tribes at all levels (state, federal and international). At a minimum, Alaska Native

3 Kawerak (www.kawerak.org) is the Alaska Native Tribal consortium for the Bering Strait region. The organization provides a variety of services to region residents such as childhood education, vocational rehabilitation, job training, land management, social science research, operation of a cultural center, and other activities. 4 Sociocultural Features of the Bering Strait Region 85 co-management bodies should be fully funded so that they can carry out the responsibilities of true co-managers. An overall restructuring of co-management, which would more equitably distribute power, has also been suggested for consideration. Infrastructure and capacity in the Bering Strait region of Alaska also need to be expanded and improved. Currently, there is very minimal oil and hazardous material spill response equipment deployed in the region (e.g. WCS 2014; Nuka 2016). The small communities of the region have very little capacity to respond to emergency situations, though most communities have existing volunteer Search and Rescue (SAR) teams. These SAR teams are highly skilled in operating in both the marine environment (including sea ice) and on land. Teams do not have training or equipment necessary to respond to large-scale emergency situations that may include hazardous materials or large numbers of people. Tribes are also in need of research- related capacity to review, engage in, monitor, and develop research projects. Recognition and equitable use of Traditional and Indigenous knowledge is crucial to all of these processes and actions. If Traditional Knowledge is not considered a valid source of information, on par with science, Tribes and Indigenous people will remain at a disadvantage in all policy, management and decision-making scenarios. Various international instruments and bodies recognize these knowledges (under various names), including the recent Arctic Scientific Cooperation agreement, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Arctic Council, and others. While recognized, in practice these knowledges and the people that hold them rarely receive equitable application or recognition. Increased bilateral cooperation, on all issues, are important opportunities to include and engage these knowledges and knowledge-holders. The Indigenous people and communities on the US and Russian Federation ‘sides’ of the Bering Strait have a long and connected history which has included, among other things, family ties, trading relationships, friendships, and unfettered movement across the region, until such activities and connections were prohibited, or simply made too difficult, by what became the United States and USSR (now Russian Federation) governments. We provided an overview of the US side of the Bering Strait, above, and now move to a description of the Russian Federation portion of the region.

4.6 Bering Strait Region of the Russian Federation

The unique natural features of the Bering Strait, located at the junction of the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, have shaped a distinctive human landscape over millennia. Indigenous groups of the region have demonstrated adaptability and cre- ativity in what is an extreme environment. The traditional activities of the Chukchi and Siberian Yupik include reindeer herding, marine mammal hunting, fishing, and hunting (Eskimo 2017). The ancestors of the Chukchi were wild reindeer hunters in the continental part of Chukotka during the period of 4000– 2000 BC (Vdovin 1965). 86 J. Raymond-Yakoubian and E. Zdor

The Chukchi focus on two main animals for their subsistence activities; reindeer and sea mammals. The Chukchi reindeer herders live in the interior continental part of Chukotka, and they call themselves “chav’chu” (reindeer people), while the inhabitants of the coasts call themselves “Ankal’yn” (maritime people). The culture of Siberian Yupik people was historically maritime-focused and based on sea hunting (Menovschikov 1959). Other activities included land hunting, fishing and gathering. Marine mammal hunting is currently still practiced in Chukotka. The main animals harvested are bowhead whales, gray whales, walruses, and seals.

4.7 Distinctive Cultural Features of the Russian Federation Side of the Bering Strait

The Yupik language is part of the Eskimo-Aleut language family. The Chukchi language is part of the Chukchi-Koryak group/family of Paleo-Asiatic languages. Today, the Yupik language is not spoken in everyday life and only one-third of Chukchi people speak their Indigenous language (Russian Census 2010). The contemporary language situation was affected both by the increase in contacts with non-Indigenous people, and by the educational policy in the USSR. Education in schools was conducted in Russian, whereas Indigenous languages were taught as a separate subject in primary school. In the twenty-first century, this system has not changed much. While in 2002 44% (5555) of Chukchi people spoke their native language, in 2010 only 28.8% (3662) of Chukchi people did. For the Yupik people, the language situation is directly opposite: in 2002, barely a sixth of Yupik people (or 15.4% (236)) spoke their native language (Russian Census 2002). In 2010 28.5% (436) of Yupik people stated that they spoke their Indigenous language. The increase in the number of people reporting to be Yupik speakers is most likely due to the revitalization of ethnic identity, influenced by the growing contacts between relatives on both sides of the Bering Strait. The Indigenous people of Chukotka who live in villages (as opposed to cities) still rely heavily on reindeer (for Chukchi people living inland), and marine mammals (for coastal Chukchi residents) as primary sources of food (Yamin-Pasternak et al. 2014). This includes the blood, organs, and fat of reindeer and marine mammals. Since ancient times, there has been a wide exchange of food products between the tundra and coastal residents of Chukotka. This exchange is reflected in oral traditions and stories. Indigenous people consume meat in boiled form, but fermented and dried foods are also widely consumed, as well as frozen raw meat and fish. In the preparation of food, the leaves and bark of young shoots of the polar willow, wild onions, and several species of sorrel, berries, and sea kale played a large role. Mollusks were also used. Traditional food still plays an important role in the daily diet of the Chukotka Indigenous population (Fig. 4.4). Food products are still stored in special meat pits—ice cellars, next to people’s homes. Most of the Indigenous people in Chukotka remain connected to the beliefs of their ancestors and practice ancient rituals (Vate 2005) and their beliefs could be characterized as animist (Ethnographic information 2017). In this belief system, spirits (good and evil) occupy individual places and phenomena of nature (e.g. the 4 Sociocultural Features of the Bering Strait Region 87

Fig. 4.4 A Chukchi woman processing plants for winter nutrition. (Credit: Vladimir Puya) masters of the mountains, forests, water, or fire), many animals (e.g. the whale, bear, and raven), the stars, the sun, and the moon. The mediators between spirits and people were shamans, who had a helper in the form of a kind spirit (Pimenova 2015). However, with the opening of the borders in the late twentieth century, Evangelical missionaries began to visit Chukotka (Oparin 2015). In the last decade, Orthodox Christianity has begun to play an increasingly prominent role in the contemporary life of coastal village residents due to the clericalism of everyday life. Despite the fact that shamanism was brutally destroyed during the Soviet period, the echo of this tradition is so strong that, even today, the elder members of families conduct rituals and ceremonies on family holidays and in the process of practicing subsistence. Reindeer herders and marine mammal hunters have a special designation for every season of traditional subsistence activity and unique practices that take place during those times (Yashchenko 2013). Many of these practices are carried out to attract good spirits to ensure well-being and sacrifices play an important role in this (Ethnographic information 2017). Reindeer herding Chukchi observe several such practices: slaughtering young reindeer in August, dividing reindeer herds in the spring in order to separate the females from bulls, the celebration of the “antlers” in the spring after calving, as well as others. The special practices of marine mammal hunters are also related to the subsistence calendar. The most important events are the Whale Festival, the first launching of the skin boat, and other family holidays. Sacrifices are common as a token of gratitude for a successful hunt. Today, these practices continue their existence in transformed ways. The traditional song and dance art of the Indigenous peoples is well developed. Almost every village has its own dance group in which adults and children participate, and regional cultural 88 J. Raymond-Yakoubian and E. Zdor festivals are held regularly. The practices and rituals that certain families and traditional collectives carry out (such as a reindeer herding camp, or a team of sea hunters) are important.

4.8 Issues of Interest for the Indigenous Residents of the Russian Federation Side of the Bering Strait

Indigenous peoples current status within the Russian Federation is a continuing issue of concern. In addition to the Russian Constitution, three federal laws establish the cultural, territorial and political rights of Indigenous peoples and protect “the small numbered Indigenous peoples.” The conditions of this status are that groups cannot have more than 50,000 members, must maintain a traditional way of life, must inhabit certain remote regions of Russia, and must identify as a distinct ethnic community. Crucially, the existing legislation does not acknowledge Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to their ancestral territories and they are not regarded as the owners of their ancestral lands. Based on their traditional occupancy, they are merely granted usufruct rights to hunt, fish, and herd their reindeer on the land (Indigenous peoples in Russia 2017), and they must obtain permits for whaling activities. Additionally, Russia has not ratified the ILO Convention 169, nor endorsed the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Though organizations of the Indigenous peoples of Chukotka, such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC-Chukotka), the Association of Traditional Marine Mammal Hunters of Chukotka (ChAZTO), and the Union of Reindeer Herders of Chukotka, regularly work with federal and international authorities, there is only one official international document signed by the Russian government, which endowed the Union of Marine Mammal Hunters to participate in the management of the Alaska-Chukotka polar bear population with the Alaska Nannut Co-management Council. The food of the majority of the Indigenous people in the villages comes from the sea and what is available at grocery stores, in approximately equal proportions. Despite the relative stability of what the sea gives and the store sells, the villagers are constantly wor- ried about whether there will be a migration of marine mammals and fish (Bogoslovskaya et al. 2016), and whether fresh fruits and vegetables will be brought to the local trading company. The high price of food is also of concern for village residents. The economy of communities focuses on the production and distribution of elec- trical and thermal energy and water, as well as the production of food, such as meat, dairy products, and baked goods (Chukotsky district 2017). The National Park “Beringia” has also begun to play a role in the economy. Traditional subsistence is incorporated into the economy of the region. Reindeer herders are engaged in two municipal agricultural enterprises, and three “state” collectives are engaged in aboriginal hunting. In fact, they were transformed by Soviet enterprises. Private reindeer herding was forcibly transferred to municipal ownership in the 2000s (Gray 2000, 2001). Only 200 hunters work in communities engaged in sea mammal hunting, receiving boats, weapons and wages. There are also several independent hunting communities that do not receive state support. Official sources report that the 4 Sociocultural Features of the Bering Strait Region 89 level of registered unemployment in the districts of the region is as follows: Providensky district, 7.94%; Chukotka District, 13.67% (Labor market 2017). Some experts assert that the real unemployment rate is about 2–3 times higher. There are multiple infrastructure challenges in Chukotka, including the current state of much of the residential housing in the region. For example, today in the Chukotsky region, housing for one resident is an average of only 16.9 square meters. And in some remote villages, people live in dilapidated, pre-crisis housing that cannot be demolished because there is no alternative (Chukotsky district 2017). Aviation is crucial to the movement of people and cargo inside and outside the region (Transport 2017). There is only one airline in the region and flights are often limited to one to two flights per week, and there is only one operational helicopter. Passenger vessel traffic to region ports is also quite limited. The traditional subsistence practices of Chukotka’s Indigenous people are a key factor in the preservation of cultural identity (Fig. 4.5). Sociocultural practices serve as markers of belonging to the Indigenous population, and contribute to the preservation of the values of the Chukchi and Yupik peoples (Arutyunov 2017). The Indigenous people of Chukotka historically possessed vast territories, rich in natural resources that supported their culture. During the Soviet period, the authorities granted them “equal” rights with the majority of the country’s population, but as a result, Indigenous peoples were deprived of their right to self-governance, and their rights to traditional territories and renewable natural resources were restricted and bureaucratized (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) https://www.iwgia.org/en/). Globalization has accelerated this process of alienation to such an extent that it threatens the identity of Indigenous peoples. The totality of the USSR crisis, the painful transformations of the transition period of the 1990s, and the flawed social and economic strategies of the past decades have caused a steady level of social diseases. The region has high levels of alcoholism, tuberculosis, and psychological disorders caused by unemployment, low wages, xenophobia and chauvinism, lack of housing, dysfunctional families, boarding schools, and other acts of acculturation (Kozlov et al. 2013; Oparin 2015). Climate change, particularly the loss of sea ice, is a current and growing problem that contributes to food insecurity and creates risks to the health of Indigenous peoples and the ability to practice cultural traditions. For example, the timing of the spring migration of walruses has shifted. Sometimes they pass so quickly that the villagers are not able to hunt them. In the summer, villagers are only able to harvest fish, because walrus have moved north to follow the sea ice (Bogoslovskaya et al. 2016). Changes in access to resources needed for subsistence, in combination with low incomes, pose large challenges for rural residents. Autumn hunting for walruses has also become unpredictable and unproductive due to the prolonged absence of sea ice, which forces walruses to concentrate at one or two places on the coast of Chukotka. The concentration of animals in a small area creates two main problems: only a few villages have the opportunity to harvest walruses to prepare food supplies for the winter, and the super concentration of marine mammals makes their population extremely vulnerable and leads to increased mortality as a result of the activity of predators, dogs, and humans. Additional factors of concern include aviation, shipping, and offshore activities. 90 J. Raymond-Yakoubian and E. Zdor

Fig. 4.5 Ready for whaling. Millennia-old traditions of Bering Strait Indigenous peoples have continued on to the present. (Credit: Vladimir Puya)

4.9 Steps to Enhance the Sustainability of Russian Federation Communities

Providing further recognition of Indigenous peoples in the Russian Federation, and endorsing additional protections for them, would be an important step for Indigenous rights and towards Indigenous governance. For example, Russian Federation ratification of ILO Convention 169 and endorsement of UNDRIP. The food security of Chukotka’s Indigenous people is currently limited by restrictions placed on them by the federal government. Allowing more local control over hunting and fishing rights and activities would improve the food security of Indigenous communities. For example, giving local control over the determination of harvest seasons. Additionally, economic opportunities and wage employment is limited in the region. Both of these factors – broad government restrictions on traditional subsistence activities, and limited opportunities for wage employment – limit the ability of Indigenous communities to enhance their food security and economic security (in fact, the two are tied together). Infrastructure improvements in the region would also likely lead to improved physical and mental health and an overall improvement in the well-being of Indigenous people in the region. As on the US side of the Bering Strait, coastal Chukotkan communities have little ability to respond to spills of oil or other hazardous materials, and additional capacity is needed in the form of infrastructure, materials and training. 4 Sociocultural Features of the Bering Strait Region 91

Indigenous peoples are trying to respond to challenges by pooling their efforts; they write appeals to the authorities and the world community, take part in regional, federal, and international meetings, work with the media, and in some cases create non-governmental organizations to protect their ways of life.

4.10 Conclusions

The Indigenous and non-Indigenous residents of the Bering Strait region, in both the US and the Russian Federation, have an abiding desire to maintain a healthy regional ecosystem, to have a voice in decisions that affect the region, and to be respected and valued members of their communities and the global community. Enhancing bilateral cooperation in the region will require a recognition of and engagement with the diverse peoples living there. Improving and facilitating communication between communities on both coasts of the Strait – including between individuals, subsistence practitioners, scientists, families, local governments and regional governments – will only strengthen our ability to cooperate and plan and carry out governance strategies that protect the ways of life of people living there and address the needs of the larger global community (Table 4.1). In order to be effective and sustainable, existing, as well as new, governance structures need to equitably incorporate Tribes and Indigenous communities. Any new governance tools need to be developed in collaboration with Tribes and Indigenous peoples of the region. Governance actions should support the maintenance of healthy communities, ecosystems and economies; should actively assist in promoting access to subsistence resources; and should enhance the ability and capacity of Tribes and Indigenous communities to enact self-governance. All of the potential actions discussed here, and others, would significantly contribute to the food security of, and thus the sovereignty, sustainability, and well-being of, Bering Strait communities. Achieving these goals will also contribute to maintaining cultural diversity in this region and in the Arctic. Cultural diversity is crucial to an adaptable Arctic; the more wisdom, perspectives, knowledges, histories and experiences available to us, the more likely we are to have the ability to develop solutions to the problems and difficulties that face all residents of the Arctic and those who care about the region.

Table 4.1 Crucial sociocultural considerations in future Bering Strait governance actions Crucial sociocultural considerations in future Bering Strait governance actions Food security is imperative to the well-being of communities, and negative anthropogenic impacts to the ecosystem or subsistence practices must be avoided or mitigated. The cultural identity of Indigenous people in the region must be maintained to protect the health and well-being of individuals, communities and the ecosystem. Indigenous people must be recognized as sovereign and must be empowered to equitably participate in decision making. The Traditional Knowledge of Bering Strait region Indigenous peoples should be utilized in governance actions in the region, with the cooperation and leadership of Indigenous peoples. 92 J. Raymond-Yakoubian and E. Zdor

References

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Abstract Drawing on the chapters dealing with the ecological, economic, and sociocultural systems of the Bering Strait Region, this chapter identifies key issues of governance arising in the region and makes use of our approach to informed decisionmaking for sustainability to guide thinking about options for addressing these issues. We identify two issues as priority concerns: (i) what will be the consequences of increased access to the region and the subsequent rise in the volume of commercial shipping and (ii) how will environmental changes affect the well-being of the region’s human residents? In each case, we examine data and evidence relevant to informed decisionmaking. We then identify options (without advocacy) that decisionmakers may consider in selecting responses to the priority issues in such a way as to maximize the achievement of sustainability.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 95 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_5 96 O. R. Young et al.

5.1 Introduction

What do the analyses set forth in Chaps. 2, 3, and 4 have to tell us about needs for governance in the Bering Strait Region that are now coming into focus or that may emerge as prominent concerns during the foreseeable future? Are some of these needs more urgent than others? Are there alternative ways to frame the key issues that will be of interest to policymakers responsible for matters of governance in the BeSR? What are the relative merits of initiatives targeting different venues that may be suitable for addressing these issues? Can we generate a range of options that policymakers may consider as they think about issues of governance in the BeSR? Are there linkages between or among these issues that ought to be taken into account in constructing institutions and associated infrastructure to respond to needs for governance in the region? Are there critical uncertainties that make it difficult to answer questions of this sort, and can analysts play constructive roles in identifying key uncertainties and marshaling data and evidence that can help to reduce them? Drawing on the contributions of the preceding chapters, this chapter applies our general approach to informed decisionmaking as presented in the Series Preface to provide some preliminary responses to these questions. The first two substantive sections deal with needs for governance. In keeping with our general approach, we start in Sect. 5.2 by identifying key questions about governance and proceed in Sect. 5.3 to a consideration of data and evidence relevant to responding to these questions. In this connection, we treat the BeSR as a distinct region linked in various ways to the outside world and concentrate on identifying emerging governance questions that involve issues extending beyond the range of measures that either the Russian Federation or the United States can adopt unilaterally. A major theme is the challenge of achieving sustainability at the regional level given the growing impact of external forces shaping the future of the BeSR. Section 5.4 addresses options for addressing those needs for governance likely to call for intentional responses in the near term. Central to this discussion is the distinction between institutional arrangements (often called regimes) and infrastructure along with an emphasis on the importance of combining regimes and infrastructure to create effective governance systems. To highlight their importance, we draw attention in Sect. 5.5 to issues of interplay among arrangements created to deal with distinct needs for governance in the BeSR. We pose the question of whether there are already or soon will be sufficient benefits arising from the development of an integrated governance system (often called a regime complex) for the BeSR to justify the effort required to create such a system. In the spirit of presenting options, we offer a preliminary account of a possible rationale for creating a Bering Strait Authority and consider steps that could be taken today to pave the way for the development of such an arrangement over the course of time. The concluding section turns to questions about governing the BeSR over the longer term and discusses the roles that analysts can play in reducing uncertainties that make such questions hard to address in a rigorous fashion. Throughout the chapter, we focus on exploring issues and options. Our goal is to make a constructive contribution to informed decisionmaking about matters of governance in the BeSR rather than to become advocates for particular courses of action 5 Governing the Bering Strait Region 97 in this realm. We recognize that policymakers must respond to a variety of pressures in making choices, that governance systems that look attractive on paper often prove disappointing in practice, and that high levels of uncertainty plague all efforts to make informed choices regarding responses to needs for governance. Nevertheless, we are convinced that informed decisionmaking is a worthy goal and that analysts can make a variety of contributions toward the fulfillment of this goal.

5.2 Governance Questions in the Bering Strait Region

What issues relating to governance on a regional scale are coming into focus today, and how will they evolve in the coming years? To respond to this question, the Arctic Options Project organized an intensive facilitated workshop in which a diverse group of participants sought to identify drivers of change in the BeSR likely to generate needs for governance on a regional scale (Arctic Options 2014). We asked participants to evaluate drivers in terms of several relevant criteria:

• Likelihood of occurrence (Low – Medium – High); • Spatial scale (Small – Medium – Large); • Temporal scale (Near-Term – Long-Term), and • Intensity (Minor – Major).

Among the 64 drivers identified, workshop participants ranked developments relating to sea ice and shipping as the most significant drivers of change in the BeSR (Table 5.1). While additional steps may be required to gauge the perspectives of Arctic stakeholder groups fully, sea ice and shipping seem certain to remain as key drivers of change, influencing the design and implementation of regimes and associated infrastructure for the BeSR.

Table 5.1 Identification and ranking of Bering Strait Region (BeSR) drivers of changea Likelihood Scale of IntensityRank SpatialTemporal Impact Driver occurrence Near- Long- Low MediumHighSmall Medium Large MinorMajor term term 1Changing sea-ice coverXXXX1 Patterns of ship traffic 2 through the BSR (numbers, XXXX1 types, timing) 3Offshore oil-and-gas activity XXXX2 Marine ecosystem changes in 4 XXXX2 productivity Marine governance (regional 5 XXXX3 to universal) Loss of subsistence (e.g., contaminants, general 6 XXXX3 change in marine environment) aRepresenting highest ranked by consensus of risks and uncertainties from among 64 impact drivers 98 O. R. Young et al.

One important observation arising from this exercise coupled with the analyses developed in Chaps. 2, 3 and 4 is that needs for governance in the BeSR will arise in many cases from external forces involving the activities of public, private, and hybrid actors who have little reason to pay close attention to the consequences of their actions for the sustainability of the ecological and socioeconomic systems of the region. Some of these needs are likely to arise in connection with activities that take place in the BeSR itself, though they are propelled in large part by outside forces. Issues associated with increases in the number of ships transiting the Bering Strait exemplify this category of needs. In other cases, the needs will involve unintended side effects or externalities arising from actions occurring outside the region. The impacts of climate change on the biophysical and socioeconomic systems of the BeSR constitute a dramatic example of this category of needs. But there are other issues belonging to this category as well, such as regional impacts associated with the efforts of outside environmental groups to ban both the commercial harvesting and incidental killing of marine mammals that are central to hunting and gathering practices of the residents of the BeSR. Residents of the region have a limited capacity to control the trajectory of these external forces. Yet their welfare may be affected dramatically by resultant impacts. This means that we need to consider how residents of the region can respond or adapt most effectively to the biophysical and socioeconomic impacts of these forces. We do not endeavor in this chapter to address all needs for governance likely to arise in the BeSR in the coming years. Rather, our strategy is to select particularly prominent cases in order to showcase the application of our approach to informed decisionmaking for sustainability. In the discussion to follow, we consider two central questions: (i) what will be the consequences of increased access to the BeSR and the resultant growth of commercial shipping in the region? and (ii) how will largescale environmental changes impact the welfare of the region’s human residents?

5.3 Data and Evidence for Informed Decisionmaking

To support informed decisionmaking regarding these questions, it is essential to begin by assembling relevant data and evidence. An exhaustive effort to do so is not possible within the scope of a single chapter. But we can identify key issues, including matters characterized by major uncertainties, and initiate the process of assembling data and evidence.

5.3.1 Increased Access and the Growth of Commercial Shipping

The impacts of climate change are progressing more rapidly and manifesting more dramatically throughout the Arctic than in any other part of the Earth system. The BeSR is no exception in these terms. As Chap. 2 documents, there has been a sharp decline in sea ice in the northern Bering Sea in recent years, allowing for increased access on the part of commercial ships. Already, as Chap. 3 indicates, the number of 5 Governing the Bering Strait Region 99 ships transiting the Bering Strait is rising. While the absolute numbers are small when compared with transits through the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal, the trend is clearly upward. Chap. 4 makes it clear that most of the human communities located in the BeSR have indigenous majorities whose livelihood depends on subsistence activities; they may be affected, sometimes positively but more often negatively, by both the impacts of climate change and the consequences of increased shipping driven largely by forces external to the region. In terms of needs for governance, the significance of these developments is largely a matter of projections relating to events expected to unfold in the future. There is a high degree of uncertainty regarding such projections arising both from biophysical processes and from human actions affecting and responding to these processes. While sea ice is retreating and thinning dramatically in the BeSR, it would be a mistake to suppose that the Bering Strait will be ice free most of the year anytime soon. What is likely is that the shipping season for commercial vessels operating in the region will become longer with the passage of time (see Chap. 3). Credible projections suggest that the Bering Strait is likely to be open to commercial shipping for half the year by 2030. As a consequence of greater access, some observers anticipate a rapid growth of economic activity in the Arctic (Howard 2009; Sale and Potapov 2010). From the perspective of the BeSR, the most significant impacts of increased economic activity are likely to stem from increases in the volume of commercial shipping using the Bering Strait to pass into and out of the Arctic. Numerous factors make it difficult to make confident predictions regarding the trajectory of growth in the scope of these activities over time. But it is worth differentiating among developments pertaining to: (i) commercial shipping along the Northern Sea Route; (ii) energy development in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas; (iii) mining activities in northern Alaska and the Russian Far East, and (iv) ship-based adventure tourism in the Arctic. Much has been written about these developments, without any clear consensus emerging as yet. But the following summary of expectations seems reasonable. While extensive use of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to move cargo between Europe and East Asia seems some distance off, shipments of natural resources (e.g. liquified natural gas from the port of Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula) along this route are increasing already and will almost certainly continue to increase during the foreseeable future. Energy development is sensitive both to fluctuations in world market prices and to the ups and downs of national policies. Although predictions regarding such matters are hazardous, future efforts to extract oil and gas in the Russian North as well as the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas could lead to a substantial growth of shipping using the Bering Strait. The Red Dog lead-zinc mine in northwest Alaska is the only current mining operation with implications for shipping in the BeSR. But there are major deposits of minerals in Siberia; the development of these resources could lead to a substantial growth in the volume of shipping in the BeSR. Adventure tourism in the Arctic will remain a niche industry. But as the recent voyages of the Crystal Serenity through the Northwest Passage make clear, transits of cruise ships using the Bering Strait are feasible. It is reasonable to expect some increase in such voyages during the foreseeable future. 100 O. R. Young et al.

Overall, projections of increases in commercial shipping in the BeSR during the foreseeable future vary from modest increases to relatively dramatic increases. For purposes of thinking about needs for governance, a reasonable assumption is that transits of the Bering Strait on the part of surface vessels will roughly double between now and 2025–2030. Of course, this does not include the operations of submarines, and it does not take into account scientific cruises employing icebreakers from China, Japan, and Korea as well as the Arctic states. What this suggests is a need to respond to a steady rise in vessel traffic in the BeSR, but not a nonlinear or abrupt increase of the sort envisioned by those who stress the opening up of the Arctic as a major sea route or locus of largescale offshore energy development. Some needs for governance arising in this connection center on the design and operation of ships passing through the BeSR and on the development of vessel routing systems to minimize the risk of interference and provide for maritime order. Of interest in this connection, is a recent joint initiative on the part of Russia and the US to establish a vessel routing scheme for the BeSR. Approved by the International Maritime Organization, implementation of this plan will fall to the two coastal states (Ham 2018). Related to this development are needs for enhanced infrastructure to address a range of issues including weather forecasts, hydrographic charting, search and rescue, emergency repairs and salvage, and so forth. Beyond these issues relating to the management of ship traffic lie a series of questions pertaining to unintended (and sometimes unforeseen) externalities of commercial shipping likely to affect biophysical systems and socioeconomic conditions in the region. Would increased ship traffic threaten resident species (e.g. walrus, seals) or migratory species (e.g. whales, seabirds) that are important subsistence resources for residents of BeSR communities? Would such threats take the form of ship strikes on marine mammals, disturbance of migratory patterns, or air, water and noise pollution associated with the operation of large ships? Would the construction of new infrastructure (e.g. port facilities, improved weather services and hydrographic charts) impact the welfare of BeSR communities? Would residents of these communities be called upon to act as first responders in the event of maritime accidents in remote locations? If so, what sorts of resources and training would these people need to be able to play this role both effectively and safely? Would increases in the number of ship-based tourists visiting BeSR communities have significant impacts (either negative or positive) on local residents?

Box 5.1: The Polar Code in the Bering Strait Region Lawson Brigham The International Maritime Organization’s Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters entered into force on 1 January 2017. This new regime is applicable to Bering Sea waters above 60°N, including the entire Bering Strait Region (BeSR). The Polar Code establishes mandatory, international standards for new and existing commercial carriers and passenger vessels (500 tons or greater) operating in Arctic and Antarctic waters. Its provisions cover

(continued) 5 Governing the Bering Strait Region 101

Box 5.1 (continued) ship structural standards; required marine safety equipment; training and experience for ship officers and crew; and environmental regulations regarding oil, noxious liquids, sewage and garbage. Key requirements for ships under the Code include a Polar Ship Certificate (issued by the flag state) and a Polar Water Operations Manual that provides ship specific guidance for operations, including emergencies. The Code takes the form of amendments to three existing IMO conventions: the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS); the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW). The Polar Code’s boundary at 60°N approximately matches the winter maximum advance of sea ice in the Bering Sea; it is also located near the shelf break in the central Bering Sea. The boundary provides some measure of protection to the northern Bering Sea ecosystem, the region’s world-class fishery, and coastal communities. The Code covers all large commercial ships, including bulk carriers sailing to the Red Dog Mine terminal at Kivilina in the Chukchi Sea. These ships, all SOLAS and MARPOL certified, are conducting international trade by carrying high-grade zinc ore from the Alaskan Arctic to global markets and are operating north of the boundary in ice-free polar waters during the summer. Off the western shores of the BeSR ships on international voyages sailing along Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR) will also operate under the Code. It is likely that as the NSR navigation season lengthens, LNG carriers, bulk carriers, and tankers will sail in ice-covered waters through the BeSR. Part II of the Polar Code focuses on four environmental protection requirements that have particular relevance to the relatively shallow and coastal waters of the BeSR:

• Pollution form oil ~ All discharges of oil into regions designated polar waters by the Polar Code are prohibited. • Pollution from Noxious Liquid Substances ~ All discharges of noxious liquid substances into region designated polar waters by the Polar Code are prohibited. • Pollution from Sewage ~ Discharge of treated sewage must be at least 3nautical miles from any ice shelf or fast ice; discharge of untreated sewage must be more than 12 nautical miles from an ice shelf or landfast ice which is prevalent in the winter BeSR. • Pollution by garbage ~ Garbage discharge must be at least 12 nautical miles from land and ice.

The Polar Code is a flexible framework, allowing additional measures to be added in the future. Although issues relating to black carbon, air emissions, and heavy fuel oils are not covered now, efforts are underway at the IMO to extend the Code to address these issues. 102 O. R. Young et al.

These comments are far from exhaustive with regard to the likely consequences of increased access and the growth of ship traffic in the BeSR. But they do make one point relating to needs for governance crystal clear. From the perspective of sustainability, it is not adequate to disaggregate developments, looking at vessel routing schemes, or shifts in migratory patterns of whales, or new demands on the resources of local communities in isolation. The most important and at the same time most complex needs for governance will involve intersections among biophysical developments, economic activities, and the sociocultural circumstances of the BeSR’s human communities. Because the drivers of the relevant processes are often external to the region (e.g. determinants of increases/decreases in greenhouse gas emissions, fluctuations in world market prices for oil and gas), realistic efforts to address needs for governance in this region will require mutually respectful and constructive engagement among a range of actors located in the public sector and the private sector as well as within the region and beyond the confines of the region.

5.3.2 Environmental Changes Affecting Human Well-being

Even if increased access does not lead to a significant growth of commercial shipping in the region, the BeSR will experience dramatic biophysical changes that will have serious consequences for the well-being of the region’s residents. In the winter of 2018, for example, “the Bering Sea lost half its ice extent at a time when ice should still have been growing” (Rosen 2018; see also Chap. 2). Although future years may be less extreme in this regard, there are good reasons to expect that sea ice will decline steadily in the BeSR. One influential process in this context centers on the fact that open water has a lower albedo than sea ice. As a result, open water absorbs more solar radiation than sea ice, triggering a feedback process that is likely to intensify current trends regarding declines in the extent and thickness of sea ice in the region. The impacts of this cascade of biophysical changes on the human communities of the BeSR are dramatic. One major consequence is the increased difficulty in engaging in subsistence practices focused on the hunting of marine mammals (e.g. walrus) that are dependent on the presence of sea ice. But this is by no means the only difficulty. Hunters who pursue migratory whales from the ice edge are either losing their base of operations or engaging in increasingly risky activities as sections of sea ice become unstable or break free making it impossible for hunters to return to land. Coastal communities are experiencing destructive flooding and increased erosion due to the absence of ice that previously reduced the force of storm surges together with the destruction or degradation of infrastructure resulting from thawing permafrost. Increasing numbers of communities in the BeSR are now facing the necessity of abandoning their existing locations and coming to grips with the emotional stresses, transaction costs, and material costs of relocation. Above all, residents of these communities are finding that their knowledge of the behavior of physical and biological systems built up over many generations no longer provides an adequate basis for making important choices regarding day-to-day activities 5 Governing the Bering Strait Region 103

(Krupnik and Jolly 2002). As a result, communities find themselves adrift in the face of systemic uncertainties beyond anything they have experienced in centuries. The last several decades also have witnessed a dramatic rise in global concern regarding matters of environmental protection. A particularly influential strand of this movement concerns the fate of marine mammals that are important to the livelihoods of BeSR residents. Campaigns to save the whales constitute a prominent case in point. These campaigns have impacted the largely indigenous communities of the BeSR dramatically and given rise to issues of governance featuring sharp conflicts between outside preservationist groups (e.g. the International Fund for Animal Welfare) dedicated to prohibiting all intentional killing of whales and BeSR residents and others for whom the harvesting of whales is of great importance not only as a source of protein but also as a central feature of longstanding sociocultural practices. Because the sources of these difficulties lie beyond the reach of human residents of the BeSR, there is no basis for assuming that they can stop systemic changes affecting their way of life. As a result, the challenge facing the human communities of the region centers on the development of adaptation strategies that will allow both the communities and their individual residents to maintain their integrity in the face of continuing biophysical and socioeconomic changes. At one level, adaptation is not a systemic issue. Unlike mitigation in the case of climate change, which is a matter of cutting back on emissions of greenhouse gases on a global scale, adaptation will require the design and implementation of adjustments that are tailored to the specific circumstances of individual communities. The communities of the BeSR are not all equally dependent on hunting marine mammals or equally vulnerable to the effects of storm surges. Nor are their circumstances the same with regard to the availability of economic options. Regional centers like Nome or Kotzebue have mixed economies that differ markedly from the predominantly subsistence systems of smaller communities like Shishmaref or Uelen. The roles of regional and national governments regarding such matters differ in many ways between the American and Russian sectors of the BeSR. It follows that many aspects of adaptation to socioecological changes in the BeSR will call for strategies that are placed-based. There is no reason to assume that what works for one community will be equally effective in addressing the needs of others. Given the material resources required to implement adaptation strategies, moreover, the communities of the BeSR will need to look to sources outside the region for essential financial support. On the Alaska side, for example, this means turning to state and federal agencies for the support needed to address issues like coastal erosion and the damage to essential infrastructure attributable to melting permafrost. Early indications make it clear that questions relating to who should provide financial support for adaptation in situations of this kind on both sides of the Bering Strait are destined to become matters of intense political controversy. At the same time, there are issues relating to adaptation to changes occurring in the BeSR that can and should be addressed at the regional level. As the work of bodies like the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission makes clear, there are opportunities for the residents of coastal communities to band together to tackle issues of prime importance to their welfare and to amplify their voices in larger 104 O. R. Young et al. arenas, including international venues like the International Whaling Commission or the International Maritime Organization. Shared services, like search and rescue facilities, that are important to all the communities of the region but too costly for individual communities to afford on their own may be provided through efforts to pool resources on a regional basis. Because the communities of the BeSR are small and have limited social as well as material capital, it may make sense to join forces on a regional level to support representation in venues like the Arctic Council. Overall, there is much to be said for sharing experiences regarding matters of adaptation on a regional level, even when the specific circumstances of individual communities do not allow for the development and implementation of common strategies to deal with local needs for adaptation.

5.4 Options: Institutions and Infrastructure

What options are available for addressing these emerging needs for governance in an effective, efficient, and equitable manner? Is there a case for restructuring existing institutional arrangements or is it preferable to think in terms of creating new arrangements to meet these needs? What enhancements of existing infrastructure would be required to implement and administer new or improved regimes in this region? The goal of this section is to identify and assess options in such a way as to enrich the discourse about governing the BeSR during the near future, making a contribution to informed decisionmaking for sustainability in the process. Thus for purposes of analysis, we find it helpful to organize discussion around institutional arrangements relating to four distinct clusters of issues: (i) ship design and operation; (ii) sea lanes, traffic separation schemes, and other vessel routing systems, (iii) protection and sustainable use of marine living resources, and (iv) environmental and social protection. In each case, there are associated issues relating to the infrastructure required to implement and administer new or restructured governance systems. In this connection, we consider: (i) compliance and law enforcement mechanisms; (ii) monitoring, reporting and verification systems, and (iii) built infrastructure, including aids to navigation, search and rescue capabilities, emergency services, salvage operations, and normal port facilities commensurate with expanded or newly created governance systems.

5.4.1 Institutions

One consideration to ponder at the outset regarding the development of regimes to meet emerging needs for governance in the BeSR involves timing. New needs for governance in the BeSR will not spring up overnight as full-blown concerns. They will emerge step-by-step and become increasingly prominent over a period of years and sometimes decades. Given the complexity of the forces generating these needs, we must expect needs for governance to evolve continuously but often 5 Governing the Bering Strait Region 105 unpredictably, even after we are able to document their initial trajectories. This makes it important to think carefully about when to put in place new or restructured governance arrangements and how to ensure that these arrangements are able to adapt agilely to changing conditions. Should steps be taken now to create new arrangements, or is it better to wait until the needs become more well-defined in order to ensure that the arrangements created are designed properly to fit actual rather than anticipated needs? There are no simple answers to these questions. But one useful way of responding to this concern in the case of the BeSR may be to identify possible thresholds involving the onset of threats to sustainability that should trigger the adoption of measures to avoid or mitigate the risks. Revealing options in advance, so that the decisionmakers will be able to respond agilely once such thresholds are reached would make sense, especially as more is learned about the exact nature of the relevant needs.

Ship Design, Equipment, and Operation Today, the navigation season in the BeSR typically runs from sometime in June through to sometime in November, depending on weather and sea-ice conditions in any given year. The length of the open-water season will increase in the future, though it is important to note that ice conditions and related hazards need to be considered in real time on a year around basis. It is unlikely that the Bering Strait will be ice free throughout the year during the foreseeable future, though the ratio of first-year ice to multi-year ice is rapidly increasing across the entire Arctic Ocean, including the BeSR (NSIDC ongoing).

Ships operating in this environment will need to be properly prepared for conditions in the BeSR. Will the applicable rules of the law of the sea, including those articulated in UNCLOS, and the provisions of the Polar Code, which entered into force at the beginning of 2017, suffice? It may be appropriate to consider supplemental regulations applicable specifically to the BeSR dealing with issues like speed limits in sensitive areas, seasonal restrictions on the location of sea lanes, the combustion or carriage of heavy fuel oil (HFO), emissions of black carbon, ship strikes on marine mammals, and the control of invasive species. Even if these concerns are addressed on a BeSR-specific basis, it may make sense to include them as elements of a package of measures involving additional amendments to the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions. The current effort to extend the provisions of the Polar Code to ban the combustion or carriage of HFOs throughout the Arctic is illustrative in this regard. Could UNCLOS Art 234 provide a legal basis for more stringent regulations for the BeSR to be adopted by the Russian Federation and the United States and administered on a collaborative and non-discriminatory basis? Might any of the existing bilateral arrangements for the region identified in Chap. 1 be relevant to regulating ships operating in the BeSR? Would an operational system using the next generation shipping assessment tools analyzed in Chap. 11 be an attractive option for monitoring the activities of ships in the BeSR? 106 O. R. Young et al.

Vessel Traffic Systems The number of ships operating in the BeSR is currently too small to require an elaborate system to manage vessel traffic. But as the data provided in Chap. 3 indicate, the number of transits of the BeSR more than doubled between 2008 and 2012. The current and potential economic developments reviewed in that chapter may lead to a growth in the volume of vessel traffic in the BeSR to the point where there will be a need for well-defined rules of the road. Will the spatial and seasonal sensitivity of the BeSR require special regulations including the designation of “no go” areas and variable speed limits? Can these needs be handled under existing agreements, including but not limited to the Polar Code regulations? Can we envision a cooperative bilateral Russia/US management system in this realm?

Such an arrangement might include a coordinated system to advise ships to take one route or another through the strait depending upon relevant ice and weather conditions. The 2011 Joint Presidents Statement (Joint Statement 2011) and the 2012 Clinton/Lavrov Joint Statement (2012) provide a foundation for elaborating such a system. Building on this foundation, Russia and the US proposed in January 2018 a voluntary system “of two-way routes for vessels to follow in the Bering Strait and Bering Sea” (Ham 2018). Submitted formally for consideration by the IMO, the plan calls for a system of “six two-way routes and six precautionary areas” (Ham 2018). The IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee approved the plan at its May 2018 meeting to take affect on 1 December 2018 (see Fig. 5.1) (World Maritime News 2018).

Living Resources Two sets of issues relating to living resources arise in thinking about needs for governance in the BeSR. One includes issues relating to commercial fishing. At this stage, the United States and the Russian Federation are responsible for fisheries management within their own EEZs. As Chap. 3 notes, the United States has imposed a moratorium on all commercial fishing within its EEZ north of the Bering Strait; the Russian Federation has not as yet adopted similar measures. Both countries allow commercial fishing within their own jurisdictions in the Bering Sea south of the Bering Strait. Because fish do not respect ecologically arbitrary limits like jurisdictional boundaries in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, efforts to manage the fisheries of these areas on a unilateral basis are not likely to produce sustainable results.

It may be possible to build on the 1994 bilateral Agreement on Cooperation regarding the Environment and Natural Resources to develop a cooperative regime designed to manage fish stocks in the BeSR sustainably (Russia-US Agreement 1994). The bilateral arrangement between Norway and the Russian Federation respecting the fish stocks located in the vicinity of the maritime boundary between the two countries in the Barents Sea (see Chaps. 7 and 9 for details) might well provide a source of useful precedents regarding cooperation in managing BeSR fish stocks (Stokke 2012). In addition, the provisions of the ten-nation Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, completed in late 2017, opened for signature in 2018 and now ready for ratification, may be helpful in thinking about ways to regulate fishing activities north of the Bering Strait, 5 Governing the Bering Strait Region 107

Fig. 5.1 Bering Strait routing measures 108 O. R. Young et al. though this agreement applies formally only to areas beyond national jurisdiction and therefore does not cover the BeSR in any legal sense (Central Arctic Ocean Agreement 2017). The other issue relating to marine living resources involves subsistence harvests of fish and marine mammals on the part of residents of the coastal communities located within the BeSR described in Chap. 4. Perhaps the most complex issues center on subsistence harvesting of whales, walrus, seals, and polar bears, all of which are impacted by the changing biophysical conditions associated with climate change and other large-scale environmental changes described in Chap. 2. Harvesting of these resources takes place, inter alia, under arrangements set forth in the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) and the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (Polar Bear Agreement 1973). But these activities are also subject to regional co-management arrangements, such as those established through the efforts of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC current), the Eskimo Walrus Commission (EWC current), and the Russian/ U.S. Agreement on Polar Bears of 2000 (Russia/US Polar Bear Agreement 2000). For the most part, these co-management arrangements supplement but do not con- tradict the relevant international regimes. There is no doubt, as Chap. 2 documents, that the recession and thinning of sea ice in the BeSR are affecting the condition of walrus and polar bear stocks. But this does not constitute a compelling reason to impose a total prohibition on subsistence harvesting of these resources. What is needed are practices that not only encourage bilateral cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation, but also afford opportunities for building effective forms of cooperation between local organizations reflecting insights and concerns of user communities (described in Chap. 4) and public agencies that have the formal authority to make decisions about regulations pertaining to living resources located within the EEZs of the two states. Because marine mammals moving around in the BeSR do not pay attention to the location of jurisdictional boundaries and these movements vary from species to species, achieving sustainability regarding marine mammals calls for high levels of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the United States, between scientists and subsistence harvesters, and between public authorities and organizations (e.g. the Eskimo Walrus Commission) that represent the interests and views of the coastal communities of the BeSR. One interesting opportunity involves the prospect of strengthening links among communities on the two sides of the Bering Strait regarding ways to represent the concerns of subsistence harvesters effectively in regional and international governance systems.

Environmental and Social Protection During the foreseeable future, the growth of human activities in the BeSR will be motivated primarily by a desire to move ships and the cargoes and passengers they carry through the region rather than by an interest in largescale development in the region itself. But the resultant activities will affect the region in a variety of ways ranging from the impacts of industrial activities (e.g. hardrock mining) on the natural environment to the economic and 5 Governing the Bering Strait Region 109 social side effects of these activities (including ship-based tourism) on the small and predominantly indigenous communities located within the region.

A major need for governance in this setting is to minimize the negative externalities arising from increased human activities in the region as well as to take advantage of any positive externalities that may arise from these activities. Environmental impacts may include ship strikes on whales, the effects of noise on marine mammals, the consequences of oil spills arising from accidents at sea, the spread of invasive species, and the side effects of burning HFOs (e.g., emissions of black carbon). Some externalities may produce positive social effects, creating job opportunities or justi- fying the development of built infrastructure of use to communities located in the BeSR. But social impacts may turn negative when they interfere with subsistence hunting and gathering or disrupt the social fabric of coastal communities. One option to consider is the establishment of a system of marine protected areas (MPAs) located either wholly within the BeSR or in areas encompassing portions of the region. Several (not mutually exclusive) options are worthy of consideration in this context (Laughlin 2013). One option is to establish MPAs under the provisions of overarching international regimes, such as ecologically or biologically sensitive areas (EBSAs) under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD current) or particularly sensitive sea areas (PSSAs) under MARPOL (MARPOL current). A second option would be to integrate protected areas in the BeSR into a circumpolar network of MPAs along the lines proposed within the Arctic Council (2015). A third option would be for the United States and the Russian Federation to establish one or more jointly administered MPAs covering parts of the BeSR straddling the jurisdictional boundary between the two states. Yet a fourth option would be for the United States and the Russian Federation to establish separate MPAs within their respective sectors of the BeSR in a manner featuring informal coordination. In the case of the third and fourth options, it would make sense to think about linking MPAs to the Shared Beringian Heritage Program that has evolved in recent years to address issues relating to the management of American and Russian national parks in the region (Beringian Heritage Program 1991). Two general concerns require consideration in thinking about the role of MPAs in the governance of the BeSR. One has to do with the spatial coordinates, regulatory content, and administration of the MPAs themselves. Are there ways to situate MPAs to maximize environmental protection while minimizing interference with other activities (e.g., shipping or subsistence harvesting of marine mammals)? What activities should be permitted/prohibited within the confines of individual MPAs? What administrative arrangements would be needed, especially for MPAs established under broader international regimes or covering areas under the jurisdiction of both the United States and Russian Federation? Given that marine systems are fluid and dynamic, would it be useful to develop a management mechanism to adjust the boundaries of MPAs in this region as needed to accommodate biophysical changes occurring over time? Is the 1989 United States-USSR Bilateral Agreement on Combating Pollution (US-USSR Agreement 1989) a useful point of departure in this realm? Could the 2013 Draft Joint Parks 110 O. R. Young et al.

Agreement be applied and extended to offer protection for the coastal communities or marine ecosystems located in the BeSR? Innovations regarding such matters would be of interest to those working on the creation of MPAs far beyond the confines of the BeSR. The other general issue deals with the interplay between MPAs and regimes governing other human activities, such as shipping, offshore energy development, commercial fishing, or subsistence activities. Should there be regulations designed not only to designate sea lanes open to vessel traffic, but also to minimize harmful effects of ship traffic (e.g., ship strikes, noise pollution) on marine mammals? What should be the relationship between the rules governing MPAs and fisheries regulations covering matters like area closures and gear restrictions? An area of special concern in this connection is the need to protect the well-being of the BeSR’s coastal communities that, as Chap. 4 documents, are heavily dependent on the living resources of the region. This may involve the development of cooperative arrangements aimed at protecting the rights of residents of these communities to engage in subsistence harvesting of living resources, while at the same time ensuring the integrity of the biophysical systems of the protected areas.

5.4.2 Organizational Capacity and Built Infrastructure

Whatever arrangements are devised to address needs for governance in the BeSR, they will require a concerted effort to address matters of implementation or, in other words, procedures needed to move their provisions from paper to practice as well as to create adequate infrastructure to operate these arrangements on a day-to-day basis. Although there are clearly important links among them, we differentiate three sets of concerns relating to implementation for purposes of analysis.

Compliance and Law Enforcement Every governance system must find ways to address matters of compliance on the part of those subject to its provisions. In the case of the BeSR, it is realistic to assume that both the United States and the Russian Federation will have limited assets (e.g., ships, aircraft, trained personnel) to assign to this task on a regular basis. This will place a premium on the use of low-cost measures (e.g. shifting the burden of proof to operators by requiring any ship intend- ing to enter the BeSR to demonstrate in advance that it has a valid certificate for operating in the area), on the development of cooperative procedures to minimize redundancy in the assignment of assets to address issues of compliance, and on the development of positive relations with those subject to relevant regulations.

Relatively simple actions, such as banning a ship that fails to comply with the applicable rules from operating in the BeSR or from using American and Russian ports, onshore facilities, or aids to navigation, may be useful in this context. The fact that there are no areas of high seas within the BeSR should facilitate efforts on the part of the Russian Federation and the United States to deal with the challenge of compliance. In addition to bilateral assets, the multinational Arctic Coast Guard 5 Governing the Bering Strait Region 111

Forum may be able to make a constructive contribution in this realm with its remit to ensure safety, security and stewardship of Arctic waters (US Department of Homeland Security 2015).

Monitoring, Reporting and Verification All governance systems require some means to determine whether the actions of subjects conform to the rules and regulations and to document changing conditions that may call for institutional adjustments. When the relevant activities take place in regions that are both remote and sensitive in geopolitical terms, it is important to create information systems that are accurate and unbiased but at the same time as unobtrusive as possible. In this sense, satellite observations may play a key role in meeting the needs for governance in the BeSR by providing a critical alternative to sea-based or ground-based inspections that can be too sensitive politically as well as too costly in monetary terms to be acceptable. We include a more general discussion of such matters in Chap. 11. But several initial observations are relevant here.

Under SOLAS, the Automatic Identification System (AIS) data collected both by ground stations and by satellites are being used to track the location and movements of vessels in the Arctic Ocean. In the future, to track and verify compliance with the Polar Code (2016), AIS metadata for each ship (e.g., ship registry, dimensions, cargo type, routing plans) could be expanded to include appropriate details of the Polar Ship Certificate required under the provisions of the Polar Code. Since both the United States and the Russian Federation have advanced capabilities in this area, there is room for collaboration to fulfill the Polar Code’s objectives. In addition, private providers operating under arrangements approved by the United States and the Russian Federation may be able to participate in public/private partnerships dealing with vessel tracking and verification. Such observing systems would contribute to the realization of the Arctic Council’s initiatives designed to provide a pan-Arctic system of Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (SAON current). The Russian-American Long-Term Census of the Arctic (RUSALCA current) provides the basis for a bilateral initiative between the United States and the Russian Federation that could be revived and enhanced with additional types of marine monitors to assess biophysical as well as anthropogenic impacts to further facilitate sustainable development of the BeSR. As a common Arctic objective that has been agreed by all Arctic states and Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations in the 1996 Ottawa Declaration that established the Arctic Council, sustainability requires balance between economic prosperity, environmental protection, social equity and societal welfare in view of the urgencies of today and the needs of future generations.

Other Built Infrastructure Governing human activities in the BeSR will create a need for the development and operation of various types of built infrastructure, which will require coordination, consistency and cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation to be sustainable. As noted above, built elements complement governance mechanisms, both of which are required to ensure sustain- 112 O. R. Young et al. able outcomes. The built elements include mobile and fixed assets as well as observing, communication, research, and information systems.

Some of these built elements will take the form of aids to navigation (e.g. better hydrographic charts, weather forecasting systems, search and rescue facilities, emergency services, salvage capacity, oil spill preparedness and response capabilities). Advanced technologies (e.g. AIS) may also play a role in this realm. The capacity to protect MPAs and coastal communities from the impacts of oil spills and other industrial accidents constitutes another relevant consideration. There has been consideration of establishing a deepwater port somewhere within the BeSR as well as upgrading airfields and associated infrastructure. On the American side, for example, the closest major port currently is at Dutch Harbor, located a 1000 miles south of the Chukchi Sea. When an icebreaker that was part of Royal Dutch Shell’s 2015 flotilla supporting exploratory operations in the Chukchi Sea sustained damage to its hull, it had to travel south to Portland, Oregon for repairs, transiting the Bering Strait in both directions. There may be a strong case for collaboration between the United States and the Russian Federation in developing port facilities both to maximize effectiveness and to avoid redundancy in implementing management systems in the BeSR. As an alternative to a deep-water port facility along the coast of the United States or the Russian Federation, it may be worthwhile to consider development of an emergency response platform located in the shallow waters of the Chukchi Sea at the confluence of the Northern Sea Route, the Northwest Passage, and the transpolar route as they enter the BeSR (Berkman and Stavridis 2015). It may make sense also to create and administer an oil spill contingency fund that shipping companies would be required to underwrite in the form of a system of fees linked to transits of the Bering Strait. Similar arrangements might be of interest regarding other threats to the natural environment or to the infrastructure of coastal communities.

5.5 Governing the Bering Strait Regime Complex

As human activity in the BeSR rises, the arrangements we have considered in the preceding section will interact with one another in increasingly significant ways. Measures dealing with the governance of vessel traffic will affect the health of marine mammals and produce a variety of impacts of coastal communities. The efforts of communities to respond to the impacts of climate change will have significant consequences for the operation of the infrastructure needed to support commercial shipping in the region. This will result in the development of what governance scholars call a regime complex or, in other words, a set of functionally and organizationally distinct but overlapping institutional arrangements that affect each other’s performance in significant ways (Oberthür and Stokke 2011; Alter and Raustiala 2018). In this setting, it will become important to think about the BeSR regime complex holistically in the interests of avoiding unintended interference 5 Governing the Bering Strait Region 113 and taking advantage of possible synergies arising from efforts to coordinate the activities of the individual elements of the complex. Such issues need to be addressed incrementally as they come into focus. But already we can identify some options that may be worthy of consideration in this context. An initial step might involve building on the work of the existing Bering Strait Regional Commission (1989). At some stage, this process may make it worthwhile to consider the option of establishing a Bering Strait Authority. Such arrangements are common at the domestic level in situations where functionally distinct activities require coordination extending across the jurisdictional boundaries of two or more states, provinces, or other regional political units. Familiar examples in the United States include the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which coordinates a variety of transportation systems in the greater New York City area, and the Tennessee Valley Authority, which coordinates the generation of hydroelectric power and other commercial activities involving several states that share the valley of the Tennessee River. There also are parallels at the international level. A prominent example is the Saint Lawrence Seaway, which allows ocean-going vessels to access the Great Lakes of North America and is operated as a cooperative arrangement by Canada and the United States (St. Lawrence Seaway current). Prior to 1999, the bilateral (United States and Panama) Panama Canal Commission was responsible for the operation of the Panama Canal Zone. Since the reversion of the Canal Zone to Panama, this function has been taken over by the Panama Canal Authority operated by Panama. The Suez Canal Authority owns, operates and maintains the Suez Canal. Established initially by Egypt, the authority is now an independent body that has legal personality and organizational capacity in its own right. Should a bilateral BeSR Authority become a live option, its development might be rooted in the 1994 Russia-US Agreement regarding the Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources and constitute a logical application of provisions included in the 2011 Joint Statement on Cooperation. The fact that both countries strictly respect the Agreement of 1990 on the Maritime Boundary (the longest maritime boundary in the world) constitutes a positive basis for cooperation in the BeSR (Vylegzhanin 2010). In this setting, a regional authority might encompass an evolving system of regulatory measures together with decisionmaking procedures and an administrative mechanism designed to manage the system on a day-to-day basis. One interesting possibility would be for the authority to manage the emergency response platform located in the Chukchi Sea mentioned in the preceding section. Created under an agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation, this arrangement could provide opportunities for regional and local constituencies to participate in such a way as to ensure the protection of their interests relating to human activities in the BeSR. Should the two countries take steps to create a prototype authority in the near future, it could include a mechanism to allow for regular reassessments and suitable adjustments as human activities in the region increase over time. It is worth noting in this regard that rising tensions between the United States and the Russian 114 O. R. Young et al.

Federation at the level of geopolitics have not impeded the ability of the two countries to engage in cooperative activities at the level of day-to-day concerns like the management of human activities in the BeSR.

5.6 Conclusion: Future Needs for Governance

The Bering Strait Region is a sensitive area in both socioecological and geopolitical terms. While the region has long been a remote area involving only limited human activities, this condition is changing. There are good reasons to expect more far- reaching changes during the foreseeable future, largely as a result of the impact of human activities that are causing profound biophysical changes in the region and may lead to a steady growth in ship traffic and associated commercial activities in the region and beyond. Specific needs for governance are not easy to determine in advance. But new issues will arise, and we are able already to discern the basic character of major developments. General international law (e.g., most of the provisions of UNCLOS) as well as more specialized international arrangements (e.g., the Polar Code applicable to the operation of commercial ships operating in polar waters) will provide a solid foundation for addressing these needs. Because the waters and coastal areas of the BeSR lie wholly within the jurisdiction of the United States and the Russian Federation, these states have both an opportunity and an obligation to establish and implement more specialized governance arrangements for the region. At one and the same time, such arrangement could provide stable expectations, allowing ship operators to make concrete plans regarding the use of the waters of the BeSR, and include restrictions that offer adequate protection to the sensitive ecosystems and human communities of the region. One option that may prove attractive over the longer run is the development of a joint Russian-American Bering Strait Authority to devise coherent, effective, and flexible management practices applicable to the BeSR as a whole. Such an authority would have its own unique features. But there is considerable experience with arrangements of this sort operating both within and across the jurisdictional boundaries of states that could prove helpful to those responsible for designing and administering a Bering Strait Authority. Despite growing tensions at the level of high politics, the United States and the Russian Federation have demonstrated an ability to cooperate effectively in addressing day-to-day issues in the BeSR. One positive side effect of the development of a Bering Strait Authority could be to demonstrate the feasibility of successful collaboration between the two countries in an area of increasing importance for the global community. 5 Governing the Bering Strait Region 115

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Russia/US Agreement (1994) Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources. T.I.A.S. 12550 Russia/US Polar Bear Agreement (2000) Agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on the Conservation and Management of the Alaska-Chukotka Polar Bear Population. T.I.A.S. 07–923 Sale R, Potapov E (2010) The scramble for the Arctic: ownership, exploitation and conflict in the far north. Frances Lincoln, London SAON current. Sustaining Arctic Observing Network. www.arcticobserving.org St. Lawrence Seaway current. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway System. www.greatlakes-seway. com Stokke OS (2012) Disaggregating international regimes: a new approach to evaluation and comparison. MIT Press, Cambridge US Department of Homeland Security (2015) Coast Guard Leaders from Arctic Nations Sign Historic Joint Statement, 30 October. www.dhs.gov/news/2015/10/30/ coast-guard-leaders-arctic-nations-sign-historic-joint-statement US/USSR Agreement (1989) Agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Concerning Cooperation in Combatting Pollution in the Bering and Chuckchi Seas in Emergency Situations. 2190 U.N.T.S. 179 Vylegzhanin, A.N. (2010) 20 years of provisional application of the agreement between the USA and the USSR on the Maritime Boundary, in Russian. Vestnik/MGIMO-University, 1-4-113 Part III The Barents Sea Region Ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region 6 Jon L. Fuglestad, Rasmus Benestad, Vladimir Ivanov, Lis Lindahl Jørgensen, Kit M. Kovacs, Frode Nilssen, Hein Rune Skjoldal, and Julia Tchernova

Abstract The Barents Sea Region differs from most other Arctic sea areas in the way that the majority of the Barents Sea has historically been ice-free all year round. There is a huge human population living around the Barents Sea, and the exploration of both living and non-living resources is important. The region is highly developed and industrialized. Cold Arctic waters meet warm Atlantic waters and there are diverse and different ecosystems between the northern and southern part of the region. Due to climate change and warmer waters there is an ongoing

J. L. Fuglestad (*) Norwegian Research Council, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] R. Benestad Norwegian Meteorological Institute, Oslo, Norway V. Ivanov Geography Department, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia Ocean-Air Interaction Department, Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, Saint Petersburg, Russia L. L. Jørgensen Institute of Marine Research (IMR), Bergen, Norway K. M. Kovacs Biodiversity Section, Norwegian Polar Institute, Tromsø, Norway F. Nilssen Nord University, Bodø, Norway H. R. Skjoldal Institute of Marine Research (IMR), Bergen, Norway J. Tchernova Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Tromsø, Norway

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 119 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_6 120 J. L. Fuglestad et al.

borealization of the Barents Sea region. Species are moving northwards and new species are introduced to the area. The region is one of the most fishery intensive regions in the world. Because of the warmer waters, the huge northeast Arctic cod population is moving farther north and east in the Barents Sea. The commercially important species mackerel and snow crab have migrated to the region. The co-management regime between Norway and Russia is a main reason for the healthy fish stocks in the region.

6.1 Introduction

Scientists, authorities and business organizations may delineate the boundaries of the Barents Sea differently depending on the purposes they have in mind. The Barents Sea Region (BaSR) as discussed in this book differs from the geographical Barents Sea. As Fig. 1.2 indicates the BaSR includes a part of the Norwegian Sea as well as the Barents Sea. The BaSR includes parts of the Barents Sea Large Marine Ecosystem (LME), parts of the Norwegian Sea LME, and parts of the Central Arctic Ocean LME (PAME 2013). For clarity, the whole area covered is named the Barents Sea Region or BaSR. Thus, the marine area covered in this chapter has huge differences in physical and chemical properties as well as biology. Due to the Norwegian Atlantic Current and the Norwegian Coastal Current carrying warm Atlantic waters northwards, most of the Barents Sea Region is mild and is ice-free all year round, contrary to most other marine Arctic areas at this latitude. The Barents region is, compared to other parts of the Arctic area, highly populated with huge coastal cities like Murmansk in Russia (population ca. 320,000) and Tromsø in Norway (population ca. 75,000). The Barents Sea Region and the adjacent land areas have huge natural resources such as oil and gas, minerals and coal, and ocean fisheries. It is a highly developed and industrialized region. The industrial activity in the region results in a highly developed infrastructure with major airports, road transport and all year-round shipping activity. Lots of the shipping is related to the ocean fisheries in the region. In the last decade the fish farming industry has increased tremendously in the region and has become an important income for coastal communities, especially in Norway. An ecosystem is the interaction between living organisms and their non-living environment. The living organisms and the biological production of a marine ecosystem are therefore totally depended on the abiotic components such as temperature, pH, chemicals, salinity, substrate, light, topography, etc. Any changes in these abiotic components can influence the living organisms, how well functioning the ecosystem is and the ecosystem services. 6 Ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region 121

6.2 Physical and Chemical Features of the Barents Sea Region

6.2.1 Circulation/Ocean Currents

The Barents Sea Region, as defined in this book, constitutes a combination of warm Atlantic waters to the west and south and cold Arctic waters in the northeast. It is a flow-through system were Atlantic water flows with the Norwegian Atlantic Current and the Norwegian Coastal Current into the Norwegian Sea and continues into the Barents Sea between the Norwegian mainland and Bear Island (Bjørnøya) (Fig. 6.1). Another branch of Atlantic water flows around the periphery of the Barents Sea shelf as the West Spitsbergen Current, and both branches meet at the opening of the St. Anna Trough in the northern Kara Sea before they continue as boundary currents into the Arctic Ocean as the Barents Sea and Fram Strait branches of Atlantic-origin water (Dickson et al. 2000; Rudels et al. 2016). The Barents Sea is, together with the Fram Strait, the most important pathway for transport of Atlantic water to the Arctic Ocean. These transport pathways contribute to much more volume transport to the Arctic Ocean than the transport of Pacific water through the Bering Strait. (Ingvaldsen and Loeng 2009). As it moves northwards the Atlantic water loses heat, which is a dominant feature of the climate system defining the oceanographic properties and sea ice conditions in the Barents Sea as well as in adjacent parts of the Arctic (Skagseth 2008; Sandø et al. 2010).

Fig. 6.1 Bathymetry and the main ocean currents in the Barents Sea Region 122 J. L. Fuglestad et al.

Cold Arctic waters from the Arctic Ocean flows into the Barents Sea mainly between the island Nordaustlandet northeast of Svalbard and Franz Josef Land and between Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya. The Barents Sea is a typical shelf sea with a shallow average depth, 230 m (Sakshaug and Kovacs, 2009). West of the Svalbard-Bjørnøya-Norway mainland line is the Norwegian continental slope and the water depths west of this line becomes deeper where for example the Lofoten basin has water depths of about 3200 m (Skjoldal (ed) 2004). The oceanographic polar front contributes to the boundary between warm Atlantic water and cold Arctic water and is relatively distinct and topographically driven in the western part while being more gradual in composition due to mixing and water mass transformation in the eastern part of the Barents Sea. The division into a boreal south and an Arctic north is reflected in the distribution of biota including plankton, benthos and fish (Wassmann et al. 2006; Eiane and Tande 2009; Johanesen et al. 2013; ) (Fig. 6.2). There are rather few major rivers with outlet to the Barents Sea region. In Norway there are many small river catchments, there is no Swedish rivers with outlets to the Barents Sea region, and only one Finnish catchment with an outlet to the Barents Sea Region, via the Pasvik river in Norway. The huge Russian rivers (Northern Dvina, Pechora, Ob, Yenisei and Lena) all have outlets to the ocean outside the region covered in this book. However, discharges from rivers can have a huge influence on the marine ecosystem and the physical properties of the oceans far away from their outlet, e.g. the creation and melting of sea ice. Even if the Northern Dvina and Pechora rivers have outlets outside the region covered in this book, they can

Fig. 6.2 Mean surface temperatures in the Barents Sea Region. The region is characterized by warm Atlantic waters in the south and west and cold, Arctic waters in the north and east 6 Ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region 123 have an influence on the region. These two rivers have huge catchments about the size of Norway or Finland. Models suggest that river flows into the total Arctic Ocean may increase 25–50% by the end of this century (CliC/AMAP/IASC 2016). The increased freshwater flow is followed by increased nutrient and sediment par- ticle flow into the oceans. It also means there can be a change in the coastal water salinity. In the coastal areas all these factors will have implications for a healthy ecosystem and ecosystem services such as a reduced range of animals and plants in the coastal areas (CliC/AMAP/IASC 2016). This again leads to changes in the socio-economic conditions.

6.2.2 Climate and Temperature

There has been increased average air temperature rise in the Arctic compared to global values due to “polar amplification” (AMAP 2017a). Ice and snow melt amplify the rise in temperature which then influence vegetation changes which in turn have effects on temperature rise. In Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, there has been an observed increased air temperature of 1.3 °C per decade during the period 1994– 2013, with the highest increase in wintertime of 3 °C per decade. (AMAP 2017a). Projections using the RCP 4.5 scenario indicate increasing air temperature will continue and winter temperatures over the land-area surrounding the Barents Sea may increase by 3–10 °C over the period 2015–2080 (AMAP 2017a). According to the IPCC studies the sea temperature is expected to rise more slowly than the air temperature in the region due to shorter response time for the troposphere. The region is a biogeographical transition zone between warmer boreal waters and cold Arctic waters. The southwestern part of the Barents Sea Region is covered with warm Atlantic waters (5–7 °C at 100 m depth) while the northeastern part has cold, Arctic water masses (−1–0 °C). Atlantic water in the southwestern part of the region is defined by high salinity (>35) and temperatures above 3 °C. Between mainland Norway and Bjørnøya the water temperature varies seasonally and inter-annually between 3 °C and 7 °C (Ingvaldsen and Loeng 2009). Arctic water, in the east and north of the Barents Sea Region, is characterized by lower salinity than Atlantic Waters (34.4–34.7) and temperatures below 0 C. Arctic waters and Atlantic waters are separated by the Polar Front. Water temperature and salinity (basic seawater properties) affect the functioning of ecosystems, directly or indirectly through secondary effects such as density, stratification and light transmission (AMAP2017a ). Therefore, these differences between the water masses are important for the biology in the BaSR, including fish stocks and seasonal sea ice-edge production.

6.2.3 Sea Ice

The majority of the BaSR is ice-free all year-round, contrary to other sea areas at the same latitude. Only in the very northern part is there is year-round ice. In winter the 124 J. L. Fuglestad et al. ice edge normally is located just north of the polar front (Smedsrud et al. 2013). Also, most of the coastal areas, including fjords and bays, in the BaSR are ice free year round allowing for ship transport to major ports in Norway and Russia even in winter. The coastal areas and the west and southern parts of this region have always been ice free throughout the year. The West Spitsbergen Current that brings water masses from southern areas, influences ice cover in the Barents Sea Region (Ivanov et al. 2012); and even in winter there are open water areas at very high latitudes. The interactions between the Atlantic currents and the Arctic currents play a major role in the formation of sea ice in the BaSR (AMAP 2017a). In the geographically defined Barents Sea there is a strong seasonal variability in ice cover. Approximately 50% of the Barents Sea is ice covered during the winter months, but most of it is ice free in summer. The further expected warming of Arctic regions including the Barents Sea Region, will have profound implications for the sea ice cover also in winter in the eastern and northern parts of this region. The decline in sea-ice extent and volume has been widely documented the last couple of decades (e.g. Overland and Wang 2007; AMAP 2017b). Laidre et al. (2015) provided an ecologically-focused study of seasonal changes in sea ice. The study showed the Barents Sea region to have experienced four times the average rate of change in terms of seasonal sea-ice coverage compared to the Arctic in general, with a reduction of 20+ weeks in just the last few decades. Over the period 1979–2012 first-year sea ice extent decreased by 3.5–4.1% per decade, with the most pronounced reduction occurring during summer at 9.4–13.6% per decade (equivalent to a loss of 0.73–1.07 million km2 per decade), and was 11–16% per decade for multi-year sea ice (Vaughan et al. 2013). The Barents Sea is expected to become the first Arctic region that is ice-free all year round. Using RCP 8,5 projections it is indicated there will be a 94% reduction in September sea-ice extent. Sea ice influences the connection between ocean and the atmosphere, planetary energy flow, weather phenomena, and marine life, and so a decrease in its extent and volume could have profound effects on the future Barents area (AMAP 2017a). Sea ice cover is about the extent as well as the volume of the sea ice. As the warming of the Arctic continues there is less and less multi-year ice in the Barents region. The properties of multi-year ice are very different from annual ice and the physical properties of the ocean-atmosphere are very different between ice-free or ice-covered oceans. For all kinds of marine life associated with sea ice this has huge implications, e.g. for seals and polar bears, but also for microorganisms and thereby the ecosystem. For human activities like shipping or extraction of natural resources the sea ice cover, or lack of it, has of course tremendous implications. There is a strong correlation between the ice conditions and the socio-economy, both locally and globally. The land adjacent to the BaSR is a highly populated and developed region and there are various industrial sectors in the area, both those important internationally as well as those important for local communities. A continued future warming of the Arctic and declining sea ice leads to increased heat release to the atmosphere and reduced vertical stability. Also a shift in the large- scale atmospheric circulation pattern over Europe in winter is expected (Christensen 6 Ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region 125 et al. 2015).The declining sea ice is also important for the possible future increase in shipping trough the North east passage and extraction of natural resources in the region.

6.2.4 Ocean Acidification

Another feature of the entire Arctic marine areas, including the BaSR, which has been called the “new kid on the block” is the ocean acidification. Calculations indicate that 25% of the world’s human emissions of CO2 have been dissolved in sea water. This process creates a weak acid and lowers the oceans pH. Ocean acidification is an Arctic issue because CO2 dissolves better in cold waters than in temperate and tropical waters. Therefore Arctic Ocean acidification has a number of potential biological and ecological consequences. The pH of surface waters in the Norwegian Sea has decreased significantly over the past 30 years (Skjelvan et al.2014 ). There are so far scarce data concerning responses of ocean acidification on the Barents Sea Region species and ecosystems. However, Arctic marine ecosystems are likely to be at risk from ocean acidification and then it could have huge socio-economic consequences.

6.3 The Biology of the Barents Sea Region

6.3.1 Plankton

The primary production, the phytoplankton grow and the following grazing by zooplankton is vital to a well-functioning ecosystem. With very few exceptions all marine life is based upon the biological conversion of light energy to chemical bond energy stored in the form of organic carbon (Rey 2004). In the BaSR the primary production is highly seasonal due to the extreme variation in light levels and temperature across the annual cycle (Sakshaug et al. 2009). The pronounced spring bloom is based on the nutrients accumulated in the water masses during winter when there is too little light for the phytoplankton to start the primary production. The majority of the primary production in the region is by phytoplankton with some contribution by ice-algae. In the western and southern part of the Barents Sea region the contribution from ice algae is insignificant. With the projected even less sea ice in the east and northern Barents Sea in the coming decades it is anticipated the role of the ice algae will decrease in the future with a concomitant increase in phytoplankton production. Analyses of time series 1998–2011 indicates a moderate increase in net primary production in the Barents Sea due to rising sea temperatures, declining sea ice and prolonged open water seasons (Dalpadado et al. 2014). The zooplankton grazes on the phytoplankton and is the link to the higher trophic levels. There is a diverse number of zooplankton species of various taxonomic and trophic groups in the region (Eiane and Tande 2009). There are boreal groups associated with the warmer Atlantic water in the south and Arctic groups associated with 126 J. L. Fuglestad et al. cold Arctic water in the north. With the continued expected warming of the region it is expected the boreal species will expand east and north while the Arctic species will retreat. This can have impacts on the geographical distribution of higher trophic levels like fish and whales.

6.3.2 Benthos

Animals that live on (epifauna) or in (infauna) the bottom sediments are referred to as benthos. Most infauna animals are bivalves and worms while epifauna is e.g. some fish, brittle stars, sea urchins, shrimps and crabs. In addition benthos can be divided into macro- and microbenthos and therefore there is a huge variety of animals referred to as benthos. The majority of benthic fauna is stationary. The prevailing environmental conditions, including large-scale oceanography, reflect the composition of benthos of the Barents Sea Region (Carroll et al. 2008; Cochrane et al. 2009; Jørgensen et al. 2015). Studies show that infauna (mostly worms and bivalves) density and species richness in the Barents Sea area are 86% and 44% greater at stations near the Polar Front than at stations in either Atlantic- or Arctic-dominated water masses (Carroll et al. 2008). North of the Polar Front, sea ice suppresses water column productivity and infaunal abundances are significantly lower than in open-water areas south of the Polar Front, while the numbers of taxa present are similar (Cochrane et al. 2009) (Fig. 6.3). Bottom trawling operations can have destructive impact on benthic habitats and communities and is of particular concern. In areas of traditional trawl fishing, including the Barents Sea, such operations can cover up to half of the seabed area and can result in the death of 20–40% of benthic organisms. Trawling impacts are greatest on hard bottom habitat dominated by large sessile fauna (Jørgensen et al.

1924-1935 1968-1970 1991-1994

Total biomass, g/m2

<10 10-25 25-50 50-100 100-300 300-500 >500

Fig. 6.3 Distribution of benthic biomass in the Barents Sea for three survey periods (after Brotskaya and Zenkevich 1939; Antipova 1975; Kiyko and Pogrebov 1997) (Institute of Marine Research) 6 Ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region 127

2015). Direct visual observations in the Barents Sea show vast areas of the seabed exhibit traces of trawling in the form of a trench 2.3 m wide and 0.8 m deep, where the benthic fauna has been virtually eliminated (Aibulatov 2005). The most vulnerable species include corals, sponges and other components of benthic communities. Such species can take tens to hundreds of years to recover from trawling pressure. The long-term impacts of bottom trawling are now the focus of detailed studies in relation to the development of ‘sustainable fisheries’ (Lyubin et al. 2011; WWF 2013).

6.3.3 Fish

There are about 200 species of fish in the Barents Sea region, but far from all of them are commercially exploited. There are three main groups of fish in the Barents Sea seen from a trophic level perspective: Species feeding on plankton, species feeding on benthos, and species feeding on other fish (Dolgov et al.2011 ). The planktivorous species, capelin (Mallotus villosus), polar cod (Boreogadus saida) and juvenile herring (Clupea harengus) are important species for top trophic predators in the Barents Sea marine ecosystem. These three species have broadly divided the sea area among them with capelin in the north, herring in the south, and polar cod mainly in the east (AMAP 2017a). Northeast Arctic cod (Gadus morhua), haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), saithe (Pollachius virens), herring, and capelin are the most commercially important fish species in the Barents Sea Region. The region is one of the most fishery intensive areas in the world. Recruitment of Northeast Arctic cod, haddock and herring is related to the inflows of Atlantic water and the accompanying higher temperatures in the Barents Sea (Ottersen and Loeng 2000). The Northeast Arctic cod distribution area increased from 2004 to 2013 and has the last decade covered most of the Barents Sea shelf in autumn (August–September) and has also expanded northward during winter (Johansen et al. 2013; Prokhorova 2013). The northern expansion of cod is a prime example of the “borealization’ of the Barents Sea ecosystem (Fig. 6.4). The Northeast Arctic cod stock migrates in late winter/early spring to the Norwegian coast for spawning. Approximately 40% of the stock migrates to the Lofoten islands in the southern part of the Barents Sea Region. This spawning migration is source for huge commercial cod stock fisheries along the Norwegian coast. Haddock is the second most commercially important fish species in this region. Cod feed mostly on other pelagic species while haddock mainly feed on benthic species. Haddock has also recently reached a historic high in abundance and has increased its distribution range since the 1950s (Mehl et al. 2013; McBride et al. 2014). This finding is related to large haddock stocks, an increasing proportion of large individuals in the stocks and higher water temperatures, similar to the situation for Northeast Arctic cod. Mackerel (Scomber scombrus) distribution is primarily south of the Barents Sea Region and prefers water temperatures above 6 °C. The spawning areas are in the 128 J. L. Fuglestad et al.

Fig. 6.4 Distribution of Atlantic cod in the Barents Sea 2004 and 2013. (Prozorkevich and Gjøsæter 2013)

North Sea and west of the British Isles and along the French, Spanish and Portuguese coast. After spawning in February–July mackerel migrates north into the Norwegian Sea and recently even north to Svalbard and into Greenlandic waters. Mackerel is a typical example of a commercial fish stock that lately has migrated further north into the waters off the Norwegian northern coast and even further north. Traditionally the commercial mackerel fisheries have been outside the boundaries of Barents Sea Region (including the Norwegian Sea). In the period 1973–2001 ca 10% of the total mackerel was caught in the Norwegian Sea with the highest catch of 135,000 tons in the mid-1990s (www.imr.no).Most of the catch is landed by Norway and Russia. The last couple of years the catch has been higher than the advice from the International Council for Exploration of the Seas (ICES) because the countries which fish mackerel didn’t reach an agreement. In 2015 Norway, the European Union (EU) and the Faroe Islands agreed, but Iceland and Russia were not part of the agreement. The distribution of mackerel is of today limited to west of the line between Spitsbergen, Bear Island (Bjørnøya) and mainland Norway.

6.3.4 Marine Mammals

The BaSR contains one of the most species-rich marine mammal communities in the circumpolar Arctic (Laidre et al. 2015). Key marine mammals include whales, seals, walrus and polar bear. The majority of marine mammals are higher trophic level feeders, with large body sizes and large blubber reserves, which are important for insulation as well as for energy storage. These animals require food resources that are concentrated in time and space at least on a seasonal basis, making them particularly good ecosystem health indicators; they integrate signals of ecosystem change at lower trophic levels and hence are often referred to as ecosystem 6 Ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region 129

‘sentinels’, thus warranting significant attention in climate change assessments (AMAP 2017a). Most of the marine mammals in the Barents Sea region have experienced high levels of past exploitation and some are still artificially depressed by these earlier excessive harvests, such that they are included on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species and consequently protected (AMAP 2017a). Today two species of marine mammals are commercially harvested in the region; the harp seal (Pagophilus groenlandicus) and minke whale (Balaenoptera acutorostrata), both species are harvested well within sustainable limits. The circumpolar Arctic endemic marine mammal species include polar bear (Ursus maritimus), the three ice-affiliated cetaceans bowhead whale (Balaena mysticetus), narwhal (Monodon monoceros), and white whale (Delphinapterus leucas) are permanent residents in the north-eastern part of Barents Sea Region. Polar bears do not inhabit the mainland in the region, only on the islands to the north and east; e.g. Svalbard and Franz Josef Land. Due to the retreat of the sea-ice the polar bear habitat has declined, but polar bears in Svalbard have shown high adult survival and stable body condition (males) and production of yearlings from 1995 to present ( Aars et al. 2017).

6.4 Contaminants

Every ecosystem on earth has its’ share of contaminants that can harm its living organisms, from molecular level to populations. Many contaminants (heavy metals, Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), emerging contaminants) undergo long-range atmospheric transport (LRT) from far away sources and are deposited in the Arctic (AMAP 2004). Other transport routes to the Arctic are ocean currents, riverine inputs and biotic transport. Prevailing wind directions and ocean currents transport contaminants to the Barents area from distant sources in Europe, Asia and North America. There are relatively few major contaminant sources in the Barents Sea Region. Industrial point sources contribute to local pollution, but also global pollution via CO2 emissions. The local point sources include mining, smelters and petroleum activities. Some of the most widespread pollutants in the Barents Sea Region are heavy metals (mercury, lead, cadmium), oil (oil slicks, PAH and other hydrocarbons), persistent organic compounds (e.g. PCB, HCH, DDT) and artificial radionuclides (strontium-90, cesium-137, plutonium-239). The coastal ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region are most exposed to anthropogenic activities. However, even in coastal areas, the levels of chemical pollutants are generally lower than officially accepted environmental quality standards and lower than in other parts of Russian or European seas (UNEP 2004; Matishov 2007). The ecological situation is most severe in impact zones (“hot spots”), which are situated in coastal areas with high economic activities. In regards to marine (pelagic) ecosystems, there is no reason to suppose negative effects of contaminants in open waters due to their low background contamination. Impacts of pollutants on seabird populations have been observed and 130 J. L. Fuglestad et al. studies on dead and dying seabirds on Bear Island indicate contaminants could be the main reason for the mortality (Sagerup et al. 2009). Atmospheric monitoring since the 1990s at the Zeppelin monitoring station, Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, show declining trends of most legacy POPs (AMAP 2014). The decline seems to have slowed down in recent years as the concentrations have become much lower (AMAP 2014). The declining trends are anticipated to continue. However, continued sea-ice retreat may result in re-emission of previously sea-ice deposited PCBs and other contaminants. The brominated flame retardant polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs) showed a declining trend 2006–2012 at Zeppelin and Pallas air monitoring stations (AMAP 2014). Both PCBs and PBDEs are listed on the Stockholm Convention and further declining trends are expected on medium and long term. Of the heavy metals mercury is the one which has had the most attention in the Arctic. Monitoring and assessment of mercury in the Arctic was important input for the Minamata Convention on mercury. Over the past 150 years mercury levels in the Arctic have increased roughly ten-fold. Nearly all present day mercury levels in biota are therefore of anthropogenic origin (AMAP 2011). Most of the time series data showing increased trends are for marine species, while no significant recent increases were found for terrestrial animals (AMAP 2011). Many of the contaminants are transferred through nutrition, from the lower levels of the food chain, such as polar cod and capelin, to the higher trophic levels. Thus, species at the top of the marine food chain, such as polar bears and glaucous gulls, accumulate high concentrations of contaminants. Many of the organic substances also bind to fat, and Arctic species typically build up fat reserves to protect them from the cold and give them an energy source when food is scarce. When the animals consume this fat, the pollutants are released into their blood stream, perhaps having harmful effects even though the air and the water are cleaner in the Arctic than further south. Future trends of mercury in Arctic biota on medium and long term are dependent on the implementation of the Minamata Convention and global emissions. The Minamata convention entered into force May 2017 when more than 50 countries had ratified it. Emissions scenarios project that if currently available emission reduction measures are implemented globally, then mercury deposition in the Arctic might be expected to decrease by as much as 20% by 2020 relative to 2005 levels (AMAP 2011).

6.5 Marine Biological Resources

6.5.1 Ocean Fisheries

Much of the shipping activity in the Barents Sea Region is fishing vessels. Of a total of approximately 5000 ships in 2009, around 1600 were fishing boats (Arctic Council 2009).The commercially most important fish species in the Barents Sea Region are Northeast Arctic cod, haddock, saithe, herring, and capelin. The North east Arctic cod is the world’s single largest cod stock that represent a Total Allowable 6 Ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region 131

Catch (TAC) quota of around one million metric tons. Although the agreed TAC quota has been reduced to almost 900.000 metric tons for 2016 and the International Council for Exploration of the Seas (ICES) has recommended the cod quota for 2017 be set to 805.000 metric tonnes (the same as the recommendation for 2016), the economic value and contribution to the countries involved (mainly Norway and Russia) is significant (AMAP 2017a). There are annual quota negotiations between Russia and Norway based on ICES scientific advice. Over several years the spawning stock of Northeast Arctic cod has been at a very high level (Gradinger 2015) and the fish stocks in the regions are in good health. A key question for the future is how the observed and projected increased water temperatures will further influence the biological productivity and the ecosystem. A change in the ocean’s physical/chemical properties can influence the primary and secondary production. Zooplankton species (e.g. Calanus) play a crucial role in the Barents Sea ecosystem and the capelin is a key fish species important for the cod stocks. So far there are no or little evidence that the increased water temperature and other physical/chemical factors have had negative impact on the different trophic levels and therefore not have influenced the cod stock. Besides the questions related to physical/chemical and biological factors influencing the TAC of the commercial important species, a major question is how the fish stocks are managed in the future. In 1976 the Joint Norwegian Russian Fisheries Management Commission was established and it has had positive influence on the stock size. The Commission decides on the TAC and distribution of quotas among the involved parties (Norway, Russia and 3rd countries.). Around 15% of the Northeast Arctic cod quota is allocated to third countries. The commission coordinates cooperative research projects between Norway and Russia, e.g. fish stock surveys, focused on enhancing understanding of the Barents Sea ecosystem and factors driving the dynamics of the most important commercial species (AMAP 2017a). In 2002 the two parties agreed to establish a new tool for sustainable precautionary management principle; a guideline that restricted the changes in TAC to approximately 10% annually. Based on this principle positive impact from the joint management regime became much stronger (Hønneland 2006). It is believed that this co-management regime is one of the main reasons behind the healthy state of the fish stocks in the Barents Sea and adjacent waters. In general, the joint Fisheries Commission has been successful in terms of establishing and maintaining a both biological and economic sound fisheries management regime (Fig. 6.5). There has been a tendency that small-scale coastal fishing is being replaced by high technology, fewer fishermen and larger companies and trawlers (Keskitalo 2008). These trends can be exacerbating with climate change trends. More ocean-going vessels and the need to possess quotas for other (more expensive) species may limit the extent to which local fishermen can cope with such changes (Keskitalo 2008).

6.5.2 Aquaculture

Of the total Arctic fish farming the Norwegian share is currently 98% of total value (Hermansen and Troel 2012). There are some small volumes of freshwater fish 132 J. L. Fuglestad et al.

Catch, thousand tonnes 4500

Saithe Herring 3750 Shrimp Greenland halibut Haddock Redﬁsh 3000 Polar cod Atlantic cod Capelin

2250

1500

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0 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Fig. 6.5 Total catches of the most important fish stocks in the Barents Sea (including catches in all of the ICES areas - along the Norwegian seas and the Norwegian coast south to 62 N) from 1965 to 2013. The herring fishery targets adult fish, which are actually taken outside the Barents Sea, but these fish spawn within the Barents Sea being produced in Finland and Sweden and some production of Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) in the Murmansk region. The Norwegian marine aquaculture industry is relatively new, starting in the early 1970s on the Norwegian West coast. After approximately ten years of extensive “trial and error”, combined with a significant research effort, Atlantic salmon took the lead as the main breed of farmed marine salmonoids. The history of the farming of Atlantic salmon has gone through stages of different challenges – both technological, biological and market-challenges. The positive trend in production volumes has, notwithstanding, continued throughout the years as illustrated in the figure below (Fig. 6.6). In the period 1998–2016 Norway’s total fish farming production increased from about 0.4 million tons to more than 1.3 million tons. Fish farming in Norway is nearly entirely marine fish farming of finfish and salmon (Salmo salar) makes up approximately 95% of the total production. In 2016, the three northernmost counties (Nordland, Troms and Finnmark) contributed to almost 40% of Norway’s total marine aquaculture production. This is an increase from ~27% in 1998 (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2016). About 2000 people were employed in the Norwegian aquaculture industry in the three northernmost counties in 2016 (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2016). In 2016 the total value of Norwegian farmed fish was 64 billion NOK, comparable to approximately 8 billion USD (Statistics Norway 2017). In Russia the aquaculture sector is under strong development in the Murmansk region, where the volume of raised commercial fish is now significantly higher; increasing from 440 tons in 2007 to 16,300 tons in 2012 (Strategy for development 6 Ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region 133

1600000

1400000

1200000 Year 1000000

800000

600000

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0 12345678910111213141516171819

Fig. 6.6 Production of farmed salmonids in Norway 1998–2016. Red is total production in Norway, green is the production in the three counties (Nordland, Troms, Finnmark) within the Barents Sea Region. (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2017) of the Murmansk region 2013).Further development of the aquaculture sector is planned, as it is expected that measures underway will drive an increase in the volume of fish farmed from 16,300 tons in 2012 to 98,900 tons by 2025 (a sixfold increase). This is approximately the same amount as was produced in the northernmost county in Norway, Finnmark, in 2016. There are several reasons for the trend that more fish is produced in the northern regions, including the increase in ocean temperature in the south and central West coast of Norway and vast unexploited sheltered sea areas in northern Norway. Increasing ocean temperature is not favorable for salmon aquaculture for several reasons, including the spread of viral disease outbreaks (pancreas disease, infec- tious pancreatic necrosis), heart and skeletal muscle inflammation, and cardiomy- opathy syndrome (Stene et al. 2014; Taranger et al. 2015). The increase in temperature is a significant driver for moving aquaculture activities towards areas with lower ocean temperatures and with sufficient water flow. Northern Norway is an area with both qualities, and with relatively good infrastructure throughout the entire salmon farming value chain. The role and influence of the arctic temperature regime for salmonoid aquaculture need more scientific investigation and documentation. Norwegian fish farming face huge problems with diseases, lice, and farmed salmon escaping from the cages and genetically mix with the wild salmon. A farmed salmon differs quite much from a wild salmon and therefore mixing of genes between them is not wanted. Fish farming is also a major source of nitrogen and phosphorus discharges to Norwegian coastal waters. In 2013, discharges from fish-farming in the three counties within the Barents Sea Region (Nordland, Troms and Finnmark) accounted for about 85% (nitrogen) and 90% (phosphorus) of the total anthrophonic inputs of 134 J. L. Fuglestad et al. these substances to this coastline (Selvik and Høgåsen 2014). However, the coastline is considered of good or high status according to the EU Water Framework Directive, and as a non-problem area for eutrophication according to the Oslo-Paris Convention (OSPAR) screening procedure (Norderhaug et al. 2016). Another aspect that can play a role in the future development of farming of Atlantic salmon is the new ideas for developing the large high seas structures for salmon farming. These structures are supposed to be located outside of the traditional coastline area and will face other challenges, but also present potential opportunities.

6.5.3 Red King Crab and Snow Crab

The red king crab (Paralihoides camtschatica) was deliberately introduced from the North Pacific Ocean to the Kola Peninsula area in the 1960s. The crab has since then migrated into Norwegian waters and east and south of North Cape. The crab is a commercial important species, but it can increase to huge number of individuals within limited geographical area and cause ecological problems. East of North Cape the harvest is controlled with specific quotas, but west of North Cape the crab can be caught without restrictions. In the Russian part of this region, the fjords are open and slope gradually toward the open ocean while in Norway, the coast and fjords are steep and deep. As a result, the crabs are restricted to the coast in Norway where the migration for feeding (deep waters) and mating (shallow waters) take place close to land, while on the Russian side the crabs migrate northward over the shallow banks to reach foraging areas in deeper waters (Jørgensen and Nilssen 2011). The snow crab (Chionoecetes opilio) was first discovered in the Barents Sea in 1996. The crab could have been introduced by ballast water, but this is not totally clear. Genetic studies have shown the snow crab in the Barents Sea and the Bering Sea are related and this supports the hypothesis that it has migrated from east and not from the population in West-Greenland (www.imr.no). The snow crab is a cold a water species which has migrated into the eastern part of the Barents Sea Region. In the Barents Sea commercial snow crab fishing started in 2013. Russian studies have shown the biomass of the snow crab in the Barents Sea, primarily distributed in the eastern Barents Sea, is ten times the biomass of the red king crab in the Barents Sea and half the biomass of shrimps. It is expected the snow crab will migrate north and north-west and inhabit the waters around Franz Josef Land and Svalbard. This can lead to conflicts who has the rights to quotas around Svalbard (Box 6.1).

6.6 Marine Areas of Ecological Importance

Marine Protected Area (MPA) is a generic term that includes a variety of types of protected areas. In 2016, 4.7% of the total Arctic’s marine areas are protected. 6 Ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region 135

Box 6.1: Ecosystem Services The term ecosystem services have become more common the last decade with the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) published by the United Nations in 2005 as a milestone. This assessment defined “ecosystem services” as the benefits people obtain from ecosystems and as such link ecosystems with the human society. Ecosystem services thus range e.g. from drinking water supply via clean air to food production. The MEA distinguishes between four categories of ecosystem services, where the so-called supporting services are regarded as the basis for the services of the other three categories; provisioning, regulating and cultural (MEA 2005). Ecosystem services consist of two elements: the ability of ecosystems and biodiversity to provide services (the biophysical and ecological element), and the benefits of these services to humans (the social, cultural and economic elements) (Kettunen et al. 2012). Full benefits of ecosystem services are depended on healthy ecosystems. In the Barents Sea Region one of the main ecosystem services is the well-being and harvesting of the huge commercial fish stocks and the following economic value and health benefits people get from these fish stocks. In a rapid changing Arctic the ecosystems are also changing as has been described with e.g. the “borealization” of Arctic waters. As the ecosystems change in the Arctic so do the ecosystem services and consequently it is a need for adaptation to the new ecosystem services (Forsius et al. 2013). It is often seen that a change in ecosystems and ecosystem services is negative and not so often a positive change. Sometimes it can also be discussed if a change is negative or not. Invasive alien species can have a negative impact on an ecosystem, or change the ecosystem to a new state and on the other hand increase the benefit humans have from that ecosystem. The invasion of the red king crab along the Russian-Norwegian border is an example how this species has increased the income for people in the area. Reduced emissions of greenhouse gases are a top priority for conserving the ecosystems and ecosystem services as they are today. However, societal changes also have huge impacts on ecosystem services. The vulnerability of ecosystem services in the Arctic to the developing bio-economy and to the increasing use of natural resources requires further investigation (AMAP 2017a).

In the Barents Sea Region there are several local areas defined as “areas of heightened ecological significance” (AMSA IIc) and Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) as defined by IUCN. The “areas of heightened ecological significance” have been classified according to its use by birds, fish or marine mammals. The classification can be assigned based on spawning areas for fish, breeding, feeding, molting, migration, staging and wintering areas for the animals. In the Barents Sea Region there are several area of heightened ecological significance (Fig. 6.7) (AMSA IIc) 136 J. L. Fuglestad et al.

Fig. 6.7 Areas of heightened ecological significance in the Barents Sea Large Marine Ecosystem (AMAP/CAFF/SDWG 2013)

In the southern part of the Barents Sea Region (the Norwegian Sea) the Lofoten Islands is defined as an area of heightened ecological significance because of its’ importance as a spawning area for Atlantic cod migrating from the Barents Sea and also as an important breeding area for seabirds and feeding area for marine mammals (AMSA IIc). Table 6.1 gives an overview of these areas and their significance for the fauna. Two distinct geographical areas within the Barents Sea Region have been defined by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) as Ecologically or Biologically Significant Areas (EBSAs). These are the “North-eastern Barents-Kara Sea” and “Murmansk Coast and Varanger fjord”. The EBSA areas provide important services to one or more species/population of the ecosystem or to the ecosystem as a whole (CBD 2015) The Norwegian Government has produced several white papers to the Storting (parliament) about ecosystem based management plans for the Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea. The purpose of the management plans is “to provide a framework for value creation through the sustainable use of natural resources and ecosystem services in the sea areas and at the same time maintain the structure, functioning, productivity and diversity of the ecosystems.” (Meld. St. 20 (2014–2015)).The first management plan for the Barents Sea and Lofoten islands was presented to the 6 Ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region 137

Table 6.1 Areas of heightened ecological significance identified within the Barents Sea Region including information on the extent of the area and its use by fish, birds and marine mammals Area (103 No Area name km2) Fish Birds Mammals 1 Pechora Sea 263 Sp, F, St, Mo B, F, W F 2 Norwegian and Murmansk coasts 130 Sp B, F, W 3 Entrance and northern White Sea 20 Mo, W B, Mo, Mi, W 4 White Sea (Kandalaksha, Onega and 32 Sp B, F, Mo, F, W Dvina bays) St, W 5 Bear Island 10 B, F, St 6 Svalbard Archipelago 150 Sp B, F, Mo B, F, W 7 Franz Josef Land 117 B, F, St B, F, W 8 Western and Central Barents Sea 139 W F, Mi, W F 9 Northern Barents Sea – marginal ice 228 F zone 10 Western Novaya Zemlya 101 F, B, Mi Mi B breeding, F feeding, Mi migration, Mo molting, Sp spawning; St staging, W wintering Reproduced from AMAP/CAFF/SDWG (2013)

Storting in 2006. An update of the plan was published as a white paper in 2015 (Meld. St. 20 (2014–2015)). The management plans are cross-sectorial and the Norwegian government will in 2020 present an overall revision of the entire Barents Sea-Lofoten area management plan. In the management plans the Norwegian government underline stewardship of the marine areas must be based on knowledge, both about business activities as well as the status and trends of the marine ecosystems. In the geographical area covered by this book the biggest marine protected areas are on the west coast of Svalbard archipelago, classified according to IUCN management category as Ia- Strict Nature Reserve (CAFF and PAME 2017). This category defines and area where use and impacts are strictly controlled and Ia areas can serve as reference areas for research and monitoring. Just outside the Barents Sea Region, the marine areas around Franz Josef Land are classified as Ib- Wilderness area. The framework for pan-Arctic network of marine protected areas sets out a common vision for international cooperation in MPA network development and management. It aims to inform the development of MPAs under national jurisdiction. The framework is not legally binding (PAME 2015). The purpose of the national MPA network in the Arctic is to protect and restore marine biodiversity, ecosystem function and special natural features including preserving cultural heritage and subsistence resources. 138 J. L. Fuglestad et al.

6.7 Summary

The Barents Sea Region is a diverse region with cold, Arctic waters in the east and north and warm Atlantic waters to the west and south. Parts of the region have always been open waters with no seasonal sea-ice. The ongoing and predicted future changes physical, chemical and biological conditions in the region that can have impacts on the governing of the region. Declining sea ice will have an enormous impact on the ecosystem and all species associated with sea-ice. Declining sea ice, but also technological development, opens up the region for oil and gas exploration and the Northern Sea Route which can lead to a conflict between environmental protection and economic development.

Table 6.2 Summary of key observations, drivers of change and conditions affecting sustainability Observation Driver Condition (current and future manifestation) Higher sea Climate Most of the Barents Sea Region has always been ice-free temperatures change, all year round including coastal areas, with strong seasonal and declining emissions of sea-ice conditions in the east and north part of the region. sea ice greenhouse Retreating sea-ice impacts all marine life associated with gases. sea-ice including primary production and higher trophic levels like seals and polar bears. A key question for the future is how the observed and projected increased water temperatures will further influence the biological productivity and the ecosystem. Decreasing sea ice in the east and north parts of the Barents Sea region also potentially open the Northern Sea Route for more commercial ship traffic between Asia and Europe. Fish stocks Increased sea Atlantic cod, haddock, saithe, herring, and capelin are the migrating temperatures most commercially important fish species in the Barents north and east Sea Region. The region is one of the most fishery intensive areas in the world. The cod distribution area has increased the last decade covers now most of the Barents Sea shelf in autumn. The Atlantic cod stock is the most commercial important fish stock in the region and is co-managed between Norway and Russia. A future healthy fish stock population is both depended on a still healthy ecosystem and a maintaining a biological and economic sound fisheries management regime. Introduction of Increased sea With borealization of the Barents Sea region with inflow of new, temperatures, Atlantic waters, new species are introduced to the area. commercial human These species are deliberated introduced by humans (e.g. species activities. the Red King Crab) or they have migrated to the region, e.g. mackerel. The red king crab has caused ecological problems, but is also a commercial important species. The snow crab is relatively new the region and the juridical rights to the fisheries in the Svalbard fishery zone are not solved. 6 Ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region 139

Northeast Arctic cod populations have expanded north and east due to increased sea temperatures. The cod fisheries in the region are huge and represent great commercial interests. A changed distribution between Norwegian and Russian waters is important for the stewardship of cod and other commercially important fish stocks. New species have been introduced to the region either naturally or they have been introduced by humans and it is expected the commercial value of such species will increase in the coming years. Commercial fisheries of the snow crab started in 2013 and when the crab migrates into the areas around Svalbard it is an example of who has the rights to the snow crab quotas in the Svalbard fishery zone (Table 6.2).

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Skjelvan I, Jeansson E, Chierici M, Omar A, Olsen A, Lauvset S, Johannessen T (2014) Ocean acidification and uptake of anthropogenic carbon in the Nordic Seas, 1981-2013. Norwegian Environment Agency, Report M244-2014 Smedsrud LH, Esau IN, Ingvaldsen RB, Eldevik T, Haugan PM, Li C, Lien V, Omar A, Otterå OH, Risebrobakken B, Sandø AB, Semenov V, Sorokina SA (2013) The role of the Barents Sea in the Arctic climate system. Rev Geophys 51:415–449 Statistics Norway (2017). www.ssb.no/fiskeoppdrett. Salg av slaktet matfisk, førstehåndsverdi (In Norwegian) Stene A, Bang Jensen B, Knutsen Ø, Olsen A, Viljugrein H (2014) Seasonal increase in sea temperature triggers pancreas disease outbreaks in Norwegian salmon farms. J Fish Dis 37(8):739–751 Taranger GL, Karlsen Ø, Bannister RJ, Glover KA, Husa V, Karlsbakk E, Kvamme BO, Boxaspen KK, Bjørn PA, Finstad B, Madhun AS, Morton HC, Svåsand T (2015) Risk assessment of the environmental impact of Norwegian Atlantic salmon farming. ICES J Mar Sci 72(3):997–1021 UNEP (2004) Matishov, G., N. Golubeva, G. Titova, A. Sydnes and B. Voegele. Barents Sea: GIWA Regional assessment 11. University of Kalmar, Sweden Vaughan DG, Comiso JC, Allison I, Carrasco J, Kaser G, Kwok R, Mote P, Murray T, Paul F, en J, Rignot E, Solomina O, Steffen K, Zhang T (2013) Observations: cryosphere. In: Stocker TF, Qin D, Plattner G-K, Tignor M, Allen SK, Boschung J, Nauels A, Xia Y, Bex V, Midgley PM (eds) Climate Change 2013: the physical science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Wassmann P, Slagstad D, Riser CW, Reigstad M (2006) Modelling the ecosystem dynamics of the Barents Sea including the marginal ice zone. J Mar Syst 59(1–2):1–24 WWF (2013) Impact of trawling fisheries on bottom ecosystems of Barents Sea. World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Economies of the Barents Sea Region 7 Valeriy Kryukov and Diwakar Poudel

Abstract This chapter provides a synopsis of the economic dimensions of the Barents Sea Region. It discusses the economic value of different resources, including fisheries and aquaculture, oil and gas development, mining, and tourism, as well as the economic potential of other resources like wave energy and genetic resources in both the Norwegian and Russian components of the Barents Sea Region. The main features of the economies of the Barents Sea Region include: orientation to the development of natural resources (organic and inorganic) and biological resources (fish and sea animals) together with economic activities molded by the traditional way of life of indigenous peoples of the Arctic region and largely aimed at meeting their needs.

7.1 Introduction

The Barents-Arctic region is Europe’s largest region for inter-regional cooperation that includes the northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Northwest Russia. The region has a unique natural and environmental wealth. The wealth and diversity of resources such as forests, wildlife, fish and birds, minerals, diamonds, oil and gas creates great opportunities and challenges for its management. As defined in this book, the Barents Sea Region (BaSR) covers almost 3 million sqkm

V. Kryukov (*) Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russia e-mail: [email protected] D. Poudel Norwegian Polar Institute, Tromsø, Norway

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 143 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_7 144 V. Kryukov and D. Poudel and has a population of over 1.6 million people. The BaSR extends over the Barents Sea, which has an average depth of ca. 230 m, and a maximum depth of about 500 m at the western end of Bear Island Trough (ICES 2013). The Barents Sea itself is one of the most productive oceanic areas in the world (NMCE 2016b; O’Brien et al. 2004) and is still relatively undamaged by anthropogenic activities. As such, there is potential for protecting its natural values for the future and for maintaining and developing sustainable industries based on its natural resources, along the coast of the Barents Sea and the region (WWF 2003). The Barents Sea ecosystem is rich in diversity, with many species of zooplankton, fish, sea birds and mammals (Flaaten 1988). It is home to at least 20 million seabirds during the summer season. They belong to 40 different species and breed in 1600 colonies [12]. The Barents Sea sustains the highest sea floor biodiversity, including the world’s largest deep-water coral reef, huge mussel banks and large coastal kelp forests (WWF 2003). The Barents Sea is one of the most studied and well-managed seas in the world. The management of the living marine resources in the Barents Sea is carried out through collaboration between Norway and Russia (NMCE 2016b).

7.2 Economics of the Barents Sea Region from the Norwegian Perspective

The Barents Sea region and the territories comprises the Nordland, Troms and Finnmark Counties and the Svalbard Archipelago region, with a total population of approximately half million. Fisheries and aquaculture is the main living in the region followed by other mining industries and reindeer herding. The fishing industry from the Barents Sea region as a whole including harvested fish, farmed fish and fish processing contribution during 2012 was reported 5.4% of Gross regional Product (GRP) (Glomsrød et al. 2015). The oil and gas exploration activity has been increasing in the Barents Sea region from the beginning of the century, along with tourism and recreation activities. The economic activities and the contribution of the Barents Sea is discussed below.

7.2.1 Fisheries and Aquaculture

The Barents Sea is very important for the Norwegian fishing industry because it is a valuable nursing area for several important species of fish, and also contains a large proportion of the total Norwegian harvest. The major fish species in the Barents Sea include bottom-dwelling fish, such as cod, haddock, Greenland halibut, long rough dab, and redfish, as well as other commercially important species, including capelin, northern shrimp, Minke whales and harp seals. For the past 40 years, the Barents Sea has provided a yield of between one and 3.5 million tons of fish (NPI 2017). The Barents Sea harbors more than 200 different fish species, including some of the important commercial stocks (Michalsen et al. 2013). Among these are some of the world’s largest fish stocks, such as the Norwegian-Arctic cod, capelin, haddock, 7 Economies of the Barents Sea Region 145 saithe and Norwegian spring-spawning herring. There are also hundreds of cold- water coral reefs in the Barents Sea, which are very important spawning and nursing areas for many fish species, including the commercial stocks. The coral reefs are also an important habitat for more than 750 other species in the ecosystem (WWF 2003). The Barents Sea fisheries make a key contribution to the livelihood and maintenance of coastal communities in Northern Norway, in addition to the supply of the seafood to Norway and other parts of the world. The catch of the Barents Sea stock has been increasing overtime. In 2010, the catches of capelin, polar cod, cod, haddock, redfish, Greenland halibut, and shrimp in the Barents Sea were reported to be close to 2.9 million tons. The landed value of Norwegian catches from the Norwegian– Russian joint stocks was about NOK 4.2 billion, and the total export value was about NOK 7 billion (NMCE 2016a). In 2013, the landed value of catches from Norwegian fisheries in Arctic waters was about NOK 13 billion (NMCE 2016b). The total allowable catch (TAC) for 2017 for Barents Sea cod has been set at 890,000 tons by the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission. For haddock, the TAC was set at 233,000 tons. The harvest quota for Greenland halibut was 24,000 tons and for deep-sea redfish, the TAC was 30,000 tons. However, the there is no capelin fishing in the Barents Sea in 2017, as recommended by ICES (ICES 2016). In addition to the fish stocks, commercially important species of marine mammals, such as harp seals and Minke whales, are also harvested in the Barents Sea, although on a smaller scale (Jacobsen and Ozhigin 2011). Aquaculture and fish farming on the other hand, has been one of the most important industries in the Barents Sea region over many years. The Norwegian government has prioritized the aquaculture industry for seafood production in the recent years. The Government’s objective is to be the world’s leading seafood nation. About one-third of aquaculture takes place in North Norway, and production is increasing. Nordland county is one of the country’s largest aquaculture producing counties. Aquaculture production in Troms has also been more than doubled in recent years. In 2010, the fishing and aquaculture industry exported seafood to a total value of NOK 53.8 billion. Aquaculture products accounted for 62% of this figure (i.e. 33.4 billion NOK). The production from aquaculture has been increased to NOK 46.9 billion in 2015 (Statistics Norway 2016). Salmon and trout are the main aquaculture products in Northern Norway. In 2011, the Government decided to permit 5% growth of salmon and trout production in Troms and Finnmark. Farming of other marine species, such as cod and halibut, as well as some mollusks and crustaceans, has also been increasing in northern Norway, and the Government is facilitating further growth in the aquaculture industry within an environmentally sustainable framework (NMCE 2016a).

7.2.2 Oil and Gas Resources

The Barents Sea is the largest area of the Norwegian continental shelf, covering 313,000 km2. The Barents Sea South has been opened for petroleum activities and the government has identified several blocks for exploration in the Barents Sea over 146 V. Kryukov and D. Poudel many licensing rounds. In 24 licensing rounds, the government proposes to announce 93 blocks in the Barents. Over the last few years, the exploration effort has started to pay off, and the Barents Sea is becoming an exciting center of activity on the Norwegian continental shelf. To date, a total of 4 billion barrels of oil equivalent (bboe) of oil and gas have been discovered across the province.1 Furthermore, it is estimated that about half of the undiscovered resources on the Norwegian continental shelf are in the Barents Sea (visual diagram is presented in Fig. 7.1). There are five major projects in the Barents Sea, namely Snøhvit, Goliat, Johan Casberg, Wisting and Alta/Gohta. The Snøhvit and Goliat fields are in production, while the other three projects are in the discovery phase (Fig. 7.2).

7.2.2.1 Snøhvit Gas Snøhvit was discovered in the 1980s in the Norwegian Barents Sea, and is a large gas find contained within several reservoirs. Due to its location and the difficulties associated with getting the gas to market, commercial production only started about three decades after its discovery. The Snøhvit started its commercial production in 2007. Although the production was low for several years, the field achieved its

Fig. 7.1 The Barents Sea oil and gas network 2030 (projection). Source: North Energy (2012)

1 http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-76/issue-8/northwest-europe/barents-sea- norway-s-emerging-oil-province.html 7 Economies of the Barents Sea Region 147

Fig. 7.2 Dynamics of shipments along the Northern Sea Route (composition of cargoes and delivery destinations) in 2010–2015, million tons highest production in 2015, exporting more than 5 million metric tons (5.5 million tons) of liquefied natural Gas (LNG).2

7.2.2.2 Goliat Oil and Gas Goliat is the first oil field to come on stream in the Barents Sea, located 85 km northwest of Hammerfest in an ice-free area, off the shore of northern Norway. The development plan was approved by the authorities in 2009. The Goliat platform arrived in the Barents Sea in 2015 and started producing oil in 2016. The field will produce 100,000 barrels of oil per day. The Goliat field is estimated to contain about 180 million barrels of oil (28.5 million cubic meters) and 8 billion cubic meters of recoverable gas reserves.

7.2.2.3 Johan Castberg, Wisting Central and Alta/Gohta Field The Johan Castberg field, discovered in 2011, has two primary reservoirs called Skrugard and Havis and is predicted to produce 610 million barrels of oil. In 2013,

2 ibid. 148 V. Kryukov and D. Poudel two new fields, Wisting Central and Gohta, were discovered.3 With the anticipated startup of Castberg, Wisting and Alta/Gohta, total Barents production may go beyond 500,000 barrel of oil equivalent/day (boe/d), making the Barents Sea the province with the highest level of discovered resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS).4 This is about five times higher than current production from the area. With these new projects, the Barents Sea will become an important production province and could contribute to as much as 15% of total Norwegian production by the end of the next decade.5 Furthermore, the melting of Arctic ice is unlocking new possible gas and oil stocks and new shipping routes.6

7.2.3 Tourism and Recreational Industry

7.2.3.1 Tourism Tourism plays an important part in the economy of the Barents region. The major tourism attractions and activities in northern Norway and the Barents region that play a significant role in the Norwegian economy include the experience of Northern Lights; The Lofoten Islands, for scuba diving, recreational fishing, bird watching and mountain climbing; The North Cape, 71° North; The Arctic-Circle; Svartisen glacier; killer whale safaris in Tysfjord; whale safaris in Andenes, in Lofoten; Setergrotta cave, north of Mo i Rana; etc. The rich and diverse cultural life also offers memorable experiences for tourists (Barentsinfor.org 2017). The direct contribution of travel and tourism to the GDP of Norway was NOK 91.8 billion (2.9% of GDP) in 2014. This mainly reflects the economic activity generated by industries such as hotels, travel agents, airlines and other passenger transportation services (excluding commuter services). Nevertheless, it also includes, for example, the activities of the restaurant and leisure industries (WTTC 2015). The travel and tourism industry contributes to 5% of the employment in Norway, with northern Norway playing a significant role in generating both direct and indirect employment. The tourism sector in North Norway employs about 17,970 people in the three northernmost counties. The industry is, relatively speaking, a more important creator of jobs in Nordland, where 8.6% of employed people work in the industry (WTTC 2015).7

7.2.3.2 Recreation Recreational activities, such as fishing, hunting of sea birds or mammals, bird watching, whale and seal safaris and swimming, play very important role in creating

3 The Gohta field is estimated to contain between 10 and 21 million standard cubic meters of recoverable oil and between 5 and 8 billion standard cubic meters of recoverable gas. 4 http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-76/issue-8/northwest-europe/barents-sea- norway-s-emerging-oil-province.html 5 http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-76/issue-8/northwest-europe/barents-sea- norway-s-emerging-oil-province.html 6 http://www.norwaynews.no/meps-reject-ban-on-arctic-oil-drilling/ 7 Data source: World Travel and Tourism Council, 2015. 7 Economies of the Barents Sea Region 149 revenues in the Barents sea and coastal areas. Both national and international tourists visit the area. These are also other key values and benefits associated with cultural ecosystem services. A simple estimate suggests that the value of the recreational activities (as a consumer surplus) ranges from NOK 270–800 million for the people living in the Barents Sea–Lofoten area (Magnussen 2012). The economic effects of marine ecosystems on the recreational tourism sector are estimated, by Borch et al. (2011), to be over 500 million NOK per year in the Barents Sea region of Finnmark, Troms and Nordaland.

7.2.4 Other Economic Activities in the Barents Sea Region

7.2.4.1 Wind and Tidal Energy Production The Barents Sea could contribute to the production of renewable energy, such as wind and tidal energy. There is high potential for both offshore and onshore wind energy production in the Barents region. An example is the Hamnefjell project. The Hamnefjell project can take advantage of rich Arctic winds. The first phase of the project involves 15 wind turbines, with total rated power of approximately 50 MW, which is expected to generate 186 GWh per year. This could cover the energy needs of a town of around 8000 homes, and the wind farm is expected to be completed by the end of 2017. Both offshore and onshore wind energy production are seemingly set to increase in the Barents Sea over the coming years. In addition, there is high potential for tidal energy production. An example is the Floating tidal power plant, Morild II, which was tested over a 2-year trial in Gimsystraumen, in Lofoten, Northern Norway, in 2010. There is ongoing research on different types of models for tidal energy production (Grabbe et al. 2009).

7.2.4.2 Transportation Maritime transport is important for coastal communities in the Barents Sea region because the majority of goods and passengers within the region are transported by ship. There are 150–200 ship-owners in the local transport and cruise traffic sector, most are small businesses but there are also several major companies, such as Torghatten trafikkselskap, Veolia Nord and Hurtigruten. Ship-owners form a larger proportion of the maritime industry in North Norway than in the rest of the country. There are at least three potential factors linked to the maritime industry in the High North, including offshore energy extraction, intra-regional transport and polar transit. Although there is less activity in the Barents Sea than in others, it is predicted to increase in future, due to the Barents Sea oil and gas exploration activities. For example, Tanker activity in the area is likely to increase by more than 100 %, especially for large oil and gas tankers (NMCE 2016a). The Coast Guard and research vessels are other important actors in the region, in addition to the fishing vessels. The domestic and international maritime transport industry accounts for approximately 2% (3700 people) of employment in the three northernmost counties. 150 V. Kryukov and D. Poudel

7.2.4.3 Marine Bioprospecting According to Norway’s 2009 strategy for marine bioprospecting, there are estimated to be over 10,000 species in the region that are understudied and unexplored. This wide variety of species indicate that there are prospects for finding marine organisms with unique biochemical traits and substances. The Government has pro- moted marine bioprospecting through its 2009 strategy. The Government allocated NOK 59 million in 2010 and NOK 54 million in 2011 to activities such as gathering marine organisms from the northern sea areas and further development of infrastructure and research. The Government’s goal is sustainable value creation, and commercialization of products derived from marine bioprospecting (NMCE 2016a)

7.2.4.4 The BaSR Forest The forest in the Barents region of the northern Norway covers an area of about 2.7 million hectares, which is approximately 19% of the country’s total forest area. However, only 1.1 million hectares of the forest is productive. Of the total, half of the productive forests in Northern Norway have been estimated to be economically non-operational due to difficult terrain and long transport distance. The productive forest is divided into more than 18,000 forest holdings of at least 2.5 hectares. However, the forestry and forest industry are much less important sources of livelihood in Northern Norway, with the forest sector only providing employment for about 700 people (Välkky et al. 2008). On the other hand, the forest forms the basis for a rich and diverse array of wildlife, providing various indirect benefits and ecosystem services. The forest is a renewable resource and has potential for producing renewable energy in the region.

7.2.5 Employment and Indirect Benefits

The Barents Sea creates employment through different activities in Northern Norway. The fisheries sector (fishing, aquaculture and fish processing) provides employment for almost 5% of the labor force in North Norway, and is very important for maintaining settlement patterns. In addition, it generates a considerable number of jobs, for example, the supply, fish processing and fish transport industries (NMCE 2016a). The travel and tourism industry contributes 5% of the employment in Norway, with Northern Norway playing a significant role in generating both direct and indirect employment (WTTC 2015). The domestic and international maritime transport industry accounts for approximately 2% of employment in the three northernmost counties. According to the Bod Science Park report, there were 2210 people employed in the petroleum sector in the three most northern counties in 2015 (Nordland, Troms and Finmark). However, with increasing petroleum exploration activities, there is highly likely to be an increase in this form of employment. The Barents Sea offers several indirect benefits and services. These include: supporting services, such as maintenance of biodiversity and primary production, are necessary for the production of all other ecosystem services; regulating services, such as climate regulation and water purification; provisioning services, which are 7 Economies of the Barents Sea Region 151 the products obtained from ecosystems, such as fish, shellfish and energy sources, and genetic resources that provide a basis for the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries; and cultural services, which provide non-material benefits in the form of recreation, aesthetic experience and a sense of place and identity.

7.3 Economics of the Barents Sea Region from the Russian Perspective

The Barents Sea Region comprises the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts, the Republic of Karelia, and the Nenets Autonomous District. Its population (as of January 1, 2016) is 2.6 million. The economy of all these territories (subjects of the Russian Federation) is based on the development and use of natural resources, as well as the provision of transport services (primarily shipping). For example, the economy of the Murmansk Oblast is largely based on the local rich natural resource, including mainly mineral, hydrocarbon and marine bioresources. The main industries are the extraction of mineral and hydrocarbon resources (oil and gas, polymet- als, and apatite and iron ore), and the development of forest resources (wood procurement and processing). Other important industries include fishing, shipping and shipbuilding. Each of the constituent entities in this region has a specialization of its own. Economic activities involving the development and use of marine resources of the Arctic basin prevail in the economy of the Murmansk Oblast. Yet the bulk of this economy includes the mining and metallurgical industries, followed by commercial fishing, fish processing, shipping, shipbuilding and ship repair. The economy of the Arkhangelsk Oblast is dominated by forestry, mining, shipping and, on a much smaller scale, fishing. The economy of the Nenets Autonomous District is characterized by a rapid development of the oil and gas sector (Russia’s only oil and gas platform operates offshore in the area). The major economic activities and the contribution of the Barents Sea is discussed below.

7.3.1 Fisheries

Barents Sea fisheries play the greatest role in the Murmansk Oblast: its share in the gross regional product in 2001–2014 ranged from 9% to 15%. In 2015, fishing companies of the region caught 932,000 tons of aquatic bioresources. Of these, 679,400 tons were caught by companies of the Murmansk Oblast. These companies have a wide geography of operation, including not only Russia’s economic zone and continental shelf but also the economic zone of Norway, areas near Greenland, the Faroe Islands and the Svalbard archipelago, convention areas of the North-East and North-West Atlantic, and zones of African countries. Today, the fishing fleet of Russia’s Northern Basin mainly operates in the Barents Sea and other areas of the North-East Atlantic, where 80–90% of aquatic bioresources are caught. Catch volumes in the North-West Atlantic are insignificant compared to the North-East Atlantic (less than 1% in 2014), although recent years have 152 V. Kryukov and D. Poudel seen an increase in catch volumes in central and southern fishing areas of the Atlantic (10–15%) (Jørgensen and Hønneland 2015). The catch of aquatic bioresources in the Barents Sea alone was about 400,000 tons in 1996, and 580,000 tons in 2016. These figures are much lower than those of the 1980s. For example, the average annual catch by companies from the Murmansk Oblast in 2000–2010 was 605,000 tons, which is approximately three times less than the average figure for the 1980s. In 2011–2014, the situation improved somewhat – the average catch reached 614,500 tons. The most important distinctive feature of the situation in the fishing industry in the Barents Sea region (the Northern Basin) is that it is in the process of continuous transformation and change. This refers not only to property rights to the main assets (ships, terminals and fish factories) but also fishing rules and relationship with the state (ranging from financial support measures to fishing quota allocation principles). These factors add to the uncertainty about the functioning and, especially, development of the industry. At the same time, it should be noted that IUU fishing has considerably decreased since the 1990s. One of the key economic factors is that the industry very quickly (during the first half of the 1990s) reoriented itself from supply predominantly to the domestic market to export. Between 2007 and 2014, domestic cod resources increased almost 2.5 times. The fishing is a professional occupation of the coastal population which has no other employment alternatives (Jacobsen and Ozhigin 2011; Vaisman 2002; Zilanov 2013).

7.3.1.1 Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission Norway and Russia are united in the North by common interests and various forms of political cooperation. Of special importance is the management of marine resources, which requires not only constant and consistent implementation of mana- gerial decisions, but also permanent contact between the authorized bodies of the two countries (Jørgensen and Hønneland 2015). The Commission has been functioning for 40 years. Based on joint studies, it annually establishes total allowable catches (TACs) for cod, haddock, halibut, capelin, perch, herring and other fish in the Barents Sea. In addition, the Commission establishes national quotas for the catch of shared stocks for Russia, Norway and other nations. The Commission develops and adopts regulatory measures and gives recommendations to relevant bodies of the two countries for managing and control- ling fishing in the Barents Sea. The Treaty between Norway and Russia concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, which entered into force on July 7, 2011 states that ‘the Norwegian-Russian Joint Fisheries Commission shall continue to consider improved monitoring and control measures with respect to jointly managed fish stocks in accordance with the Agreements’. These are the Soviet-Norwegian agreement on cooperation in the fishing industry of April 11, 1975, and the Soviet-Norwegian Agreement Concerning mutual relations in the Field of Fisheries of October 15, 1976. Undoubtedly, fish stocks of the Barents Sea should be shared by the two delimited national regions. Peculiarities of fish migration in the sea basin (spawning grounds are in the eastern part, while habitats of adult fish are mainly in the western 7 Economies of the Barents Sea Region 153 part, in the waters of the Spitsbergen Island) requires a joint, coordinated efforts of respective administrative government agencies of the two countries. The introduction and maintenance of a regime under which both countries could fish throughout the Barents Sea. This regime would also presuppose that one part of the TAC would be offered to other countries. In a situation where fish stocks of the Barents Sea were in a poor state and the parties were not able to agree on management issues and technical regulatory measures, Russia and Norway were forced to think in a new way (Jørgensen and Hønneland 2015). The bilateral mechanism for managing stocks is based on Russian-Norwegian cooperation in scientific research (Jacobsen and Ozhigin 2011).

7.3.2 Oil and Gas Resources

Several oil and gas deposits have been discovered on the shelf of the Barents and Pechora Seas. The largest of them is the Shtokman gas condensate field, located in the central part of the Barents Sea (600 km from the city of Murmansk, with the depth of sea in the area varying from 320 m to 340 m).

7.3.2.1 Barents Sea Shelf The Gazprom company has repeatedly emphasized that the shelf of the Western Arctic has a high hydrocarbon potential, with non-associated gas prevailing. The discovery of the unique Shtokman gas condensate field (3.9 trillion cubic meters of category C1 gas reserves and 53.3 million tons of categories C1 and C2 condensate reserves) creates prerequisites for the formation of an offshore gas producing region. Other deposits with a high potential are located in the Pechora and Kara Seas (Dolginskoye, Prirazlomnoye, Ludlovskoye and Ledovoye, as well as offshore areas of the Semakovskoye, Krusensternskoye, Tota-Yakhinskoye, Antipayutinskoye and Kharasaveiskoye fields). It is the Gazprom group, namely Gazprom Neft, that now extracts hydrocarbons on the Arctic shelf, the only project of this kind in Russia. The work is conducted at the Prirazlomnoye oil field, located in the Pechora Sea 60 km from the shore. The initial recoverable oil reserves are estimated at over 70 million tons. The extraction is done with the help of the Prirazlomnaya offshore ice-resistant fixed platform, installed in 2011. The first well was drilled in the summer of 2013, and in December 2013 the Prirazlomnaya platform began producing oil. The project for developing the Prirazlomnoye field provides for commissioning 32 wells. By the end of November 2016, the platform had produced three million tons of oil. Oil is transported by two double-hulled ice-class (Arc6) oil tankers, the Kirill Lavrov and the Mikhail Ulyanov. Both were built at the Admiralty Shipyards, St. Petersburg, to ensure the year-round safe transportation of oil from the platform under Arctic conditions. The first oil was shipped from the field in April 2014, and the new sort of crude has been named Arctic Oil (ARCO) (Neftegaz.ru 2016). 154 V. Kryukov and D. Poudel

7.3.2.2 Pechora Sea Shelf The expansion of oil production in the northern part of the Timan-Pechora oil and gas province in the 1990-2000s was the result of Soviet-era achievements in geological prospecting, the booking of reserves, and aggressive corporate strategies, especially that of Lukoil (oil production in the Nenets Autonomous District in the 1990s was only 1.2 million tons, or 7.6% of the production in the Timan-Pechora oil and gas province, whereas in 2007 production reached 13.6 million tons, or 52.9%). [...] The low infrastructure level of the northern part of the Timan-Pechora oil and gas province ultimately led to the domination of large vertically integrated corporations, primarily Lukoil (as of 2007, the company accounted for 49.7% of all production, and when the Yuzhno-Khylchuyuskoye field reaches the design capacity, it will ensure up to 70% of oil production in the district; the company has the most developed pipeline system in the region, its own export marine terminal, Varandey, and a major control center in Naryan-Mar) and Rosneft (in 2007 it accounted for 39.5% of all oil production in the Nenets Autonomous District) (Anonymous 2010). Lukoil has completed the construction of a unique ice-resistance marine terminal in the Pechora Sea (the Varandey oil export terminal) with a capacity of up to 12 million tons per year, capable of accommodating ships with a displacement of up to 70,000 tons and ensuring direct shipments of oil from the Nenets Autonomous District to world markets. The company has also formed a fleet of ice-class tankers for the transportation of oil from the Timan-Pechora oil and gas province, and is much closer than other players to the creation of an integrated system of inter-field pipelines. Rosneft in 2003 acquired 100% of the Severnaya Neft company. In the 1990–2000s, several joint ventures operated simultaneously in the northern part of the Timan-Pechora oil and gas province (in close proximity to the Pechora Sea coast). These ventures involved the United States’ ConocoPhillips, France’s Total and Norway’s Statoil (this refers, above all, to the development of the Kharyaga oil field under production sharing agreements). As a result, there are now four oil production centers in the Nenets Autonomous District, which use three main non-overlapping routes for transporting oil – the northern route (Varandey) and two southern routes (Kharyaga-Usinsk and Val Gamburtseva field-Salyukinskaya booster pipeline pumping station). The Timan-Pechora oil and gas province is one of the fastest-developing oil production centers. Rosneft and Lukoil are jointly implementing a project to develop the Trebs and Titov oil fields, the largest in the region. Their peak oil production, expected to be achieved by 2020, is estimated at 4.8 million tons per year (Bashneft.ru 2017). The extraction of hydrocarbons in the Nenets Autonomous District is gradually shifting farther and farther to the north – to the Arctic coast of the Pechora Sea. This factor assigns a greater role to the maritime transport infrastructure in delivering oil to markets outside the region (the Varandey port). Much effort is also made to intensify hydrocarbon production at previously commissioned fields.

7.3.2.3 Prospects Companies developing oil and gas fields on the Pechora Sea shelf and the Yamal peninsula transport hydrocarbons from the fields to marine terminals on the coast or on the shelf and then to terminals in Kola Peninsula bays (in Murmansk, the Kola 7 Economies of the Barents Sea Region 155

Bay, and the Pechenga Bay). Terminals in Kola Peninsula bays are export terminals. There hydrocarbons are loaded on to large tankers or gas carriers for export. According to reports (Bambulyak 2005), these terminals pose the risk of polluting the Barents Sea with oil products during transshipment. The terminals include the Varandey terminal, the Prirazlomnoye field, the Kolguyev terminal, the Indiga port, Teriberka, and terminals in Murmansk, the Kola Bay and the Pechenga Bay. Not all oil and gas projects are implemented equally intensively, as priority is given to projects for extracting oil and producing liquefied gas (above all, in offshore areas of the Barents and Pechora seas). The implementation of large offshore gas projects, such as the development of the Shtokman field, has been postponed. Earlier, three major companies – Gazprom (51% of shares), Total S.A. (25%) and Statoil ASA (24%) – established Shtokman Development AG to develop the Shtokman gas condensate field on the shelf, whose reserves, estimated at 3.9 trillion cubic meters, would be enough to meet the world’s demand for gas for a year. The consortium was named the owner and operator of the infrastructure of the first phase of the Shtokman project for a period of 25 years from the time of the field’s commissioning. However, in 2010 it was announced that the development would be postponed due to a decrease in the demand for gas and the reduction of Gazprom’s investment program. Earlier, the decreased demand for gas had caused Gazprom to postpone the commissioning of its first major project on the Yamal Peninsula – the Bovanenkovskoye field with a potential yield of 115 billion cubic meters of gas per year – until 2012. On July 1, 2012, the Shtokman Development AG agreement expired. Statoil returned its shares to Gazprom and wrote off about U.S. $335 million of investment in the project. Much hope for the implementation of this project was pinned on the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts. If implemented, the project would have not only created prerequisites for more sustainable energy supply to the economies of these regions but also fundamentally changed the structure of their economies and revenues. Currently, there is no certainty as to when the project will be implemented. The reasons for that include high costs, an impeded access to subsea production technologies, and a relative overcapacity of gas production in the country. It should be noted that many oil and gas production projects have been considered and implemented with the active participation of foreign companies. For example, Statoil has shares in several oil and gas projects in Russia, both onshore and offshore. Most of them are implemented jointly with Rosneft (vedomosti.ru 2017).

7.3.3 Transportation

The Barents Sea Basin is one of the largest sea transport regions in Russia. It hosts the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk commercial ports. The directions of sea transport flows depend on the following two factors: (a) export of mineral, hydrocarbon and forest resources from Russia to various countries of the world; (b) transportation of cargoes along the Northern Sea Route – both eastward (from Murmansk and Arkhangelsk to the mouths of Siberian rivers and the sites of major projects in the 156 V. Kryukov and D. Poudel mineral and hydrocarbon sector) and westward (export of oil, gas condensate, LNG, and polymetallic ore from Norilsk to Pechenga and Zapolyarny). The transformation of the Northern Sea Route into an international transport artery between Western Europe and Asia-Pacific countries has been discussed for a long time. However, the number of transit voyages has not been great so far. The reasons for that include not only the undeveloped infrastructure along the route (from the point of view of navigation and emergency prevention and response) but also other requirements (for example, mandatory icebreaker support). The Murmansk Commercial Seaport is the largest port in the region. The current situation is characterized by a significant change in the structure of cargoes and delivery destinations. In 2016, for example, coastal shipping placed second after export in the structure of the port’s freight turnover. One of the factors behind this was a significant increase in the transshipment of crushed stone in the direction of the port of Sabetta8 (transshipment from the Norwegian port of Kirkenes), where the construction of infrastructure for the oil and gas industry continued.9 Another kind of “unusual” cargo was brought by the ship Wilson Nice in 2016. It delivered about 8000 tons of iron ore mined at one of the largest deposits in the north of Sweden and loaded onto the ship in the Norwegian port of Narvik. If this logistics chain proves effective, voyages from Narvik to Murmansk may become regular.10 The freight turnover of the Murmansk Commercial Seaport in 2015 exceeded 14.5 million tons. The main type of cargo handled by the port is still coal. The volume of coal transshipment for export in 2015 was 13.6 million tons.11 The Arkhangelsk Commercial Seaport placed second in the volume of cargo handled: its turnover in 2016 stood at 1.6 million tons (including 0.5 million tons of timber exports, one million tons of coastal cargo, and 0.06 million tons of imports).12 In total, operators of sea terminals in the Arctic Basin in 2016 transshipped 49.7 million tons of cargo, which is 40.6% more than in 2015. The volume of dry cargo transshipment increased to 26.6 million tons (+6.6%), and liquid cargo to 23.1 million tons (by 2.2 times). The total freight turnover of ports (including commercial ports and terminals of individual companies) increased to: 33.4 million tons (by 1.5 times) in Murmansk, 8 million tons (+21.6%) in Varandey, and 1.2 million tons (+1.6%) in Dudinka. Cargo transshipment decreased in the port of Arkhangelsk to 2.6 million tons (−31.0%) and Kandalaksha to 0.8 million tons (−3.4%) (Livejournal 2016). The growth in freight turnover is due to the increase in the shipment of ore, building materials and hydrocarbons. This factors affect the environment of ports.

8 The Arctic port of Sabetta and the Yamal LNG plant are priority projects for creating an LNG production center in Russia with a capacity of 16.5 million tons per year, based on the Yuzhno- Tambeyskoye gas field on the Yamal Peninsula. Leading enterprises of the Murmansk Oblast actively participate in the project, taking advantage of the port infrastructure (http://www.portmurmansk.ru/ru/press/news/?section=full&id=3102). 9 http://www.portmurmansk.ru/ru/press/news/?section=full&id=3116 10 http://www.portmurmansk.ru/ru/press/news/?section=full&id=3115 11 http://www.portmurmansk.ru/ru/press/news/?section=full&id=3052 12 http://www.ascp.ru/htm/2.htm 7 Economies of the Barents Sea Region 157

According to the Survey of the state of the Environment and Environmental Pollution in the Russian Federation for 2015, prepared by Russia’s Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromet), “the content of petroleum hydrocarbons in the area of the Murmansk Commercial Seaport during the year changed essentially. In January, the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) of petroleum hydrocarbons was exceeded by 3.4 times, and in March by 11 times. During the rest of the year, the concentration of petroleum hydrocarbons decreased sharply (Roshydromet 2016, p. 137). Other major pollutants are iron and copper, and there are high concentrations of pesticides, ammonium nitrogen, and manganese in water. The most polluted is the Kola Bay near Murmansk. On the other hand, the greatest interest is the development of the Northern Sea Route as a transit international sea artery. As noted above, its future depends not only on the development of infrastructure and emergency prevention and response services along the route (Marchenko 2012), but also on a navigation regime that Russia is ready to establish for foreign ships. The Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian Parliament) pointed out in June 2016 that “at the turn of the 1980s/1990s, up to eight million tons of various cargoes were transported annually along the Northern Sea Route. To date, more than half of the 50-plus ports and berths have stopped operating.13 In August 2016, the Russian government approved “the Action Plan for Implementing the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period to 2020.” The plan attaches special importance to the safety of navigation and the development of the necessary infrastructure.

7.3.4 Mining Industry

The mining sector – the extraction of minerals - has been developing the fastest in the Murmansk Oblast, the Arkhangelsk Oblast (diamond mining) and the Nenets Autonomous District (extraction of hydrocarbons, coal and iron ore).

7.3.4.1 Kola Peninsula The Murmansk Oblast is one of the leading regions in Russia and, possibly, the world for the extraction and smelting of nickel and polymetallic ores and the extraction of apatite ores (raw material for obtaining phosphate fertilizers). The largest ore mining and smelting centers are located near Russia’s borders with Finland and Norway and not far from Barents Sea bays. The Kola Mining and Metallurgical Company (KMMC) is the leading enterprise in the Murmansk Oblast. It is a division of Norilsk Nickel, which produces sulphide copper-nickel ores and non-ferrous metals. Copper and nickel production on the Kola Peninsula was launched in the 1930s. The Kola Mining and Metallurgical Company was established on November 16, 1998. It was founded by two local sub- sidiaries of Norilsk Nickel: Pechenganickel and Severonickel mining and

13 http://www/vedomosti/ru/politics/news/2015/06/26 [Rus. Ed.]. 158 V. Kryukov and D. Poudel metallurgical combines. The KMMC is the main employer for residents of the towns of Zapolyarny, Monchegorsk and Nikel, where the company’s production facilities (town-forming enterprises) are located. Every third resident of working age in the area works for the company. KMMC plants produce electrolytic nickel and copper, carbonyl nickel powders, cobalt concentrate and precious metal con- centrates.14 As of December 31, 2012, the number of personnel employed at KMMC enterprises stood at 12,462.15 In 2010, KMMC enterprises produced 111,318 tons of commercial nickel, 56,378 tons of copper, and 2548 tons of cobalt. Metallurgical workshops in Nikel and Zapolyarny started production in the 1930s. For decades, they annually emitted more than 100,000 tons of sulfur dioxide (SO2). Until the 1970s, the plants used local ore with a sulfur content of about 6.5%, but in 1971 the plant started receiving Siberian ore from Norilsk, which had a sulfur content of almost 30%. This led to a sharp increase in sulfur dioxide emissions. In 1979, annual emissions reached about 400,000 tons [30]. To date, the level of emissions by Pechenganickel is lower than in the 1980s, yet the concentration of sulfur dioxide is still above the critical level. Since 1998 (the year of the company’s foundation), KMMC specialists have implemented several projects at Zapolyarny and Nikel, which allowed reducing sulfur dioxide emissions from 188,000 to 119,700 tons in 2016. The scale of the company’s impact on the regional environment can be seen from the fact that “in 2008, for example, sulfur dioxide emissions by Pechenganickel alone were 20% higher than sulfur dioxide emissions in the whole of Finland and approximately five to six times higher than gross emissions of sulfur dioxide in Norway” (Bronder et al. 2010). The main problem is outdated ore dressing and smelting technologies, which lead to the significant emissions of sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere and the contamination of the ground and water resources with heavy metals. Measures to fundamentally improve the environment require much time and investment. A closure or even temporary shutdown of these industries would be a difficult decision as they are the main employers for people living in nearby monotowns.

7.4 Concluding Remarks

7.4.1 Contribution of the Barents Sea Region to the Coastal Communities

The Barents Sea Region has been important for people’s livelihoods in Norwegian and Russian coastal communities for centuries and this has largely been based on the use of natural resources (both renewable and nonrenewable). In addition, the Barents Sea has also provided different socioeconomic and ecosystem services to the communities. Traditionally, hunting, fishing and reindeer herding were the main

14 http://www.kolagmk.ru/about/info 15 http://www.kolagmk.ru/news/2013-01-24/obespechennost-personalom-na-kolskoy-gmk-v- 2012-godu-sostavila-98.html [Rus. Ed.]. 7 Economies of the Barents Sea Region 159 activities (Hoel 2009), but now the Barents Sea has become the ’sea of Norwegian economy’ due to its commercialization and industrialization. In addition to the contribution to coastal communities, the share of Barents Sea contribution in the Norwegian economy is increasing, due to fishing and aquaculture, mining of oil and gas and maritime and tourism industries. These industries have created both direct and indirect employment in the region.

7.4.2 Sustainable Management of Renewable Resources

The Barents Sea and the region is rich in natural renewable resources, including the fisheries and forest resources, coral reefs and marine animals and their diversity. In particular, the fisheries have been the key resource in the Barents Sea, and are one of the best-managed examples in the world. Some of the important commercial stocks, such as haddock, Northeast Atlantic cod and capelin, are shared by the Norway and Russia and other neighboring nations. Despite disputes over several issues, the Barents Sea stock is jointly managed by the two countries. The quota is set jointly through the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission every year. Furthermore, the commercial stocks are regulated through quotas and licensing. Despite this, there has been increasing conflict between different actors in the fishing industry, oil and gas industry and tourism industry. For example, the majority of the coastal fisheries on the north are more vulnerable due to oil pollution and the loss of traditional fishing areas due to the discoveries and production of oil and gas. This requires that conservation and utilization of the natural resources, in collaboration with the coastal communities in the region, should be emphasized. Local communities’ participation in the natural resource management should be increased for sustainable management.

7.4.3 Associated Costs and Externalities

All or most of the economic activities have consequences and externalities. The oil and gas industries could have a serious impact in the fisheries and aquaculture, by impacting the Barents Sea ecosystem and biodiversity. An oil spill from a shipping accident could be disastrous for the marine ecosystem and the natural resources. Similarly, fishing activities can damage the coral reefs, habitats, species and biodiversity. The fishing vessels leave physical litter. The plastic litter from the fishing and aquaculture industries is the litter most frequently found on the beaches and ocean beds. Plastic litter could be a threat to birds and marine mammals. Maritime industries, such as shipping, could increase air pollution in the region, for example, through releases of nitrogen and Sulphur oxides, and could disturb the delicate ecological balance in the arctic by transporting and spreading alien species. Tourism and recreational activities could also increase pollution, for example, through transport and emissions, noise, solid waste, littering and disturbances to the birds and mammals in the coastal areas. These activities could increase the associated cost of management of the Barents region. 160 V. Kryukov and D. Poudel

7.4.4 Mining and Maritime Industries and Consequences for Environment

There is increasing anthropogenic encroachment in the Barents Sea Region due to the increased discoveries of the oil and gas resources and expansion of maritime industries. In terms of production, the Barents Sea will grow considerably and could contribute to as much as 15% of total Norwegian production by the end of the next decade. The exploration activities not only affect the marine environment but also the coastal communities. The potential consequences will be large for any accidents that happens in the areas of special importance such as the marginal ice zone and coastal waters (NMCE 2016b). On the other hand, the changing climate is becoming favorable to the mining and maritime industries due to the melting ice. This further damages the environment. A good planning and precautionary policy is important for minimizing environmental damage in the Barents Sea and the region.

7.4.5 Search for Ways to Solve Environmental Problems

The search for approaches solving environmental problems posed by the mining industry has continued for more than 40 years. Possible solutions have been discussed at various levels, ranging from intergovernmental to interregional level. For example, the project ‘joint Ecogeochemical Mapping and Monitoring in Scale of 1.1 Million in the West Murmansk Oblast and Contiguous Areas of Finland and Norway,’ abbreviated to “Kola Ecogeochemistry,” was initiated in 1991 as cooperation between the Central Kola Expedition (CKE) and Geological Surveys of Finland (GTK) and Norway (NGU) (Reimann et al. 1997). Prime Ministers Nikolai Ryzhkov and Gro Harlem Bruntland signed Soviet- Norwegian Environmental Agreement, which established a joint Soviet-Norwegian Environmental Commission, in Oslo in January 1988. At the intergovernmental level, there is a unanimous understanding of the need to solve pressing problems. Moreover, the Russian government has repeatedly reiterated its readiness to offer the corporation privileges and preferences that would facilitate the implementation of necessary decisions. At the same time, the solution of the problems was impeded by the corporation’s formation based on previously established enterprises in the new (market) economic conditions. International law distinguishes the following sources of marine pollution: land- based sources and activities; sea transportation and other activities, such as fishing and aquaculture; dumping; seabed activities; and atmospheric sources. Ecologists name the economic and industrial development of the Arctic as the main cause of all environmental problems in the region. The Arctic suffers not only from oil but also from contamination with heavy metals, persistent organic pollutants and radioactive substances (Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5). 7 Economies of the Barents Sea Region 161

Table 7.1 Contributions of Individual Industries to GRP of the Barents Sea Region in 2014 (%) Extraction of mineral and Transport and Territory Fishing hydrocarbon resources communication Murmansk Oblast 8.2 10.8 13.6 Arkhangelsk Oblast 1.0 20.6 14.3 Republic of Karelia 0.7 19.3 15.4 Nenets Autonomous 0.6 74.3 2.9 District Note: The Gross Regional Product contribution is higher from the Nenets Autonomous District and the contribution from the fishing industry is higher in the Murmansk Oblast. The transport industry contribution is Murmansk Oblast, Arkhangelsk Oblast and Republic of Karelia Source: Rosstat (2015)

Table 7.2 Total catch of aquatic bioresources in the Barents and Norwegian Seas (ICES Areas I and II) in 1992–2011 Russia Norway Other countries Total Year 000’ tons % 000’ tons % 000’ tons % 000’ tons 1992 813.2 34.8 1381.1 59.2 139.6 6.0 2,333.9 1993 676.6 32.4 1292.9 61.9 118.6 5.7 2,088.2 1994 542.7 27.6 1228.3 62.4 198.7 10.1 1,969.7 1995 578.6 24.6 1338.0 56.8 438.2 18.6 2,354.8 1996 618.8 23.5 1476.1 56.1 536.7 20.4 2,631.7 1997 667.0 23.8 1615.7 57.6 520.7 18.6 2,803.4 1998 578.2 23.0 1463.5 58.1 475.1 18.9 2,516.7 1999 645.5 21.4 1414.1 47.0 950.8 31.6 3,010.4 2000 737.9 23.5 1533.5 48.8 871.1 27.7 3,142.5 2001 823.0 28.5 1511.5 52.3 554.0 19.2 2,888.4 2002 867.2 28.9 1526.1 50.8 608.5 20.3 3,001.8 2003 741.0 25.6 1363.8 47.2 787.3 27.2 2,892.1 2004 631.9 24.7 1362.9 53.3 562.6 22.0 2,557.5 2005 670.0 28.7 1175.9 50.4 488.7 20.9 2,334.5 2006 647.3 28.9 1190.8 53.2 401.0 17.9 2,239.1 2007 601.0 26.1 1357.3 58.9 346.1 15.0 2,508.8 2008 610.1 24.3 1523.4 60.7 375.2 15.0 2,508.8 2009 745.9 25.7 1795.4 61.9 357.2 12.3 2,898.5 2010 828.7 25.9 1855.9 58.0 515.1 16.1 3,199.7 Source: Zilanov (2013)

Table 7.3 Catch of aquatic Thousand bioresources by territories of Territory tons the Northern Basin in 2015 Murmansk Oblast 679.4 Arkhangelsk Oblast 157.9 Republic of Karelia 80.5 Nenets Autonomous 14.2 District Source: Zilanov (2016) 162 V. Kryukov and D. Poudel

Table 7.4 Pollutant Emissions by Industrial Enterprises of Murmansk Oblast in 2000-2015 Years Air pollutants (000 tons) 2000 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Emitted by stationary sources 373.3 263.1 258.9 269.8 276.4 275.8 Including manufacturing plants 161.2 163.2 176.3 178.8 182.1 Extraction of minerals and hydrocarbons 24.4 23.1 23.8 24.8 24.4 Source: Murmanskstat (2016)

Table 7.5 Summary of main points The BaSR has a long history of industrial scale resource development World class fisheries have long been the dominant industry, but other industries are of increasing importance Norway and Russia have a history of effective cooperation in the region Rapid biophysical changes are raising new challenges for economic cooperation in the BaSR

References

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Ole Øvretveit, Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, Maria Goes, Elena Kudryashova, Rauna Kuokkanen, and Maksim Zadorin

Abstract The Barents Sea Region (BaSR) is a dynamic and complex region that acts as a meeting place for both states and peoples. Using a human security lens, this chapter reveals some of the stories of the people of the BaSR as a home to multiple ethnicities and nationalities, to large cities and small communities. The region’s relevance to current geopolitics is significant, where Norway, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), borders the Russian Federation. This geopolitical relevance, though important, does not define the region or relations among peoples. Indeed, the region is also well known for very good relations between Russian and Norwegian peoples from the times of the Pomor trade to the present. Overlapping these dynamics are the continuous struggles of Indigenous peoples to maintain and develop their own societies and political institutions. The Sámi people have experienced various forms of colonization on both the Norwegian and Russian sides of the borders. Over time, Sámi

O. Øvretveit (*) Arctic Frontiers, Tromsø, Norway e-mail: [email protected] G. H. Gjørv Critical Peace and Conflict Studies, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Harstad, Norway M. Goes Barents Institute, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Harstad, Norway E. Kudryashova Northern Arctic Federal University, Arkhangelsk, Russia R. Kuokkanen Arctic Indigenous Studies, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Finland M. Zadorin Department of International Law and Comparative Law, Northern Arctic Federal University, Arkhangelsk, Russia

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 165 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_8 166 O. Øvretveit et al.

rights have increased, as has access to governance structures, though to different degrees depending on Russian or Norwegian state policies. Intertwined within these relations of power between states, and between states and peoples, is the extensive natural resource wealth of the region from fisheries to oil and gas. The combination of all of these dynamics make the region unique to the Arctic setting.

8.1 An Introduction to the Barents Sea Region

As defined in this book, the Barents Sea Region or BaSR (see Fig. 1.2) is a marine area lying largely to the north of the northernmost coast of Norway and the north coast of the northwestern part of Russia.1 This region’s coastal fringe is populated by both Indigenous peoples and other local populations including Norwegians, Russians, and Kvens (Finnish origin) among others.2 The name “Barents” was assigned to this area in the nineteenth century in honour of the Dutch explorer and navigator Willem Barentsz. It was known previously as the “Murman” (Norwegian) Sea by the Russians. The Barents Sea Region, including the coastal zone, has additionally been characterized as Fennoscandia – representing the region’s unique geological traits as well as cultural linkages between the northern sectors of Sweden, Norway and Finland, and neighbouring parts of Russia (the Republic of Karelia, Murmansk Oblast and parts of Leningrad Oblast). For the region’s Indigenous peoples and especially the Sámi, however, these permutations of regional identity as “Barents” may have far less meaning than a vision of the region as Sámiland or Sápmi. It is important to draw a clear distinction between the BaSR and the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR). Established under the terms of the 1993 Kirkenes Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, the BEAR encompasses the northernmost counties and oblasts of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the northwestern part of the Russian Federation (Kirkenes Declaration 1993). With a human population of ~5.5, the BEAR has become a focus of attention among both national and regional policymakers in the four countries led by the efforts of the Regional Council including representatives of regional governments and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council including representatives of the national governments. The Barents Sea Region, the main focus of this chapter, is a subset of the BEAR. All the human communities of the BaSR are included within the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. But the BEAR covers areas and human communities that lie outset the boundaries of the BaSR. All these regional monikers, including Sápmi/Samiland, reflect the dynamism of this place and its peoples: lived experiences and the meaning of this region differ significantly. As such, what is included in the Barents Sea Region requires

1 We refer to “Russian Federation” and “Russia” interchangeably. 2 By “local population” we refer to the many other ethnic but non-Indigenous communities in the region. 8 The Barents Sea Region in a Human Security Perspective 167 additional specification. The total human population of the BaSR is ~1.6 million living both to the west and to the east of the international boundary between Norway and Russia. Unlike the Bering Strait Region, the BaSR contains sizable cities, including Tromsø in Norway with a population of ~75,000 and Murmansk in Russia with a population of ~300,000. Archangel (Arkangelsk), an even larger city with a population of ~350,000, is located at the southeastern corner of the region. Although the region includes a sizable number of Indigenous residents, a large majority of the people living in the BaSR are non-Indigenous local populations. Overall, the BaSR stands out, especially in contrast to the Bering Strait Region (see Chap. 4), as a developed area that encompasses large communities and modern industries and that is an area of intense concern to national governments in Oslo and Moscow. As such the Barents Sea Region has innumerable stories to tell. To capture a comprehensive picture of the BaSR requires multiple voices, multiple chapters. Here, we are able to examine a few of these stories in light of human security perspectives in the region. We use human security as a lens into the region to illustrate the ways in which the apparently “smallest” (individual-based) relationships can have meaning for the survival of everyday life and further impact the “bigger picture” of the region and beyond.

8.2 The Barents Sea Region in Context

Some analysts think of the BaSR as part of the “Old North,” a description meant to differentiate the area from other parts of the Arctic and to signal the longstanding integration of the region into the national economic and social systems of Norway and Russia. In this regard, the contrast between the BaSR and the BeSR is striking. The BaSR is geopolitically sensitive. Four North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member states border the Russian Federation (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Norway). Norway’s border with Russia is located in the Arctic in the Barents Sea Region region. This border has played a significant role in the history of the BaSR, where for over 40 years the border extending into the Barents Sea was contested until Norway and Russian negotiated the 2010 boundary delimitation treaty (Hoel 2012; see also Chap. 9). The region is home to the Russian Northern Fleet and nuclear installations on the Kola Peninsula (Baev 2009; Sergunin and Konyshev 2014). On the opposite side of the border are NATO cooperative radar stations in the otherwise small, unassuming towns of Vardø and Vadsø (Higgins 2017). If this sounds like the perfect recipe for Cold War posturing, it is not. The Norwegian city of Kirkenes is approximately 11 km from the Russian border. Around 10% of its population is Russian, and street signs in the city center are in both Norwegian (Latin alphabet) and Russian (Cyrillic alphabet). This is also the region where many people continue to have a strong sense of collaboration and support based on a powerful history dating from WWII, when Russian troops supported Norwegian citizens who were devastated by the German occupation, and where Norwegians supported partisan efforts in Russia (Myklebost and Nielsen 2014). 168 O. Øvretveit et al.

The BaSR is a region where people for all intents and purposes boast about “people to people” cooperation. Since 2008 there has existed an open border area between Russia and Norway ensuring that local people with special visas can cross with relative ease (Novikova 2015). The relationship between Russia and Norway is often framed in positive terms. People’s relationships provide a counterpoint to geopolitical concerns. Overlapping the traditional “state-based” security concerns are also the interests of peoples who view the region on a different map, where Sámiland has greater meaning than the nationalities of dominant ethnicities and states.

8.3 The Barents Sea Region Through the Lens of Human Security

The complexity of populations and nations in the BaSR is reflected in differing “security” perspectives, ranging from national and regional to local and individual, from the geopolitical to the human. Security is the perception and/or feeling of no worries, to put it most simply. It is not a concept relegated to only the state, and indeed, the BaSR demonstrates the importance of the concept at the human level. The nuances and variation of locally lived experiences justify a focus on the human security perspective in the BaSR. Already when comparing different parts of the region, the differences in security become apparent. The Norwegian-Russian border in the BaSR has the distinction of having one of the largest differences in standard of living depending on which side of the border one lives. In and of itself, this is an indication of the relevance and importance of human security perspectives in the region. Arctic security ranges from state-protection, military-based security perceptions, to economic, energy, and environmental security including consequences of climate change (Berkman and Vylegzhanin 2012; Hoogensen Gjørv et al. 2014; Hoogensen Gjørv et al. forthcoming). The security of communities, human security, adds an additional layer of security concerns emanating from different Arctic communities and populations that intersect with economy, energy, and the environment, as well as traditional state security concerns. Arctic security cannot be understood as separate from broader global politics, trends, and claims to security. Human security perspectives make visible differing individual and community perspectives around economic, food, health, personal, political, environmental and group identity/community security (UNDP 1994). These perspectives can complement each other across communities, or embody competing perspectives as different communities may see their survival in different priorities. Likewise between individuals/communities and states – at times the perspectives may complement one another, but not always. As such, human security helps illuminate who the different actors/ peoples/states are, and the power dynamics among actors in the region and expose who decides whose security perspective dominates (Hoogensen Gjørv 2017). Human security therefore makes visible the intersections of security in the Arctic as a lens through which to understand current and future trends in governance and security from the state to individual levels. It can provide interesting insights into the challenges that BaSR communities, industries, and governance structures experience. 8 The Barents Sea Region in a Human Security Perspective 169

Our focus in this chapter is what we call “bottom-up,” focusing on the different peoples that make up the BaSR. Human security has been increasingly reflective of bottom-up approaches with a sensitivity to multiple identities that exist and interact within a particular space or geography. As such, an “intersectional” approach is useful in further understanding of human security, recognizing the relevance of diverse identities and perspectives of security, and the power dynamics between them. An intersectional approach with a focus on gender is particularly relevant in a region where the power dynamics and access to tools of security differ greatly between peoples (Kuokkanen and Sweet forthcoming). Intersectionality makes visible the practices or experiences of people of color, Indigenous people, non-white-centric ethnicities and cultures, or those with differing experiences based on age, class, sexuality, and ability (Kuokkanen and Sweet forthcoming; Marfelt 2016) who are otherwise often excluded in debates about security. Coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in the late 1980s (Crenshaw 1991), the term intersectionality was designed to critically assess the intersection between race and gender. While a human security lens is most often applied to contexts of the global south, dynamics in the Arctic region also serve to illustrate the purchase and utility of a human security perspective. The BaSR is a unique space populated with peoples claiming and representing various if not multiple identities, interacting with a rich, dynamic natural environment around them. As such, it is important to consider the relationships people have to the environment, to economies, and to energy – all three of which play an important role in security perspectives both locally and regionally. Environmental perspectives of security, ranging from state level perceptions to human security, play an important part in the Arctic security picture, combining extensive natural resources with an increasingly fragile environment due to the impacts of climate change. The meaning of environmental security ranges from the importance of protecting natural resources for the security of the state to protecting the environment for human security (human well-being), to protecting ecosystems for their own sake (Dalby 2014). Environmental security focuses on communities identifying threats to their existence and lifestyles, and their capacities to mitigate or adapt to these threats as needed, in concert with other actors from the state, to industry, NGOs, and civilian populations (Hoogensen Gjørv et al. 2014). The human security literature has enhanced our understanding of environmental security by taking a “bottom-up” perspective that prioritizes individuals and communities over the state. Environmental security thus has gravitated toward a better understanding of the relationships between human communities and their natural surroundings, and the ways in which human beings are dependent upon a thriving and diverse environment (O’Brien et al. 2010). Energy security is equally relevant in Arctic settings, not least in the BaSR. It reflects some of the earlier iterations of environmental security, insofar as it embod- ies the important role of natural resources to the security of the state. Cherp and Jewell (2014: 415) refer to the practice of understanding energy security through the “four As”: availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptability. The production of, and necessity for, energy affects state security and policy, including the economic viability of the state. Energy security definitions and debates are also 170 O. Øvretveit et al. increasingly affected by the demands of electorates/populations, both in regions used to constant and consistent energy availability as well as those that have not enjoyed regular access and require more reliable access to resources in order to ensure increased development, employment, and living standards. Experiences in the BaSR reflect both sides of the energy security equation. Environmental and energy security concerns combine with economic security, where for many northern communities, economic security emanates from opportunities arising from energy industries, binding the survival (and thus security) of the individual, community and state together through a reliance on one dominant industry. Economic security pertains to potential threats against finances or resources needed to function and thrive in society, for individuals and states alike (Carlarne 2009). Energy security depends on affordable prices, but these cannot be so low as to burden the industry and make it unprofitable for either states or local communities that may benefit. Thus interacting with economic, environmental and energy security concerns are experiences of human security – how people themselves experience security and insecurity.

8.4 The Place of Indigenous Peoples in the Barents Sea Region

The history of the Sámi people, as with many Indigenous peoples, is characterised by colonialism, persisting inequalities, resistance, and resilience. Indigenous peoples have had to endure much to fight for their survival and human security, not just physically but also their identities as Indigenous societies that were threatened by state policies designed to eradicate them (Greaves 2016; Kuokkanen and Sweet forthcoming). Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, southern governments in Norway and Russia sought to integrate “frontier zones” and to assimilate Indigenous inhabitants of northern areas into dominant cultures. Norwegian governments adopted a policy to assimilate the Sámi into Norwegian culture (Hansen 2012). As modern Russian historians point out (Goldin et al. 2015):

The relatively tolerant attitude of the state to the Indigenous population did not exist for long and changed in the first half of the 19th century. At the beginning of the century, the geopolitical map of Scandinavia changed. The Norwegian-Finnish section of the border became the border between Norway and Russia. At the same time, the ideological polariza- tion of European politics intensified. …. By analogy with continental Europe, … the state began to take enforced measures to tighten border regimes and to apply techniques of social and ethnic engineering. Technological progress played an essential role in this, contributing to the reappraisal of the values of different types of economic systems.

The Sámi of the frontier zone of Norway and Russia were traditionally perceived as constituting a “dual-population,” a situation that accounts for both the development of the policy of Norwegianization and the active role of the Orthodox Church of Russia. In both cases, the goal was cultural and religious assimilation of the 8 The Barents Sea Region in a Human Security Perspective 171

Sámi. According to archival data (Archangel Oblast) during the colonization of the Murmansk coast by Russian fishers in the nineteenth century, colonists complained about the privileged position of the Sámi, who had priority regarding fishing and grazing of reindeer. Household and interpersonal conflicts occurred frequently. Thus, it is essential to note that the policies of states varied, and the assimilation of Indigenous peoples depended on both local conditions and factors relating to foreign policy. The overall effect on Sámi culture and societies was negative, frequently producing devastating consequences. As the result of the Alta River conflict, there was a radical change in Norwegian Sámi policy by the end of the 1980s. A main component of this was a clear admis- sion of the wrongdoings in governmental Norwegianization policy and the final abandonment of this policy. In 1989, the Sámi Parliament was established. Originally, the Sámi Parliament was an advisory body, but its authority has somewhat expanded throughout the 1990s. A major question in the 1990s was the Sámi right to land and natural resources. This resulted in the Finnmark Act of 2005, a co-management arrangement in parts of Finnmark county.3 There are Sámi Parliaments also in Sweden and Finland. The Constitutions of Norway and Finland have recognized a form of Sámi cultural, non-territorial autonomy exercised through elected, representative bodies of the Sámi Parliaments. The three Sámi Parliaments are also government agencies in charge of administering Sámi-related affairs, specifically Sámi cultural policy. All three Sámi Parliaments have somewhat ambiva- lent mandates but all been established as mainly consultative or advisory bodies rather than self-governing institutions (Kuokkanen 2019). In Sápmi, resource development (economic security) has generally enjoyed strong state support, though the Sámi have had limited possibilities to influence decisions, legislation and policy. In their Arctic strategies, Nordic states are increasingly committed to the promotion of extractive industry investments in Sápmi, but the role, duties and modus operandi of the state are changing. Tensions between environmental, energy, and economic security and whose security interests prevail, are influential to Sámi experiences. In Sweden, studies have examined the role of resource extraction in the colonization of Sámi territories and erosion of Sámi land rights, the ways in which ongoing colonialism and dispossession manifests as conflicts between Sámi reindeer herding communities and industry proponents backed by the state and the industry’s negligence regarding the international norm of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) (Lawrence 2014; Lawrence and Åhrén 2016; Sehlin MacNeil 2017). In Norway, there are some studies on land use conflicts between reindeer herding and extractive activities and Sámi-industry relations (Johnsen 2016; Nygaard 2016; Wilson 2017; Dannevig 2018; Magnussen 2018). There are also studies on extractive industries such as forestry and hydro development in the Sámi region (Mustonen et al. 2011; Össbo and Lantto 2011; Horstkotte 2013; Carson et al. 2016).

3 Please see: Fakta om Finnmarkloven (Facts on the Finnmark Law) https://www.regjeringen.no/ no/dokumenter/fakta-om-finnmarksloven/id88240/ (only available in Norwegian) 172 O. Øvretveit et al.

The Sámi people of the Murmansk Oblast are the only Indigenous people of the Russian sector of the Barents Sea Region. The overarching BEAR also includes Nenets and Karelian Veps, but along the sea coast, the Sámi remain the only Indigenous community of the Kola Peninsula. The Kola Sámi number just over 1500 people. In 2018, however, 39 Sámi communities4 were registered in this area, not counting the three Sámi public organizations (e.g. the Kola Sámi Association, a member of the international Sámi Union). Nine communities have leased forest areas for reindeer grazing. All sites include areas for traditional fishing. Two communities have access to fishing grounds on the White Sea. The Sámi communities are located in four districts of Murman: the Kovdorsky urban district, the Kola municipal district, the Lovozersky municipal district, and the Tersky municipal district. The Lovozersky district is home to 66% of the Kola Sámi. The village of Lovozero (or Luujäuˊrr in Skolt Sámi) is the cradle of the Sámi culture of the Kola Peninsula; it is sometimes called “the capital of Russian Lapland.” The Russian Sámi are somewhat isolated from the Scandinavian Sámi. Several factors account for this separation. The Kola Peninsula is a military outpost of Russia including the home base of Russia Northern Fleet. Russian Sámi also experience language isolation, since their textbooks are published mainly in Cyrillic rather than Latin script. Moreover, the Kola Sámi traditionally practiced a dual faith, blending Indigenous traditions and Orthodoxy. This autonomy persists to this day, reinforced by present geopolitical realities. The Kola Sámi do not have a body similar to the Sámi Parliament in Fennoscandia although its establishment has been discussed for some time. The Kola Sámi are involved in the transnational Sámi cooperation through the Sámi Council, which is an NGO with an ECOSOC status at the United Nations and Permanent Participant status at the Arctic Council. Specific features of the federal structure of Russia (e.g. a strong central authority) and the presence of 47 Indigenous minorities have produced different results.5 Nevertheless, a Council of Representatives of Small Indigenous Peoples of the North under the Government of the Murmansk Oblast (the so-called “Aboriginal Board”) has the right to develop recommendations for public authorities on conditions of Sámi life and to control land relations and the protection of the environment. Key issues for the life and security of the Sámi are the preservation of their native language (Kildin dialect) and support of fisheries and reindeer herding. The special feature of the Sámi reindeer husbandry on the Kola Peninsula is that reindeer are “assigned” to the former collective farms converted into the agricultural cooperatives “Tundra” and “Olenevod”. This helps the Sámi with employment and sustains the traditional way of life connected with reindeer herding. But it does not consider the most important thing, measures to protect reindeer pastures and prevent degradation of vegetation cover.

4 Non-governmental organisations, Ministry of Justice (Russia). URL: http://unro.minjust.ru/ NKOs.aspx. Accessed 03.05.19. 5 O Edinom perechne korennykh malochislennykh narodov Rossiyskoy Federatsii [On Unified List on Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the Russian Federation], Governmental resolution of March 22, 2000 No. 255. URL: http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901757631. Accessed 03.05.19. 8 The Barents Sea Region in a Human Security Perspective 173

The goal of this system is primarily economic growth, while Sámi families have traditionally adjusted their herds to the sustainability of the biological/environmental system. Because more than 66% of the Kola Sámi live in rural areas, there are problems with language proficiency. According to the 28 June 2013 Law of the Murmansk Oblast (No. 1649-ZMO) “On Education in the Murmansk Oblast,” meeting the needs of the Indigenous minorities of the North in learning their native languages and reading Indigenous literature falls under the authority of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Murmansk Oblast. The Kola Sámi Association President Elena Goy notes that the study of Sámi language at schools of the Lovozersky District depends on the wishes of parents who can request extra classes. Sámi language classes are open to everyone, including the Komi-Izhemtsy and Russians (Goj 2018). On 26 October 2018, the President of Russia signed a decree establishing a Fund for the Preservation and Study of the Native Languages of the Peoples of Russia.6 Despite Russia’s non-participation in ILO Convention 169 and the Sámi Convention, this gives hope that mechanisms will be created to protect the linguistic rights of the Sámi as part of the Sámi cultural heritage in Scandinavia and the Kola Peninsula.

8.5 Barents Sea Region Livelihoods

Since the early 2000s, issues relating to extractive industries have become increasingly central to the Barents development discourse. At the core is a balance between petroleum development, fisheries interests and ocean environment in the north (Hønneland and Jensen 2008; see also Chap. 7). During the last decade, another component has become increasingly prominent, the effects of carbon emissions from the extraction and consumption of fossil fuels on the global climate.

8.5.1 Norwegian Experiences

Economic, energy, and environmental security intertwine at the local and regional levels, impacting local peoples as well as Norway as a nation, simultaneously. With its long coast, Northern Norway’s marine resources have laid the foundation for local economies and to some extent national economic growth. Increased capacity, new technology and natural fluctuations in fish stocks resulted in collapses in some fish stocks from the late 1960s to the 1980s. Governmental resource management based on close collaboration with industry and the scientific community has secured sustainable and profitable fish stocks since the 1990s (see also Chap.10 ). Since 2008, Norwegian seafood exports have grown some 122% reaching a net worth of

6 O sozdanii Fonda sokhraneniya i izucheniya rodnykh yazykov narodov Rossii [On the creation of the Fund for the preservation and study of the native languages of the peoples of Russia]. URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58914. Accessed: 03.05.2019. 174 O. Øvretveit et al.

99 billion kroner (~11.4 billion USD). A number of fish stocks have been of special importance, among them Northeast Arctic cod and Norwegian spring spawning herring. Much of the explanation behind the increasingly prosperous fisheries industry lies in fisheries management within the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone and across maritime borders. In this context, it is worth paying a closer look at the Russian-Norwegian fisheries collaboration (see Chap.9 ). This collaboration has been a successful case of cross-border collaboration, very stable across different periods. Though it has roots all the way back in the first decade of the 1900s when Russian and Norwegian ocean research pioneers started collaborating in the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), the collaboration found its present platform with the establishment of the Norwegian-Russian Joint Fisheries Commission in 1975 (Rowe 2008). The collaboration in the fisheries commission has been pivotal in the management of the plentiful fish stocks in the Barents Sea. It has served as a platform for extended science cooperation, especially between the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research (IMR) and Knipovich Polar Research Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanography (PINRO) (Dolgov et al. 2007). The research collaboration, which is the basis for the scientific advice provided by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) is the backbone of the management system. The commission sets total quotas for cod, haddock, capelin, Greenland halibut and redfishfish and allocates the TACs according to set formulas including quotas for third countries fisheries in the region. As there always is a degree of uncertainty in the scientific estimates, the commission has based its decisions on recommendations on scientific advice from ICES based on a precautionary approach (Hønneland and Jørgensen 2018). Although the fisheries collaboration has to a large extent kept the peace on the fishing grounds, different disagreements have arisen between the Norwegian and Russian members from the 1980s up to around 2005 when, for example, Russia wanted higher quotas. During recent years, aquaculture has outgrown fisheries in export value (see Chap. 7). After some challenging decades, the aquaculture industry has grown to become larger in export value than capture fisheries.7 The industry has focused mainly on Atlantic salmon. In the formative years in the 1970–90s, the owners of the fish farms were mainly small local entrepreneurs. As prices have risen and technology and competence have turned aquaculture into a more mature industry, ownership has been consolidated into fewer hands. Aquaculture is controversial, from its business models to environmental impacts among other things, and tension is growing as the industry moves further north along the Norwegian coast. The Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the Lofoten Basin are the areas with the largest prospects for major reservoirs of hydrocarbons on the Norwegian continental shelf. There have been expectations for findings in the Barents Sea, especially in the former disputed area with Russia (Rottem et al. 2008: 70). After the agreement on the delimitation line in 2010, optimism was further raised about the prospects for

7 See Norwegian Seafood Council “Sjømateksport for 99 milliarder i 2018 (Seafood exports at 99 billion in 2018)”: https://seafood.no/aktuelt/nyheter/sjomateksport-for-99-milliarder-i-2018-/ 8 The Barents Sea Region in a Human Security Perspective 175 extraction opportunities. Though activity has risen in the area, major breakthroughs in the Barents Sea have yet to occur. Exploratory activities and drilling in the north are controversial, particularly in the Lofoten/Vesterålen area, and cause tension and disputes between environmentalists and industry and between and within political parties. Experience in the BaSR is not limited to natural resources. Northern Norway is increasingly urbanised, and the closest relationship many people have with fish is that which they buy in the stores, or to petroleum as that which they pump into their cars (electric cars are increasing in popularity, though more so in the south of Norway). Research, service, and tourist industries are also a growing part of north Norwegian life. The third largest university in Norway is located in Tromsø – UiT The Arctic University of Norway. Bodø is home to Nord University, also located in northern Norway.8 Both foster national and international research cooperation. The Fram Centre (High North Research Centre for Climate and the Environment) plays a central role in regional, national and international research on climate and environmental issues. North Norway is experiencing increasing tourist visits which are putting increasing demands on tourist-based industries and general service industries including restaurants and hotels.9 The developments in both research institutions and tourist and service industries are by no means divorced from their location as part of the BaSR, as the region is a focal point for increasing knowledge and understanding on issues ranging from marine and terrestrial life in the north to international law, geopolitics, and peace and conflict in the Arctic.

8.5.2 Russian Experiences

Despite a lack of studies related to human security, the security concept has been present in the Russian experience, ranging from the level of individuals and their communities to geopolitical considerations (Goes 2018). Human security in northwest Russia can be exemplified by the experiences of individuals who, not unlike their neighbours to the west, find their lives impacted by economic, environmental and energy security considerations. Perhaps even more so than their western neighbours, local residents in the Russian part of the BaSR find their human security experiences also tightly intertwined with national security issues and geopolitics. People born and raised on the shore of the White Sea in the town of Severodvinsk10 (the Archangel region, Northwest Russia), during the last years of the Soviet era, had to go through a border control: the bus was stopped at the checkpoint and the

8 University student numbers, in Norwegian: https://www.ssb.no/utdanning/artikler-og-publikas- joner/her-er-de-storste-studiestedene-i-norge. List of universities and colleges in Norway, in English: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/kd/organisation/kunnskapsdepartementets-etater-og- virksomheter/Subordinate-agencies-2/state-run-universities-and-university-co/id434505/) 9 Statistics on tourism, in Norwegian: https://www.statistikknett.no 10 In the Soviet time, Severodvinsk had status of closed town or ZATO. ZATO status restricted uncontrolled movement out of and in the town. 176 O. Øvretveit et al. documents of every passenger were inspected. It was better not to reveal the name of one’s town of origin: “Say that you are from Archangel, if somebody asks you.” Children knew that there were “secret enterprises” that were very important to the state. The word security was never pronounced, but the words ‘state,’ ‘defence’ (in spoken Russian oboronka) and ‘secret’ were always there (Goes 2018). An order (zakaz)11 was very important for such a northern town: enterprises needed orders from the state since only the state could use the facilities of these huge enterprises.12 Because these towns were so important to the state, life there was much better than outside the checkpoint. There was a better supply of food, people were better edu- cated, and they had better salaries than in the neighbouring towns, having a significant impact on their experienced human security. The Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991. The words ‘secret’ and ‘state’ quickly disappeared from daily vocabulary.13 Inhabitants used various strategies of survival to cope with economic difficulties. The huge military enterprise was in the process of conversion from military-oriented products into building civilian vessels and oil platforms and supplying consumer goods. Since it was hard to find customers for an enterprise which for years had been subsidised by the state, the number of inhabitants in this town declined from nearly 259,000 in 1991 to 188,000 18 years later.14 Despite the decline in the 1990s, an increase in energy prices and the new energy policy of Russia have brought about a change in the city’s fortunes. Notable in this regard is the adoption of the “Integrated Investment Plan for the Development of the Severodvinsk Single-Industry Town for 2010–2020,” approved by the government of the Archangel Oblast.15 The total amount of financing of the Integrated Investment Plan is about 40 billion rubles. The key investment projects are the technical re- equipment of the United Shipbuilding Corporation OJSC, and the development of a new shipyard as a joint construction project of “Sevmash” and “Zvyozdochka” partly supported by the state to build large vessels, including civilian ships. The investment projects for the development of the single-industry town of Severodvinsk for 2010–2020 include reconstruction of the bridge across the Nikolskoye Mouth of the Northern Dvina, restoration of the Archangel highway, construction of a road to connect Okruzhnaya and Yubileinaya streets, and the repair of engineering infrastructure for wastewater and sewage. Recently, Severodvinsk received significant federal funds to support this development. The town was

11 The system of orders was developed in the Soviet time. It was connected to an economics based on the principle of distribution. The state provided money to the plants to build a submarine or to repair a ship. The plants did not participate in any open competition, and just had to wait for the contact from above. This became especially crucial in the ‘90s. For such a town the absence of orders from the state meant, literary, economic death, because the majority of the inhabitants were employed by the state through four major enterprises. 12 Life in Severodvinsk is built around four major enterprises working for the state defence. 13 The volume of defence orders to the Naval Yard in Severodvinsk from the state fell by 95% in 1990 (Åtland 2009: 114). 14 Trofimova “Zigzagi demografii.” [Zigzags of demography]. Newspaper Severnyi rabochii, Severodvinsk, 2010, January 21: 9. 15 Please see: http://www.dvinaland.ru/prcenter/release/17278/ 8 The Barents Sea Region in a Human Security Perspective 177 founded and still exists due to its importance as a shipbuilding and ship repair complex. But today it is necessary to overcome the single-industry structure of the town’s economy. A comprehensive investment plan has been developed to meet this need. The above story is just one of many from Russia of the 1990s. Another case is Murmansk. The Murmansk region is located in northwest Russia, mainly on the Kola Peninsula and borders Norway and Finland. The administrative centre of the Murmansk region is the city of Murmansk. It was established in 1916, and the region was actively developed during the Soviet era. Murmansk is the only ice-free port in the European North of Russia, and connects Russia to Europe and North America. That is why Murmansk is often called “a gate to the Arctic”. Nevertheless, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region faced various problems, including a severe decline of population and a high rate of unemployment. The development of the Shtokman gas field, located in the offshore zone of the Murmansk region, was connected to hopes for future prosperity of the region and the country. The regional administration and Gazprom16 claimed that the expected development of the Shtokman field would attract not only energy companies, but also building and transport companies and various related services, and that it would boost the development of the region.17 All this had to occur in an area subjected to an active military presence and deemed to be of high national importance. It is difficult to find anything about Shtokman in media today. Of those headlines that do appear, the tone of those publications is different than before. For example, “Shtokman: long jump to nowhere,” (Bi-port 2013), “Shtokman moves further out of sight” (Staalesen 2013), or “Goodbye, Shtokman” (Staalesen 2012). The intensity of the publications is not comparable with the period from 2007 to 2012. The capacity of the communities in the region to adapt themselves to these kinds of changes remained unclear as well as whether or not oil and gas development had an impact on the region. By the same token, some positive trends might be noted with regard to the Year of Ecology projects in 2017. According to the Analytical Gazette of the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of Russia, in 2017, a plan to clean up Kola Bay from the flooded sunken property was started and supported by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of Russia. Russian industrialists also have assumed a certain amount of environmental responsibility. For example, Norilsk Nickel reduced emissions and opened a modern visitor center in the Pasvik Nature Reserve. The international status of this reserve provides opportunities for the visitor center to become a platform for the development of cooperation in border areas. Also, with the participation of the Government of the Murmansk Oblast, an international

16 Gazprom is a large Russian company working with extraction, production and sale of natural gas. The Russian Government holds a majority stake in the company. 17 “Shtokmanovskyi proekt – kluch k promyshlennomu razvitiju Evropeiskogo Severa Rossii.” [Shtokman project – a key to industrial development of the European North of Russia]. Alexey Miller’s report on the Murmansk International Economic Forum: http://www.gazprom.ru/press/ news/2009/october/article69343/ published online October 15, 2009. Accessed November 22, 2016. 178 O. Øvretveit et al. project to rehabilitate the former coastal base in Andreeva Bay, an area of severe radiation hazards, has been completed. This project is an example of international cooperation, involving the collaboration of hundreds of specialists from seven states.18 The change in the geopolitical situation with the end of the Cold War reshaped the international security configuration. At the same time, this change also brought uncertainty in ways that were not known before in Russia. The first Russian economic crisis (1992–1995) caused by the transition from a planned to a market economy heavily affected those regions which were related to the military-industrial complex.19 Changes in the political and economic structure altered the configuration of state – individual relations: they were no longer ‘the one whole.’ State control through the planned economy was connected to security for the people: stable incomes, social guarantees and a predictable future. New political and economic structures brought prospects of development as well as displayed the difference in interests between the state and individuals and the inability of the state to be a sole provider of security. Thus, challenges are related to the ability of the state and individuals to articulate their concerns, to balance their interests and to mitigate insecurities. Changes regarding the role and place of energy security in relation to national security also took place. Heininen (2016) points out that the increasing role of energy security is a global trend. Moreover, energy security becomes increasingly important in oil and gas dependent countries like Norway and Russia, since access to energy resources is related to power and geopolitical influence (Heininen 2016: 19, 22). Therefore, it is important to examine how this global trend affects the oil and gas regions and perceptions of security in these places. The first economic crisis of the years 1992–1995 in Russia demonstrated the power of economic security. The threat of economic insecurity forced the state to search for new sources of economic sustainability. The oil and gas sector was one of the few sectors of Russia’s economy that was lightly affected during the first crisis and demonstrated fast recovery compared to other Russian industries like machine building or metallurgy (Zubarevich 2016). The price for oil and gas was relatively stable in the 1990s, and the export of petroleum provided a stable income, in particular for regions where the oil and gas were produced. That is why it is not surprising that the oil and gas sector was viewed by the state as a cure for economic insecurity. Kryukov (2009) points out that the decision to develop the Russian Arctic shelf was mainly based on the reason of economic security rather than energy needs. The Shtokman project20 was

18 Please see (in Russian): http://council.gov.ru/activity/analytics/analytical_bulletins/92403/) 19 Zubarevich (2016) extracts four crises in Russia. The first one took place in 1992–1995. The second one from 1998 is partly related to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and partly to the difficult economic situation in Russia, which resulted in devaluation of the ruble and default. The third crisis took place in 2008–2009 and was related to the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. The fourth one started in 2013 and is still ongoing. This crisis is related to the decrease in oil prices in 2014. 20 The Shtokman gas and condensate field is located on the territory of the Murmansk region. 8 The Barents Sea Region in a Human Security Perspective 179 initiated to support the military-industrial complex of the Murmansk and Archangel regions in a critical economic situation in the 1990s (Kryukov 2009: 37). Thus, the oil and gas sector represents an important trend in economic development related to new sources of economic stability.

8.6 Cross-Border Relations

The Barents Sea Region has historically been an area of extensive contact across national borders. This also goes for scientific cooperation and resource management. Different ethnic groups and nationalities have moved across the regional and national borders. People-to-people interaction, culturally and commercially, has a long history in the region, not least in the form of the Pomor trade (Myklebost/ Nielsen 2014). The Pomor trade featured commerce and barter of fish and grain between northern Norwegian and Russian coastal communities. The Pomor trade lasted some 200 years until the Russian revolution in 1917 made all cross border activities more difficult.21 With the end of the Cold War however, cross-border cooperation was again on the agenda. The smaller countries in the region sought to mul- tilateralize collaboration with Russia, and the Barents region gained a new meaning. With a vision to encourage sustainable economic and social development, improve living conditions, contribute to stability, environmental development and peaceful development of northern Europe, the Barents cooperation was formalised by the foreign ministers of Russia, Norway, Finland and Sweden in addition to representatives from Denmark, Iceland and the European Commission in 1993 with the signing of the Kirkenes Declaration. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council became a forum to enhance interregional contact in the northernmost parts of Norway, Russia, Finland and Sweden. Along with the Barents Euro-Arctic Region where representatives of the Indigenous peoples and regions also signed and the Barents Secretariat provides administrative support, a bilateral collaboration between Norway and Russia arose on the regional level. These institutions enhance interregional contact and activities across the borders.22 The Barents collaboration has had varying levels of success. However, though the parties seem to a large extent to be pursuing national interests within the framework of the Barents collaboration, and commercial activities across the borders have stagnated, the structures and institutions of the Barents collaboration still stand strong.

21 See «The Pomor Trade»: https://www.ub.uit.no/northernlights/eng/pomor.htm 22 See «The Barents Region»: https://barents.no/nb/om-oss/barentsregionen 180 O. Øvretveit et al.

8.7 The Barents Sea Region in a Global Context

An important theme running through this account of the societies and cultures of the BaSR is the extent to which the region is affected by the global forces of geopolitics and geoeconomics (see Chap. 9). Although these forces do not negate the regional concerns discussed in the preceding sections, they do impact efforts to address issues of security at the regional level, sensitizing national governments to regional developments and creating conditions in which considerations of high politics intrude to complicate initiatives intended to respond to regional concerns. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the sensitivity of the Arctic with regard to matters of military security declined dramatically. The emphasis during the 1990s and 2000s fell on matters of environmental protection and sustainable development. More recently, however, there has been a revival of interest in the role of the Arctic as a theater of military operations. While the significance of this development is widely debated, nowhere are the signs of renewed military activities more visible than in the Barents Sea Region. As it rebounds from the collapse of the 1990s, Russia has sought to reclaim its role as a great power, strengthening the Northern Fleet based on the Kola Peninsula and resuming active military patrols in the Barents Sea Region. At the same time, China has emerged as a great power with growing interests in the Arctic. The development of the idea of the Polar Silk Road as a component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative provides a rationale for China’s new- found interest in the Arctic (Lanteigne 2019). In concrete terms, this is reflected in expressions of Chinese interest in specific projects such as the proposed Kirkenes- Rovaniemi rail link. The BaSR is also affected by global geoeconomic developments. Not only is the prospect of offshore oil and gas development in the region attractive to some major players (Kristoffersen and Dale 2014); the growth of commercial shipping using the Northern Sea Route will lead to a substantial increase in the number of ships passing through the BaSR (Humpert 2018). While the use of the Northern Sea Route by container ships moving goods between Europe and Asia is not likely to become a major factor in the near term, the shipment of raw materials extracted in the Arctic to southern markets is already increasing rapidly. A particularly prominent example is the growth in maritime traffic involving the use of state-of-the-art LNG tankers to move liquified natural gas from the port of Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula to European consumers. One controversial issue in this realm concerns the tranship- ment of natural gas from ice-strengthened vessels to regular tankers for onward shipment to international destinations. A particularly interesting feature of this development is the emerging competition between LNG tankers and pipelines as preferred means of moving natural gas across international borders. Like the Bering Strait Region, therefore, some of the issues giving rise to needs for governance in the BaSR are attributable in large measure to the impact of outside forces, including the growth of pressure simultaneously to take advantage of the increasing accessibility of Arctic resources and to address a suite of problems associated with the impacts of climate change in the Far North. Yet, it would be a 8 The Barents Sea Region in a Human Security Perspective 181 mistake to exaggerate the importance of these global forces in thinking about the issues of concern to the societies and cultures of the Barents Sea Region. As the previous sections make clear, the BaSR is a distinctive region with a set of concerns that revolve around relations between Indigenous peoples and local communities and the links between human communities of the coastal fringe and the priorities of national governments located in Oslo and Moscow.

8.8 Concluding Observations

The Barents Sea region is dynamic, contested, and a window into a multilevel security politics picture. The border area between Norway and Russia has played an enormous practical as well as symbolic role. There is a long history of cooperative relations in this region, dating back to early Indigenous-local population interactions and the Pomor trade and moving forward through the cooperative efforts associated with the fight against Germany during World War II and the development of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission in the 1970s to the experience of recent decades with the Barents Euro-Artic Region. In practical terms, this has resulted in day-to-day interaction through the landing of fish harvested by Russian vessels in Norwegian ports and the cross-border interaction focused on the city of Kirkenes. Yet, this history of cooperative relations goes hand-in-hand with tensions relating to the survival of Indigenous livelihoods in the face of escalating extractive activities, the redevelopment of Russian military installations in northwestern Russia and extensive NATO exercises in the Arctic (e.g. the Trident Juncture exercise in 2018). Other important developments include the flow of refugees from the Middle East across the relatively open border between Russia and Norway; the growth of commercial shipping in the region, and the uncertain impacts of dramatic changes in the biophysical environment of the BaSR associated with climate change (see Chap. 6). Making use of the lens of human security, we have sought to dissect this complex picture, showing how the BaSR raises complex concerns relating to economic, energy, environmental, and human security as well as the more traditional concerns relating to military security. In short, monochrome, one-dimensional perspectives are not helpful in thinking about the societies and cultures of the Barents Sea Region. The human relations in the region demonstrate that small and largescale politics are far more dynamic and complex than that. The lens of human security attempts to make visible those actors who either have never been “heard” or have been “silenced” (Indigenous peoples, women, minorities, etc.) due to dominant discourses concerning what security should be about. Given that the employment of the notion of security is highly political, giving top priority to issues deemed most valuable in the eyes of powerful actors (usually the state but not always exclusively), we wish to make visible the priorities and values of individuals and communities to see how they can and should inform these political discourses and future plans (Table 8.1). 182 O. Øvretveit et al.

Table 8.1 Summary of major findings The BaSR is integrated into national policies and priorities The BaSR features the presence of modernized communities and complex relations between regional authorities and national governments The Barents Sea fringe is geopolitically sensitive The lens of human security provides a basis for thinking about the BaSR coherently Cross border or people to people relationships provide a counterpoint to geopolitical concerns The Norwegian-Russian border in the BaSR has the distinction of having one of the largest differences in standard of living Environmental perspectives of security, ranging from state level perceptions to human security, play an important part in the Arctic security picture Arctic security ranges from state-protection, military-based security perceptions, to economic, energy, and environmental security including consequences of climate change Cross border science and management collaboration of ocean resources have resulted in healthier and productive marine ecosystems Energy security becomes increasingly important in oil and gas dependent countries like Norway and Russia, since access to energy resources is related to power and geopolitical influence While the use of the Northern Sea Route by container ships moving goods between Europe and Asia is not likely to become a major factor in the near term, the shipment of raw materials extracted in the Arctic to southern markets is already increasing rapidly

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Abstract Drawing on the chapters dealing with the ecological, economic, and sociocultural systems of the Barents Sea Region, this chapter identifies key issues of governance arising in the region and makes use of our approach to informed decisionmaking for sustainability to guide thinking about options for addressing these issues. We identify two issues as priority concerns: (i) will the suite of biophysical changes that are altering the character of the Barents Sea Region generate new needs for governance and (ii) how can we address a number of socioeconomic developments in the region that are making it harder to respond to needs for governance on a sectoral basis? We then identify options (without advocacy) that decisionmakers may consider in selecting responses to the priority issues in such a way as to maximize the achievement of sustainability.

A. N. Vylegzhanin (*) Department of International Law, MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] O. R. Young Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA P. A. Berkman Science Diplomacy Center, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 185 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_9 186 A. N. Vylegzhanin et al.

9.1 Introduction

What do the analyses presented in Chaps. 6, 7 and 8 have to tell us about needs for governance now coming into focus in the Barents Sea Region and about ways to think about these needs in a manner that can contribute to the achievement of sustainability? As in Chap. 5, we proceed in this chapter to address the following questions. Are some needs for governance in the BaSR more urgent than others? Are there alternative ways to frame the key issues relating to governance in the Barents Sea Region (BaSR) that will be of interest to policymakers responsible for matters of governance in this region? What are the relative merits of strategies targeting different venues that may be suitable for addressing these issues? Can we generate a range of options that policymakers may want to consider as they think about issues of governance in the region? Are there linkages between or among these issues that ought to be taken into account in constructing institutions and associated infrastructure to respond to needs for governance in the region? Are there critical uncertainties that make it difficult to answer questions of this sort, and can analysts play constructive roles in identifying key uncertainties and marshaling evidence that can help to reduce them? Drawing on the contributions of the preceding chapters, we apply our general approach to informed decisionmaking for sustainability as described in the preface to this book series to provide some preliminary responses to these questions. Section 9.2 deals with needs for governance. In keeping with our general approach, we start in this section by identifying key questions. We then proceed in Sect. 9.3 to consider data and evidence relevant to responding to these questions. In doing so, we treat the BaSR as a distinct region linked in various ways to the outside world and concentrate on identifying emerging needs for governance that will require responses extending beyond the limits of measures that either Norway or the Russian Federation can develop and implement on its own. A major theme is the challenge of achieving sustainability at the regional level, given the growing impact of external forces shaping the future of the BaSR. Section 9.4 deals with options for addressing those needs for governance likely to require intentional responses in the near term. Central to this discussion is the distinction between institutional arrangements (frequently called regimes) and infrastructure along with an emphasis on the importance of combining institutions and infrastructure to create effective governance systems. Focusing on the interplay among arrangements created to deal with needs for governance in the BaSR, we describe the Barents Sea regime complex in Sect. 9.5 and pose the question of whether there are now or soon will be sufficient benefits to be reaped from deliberate efforts to increase the integration of the principal elements of the complex to justify the effort required to pursue this option. We offer a preliminary account of opportunities in this area and discuss options that Norway and Russia (and potentially other interested parties) may want to consider in the coming years. The concluding section ties together the messages of the chapter, commenting on the roles that analysts can play in reducing uncertainties that make such questions hard to address in a rigorous fashion, contributing to informed decisionmaking for sustainability in the process. Throughout the chapter, we focus on exploring issues and options. Our goal is to make a constructive contribution to informed decisionmaking about needs for 9 Governing the Barents Sea Region 187 governance in the BaSR rather than to become advocates for particular courses of action in this realm. We recognize that policymakers must respond to a variety of pressures in making choices, that governance systems that may look attractive on paper often prove disappointing or fail outright in practice, and that high levels of uncertainty often plague efforts to make informed choices regarding constructive responses to specific needs for governance. Nevertheless, we are convinced that informed decisionmaking is a worthwhile goal and that analysts can make a variety of contributions toward the fulfillment of this goal.

9.2 Governance Questions in the Barents Sea Region

There are both similarities and differences between the Barents Sea Region and the Bering Strait Region that are important to take into account in thinking about needs for governance. Perhaps the most significant similarity arises from the fact that needs for governance in the Barents Sea Region, as in the Bering Strait Region (BeSR), reflect the impact of external drivers. These drivers include both biophysical forces (e.g. the impacts of climate change on sea ice, salinity, water temperatures, the distribution of fish stocks) and socioeconomic forces (e.g. rising interest in commercial shipping, the effects of world market prices for hydrocarbons, incentives to construct a rail line from Finland to the Barents Sea, increasing tension between Norway and Russia associated with deployments of military forces). In some cases, these external drivers give rise to new needs for governance as in the case of pressures to allow fishing on the part of third parties arising as a consequence of shifts in the distribution of fish stocks. In others, external pressures intensify concerns regarding developments occurring within the region (e.g. the intentional or unintentional introduction of species such as red king crabs and snow crabs that are not native to the BaSR). As a consequence, any consideration of needs for governance in the BaSR as well as options for addressing them must take into account the linkages between this ecopolitical region and the broader setting in which it is situated. That said, differences between the BaSR and the BeSR are also significant, making it clear that we need to think carefully about the distinctive features of the Barents Sea Region in exploring needs for governance. First and foremost, the BaSR is a relatively developed region with a sizable human population, major urban hubs, modern economies, and strong links to the southern metropoles in both Norway and Russia. An estimated 1.6 million people live in the BaSR compared with an estimated 50,000 in the BeSR. The BaSR has sizable cities, including Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula with a population of more than 300,000 and Tromsø in northern Norway with a population of ~76,000. The southern portion of the BaSR has long been ice-free year around, a condition arising from the effects of the extension of the Gulf Stream known as the North Atlantic Drift. This has permitted the development of world class fisheries (e.g. the Barents Sea cod fishery); it makes the region’s coastal areas suitable for the development of aquaculture, and it means that projects aimed at the development of hydrocarbons in the area are less complex than similar efforts in other parts of the Arctic where sea ice and exceptionally severe weather are frequent problems. Both Norway and Russia have 188 A. N. Vylegzhanin et al. highly developed national interests in maintaining robust human societies in their sectors of the Barents Sea Region. Norway, for example, has adopted an array of policies designed to strengthen its northern counties, including creating a major university and building up a collection of research institutions (e.g. the Norwegian Polar Institute) in Tromsø. Tromsø has emerged also as the administrative hub of the Arctic Council, hosting the council’s secretariat and the secretariat of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme along with several related administrative units. In addition, the existing governance system for the shared resources of the Barents Sea Region is more highly developed than the parallel system in the Bering Strait Region. Norway and Russia are the principal actors in this ecopolitical region, occupying the roles of adjacent states in the terminology of UNCLOS Article 74. The two countries have an extensive track record of cooperation regarding the management of shared marine resources going back to the establishment of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission under the terms of agreements dating to 1975/1976 (Stokke 2012). The commission has played an important role in promoting bilateral cooperation ever since. More recently, the two countries have established cooperative arrangements to deal with matters of environmental protection of common concern. Prominent in this regard are the activities of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Commission on Environmental Cooperation, launched initially in 1988 and restructured in 1992 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 2010 boundary delimitation treaty resolved outstanding jurisdictional issues regarding the maritime boundary between Norway and Russia, eliminating the problem of overlapping claims in what was known as the gray zone and reinforcing and extending the mechanisms through which the two states deal with issues of common concern regarding natural resources and ecosystem protection in the area. Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude that governing the BaSR will be a matter of clear sailing with no major challenges during the foreseeable future. The region is characterized by both biophysical and geopolitical features that pose significant challenges for those concerned with promoting peaceful and sustainable uses of the Barents Sea’s natural resources and ecosystem services. Unlike the BeSR, the Barents Sea Region features jurisdictional complexities whose significance is likely to grow as a consequence of shifts in the location or distribution of living resources. The most prominent cases in point concern the waters of the loophole, an area that is acknowledged to be high seas (though surrounded by areas under the jurisdiction of Norway and Russia) and therefore open to access on the part of nationals of any (party to UNCLOS) State, and the status of the Svalbard Fishery Protection Zone, an area whose status is subject to significant disagreements among the signatories to the 1920 Paris Treaty (Pedersen 2008; Østhagen 2018). As a result, governance arrangements for the Barents Sea Region must take into account the interests of outsiders who are entitled to engage in a range of activities under the terms of the prevailing law of the sea and who may have specific claims under the provisions of the 1920 Paris Treaty (Vylegzhanin et al. 2018). Movements of important fish stocks in the region, as described in Chaps. 6 and 7, are increasing the importance of these jurisdictional complexities of the BaSR. More generally, uncertainties regarding the 9 Governing the Barents Sea Region 189 trajectories of biophysical and economic developments in the region make it essential to develop and maintain a capacity to adjust the provisions of existing governance systems agilely to be responsive to changing needs for governance that are often hard to anticipate. As in Chap. 5, we concentrate here on particularly prominent emerging needs for governance in order to demonstrate the use of our methodology for achieving informed decisionmaking in some detail. Specifically, we ask (i) will a suite of biophysical changes that are altering the character of the BaSR as an ecopolitical region generate new needs for governance? and (ii) how can we address interactions among a number of socioeconomic developments that are making it increasingly difficult to deal with needs for governance in the region on a sectoral basis?

9.3 Data and Evidence

Following the same logic we adopted in Chap. 5, we turn now to assembling data and evidence needed to engage in informed decisionmaking about questions of governance in the Barents Sea Region. Though it is by no means exhaustive, the following account directs attention to key issues in this realm.

9.3.1 The Consequences of Biophysical Changes

Chapter 6 documents the fact that most of the Barents Sea Region has been ice-free year around during modern times. A key difference between this region and other parts of the Arctic, this condition has played an important role in the development of human activities in the BaSR in modern times. Among other things, it has enabled the rise of sizable settler communities in the region, facilitated largescale commercial fishing operations, and made coastal shipping comparatively easy. It also explains the fact that Russia’s Northern Fleet, the country’s most powerful naval force – including late model nuclear-powered submarines equipped with sea-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear-powered attack submarines – is based in the region (along the north coast of the Kola Peninsula). Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that the physical features of this region are stable conditions that can be expected to remain unchanged during the foreseeable future. We have known for some time that the impacts of climate change are developing more rapidly throughout the Arctic than in other parts of the world. But recent scientific research indicates that the northern part of the Barents Sea has emerged as a particularly prominent climate “hotspot” featuring a sharp increase in ocean temperature, a decline in sea-ice, and a rising level of salinity. The result is what researchers have taken to describing as the Atlantification (or borealization) of the Barents Sea Region (see Chap. 6 and Lind et al. 2018). How these developments will unfold during the coming years remains highly conjectural at this stage. It is possible, though by no means certain, that nonlinear changes will occur leading to major surprises regarding oceanic conditions in the region. But in any case, physical 190 A. N. Vylegzhanin et al. changes are already producing documented biological effects that raise important questions regarding governance in the BaSR. Perhaps the most significant biological effect in terms of governance involves shifts in the distribution and abundance of northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua), the single most important fish species in the region and the focus of a world-class fishery. Cod stocks have been robust in recent years, a condition many attribute to good fisheries management under the leadership of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to expect that these stocks will be affected by the Atlantification of the BaSR. Already, there is evidence indicating that the distribution of cod stocks is shifting to the north and east (see Figure 6.4 in Chap. 6) and that fluctuations in the abundance of cod are increasing. The Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission set the cod quota for 2018 at 775,000 tons, down from the 2017 quota of 890,000 tons, following a recommendation from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) that the 2018 quota should not exceed 712,000 tons (Nilsen 2017). Despite the operation of a sophisticated management system, it is difficult to anticipate future developments regarding the status of the BaSR’s cod stocks as well as other species (e.g. red king crabs and snow crabs) that have presented complex management challenges in recent years (Østhagen and Raspotnik 2019). Aside from the obvious importance of setting annual quotas in such a way as to maintain the robustness of key stocks while at the same time satisfying the most urgent demands of the fishing industry, these developments raise important governance questions linked to the jurisdictional arrangements in place in the Barents Sea Region. Issues associated with shifts in the distribution and abundance of cod stocks constitute a prominent example in this regard. In part, this is attributable to the fact that increasing quantities of cod are showing up in the loophole, an area of high seas that is open to access on the part of fishers from third countries. The critical question here is whether the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission can find ways to accommodate the activities of such fishers that allow the commission to continue to operate as the main instrument for fisheries management in the region or, alternatively, some major modifications or even a significantly restructured regime will become necessary to address the consequences of shifting stocks in the BaSR in the coming years. At the same time, stock shifts are reawakening somewhat dormant concerns relating to the status of the waters surrounding the Svalbard Archipelago. The central question here is whether these waters should be treated as part of Norway’s Exclusive Economic Zone and arguably subject to the provisions of Article 2 of the 1920 Paris Treaty on equal rights of fishing, despite that fact that the concept of EEZs did not exist at the time the treaty entered into force. Norway, which has created a Fishery Protection Zone in the area, asserts that the Svalbard Archipelago does not have an Exclusive Economic Zone of its own, so that the waters in question are not subject to the provisions of the 1920 treaty. Others (e.g. Iceland, Russia, Spain), interested in gaining access to potentially growing fish stocks located in an area often called the Svalbard box, have taken the position that they should be allowed to enjoy the treaty’s equal access provisions with regard to resources located 9 Governing the Barents Sea Region 191 in the waters surrounding the archipelago. In recent years, representatives of the European Union’s Commission have expressed interest in the area’s living resources, further complicating Norway’s position. There is no way to forecast with any precision at this time how the key biophysical and legal processes will develop during the coming years. We do know that the impacts of climate change are particularly strong in this region and that we should be prepared for surprising developments in the future. But this observation does not have straightforward implications with regard to the development and operation of governance systems. What is clear is that it is important to avoid lock-in with regard to decisions made in response to specific needs for governance in the BaSR. In practice, this raises a critical question that is likely to arise in one form or another in many ecopolitical regions during the coming years. Are we best off for now making ad hoc adjustments to the existing arrangement featuring the operation of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission in the main part of the Barents Sea and Norwegian control in what is known as the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard? Or would it make sense to launch a more general effort to consider a restructured regime for this dynamic region? We will come back to this question in the next section.

9.3.2 Interactions among Sectoral Developments

As is the case in other parts of the world, most governance systems in the BaSR are sector specific. The Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission manages the region’s commercial fisheries subject to the terms of the longstanding bilateral Norwegian-Russian agreement on procedures for setting quotas and promoting compliance on the part of harvesters. Current tensions regarding the effectiveness of this arrangement are being treated largely as a matter of adjusting the fisheries regime. Offshore energy developments in the BaSR (e.g. the Snøhvit gas field and the Goliat oil field located in the Norwegian sector of the region) are subject to national regimes operated by Norway and Russia. In the case of reservoirs that straddle the maritime boundary between the two countries (e.g. the Fedynsky High depicted in Fig. 9.1), Norway and Russia have established general procedures (with details to be addressed case-by-case) under the terms of the boundary delimitation treaty to deal with the development of shared energy resources on a unitized basis. Norway is now opening up additional tracts for potential development in its part of the BaSR, a process that has triggered sensitivities in cases where tracts are located in waters surrounding the Svalbard Archipelago. But there are no provisions to address potential interactions between commercial fisheries and offshore oil and gas development in place at this stage. Similar observations are in order regarding commercial activities in other sectors. Most important (as documented in Chaps. 7 and 11) is the prospect of enhanced shipping arising from commercial activities taking place in the BaSR itself, the transport of Arctic commodities (e.g. liquid natural gas originating on the Yamal Peninsula) to European markets, and (potentially) the use of the Northern Sea Route 192 A. N. Vylegzhanin et al.

Fig. 9.1 Barents Sea hydrocarbon reservoirs (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate). (Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) to move goods between Europe and East Asia. Ship-based tourism, especially in the form of tours to the North Pole aboard Russian icebreakers in the summer months, has added to ship traffic in the eastern portion of the BaSR.1 Strictly speaking, the provisions of the Polar Code, adopted by the International Maritime Organization and codified largely in the form of amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life At Sea Convention and the 1973/1978 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, do not apply to areas that are ice-free year around, a fact that puts much of the BaSR formally beyond the scope of this regulatory regime. But overall, the number of ships operating in the region is rising rapidly, leading not only to a growing interest in the regulation of ship traffic but also to the prospect of

1 A recent article claims that “More than 80 percent of tourists on Russian icebreaker tours to the North Pole are Chinese” (Pincus 2018). 9 Governing the Barents Sea Region 193 rising tension between shipping on the one hand and fishing and oil and gas development on the other. For the most part, issues of environmental protection in the region are subject to separate governance arrangements. Both Norway and Russia have created sizable protected areas in the Arctic (e.g. large parts of the Svalbard Archipelago on the part of Norway and of Franz Josef Land on the part of Russia). The two countries established the Joint Norwegian-Russian Environmental Commission in 1988 to address environmental concerns of common interest in the BaSR. For the most part, this commission has focused on matters of environmental protection regarding terrestrial areas and the coastal zones along the southern margins of the BaSR. Nongovernmental organizations (e.g. WWF) have assessed the need for the creation of marine protected areas in the BaSR and published maps showing the location of areas regarded as priorities from this perspective. But the governments have not acted to adopt the recommendations emanating from these sources. With regard to needs for governance, the obvious question arising in this context concerns the prospect of interactions among these activities that none of the sectoral regimes has a clearcut mandate to address. How might oil and gas development in the BaSR affect fishing and shipping? Will oil spill preparedness and response plans become an important mechanism to protect other activities from harm? Will there be a need to create sea lanes for shipping to avoid negative interactions between the operation of commercial ships and other activities in the region or to avoid or mitigate environmental impacts (e.g. ship strikes on marine mammals, noise pollution) arising from commercial shipping? Can marine protected areas be established in a manner that provides adequate protection for particularly sensitive ecosystems without imposing excessive costs of industrial activities? As Chap. 10 documents, significant developments involving the methodology of integrated ocean management may provide a means to address some of these questions. Norway has taken a leading role in this area and now makes use of integrated ocean management in its sector of the BaSR. Russia has taken significant steps to follow suit, and there is evidence of a growing effort to bring these techniques of integrated ocean management to bear in the BaSR in a coordinated fashion. Of course, all these matters are subject not only to the biophysical uncertainties referred to in the preceding subsection but also to a range of uncertainties arising from socioeconomic considerations. It is difficult to say whether world market conditions will make hydrocarbons located in the BaSR (e.g. the huge proven Shtokman gas field whose development is now on indefinite hold) economically attractive during the foreseeable future. There are fundamental uncertainties regarding both the types of volumes of future shipping along the Northern Sea Route that will affect interactions between shipping and other activities in the BaSR. Such considerations highlight, once again, the importance of avoiding lock- ins in efforts to address needs for governance in the Barents Sea Region during the coming years. 194 A. N. Vylegzhanin et al.

9.4 Options: Institutions and Infrastructure

For the most part, existing governance arrangements have performed well in maintaining peace and contributing to the achievement of sustainability in the BaSR. All interested parties accept the prevailing law of the sea centered on UNCLOS as the constitutive base on which to build regimes dealing with more specific needs for governance arising in the region. The 2010 bilateral treaty between Norway and Russia not only settled the principal jurisdictional dispute between the two countries; it also contains annexes extending and formalizing longstanding arrangements dealing with fisheries and providing for similar cooperative measures relating to energy development. So far, the arrangements established under the terms of this treaty have proven effective, though it is fair to observe that they have not yet been subjected to severe tests (Stokke et al. 1999; Stokke 2012). For the most part, the region’s fish stocks are robust; ICES plays an acknowledged and significant role in determining total allowable catches, even though the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission is not required to accept its advice and sometimes adopts quotas that differ from those ICES recommends. The joint commission on environmental protection is engaged actively in a broad effort to capitalize on Norway’s role as a leader in the development of advanced tools in the area of integrated ocean management. A working group operating under the auspices of the commission released a plan in November 2016 for Norwegian-Russian cooperation to protect polar bears and other key species in the BaSR (Joint Russian-Norwegian Commission on Environmental Protection 2016). Overall, as Table 9.1 indicates, there is a sizable collection of organizations (i.e. material entities with administrative capacity and resources) that are regional in

Table 9.1 Regional International Council for the organizations active in Exploration of the Sea administration of governance Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries systems for the Barents Sea Commission, Committees, Working Region Groups Joint Norwegian-Russian Commission on Environmental Protection, BarentsPortal OSPAR Commission, Working Groups, Secretariat North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, Committees, Secretariat Barents Euro-Arctic Council and Barents Regional Council Arctic Council Working Groups, Task Forces, Expert Groups, Secretariats 9 Governing the Barents Sea Region 195 scope and that play roles in addressing functional issues arising in connection with the day-to-day operation of governance systems applicable to the BaSR.2 The fact that these arrangements have worked well in the past, however, does not mean that there are no important challenges on the horizon regarding needs for governance in this dynamic region. For purposes of this discussion, we focus on four broad categories of governance concerns: practices needed to avoid problems arising from unresolved and contentious jurisdictional issues; procedures needed to strengthen ecosystem protection at the regional level; measures designed to handle interplay among sectorally-defined regimes, and arrangements established to allow for agile responses to major (often nonlinear and surprising) changes in biophysical and socioeconomic conditions. In each case, appropriate types of infrastructure will be required to ensure that regimes created to address the relevant needs are implemented dependably, monitored on an ongoing basis, and adjusted in a timely manner to respond to changing circumstances (Berkman 2015).

9.4.1 Institutions

The most prominent unresolved jurisdictional issue in the Barents Sea Region focuses on the status of the waters surrounding the Svalbard Archipelago (Pedersen 2008; Østhagen 2018). In essence, the issue turns on the applicability to the archipelago of provisions of the contemporary law of the sea – especially those dealing with Exclusive Economic Zones as set forth in UNCLOS Part V – that did not exist in 1920 when the Paris Treaty was negotiated. Norway takes the view that it is entitled to exercise authority not subject to the provisions of the treaty in areas lying beyond a narrow band of territorial waters surrounding the archipelago. Based on this rationale, it has established a 200-mile Fishery Protection Zone in these areas. A number of Parties to the treaty, including Great Britain, Iceland, Spain, and Russia, prefer an interpretation under which an Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf associated with the archipelago should be subject by extension to the equal access provisions of the regime established under the terms of the Paris Treaty. Like many disagreements regarding matters of jurisdiction, this one has no straightforward or easy to implement solution. It is likely to prove difficult to resolve the differences to everyone’s satisfaction during the foreseeable future. For now, the way forward may well be to make use of practical mechanisms that allow for cooperation without prejudice to the legal positions of the parties, following precedents like the treatment of the gray zone in the Barents Sea prior to the negotiation of the 2010 boundary delimitation treaty between Norway and Russia (Oude Elferink 1994) and the handling of the disagreement between Canada and the US regarding transit passage in the Northwest Passage (Kirkey 1994–1995). So long as interest in the area’s resources (e.g. fish stocks or hydrocarbons) remains

2 Organizations differ from institutions in that they are material entities with offices, personnel, and budgets. Typically, organizations play important roles in administering institutions (Young 1989, Ch. 2). 196 A. N. Vylegzhanin et al.

Fig. 9.2 OSPAR regions. (Source: open access at: www.ospar.org/convention/the-north-east-atlantic) limited, such an arrangement may be adequate. Should human activities become more intense and diversified in the future, however, pressure may rise to make a conscious effort to sort out these differences. Most of the BaSR lies within OSPAR’s Region 1 labeled Arctic Waters (see Fig. 9.2).3 Many observers regard this regime established under the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic as an effective arrangement created initially to address problems of ship-based and land- based pollution but now dealing increasingly with European standards on matters of marine biodiversity, eutrophication, hazardous and radioactive wastes, and offshore oil and gas development as well (Molenaar and Oude Elferink 2009). It seems accurate to say, however, that Region 1 has received much less attention under the terms of this regime than other regions, including Region II encompassing the North Sea. This condition is unlikely to change during the foreseeable future, especially given the fact that the Russian Federation is not formally a contracting party to the OSPAR Convention. At the national level, Norway has proceeded vigorously to develop a system of coastal and ocean management applicable to areas under its jurisdiction (see Chap. 3 and Hoel and Olsen 2012). A particularly notable feature

3 The Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission has regulatory areas encompassing those parts of the BaSR that are beyond coastal state jurisdiction. 9 Governing the Barents Sea Region 197 of Norway’s approach has been a proactive effort to apply the tools of integrated ocean management, sometimes referred to as marine spatial planning in other regions of the world (see Chap. 10 and Young et al. 2007). The development of bilateral cooperation between Norway and Russia on marine issues within the framework of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Commission on Environmental Protection suggests that there is room for an intermediate arrangement that transcends national boundaries but is more focused than Region I of OSPAR (see Fig. 9.2). One mechanism that may provide helpful insights in this connection is the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) with its various subsidiary bodies and with a secretariat located in Kirkenes, Norway.4 The Barents Regional Council, which operates under the auspices of BEAC, is composed of subnational units of government including the northern counties of Norway and the northwestern oblasts of the Russian Federation as well as the northern counties of Finland and Sweden and representatives of Indigenous peoples’ organizations and is designed to engage regional authorities in efforts to stimulate and implement cooperative measures on matters of particular concern to local or regional constituencies (Stokke and Hønneland 2007). Although the spatial domain of the BEAC does not coincide with what we treat as the BaSR and the council has focused more on terrestrial than marine matters, this body’s experience in stimulating functional cooperation on issues that cut across jurisdictional boundaries may suggest constructive approaches to the governance of a marine ecopolitical region like the BaSR. One interesting strategy for achieving coordination regarding matters of regional concern in the BaSR may be to start by establishing a coordinated network of marine protected areas (MPAs) in the region through some procedure featuring mutual consent (Figure 6.7 in Chap. 6 provides a map of areas of heightened ecological significance in the region). It is worth noting in this connection that the waters around the Svalbard Archipelago and around Franz Josef Land are accorded particularly high priority in these terms. As it happens, these are areas in which Norway and Russia already have taken significant steps, going back in some cases to the 1970s, to protect coastal and marine ecosystems (Sazhenova 2016). Beyond this, it will be essential to proceed with care, assessing the relationship between high priority areas from the perspective of ecosystem protection and areas of particular interest to fishing, energy, and shipping interests. Experience in other regions makes it clear that it is typically difficult to delineate specific areas for various forms or levels of protection that all parties concerned can accept comfortably. Nevertheless, there is growing momentum in other parts of the world to establish larger and larger MPAs (McLeod and Leslie 2009). Naturally, it is more difficult to make progress in areas located beyond the jurisdiction of coastal states. But the decision announced in October 2016 to create a large MPA in the Ross Sea adjacent to Antarctica indicates that international cooperation even in parts of the high seas is feasible (ASOC current). It may well be that Norway and Russia can build on their success in governing shared marine resources to design a coordinated network of MPAs in the BaSR.

4 For background on the structure and operations of the BEAC, consult: www.beac.st/en 198 A. N. Vylegzhanin et al.

As these observations suggest, there are limitations inherent in any system of governance founded on the principle of dealing with needs for governance in a sectoral manner (Crowder et al. 2006). In the BaSR, there are currently in place distinct arrangements dealing with fishing, energy development, shipping, and ecosystem protection. So long as human activities in these separate sectors are limited, such a system can produce satisfactory results. But as human activities in a marine ecopolitical region like the BaSR increase, problems of institutional interplay arise. This is an issue that is destined to become more prominent in the BaSR and other regions involving shared resources in the coming years (Young 2016). In the Barents Sea, the main areas of overlap involve fishing grounds, gas fields, shipping lanes, and marine protected areas. Undoubtedly, some of the resultant issues can be handled on an ad hoc basis. Shipping lanes can be adjusted on a seasonal basis to avoid major fishing grounds or the annual migratory routes of marine mammals. It is possible to impose regulations on offshore oil and gas development (e.g. the requirement to drill relief wells) that are effective in minimizing the likelihood of accidents or the destructive impacts of oil spills or gas leaks that get out of control. Sophisticated tools may make it possible to design marine protected areas in ways that minimize interference with conventional economic activities like fishing and shipping (Airame et al. 2003). At some stage, however, the challenge of finding ways to integrate the elements of this regime complex will become a major concern (Oberthür and Stokke 2011). Regime complexes are sets of nonhierarchical arrangements that arise to deal with needs for governance in an identifiable issue domain or spatially defined area (Raustiala and Victor 2004; Keohane and Victor 2011; Alter and Raustiala 2018). Although the initial emergence of a regime complex reflects unplanned or de facto rather than intentional developments, it becomes important as human activities increase in scope and intensity to think about rationalizing constituent elements in order to avoid conflicts between or among individual regime elements and to take advantage of potential synergies among them (Oberthür and Gehring 2006). There is no simple criterion for determining when this threshold is reached. But the growth of a range of human activities in the BaSR indicates that we are likely to reach a threshold of this sort in addressing needs for governance in the Barents Sea Region during the foreseeable future. An additional need for governance centers on the importance of devising arrangements that can facilitate efforts to respond agilely to nonlinear, sometimes abrupt, and often surprising changes in marine ecopolitical regions. Although their main impact lies to the west of the area we treat as the BaSR, recent shifts in the mackerel (Scomber scombrus) stocks in the North Atlantic offer a striking illustration of this sort of dynamism (Nøttestad et al. forthcoming). Stocks of Atlantic mackerel have expanded rapidly in a westerly direction, starting in the Norwegian Sea and extending into waters under the jurisdiction of the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and even Greenland (Ministry of Industries and Innovation current). By some measures, mackerel now constitute the largest single-species biomass in the North Atlantic. This expansion has occurred rapidly; it is not known whether the stocks will crash or recede equally rapidly in the coming years, making it challenging to provide for 9 Governing the Barents Sea Region 199 effective governance. Already, ICES is calling for reductions in allowable catches of this species (ICES 2015-2016). But achieving the consensus needed to act on such recommendations is difficult. The BaSR may experience similar dynamism, driven by a range of factors including shifting weather patterns, ocean acidification, the growth of aquaculture, fluctuations in world market prices for oil and gas, and the growth of commercial shipping, among others. The arrangement covering fisheries established initially under the bilateral agreements of the 1970s and reconfirmed and extended to energy development under the terms of the 2010 Norwegian- Russian Treaty may be part of the answer to this challenge. But they are not likely to be sufficient. Pressure from the fishing industry may lead the Joint Norwegian- Russian Fisheries Commission to set allowable harvest levels in excess of the recommendations of ICES, especially if the cod stocks enter a period of decline relative to their current robust condition. As fish stocks move into the international waters of the loophole, fishers from other countries are becoming increasingly resistant to the decisions of the Joint Commission regarding quotas. In any event, these arrangements cannot deal with the establishment of new or expanded MPAs, a response recommended by many as a means of cushioning the impacts of largescale but unpredictable shifts in the composition of marine systems (McLeod and Leslie 2009). As a result, dealing effectively with the dynamics of the BaSR may require the development of institutional arrangements that are better positioned to address systemic shifts than those in place today.

9.4.2 Infrastructure

Governance systems are seldom self-executing. They require the development of administrative capacity to handle implementation on a day-to-day basis as well as the creation of monitoring systems, compliance mechanisms, and dispute settlement procedures. Relative to other sectors of the Arctic, the BaSR has some distinct advantages with regard to such matters. Because much of the region, including those areas of greatest interest from the perspectives of fishing and energy development, are ice free year around, there is little need to contend with problems (e.g. shipping in ice-covered or ice-infested waters, search and rescue under unusually difficult conditions, or responses to pollution in ice-infested waters) that loom large in moving governance systems from paper to practice in other parts of the Arctic. Similarly, the Arctic coasts of Norway and northwestern Russia are better endowed with ports and other relevant forms of built infrastructure than other parts of the Arctic. As Table 9.1 indicates, a number of intergovernmental organizations and related bodies encompass the BaSR within their scope of authority and contribute to the administration of governance systems currently operative in the region. These are distinct advantages; they set the BaSR apart from other parts of the Arctic with regard to the availability of built infrastructure capable of taking on a variety of functional tasks. Still, it would be a mistake to conclude from these observations that upgrading infrastructure is not an important consideration in governing the BaSR effectively. 200 A. N. Vylegzhanin et al.

Some requirements are largely matters of extending or adapting existing capabilities to address the evolving character of the Barents Sea regime complex. This applies to the role of ICES in providing science-based advice on the condition of fish stocks in the BaSR, the capacity of advanced technologies to monitor ship traffic in the region, and the activities of Norwegian Coast Guard and Russian Federal Border Service units in addressing the challenges of law enforcement regarding fisheries and other matters of joint concern. But other requirements are likely to call for the development of new organizational capacity and built infrastructure. The most obvious example centers on the introduction of organizational arrangements designed to sort out tensions and take advantage of synergies in the evolving Barents Sea governance complex. One worthwhile avenue to explore for early action in this connection is the strengthening of capacity in the areas of monitoring, reporting, and verification. The region is already served by well-developed ship tracking systems and by sophisticated tools used to support integrated ocean management (see Chaps. 10 and 11). But rapid advances in technology are opening up new opportunities to combine Earth observations from satellites with a variety of surface observations to provide advance warning of emerging problems, support emergency services, and conduct real-time monitoring to verify compliance with regulations and facilitate the appre- hension of those who violate applicable regulations.5 In this regard, there may be a role for mechanisms operating within the framework of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) or, more modestly, for assessing the experience of the BEAC in promoting transnational cooperation on a regional basis as a source of lessons of interest to those with a mandate to implement the various elements of the emerging governance system applicable to human activities occurring in the BaSR and the probable growth of these activities during the foreseeable future (Stokke and Hønneland 2007). The critical challenge in this regard is to mesh regional arrangements that provide prominent roles for local actors possessing in-depth knowledge of the region (see Chap. 8) with broader international arrangements that apply equally to the BaSR and a range of other regions.

9.5 The Future of the Barents Sea Region Regime Complex

The discussion in the preceding section suggests that it would be worthwhile for decisionmakers to consider options for increasing the integration of the Barents Sea Region regime complex and enhancing its agility in responding to changes that are difficult to foresee in advance (Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Oberthür and Stokke 2011). Certainly, Norway and Russia will be the lead actors in any activity of this sort. But it may make sense to develop explicit procedures to allow for enhanced participation on the part of other governments (e.g. the Faroe Islands, Iceland),

5 For a general account of the uses of satellite observations in addressing environmental problems, see Stokke and Young 2017. 9 Governing the Barents Sea Region 201 intergovernmental organizations (e.g. ICES, NEAFC, OSPAR), and Indigenous peoples’ organizations (e.g. the Saami Council). The creation of an integrated arrangement of this sort is apt to be a slow process involving negotiations and the evolution of informal practices over a period of time among a variety of stakeholders with distinct but overlapping interests. A consideration of the rising need for integration among the elements of the Barents Sea regime complex suggests that it may make sense to start the process of working out the terms of what could evolve over time into a Barents Sea Regional Authority sooner rather than later to alleviate the problem of having to make decisions under severe time pressure at a later stage (see also Chap. 5). One way to initiate this process would be to focus at the outset on the articulation of a set of common principles governing human activities in the BaSR rather than on the development of more formal or legally binding rules or procedures (Young 2017, Chap. 6). To some extent, this would be a matter of adapting generic principles set forth in global international agreements like UNCLOS to the specific circumstances of this region. Among the most relevant of these are the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, and the principle of environmental equity. The principle of stewardship may offer a particularly attractive point of departure for thinking about the future of governance in the BaSR in a coherent manner (Chapin et al. 2015). Principles of this sort are codes of conduct that are expected to operate as guides to normatively prescribed or ethical behavior rather than legally binding rules that actors are obligated to comply with under applicable international law. They are intended to provide a basis for building up a set of normatively grounded social practices that serve to structure the behavior of public and private actors in an issue domain or spatially defined region. Principles are not substitutes for more formal rules setting forth requirements and prohibitions that are legally obligatory. Nevertheless, there is much to be said for encouraging the growth of principled governance as a basis for addressing more specific needs for governance in an effective manner in an area like the BaSR (Young 2017, Chap. 6). Whether or not this process would evolve over time toward the creation of a Barents Sea Regional Authority would depend more on incremental developments than on a constitutive decision taken at a particular point in time.

9.6 Conclusion

In one sense, the Barents Sea Region is a comparatively simple case with regard to governance in which two adjacent states – Norway and Russia – have a substantial history of cooperation, have resolved their longstanding disagreement regarding the delimitation of their maritime boundary in the area, and have put in place cooperative arrangements to address needs for governance relating to fisheries, energy development, and environmental protection. From the perspective of governance, these are noteworthy achievements. Going forward, however, we can expect the emergence of new needs for governance in this region. Many of these needs arise from the complex biophysical dynamics of the region or reflect the growth of human 202 A. N. Vylegzhanin et al. activities in distinct sectors that generate challenges involving the integration of the Barents Sea regime complex to match shifting conditions in the region. Norway and Russia will remain the dominant players in the BaSR. But both biophysical and socioeconomic changes have given rise to conditions that will require a consideration of the interests of additional players. The dominant players will need to acknowledge the validity of the interests of others; they should take the lead in proposing institutional adjustments that allow others to have a voice in governing the BaSR, while at the same time protecting the legitimacy of the practice of treating the coastal states as the primary actors in this region. Rationalizing the Barents Sea regime complex is a matter of devising procedures to manage institutional interplay, a classic challenge for governance in complex settings (Oberthür and Stokke 2011). It will also require the development of suitably augmented or new forms of infrastructure to administer the resultant arrangements on a day-to-day basis. In one sense, these governance challenges constitute a case of what we can treat properly as “good trouble.” There is no need to start from scratch in addressing needs for governance in the BaSR or to treat the current situation as approaching a condition of crisis. The arrangements already in place in this region provide an excellent point of departure for addressing new needs for governance as they arise over time. Yet it is important not to adopt a complacent attitude regarding the governance of this ecopolitical region. There is much to be done in enhancing the existing governance system of the BaSR not only to meet needs coming into focus today but also to anticipate needs already visible on the horizon for the future.

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Lind S, Ingvaldsen RB, Furevik T (2018) Arctic warming hotspot in the northern Barents Sea linked to declining sea-ice import. Nat Clim Chang 8:634–639 McLeod K, Leslie H (eds) (2009) Ecosystem-based Management for the Oceans. Island Press, Washington, DC Ministry of Industries and Innovation of Iceland. Mackerel fishing dispute questions and answers. http://eng.atvinnuvegaraduneyti.is/mackerel-fishingidispute/news/nr/6903 Molenaar EJ, Oude Elferink AG (2009) Marine protected areas in areas beyond National Jurisdiction – the pioneering efforts under the OSPAR convention. Utrecht Law Rev 5:5–20 Nilsen (2017) Russia, Norway agree to reduce Barents Sea cod quota. The Barents Observer, 13 October Nøttestad L et al (forthcoming) Quantifying changes in abundance, biomass, and spatial distribution of Northeast Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) in the Nordic Seas from 2007 to 2014. ICES J Mar Sci 73(2):359–373 Oberthür S, Gehring T (eds) (2006) Institutional interaction in global environmental governance: synergy and conflict among international and EU policies. MIT Press, Cambridge Oberthür S, Stokke OS (eds) (2011) Institutional interaction and global environmental change. MIT Press, Cambridge Østhagen A (2018) Managing conflict at Sea: the case of Norway and Russia in the Svalbard Zone. Arctic Rev Law Politics 9:100–123 Østhagen A, Raspotnik A (2019) Why is the European Union challenging Norway over snow crab? Svalbard, special interests, and Arctic governance. Ocean Dev Int Law. https://doi.org/10.108 0/00908320.2019.1582606 Oude Elferink AG (1994) The law of maritime boundary delimitation: a case study of the Russian Federation. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht Pedersen T (2008) The dynamics of Svalbard diplomacy. Ocean Dev Int Law 32:236–262 Pincus R (2018) China’s polar strategy: an emerging gray zone. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat. com/2018/07/chinas-polar-strategy-an-emerging-gray-zone/ Raustiala K, Victor DG (2004) The regime complex for plant genetic resources. Int Organ 55:277–309 Sazhenova A (2016) Russia ready to boost Arctic tourism. The Barents Observer, 29 June Stokke OS (2012) Disaggregating international regimes: a new approach to evaluation and comparison. MIT Press, Cambridge Stokke OS, Hønneland G (eds) (2007) International cooperation and Arctic governance: regime effectiveness and northern region building. Routledge, London Stokke OS, Young OR (2017) Chapter: 6: Integrating earth-observation systems and international environmental regimes. In: Onoda M, Young OR (eds) Satellite earth observations and their impact on society and policy. Springer, Tokyo Stokke OS, Anderson LG, Mirovitskaya N (1999) The Barents Sea fisheries. In: Young OR (ed) The effectiveness of international regimes. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 91–154 Vylegzhanin AN, Young OR, Berkman PA (2018) Governing the Barents Sea Region: current status, emerging issues, and future options. Ocean Dev Int Law 49:1–27 Young OR (1989) International cooperation: building regimes for natural resources and the environment. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Young OR (2016) Governing the Arctic Ocean. Mar Policy 72:271–277 Young OR (2017) Governing complex systems: social Capital for the Anthropocene. MIT Press, Cambridge Young OR et al (2007) Solving the crisis in ocean governance: place-based Management of Marine Ecosystems. Environment 49:20–32 Part IV Crosscutting Themes and Analytic Tools Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 10

Ellen Øseth and Oleg Korneev

Abstract The Barents Sea is a high-latitude large marine ecosystem shared uniquely by Norway and Russia, located off the northern coasts of both countries. In the South and West it is influenced by Atlantic water (warmer and more saline water), and in the North and East by Arctic or mixed (Atlantic and Arctic) water (colder and less saline). The Barents Sea is characterized by large seasonal and annual variations in ocean climate and moderately high productivity. On the Norwegian side, a management plan was established in 2006, updated in 2011, and are now planned for a full revision in 2020. In Norway, the foundation of the management plans is not in the legal system, meaning there are no laws regulating the existence of management plans as a tool for management. However, the management plans are sanctioned at the highest political level in Norway, as they are presented as White papers from the Government to Parliament, and endorsed by Parliament. On the Russian side, a number of strategic documents of the Russian Federation are devoted to the issues of environmental management. Thus, in accordance with the Environmental Doctrine of the Russian Federation, the main direction of the state’s environmental policy is the implementation of comprehensive environmental management, and its orientation towards sustainable development of the Russian Federation. There is no management plan in place for the Russian side of the Barents Sea, but Norway and Russia are cooperating,

E. Øseth (*) Environmental Management Section, Norwegian Polar Institute, Tromsø, Norway e-mail: [email protected] O. Korneev Federal State Budgetary Institution North-West Administration of Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring, St. Petersburg, Russia

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 207 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_10 208 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

aiming at harmonisation of the management of the shared ocean area. Russia is working towards a management plan.

10.1 The Barents Sea: A Rich, Common Ocean Area

Norway and Russia share a common ocean space, and have a long history of collaboration in this area. The Barents Sea (Norwegian: Barentshavet; Russian: Баренцево море) is a high-latitude large marine ecosystem shared uniquely by Norway and Russia, located off the northern coasts of both countries. In the South and West it is influenced by Atlantic water (warmer and more saline water), and in the North and East by Arctic or mixed (Atlantic and Arctic) water (colder and less saline). The Barents Sea is characterized by large seasonal and annual variations in ocean climate and moderately high productivity (McBride et al. 2016). With an average depth of 230 m and a maximum depth of approximately 500 m at the western entrance, it is a shallow shelf sea (Stiansen et al. 2009). The southern half of the Barents Sea is not ice covered, but in the northern part sea ice is present parts of the year. The Barents Sea sea ice cover is characterized by large variation from year to year. The main development in the ice extent since 1979 has been a clearly negative trend (MOSJ 2019) (Fig. 10.1). The Barents Sea is an important feeding area for cod, capelin, haddock, herring, sea perch, catfish, plaice, halibut, Atlantic salmon, and redfish. Major international fisheries take place in the area, and the main sources of pollution are industrial activities linked to marine transport, the extraction of petroleum products (oil and gas) and fresh-water runoff (McBride et al. 2016). In recent years, a continuous increase in temperature and a decrease in sea ice have caused a ‘borealisation’ of the Barents Sea. Temperature increases have caused Atlantic and thermophilic species to migrate from the South-West parts of the Barents Sea to migrate North and East, while the distribution of Arctic species to a large degree is limited to the nothernmost and easternmost areas. Loss of sea ice has increased primary production, which together with solid fisheries management created the foundation for a large stock of Northeast Arctic cod (Arneberg and Jelmert 2017). Other important trends in the ecosystem are not as positive as for the stock of Northeast arctic cod. Most seabird populations are declining, probably due to failure in food availability, and populations of the ice-dependent seal species and certain fish stocks are showing negative trends. The increased distribution of snow crab, a new species in the ecosystem, might have changed the biomass of benthos in some areas (Arneberg and Jelmert 2017). The sustainable management of such a resource rich area needs to be done in a holistic manner, including all anthropogenic impacts and the natural variations to foresee the possible trajectories for the ocean, but also to insure the necessary limitations and precautions for industrial activity to maintain the productivity and diversity of the area’s ecosystems. Both Norway and Russia have decided ecosystem- based management plans are helpful frameworks for achieving this. 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 209

Fig. 10.1 Map of the Barents Sea

10.2 Why Develop Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea?

As both Norway and Russia are aiming at managing the Barents Sea within the framework of ecosystem-based management (EBM), a short description of the theoretical framework for this is needed. However, this chapter is a description of the approach of the two states, and a comparison as far as it is possible, given the different stages the two processes are at, and given the differences between the organization of the two states. The aim is not to evaluate the effectiveness or success of the two processes, but to give insight on the status and development. EBM is widely recognized as a strategy for sustainable management of the oceans (Sander 2018). Over the last decades, the use of it has grown consistently, due to the recognition of management failing the sustainable exploitation of marine 210 E. Øseth and O. Korneev resources. Fish stock collapses in the decades before the millennium are presented as the reason behind the need for a different management regime (Curtin and Prellezo 2010). In the Arctic Council report on EBM in 2013, a definition is given:

EBM is the comprehensive, integrated management of human activities based on best available scientific and traditional knowledge about the ecosystem and its dynamics, in order to identify and take action on influences that are critical to the health of ecosystems, thereby achieving sustainable use of ecosystem goods and services and maintenance of ecosystem integrity (Arctic Council 2013).

The main difference from more single-sector management regimes, is the holistic approach where the ecosystem as such is the entity for management, not single species, habitats or concerns (Sander 2018). Another main point in EBM is the recognition of ecosystems as complex adaptive systems where changes in lower trophic levels can due to actions and processes occurring at lower levels. Humans are part of the complex adaptive systems and can change the functioning of them. This recognition is also important in order to show how society can exploit these resources in a sustainable manner. To achieve legitimacy, the inclusion of stakeholders is important (Curtin and Prellezo 2010). Given these basic theoretically descriptions of EBM, Norway an Russia are continuously working on finding the best way of implementing, adopting and developing their management plan regimes.

10.3 Development of the Management Plan Systems in the Barents Sea

10.3.1 Russian–Norwegian Cooperation in the Barents Sea

10.3.1.1 Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission Major stocks of commercial important fish species in the Barents Sea are shared between Russia and Norway. During the late 1970s, cooperation on management of shared fish stocks was instituted through the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission (JNRFC), formally established in 1975. The bilateral cooperation is of critical importance to ensure sustainable fisheries in the Barents Sea. Stocks are currently assessed through the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), which provides scientific advice and contributes to sustainable management. JNRFC uses this advice to decide safe fishing quotas for Russia, Norway, and third-party countries. Joint agreements are also established on effective regulatory measures. Quotas for joint stocks of Northeast Arctic cod, haddock, and capelin are determined based on sustainable management strategies. The Polar Research Institute of Marine Fisheries (PINRO) in Russia and the Institute of Marine Research (IMR) in Norway have a close collaboration on monitoring, research and advice on quota in the Barents Sea. 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 211

10.3.1.2 The Joint Norwegian–Russian Commission on Environmental Protection A well-functioning cooperation between Norway and Russia is important to protect the environment and manage the resources in the Barents Sea. Sharing borders both on land and in the Barents Sea, the two countries also share the responsibility for the environment in these areas. The Barents Sea ecosystem is common, with shared populations of birds, fish and mammals. Cooperation within the field of protection of the environment is coordinated by the Joint Russian–Norwegian Commission for the Protection of the Environment. The Ministry of Natural Resources of Russia and the Ministry of Climate and Environment in Norway signed the first agreement on cooperation in 1992. About 12 years ago, the Ministry of Natural Resources of Russia started dealing with issues of preparation for the environmentally safe development of the resources of the Russian part of the Barents Sea. For example, in January 2005, within the work of the Joint Russian–Norwegian Commission for the Protection of the Environment of the Barents Sea, a Marine Group was established, which included representatives of the main organizations involved in science and management of the Russian and the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea. Within the work of the Marine Group under the Joint Russian–Norwegian Commission, in the years 2005–2007, Norway’s experience with development of a management plan was studied. During the years 2007–2008 large joint work was carried out to determine the situation in the Barents Sea ecosystem and the level of economic activity. In 2009, for the first time in the history of international environmental relations of Russia, the Joint Russian–Norwegian Report on the State of the Barents Sea Ecosystem was published. In the years 2010–2018, the work of the Marine Group was focused on the following projects:

Ocean-1 Development of the concept of the Barents Sea resource management plan Ocean-2 Web portal with status evaluation and environmental data for the Barents Sea Ocean-3 Ecosystem monitoring of the Barents Sea Ocean-4 Oil and gas activity in the Barents Sea Ocean-5 Mapping of the biotopes in the Barents Sea

Within the Ocean-1 project in 2015, the joint report on the status of the Barents Sea ecosystem, was published. In 2018, a decision to involve ICES into the project was made, to help establishing a joint approach on mapping vulnerable and valuable areas in the Barents Sea. Ocean-2 runs an updated web portal presenting status and data for the entire Barents Sea, which facilitates regular updates on status. The next update will happen in 2020 at the latest. The project Ocean-3 project published the joint report “On Ecological Indicators for Ecosystem Monitoring of the Barents Sea” in 2015. After this, the focus has 212 E. Øseth and O. Korneev been on increasing knowledge on several species included in the selected indicators, in cooperation between Russian and Norwegian scientists. Within the project Ocean-4 from 2008 to 2014 joint visits to the oil production platforms in Norway and Russia were carried out to share experience in the field of environmental control in the activities. Within the Ocean-5 project in 2013, for the first time in international practice in the Arctic, a joint geological (lithological) map of the Barents Sea was designed («Sevmorgeo» from Russia, the Geological Survey from Norway), presented at the Barents Portal (http://www.barentsportal.com). This all means that steps taken within the joint marine working group have brought the Norwegian and Russian management of the shared ocean and the resources therein closer. The cooperation within environmental protection is regarded as a success story by both sides.

10.3.2 Management Plan Systems in the Two Countries

10.3.2.1 Norway In Norway, the foundation of the management plans is not in the legal system, meaning there are no laws regulating the existence of management plans as a tool for management. However, the management plans are sanctioned at the highest political level in Norway, as they are presented as White papers from the Government to Parliament, and endorsed by Parliament. In 2002, the Norwegian Government presented a White paper called Protecting the Riches of the Seas, where a management plan system for the Norwegian ocean areas was proposed, and consequently endorsed by Parliament. In the White paper, the Government states:

The overall goal is to provide the prerequisites for a clean and rich sea, inter alia, through the establishment of external conditions that allow us to strike a balance between the commercial interests connected with fisheries, aquaculture and the petroleum industry within the framework of a sustainable development.

Based on this, Norway now has management plans for all three defined ocean areas, the North Sea and Skagerak, the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. The first Norwegian management plan for the Barents Sea–Lofoten Area was presented for Parliament in 2006, and the plan was updated in 2011. A new update and revision is planned for 2020. From the very beginning, the management plan system has been ecosystem and knowledge based, see Fig. 10.2. The management plans are sanctioned at the highest possible political level, as the management plans are presented by the Government as White Papers to Parliament. To develop the plans, there is an organizational body with a steering committee of representatives from nine ministries, and two scientific entities delivering the scientific basis for the plans (Fig. 10.3). The Management forum consists of representatives from 12 directorates from all sectors, cooperating across sectors. In the Monitoring group, there are 13 directorates and public research institutes 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 213

based on best available ecological

serve as key environmental and socio-economic indicators

Develop knowledge base: Ecosystem impact assessments

Set goals

Develop Monitor & assess conceptual models

PrProjecoject Collect physical, biological & manamanagementgement Make and implement socioeconomic data & ststakakeholdeeholder EBM decisions

Visualize data Process & manage data & scenarios

Analyze data & develop models & scenarios

Possible Methodology for Applying EBM

Fig. 10.2 The ideal for the management plan system for the Norwegian ocean areas. Arctic Marine Strategic Plan 2015–2025 cooperating to make reports on the status of the ecosystems and identifying important monitoring gaps. The scientific process produces a scientific base for the political process of developing the plan (Fig. 10.3). The monitoring part of the system is indicator based. This means that the Monitoring group reports on a set of indicators, providing the needed knowledge base for the environmental status in the three different ocean areas, including the Barents Sea. The selected indicators, most of them updated with data yearly, form the basis for the regular status reports from the Monitoring Group, and the data and interpretations of the indicators are published in Norwegian on the website www. environment.no. Other knowledge from monitoring and research publications com- pliments the indicators as a scientific foundation.

10.3.2.2 Russia A number of strategic documents of the Russian Federation are devoted to the issues of environmental management. Thus, in accordance with the Environmental 214 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

Fig. 10.3 The organization of the Norwegian management plan system consists of all the nine relevant Ministries and directorates and public research institutes from all relevant sectors

Doctrine of the Russian Federation,1 the main direction of the state’s environmental policy is the implementation of comprehensive environmental management, and its orientation towards sustainable development of the Russian Federation. Work on the draft for the comprehensive marine management plan in the Russian part of the Barents Sea began during the work of the “ocean group” of the Joint Russian–Norwegian Commission for Environmental Protection in 2005 under the auspices of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of Russia and the Ministry of Environment of Norway. On June 52,014, in St. Petersburg, a meeting under the leadership of the President of the Russian Federation dedicated to the issues of safe development of the Arctic was held. Following on June 292,014, the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation issued a document “List of orders of the President of the Russian Federation to the Government”. In point 3b it states: “to develop a pilot plan for the comprehensive environmental management in the Arctic seas and implement it in the Russian part of the Barents Sea”. In Russia, the following declarations and resolutions of the United Nations are the base of the ecosystem-based management (EBM) for sustainable development of the human activity in the Barents Sea:

–– For Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972); –– For Environment and Development (Rio-de-Janeiro, 1992); –– For Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002); –– Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Geneva, 2015)

1 dated August 31, 2002 No. 1225-r 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 215

In addition, the Norwegian experience of creating the integrated management plan, UNESCO Guidelines for Marine Spatial Planning (2009 and 2014) and Protocol of the Strategic Environmental Assessment for UN Espoo Convention, have been used. The strategic plan for maritime development of the Russian Federation for the period until 20302 for the purposes of marine environmental management sets a goal of development and use of marine spatial planning. The strategic plan for development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and ensuring national security for the period until 2020, approved by the President of the Russian Federation in 2013 is at its second stage (until 2020). According to paragraph 31, it provides for a “set of measures to ensure sustainable use of aquatic resources of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation”. The President of the Russian Federation ordered in 2014–2015 research on the topic “Concept of Ecosystem-based Management in the Russian part of the Barents Sea”. The work was conducted under the management of JSC «Sevmorgeo» (part of the state holding company «Rosgeo»), and a pilot project was conducted. In their work they used the Norwegian expertise in developing a resource management plan, taking into account the guidelines for marine spatial planning of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of the United Nations.3 The Murmansk Biological Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Polar Research Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanography (Federal Agency for Fishery), Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (Roshydromet), All-Russian Research Institute of Ecology (Ministry of Natural Resources) and World Wildlife Fund (Russian branch), participated in the work of developing the draft plan for comprehensive marine management for the Russian part of the Barents Sea. When setting goals and objectives for the pilot project for the management plan in the Russian part of the Barents Sea, the following documents were used:

–– Guidance of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission for marine spatial planning (A Step-by-Step Approach to Ecosystem-based Management, 2009); –– The management plans for the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea from 2006 and 2011; –– a report on the research and development of the Ministry of Natural Resources “Proposals and recommendations for the draft plan for resource management in the Russian part of the Barents Sea based on the ecosystem approach”, 2015.

Thus, taking into account international documents on ecosystem management and marine spatial planning, the main objective for the pilot project on comprehensive marine management in the Russian part of the Barents Sea is to ensure an optimal level of economic development in the marine area without interrupting the sustainability of the biodiversity in the ecosystem.

2 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of December 8, 2010 No. 2205-r 3 UNESCO, No. 342009 and No. 702014. IOC Manuals And Guides 216 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

Based on the research work on the development of the pilot project, the Ministry of Natural Resources developed a report to the Government of the Russian Federation on the implementation of the Presidential Order of June 29, 2014, within which a roadmap for its implementation was developed.

10.3.3 Purpose of the Plans

10.3.3.1 Norway The purpose of the management plan for the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea remained unchanged in the update:

The purpose of this management plan is to provide a framework for the sustainable use of natural resources and goods derived from the Barents Sea–Lofoten area and at the same time maintain the structure, functioning, productivity and diversity of the area’s ecosystems. The management plan is thus a tool for both facilitating value creation and maintaining the high environmental value of the area.

The area defined in the Barents Sea and Lofoten management plan is presented in Fig. 10.4.

10.3.3.2 Russia During the pilot project on comprehensive marine management in the Russian part of the Barents Sea, the following results have been obtained:

–– spatial and time limits of the marine environmental management plan; –– mapping and analysis of existing and planned human activities; –– spatial conflicts between branches of the national economy; –– mapping and analysis of the current state of the ecosystems; –– identification of spatial conflicts between sectors of the national economy and the state of the ecosystems; –– the development of a list of measures and proposals to minimize the negative impact of the industrial development on the state of the ecosystems; –– a monitoring system for both implementation of the comprehensive marine management plan and the state of the ecosystem; –– suggestions on adaptation of the developed plan during the actual implementation process based on the monitoring results.

In the latest version of the draft Federal Law “On the State Management of Maritime Activities”4 (adoption is planned in 2019), the expediency of using the marine spatial planning is indicated, but without detail.

4 Article 10 para. 3 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 217

Fig. 10.4 Map over the area of the Norwegian management plan for the Barents Sea. ((C) Norwegian Polar Institute, 2017)

10.3.4 Updates and Evolvements

When a management plan is in place, regular updates and revisions are needed to keep track of developments both in the environment and in activities in the area.

10.3.4.1 Norway On the Norwegian side, all three ocean areas now have management plans and undergo scheduled revisions and updates. The newly decided frequency of updates for all management plans in Norwegian waters is an update every 4th year and a complete revision every 12th year. For the Barents Sea, the first management plan was presented in 2006, updated in 2011 and is now undergoing a complete revision due to be finished in 2020. Updates are done to make sure the plans are based on the most updated knowledge on status in the environment and the situation for the 218 E. Øseth and O. Korneev activities. The latter can for example be due to changes in the politics for activities in the area. This means, in an update, only new knowledge is added as basis for adjustments to the plan. A revision is a more comprehensive process. In the mandate for revisions, it is stated that the scientific basis must provide a thorough review of status and development, assessment of changes and a review of areas with new knowledge or changed activities. The current revision of the scientific basis started in 2016 and is due spring 2019. Based on this scientific basis and the government’s policies and politics, a new management plan will be presented in 2020. The following topics will be included in the scientific basis for the revision:

–– Evaluation of environmental goals; –– Environmental status and cumulative environmental effects; –– Particularly vulnerable and valuable areas; –– Industrial activities, present-day and future area usage and needs, and effects on the environment and other industries; –– The foundation for ocean-based industries (ecosystem services); –– Risks and preparedness for acute pollution; –– Knowledge gaps; –– Status for implementation of measures in previous management plans, and the effect of them

10.3.4.2 Russia Taking into account the fact that only a pilot project of the comprehensive marine management plan has been developed in Russia, its update is not planned, but the development of this approach continues at present within a project of the “ocean group” of the Joint Russian-Norwegian Environmеntal Commission. Nevertheless, after the development of the actual plan after 2020, the pilot project suggested to regularly update it, presumably once every 5–7 years. In accordance with the UNESCO Guidelines for marine spatial planning, determining the spatial and time limits of the comprehensive marine management plan for the Russian part of the Barents Sea is to be carried out in two stages. Firstly, the definition of the spatial boundaries are set, followed by a definition of the time limits. The stage of determining the spatial boundaries was divided into two sub-stages: firstly the defining of boundaries between the branches of the national industry in the water area; secondly defining the limits of the analysis of natural conditions in the given ocean area. Taking into account the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation in the Barents Sea, the area of implementation of the comprehensive marine management plan is contained within national waters including waters of the sea itself and waters of the exclusive economic zone, as well as the main physical infrastructure objects on the coast, such as ports and settlements (Fig. 10.5). Defining the time limits was also divided into two sub-stages; the definition of the base year or the period for assessing current conditions; followed by a definition of the planning perspective (year or period). 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 219

Fig. 10.5 Map of the area of the management plan area in the Russian part of the Barents Sea (highlighted in blue). (Korneev et al. 2015) 220 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

The years from 2012 to 2014 are defined as the base period for this project, since there is up-to-date information on both the state of the ecosystem and physical infrastructure in the Russian part of the Barents Sea available. The planning perspective extends for the period 2020–2030, which is determined by the strategic plans of development of the national industry, set out in relevant documents.

10.4 Development of a Management Plan

10.4.1 Norway

All the Norwegian management plans are based on knowledge from science. The Management Forum (see Fig. 10.3) coordinates and collects the necessary data and information as basis for the political decisions in the management plan. Throughout the years of the management plan system, more than 100 single reports on different aspects of the management plan have been produced. The reports vary in theme, from more typically environmental status reports, to analysis of maritime traffic, to fisheries, to cumulative effects from activities, to prospects for oil and gas to tourism, to scenarios for future developments for the northern part of Norway, to effects on indigenous people and much more. Between every update of the management plan, new knowledge is produced, both from monitoring and science in general, but also as assessments and studies ordered by the Management Forum. Before every update, all new knowledge is combined in an assessment from the management forum to the Ministries as scientific basis for the management plan. Each update process has a specific mandate from the Ministries, giving guidance on areas to cover in the scientific foundation. For the complete revision of the management plan for the Barents Sea in 2020, the scientific basis is presented as several reports within defined topics, and a summary report of them all.

10.4.2 Russia

To implement the comprehensive marine management plan for the Russian part of the Barents Sea, two main things must be made. Firstly, an evaluation of the current and future state of the marine ecosystem, taking into account spatial characteristics of geo- and biodiversity; and secondly an evaluation of the current and future human impact on the marine ecosystems. As is known, the ecosystem consists of two main parts: the environment – non- living nature (abiotic components or geodiversity) – and living nature (biotic components or biodiversity). For assessing geodiversity the «Sevmorgeo» JSC (geological environment), the Polar Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography and the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) (atmosphere, ice, water masses) were involved. 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 221

For assessing biodiversity, the Murmansk Marine Biological Institute, the Polar Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography and the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute for Environmental Protection (VNII Ecology) and the Marine Mammals Council were involved. Based on these results, the state of the marine ecosystem of the Russian part of the Barents Sea was assessed through the abiotic components atmosphere, hydro- sphere, sea ice, lithosphere and an assessment of current and expected climate change. The biotic components in the assessment were plankton (phytoplankton and zooplankton), benthos (phytobenthos and zoobenthos), fish (benthic, pelagic and transitional), marine mammals (pinnipeds, cetaceans, polar bear), seabirds, invasive species and human population, including indigenous peoples. An assessment of the impact of current and predictive climate changes on the state of the biotic components of the ecosystem were included too. In accordance with the data of the World Meteorological Organization, the climate changes expected over the Barents Sea by 2031 are increasing air temperature, decreasing salinity of surface waters, increasing ocean acidification and decreasing sea ice. These climate changes can lead to changes in the biotic components.

10.4.3 Valuable and Vulnerable Areas

10.4.3.1 Valuable and Vulnerable Areas in the Norwegian Part of the Barents Sea From the very beginning of the Norwegian management plan, the identification of valuable and vulnerable areas has been of large importance. In 2003, the first report on methodology and suggestions for areas in need of a special protection was presented. The goal was to identify the areas from a pre-defined set of criteria. An expert panel with representatives from all relevant sectors defined the valuable areas for all different components of the ecosystem, and based on an over-all evaluation, it was suggested to define some areas as the valuable areas of the management plan. The criteria were defined as main criteria (importance for biodiversity and importance for biological production) and supplementary criteria (importance for representation of all biological zones, biotopes, habitats, species and cultural heritage in the area, connections between marine and terrestrial environment, extent of human influence, uniqueness, economic importance, scientific value and availability). Under all of these criteria, more specific, detailed and explanatory criteria were defined. For practical reasons, the identification of valuable areas was mainly based on the two main criteria listed above. In the marine environment, areas important to biodiversity and areas important for biological production, are often found where there are special oceanographic or topographic conditions. Therefore, by identifying such areas, areas of an especially rich or unique flora and fauna are identified too. I addition, marine organisms occupy different habitats through the different life stages. Such areas, for example spawning areas and nursery areas, are not always connected to a specific topography or oceanography. Hence, areas important at different life stages were identified separately. 222 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

Under oceanographic and topographic unique areas, front systems (the marginal sea ice zone, the polar front, the edge of the continental slope) were defined as valuable. In these areas nutrition is available in the upper, productive layer of the water column, creating the foundation for high primary production and hence organisms higher in the food web. In addition, areas of strong currents, fjords and polls, reten- tion areas and the littoral zone were defined as valuable. Areas important for the life history of organisms were defined as spawning, feeding and nesting areas, nursing areas and areas were early life stages of many organisms are transported in the water masses, feeding areas, overwintering areas and moulting areas. Already established or suggested protected marine areas and cultural heritage sites and areas under water were also taken into consideration. In the first management plan (Report No 8 to the Storting (2005–2006)) the particularly valuable and vulnerable areas were defined, and then again in the updated plan (Meld. St. 10 (2010–2011)) in 2011 (Fig. 10.6), but no changes were made. An update of the scientific foundation for the definition of the particularly valuable and vulnerable areas will be presented in 2019, and decided in the revision of the management plan in 2020.

10.4.3.2 Valuable and Vulnerable Areas in the Russian Part of the Barents Sea Based on the assessment of some specific marine species of the Barents Sea, integrated spatial distribution of biodiversity charts were prepared for the main four seasons: winter (November–February), spring (March–May), summer (June– August) and autumn (September–October). In the following, we describe how these charts were made. The main biotic components of the ecosystem of the Russian part of the Barents Sea are plankton (phytoplankton and zooplankton), benthos (phytobenthos and zoobenthos), fish (bottom fish, pelagic and migratory fish), marine mammals (pinnipeds, cetaceans and polar bears) and seabirds. For a more correct spatial assessment of biodiversity in the Russian part of the Barents Sea, the trophic chain was conditionally divided into two main subclasses:

–– lower trophic (phytoplankton, ichthyoplankton, zooplankton and zoobenthos) (Fig. 10.7); –– higher trophic (fish, birds, marine mammals).

The fish are represented by the following main classes and species: bottomfish (North Atlantic cod, haddock), pelagic fish (capelin, saika), migratory fish (Atlantic salmon, pink salmon, trout, Arctic char, nelma, omul). MMBI scientists developed seasonal maps of the total distribution of these species (Fig. 10.8). As can be seen from this figure, the main distribution maxima are located in the southern part of the Barents Sea. In the Russian part of the Barents Sea, with different probability, 19 species of mammals (MMBI, Marine Mammal Council) can be encountered. 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 223

Fig. 10.6 Particularly valuable and vulnerable areas in the Barents Sea–Lofoten area (the coastal zone shown in green, the marginal ice zone shown in dotted green and the polar front shown in striped green). (Source: Norwegian Polar Institute, 2011) 224 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

Fig. 10.7 Distribution of phytoplankton and hydrobionts of the lower trophic level (zooplankton, ichthyoplankton, zoobenthos) by quarters (Upper left panel: winter; upper right panel: spring; lower left panel: summer; lower right panel: autumn). (Korneev et al. 2015) 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 225

Fig. 10.8 Total ranked distribution of the main fish species of the Barents Sea by season: Upper left panel: winter; upper right panel: spring; lower left panel: summer; lower right panel: autumn; 1–5: rankings. (Korneev et al. 2015)

Based on data on the distribution of major mammal species, MMBI scientists developed seasonal charts of the ranking of the distribution of the main mammal species (Fig. 10.9). Analysis of Fig. 10.9 also shows that the main distribution maxima are concentrated in the southern part of the sea, and on the seasonal distribution plan the maxima are observed in winter, when the pinnipeds use ice for hunting and breeding. In the open sea, birds are represented by typically colonial species, among which mule and thick-cheeked guillemots predominate. The largest colonial concentrations of birds (bird bazaars) are observed on the western coast of Novaya 226 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

Fig. 10.9 The total ranked distribution of Barents Sea marine mammals by seasons: Upper left panel: winter; upper right panel: spring; lower left panel: summer; lower right panel: autumn; 1–5: rankings. (Korneev et al. 2015)

Zemlya. The MMBI scientists compiled seasonal seabird distribution charts in the Barents Sea (Fig. 10.10). As a result of juxtaposition of charts of fish, marine mammals and seabirds distribution by means of ArcGIS software complex maps of distribution of these higher trophic species were compiled (Fig. 10.11). As can be seen from the presented figures, the main maximum of biodiversity is observed in the coastal part of the Kola Peninsula. During the year, highs are observed in the third and fourth quarters, which is especially evident in the Pechora Sea and off the coast of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago. 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 227

Fig. 10.10 Ranked distribution of Barents Sea colonial and water birds (16 species) by seasons: Upper left panel: winter; upper right panel: spring; lower left panel: summer (September); lower right panel: autumn; 1–3: rankings. Arrows show the direction of the seasonal bird migrations. (Korneev et al. 2015)

10.4.4 Involvement of Stakeholders

Throughout the history of the Norwegian management plans, several public meetings, meetings with stakeholders, and public hearings have been organized in the process of developing the joint scientific foundation for the management plans. There are a lot of different stakeholders with both different and sometimes opposite interests when discussing the ocean areas. From local fishermen to international oil companies, from environmental organizations to mining industries, and of course 228 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

Fig. 10.11 Seasonal distribution of Barents Sea higher trophics (fish, birds, marine mammals): Upper left panel: winter; upper right panel: spring; lower left panel: summer; lower right panel: autumn. (Korneev et al. 2015) 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 229 the general public as such – they all have views on the management of the oceans. In the scientific report from the Management Forum, no suggestions for specific measures or actions are made, but the definitions of valuable and vulnerable areas are important for all groups as it is expected the areas will get extra attention and protection in the management plans. During the work on development of the pilot project on comprehensive marine management in the Russian area, the existing economic activities in the Russian part of the Barents Sea and its cost for their subsequent optimization were assessed:

–– Port activities (ports, offshore stationary oil terminals, oil transshipment complexes); –– Shipping (cargo and passenger transport, fishing vessels, research vessels, auxil- iary vessels); –– Industrial fishing (bottom and pelagic fish, Kamchatka crab, snow crab, Iceland scallop and northern shrimp); –– Exploration and production of hydrocarbon resources (seismic survey, prospecting, explorative and mining drilling, offshore gas pipelines); –– Navy; –– Operation of coastal municipal treatment facilities; –– Aquaculture; –– Sea-hunting industry; –– Anthropogenic objects on the bottom (cables and communication lines, sunken vessels and structures, underwater pipelines); –– Regional and transboundary pollution (chemical, mechanical, acoustic, radioactive, biological); –– Specially protected natural areas; –– Recreational resources; –– Objects of cultural heritage in the sea, on the islands and on the coast.

Thus, the main stakeholders in Russia are either private companies that carry out economic activities in the Barents Sea, or government bodies responsible for developing economic activities at sea (Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Defense, Academy of Sciences, Rosrybolovstvo, Rosnedra, Rosmorport) or government bodies responsible for the environmentally safe use of this water area (Rosprirodnadzor, Rostekhnadzor, MNRE).

10.4.5 Identifying Knowledge Gaps

For both the Norwegian and Russian sides of the ocean, the main knowledge gaps and hence the challenge for planning economic activities are caused by three factors. Firstly, there is an uncertainty in assessing the future development of the ecosystems because of future climate change. Species respond very differently to the changing conditions, and while some species are categorized as winners in the future, others are expected to be losers. 230 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

Secondly, there is an uncertainty in forecasting the human-caused impacts on the ocean areas, due to various possible scenarios of economic development in the region and throughout the world. Thirdly, modeling the total effects on the ecosystems is not straightforward, not even if we had the perfect knowledge of future industrial activities in the Barents Sea. The cumulative effects are challenging to foresee. In the Norwegian management plan system, attention to knowledge gaps has been important from the beginning. Systematic reports on identified knowledge gaps were produced in 2003, and in the Management Forum report in 2010, an evaluation of the development of knowledge status was made. Both management plans review the knowledge gaps, and most importantly – some of the gaps from the first management plan had been filled by the time the plan was updated in 2011. In the ongoing process of updating the management plan in 2020, there is also attention on knowledge gaps.

10.4.6 Species Management

10.4.6.1 Species Management in the Norwegian Part of the Barents Sea It is a goal to manage the marine resources in an ecosystem perspective, meaning the earlier one-species-targeted management should be replaced by a management of the ecosystem. This trend started before the management plan system was in place, but has gathered momentum during the years of a management plan. Species management, as all management through concrete actions, is still a responsibility of the different sectors. However, the ecosystem perspective on management helps when establishing fishing quotas for commercial species or when limitations or allowances for industrial activity are decided. The Government used the following targets for evaluating species management in the Barents Sea–Lofoten area in the management plan from 2011:

–– Naturally occurring species will exist in viable populations and genetic diversity will be maintained; –– Harvested species will be managed within safe biological limits so that their spawning stocks have good reproductive capacity; –– Species that are essential to the structure, functioning, productivity and dynamics of ecosystems will be managed in such a way that they are able to maintain their role as key species in the ecosystem concerned; –– Populations of endangered and vulnerable species and species for which Norway has a special responsibility will be maintained or restored to viable levels as soon as possible. Unintentional negative pressures on such species as a result of activity in the Barents Sea–Lofoten area will be reduced as much as possible by 2010; –– The introduction of alien organisms through human activity will be avoided. 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 231

The evaluation of the management of the different species is performed by comparing status to the targets listed above when updating or revising the plan.

10.4.6.2 Species Management on the Russian Side of the Barents Sea Based on the results of marine spatial planning in Russia in 2014–2015 with the planning perspective to 2030, relevant proposals were made on the management of the main resources of the Russian part of the Barents Sea, especially the management of the fishery industry. As a basis for improving all fishery industry practices, it seems appropriate to consider the implementation of the principles of sustainable fisheries as specified in the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (adopted by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on October 31, 1995 in Rome, Italy) and applied in environmental certification of fisheries according to the standards of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). Regarding measures for reducing the impact of bottom trawling on benthic communities and their protection, it should be recommended for the Russian trawling fleet to use reporting in case of megabenthos catches with the subsequent mandatory change of the location of the fishing area. With respect to traditional trawl fishing areas, where limitations are difficult and impractical to implement, it is necessary to change the trawl fishery itself to improve its ecological character. This means, to reduce the impact on benthic communities in the following ways:

1. switching to trawls with pelagic boards and (or) flexible spacers not touching the ground; 2. modernization of ground ropes for exclusion or minimal touching of soil and introduction of appropriate elaborations into practice; 3. improvement of the technology of the trawling process for more accurate, targeted towing of the trawl in the places of commercial accumulations (for example, the Autotral system).

Regarding measures for reducing non-target by-catches and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, it is recommended to consider the possibility of:

1. revision of approaches to fishery regulation in terms of rationing of by-catch and accounting of caught products; 2. restoration of the short-term forecasting system and operational coordination of the fleet; 3. equipping the production ships with modern search equipment, which makes it possible to determine the size and species composition of the clusters and to select areas for the overfishing with a minimum proportion of non-target objects and young fish. 232 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

It is quite obvious that it is impossible to completely eliminate the negative impact of fishing on the ecosystem of the Barents Sea. Therefore, the following general approaches are suggested to be implemented:

1. providing the most objective information about the actual catch of marine species, both commercial and non-commercial; 2. systematic, comprehensive collection of data on environmental conditions, the status of populations of both commercial and non-productive inhabitants of the Barents Sea and adjacent waters; 3. improvement of mathematical models for calculating the fishery industry and its impact on reserves in order to improve the accuracy of the forecast; 4. calculation of interdependent values of the general catch of several ecologically related commercial species. Based on such general catch catches, out of economic and social expediency, complex quotas consisting of several commercial objects can be determined; 5. to reduce the impact of fishing gear, primarily bottom trawl, it is necessary: –– to develop Russian longline fishing and increase its segment in the total admissible catch of cod, haddock, black halibut, etc.; –– to use streamers and light and sound emitters to repel birds when setting up a line.

10.4.7 Sector-Based Actions

10.4.7.1 Norway The Norwegian management plan can draw some overarching limitations and concerns, but the specific actions are still made by the sectorial authorities. Species management, fisheries, shipping, petroleum and other industries are regulated in detail by the different sector authorities. A concrete example of sector regulations because of the management plan is the framework for petroleum activities in the Barents Sea. The definition of particularly valuable and vulnerable areas in the management plan resulted in a framework where most of the defined vulnerable and valuable areas were defined as areas where no petroleum activities were allowed. The map of areal regulations are presented in Fig. 10.12. When comparing this map to the map in Fig. 10.6, it is evident that the planning has taken the results of environmental mapping well into account.

10.4.7.2 Russia The main negative impact on the situation of the ecosystem of the Russian part of the Barents Sea is provided by industrial fishing, shipping traffic and oil and gas activity. It should be noted that industrial fishing is currently well-managed by taking into account the limitations of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea and the Russian-Norwegian Fishery Commission in establishing the values of the total allowable catches for each type of commercial fish. 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 233

Fig. 10.12 Framework for petroleum activities in the Barents Sea–Lofoten area. (Source: Ministry of the Environment 2006) 234 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

Great prospects for the development of sea freight are specified in the strategic planning documents of the Ministry of Transport of Russia. By 2030, the total cargo turnover is expected to increase by almost seven times, and traffic along the Northern Sea Route by 53 times (Shcherbanin 2013). In oil and gas activities, real oil production in the sea is carried out only at the Prirazlomnoye field, and within the remaining 33 licensed areas seismic exploration and prospecting drilling are carried out. As a result of overlapping of the main activities, maps were obtained showing their spatial ratio for each season. For the mapping of fishing, the main commercial species of fish are selected, these are cod and haddock. The greatest conflicts are observed in the period of maximum biodiversity, in summer and in autumn (third and the beginning of the fourth quarter) (Korneev et al. 2015). In summer, the zone of cod and haddock distribution in the northeastern direction increases substantially towards the Russian part of the Barents Sea. During this season the following main conflict zones are observed: Between fishing and oil and gas activities:

In the zones of maximum distribution of cod and haddock in the southern part, conflict zones remain, as in I-II quarters, but the cod fishing area already covers not only the areas of license areas of OJSC Severneftegaz: Kolsky-1, Kolsky-2, Kolsky-3 (No. 2, 3 and 4) and Rosneft Fedynsky OJSC (No. 12), but also license areas No. 7 (Shtokman GCF), No. 11 (NK Rosneft OJSC), No. 21 and 22 (Gazprom PJSC); In the zone of the maximum distribution of polar cod is the central part of the license area Fedynsky. In the areas of maximum distribution of capelin and polar cod, located in the central and northern part of the sea, there are almost all licensed areas of this area of the sea. In the Pechora Sea, there are conflict zones between the polar cod fishery and licensed areas of Gazprom PJSC (No. 27) and NK Rosneft OJSC (No. 13, 14, 15 and 19).

Between shipping traffic and fishing:

Shipping routes to the West and the East stretch along the zones of maximum distribution of cod and haddock off the coast of the Kola Peninsula and in the central part of the sea, including navigation routes of the northern version of the Northern Sea Route. In the zones of maximum distribution of capelin and polar cod in the central and northern (near the coast of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago), the northern version of the Northern Sea Route stretches throughout the sea; in the Pechora Sea, navigation routes cross the zone of maximum spread of the polar cod to the northeast of the Kolguev island.

Between shipping traffic and oil and gas activities:

Along the coast of the Kola Peninsula, possible routes according to Unified Information System on the World Ocean cross license areas No. 2, 3 and 4; 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 235

In the Pechora Sea, there is a large number of both licensed areas and options for navigable waterways, which implies the emergence of conflicts in the event of the start of oil and gas production in these licensed areas. When assessing the impact of the offshore oil and gas activities on the Barents Sea ecosystem, most vulnerable areas under the risk of stress/negative impact from this type of economic activity were identified. Such division was based on the recommendations of the 9th Conference of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2008). At present, the most intensive infrastructure impact in the Russian part of the Barents Sea is on the Pechora Sea. In this sea, the first in the Russian Arctic production oil platform Prirazlomnaya already operates, and for several years the year-round shipment of oil at the PJSC Lukoil’s remote oil export terminal has taken place. The transportation of oil is carried out by tankers from the port of Varandey and Naryan-Mar, as well as by transit from the Kara Sea. The above allocation of areas with limited anthropogenic activities should be taken into account when granting hydrocarbon exploration and production licenses, as well as issuing permits for exploratory and production drilling in the Pechora Sea by introducing special measures to prevent negative anthropogenic impacts of oil and gas facilities.

In addition, in development of oil and gas facilities using the ecosystem approach the following circumstances should be taken into account:

1. In regions where the maxima of biodiversity are located, seismic prospecting should be performed only in the first and second quarters and at the end of the fourth quarter of the year; 2. Explorative and production drilling should be carried out only according to the “zero discharge” scheme; 3. Shipment of oil at the terminals should be carried out with indispensable recu- peration of output hydrocarbon gases from tanks (“large and small breathing”); 4. Transportation of hydrocarbons by sea should be under constant control of the rescue centers located along the transportation route.

The following has been proposed for regulation of maritime traffic:

1. It is advisable: –– to recommend that the Ministry of Natural Resources applies to the Ministry of Transport with a proposal to declare the restricted areas of navigation in the water zones of marine protected areas (MPAs) with the appropriate publication of these restrictions in the “Notice to the Mariners”: –– to establish MPAs located in the territorial sea and inland waters, on the basis of Federal Law of July 31, 1998, No. 155-FL “On Inland Sea Waters, Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation”; –– to establish MPAs located in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation, that is the marine area of the SPNRs around the Franz Josef Land 236 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

archipelago, on the basis of the Article 32 of the Federal Law “On the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation”, No. 191-FL of December 17, 1998; 2. that, on the basis of the Article 33 of the Federal Law “On the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation”, the Ministry of Natural Resources recommends that the Ministry of Transport applies to determine the recommended navigation routes; –– that, the main cargo traffic according to the Northern Sea Route is carried out according to the northern variant (above Novaya Zemlya archipelago), while the recommended route in the area of Cape Zhelaniya in the third quarter is shifted to the north by 5 miles to avoid its intersection with the maximum biodiversity in the area; –– when sailing in the Pechora Sea it is recommended to choose the sea routes above Kolguev island for 70 degrees N; 3. To recommend that the Ministry of Natural Resources applies for the introduction of a permanent (in the Ministry of Transport) or temporary (second and third quarters) restrictions (Defense Ministry) for navigation during cargo transportation in the Pechora Sea through the Yugorskiy Shar (the territorial sea); 4. To recommend that the Ministry of Natural Resources applies to the Ministry of Transport with a proposal on the priority use for navigation of ships along the coast of the Kola Peninsula of the possible navigation routes offered by the Unified Information System on the World Ocean, which are farther from the coast.

10.4.8 Risk Evaluations

In Norway, the risk of acute pollution, and preparedness and response to acute pollution, have been central in the management plan from the first and throughout the updated management plan. The management plan analyses risks and trends in risk within maritime traffic, petroleum activities and radioactivity. Risks of oil spills, including oil drift models, in particularly valuable and vulnerable areas are also a part of the management plan. In addition, an analysis of the preparedness and response to acute pollution is an important part of the foundation for deciding the framework for activities that can lead to oil spills with large negative effects. From the first management plan in 2006 to the updated plan in 2011, several new measures were implemented to strengthen the preparedness and response to acute pollution. Within governmental and municipal measures, emergency response equipment has been renewed and reallocated, and a new Coast Guard vessel carrying oil spill recovery equipment has been gradually implemented. The competence of personnel in the governmental system has been strengthened by increasing the frequency of exercises. The knowledge base for environmental risk and preparedness analyses has been strengthened, and new tools for decision-making for the use of dispersants have been developed. Licenses awarded for the oil industry now contain more 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 237 specific requirements for dealing with oil spills close to the source and in the drift trajectory towards the coast. In the private sector, the number of high seas oil recovery systems has increased. New technology needs are identified, and a technology programme in cooperation with the Norwegian authorities is implemented. In order to comply with the requirements for preparedness and response to acute pollution during planned operations over a limited period (exploration drilling), the operators have strengthened preparedness for coastal waters and the shoreline for certain segments of coast in the management plan area (Ministry of the Environment, 2011). In Russia, there are currently no officially approved guidelines for risk assessment of the impact of the implementation of various economic plans on the state of ecosystems. Within the framework of Russian–Norwegian cooperation in 2012, a seminar was held on analysing existing approaches in both countries to the environment risk assessment, but this line of research is still officially absent in Russia.

10.4.9 Ratifications of the Plans

There are no laws in Norway regulating the development of the management plans, but as a now over 10-years-old system, it seems to be stable. The system has survived different Governments, and is still regarded to be the best way of managing the ocean areas. Evolvements and improvements have been implemented throughout the years. It is the highest possible political level, The Parliament, who sanctions the Managements plans. The different activity sectors have, maybe due to the broad participation in the process, operated within the limitations set by the management plans. In Russia there are no any laws regulating the development of Plans on Integrated Management of Marine Environmental Management. However, taking into account the experience in the development and implementation of the existing Federal Target Programs (FTP) in Russia, for example, the FTP “World Ocean”, the implementation of the project developed by Plans on Integrated Management of Marine Environmental Management will require the publication of a special Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation. This Resolution will define the responsibilities of both private companies and government agencies to clearly implement the provisions of the Plans on Integrated Management of Marine Environmental Management and monitor their implementation.

10.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Systems

10.5.1 Strengths and Weaknesses in the Norwegian Management Plan System

The ecosystem approach is definitely a strength of the system. The inclusion of all sector authorities in creating the scientific basis for the plans makes it robust. All groups with interests are invited to give their feedback to the reports from the 238 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

Management Forum, meaning the scientific foundation for the white papers in general are consensus based, with few disagreements between sectors. The system has proven resilient to political changes, as different Governments of Norway have further developed the system. Every comprehensive management system has potential for improvements. In 2015, the 10-years anniversary of the management plan system was celebrated with a conference where lessons learned were presented, and summed up in a report. The report points out several aspects where improvements are both needed and possible. There is a need for a better coordination between different national and international projects relevant for the system. Some of the political decided environmental goals are strategical, but not tractable, meaning it is very difficult to design a management plan with a monitoring system to detect achievement of objectives. Even though the monitoring and management systems are meant to be ecosystem-based, there is still quite a potential to move the system away from a single-species and single-impact focus to a focus on the processes of the ecosystems and the cumulative effects of activities and other anthropogenic influences.

10.5.2 Strengths and Weaknesses in the Russian Management Plan System

The Russian management plan system is not yet adopted. The strengths of having a management plan for the Russian part of the Barents Sea will be to have precise data for existing climate conditions and the opportunity to visualise and compare the location of areas with intensive development of economic activities and foci with a maximum biodiversity. The weaknesses can be uncertainties of future climate changes and, accordingly, uncertainty about the future state of ecosystems, which is extremely important for management planning. The process of plan development is long and new information on the initial statement of the ecosystem is needed, and for this, new real observations of geo- and biodiversity are needed. Obtaining strategic development plans in Russia from Gazprom, Rosneft, Sovcomflot and other private companies is a complex challenge, and there is uncertainty of business plans in the context of uncertainty in the development of various scenarios for the development of the post- crisis economy in the region and in the world.

10.6 Plans for the Future

On the Norwegian side, there are expectations for a regular and relatively frequent update of the management plan in the future. Norway has divided the Norwegian waters into three management plan areas, the North Sea and Skagerak, the Norwegian Sea, and the Barents Sea, and all areas now have management plans. In the future, updates of the management plans will be performed every fourth year, and a total revision will be performed for each of the areas every 12th year. 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea 239

Table 10.1 Summary of major points The Barents Sea is a high-latitude large marine ecosystem shared uniquely by Norway and Russia, located off the northern coasts of both countries. On the Norwegian side, a management plan was established in 2006, updated in 2011, and are now planned for a full revision in 2020 In Norway, the foundation of the management plans is not in the legal system, meaning there are no laws regulating the existence of management plans as a tool for management. However, the management plans are sanctioned at the highest political level in Norway, as they are presented as white papers from the government to parliament, and endorsed by parliament On the Russian side, a number of strategic documents of the Russian Federation are devoted to the issues of environmental management. Thus, in accordance with the environmental doctrine of the Russian Federation, the main direction of the state’s environmental policy is the implementation of comprehensive environmental management, and its orientation towards sustainable development of the Russian Federation There is no management plan in place for the Russian side of the Barents Sea, but Norway and Russia are cooperating, aiming at harmonisation of the management of the shared ocean area. Russia is working towards a management plan

A new mapping tool for compilation and analysis of different area-based data is under development by the Management Forum, and will hopefully both improve and rationalize the updates and revisions of management plans in the future, and enable a better evaluation of areal conflicts. For the Russian management plan process, the development of the roadmap for implementation of a management plan system is described earlier in this chapter. One of the points of the road map is the development of the draft Federal Law “On Maritime (Aquatorial) Planning in the Russian Federation” in 2020 After the adoption of this law by the State Duma, its ratification by the Federation Council and approval by the President of the Russian Federation, it is planned to issue a Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation on its implementation based on the developed national Guidelines on marine spacial planning. A common framework, close cooperation and exchange of data, shared knowledge and information between the two states will contribute to an even better management of the Barents Sea in the future. While already in place for fishery management, the cooperation and agreement on methodology for common management of other shared resources will be developed within the framework of the Joint Norwegian–Russian Commission on Environmental Protection and by the two states separately. Cooperation on different levels, e.g. scientific, within the bureau- cracies and at the political level, is crucial to insure a joint management of the common Barents Sea (Table 10.1).

References

Arctic Council (2013) Ecosystem-based management in the Arctic. Report submitted to senior Arctic officials by the expert group on ecosystem-based management. Tromsø Arneberg P, Jelmert A (eds) (2017) Status for miljøet i Barentshavet og ytre påvirkning – rapport fra Overvåkingsgruppen 2017. Fisken og Havet, særnummer 1b-2017 (In Norwegian) 240 E. Øseth and O. Korneev

Curtin R, Prellezo R (2010) Understanding marine ecosystem based management: a literature review. Mar Policy 34(2010):821–830 Korneev OY, Rybalko AE, Korneyva EV, Pavlov AP, Ivanova TY, Ermark EO, Tomilin AM, Shavykin AA (2015) Development of information analysis materials as part of the work program of Russian-Norwegian environmental cooperation in 2013–2015. Sevmorgeo, St. Petersburg McBride MM, Hansen JR, Korneev O, Titov O (eds) Stiansen JE, Tchernova J, Filin A, Ovsyannikov A (co-eds) (2016) Joint Norwegian – Russian environmental status 2013. Report on the Barents Sea ecosystem. Part II – complete report. IMR/PINRO Joint Report Series, 2016 (2), 359pp. ISSN:1502–8828 Ministry of the Environment (2006) Report no. 8 to the storting (2005–2006) Integrated management of the marine environment of the barents sea and the sea areas off the Lofoten Islands Ministry of the Environment (2011) Meld. St. 10 (2010–2011) Report to the Storting (white paper) First update of the Integrated Management Plan for the Marine environment of the Barents sea–Lofoten Area MOSJ (2019) Sea ice extent in the Barents Sea. http://www.mosj.no/en/climate/ocean/sea-ice- extent-barents-sea-fram-strait.html. Downloaded 06.01.19 Sander G (2018) Against all odds? Implementing a policy for ecosystem-based management of the Barents Sea. Ocean Coast Manag 157(2018):111–123 Shcherbanin YA (2013) Transport and transport infrastructure in 2030: some predictive estimates. Stud Russ Econ Dev 24(3):259–264 Stiansen JE, Korneev O, Titov O, Arneberg P (eds) Filin A, Hansen JR, Høines Å, Marasaev S (co-eds) (2009) Joint Norwegian-Russian environmental status 2008. Report on the barents sea ecosystem. Part II – Complete report. IMR/PINRO Joint Report Series, 2009(3), 375 pp. ISSN 1502–8828 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments 11

Paul Arthur Berkman, Greg Fiske, Jon-Arve Røyset, Lawson W. Brigham, and Dino Lorenzini

Abstract The Arctic is prominent in the history of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), following the RMS Titanic disaster in 1912 and soon signing in London of the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea in 1914. Eighty years later, the IMO initiated a process to manage shipping in ice-covered oceans. In concert with the IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters in 2002 and their 2004 release of the Arctic 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, the Arctic Council initiated the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), which issued its final report in 2009. The goal of this chapter is to build on AMSA as a case study of informed decisionmaking through the steps of questions to generate data, which are then integrated into evidence to reveal options (without advocacy), informing decisions by relevant institutions to address a ‘continuum of urgencies’ that involve shipping in the new Arctic Ocean with its transformed sea-ice cap, assessing whether shipping is increasing as sea ice is decreasing (‘ship-ice hypothesis’). Primary sources of data for AMSA involved ship tracking from ground-station Automatic Identification System (AIS), shore-based radar systems and details of fishing ves-

P. A. Berkman (*) Science Diplomacy Center, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected] G. Fiske Woods Hole Research Center, Woods Hole, MA, USA J.-A. Røyset IMO International Maritime Law Institute, Msida, Malta L. W. Brigham Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, USA D. Lorenzini SpaceQuest, Ltd., Fairfax, VA, USA

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 241 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_11 242 P. A. Berkman et al.

sels as well as other smaller ships provided by the Arctic nations. However, Arctic ship traffic fundamentally changed the year of the AMSA report, when satellite AIS records began providing continuous, synoptic, pan-Arctic coverage of individual ships with data pulsed over seconds to minutes. This chapter reveals the oldest and longest continuous satellite AIS record (from 1 September 2009 through 31 December 2016), applying the ‘spacetime cube’ (which also was unavailable during AMSA) with more than 120,000,000 satellite AIS messages from SpaceQuest Ltd. to begin addressing synoptic questions with any level of granularity from points to regions to pan-Arctic over time. Future questions can be considered to assess ship attributes (including vessel flag state, size and type) in view of biophysical and socio-economic variables, recognizing that shipping and sea ice are recognized as primary drivers of change in the Arctic Ocean. Contributions to these assessments come from all areas of science (inclusively defined as the study of change), across the natural and social sciences with Indigenous knowledge in an holistic (international, interdisciplinary and inclusive) manner to achieve Arctic sustainability across generations. As a practical outcome in a user-defined manner, this chapter reveals characteristics of next-generation Arctic marine shipping assessments, revealing patterns and trends that can be applied to informed decisionmaking about the governance mechanisms and built infrastructure as well as operations for multilateral stability and sustainable development in the new Arctic Ocean.

11.1 Science Diplomacy and Arctic Shipping

This book is about regional lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea (AMAP 2017a, b; Berkman et al. 2016; Vylegzhanin et al. 2018; Raymond-Yakoubian 2018) in the Arctic Ocean to help address issues, impacts and resources within, across and beyond jurisdictional boundaries generally. As a premise for each region, however defined, there are stakeholder perspectives, geospatial evidence and governance mechanisms that influence all manner of decisions for sustainable development (Preface Figs. 4 and 6). Simply defined as the study of change, the science behind these decisions can be international, interdisciplinary and inclusive (holistic), characterized by patterns, trends and processes with methodologies from the natural sciences and social sciences as well as Indigenous knowledge. At user- defined levels of granularity (across time and space) –goal of this chapter is to contribute to informed decisionmaking about a fundamental socio-economic driver of Arctic change, namely ship traffic in the Arctic Ocean. Human activities in the world ocean operate under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) and customary international law of the sea more generally, applying to maritime governance and enforcement within, across and beyond national jurisdictions in the Arctic Ocean (Berkman and Young 2009). The International Maritime Organization (IMO 2017a) is the specialized agency of the United Nations in London, established in 1948, with “global standard-setting authority for the safety, security and environmental performance of international shipping.” The Arctic is prominent in the history of the IMO, following the RMS 11 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments 243

Titanic disaster in 1912 and subsequent signing in London of the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 1914). With the Arctic Ocean at the center – literally and figuratively – IMO has provided leadership since 1993 to manage shipping in ice-covered oceans (Brigham 2017). Notable steps include adoption of the voluntary or recommendatory IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters (IMO 2002) and Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (IMO 2009), en route to the legally binding International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) that came into force on 1 January 2017 (IMO 2017b). The Polar Code is implemented by amendments to SOLAS (1974) as well as the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 1973) and International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW 1978). During the 2004–2009 period – when the IMO shipping guidelines were expanding to both polar regions – the Arctic Council conducted the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) through its Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group. With broadly relevant lessons for Arctic sustainability, AMSA (2009a) integrated perspectives from diverse stakeholders into questions, generating data, evidence and options that contributed to informed decisions (Preface Fig. 5). These lessons from AMSA (Brigham 2011; Box 11.1) illustrate practical applications of science diplomacy as a holistic process, involving informed decisionmaking to balance national interests and common interests for the lasting benefit of all on Earth across generations (Berkman et al. 2017).

Box 11.1: Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) On 29 April 2009 the Arctic Council Ministers in Tromsø, Norway approved the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), involving nearly 200 experts under the Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group led by Canada, Finland, and the United States during 2004–2009. AMSA was a broad, interdisciplinary assessment including diverse topics: marine geography and regional climate; governance and law of the sea; Arctic marine transportation history; the human dimension and Indigenous marine use; scenarios or plausible futures of Arctic marine navigation; environmental impacts; marine infrastructure; and a database of vessels in the Arctic marine environment derived from a survey of the Arctic states (prior to era of comprehensive AIS-derived ship information). A key objective of AMSA was to obtain the official (national) ship data within Arctic regions defined by the individual states. The AMSA team took a holistic approach to Arctic marine use and included nearly all surface vessels over 100 tons (less naval ships), including: tankers; container ships; icebreakers; cruise ships; fishing vessels; offshore support vessels; survey vessels; research ships; coast guard vessels; ferries; salvage vessels; and, tug- barge combinations. The data survey revealed an estimated 6000 individual ships operating in or near the Arctic marine environment during calendar year 2004. The outcome was the first pan-Arctic snapshot of shipping and operations in the Arctic marine environment, within regions defined by each of the

(continued) 244 P. A. Berkman et al.

Box 11.1: (continued) Arctic states (who identify themselves collectively as having territories north of the Arctic Circle, which is an objective Earth system boundary). The AMSA effort can be viewed as a:

• Baseline assessment of Arctic marine activity early in the twenty-first century using the 2004 database as an historic snapshot of Arctic marine use; • Strategic guide for a host of Arctic and non-Arctic actors and stakeholders; and • Policy document of the Arctic Council since the AMSA 2009 Report was negotiated and approval was reached by consensus of the eight, Arctic state Ministers within the Arctic Council.

Ninety-six findings are identified throughout the AMSA (2009a) report and seventeen recommendations are listed under three inter-related themes: (1) Enhancing Arctic Marine Safety; (2) Protecting Arctic People and the Environment; and, (3) Building the Arctic Marine Infrastructure. A significant challenge for AMSA was to address the future of Arctic marine shipping. Using scenario planning exercises to create plausible futures, AMSA identified nearly 120 factors and forces that could shape the future of Arctic marine operations and shipping. The scenarios effort identified two primary drivers and uncertainties: resources and trade (the level of demand); and governance (the degree of relative stability of rules for use) within the Arctic and globally. AMSA emphasizes that the vastness and harshness of the Arctic environment make the conduct of marine emergency response more difficult than other marine regions. Missing or lacking marine infrastructure in most Arctic areas include: hydrographic data and marine charts; communications coverage; environmental monitoring (sea ice, weather and icebergs); search and rescue, and environmental response capacities; salvage; aids to navigation; ship monitoring and tracking; icebreaking; ports; and more. The Arctic human dimension is addressed throughout the AMSA report and the final recommendations include the critical need for surveys of Arctic Indigenous marine use to assess local impacts of Arctic marine operations. Moreover, AMSA identified the release of oil from ships through accidental and or illegal discharge as the most significant environmental threat in the Arctic. AMSA further considered potential impacts on Arctic marine ecosystems from lengthening the navigation season, potentially year-round. A major success from AMSA was its contribution to development of the mandatory ‘Polar Code’ to manage ship operations in the Arctic Ocean into the future.

As fertile ground for informed decisionmaking en route to the Polar Code in 2017, AMSA along with other scientific assessments (e.g., ACIA 2004; AMSP 2004; OGA 2007) soon began to bear fruit through the “high level forum” of the Arctic Council with binding legal agreements signed by the Foreign Ministers of the eight 11 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments 245

Arctic States regarding search-and-rescue (SAR 2011) as well as marine-oil-pollution prevention, preparedness and response (MOPP 2013). Progress in this arena of informed decisionmaking is further complemented by the Arctic Science Agreement (2017), which “is a strong signal reaffirming the global relevance of science as a tool of diplomacy, reflecting a common interest to promote scientific cooperation even when diplomatic channels among nations are unstable” (Berkman et al. 2017). AMSA provides a benchmark and, as such, it is the organizing feature of this chapter (Box 11.1) to consider characteristics of next generation Arctic marine shipping assessments. The starting point for informed decisionmaking involves questions (Preface Fig. 5), which the Arctic States and Indigenous peoples along with others framed in terms of their common interests about marine shipping to generate the data for the assessments (AMSA 2009b):

• What are the environmental and geographic features that should be assessed (e.g., bathymetry, large marine ecosystems, climate and monthly sea-ice coverage) north of the Arctic Circle and in areas defined by each Arctic state? • What marine activities based on vessel routes (especially the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage) and vessel categories (e.g., general cargo, bulk carriers, tankers, tugs, barges and icebreakers) should be measured and how, but without elaboration of individual ships and with fishing activities treated separately? • How should origin and destination ports be characterized?

Value of such questions is they initiate holistic integration, contributing to sustainable development in the Arctic Ocean across a ‘continuum of urgencies’ from security to sustainability time scales (Preface Fig. 3). The pan-Arctic context for AMSA (2009a) also includes estimates of Northern Hemisphere sea-ice extent from 1978–2007, building on the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA 2004) with its data embedded at different time and space scales to address local-regional-global questions (Preface Table 2). Ancillary data on maritime accidents north of the Arctic Circle, involving vessel damage or failures from 1995–2004, along with adjacent human population demographics were represented in the Geographic Information Systems (GIS) analyses with raster data. There also were derived products from the AMSA data (AMSA 2009b), including the “the world’s first activity-based estimate of Arctic marine shipping emissions.” Importantly, the AMSA data and analyses demonstrate that nations can balance national interests and common interests through shared methods to answer questions. However, data to answer questions is different than evidence for decisions. The evidence is framed by integrating data from the natural and social sciences along with Indigenous knowledge in view of the decisionmaking institutions that produce governance mechanisms and built infrastructure, which require close coupling to achieve sustainability. As a process, AMSA (2009a, b) took into consideration holistic evidence along with stakeholder perspectives and prevailing governance mechanisms to produce seventeen recommendations across three major themes: Enhancing Arctic Marine Safety; Protecting Arctic People and the Environment; and Building the Arctic Marine Infrastructure. PAME (2017) now is working “to develop and adopt updated 246 P. A. Berkman et al. shipping priorities and recommendations under the three themes of the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment.” Introducing options (without advocacy), which can be used or ignored explicitly, this chapter will focus on development of an Arctic Marine Traffic System recommended under the AMSA (2009a) theme of Building the Arctic Marine Infrastructure:

comprehensive Arctic marine traffic awareness system to improve monitoring and tracking of marine activity, to enhance data sharing in near real-time, and to augment vessel management service in order to reduce the risk of incidents, facilitate response and provide awareness of potential user conflict. The Arctic states should encourage shipping companies to cooperate in the improvement and development of national monitoring systems.

Recognizing that “marine use of the Arctic Ocean is expanding in unforeseen ways early in the 21st century” (AMSA 2009a), this chapter will highlight fundamental contributions of satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) data and vector- based GIS methodologies that also were unavailable for AMSA to consider. To operationalize an Arctic Marine Traffic System, it will be necessary to simultaneously assess sea ice and shipping as linked biophysical and socio-economic drivers of human activities in the Arctic Ocean. Informed decisions also will consider an Arctic Marine Traffic System as central for “sustainable infrastructure development” (Berkman 2015) to balance economic prosperity, environmental protection and societal well-being in a pan-Arctic context with global relevance across generations.

11.2 Arctic Shipping Traffic from Satellites

11.2.1 Arctic Satellite AIS Data

Satellite AIS analyses of Arctic ship traffic still are in their infancy (Eucker 2011. Østreng et al. 2013; Eguíluz et al. 2016; Melia et al. 2017; Serkez et al. 2018). The oldest and longest continuous satellite AIS database for the Arctic Ocean is analyzed herein with SpaceQuest (2017) data from its polar-orbiting constellation from 1 September 2009 through 31 December 2016 (Table 11.1).

Table 11.1 Satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) Data Provided by SpaceQuest Ltd. for Pan-Arctic Options: Holistic Integration for Arctic Coastal-Marine Sustainabilitya with Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) of Unique Ships in the Arctic Ocean (Fig. 11.1) from 1 September 2009 through 31 December 2016 Satellite AIS messages characteristics Satellite AIS data Messages received Total AIS messages received 122,771,418 Total AIS messages with validated MMSIb in the study area 85,664,811 (Fig. 11.1) aA Belmont-Forum project (Preface Table 1) with support of national science agencies in Canada, China, France, Norway, Russian Federation and United States (http://panarcticoptions.org/) bMMSI validated by 9-character strings and correct formatting ITU (2019) and USCG (2019) 11 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments 247

The satellite AIS data from SpaceQuest (Table 11.1) are from the region north of the Arctic Circle (see Book Cover Figure), focusing on the Barents Sea Region (BaSR) and Bering Strait Region (BeSR), as introduced in Chap. 1. GIS spatial-data files defined by longitude-latitude coordinates were established to enable spatially- consistent comparisons in future assessments of these regions (Fig. 11.1).

Fig. 11.1 Arctic Ocean regions north of the Arctic Circle (blue), including the Barents Sea Region (BaSR – red) as well as Bering Strait Region extending slightly southward (BeSR – orange), with color coding that is consistent in subsequent figures (green is satellite ship traffic data minus BeSR and BaSR). Rationale for the regional boundaries have been elaborated previously for BeSR (Berkman et al. 2016), BaSR (Vylegzhanin et al. 2018), with the actual data provided for the three colored regions as mapped. Boundaries also are shown for the Polar Code north of 60° North latitude (IMO 2017a, b, c) and associated marine boundaries (including dark grey areas) of the Arctic Science Agreement (2017), as mapped by Berkman et al. (2017). These boundaries are complemented by additional overlapping boundaries compiled from previous years (Berkman 2015), with the Arctic Circle as a consistent natural system boundary based on the tilt of the Earth’s axis. All of these regions can be defined by spatial data for Geographic Information System (GIS) analyses to generate accurate assessments of socio-economic and biophysical patterns, trends and relationships in the Arctic Ocean into the future with synoptic pan-Arctic satellite measurements, available for both shipping (e.g., Table 11.1) and sea-ice (e.g., NSIDC 2017) 248 P. A. Berkman et al.

Table 11.2 Ship and movement details encoded on Automatic Identification System (AIS) messages from Class A Transponders Versus Class B Transponders with movement details only (see NAVCEN 2017)a Maritime Mobile Service Identify (MMSI) – Unique identification for each transponder; International Maritime Organization (IMO) number – Unique identification for each ship; Vessel name; Type of ship/cargo (e.g., tanker, bulk carrier or enforcement); Navigation status (at anchor, under way using engines or not under command); Rate of turn – Right or left, 0 to 720 degrees per minute; Speed over ground; Position accuracy; Longitude and latitude; Course over ground; True heading; Time stamp (UTC, time accurate to nearest second when data was generated); International radio call sign, assigned to the vessel by its country of registry; Dimensions of ship; Type of positioning system (e.g., Global Position System or LORAN-C); Location of positioning system’s antenna on board the vessel; Draught of ship (0.1–25.5 m); Destination; and Estimated time of arrival at destination. aFlag state designation is transmitted as three Maritime Identify Digits (MID) in the MMSI Code ITU (2019) and USCG (2019)

As anticipated in earlier papers, within consistent boundaries, regional governance lessons associated with the Bering Strait (Berkman et al. 2016) and Barents Sea (Vylegzhanin et al. 2018) can be integrated with quantitative assessments from a satellite AIS baseline for the Arctic Ocean. The AIS signals contain information about ship attributes, transmitted on different message channels by Class A transponders linked to the unique IMO number of each ship and by Class B transponders without IMO ship references and details (Table 11.2). The common feature for both classes of AIS transponders is they generate messages with time-position information linked to the Mobile Maritime Service Identify (MMSI) for each ship. In addition to the MMSI data from all of the ships (Table 11.1), SpaceQuest provided the attribute metadata from ships with Class A transponders (Table 11.2). The contributions of Class A and Class B transponder data among the validated MMSI data (Table 11.1) will be evalu- ated further with the satellite AIS time series extended to 31 December 2018.

11.2.2 Vector-Based AIS Analyses

To assess movements and behavior of individual ships as well as pattern and trends of ship traffic in the Arctic Ocean – the SpaceQuest data have been compiled within an ArcGIS architecture, applying the ‘space-time cube’ (ESRI 2017). These 11 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments 249

Fig. 11.2 (Left) Three-dimensional system to analyze change in issues, impacts or resources that are measured over space (x-y, latitude-longitude) and time (past to future). (Right) The ‘space- time cube’ from ESRI (2017) is a geospatial approach that can be applied to ‘big data’ questions with vector-based analyses (points, lines and polygons) within and between ‘bins’ vector-based analyses (Fig. 11.2) of the satellite AIS data were further enhanced by SQL queries of tables through the Google Compute Engine with BigQuery (Google 2017; Leetaru 2018), enabling questions with user-defined space and time resolution to interrogate the nearly 86 million satellite MMSI data points (Table 11.1) within seconds. Ship latitude and longitude coordinates were mapped with the North Pole Lambert Azimuthal Equal Area (Alaska) projection using the WGS84 ellipsoid (WGS 1984). Analyses of the SpaceQuest data in this chapter relate to total numbers of unique ships, which are represented by the validated MMSI data (Table 11.1) over time and space. Additionally, the attribute of flag state was included in these initial analyses because it can be extracted directly from the MMSI code of every ship (ITU 2019; USCG 2019). Other ship attributes (Table 11.2) and synoptic biophysical or socio-economic data can be introduced into these vector-based analyses with cloud processing in seconds to reveal trends, patterns and processes that underlie informed decisions, depending on the questions.

11.2.3 Arctic Ship Traffic and Sea-Ice

Ship traffic in the Arctic Ocean is of increasing interest because the sea-ice is diminishing dramatically in the Arctic Ocean (e.g., NSIDC 2017; PIOMAS 2017). Importantly, these two parameters have the advantage that they can be measured objectively by satellites (Mjelde et al. 2014; Onoda and Young 2018) with high levels of granularity across space (meters to thousands of kilometers) and time (minutes to decades). At first pass with the satellite AIS data analyses, it appears that Arctic shipping is increasing as sea ice decreasing (Fig. 11.3), which can be treated as a hypothesis (‘ship-ice hypothesis’) that can be experimentally tested in terms of cause and effect. Recognizing that BaSR is open water throughout the year, unlike the seasonally ice-covered BeSR, provides an experimental control area to test this 250 P. A. Berkman et al.

Fig. 11.3 Illustration of the ‘Ship-Ice Hypothesis’ that diminishing sea ice is driving the increase in Arctic shipping, which is itself becoming a socio-economic driver in the Arctic Ocean, providing the basis for experimental analyses with available data to test the relationship between these biophysical and socio-economic drivers of change, respectively, recognizing that ‘correlation alone does not mean causation.’ Based on satellite observations of the Arctic Ocean: (Left) Arctic sea-ice extent decreasing 9.7% per decade from 1979–2017 (NSIDC 2017). (Right) Arctic ship traffic increasing 6.6% per year, based on unique ship counts (Table 11.1) annually within the study area (Fig. 11.1), during full-observation years of 2010–2016 hypothesis and assess drivers of Arctic ship traffic that may be external to the ice- covered Arctic Ocean (Fig. 11.1), as considered with the AMSA (2009a) scenarios about trade. Such biophysical and socio-economic analyses together have societal importance, particularly with sea ice and shipping as primary drivers of change in the Arctic Ocean, as considered at the Arctic Options (2014) workshop at the University of California Santa Barbara (Table 5.1), involving diverse stakeholders:

• Indigenous peoples with subsistence livelihoods in the Arctic; • National agencies managing Arctic resources, impacts and activities; • Commercial enterprises utilizing Arctic resources; • Non-governmental organizations protecting Arctic ecosystems and cultures; • Natural and social scientists researching Arctic sustainability; and • International organizations responding to human activities in the Arctic.

Figure 11.3 reveals the number of unique ships operating annually in the Arctic Ocean, involving satellite AIS records from all class of transponders on the ships (NAVCEN 2017). AIS records from Class A and Class B transponders separately require further investigation across regions and time, especially to frame evidence that can be considered for informed decisionmaking about governance mechanisms and built infrastructure in the Arctic Ocean. Additional consideration of big-data processing strategies and intercalibration with ground-based as well as satellite receivers is necessary to apply AIS data for operational decisionmaking in the Arctic Ocean. 11 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments 251

11.2.4 Historic Arctic Satellite AIS Baseline

The oldest and longest continuous recording of satellite AIS data from the Arctic Ocean (Table 11.1) is shown on a daily basis from 1 September 2009 to 31 December 2016 (Fig. 11.4). The synoptic data in Fig. 11.4 have been integrated with the ‘space-time cube’ (Fig. 11.2), revealing the relative number of unique ships

Fig. 11.4 Baseline record of the total validated number of unique ships daily in the Arctic Ocean, derived from satellite automatic Identification System (AIS) data in relation to the Mobile Maritime Service Identity (MMSI) of each ship from 1 September 2009 through 31 December 2016 (Table 11.1). (Upper) Number of unique ships each day north of the Arctic Circle, including the Bering Strait Region and Barents Sea Region, as shown in Fig. 11.1 (see legend for regions). (Middle) Number of daily MMSI counts from the SpaceQuest satellites during the observation period. (Bottom) Number of unique ships each day, normalized in relation to the total number of daily counts collected by the SpaceQuest satellites throughout the observation period 252 P. A. Berkman et al. over time within and between BeSR, BaSR and the overall Arctic Ocean region (as represented in the Book Cover Figure). This historic baseline is being updated with 2017–2018 satellite AIS data. Simply comparing their relative trends (Fig. 11.4), ship traffic is increasing across the entire Arctic Ocean (most of which is ice-covered seasonally) at a faster rate than in BaSR, which is ice-free throughout the year. Moreover, for the entire Arctic Ocean, the rate of ship-traffic increase on an annual basis is similar to the rate of sea-ice decrease on a decadal basis (Fig. 11.3). There also is clear ship traffic seasonality in all regions of the Arctic Ocean, following the growth and decay of the sea ice. All of these conclusions support (i.e., without falsifying) the ship-ice hypothesis that sea ice is the primary driver of increased shipping in the Arctic Ocean. Interestingly, the seasonality of ship traffic in the Barents Sea is opposite to the trend in ice-covered areas of the Arctic Ocean, as revealed by the ‘diamond’ pattern in their cycles (Fig. 11.4). Analyses based on MMSI numbers just in BaSR (Fig. 11.1) in 2016 indicate that the mean centers of the ship traffic during the winter (November-May) and summer (June-October) moved 400 kilometers northeast- ward with the seasonal retreat of the sea ice, raising question of year-round traffic (Bourbonnais and Lasserre 2015; Darby 2018). Consequently, while BaSR is largely beyond the defined region of the Polar Code (IMO 2017b), as shown in Fig. 11.1, this open-water region is coupled closely with summer ship traffic in the seasonally ice-covered Arctic Ocean. Fortunately, with regard to governance, there is an existing complex of jurisdictions in the Barents Sea to complement implementation of the Polar Code (Vylegzhanin et al. 2018). In addition, the normalized numbers of unique ships in the Arctic Ocean (Fig. 11.4) indicate the highest ship traffic was in 2012, during the lowest summer ‘sea-ice minimum’ recorded by satellites (NSIDC 2017). Together, these analyses all strengthen the hypothesis that sea-ice changes are a primary driver of Arctic ship traffic over diverse time and space scales (Fig. 11.3), reflecting the importance of their being analyzed together from satellite data for the purposes of maritime operations and real-time decisionmaking to implement all binding agreements that involve ship-borne activities in the Arctic Ocean.

11.2.5 Arctic Ship Traffic Patterns

Ship traffic involves the movements of individual vessels and the flow of all vessels over time and space. Individual vessels have different classifications, dimensions, cargos, crew characteristics, fuels and other features (e.g., Table 11.2) that relate to their “safe, secure and reliable” operations in the Arctic Ocean (Deggim 2013). Ultimately, it is the individual vessels that need to be monitored at the time scales of operational decisionmaking. However, it is the aggregations of vessels that need to be characterized for long-term infrastructure investment and development, as is being suggested across the twenty-first century by the ‘belt and road initiative’ (China 2017) with its ‘polar silk road’ (China 2018). At a macro-level, ship interactions with sea ice can be analyzed to reveal both patterns and trends (such as hypothesized by Smith and Stephenson 2013) that can 11 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments 253 contribute to informed decisionmaking for sustainable infrastructure development in the Arctic Ocean. Sea-ice coverage can be interpreted from satellites with 4 km2 grid-spacing on a daily basis across the Arctic Ocean (NSIDC 2017). These sea-ice data were used to model ship-ice interactions during the period of satellite AIS observations (Table 11.1, Figs. 11.3 and 11.4) by: joining the AIS and sea-ice points in the space-time cube (Fig. 11.2); and counting the number of unique ships daily in each 4 km2 cell with sea ice. Duplicate MMSI points in each 4 km2 cell with sea ice were deleted. The total number of ship-ice interactions daily then were aggregated on an annual basis in relation to their latitudes (Fig. 11.5). Figure 11.5 reveals a pattern of Arctic ship-ice interactions with the highest numbers in 2015–2016 in the latitude band from 70°-75° North. Progressively lower numbers surround this zone of highest ship-ice interactions, revealing a trend of increasing ship-ice interactions annually at higher latitudes. Characteristics of the ship traffic across the Arctic Ocean can be further analyzed over time and space, in relation to ship attributes (Table 11.2) at user-defined levels of granularity, to address diverse questions. As an illustration, what nations have the most ships in the Arctic Ocean and where are those ships from 2009–2016? The answer (Fig. 11.6) is derived from the attribute of flag state.

Fig. 11.5 ‘Heatmap’ of ship-ice interactions by joining sea-ice data (NSIDC 2017) and satellite AIS data (Figs. 11.3 and 11.4) across latitudes on an annual basis throughout the observation period (Table 11.1), as described above. There were no ship-ice interactions with latitudes >86° or < 64° degrees in 2009 254 P. A. Berkman et al.

Fig. 11.6 International distribution of ship-ice interactions (see Fig. 11.5) in the Arctic Ocean from 1 September 2009 through 31 December 2016 (Table 11.1), based on the flag state attribute that is encoded on the Mobile Maritime Service Identity (MMSI) message from each unique ship (Table 11.2)

Figure 11.6 shows the vast majority of ships interacting with sea ice in the Arctic Ocean are Russian, located primarily along the Northern Sea Route, a well-defined region of the Arctic Ocean (Smith and Stephenson 2013; NGA 2017a) that may be opening to increased international trade (Lakshmi 2018). Norwegian ships are the next most abundant, primarily along East Greenland and throughout the Svalbard archipelago in the Greenland Sea and Barents Sea, respectively, with clusters of diverse nations operating in these regions (reflecting fishing and energy activities). There also is a cluster of diverse nations operating along West Greenland (perhaps reflecting tourism activities). In addition, it is interesting to note the ‘straight line’ of Russian nuclear icebreakers to the North Pole during August and September each year in the satellite AIS database. At the finest level of granularity, questions can be asked about individual ships over time and space (Fig. 11.7). 11 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments 255

Fig. 11.7 Collage of unique ship tracks (based on their Maritime Mobile Service Identify) throughout the satellite AIS collections period (Table 11.1) associated with international collaboration in the Pan-Arctic Options (2017) project: Canada (Louis St. Laurent), China (Xue Long), France (Tara), Norway (Lance), Russian Federation (Moskva) and United States (Healy). Tracks of commercial ships also are shown from the tourism (Lindblad National Geographic Explorer), energy (Arctic Voyager) and maritime-service (Arctica) sectors along with the movements of the Polar Stern (Germany), which has logged more than 250 polar research expeditions since 1982 256 P. A. Berkman et al.

Ship-level questions ultimately will be required for operational decisionmaking about maritime traffic in the Arctic Ocean, analogous to air-traffic control elsewhere (e.g., Flightrader24 2017), regarding the movement and behavior of individual vessels. The ‘space-time’ methodology (Fig. 11.2) can be applied to questions in an open-ended manner across diverse levels of granularity with satellite AIS (along with regional ground-based AIS) and sea-ice and other data, as illustrated by Figs. 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6, and 11.7, including:

1. GIS spatial-data files (e.g., Fig. 11.1); 2. Definition of the observation periods within the satellite AIS dataset from 2009 onward (Table 11.1), building on the satellite sea-ice dataset that extends from 1979 (Fig. 11.3); and 3. Consideration of the attributes (Table 11.2) that are available to address user- defined questions.

Answers to user-defined questions will have value to diverse communities which are concerned with shipping and sea ice as primary drivers of change in the Arctic (e.g., Table 5.1). In a practical manner, an holistic analytical process also will contribute to informed decisionmaking by ship operators as well marine traffic systems, which exist among all of the surrounding states across the Arctic Ocean (NGA 2017a, b, c, d, e). Ultimately, such crowdsourced analyses will reveal evidence and options for enhancing applications of the Polar Code (IMO 2017b) and other binding international legal agreements (e.g., SAR 2011; MOPP 2013) along with risk- management from the insurance industry (Emerson and Lahn 2012; Stoddard et al. 2016) to ensure safe, secure and reliable shipping in the Arctic Ocean.

11.2.6 Arctic Satellite AIS Intercomparison

SpaceQuest (2017) has been a pioneer with polar-orbiting AIS micro-satellites and there now are other data sources, including from the European Space Agency (ESA 2017) and exactEarth (2017). The Norwegian Coastal Administration (Kystverket 2017) operates HAVBASE (2017), which is the centerpiece of the Arctic Ship Traffic Data (ASTD 2017) project for the Arctic Council, providing an ideal cross- check of the satellite AIS data from SpaceQuest (Table 11.3). HAVBASE analyzes unique ships in the Arctic Ocean based on their IMO numbers, which are derived from AIS messages generated by Class A transponders (Table 11.2). Observed monthly for BaSR in 2016, numbers of IMO ships from HAVBASE are not significantly different from the numbers of validated ship messages from Space Quest (Fig. 11.3; Table 11.3). While there is rich metadata associated with IMO-registered ships (Table 11.2), analyses only of ships with IMO numbers avoids taking into consideration the segment of Arctic shipping associated with vessels that are utilizing Class B transponders, recognizing that Class A and Class B vessels are two subsets of the total MMSI numbers (Fig. 11.3). 11 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments 257

Table 11.3 Monthly Comparison of Ship Traffic Attributes (Table 11.2) from the Barents Sea Region (Fig. 11.1), Based on Independent Satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) Datasets for the Pan-Arctic Options (this chapter) and Arctic Ship Traffic Data (ASTD 2017) Projectsa in 2016 Pan-Arctic options Arctic ship traffic database Validated AIS data IMO Travel Month MMSI (number) (number) (number) (nautical miles) Jan 2435 1315 1153 1,361,442 Feb 2701 1350 1105 1,290,579 Mar 2800 1360 1113 1,392,242 Apr 2557 1310 1112 1,437,113 May 2541 1319 1156 1,629,659 Jun 2532 1442 1378 1,835,211 Jul 2258 1422 1543 2,134,675 Aug 2174 1444 1698 2,597,150 Sep 2402 1406 1640 2,487,115 Oct 2344 1366 1456 2,074,682 Nov 2568 1284 1247 1,701,567 Dec 2428 1187 1106 1,358,833 MEAN 2478 ± 177 1350 ± 74 1308 ± 224 1,775,022 ± 454,464 aAcquired from independent polar-orbiting AIS satellites, all validated unique ships from Space Quest (Table 11.1, Fig. 11.3) compared to IMO ships from HAVBASE (2017). These data are not significantly different (T = 0.44, 22 degrees of freedom)

Nonetheless, utilizing Class A messages from IMO-registered ships (Table 11.3), HAVBASE can be used to compare the distribution of different ship types (NAVCEN 2017) in user-defined regions of the Arctic Ocean, as reflected by BaSR, BeSR and north of the Arctic Circle (Figs. 11.1 and 11.8) in 2016. Vessel types represented by “other activities” include enforcement vessels, which will be integral to the cooperative, coordinated and consistent infrastructure for an Arctic Marine Traffic System as envisioned by AMSA (2009a) among all nations around the Arctic Ocean. Moreover, activities among vessels types within operational classes of ships, for example ice classes (e.g., Nyseth and Bertelsen 2014), underscore a suite of user- defined questions that can be addressed with satellite AIS data in a pan-Arctic context. The HAVBASE system also demonstrates the capacity to model environmental, ecosystem and socio-economic impacts in relation to Arctic marine traffic, bounded in time and space by user-defined questions (e.g., Mjelde 2014; Langdalen 2017). Applying ship attributes from AIS data (Table 11.2), for example, HAVBASE auto- matically can generate tables to estimate ship emissions, as illustrated for the Barents Sea–Lofoten Management Plan Area (Norway 2015) from August 2016 (Table 11.4), indicating the largest carbon-dioxide emissions were produced by fishing and passenger vessels in the Barents Sea–Lofoten Management Plan Area during August 2016. Table 11.4 illustrates the granularity of ship types and size-classes can be incorporated into models to estimate the consequences of ship traffic in the Arctic Ocean. In the future, such models could be parameterized similarly to 258 P. A. Berkman et al.

3,500 Fishing vessels Other activities 3,000 Other offshore service vessels

2,500 Offshore supply vessels Passenger vessels 2,000 Refrigerated cargo vessels RoRo vessels 1,500 Container vessels Number of vessel s 1,000 General cargo vessels Bulk vessels 500 Gas tankers

- Product/chemical tankers Total Arctic Waters Barents Sea Region Arctic Sea Region Bering Strait Region Oil tankers Geographical area

Fig. 11.8 Ship types derived from attributes associated with IMO numbers (Lloyds 2017), from vessels with Class A transponders, in regions of the Arctic Ocean (Fig. 11.1) in 2016, derived from the Arctic Ship Traffic Data (ASTD 2017) project generate economic value estimates, for example, to address questions about investment patterns, complementing other development forecasts for regions around the Arctic Ocean, especially in the Barents Sea (AMAP 2017a) and across the Bering Strait (AMAP 2017b).

11.3 Informed Decisionmaking About Arctic Marine Shipping

11.3.1 Science-Diplomacy Case Study

The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA 2009a, b) is a successful demon- stration of informed decisionmaking, as reflected by the Arctic search-and-rescue agreement (SAR 2011), marine-oil-pollution (MOPP 2013) and the Polar Code (IMO 2017b) as well as many other governance mechanisms (e.g., Preface Fig. 8) that were represented among the seventeen AMSA recommendations (Box 11.1). Value of the AMSA recommendations is further reflected by their being updated by the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment working group of the Arctic Council (PAME 2017). These invited recommendations within the Arctic Council framework are analogous to options (without advocacy), which can be used or ignored explicitly by the decisionmakers, providing continued utility to build common interests that generate informed decisions (Preface Fig. 5). Moreover, AMSA effectively applied the methodology of science diplomacy, starting with questions about how to achieve safe, secure and reliable shipping in the Arctic Ocean with regulations through the IMO (Deggim 2013; Finland 2014) in the context of “sustainable development and environmental protection,” which are the “common Arctic issues” established through the Arctic Council (Ottawa Declaration 1996). 11 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments 259 To Determine To To Determine To To Determine To To Determine To To Determine To To Determine To To Determine To To Determine To To Determine To To Determine To To Determine To To Determine To To Determine To To Determine To Future economic value/cost estimates

2 120,265.5 33,194.6 21,573.8 999.6 11,151.4 31913.2 3565.6 267.4 89.7 14,652.3 12,204.6 4519.6 7125.9 Total C0 Total emission 10,921.0 8338.00 0 0 0 0 4244.66 0 0 0 0 0 4093.34 0 >100,000 0 12,026.22 0 0 0 0 1678.77 0 0 0 0 1498.58 0 0 50,000– 99,999 8848.87 14,819.76 0 3443.52 0 0 1910.99 0 0 0 1351.92 6820.51 355.,58 619,94 25,000– 49,999 1292.82 29,536.22 0 4559.24 0 0 13,346.79 0 0 0 2899.32 2897.21 70.70 5452.90 10,000– 24,999 310.06 13508.17 0 3190.81 507.52 5822.47 2794,47 1102.03 230.44 89.68 1730.88 302.37 0 393.38 5000–9999 138.59 ) emission estimates (tonnes) for different ship-size classes (tonnes) ) emission estimates (tonnes) for different 2 55,301.85 25,105.96 7350.40 292.50 5304.72 5132.34 2463.54 20.78 0 8159.33 685.90 0 572.50 1000–4999 213.88 14,878.48 8088.68 3029.84 199.54 24.23 2805.16 0 16.20 0 510.86 0 0 87.19 Carbon dioxide (CO <1000 116.78 ) for Different Ship Size-Classes and Types in the Barents Sea–Lofoten Types Ship Size-Classes and ( 2017 ) for Different Carbon Dioxide Emission Estimates Generated by HAVBASE Fiskefartøy Andre aktiviteter Andre offshore Andre offshore service skip Offshore supply Offshore skip Passasjer Kjøle/fryseskip Ro last Konteinerskip Stykkgodsskip Bulkskip Gasstankere Kjemikalie/ produkttankere Skipstype (Ship type in Norwegian) Oljetankere TOTAL 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 ID 1 Table 11.4 Table August 2016 During Barentshavet) Area (Forvaltningsplanområde Management Plan 260 P. A. Berkman et al.

With different nations providing ground-based datasets of ship numbers and characteristics, AMSA identified a functional approach to collect data necessary to answer these questions. Recognizing that data to address specific questions is different than evidence for decisions, AMSA integrated patterns and trends from the natural and social sciences as well as Indigenous knowledge to reveal the need for actions in directions identified by the stakeholders inclusively. Based on their common interests, principally marine safety and environmental protection (Beckman et al. 2017), the Arctic states fully utilized the resulting AMSA recommendations, contributing to the apex goal of informed decisions (Preface Figs. 3 and 5) with regard to Arctic marine shipping (PAME 2017).

11.3.2 Next Generation Assessments

Satellite AIS data started the year the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment was published (AMSA 2009a) as revealed in this chapter with the oldest and longest continuous satellite AIS record from the Arctic Ocean (Table 11.1). Initial analyses herein of this satellite AIS record (Figs. 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6, 11.7, and 11.8) explore the open-ended types of questions that can be addressed through the holistic process of science diplomacy (Preface Figs. 3, 5 and 6) for the purpose of informed decisionmaking with regard to Arctic sustainability and marine ship traffic more specifically. The first requirement is to validate the satellite AIS record, which is an ongoing process. A critical step is to analyze the total number of unique-ship messages received at any point in time, recognizing the capacity of satellite AIS systems have been improving (e.g., Burzigotti et al. 2010). Clearly, the total number of unique- ship messages increased during the 2009–2016 period (Table 11.3), which is attributable in part to the relative number of unique-ship counts received, stored and transmitted by the different satellites. Consequently, for initial interpretations over time, unique-ship counts based on the MMSI data were normalized in relation to the operation of each satellite system (Fig. 11.4), pointing to the largest number of unique-ships in the Arctic Ocean in 2012, during the lowest annual sea-ice minimum on record (Berkman and Vylegzhanin 2013). The number of validated MMSI messages received independently on a monthly basis by SpaceQuest and Norwegian Coastal Administration satellites, for the same area (i.e., BaSR; see Fig. 11.1), were not significantly different in 2016 (Table 11.3). While this satellite intercomparison provides some validation, it is incomplete without analyzing both Class A and Class B messages, included within the total number of MMSI messages (Figs. 11.3 and 11.4). Moreover, Fig. 11.3 indicates the total number of validated AIS messages is increasing during the 2009–2016 period of observation, requiring additional data to interpret trends and rates, as are being interpreted with 2017–2018 satellite AIS records. The additional interpretations also are in view of Class A and Class B transponder data, recognizing satellite MMSI records are incompletely characterized if 11 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments 261 only ships with IMO numbers (i.e., from Class A transponders) are being analyzed. All validated MMSI records are necessary for operational decisionmaking to ensure the safety and security of each ship (Fig. 11.7). Beyond assessing the movements and increasing numbers of unique ships in the Arctic Ocean (Figs. 11.3 and 11.4), the rich set of attributes associated with IMO- registered vessels (Table 11.2) is important to understand how Arctic marine ship traffic is diversifying over space and time (e.g., Figs. 11.6 and 11.8). Together, the patterns and trends of unique ships along with their attributes will be necessary to address the development of long-term built infrastructure (including fixed and mobile assets for service, emergency and regulatory activities) and associated governance mechanisms (promoting cooperation, coordination and consistency). This chapter also applies vector-based GIS solutions that were unavailable for AMSA. With the ‘space-time cube’ (Fig. 11.2), for example, it is now possible to address questions with any level of granularity within user-defined digital boundaries over time and space, involving point to pan-Arctic scales. Questions are the challenge en route to initiate informed decisionmaking (Preface Figs. 3 and 5), considering the distribution of ships with different attributes (Table 11.2; Figs. 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6, 11.7, and 11.8) in view of any environmental variables. In this sense, it is important that shipping and sea ice are recognized as primary drivers of change in the Arctic (Table 5.1). Sea-ice coverage has been assessed from satellites much longer than ship traffic in the Arctic Ocean (Fig. 11.3) and the two datasets are herein analyzed together at the scale of ‘big data’ with more than 100,000,000 satellite AIS messages (Table 11.1). The initial pan-Arctic analyses of ship-ice interactions highlight their international distribution during the period of 2009–2016 period (Fig. 11.6). More importantly, for informed decisionmaking, ship-ice interactions are increasing over time and toward higher latitudes (Fig. 11.5). The ‘ship-ice hypothesis’ (Fig. 11.3) was used as the theoretical framework to interpret these changes in Arctic marine ship traffic, applying BaSR as experimental control since it is open water throughout the year, unlike BeSR or other regions that are seasonally ice-covered (Fig. 11.1). AMSA (2009a, b) illustrates the firm foundation for informed decisionmaking, built on questions that only could only be answered at the time with shipping data collected only from the Earth surface and directly from Arctic states individually. There is a threshold change in capacity to address Arctic marine ship traffic from satellite AIS data, fundamentally transforming Arctic marine shipping assessments into the future. Unlike AMSA (2009a, b), which was limited by national dissemination methods with subjective and inconsistent data on a regional basis, satellite AIS data are synoptic as well as objective and can be accessed from government as well as commercial sources with consistency on a pan-Arctic basis. Moreover, AIS, sea-ice and other data from satellites can be analyzed and integrated with user-defined levels granularity across time (minutes to decades) and space (meters to thousands of kilometers) in relation to diverse attributes and questions in an open-ended manner (Table 11.5). 262 P. A. Berkman et al.

Table 11.5 Next generation arctic marine shipping assessments Arctic marine shipping assessments Attribute AMSA (2009) Next generationa Sampling period 2004 2009-present Data sources Arctic states individually Diverse government and commercial automatic identification system (AIS) sources Observation Point, regional Point, regional and pan-Arctic coverage Observation scope Ground-based Ground-based and satellite Observation Inconsistent over space and Synoptic and continuous (from seconds to frequency time decades) Ship-type Variable National Standardized international designations designations Designations Individual ship Inconsistent and Consistent and comprehensive attributes incomplete Analytical capacity Limited granularity and Open-ended granularity and questions questions Science-diplomacy Scenarios and negotiated Holistic evidence and options (without contributions recommendations advocacy) Informed Governance mechanisms Operations, built infrastructure and decision-support Governance mechanisms aInvolves automatic identification system (AIS) data collected by polar-orbiting satellites

AIS data from ground-stations always will have fundamental importance in dense ship-traffic regions of the Arctic Ocean, especially in the Bering Strait (MXAK 2017) and Barents Sea (VTS 2017), which are the two regions of focus in this chapter (Fig. 11.1). Considering the recommendations from AMSA (2009a; PAME 2017), there is opportunity to unify the analyses of ground-based and satellite-based AIS data as core infrastructure for an operational Arctic Ship Traffic System. Such a system would have the capacity to address the dynamics of Arctic ship traffic in relation to governance mechanisms and built infrastructure, including traffic separation schemes, deep-water ports and emergency response networks. The Arctic Ship Traffic System also would reveal insights about ship interactions with other elements of the Arctic system, such as impacts from heavy fuel oils on the environment or ships strikes on marine mammals. Importantly, the Arctic Ship Traffic System would be a rich source of data to test user-defined questions and hypotheses, such as projections about destinational and transit traffic with various routing strategies and impact considerations (Smith and Stephenson 2013), as through the Central Arctic Ocean (Stevenson et al. 2018) or the Bering Strait (IMO 2017c) as well as across the Arctic Ocean (Eger 2011). Ultimately, next generation Arctic marine shipping assessments will be nimble and flexible enough to ensure safe, secure and reliable shipping in the Arctic Ocean, helping to achieve Arctic sustainability across generations. With holistic perspective, children borne today will be alive in the twenty-second century, which means that our sights must be at least across the twenty-first century for benefit of the most current generation without being arbitrary (Preface Fig. 1). 11 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments 263

The context of ‘Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments’ (Table 11.5) underscores the observation that sustainable strategies involve close coupling between governance mechanisms and built infrastructure to achieve progress with balance, stability and resilience (Preface Table 1) that underlie progress with sustainable development as a ‘common Arctic issue’ (Ottawa Declaration 1996). The integration of different decisionmaking arenas is highlighted by SAR (2011) and MOPP (2013), which are forward-looking agreements that are legally binding, but hollow in the absence of the built infrastructure (requiring technology and capi- talization) to implement them (e.g., Struzik 2018). For Arctic sustainability with its diverse ‘institutional interplay’ (Young 2002), the option (without advocacy) for built infrastructure is to consider that investment can be phased to achieve Arctic sustainability. Such phasing across the twenty-first century (Preface Fig. 12) will increasingly involve coastal-marine connections with coordination, cooperation and consistency among regions on a pan-Arctic scale. Ultimately, the foundation for Arctic sustainability is ‘multilateral stability’ among diverse stakeholders within and beyond the Arctic (Fig. 11.9). This stability further involves balance among economic, environmental and societal considerations, recognizing there will be an ‘economic engine’ with diverse facets (Fig. 11.9) that will be both a central source of capacity as well as risk in the Arctic Ocean, where human activities are represented by shipping as a primary socio-economic

Fig. 11.9 Conceptualization of ‘multilateral stability’ to insulate the central ‘economic engine’ that will emerge from diverse markets (e.g., Fisheries, FI; Energy, EN; Shipping, SH; Communications, CO; and Science, SC) in the new Arctic Ocean. In a multilateral context, short- term and long-term perspectives associated with equity and debt financing, respectively, provide a framework to consider resources, issues and impacts across a ‘continuum of urgencies’ (Preface Figure 3), leading to informed decisionmaking by Arctic and non-Arctic stakeholders (Preface Figure 5) for the benefit of all across generations 264 P. A. Berkman et al. measure of change in the Arctic. In this holistic context, insulating the economic engine across a ‘continuum of urgencies’ (Preface Figure) will involve Next- Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments (Table 11.5) as a key for informed decisionmaking to achieve Arctic sustainability with science diplomacy to balance national interests and common interests across generations in the interests of all.

Acknowledgements This paper is a product of the Science Diplomacy Center at Tufts University in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy with support from the National Science Foundation (Award Nos. NSF-OPP 1263819 and NSF-ICER 1660449) and the Belmont Forum with collaboration among funding agencies in Canada, China, France, Norway, Russian Federation and the United States.

References

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Peter L. Pulsifer, Yekaterina Kontar, Paul Arthur Berkman, and D. R. Fraser Taylor

Abstract Effective governance requires the best available sources of data and information. The Arctic region, society, and research community is complex and operates at multiple scales. As a result, information about the Arctic exists and flows within a complex Arctic Information Ecosystem (AIE). The conceptual framework of Information Ecology can be used to document, understand, and possibly predict the nature and functioning of the AIE. Using a stepped approach, the Mapping the Arctic Data Ecosystem (MADE) project is using Linked Open Data representational models and tools to evaluate the utility of Information Ecology to support real world applications such as contributing to strategy development for the Sustained Arctic Observing Network (SAON) program and enhancing disaster resilience in the Arctic. The non-linear, Information Ecology framework more accurately reflects early views of the AIE and stands as an alternative to currently used, more linear rational-classical strategy development and systems analysis.

P. L. Pulsifer (*) National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC),, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA e-mail: [email protected] Y. Kontar · P. A. Berkman Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA D. R. F. Taylor Geomatics and Cartographic Research Centre, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 269 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_12 270 P. L. Pulsifer et al.

12.1 Introduction

Governance involves processes of interaction, dialogue, negotiation and decisionmaking among many actors involved in the development of social norms and institutions. Understanding and addressing the values, key priorities, and common interests of actors is critical to effective governance that balances societal well- being, environmental protection and economic prosperity across generations. This is particularly challenging in the Arctic region due to the complexity of the region in the face of significant environmental, economic and societal change. To better understand the values and priorities of diverse actors as well as make progress to enhance their common interests requires constant monitoring and access to the best available sources of data and information. Identifying, documenting and, most importantly, understanding the Arctic component of the global information system will allow us to target gaps in information resources, as well as guide the ongoing development of the increasingly interconnected global information system in support of governance, research, livelihoods and myriad other applications. In this chapter we use the established conceptual framework of information ecology (IE) as an analytical tool to help organize ideas and comprehend complexity in a way that is relatively easy to understand and apply. IE is used to study one or more systems,1 and specifically information ecosystems (cf. Nardi and O’Day 1999). Although there is no authoritative definition, here we define an information ecosystem as a system of interrelated and interdependent human actors, institutions, norms and practices (including standards), technologies, information objects, relationships and the broader socio-technical environment in which it exists. Clearly defining terminology is important, yet many terms used in relation to information ecosystems are vaguely defined. For example, Eddy et al. (2014) elaborate on the challenges of defining the term “information”. The Data, Information, Knowledge and Wisdom (DIKW, or Knowledge Pyramid) hierarchy is used across many disciplines and communities of practice, despite challenges to its soundness (Frické 2009; Rowley 2007). Recognizing that IE practitioners often adopt a plu- ralistic view and recognize multiple definitions and the importance of considering context of use, we use elements of the Knowledge Pyramid here to situate our work and discuss the Arctic Information Ecosystem (AIE). There are other related and relevant organizational systems such as the Theory of Informed Decision Making presented in the Prologue of this book. In this chapter we use information as an inclusive term that comprises observations and experience and the data they create, the more synthetic “information” objects, and documented forms of the knowledge and wisdom that are based on data and information. We observe that data and information tend to exist in physical or digital object form, while knowledge and wisdom are embodied but are increasingly documented. Regardless of their form

1 Defined simply here as a set of interrelated and interdependent components that form a unified, but often complex whole. Components may include actors, relationships, parts, or other related entities. 12 Information Ecology to Map the Arctic Information Ecosystem 271

(object or embodied), knowledge and wisdom are integral parts of the AIE that we discuss here. This chapter introduces a project that is using IE to document and describe, model, and analyze the current state, structure and internal functioning of what we call the Arctic Information Ecosystem (AIE). A project called Mapping the Arctic Data Ecosystem (MADE), described in detail later in the chapter, will apply these new understandings of the AIE to help predict and influence the evolution of the AIE. Detailed results of this work will be published in future volumes of this book series and elsewhere. In this introductory chapter we first present a focused review of IE theory relevant to studying the AIE (Sect. 12.2). In Sect. 12.3 we discuss in more concrete terms the different ways that IE, a relatively immature conceptual framework, is being or may be applied. Section 12.4 describes the specific case of the AIE and argues that IE is a conceptual framework that is appropriate for studying the AIE, and should be used in place of common, traditional approaches. The section concludes with an overview of the MADE project. Section 12.5 outlines future work including presentation of a current technical prototype and an outline of analytical goals. The chapter concludes by summarizing the case for using IE to examine the AIE and potential contributions from the MADE project.

12.2 Information Ecology

IE exists in relation to narrower and broader sets of conceptual and theoretical frameworks. Individual information ecosystem nodes (e.g. databases, information structures and technologies) can be understood and implemented through the lens of frameworks within Computer Science, Library and Information Science, Statistics and other disciplines that focus on information objects. Individual social components may be studied through frameworks from Sociology, Anthropology, Science and Technology Studies or other related disciplines. While these disciplines and their conceptual and theoretical frameworks do not exist in isolation, the core of IE is in modeling and understanding relationships and interactions between and among all information ecosystem components using ecological ideas. While IE primarily draws on ecosystems theory and the discipline of ecology, it builds on and links to other concepts and theories including network theory, infrastructure studies and broader complex adaptive systems theory. Network theory helps us to understand how networks form, function, evolve and fail. Ecosystems are a kind of network with nodes in the network being connected in many ways including through the flow of information and energy. Seminal works in the 1990s and early 2000s have revealed much about networks and these have been discussed in more detail in relation to the formation of a polar data network (Albert and Barabási 2002; Barabasi and Albert 1999; Pulsifer et al. 2014). Of primary interest in our use of IE is that robust networks include multiple, highly connected hubs and a larger number of less connected nodes. These hubs and nodes are often connected through “weak ties” to form a “hub and spoke” or “scale free network” (Barabási 2002; Granovetter 1973). This means that only a small number of 272 P. L. Pulsifer et al. links are needed for most nodes to create a highly interconnected and robust network that is responsive, diverse, and less susceptible to catastrophic failure. This has implications for the formation and stability of an information ecosystem like the AIE. Infrastructure can also be understood as complex socio-technical systems containing networks through which resources are distributed. Ecosystems and infrastructures are both complex, networked entities, however they can evolve and develop in different ways. While ecosystems are self-organizing and constantly adapting to external forces and internal dynamics, infrastructure development is driven by a multitude of social, economic, organizational and governance forces. Infrastructures typically form through an evolutionary process; however this process is not entirely adaptive nor self-organizing. The presence of intelligent actors, regulated competition and human drivers of innovation do not exist in ecological ecosystems (Edwards et al. 2007; Iansiti and Levien 2004; Star and Ruhleder 1996). The AIE and other information ecosystems have both self-organizing and directed components, and thus research examining Arctic information from an infrastructure perspective is relevant to our discussion here (Knol et al. 2018). Ecosystems are recognized as a type of Complex Adaptive System (CAS) that includes a large number of components or agents that interact in a dynamic network. A number of physical and social science frameworks and disciplines use CAS with key concepts being around the idea of heterogeneous agents interacting as a system that results in adaptation, emergent behavior, and phase transitions. CAS theory recognizes the linkages between and through micro and macro scales. A comprehensive treatment of CAS and related theories is beyond the scope of this chapter, however it is important to note that there are many broader and narrower theories and methods that are relevant to our study of the AIE (Holland 2006; Miller and Page 2007; Turnbull 2007). We now focus specifically on work being done under the name of IE as the foundation for understanding the AIE. The concept of IE is not new. For example, more than 30 years ago, Hugh Taylor used the terms “information ecology” and “ecology of information” to frame discussion on the role of archivists in record keeping and preserving evidence during the early movement towards automation and digitization of information stores (Taylor 1984). It is notable here that well before the advent of the World Wide Web, Taylor highlights the importance of establishing human and technical networks to maintain and increase information diversity and accessibility. Capurro and colleagues used IE as a frame to critically examine society’s use of information technology in telematics, security, policy, telemedicine and examining the disparity in access to technology and information amongst nations and social groups (Capurro 1990). Davenport and Prusak (1997) provide an expansive treatment of many aspects of IE, including the pragmatic aspects of establishing the human resources and business models needed to work within a complex information ecosystem. Eryomin (1998) positions IE as a “hybrid” science that can bring together, identify, understand and use laws to improve the information environment and society. Here, IE is defined as “the sum total of information quality, 12 Information Ecology to Map the Arctic Information Ecosystem 273 management, products and value, as well as the evaluation of information services and needs and liability” (Eryomin 1998). In keeping with the previous discussion of network and CAS theory, Stepp (1999) provides a detailed prospectus outlining IE that includes an enumeration of relevant concepts, disciplines and contributions that can play a role in IE theory and practice. These include semiotics, linguistics, political economy and developmental psychology to name a few (Stepp 1999). Nardi and O’Day more specifically define and information ecosystem as “a system of people, practices, values, and technologies in a particular local environment” while they emphasize that such an ecological approach is focused on human activities served by technology rather than the technologies themselves (Nardi and O’Day 1999). As elaborated later in this chapter, Nardi and O’Day establish the power of using metaphors to reveal facets and understanding, and to guide our thinking around the technologies and systems that we construct and use. Many works reviewed highlight the importance of diversity and complementar- ity of system components to help maintain innovation and adaptation to change. Consequently, managing this diversity and complexity across technical and social systems requires “mediators” that can translate and transform matter, energy and information in meaningful and useful ways (Baker and Bowker 2007; Nardi and O’Day 1999; Parsons et al. 2011; Pulsifer and Taylor 2005). Lastly, the importance of scale is highlighted in many IE scholarly works, with the recognition that information ecosystems exist and interact at many scales. Thus, an understanding of scale dependent features and functions is necessary. Nardi and O’Day argue that focusing on “locality” can help to create and sustain ecologies and technologies that are appropriately situated for more efficient, effective and appropriate use (Nardi and O’Day 1999). The existing body of literature provides a theoretical and methodological foundation that identifies information ecosystem concepts such as systems (interrela- tionships, dependencies, feedbacks etc.), the co-evolution of technology and social systems, and the importance of “keystone species” that provide a foundation for information ecosystems (Iansiti and Levien 2004; Nardi and O’Day 1999; Parsons et al. 2011). These works highlight the broad and holistic nature of IE as a conceptual framework. Such an approach is required to conceptualize and analyze the complex AIE described in Sect. 12.4.

12.3 Applying Information Ecology

The concept of a data ecosystem can be used as a metaphor and a model. In a col- loquial sense, a metaphor can be defined as “a figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or action to which it is not literally applicable”. Or, a thing regarded as representative or symbolic of something else, especially something abstract. In this chapter, we align closely with the second definition. Metaphors are recognized as a powerful tool for understanding and representing complexity and have been highlighted very publicly for their utility in influencing policy and legal decisions, for example (Simoncelli 2014). Building on prior work in cognitive 274 P. L. Pulsifer et al. linguistics, Parsons and Fox (2013) discuss the use of metaphors as mechanism that create frames or small scripts that lead to cognitive shortcuts. Metaphors can both reveal and mislead depending on how these “shortcuts” are used in context (Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 2008). Parsons and Fox argue that different metaphors have different strengths and weaknesses and that many are needed to contribute to understanding complex problems and systems. While the value of metaphors like “information ecosystem” is recognized, as a conceptual framework, IE is relatively early in its development in terms of in-depth application of concepts and analytical methods. Recently, practical applications are emerging. IE is being used to conceptualize particular information system use cases such as the school, the nation state, social media, and “big data” (Demchenko et al. 2013; Finin et al. 2008; Perrault 2007; Thatcher 2010). These applications are being developed concurrently with further development of the theoretical, epistemological and philosophical underpinnings of IE (Wang and Wang 2017; X. Wang et al. 2017). Of particular relevance to our work is Eddy et al.’s (2014) work on the application of IE to science-policy integration. They propose a multi-level, multi-faceted framework that recognizes the importance of human and technical actors and the complexity of actor interaction in adaptive management of socio-ecological systems. This includes recognition of the need to facilitate information flow through the recognition of whole-part relationships (information is complex and context sensitive), the importance of scale in effective information exchange, and the value of mediation across information domains (i.e. science and policy). Although they do not use a specific case study, Eddy et al. provide specific, pragmatic observations, introspections and recommendations with respect to applying EI to science-policy integration. More specific to the Arctic region that is of interest to the authors, Parsons et al. (2011) argue that a “data ecosystem” metaphor can be used and extended based on their complex, interdisciplinary science data management experiences during the International Polar Year 2007–2009. They identify specific information ecosystem component such as data centers, open data, safe data, data discovery relationships and others. Importantly, they identify the importance of using the “data ecosystem” metaphor at a broader, global scale. Nardi and O’Day (1999) focus on “locality” and the importance of understanding individual information ecologies such as a library or organization, while Parsons et al. (2011) examine global scale research data management and highlight the importance of all scales from local to global. As a foundation for applying IE to the system we call the AIE, the cited literature has been used to establish a preliminary conceptual framework to model information ecosystems that will be further developed in practical terms through the MADE project outlined in Sect. 12.4. Our conceptual framework will be applied and refined over the course of the project. A summary of the model is presented here along with discussion of known questions and challenges that will need to be addressed over the course of the project. Figure 12.1 provides an abstract representation of our preliminary conceptual framework that will be used in the MADE project to build and analyze models of the AIE. The concepts of “Producers”, “Consumers”, and “Decomposers” are 12 Information Ecology to Map the Arctic Information Ecosystem 275

Keystone Species (Hubs)

Info Orga nism

Services Consumers

Producers ﬂows (nutrients) INFORMATION interfaces Bio(diversity)

(energy) flows scale REQUIREMENTS RESOURCES flows flows Cycles Decomposers (transformation) MEDIATORS

Fig. 12.1 A preliminary information ecosystem conceptual model developed to conceptualize the AIE. An initial framing of the AIE has identified a number of ecological constructs. Keystone species (e.g. larger or important data centers) sit at the intersection of many subsystems. Transformers or “mediators” are particularly important as the community continues to strive for increased reuse of data central to IE theory. A variety of different agents in the system produce information resources (e.g. researchers, data centers, communities), while others consume these resources (e.g. researchers, community members, decision makers). These agents function as part of processes such as competition, collaboration, succession, and responses to external disturbances (e.g. “disruptive” technologies). Like ecological ecosystems, we may see primary and secondary consumers through “value added” processes. As the drive to “reuse” information increases, decomposers (transformers or “mediators”) are recognized as critical components that process information resources and introduce synthetic products into the system in different forms (e.g. models, mass audience, earth observing products etc.) (Issarny et al. 2011; Nardi and O’Day 1999; Parsons et al. 2011; Pulsifer and Taylor 2005; Thanos 2014). Some components act as keystone species that communities of practice depend on and, if removed, would dramatically change the nature and function of the system (e.g. unique or large data centers or information projects). Pulsifer and Taylor (2005) and Parsons et al. (2011) argue that mediators often act as keystone species due to the importance of the mediation process in facilitating information flow and reuse. Iansiti and Levien (2004) recognize business leaders in the broader Internet and information and communication technology ecosystem as mediators. Barabási 276 P. L. Pulsifer et al.

(2002) demonstrates that network “hubs” function in the role of mediators and keystone species – removal of these hubs would dramatically change the network. The preliminary conceptual framework presented here identifies key components, relationships and interactions within an information ecosystem and it will be used to document and model the AIE. The framework provides us with a starting point in understanding information ecosystems in general and the AIE in particular. We propose a step-wise approach to using the conceptual framework to create models that can be used to support real world applications. The following steps, implemented in real-world contexts, can help us to critically evaluate the application of IE.

1. Identify information ecosystem components (e.g. data centers, datasets, funders, users) 2. Establish how components interact (e.g. sharing (meta)data, funding projects, exchanging personnel) 3. Model system dynamics (e.g. creation of synthetic products from multiple data centers, project succession, project extinction) 4. Apply understanding to real world applications (e.g. planning data services for an observing system, planning decadal-scale funding, supporting communities in disaster resilience)

Section 12.4 introduces the MADE project that will apply IE and the proposed conceptual framework (Fig. 12.1) to the AIE.

12.4 The Case of the Arctic Information Ecosystem

Parsons et al. (2011) propose the use of IE and an ecosystem metaphor to represent and help understand and manage the polar data (information) ecosystem. This work elaborated on important example components from the International Polar Year (e.g. the IPY DAMOCLES project), to help develop their conceptual framework. Pulsifer et al. (2014) add a discussion of the importance of network science in con- ceptualizing, understanding and influencing the polar data ecosystem, and provided a more comprehensive view (inventory) of system components. In November of 2014, the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC, http:// iasc.info) and the Sustaining Arctic Observing Network (SAON, https://www.arcticobserving.org/) joined to form the Arctic Data Committee (ADC, https://arcticdc. org/). Based on the previously cited research and discussion at their inaugural meeting held in Potsdam, Germany, in November 2014, members of the ADC recognized that the arctic information system provides a highly appropriate case study for application of IE. As discussed in the next section, the Arctic is a complex system that includes many research disciplines working together, Indigenous and non- Indigenous residents, rapidly evolving geo-politics and significant environmental change (IASC (International Arctic Science Committee) 2016; Larsen and Fondahl 2015). Better understanding the ecology of artic information was seen as valuable 12 Information Ecology to Map the Arctic Information Ecosystem 277 in its own right and for informing other domains and regions. The Mapping the Arctic Data Ecosystem project was established. The primary focus at the outset of the project was on the application of IE to the broader AIE including all kinds of data, information and knowledge. However, in recognizing the prominence of data in the system, our focus, at least initially, is on digital data, and the large number of sub-systems that comprise the data system. In June of 2016, the concept of mapping the Arctic data ecosystem was presented by task lead, Peter Pulsifer, at the second meeting of the Pan-Arctic Options Project, led by Professor Paul Berkman (www.panarcticoptions.org). Related concepts were being discussed by the Pan-Arctic Options team and other initiatives under organizations such as the Research Data Alliance have recently emerged. Starting in early 2017, the Arctic Data Committee activity is now being carried out in partnership with and using resources from and under a broader initiative led by the Pan-Arctic Options project in collaboration with other polar and global cyberinfrastructure initiatives.

12.4.1 Complexity and Scale in the Arctic Information Ecosystem

Before discussing the specifics of the AIE it is first useful to understand the context in which data, information, knowledge and wisdom on and of the Arctic are constructed. As previously stated, the Arctic is a complex region and research community. However, it is an interesting case study as it is relatively contained and accessible in terms of engagement with the research and local communities through organizations like IASC, SAON, the Arctic Council and others. Figure 12.2 provides an abstraction of the scales and dimensions of information that can be applied to many geographies and domains, but is particularly relevant to the polar regions and Arctic region in particular (Pulsifer and Arctic Data Committee 2016; Pulsifer and Strawhacker 2017). Figure 12.1 recognizes three key dimensions: (i) space-time; (ii) collaboration; (iii) conceptual. Building on the broader framework used in the Pan-Arctic Options Project (Berkman et al. 2017) this model combines these dimensions such that Projects (PRJ n) can be situated with respect to their particular attributes for each of the dimensions. For example, PRJ 1 on the diagram represents a “big science” project that is international in scope (space-time dimension), inclusive in that it has many participants from different nations and domains working together (collaboration dimension), and holistic through the inclusion of many different topics, disciplines and perspectives in the project (conceptual dimension). In other cases, projects may be more national in scope, have a smaller number and breadth of collaborators, and a more limited conceptual scope (i.e. PRJ 2). Some projects may see an individual investigator working in a single location and focused on a single topic (e.g. a discipline focused graduate student) (i.e. PRJ 3). The model presented in Fig. 12.2 outlines the challenges that the broader Arctic community faces when trying to understand the AIE. The world that we aim to understand is multi-dimensional and operates at many different scales, both in terms 278 P. L. Pulsifer et al.

Fig. 12.2 Multi-dimensional information complexity. The axes presented here are adapted from the definition of holistic under the Pan-Arctic Option project (international, interdisciplinary and inclusive). The vertical axis represents the space-time dimension, the collaborative dimension refers to the number and diversity of people involved in an information generating activity, and the conceptual dimension represents very narrow subject matter framing (e.g. isolated, one discipline or question) to very holistic framing (e.g. inclusive, many disciplines and related questions) of the phenomena being studied and the social constructions (e.g. Arctic communities, research projects) used to study them. The broader community expectation is that an AIE will serve needs and allow information to “flow” across dimensions and scales. If we are to achieve this as a community, an appropriate conceptual framework is needed to help us to better understand the system for the purpose of contributing to informed decision making as well as to influence and guide its development. We say “influence and guide” as we argue here that the system is emergent. Thus, the initial conditions designed and established for the system can play an important role, however interactions between system components (human and non-human) will produce results that are unpredictable and go beyond design intentions or expectations. As we move forward on the MADE project, we hypothesize that the underlying complexity and emergent nature of the broader Arctic system will result in similar characteristics in the AIE. We expect that a highly complex non-linear Arctic system will result in an AIE with similar characteristics.

12.4.2 Preliminary Views of the Arctic Information Ecosystem

Following the general methodology presented in Sect. 12.3 we are first focusing on identifying AIE components. A preliminary interactive, online tool was used to collect data about the AIE. Figure 12.4 captures one view of this “map”. This interactive map below is under active development in collaboration with communities of 12 Information Ecology to Map the Arctic Information Ecosystem 279

Fig. 12.3 An expanded view of parts of the U.S.-specific nodes in the AIE reveals a complex subsystem with many interrelated nodes across departments and agencies practice and other partners. Through this effort, we are learning how complex the system is. Specifically, AIE components exist at multiple scales. Many Arctic relevant data centers, stewardship and policy nodes exist at the global level (i.e. World Meteorological Organization, Group on Earth Observations). These nodes typically act as umbrella organizations that coordinate activities and/or establish broad standards and specifications. Initial examinations of the national level reveal complex national ecosystems. For example, the U.S. Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) comprises a set of seventeen government agencies and departments that have an Arctic dimension and, in many cases, produce or manage data (Fig. 12.3). Although not depicted in Fig. 12.3, further analysis at the department scale reveals a complex sub-system. For example, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration organizes a large set of nodes under the National Centers for Environmental Information. The situation is similar for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Science Foundation (NSF). At a sub-national scale we see many community-based initiatives such as the Exchange for Local Observations and Knowledge of the Arctic (ELOKA, http:// eloka-arctic.org/), a broadly collaborative effort, and the Clyde River Knowledge 280 P. L. Pulsifer et al.

Atlas (https://clyderiveratlas.ca/index.html), a project led by a particular community, to name just two of many local-scale AIE components. By using IE and examining the AIE, we can see real world examples of the complexity in the scale, conceptual and collaborative dimensions as abstractly depicted in Fig. 12.2. Reporting of detailed results is beyond the scope of this chapter. Detailed reporting will be included in future volumes of this series, other publication venues and through the primary project website at https://arcticdc.org/products/ data-ecosystem-map.

12.4.3 Potential Application Areas

IE has potential to serve many applications ranging from understanding specific, local information ecosystems (Nardi and O’Day 1999) to supporting the management of the broader polar data ecosystem (Parsons et al. 2011). In this section we discuss two specific applications. An application very relevant to the MADE project is supporting the implementation of the Sustaining Arctic Observing Network program (Berkman 2015; SAON 2009). The SAON Strategy and implementation plan includes creating a roadmap to a well-integrated Arctic observing system (SAON 2018a). This “road map” recognizes the need for an understanding of existing and emerging technical and human components of the AIE. The MADE project is playing a central role in this SAON implementation activities. Beyond documenting and understanding the AIE in support of SAON goals, using IE can challenge organizations like SAON to think and operate in new ways. Like many organizations of its kind, SAON has developed a strategy (SAON 2018b) and an implementation plan to realize that strategy. This follows the dominant, well- used, rational- classical strategy development approach that involves strategic analysis, documentation of internal resources and value chains, making strategic choices, and then executing the strategy. This approach emerged from the development of business strategy as a discipline in the 1960s and 70s (Ansoff 1965; Chandler 1962; Sloan 1962). Using the broader Information and Communications Technology (ICT) ecosystem as an object of study, Walton (2017, Chap. 1) comprehensively and convincingly argues that the rational, classical strategy is not well suited to dynamic, interconnected, volatile and sometimes unstable, emergent systems like the ICT ecosystem (Downes and Nunes 2013). Our experience and the early results of the MADE project indicate that, not surprisingly, the AIE has many of the characteristics of the ICT ecosystem. It is complex, dynamic and tightly coupled with the ICT ecosystem developments (changes in hardware, software, methods etc.). Thus, using IE as a conceptual framework for understanding and influencing the AIE seems much more appropriate than applying the rational-classical strategy development approach. We will test this hypothesis over time. We suggest that IE principles may also be appropriate for understanding and planning the arctic observing system that the AIE is part of. 12 Information Ecology to Map the Arctic Information Ecosystem 281

Applying IE to the AIE in support of SAON activities falls within the larger scale and scope information ecosystem that Parsons et al. (2011) highlight. As previously stated, smaller scale and scope information ecosystems (e.g. data centers, libraries, application level systems) are part of the larger whole and warrant focused analysis (Nardi and O’Day 1999; Star and Ruhleder 1996). The MADE project will examine the AIE at multiple scales. Initially, the most detailed of these studies will focus on analysis to the disaster resilience sub-system of the AIE. Disaster resilience is an Arctic imperative, as it reflects the ability of northern communities exposed to natural and/or technological hazards to resist, adapt to, and recover from the negative impacts of hazards in a timely and efficient manner (UNISDR 2015). Enhancing disaster resilience requires proactive policies that are based on hazard and risk assessments (Cutter et al. 2015). To be comprehensive and coherent, the assessments can incorporate scientific inferences as well as expertise from non-academic experts, including local and traditional knowledge holders, and disaster management practitioners. Open flow of information between these diverse groups of stakeholders plays a vital role in enhancing disaster resilience. To identify the research produced and implemented in the field of disaster resilience in the Arctic, as well as key stakeholder groups (i.e., components) in the disaster resilience sub-system of the AIE and the information flow (i.e., ties/flows) between them, we will analyze assessments and reports produced by the Arctic Council from its formation in 1996 until present (Table 12.1). The Arctic Council is the leading intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic States and Indigenous and local communities on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the North (Arctic Council Secretariat n.d.). The research will also analyze the corpus through social network analysis (see Sect. 12.5.2) to identify key actors in the disaster resilience sub-system of the AIE and connections between and among them. We will also identify key messages regarding the subject of disaster resilience in the Arctic and make inferences regarding their context. Core to the AIE project, we will also compare how the information flow on the subject of disaster resilience evolved in the past two decades throughout the Arctic region. This analysis will provide a very detailed view of a component information ecosystem of the AIE and will help us to understand local and regional scale structure and function as well as interactions with the whole AIE.

12.5 Future Work and Discussion

This section focuses on future work and a discussion of IE in our project context. At the time of publication, resources have been established to move the MADE project forward. Early results indicate that EI provides a powerful approach for conceptual- izing, modeling and understanding the AIE and using the knowledge constructed for a variety of different applications. To understand and realize the full value of data collected, the next phase of the work will implement a more advanced technical representation model and related tools (Sect. 12.5.1). These tools will be used to 282 P. L. Pulsifer et al. Region Bering- Chukchi- Beaufort region Pan-Arctic Pan-Arctic Barents area; & Norway Russia Pan-Arctic Pan-Arctic Pan-Arctic Pan-Arctic Context Climate change; Arctic as a region Resource exploration Resource exploration Climate change; socioeconomic systems Climate change; cryosphere Climate change; cryosphere Marine protection Arctic economy 9 10 28 21 21 21 Resilience references 266 301 7 3 1 1 1 33 13 12 Disaster references Type Scientific report Scientific assessment Scientific assessment Scientific report Assessment report Assessment report Report for decision- makers Scientific report Year 2017 2007 2007 2017 2011 2017 2015 2017 WG AMAP AMAP AMAP AMAP AMAP AMAP PAME SDWG Finalized corpus of the Arctic Council publications for analysis of AIE components Arctic Council publications for analysis of Finalized corpus of the Publication Adaptation actions for a changing Arctic: Perspectives from the Bering-Chukchi- Beaufort region Assessment 2007: Oil and Gas Arctic – Effects in the Activities 2 Volume and Potential Effects. Assessment 2007: Oil and Gas Arctic – Effects in the Activities I Volume and Potential Effects. Adaptation actions for a changing Arctic: Perspectives from the Barents area Snow, water, ice and permafrost water, Snow, Climate Arctic (SWIPA): in the change and the cryosphere Snow, water, ice and permafrost water, Snow, 2017 Arctic (SWIPA) in the Framework for a Pan-Arctic for a Pan-Arctic Framework of marine protected network areas Economy of the north Table 12.1 Table 12 Information Ecology to Map the Arctic Information Ecosystem 283 apply specific analytical methods (Sect. 12.5.2). In the longer term, these analytical results will be applied to real-world applications (e.g. development of SAON, disaster resilience in the Arctic). The application of IE presents an opportunity to advance understanding beyond simple knowledge of current structure and functioning of the AIE and raises new questions about the potential limits of the IE approach (Sect. 12.5.3).

12.5.1 Technical Representation Model

The initial representation model used for the MADE project simply documented nodes and simple hierarchical relationships (Fig. 12.3). This model was appropriate for Step 1 of the general methodology that we presented in Sect. 12.3 (Identify information ecosystem components). As we move to Step 2 (Establish how components interact) it is clear that a more expressive representation model is needed to document component relationships and interactions. We have developed a “linked open data” model to describe the components (nodes) and relationships (edges) in the system model (Berners-Lee et al. 2001; Heath and Bizer 2011; World Wide Web Consortium 2014). This approach is well suited to representing networks and systems as it uses a “graph” model to store and model data. In this context, a graph is a network of “nodes” linked together by an “edge”. Nodes are concepts (e.g. data center, data user, funder etc.) and edges are relationships that link concepts (e.g. “shares metadata with”, “is funded by”). In creating this representation, wherever possible we are aiming to use existing, mature vocabularies or ontologies that have a significant level of adoption to define concepts and relationships. This provides us with the best chance of achieving interoperability with other projects in the future. It is important to note that many vocabularies or ontologies in use are being developed dynamically and are “living” entities that provide option for review and modification, the use of change management tools, and possibility for creating new terms as needed (e.g. https://bioportal. bioontology.org/ontologies/ENVO). In the case where an appropriate ontology does not exist, we are creating our own and making it available along with documentation so that others can understand our terms and relationships. Table 12.2 provides a list- ing of the various vocabularies and ontologies that have been identified for the project at the time of publication. We see the ontologies in Table 12.2 as a set of “menus” to choose from when building the model. Some are “foundational” as they are being used broadly across many different applications and communities (e.g. Dublin Core). To make the representation model accessible to non-expert users, a dynamic visualization tool was developed (Fig. 12.4). This tool allows a user to view the AIE graph in its entirety or in parts using a query language (SPARQL). For example, Fig. 12.4 presents a query of the AIE graph to only select organization components that were in attendance at the 2018 Polar Data Planning Summit held in Boulder, Colorado in May of 2018 (https://arcticdc.org/meetings/conferences/polar-data- planning-summit). This can help us to understand organizational and social aspects of the AIE. In November of 2018, members of the polar data community convened 284 P. L. Pulsifer et al.

Table 12.2 Preliminary set of vocabularies and ontologies used to model the AIE Research data domain CASRAI research data http://dictionary.casrai.org/Category:Research_Data_Domain domain Data provenance PROV ontology: https://www.w3.org/TR/prov-o/ People and organizations W3C organization ontology https://www.w3.org/TR/vocab-org/ Friend of a friend https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FOAF_(ontology) (foundational) VIVO https://wiki.duraspace.org/display/VTDA/VIVO+Ontology+Cl asses+and+Properties.v1.4.1 Relationships Simple knowledge https://www.w3.org/2004/02/skos/; http://vowl.visualdataweb. organization system (SKOS) org/webvowl/#iri=http://www.w3.org/TR/skos-reference/skos. (essentially provides a model rdf for taxonomies) Data and metadata Metadata: Dublin Core http://dublincore.org/documents/dcmi-terms/ (general); http:// (foundational): dublincore.org/schemas/rdfs/ (ontology version) Geographic Metadata: ISO http://def.seegrid.csiro.au/static/isotc211/iso19115/2003/ 19115 metadata.html Geographic names (place http://www.geonames.org/ontology/documentation.html names): Observations and http://def.seegrid.csiro.au/static/ontology/isotc211/201203/ measurement om/; http://www.semantic-web-journal.net/system/files/ swj890.pdf; http://www.semantic-web-journal.net/system/files/ swj890.pdf to document technical aspects of the AIE (e.g. (meta)data services, sharing protocols, vocabularies etc.)(https://arcticdc.org/meetings/conferences/polar-data-architecture-workshop). At the time of writing, these data are being added to the AIE graph. This addition will allow users to query the system to establish, for example, which data centers are sharing data using the OAI-PMH protocol. The representation model and associated tools will allow the MADE project members to quickly populate the AIE graph database to support querying and visualization. Moreover, the graph database can be used to support many different kinds of analysis.

12.5.2 Analytical Approaches

As a starting point, a number of established analytical approaches will be used to analyze the AIE graph and related information. Preparatory analysis is helping us to understand various aspects of the system (e.g. semantic aspects of content, social connectivity). These results will be used to further develop our current heuristic model of information ecosystems (Fig. 12.1) and to identify additional appropriate modeling and analysis methods and tools. Analytic methods being tested are Content Analysis and Social Network Analysis. 12 Information Ecology to Map the Arctic Information Ecosystem 285

Fig. 12.4 The AIE visualization tool developed through the MADE project allows users to query the AIE graph database. Future versions will include a user-friendly query builder

12.5.3 Content Analysis

Since its origins in the eighteenth century, content analysis has been widely used in an array of disciplines ranging from information and communication sciences to earth sciences and medicine (Titscher et al. 2000, p. 55; White and Marsh 2006). For the purposes of this paper, content analysis is “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts […] to the context of their use” (Krippendorff 2004, p. 18). Content analysis is a highly flexible method that is implemented in qualitative, quantitative, and mix-method frameworks, with a shared central goal of systematically categorizing textual data in order to make sense of it (Forman and Damschroder 2007). Through systematic text coding and 286 P. L. Pulsifer et al. categorizing, content analysis allows us to explore large amounts of textual information with relative ease to determine trends and patterns of words and phrases used, as well as their frequency and relationships (Vaismoradi et al. 2013). The main goal of implementing content analysis in the MADE project is to link the AIE graph model to unstructured data resources that can help us to represent the AIE and better understand it. For example, under the initial phase of the study, we implemented conceptual content analysis to examine the presence of disaster resilience concepts in a series of assessments and reports produced by the working groups of the Arctic Council from its establishment in 1996 until the present. This has allowed us to “map” these concepts and related information resources as part of the AIE model.

12.5.4 Social Network Analysis

Social network analysis allows us to identify, map, and measure structures (e.g., relationships) between connected information entities, such as groups of people, organizations, and projects (Scott and Carrington 2011. p. 3). Implementation of social network analysis has been expanding in the last two decades from the social sciences into natural sciences as well as several applied areas (e.g., management and public health) (Borgatti and Halgin 2011). The wide application of social network analysis is due to its versatility. It can combine quantitative, qualitative, and graphi- cal data, thus allowing for fuller description and more thorough understanding of any web relationships (Borgatti and Halgin 2011). As part of Step 3 (Model system dynamics) of our methodology, in the next phase of the project, we will implement social network analysis to identify and map information flow between the key information components (e.g., research and data centers) and data users (e.g., decision- makers). Specifically, we will reveal structural positions of the nodes in the network, and their capacity and constraints to influence other nodes and control the information flow.

12.6 Discussion

This chapter is a preliminary overview of the application of IE to studying the AIE through the MADE project. Under the conceptual framework of IE, the combination of theory, methods, tools and human resources being developed will provide us with an analytical platform to address key questions about the AIE. For example, how are data being used to inform policy under the Arctic Council system? To what extent are data flows being established between nations? From a data perspective, what are the similarities and differences between the Bering Strait and the Bering Sea regions (relevant in the Pan-Arctic Options project)? We recognize that while there are many possible useful metaphors for conceptu- alizing the Artic information system, there is value in testing the widely used 12 Information Ecology to Map the Arctic Information Ecosystem 287 ecosystem metaphor in this context. The information ecosystem metaphor is widely used within our community. In using the metaphorical approach in meetings, workshops and presentations that engage a wide range of audiences (Pulsifer et al. 2017; Pulsifer and Strawhacker 2017), the authors have found the AIE metaphor to be a powerful tool that helps to initiate discussion and debate and enhance understanding of the complexity of the Arctic data system, and this has value in and of itself. However, the power and the use of IE as a modeling and predictive tool is still being determined. It is currently unclear whether it can be used to precisely theorize the formation of information ecosystems or to predict system trajectories etc.. We must strive to analyze the evolution of the information ecosystem and the driving forces behind it. We must understand how the ecosystem components interact to reach a balanced state or understand ecosystem failure. Understanding ecosystem dynamics, and particularly the role and function of mediators, is critically important if we are to use the results of IE as more than a simple view of an information ecosystem. Steps 3 and 4 in the methodology of the MADE project will be critically important as they will allow us to establish if IE can answer key questions: How do internal dynamics lead to successions in the AIE? How do the entities and the system itself respond to changes in critical conditions such as government support, information demand, available technology, and constraints on international collaboration? What happens when information producers and providers are out- competed, substituted or absorbed by other entities? Is the AIE indeed self- organizing, or is its continued development more likely to be driven by external forcings? What determines the success or failure of individual entities – government support, successful or failing response to information demand or market impulses, or other factors? A critical approach that contributes to our understanding of IE and the ecosystem metaphor is required. As indicated in Sect. 12.2, there are elements of business ecosystem concepts that do not align with ecological ecosystems (Iansiti and Levien 2004). Similarly, we can see that concepts in models of information ecosystems may not align. We suggest (Fig. 12.1) that information mediators align with the concept of decomposers due to their role as transformers and modifiers of information. In ecological ecosystems, decomposers provide functions that are crucial to the continued existence of the system: without them, the system would fail. Information mediators may be seen as a value-added component of an AIE that can continue to function without them. This may be true conceptual misalignment, or we may need to understand more about the role of information mediators. Do mediators play a degenerative role as decomposers do in ecological ecosystems? Or, for example, do mediators, in the form of data rescue agents, decompose masses of accumulated data matter (e.g. dozens or hundreds of duplicated files or meaningless versions in different parts of the system) to create new, more useful information resources? Modeling and understanding the AIE through the MADE project will help us to answer questions about the system itself, but also the full utility and appropriates of using IE to generate useful metaphors and possibly analytical tools. 288 P. L. Pulsifer et al.

12.7 Conclusion

This chapter is a preliminary review of IE and its application to what we call the Arctic Information Ecosystem. This included discussion of conceptual underpinnings of IE, and the appropriateness of IE as a conceptual framework for documenting, modeling and analyzing the AIE. There is considerable potential in IE as a tool to increase our understanding of the Arctic (and other) information ecosystems. Although IE is still maturing as a conceptual framework, we highlight some examples of IE applications and present a conceptual model (Fig. 12.1) being used to conceptualize the AIE. Using our step-wise methodology, we are first identifying the components of the AIE and seeing a large number of system entities across multiple scales. As we move from identifying components to establishing how components interact, we expect to see complex relationships. Personal experience of the authors reveals many connections between and among components and a major contribution of the MADE project will be formalizing and representing these relationships in the AIE graph. The most important contribution going forward will be establishing the utility of EI in analyzing these data to understand and predict the evolution of the AIE (modeling system dynamics), and then influence the driving forces behind it through the application of this knowledge to real world applications (e.g. development of SAON, enhancing disaster resilience). If we are to optimize our use of data and information for governance and other applications, we need to understand data, information, knowledge and wisdom entities (object or embodied) and the flow of these entities across scales and dimensions. To do this we have proposed the application of IE as a conceptual framework for theorizing, documenting, modeling and analyzing the Arctic Information Ecosystem in support of real-world applications. This chapter is a call to action to encourage the “Arctic Community” to consider more deliberate, critical, and theoretically informed approaches to understanding, designing and influencing relevant systems, including but not limited to the AIE. In particular, IE is a tool that is appropriate for developing strategy around complex, dynamic, non-linear systems like the AIE and should be used as an alternative to classical, linear approaches.

Summary of Main Points

• Governance involves processes of interaction, dialogue, negotiation and decisionmaking among many actors. Understanding the values and priorities of diverse actors requires access to the best available sources of data and information. • Information Ecology (IE) is conceptual framework that helps organize ideas and comprehend complexity in a way that is relatively easy to understand and apply. • The metaphor of an information ecosystem can be used to represent the complex, multi-scale Arctic Information Ecosystem which comprises a system of interrelated and interdependent human and technical components and the broader socio-technical environment in which it exists. • Combined with innovative representation models and tools, Information Ecology may be used to analyze the evolution of the Arctic Information Ecosystem and 12 Information Ecology to Map the Arctic Information Ecosystem 289

the driving forces behind it and influence it development to better serve governance and other applications. • The Arctic Community is encouraged to use IE as a more appropriate, holistic conceptual framework to inform strategy development.

Acknowledgements The authors greatly acknowledge the contribution two anonymous review- ers who made constructive and very useful comments on the first draft of this chapter. The engagement of the polar data community in the activities of the Arctic Data Committee and Pan-Arctic Options project is greatly appreciate. We recognize the valuable support of the National Science Foundation through awards 1650228 and 1719540. Brendan Billingsley and Billingsley Custom Software developed the Linked Open Data prototype.

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Julie Raymond-Yakoubian, Peter L. Pulsifer, D. R. Fraser Taylor, Camilla Brattland, and Tero Mustonen

Abstract A variety of mapping work has been done in collaboration with, or in relation to, Indigenous communities and organizations in the Bering Sea, Bering Strait region, and Barents Sea region. We outline Indigenous concerns related to mapping and make recommendations about future mapping work that would further empower Indigenous communities. Additional mapping work led by and done in collaboration with Indigenous communities, and focused on equity, capacity building, and appropriate methods is needed. A recognition of the value of Indigenous and Traditional Knowledge, including spatial information, will contribute to more effective and informed decision making.

J. Raymond-Yakoubian (*) Social Science Program, Kawerak, Inc., Nome, AK, USA e-mail: [email protected] P. L. Pulsifer National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA D. R. F. Taylor Geomatics and Cartographic Research Centre, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada C. Brattland Institute of Social Sciences, UiT, The Arctic University, Tromsø, Norway T. Mustonen Snowchange Cooperative, Anchorage, AK, USA

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 293 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_13 294 J. Raymond-Yakoubian et al.

13.1 Introduction

This chapter is a discussion of mapping work that has been done previously in the Arctic which has been carried out by, and in collaboration with, or which has been related to Indigenous communities and organizations. We outline Indigenous concerns related to mapping and make recommendations about future mapping work that would further empower Indigenous communities. The geographic scope of this chapter is limited to the Bering Sea, Bering Strait, and Barents Sea regions of the Arctic. The chapter reviews existing mapping of Indigenous use and Traditional Knowledge both with and without Indigenous participation. The mapping work we discuss here has been recognized by a variety of different names such as Indigenous mapping, subsistence mapping, cybercartography, Traditional Knowledge mapping, and others. Much, though not all, of the work we describe below has been conducted in close collaboration with Indigenous people and different approaches and methods were used in each mapping study. Mapping, in the context of this chapter, can be thought of as the creation of maps, which are graphic symbolic representations of the significant features of a part of the surface of the Earth. They are not simply a paper or digital artifact, however, but are cognitive constructions or ‘mental maps’ that include not only geographic features, but also wayfinding methods and environmental dynamics (e.g. winds, currents, animal migration paths) interacting with physical features, animals, and humans. The mapping work described here has documented various information and concepts. Some map-creators have documented Traditional Knowledge, others Indigenous Knowledge, and others yet have used different terms and concepts. It is important for mapping teams to clearly define what it is they believe they are mapping so that the appropriate methodologies are used and the appropriate people collaborate. Kawerak, for example, uses the concepts of “Traditional Knowledge” and “Indigenous Knowledge” to describe two different bodies of knowledge. Some Tribes and organizations prefer to use their own definitions or ones developed in international contexts, such as the Ottawa Traditional Knowledge Principles definition (Arctic Council 2016) and others (e.g. UN IASG 2014). Therefore it is important to have clear definitions when conducting mapping work so that others understand what has been done. While no widely accepted definition of “co- production of knowledge” exists in the social sciences, we would argue that mapping work that involves Indigenous people or their knowledge should be entirely Indigenous-led and produced or co-produced with researchers (especially social scientists) and Indigenous people. Characteristics of co-production that the authors believe are necessary in mapping work are discussed further below. Indigenous mapping and wayfinding have been part of Indigenous ways of life since time immemorial. One line of interest in this topic in the Western academic world started more than a half century ago with research interest in Indigenous environmental knowledge (see e.g. Irving and Paneak 1954), followed later by specific interest in Inuit mapping (Spink and Moodie 1972) and the cognitive aspect 13 Mapping and Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic 295 of Indigenous spatial ontologies (Levinson 2003). However, in the Bay of Finland on the Baltic Sea, Sakari Pälsi had already documented the sea ice and seal hunting trips of the Suursaari sealers in the 1920s (Pälsi 1924). These maps can be seen as pre-cursors to modern-day boreal and Arctic Traditional Knowledge mapping work in Eurasia. In addition to these externally-driven examinations, there has been considerable recent work in the way of Indigenous-driven mapping work put to various purposes. This includes significant applications related to land use and occupancy. For example, Terry Tobias’s “Chief Kerry’s Moose” (Tobias 2000) and “Living Proof” (Tobias 2009), and seminal works that have underpinned land claim agreements in Canada, such as the Inuit Land Use and Occupancy Project and “Our Footprints are Everywhere” (Freeman 1976, Brice-Bennett and Cooke 1977). Other work has focused on the use of new technologies such as GIP (Geomatic Information Processing) and GIS (Geographic Information Systems) for capacity building in communities (Goes in Center 2001). Related to this are ongoing initiatives such as the Aboriginal Mapping Network (http://nativemaps.org/) and the Tribal GIS initiative (https://www.tribalgis.com/). In the Nordic context, it must be emphasised that Saami-produced maps have been created much as a counter to or in conjunction with existing mapping work undertaken by various Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish state authorities, and as part of legal processes aimed at settling land and resource rights at the national scale. Two important factors are the larger presence of state institutions in the Fennoscandian region (relative to other parts of the Arctic), and the stronger role of the state at community levels, including Saami communities, as part of the Nordic social democratic governance model (see Sect. 13.2.3 for details). The Arctic region is seeing a significant increase in Indigenous mapping and knowledge documentation activities. Of special relevance for Arctic marine governance are Arctic Council activities in the field of community-based monitoring (CBM), such as the Sustaining Arctic Observing Network (SAON) which collects and reviews CBM projects in the Arctic (Johnson et al. 2016). A special issue of the journal Polar Geography (Pulsifer et al. 2014) provides an overview of a series of projects including one by Yup’ik communities in the Lower Kuskokwim region of Alaska which developed an online atlas (Fienup-Riordan 2014), the use of spatially referenced photography in Canada (Bennett and Lantz 2014), and community-based monitoring projects in Alaska (Eicken et al. 2014) and Greenland (Danielsen et al. 2014). Mapping of Traditional or Indigenous Knowledges is valuable for a variety of potential uses. These uses include cultural preservation of knowledge in spatial formats, education (within Indigenous communities and for society at large), sharing environmental knowledge (e.g. place names, physical characteristics of the environment), connecting knowledge systems, for its utility in supporting land use and occupancy for land claims, in other types of policy and governance, increasing capacity, and building sovereignty, among other possible uses. 296 J. Raymond-Yakoubian et al.

13.2 Previous Mapping Work in the Study Area

Traditional Knowledge documentation work throughout the study area has been ongoing for many years, though only some of this work has included mapping. Below we review some of the mapping efforts focused on coastal and marine areas that have been conducted in our geographic area of focus. This section does not aim to be comprehensive, but rather highlights some of the publications and products from widely used mapping projects, many of which the authors are actively involved in. All of the authors of this chapter have worked with Indigenous communities on mapping projects and topics related to mapping. Here, we collectively share our experiences collaborating and co-producing maps with Indigenous people and review other related mapping work. Julie Raymond-Yakoubian is an anthropologist and the Social Science Program Director for Kawerak, Inc., the non-profit Alaska Native Tribal consortium for the 20 Tribes of the Bering Strait Region of Alaska. She has been collaborating with Tribes in the region for over 12 years. Peter Pulsifer is the lead of the Exchange for Local Observations and Knowledge of the Arctic (ELOKA) and has been working in partnership with Indigenous communities over a period of 20 years. Fraser Taylor directs the Geomatics and Cartographic Research Centre at Carleton University in Ottawa. The Centre has been producing innovative atlases in cooperation with northern communities and organizations for over 15 years. Camilla Brattland is an associate professor at the Institute for Social Sciences, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway. She is a coastal Saami and works on mapping of Saami marine usage and participation in resource governance. Tero Mustonen is a Finnish researcher and advocate and he collaborates with Indigenous communities across the Arctic. He is the director of the Snowchange Cooperative. We are not writing on behalf of any particular Indigenous Tribe, community or individual, unless otherwise noted.

13.2.1 Bering Sea and Bering Strait Region

Some of the largest mapping projects in the Bering Strait region that involve Indigenous people and their knowledge have been carried out by Indigenous organizations. For example, nine Tribes from the Bering Strait collaborated with Kawerak to co-produce maps and to document non-spatial Traditional Knowledge of ice seals, walruses, sea ice, and other topics (Kawerak 2013a, b, c, Gadamus 2013). The information from this work was also later incorporated into two larger documents that included additional spatial information from scientific work in the biological and physical sciences. Kawerak and Oceana collaborated to create the Bering Strait Marine Life and Subsistence Use Data Synthesis (Oceana and Kawerak 2014) which included both spatial and narrative information from Traditional Knowledge holders in the region. More recently, Kawerak has shared spatial data with Audubon Alaska for their Ecological Atlas of the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas (Smith et al. 2017) (see Fig. 13.1). An explicit goal of this mapping work has 13 Mapping and Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic 297

Fig. 13.1 Map produced through a collaboration between Bering Strait Tribes, Kawerak and Audubon Alaska that shows ringed seal locations during winter. (See Smith et al. 2017 for a description of concentrations) been to have maps and associated information available to resource managers and policy-makers, and for them to be used and interpreted in consultation with the Indigenous communities whose knowledge they contain. Kawerak has also collaborated with Bering Strait Tribes to co-produce maps and document Traditional Knowledge about various fish species (Raymond-Yakoubian 2013) and ocean currents (Raymond-Yakoubian et al. 2014). Kawerak’s mapping methods have been described by Gadamus and Raymond-Yakoubian (2015) and include a co-production approach where Tribal Councils, community members, and research collaborators are involved at all steps of the research process from helping to define research questions to determining what products to produce, to distributing and using the products, and data management and sharing. Kawerak’s methods require mapping projects to be appropriately funded and typically take several years to complete in order to incorporate extensive Tribal and participant direction and feedback. Data sharing from completed projects requires significant investment of funds and time to ensure it is done properly. Kawerak has maintained copyright ownership and management of data documented during collaborative projects. This is primarily an issue of capacity; most region Tribes do not have the infrastructure or staff available to maintain spatial data indefinitely, while Kawerak has an on-site archive, a cultural center, and social science staff who are able to maintain the data and consult with Tribes regarding any new uses of data, negotiate requests for data, and facilitate individual and Tribal review of any new products or uses. 298 J. Raymond-Yakoubian et al.

Kawerak and collaborating Tribes typically have several goals in mind when embarking on mapping efforts. These goals include cultural heritage (e.g. documenting information for future generations of Tribal members), policy and management applications (e.g. documenting information so that it can be utilized in decision-making or to advocate for particular policy or management outcomes), and education (e.g. using documented information to educate youth in the region, or to educate scientists, mangers, policymakers and legislators about Indigenous ways of life and knowledge). Individual projects often have other project-specific goals. For example, a project documenting ocean currents had as an additional goal the documenting of ocean current information so that it could be used in oil and hazardous material spill response activities (e.g. predicting where spilled materials would travel) (Raymond-Yakoubian et al. 2014). While not an Indigenous organization, the Northwest Arctic Borough in Alaska conducted a large subsistence mapping project (Iñuuiałiqput Iḷiḷugu Nunaŋŋuanun) that resulted in a map atlas with information from seven Indigenous communities (NWAB 2016). The stated purpose of the study was to accurately show where people hunt, fish and gather and where animals can be found, and that such information be used to protect the area (ibid.). The maps and associated spatial information files are held and maintained by the Borough, rather than a Tribal government or organization. Some of the other mapping work conducted in the Bering Strait region includes mapping of beluga whales in the eastern Chukchi and northern Bering Seas (Huntington et al. 1999; Mymrin et al. 1999), mapping of “calorie-sheds” (Huntington et al. 2013), walruses and ice seals (Huntington and Quakenbush 2013; Huntington et al. 2015a, b, 2016a, b), polar bears (Kalxdorff 1997, Voorhees and Sparks 2012), and various marine mammals (BSEAG 2011; Huntington et al. 2013, 2016c). Some of this work has also included mapping activities with Indigenous Peoples in Chukotka in the Russian Federation (e.g. Mymrin et al. 1999; Kochnev et al. 2003, Bogoslovskaya and Krupnik 2013; Raymond-Yakoubian et al. 2014). Additional projects in the Bering Sea region have also been carried out by Tribal organizations and others. The Yup’ik Environmental Knowledge Project, described by Fienup-Riordan (2014), has evolved significantly since that publication. While its focus is inland of coastal areas, this project is being driven by the communities involved based on decades of work documenting place names and culture in book format (e.g. Fienup-Riordan and Reardon 2012), and is now moving to an interactive, online approach that will include Yup’ik curriculum (Pers. Comm. Gayle Miller, Lower Kuskokwim School District). This includes documentation of traditional stories using digital audio and video as well as focused historical studies on the Time of Warring, for example. See Fig. 13.2. Another relevant example is work by the Bering Sea Elders Group (2011) through a publication entitled The Northern Bering Sea: Our Way of Life, many of the maps from which are being made available online (http://eloka-arctic.org/communities/elders/advisory-group). The Yup’ik Environmental Knowledge Project (YEKP) and others have spawned the development of separate projects in a number of communities. The Atlas of the Alaska Native Place Names (ANPN) Project was partly inspired by the YEKP and 13 Mapping and Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic 299

Fig. 13.2 The Yup’ik Environmental Knowledge Project Atlas uses a digital platform (Nunaliit) that brings almost a decade of community effort in place name and environmental documentation to the Web. The knowledge was first shared through books. Both formats serve important roles in the community is built on the Nunaliit platform, developed in Canada (see below). Co-led by a number of partner communities, the Alaska Native Language Center, University of Hawaii at Manoa, and ELOKA, the places mapped in this project are primarily inland, however the team is starting to see dialogue between coastal projects and inland initiatives as many of the drivers for mapping activities are the same: passing on knowledge in new ways; maintaining strong usage of Indigenous languages; supporting land-based activities; cultural enrichment; and many others. The Atlas of the Alaska Native Place Names Project is compiling a comprehensive record of the Indigenous place names of Alaska, across all of Alaska’s 20 Indigenous languages. To achieve this the project draws on historical sources and collaborations with Traditional Knowledge holders. Historical sources include both early maps compiled by explorers and geographers; and language documentation records housed at the Alaska Native Language Archive (http://www.uaf.edu/anla/). The archival record spans more than two centuries, though much of the work was conducted in the past four decades at the Alaska Native Language Center (ANLC) (http://www.uaf.edu/anlc/) by scholars including James Kari, Eliza Jones, Irene Reed, Jeff Leer, and others. ANPN consolidates this information, providing links to supporting information including maps, photographs, texts, and recordings. A major innovation of the project is that Indigenous communities that speak different languages (e.g. Gwich’in, Deg Xinag) are now engaging as partners in the process of making the mapping and archival data and information available on their terms (http://qa.degxinag.apps.nsidc.org/index.html). Similarly, the Koyukuk River Traditional Place Names Atlas (http://staging. koyukuk.apps.nsidc.org/index.html) project is working with elders, important keep- ers of both language and traditional subsistence use areas, to map and record their place knowledge. This project is working to co-produce representations of that 300 J. Raymond-Yakoubian et al. knowledge. Koyukon Athabascan peoples live along the Koyukuk River in northwestern Alaska and recent changes in climate, technology, resource availability and life ways have significantly impacted land use patterns in the region as well as use of the Denaakk’e (Koyukon) language. At present the Koyukon population totals about 2300 and of these about 150, the youngest in their fifties, still speak the language. The Yukon-Kuskokwim Collaborative Community Atlas (http://staging.snowy. apps.nsidc.org/index.html) is being developed in response to a request from the Chevak Traditional Council to document and represent Indigenous knowledge and Western scientific knowledge. Based on the Strategic Needs of Water on the Yukon (SNOWY) pilot project, it is an interdisciplinary community-based research project that attempts to understand and map historical and current environmental conditions within the Lower Yukon River Basin (LYRB) and Yukon-Kuskokwim (YK) Delta, Alaska. The Yukon-Kuskokwim Collaborative Community Atlas is being developed with private and public features, allowing for community-driven decisions on what information and knowledge should be made available to their community members, and what information and knowledge can be made public.

13.2.2 Canada

In February 2018 Margaret Pearce of the University of Maine released her major compilation of Indigenous place name studies in Canada (2017). This impressive map includes information on all of the major studies on place names completed by Indigenous groups in the Canadian Arctic. Taylor and Lauriault (2014) give a description of the substantive mapping work being done by Indigenous communities in Canada’s north using the Nunaliit Cybercartographic Atlas Framework (Hayes et al. 2014). Nunaliit means “community” in the Inuktitut language, and the name reflects the major strength of this data management platform which is to empower Indigenous people to create and control their own mapping. The framework has been specifically designed to facilitate direct community control and input in a way which sets it apart from other mapping approaches. Examples include the Kitikmeot Place Names Atlas (Keith et al. 2014), the Gwitch’in Atlas (Aporta et al. 2014), and the Inuit (SIKU) Sea Ice Atlas (Ljubicic et al. 2014). In recent years, Sahtu communities and the community of Clyde River in northern Canada have also begun mapping using the Nunaliit framework. The Kitikmeot Heritage Society has also released a Pilot Atlas of the Fifth Thule Expedition (https://thuleatlas.org/ index.html) which records, from an Inuit perspective, the historic journey of the Danish explorer Knud Rasmussen across Canada, Alaska, and the Bering Strait. This includes the digital repatriation of many of the artifacts of that expedition held in the National Museum of Denmark. The Geomatics and Cartographic Research Centre at Carleton University has also released the Pan Inuit Trails Atlas in 2016 (http://paninuittrails.org/index.html) showing the extensive historical extent of Inuit travel in the Arctic over hundreds of years. 13 Mapping and Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic 301

The “Sea Ice in the Belcher Islands, Nunavut, Canada” project documents the knowledge and observations of sea ice conditions around the Belcher Islands gathered from the experience of community hunters gained through many hunting expeditions (Pulsifer et al. 2012). On the request of the community, maps were produced in paper form and then made available as digital files on the project web site (i.e. http://eloka-arctic.org/maps/communities/sanikiluaq/sanikiluaq_map_kattuk. html). Additionally, the maps produced were combine with MODIS satellite imagery to compare different types of observing data (Indigenous and Remote Sensing) (http://eloka-arctic.org/maps/communities/sanikiluaq/modis_map_ippak.html). This comparison revealed that what may appear to be sea ice on a remote sensing image, is not necessarily safe for use by communities. This highlights the unique contributions made by Indigenous people and mapping techniques in understanding the environment and environmental change.

13.2.3 Barents Sea Area

The Barents Sea Area includes coastal parts of Saami settlements, stretching from Nordland County in Norway along the northern Norwegian coastline, towards the Kola Saami coast, and also includes Saami communities on large rivers and lakes (in northern Finland). Saami communities in the coastal areas1 are generally small and dispersed, and they vary in size, population numbers, and ethnic and administrative composition, from the small Lule Saami community of Musken in Tysfjord, Nordland with under 100 inhabitants, to the municipality of Nesseby in Finnmark with around 900 inhabitants. A growing number of Saami are settled in urban centres like Alta, Tromsø, and Vadsø. Some of the earliest maps of Saami territories in the Barents Sea area were of languages and the ethnic composition of households in northern Norway from 1860 to 1890 by the ethnographer Jens Andreas Friis (e.g. Friis 1861). Other mapping of traditional Saami land use includes Vorren’s work on the seasonal migrations of Saami between traditional resource use areas (siidas) in Fennoscandia and the Kola Peninsula (Vorren 1980; see also Hansen and Olsen 2014) and work documenting the seasonal migrations of coastal Saami in the Varanger area (Nilsen 1991). The first modern-day map of the entire Saami homeland (Sápmi), utilizing only Saami place names, was made in 1975 by the Saami artist Hans-Ragnar Mathisen. The map was hand-drawn, making a political statement and being a piece of art at the same time (see Fig. 13.3). The artist has since continued to produce beautiful and geographically accurate maps of Saami regions including only Saami place names, which are sold as prints and have become both cultural statements and popular art works in many homes. Mathisen also produced a Saami Atlas showing siidas (resource areas for families), sacred places, and the location of Saami communities

1 In Norway some municipalities are part of the Saami language management area, meaning that Saami is used by the authorities as an administrative language alongside with Norwegian. 302 J. Raymond-Yakoubian et al.

Fig. 13.3 Map with Saami place names of the Saami territory. “Sábme 1975”. ©Keviselie/Hans Ragnar Mathisen. Printed with permission from the artist and reindeer herding areas on maps, which is frequently used as teaching material in schools (Mathisen 1996). Current mapping of Saami land and water use in Norway and Sweden is driven by management authorities or is done as part of research projects in collaboration with reindeer herders and fishers (Sandström et al. 2003; Brattland 2013), as well as in relation to ongoing legal processes such as the settling of land ownership and rights issues in northern Norway (NOU 2007:13a, b:14; NOU 1997:4; NOU 2001:34). In Finland some of the first mapping of traditional land use was done in the early 1900s as an ethnographic exercise, but the Saami have not been involved as participants or full partners in this work. The only contemporary, geographically systematic, and methodologically sound Saami land use mapping effort is the 1999– 2011 work with the Eastern Saami Atlas (Mustonen and Mustonen 2013) for the Skolt Saami and, between 2013–2018, documentation of modern land use in the Näätämö/Neiden watershed. Additionally, the seasonal migrations of the Inari Saami in the 1900s have been documented as a part of the “Varristallam” work in the 1990s. This work resulted in a report that contained the past migration cycles of the Inari Saami around Lake Inari (Jefremoff 2001). The Inari Saami had a very 13 Mapping and Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic 303 special seasonal cycle that was closely associated with Lake Inari and, whilst it in some ways resembled the Skolt Saami siida system, it was a totally unique Saami migratory pattern. In 2016–2017 significant progress on documenting place names was made through Samuli Aikio’s work on North Saami place names and by Ilmari Mattus’s work with Inari Saami place names (Mattus 2015). In Norway, mapping of Saami place names is undertaken by the Norwegian Map Authority (as part of its mandate under the Place Name Act of 1978). Saami cultural heritage is mapped and managed by the Saami Parliament and cultural heritage authorities (under the Cultural Heritage Act of 1977), and reindeer herders’ land use is mapped and managed by the Reindeer Husbandry Administration in collaboration with the herders. Outside of these public maps, there are various efforts to spatially document Saami place names and cultural heritage, with associated Traditional Knowledge, conducted by museums, as part of research projects (e.g. Barlindhaug 2013; Barlindhaug and Corbett 2014; Brattland 2012), and by Saami organisations and local cultural centres; some have developed online atlases (e.g. Andersen and Persen 2011). Compared to other Arctic regions there is a lack of maps of Saami use and documentation of Traditional Knowledge of the environment, aside from reindeer herding. Mustonen and Mustonen (2013) and Mustonen and Feodoroff (2013) published work from Saami-led mapping of traditional land use, climate change impacts, environmental change, and salmon issues from the eastern seaboard of Kola Peninsula to Iijarvi Lake in the Näätämö watershed in Finland. These efforts between 1999 and 2018 are the first of their kind in Russian and Finnish Saami areas, where the Saami have been involved as co-researchers and co-authors in all aspects of the mapping process. The marine and coastal land use maps of the Kola Peninsula are the first of their kind for the region. For the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea, mapping of coastal and fjord waters has recently received attention due to ongoing coastal Saami marine rights investigations in Norway (see Brattland 2010 for details). The question of Saami rights to land in the northernmost County of Finnmark was mostly settled through the 2005 Finnmark Act which transferred state ownership of the County’s land to the inhabitants of Finnmark. The land is currently gov- erned by the Finnmark Estate, whose board members represent both the Saami Parliament (the Saami peoples’ representative body) and the Finnmark County Council (the Norwegian regional government). Historic Saami rights to fishing and to marine areas off the coast of Finnmark is, however, still an unresolved issue. The Coastal Fishing Commission (NOU 2008:5) proposed an Act that would recognise the historical right to fish based on use of the waters along the Finnmark coast from time immemorial by Saami and Norwegians. The Norwegian Parliament (the Storting) did not support the proposal when it was adjudicated in 2011. Small-scale fishers in areas inhabited by Saami people were, however, granted an extra fishing quota, and the possibility of individual and/or collective rights to sea areas was acknowledged. Mapping of individual or collective territorial rights to sea areas is therefore still ongoing and claims of ownership to fishing areas or stretches of sea can be raised to the Finnmark Commission under the Finnmark Act (2005, as a result of a revision after the 2011 Storting decision). 304 J. Raymond-Yakoubian et al.

Brattland (2010) has drawn attention to both government-led and Indigenous mapping of traditional and commercial coastal Saami marine use along the northern Norwegian coastline. Following a conflict between small-scale fishers and British trawlers in the Varanger fjord area in the late 1940s, the Norwegian government commissioned maps of the extent of Norwegian (as well as Saami fishers’) use of the Norwegian coastline as evidence in the 1952 Fisheries Case that was presented in the International Court of Law at the Hague. The mapping mainly concentrated on the outer coastal areas and concluded that fishers from the region had fished far out to sea on fishing banks named with Norwegian toponyms from “time immemorial”. The evidence was taken into account by the court and British trawlers were denied the right to fish inside delineated “fjord lines” along the Norwegian coast. Beginning in the late 1800s the Norwegian Map Authority began including both Norwegian and Saami marine toponyms in sea charts covering inshore and fjord areas, including most of the Saami marine toponyms collected by the Lappologist Just Qvigstad (1938). As a result of revisions to the Norwegian Place Name Act (1990) Saami toponyms are also registered in the Norwegian central place name database including most but not all Saami marine toponyms. Many Saami place names can be viewed in the Norwegian Map Authority’s online map database for all of Norway. Brattland and Nilsen (2011), in collaboration with the Coastal Saami Resource Centre in Porsanger, mapped Saami marine toponyms for the Porsanger fjord area (with a number of small Saami settlements), using both historical and current oral sources as well as the central place name database. They found that a majority of the approximately 80 marine feature names (toponyms), such as names for fishing grounds and topographical features, were in active use among locals in the Saami language or they originated from Saami language and had been modified through Norwegian language interaction. The Coastal Saami Resource Centre (a private Saami organisation) had already collected Saami language place names and feature names for the larger Porsanger area, and published the names in their own digital online database “Meron” (www.meron.no). The word means “sea” in Saami language and reflects the particular coastal Saami history and identity of the northern Norwegian coastal population. This Indigenous-led mapping effort has since been expanded to include other fjord areas and has resulted in a restricted access database of Saami place and feature names and traditional and local ecological knowledge. A number of other scholarly studies have also been conducted by graduate students, other researchers, or as part of local museum heritage work to collect Saami place names, including marine feature names (toponyms), and Saami marine use practices and oral traditions. Documentation and mapping of Saami cultural heritage, place names, and knowledge is a popular activity for many local history and cultural organizations and museums, as well as the subject of a number of research projects (e.g. Brattland 2010; Barlindhaug 2013). Bjørklund (1993) mapped the fishing grounds, landmarks, and marine feature names used by residents of the island of Skorpa in the Kvænangen fjord, and Brattland and Eythórsson (2016) recently mapped the Spildra/Spittá small-scale fishers’ use of fishing and cod spawning grounds in the same area in an effort to visualise impacts of aquaculture development on traditional small-scale fisheries (see Fig. 13.4). 13 Mapping and Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic 305

Fig. 13.4 Illustration of impacts of aquaculture development on small-scale fisheries in the Kvænangen fjord, northern Norway 306 J. Raymond-Yakoubian et al.

Notable mapping work is conducted as part of the Finnmark Commission’s work on settling land rights claims in Finnmark where local and Saami land use is being mapped with the participation of local residents in both Saami and Norwegian (Thuestad et al. 2016). All of this work is publically available on the Finnmark Commission’s website. Building on this and a long tradition of archaeological and historical research in Finnmark, Barlindhaug and Pedersen recently issued a cultural history of the Deanodat (Western Tana area) over the last 12,000 years with numerous and detailed maps of archaeological sites and traditional use and knowledge of the Deanodat landscape in both Saami and Norwegian (Barlindhaug and Pedersen 2018). Nilsen (2010), based on the work of Johan Albert Kalstad, mapped Saami marine place names and land marks for the Varanger fjord in collaboration with the Tromsø Museum and others. The maps are based on Saami oral traditions for locating fishing areas at sea using named features on land, and shows extensive and long-term traditional Saami marine use of the Varanger fjord area (Nilsen 2010). Brattland (2013) also mapped small-scale fishers’ use of Gáivuotna/Kåfjord and their knowledge of migration routes and spawning grounds for cod, as well as the changing spatial patterns of commercial and traditional marine use of the Porsanger fjord (Brattland 2012). The mapping work was conducted as part of Brattland’s doctoral thesis “Making Saami Seascapes Matter” (2012), which attempted to formulate a methodological framework for Saami marine use mapping for the future. Notable government-led mapping of marine use, which also includes Saami fishers’ use of the Norwegian Barents Sea, is the Norwegian Fisheries’ Directorate’s marine resource mapping of fishing areas and spawning grounds for fish species based on fishers’ knowledge (described in Brattland 2013). Apart from the Norwegian Map Authority’s central place name database, these maps are not currently part of any authorized database where Saami terminology and knowledge is collected and made accessible to the public.

13.3 The Values of Indigenous Mapping Work

As noted above, maps can serve a variety of purposes, both intended and unintended. Indigenous communities have many motivations for documenting their knowledge in the form of maps. These motivations can range from a desire to document their knowledge of salmon harvest areas to use in cultural preservation efforts, for example, to mapping with specific policy or management goal in mind, such as mapping salmon spawning areas to focus habitat restoration efforts. The intended audience of community-produced maps may be limited to their own community members, or they may be intended for as wide an audience as possible. Many of the mapping projects we discuss in this chapter were not intended as ‘wayfinding devices’ (e.g. Woodward and Lewis 1998; Taylor 2014:8), but rather as ways to visualize Indigenous presence and knowledge. Benefits to Indigenous communities from producing or co-producing maps often align with the motivations for creating them. Cultural preservation and 13 Mapping and Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic 307 revitalization work can benefit from having access to map-based knowledge. Efforts by Indigenous people to preserve, maintain, or regain access to particular geographic areas benefit by having occupancy and use spatially documented (e.g. Freeman 1976). Struggles to increase understanding of Indigenous people, their lands and waters, and their connections to those places may also benefit from the availability of maps to help illustrate these concepts and preserve and prioritize Indigenous voice and perspectives (e.g. Taylor 2014, Gadamus and Raymond- Yakoubian 2015). A major advantage of Indigenous communities mapping their own knowledge is that it empowers the community to express and distribute knowledge that they consider important to their ongoing well-being and the sustainability of their way of life in the light of rapidly changing environmental conditions. If mapping projects are not predicated on Indigenous community concerns and questions, they will be of less value and utility (to everyone, not just the communities). Many rural, Indigenous communities are on the front lines of change and decision-makers, who are often not from these communities and live very far from them, must carefully consider information that comes from Indigenous communities in making policies (whether that be spatial information in the form of maps, or other types of information). If the policies do not fully take into account on-the-ground realities and needs, they can do more harm than good. Having maps readily available to use for engaging in policy and resource management decision making has been considered by many Indigenous communities (e.g. Gadamus and Raymond-Yakoubian 2015) as an important motivation for mapping work. Community-generated maps that can be used by Indigenous people to advocate for their goals and needs have the benefit (from the Indigenous perspective) of requiring the involvement of Indigenous people to use and understand them. Maps that are produced by management authorities or other agencies with the participation of Indigenous peoples, or based on information provided by Indigenous groups, may also be effective tools for engaging in policy and decision making, and may serve to reduce impacts on Indigenous resource use if such maps become part of governmental planning processes. Having Indigenous people produce knowledge in the form of maps, determine what information they think is most important, present their maps in policy and governance processes, be equally involved in explaining and interpreting it, and have the authority to recommend and carry out policy or management actions resulting from it, are highly empowering actions that are likely to improve outcomes for Indigenous communities and broader society.

13.4 Indigenous Concerns Related to Mapping

Even while many Indigenous communities have embraced mapping of their knowledge, a variety of concerns surrounding the act and consequences of mapping remain. These concerns range from issues of intellectual property rights, to the simplification of knowledge when presented in a visual/spatial form, to interpretation of maps and visualizations by non-Indigenous people, to the ‘interoperability’ of 308 J. Raymond-Yakoubian et al. different spatial data sets, and a host of other methodological, practical, and philosophical concerns. Below we explore some of these concerns and potential ways to address them. Mapping methods that will accurately convey the knowledge being documented and which are derived from or compliment Indigenous methodologies are required for effective mapping. Some communities may prefer to have mapping occur in one-on-one settings with experts, some may prefer group-based mapping, some may prefer mapping on paper maps with digitization happening later, and others may prefer initial documentation to happen digitally. Indigenous mapping or other forms of documentation are not simply technical or “data management” activities. These activities are imbued with social relationships, political dimensions, cultural knowledge and protocols, and other considerations. When designing mapping programs or projects, we must consider not only the technical but also the highly nuanced context in which such work will take place (e.g. Agrawal 2002; Usher 2003; Pulsifer et al. 2014, Gadamus and Raymond-Yakoubian 2015). Indigenous communities (and others) have consistently expressed concern about the representational capacity of maps and the inevitable loss of complexity that occurs when knowledge moves from people to static maps (and even maps that are regularly updated) (e.g. Fox 2002; Wainwright and Bryan 2009; Tayler 2014:7, Gadamus and Raymond-Yakoubian 2015). In the Arctic, this includes the very real concern that maps and other information shared by Indigenous communities could be used against them (Gadamus and Raymond-Yakoubian 2015, Raymond- Yakoubian and Raymond-Yakoubian 2017). There are various ways to work towards addressing these concerns but the most important may be guaranteeing (legisla- tively and through other methods) that Indigenous people are treated equitably in funding, research, policy, management, and other realms. This will ensure that Indigenous people are always ‘at the table’ and can actively and effectively participate in processes that impact their communities. Once information has been documented and maps have been produced, a persistent concern remains about where data will be stored and how it will be managed and accessed. All of the collaborative mapping projects that we are aware of had, as one of their goals, preservation of knowledge for future generations. This necessarily entails long term data storage which some Indigenous communities and organizations may not currently have the capacity for. Regardless of where data is stored, it is critical to have respectful and culturally appropriate data management measures in place (e.g. Pulsifer et al. 2011). In addition to the technical challenges of making Indigenous forms of knowledge interoperable with western scientific knowledge (or other knowledge systems), there are legal and ethical issues involved. These include “ownership” of knowledge and intellectual property. Under Canadian copyright law, Indigenous knowledge is not necessarily currently protected. This means that the copyright of any maps produced lies with the organizations producing the maps, not the communities involved (Scassa and Taylor 2017). Communities producing maps with outside agencies need to pay particular attention to this aspect of the work and to build-in protection of their intellectual property whenever possible. Different normative and 13 Mapping and Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic 309 legal mechanisms can be used for this purpose (e.g. click-through usage agreements on a website, use of trademark, etc.). In some cases, technical approaches such as limiting access to a digital collection based on roles assigned to user accounts, or encryption of data or information, may be appropriate. The same is the case for the Nordic countries. However, there is a difference between public mapping and mapping by other than government agencies. Since Saami institutions are increasingly participating in or tasked with quality control of public map making and production of data for map databases (such as place names and cultural heritage data), there are few legal and ethical issues with public mapping. When it comes to mapping conducted with the participation of or on Saami groups or communities, there is a growing concern related to digital storage and sharing of, for example, pictures of Saami in traditional dress (see Myrvoll and Hesjedal 2018 regarding legal and ethical issues concerning digitalization of Saami cultural heritage). Although data sharing is increasingly the norm, in some cases the respectful incorporation and protection of Traditional or Indigenous knowledge might inhibit, or even prohibit, the sharing of such information. Traditional Knowledge is not protected by existing copyright laws in most countries (Scassa an Taylor 2014) and requires new forms of template licensing to help address such problems (Scassa and Taylor 2017). Alternatively, Young-Ing (2008) argues that a “sui generis” legal regime may be in order for Indigenous Knowledge (Young-ing 2008, McCann et al. 2016). More effective legal and consent issues will help address some of the problems, but in the internet era the traditional approaches to consent, specifically the withdrawal of consent and permission, are extremely problematical. Until law catches up with these realities, there is a special need to prioritize ethics and “soft law” (Brown and Nicholas 2012; Taylor and Lauriault 2014, Scassa and Taylor 2017) and to clearly communicate the limitations of the law to Indigenous partners. Indigenous communities need to be aware that their intellectual property is not protected by existing copyright laws unless they control, own, and produce the mani- festations of it in Indigenous mapping formats.

13.5 Other Challenges Related to Mapping

There are many challenges related to mapping work, whether it is carried out directly by Indigenous people or organizations, or in collaboration with them. One of the most fundamental challenges relates to the cost of doing mapping work. When mapping work is carried out under the framework of a co-production of knowledge process, it requires intensive and often frequent in-person meetings between the research and mapping team and the knowledge holders and community members (though we note these are not necessarily mutually exclusive; knowledge holders may be both the leaders of and/or integral members of the mapping team, for example). Mapping is an iterative process of documenting and refining information that can often take several years to be done properly. Mapping Indigenous knowledges can also be a highly sensitive undertaking because of the nature of some of the information being documented. It is crucial that 310 J. Raymond-Yakoubian et al.

Table 13.1 Key messages from this chapter Key messages from this chapter regarding Indigenous mapping and informed decision making for sustainability Capacity building Capacity building to support Indigenous participation in, and leading of, mapping projects is needed to ensure that information used in decision making is valid, relevant, and useful. Distribution and Existing Indigenous maps and mapping projects need to be more interpretation of widely known and utilized. Use and interpretation of Indigenous information mapping work must be done in cooperation with Indigenous Peoples and organizations. Equity The value of Indigenous community spatial knowledge needs to be acknowledged and supported, particularly in terms of its use alongside western science. Permissions The use of Indigenous maps and knowledge requires explicit permissions and agreements and should not be used in decision making without those prerequisites. Increased mapping There are many gaps in Indigenous mapping and additional work should be done to support the capacity, concerns, and governance goals of indigenous communities. strong relationships exist between the research team and the community. Ideally these relationships are long-term, are well-established before mapping work begins, and involve high levels of trust and respect (e.g. see Table 13.1 in Pulsifer et al. 2011). Both parties – the research team and the community – must be invested in the process and committed to the care-taking of the data and products for the ‘life’ of the data. Extensive research and application in the areas of Public Participation Geographic Information Systems (PPGIS) and Participatory Mapping or GIS (PGIS) can inform the design of Indigenous mapping programs. Methods and tools have advanced since the broad adoption of [P]PGIS in the early 1990s (Obermeyer 1998). Since then, there have been many projects that have prioritized and incorporated community engagement and empowerment, the development of accessible tools, and local decision making power (McCall 2008), and [P]PGIS has been used for Indigenous-specific applications (e.g. Jelacic2010 , Barlindhaug 2013). Critical examination of [P]PGIS methods and tools is an important part of ensuring the design of Indigenous mapping projects and programs is appropriate, and a body of critical literature has emerged (Chambers 2006; Elwood 2006; Harris and Weiner 1998). Another challenge for Indigenous communities and mapping relates to ensuring that maps get utilized, which can often be associated with the distribution of map products and the construction of the narratives that go along with them. If maps are not accessible to community members or to policymakers, than they cannot be used. If they are accessible but do not have good explanatory narratives to go along with them, they may not be used or may be used inappropriately. Some Indigenous organizations may have limited experience with or capacity to distribute their mapping products, which can limit their uptake into various processes. 13 Mapping and Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic 311

In addition to maintenance of data, Indigenous communities must also consider how (or if) their data, once documented, will be shared. Some data is maintained by individual communities, in other instances it is maintained by Indigenous organizations, private interests, governments, or others. Ideally such data would be owned by, housed with, and maintained by Indigenous people, but this is not always the case. Regardless of these factors, it is important for agreements to be in place to assist in governing decision making about data sharing. Decisions about when and whom to share spatial data with may be influenced by the subject and intent of the new use, by gender, by age, political considerations, or other concerns. However data maintenance and accessibility are conducted, Indigenous sovereignty over data-related decisions must be prioritized. Data accessibility via the internet remains an issue for many communities where bandwidth is limited and/or expensive (e.g. Taylor 2014:10). Options to improve accessibility are being considered through meetings such as the Arctic Broadband Forum (held in Fairbanks in May 2017) and other fora (e.g. Hudson 2011), and many have considered this issue in terms of its implications for Indigenous mapping-related work (e.g. Hayes et al. 2014, Taylor and Lauriault 2014b; McMahon et al. 2017). In Alaska, many underserved, rural, Indigenous communities are starting to gain affordable access to broadband, fiber-optic infrastructure through the Qunitillion project, however the costs for broadband in many communities can be cost prohibitive. This makes it inaccessible for many people in smaller villages. Maintaining data and information resources, whether analogue or digital, requires resources and skills. Analogue resources require a suitable environment (e.g. temperature, humidity, physical safety, etc.) and skills in curation and making the resources findable and accessible without degrading the materials. Digital care- taking may seem easier due to the mostly ubiquitous nature of computing resources, however much is still required to organize, maintain and preserve digital data (a web search for “research data management” will reveal many relevant resources). Without attention to the state of the data and the software needed to access it, communities can find themselves in a “data rescue” situation. For example, co-author Pulsifer recently spent several weeks working with a Canadian community to help ensure that important data from the 1990s can still be used on a modern computer system. Much of the data was created and formatted using software that no longer exists. Thus, as indicated above, all partners must commit not only to creating data and information, but also to maintaining it over time. Environmental impact assessments and documents containing resource use maps and mappings of ecosystem services and values based on Indigenous knowledges are often undertaken by state agencies and research institutes based largely on literature reviews, or involving Indigenous groups in only a limited extent. For the sake of Indigenous capacity building, it is important that local communities are invited to participate in resource use mapping not only to provide accurate and appropriate information, but also to build capacity. 312 J. Raymond-Yakoubian et al.

13.6 Mapping Needs for the Future

Mapping can play a role in the future in the conjoined contexts of international cooperation, ocean management and governance, and the goals of Indigenous communities. In particular, the Arctic is experiencing climate change at a more rapid pace than the rest of the world, and it is a global priority, and is also a priority for many Indigenous Peoples across the Arctic. This is one potential issue that can continue to be addressed through Indigenous mapping with the goal of adaptive solutions. There is a strong need to bring Indigenous Peoples together (with themselves, as well as with researchers, agencies, and partners) to discuss mapping needs, goals, and concerns around mapping. Community needs and mapping and research priorities should be developed directly by Indigenous Peoples. Following this, funders should ideally work directly with Indigenous organizations to fund the work they have prioritized. This may involve capacity building and perhaps partnerships or other arrangements. Indigenous Peoples require partners to work with, rather than to speak for them. Process is as important as product (e.g. Taylor 2014; Kitchin and Dodge 2007) for many Indigenous people and this is why any partnerships that are developed should take a co-productive approach, focusing on equity, intentionality, relationship building, ethics and other important factors (e.g. Behe et al. in preparation, Raymond-Yakoubian and Raymond-Yakoubian 2017). This type of approach will be most effective and generate the best and most satisfying results. In the Bering Strait region, mapping of TK regarding fisheries and marine mammal distribution and habitat, physical oceanographic features, and subsistence use areas could be of utility in the future for a variety of purposes. This includes, for example, the development of cooperative schemes for resource and place-based management, helping inform international research and management efforts (e.g. regarding changes seen with marine species and the environment), and establishing rules and boundaries related to protocol enforcement (e.g. delineating where and when particular types of vessel activities may or may not occur). There is a need for much more mapping work in the region to both document existing knowledge and conditions, and to address planning needs and changing environmental conditions. In the Barents Sea region, there is a need to develop and integrate maps of Indigenous resource use to go alongside with public maps of biodiversity, resources and ecosystem services. Mapping of local and Indigenous use of the coastal zone already has an impact on planning for multiple usage and alleviating conflicts, such as between the growing aquaculture industry and commercial and subsistence fishing. Despite academic and local efforts to document and map Traditional and local ecological knowledge of marine ecosystems, this knowledge will not be effective unless it is authorized by scientific institutions with the power to influence policy. In Norway local knowledge is integrated with public marine biodiversity mappings, which has a direct influence on marine governance as in, for instance, aquaculture locations (Brattland 2013; Johnsen et al. 2014). This could have been expanded with a specific mapping of resource use utilizing Saami terminology and Traditional Knowledge either by the authorities, the Saami Parliament, or local institutions. Again, the cost of such an undertaking, as well as its legitimacy, are central issues. 13 Mapping and Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic 313

Eythórsson and Brattland (2012), commenting upon the interdisciplinary challenges of integrating local ecological knowledge with science, focus on partnerships between scientists and local communities and establishing social-ecological timelines to document and monitor biodiversity changes according to local knowledge. This means that Traditional and local knowledge is a topic that needs to be addressed from the outset as a natural part of future mapping efforts. In Canada, Indigenous Peoples are now being given a much larger role in the context of governing Arctic seas, especially in the preservation of the marine environment. Indigenous mapping will be an important part of this effort, in combination with remote sensing and other information from a western science methodologies. The National Inuit Strategy on Research was recently released (ITK 2018) and outlines strategies for engaging and empowering Inuit in research as well as in the application of research in policy and management. Beyond the goals of specific projects such as those noted above, there are broader goals to which mapping can be employed. These goals include, for example, the values of documenting current knowledge about the environment and resources to, for example, help track changes over time (e.g. in animal population and distribution, and in changes to ice, water temperature, and permafrost), to use in education, science, policy, and management fora, and so on. Additionally, these goals also include advancing the cause of equitable co- management, the promotion of traditional forms of natural resource conservation and stewardship, ensuring community knowledge is used widely in an appropriate fashion, and to increasing local, Indigenous control over natural resources, the land- and seascape, and the types of activities conducted in these regions. Mapping work that meets these goals can make significant contributions to Indigenous sovereignty and work as a “democratizing tool” (Taylor et al. 2014). In September of 2015, the ELOKA project supported a workshop entitled "Sharing Knowledge: Traditions, Technologies, and Taking Control of our Future". A key feature of the design of this workshop was that, with the exception of opening remarks, the speakers at the workshop were Indigenous people sharing their thoughts and ideas (see http://eloka-arctic.org/news/EAC_meeting.html). A white paper produced as a product of the workshop was submitted to the 2016 Arctic Observing Summit and provides some sense of Indigenous ideas and priorities in relation to new technologies, including geospatial technologies (http://bit.ly/ELOKAPaper). As was noted in that paper: “Space and place are central to Indigenous ways of knowing and identity and so mapping technologies are an important platform for representing Indigenous Knowledge… This technology can be used as a tool to re-connect youth to their heritage, and as a bridge to connect Indigenous and western science data and knowledge. As with any technology, it must be used in a mindful way, particularly when used to document sacred or other sensitive places.” In terms of the tangible needs to undertake these projects and make these goals a reality, there are a number of things which can be mentioned. Capacity needs are paramount and there are needs at all levels. In the Bering Strait, for example, this includes having the necessary resources for computing, and distributing map 314 J. Raymond-Yakoubian et al. products. There are needs related to training and data-collection tools in order to equip people to engage their communities, document their knowledge, and translate that into mapping products. This also includes the need to adequately pay people to undertake this work and compensate those who provide information. There is also the need to have an adequate mechanism for storing this information, deciding when and how it is shared with others, and the means by which to keep the information current through updating projects. At a broader level, there is a need for the information contained within mapping products to be valued and seen on an equal footing (if not greater, given the special legal status of Tribes) with the other sources of information which scientists and managers regularly consider.

13.7 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on projects, concerns and recommendations related to mapping work in the Arctic which has involved and can involve Indigenous communities. Discussion of some completed projects has demonstrated successful examples in the production of maps displaying Indigenous community knowledge regarding physical oceanography, marine species, subsistence-related, and marine use information, trails, place names, and other information. These efforts have been of use in policy, management, advocacy, pedagogy, conservation, and cultural preservation. There are concerns about mapping as well, such as those related to appropriate methodologies, data misuse and misinterpretation, intellectual property rights, and limitations associated with the cartographic representation of complex data and data from multiple knowledge systems. The authors also highlighted needs related to Indigenous mapping, and potential ways forward. It is felt that increasing capacity, achieving broader recognition of the value of Indigenous and Traditional Knowledge, and a move towards co-productive as well as Indigenous-led and produced mapping projects that meets communities’ needs and goals should be central to considerations in the future of mapping work related to the knowledge of Arctic Indigenous communities.

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Raymond-Yakoubian J, Khokhlov Y, Yarzutkina A (2014) Indigenous knowledge and use of Bering Strait Region Ocean currents. Final report to the National Park Service, shared Beringian heritage program. Kawerak Social Science Program, Nome Sandström P, Granqvist Pahlén T, Edenius L, Tømmervik H, Hagner O, Hemberg L, Olsson H, Baer K, Stenlund T, Göran Brandt L, Egberth M (2003) Conflict resolution by participatory management: remote sensing and GIS as tools for communicating land-use needs for reindeer herding in northern Sweden. AMBIO J Hum Environ 32(8):557–567 Scassa T, Taylor DRF (2014) Intellectual property law and geospatial information: some challenges, WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) Journal: Special Issue on Analysis of Intellectual Property Issues 6(1):79–88 Scassa T, Taylor DRF (2017) Legal and ethical issues around incorporating traditional knowledge in polar data infrastructures. CODATA Digit Sci J 16:1):1–1)14. https://doi.org/10.5334/ dsj-2017-005 Smith MA, Goldman MS, Knight EJ, Warrenchuk JJ (2017) Ecological atlas of the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort seas, 2nd ed. Audubon Alaska, Anchorage, AK Spink J, Moodie DW (1972) Eskimo maps from the Canadian eastern Arctic, Cartographica mono- graph no. 5. Department of Geography, York University, Toronto Taylor DRF (2014a) Some recent developments in the theory and practice of cybercartography: applications in indigenous mapping: an introduction. In: Taylor DRF, Lauriault TP (eds) Developments in the theory and practice of cybercartography. Elsevier Science, pp 1–16 Taylor DRF (editor) and Lauriault TP (associate editor) (2014b) Developments in the theory and practice of Cybercartography: applications and indigenous mapping, Modern Cartography Series: vol 5. Elsevier, Amsterdam Taylor DRF, Cowan C, Ljubicic G, Sullivan C (2014) Cybercartography for education: the application of cybercartography to teaching and learning in Nunavut. In: Taylor DRF (editor), Lauriault TP (associate editor) (ed) Developments in the theory and practice of cybercartography: applications and indigenous mapping, Modern Cartography Series: vol 5. Elsevier, Amsterdam Thuestad A, Eythórsson E, Barlindhaug S (2016) Kartlegging av historisk og nåværende lands- kaps- og ressursbruk i Finnmark Primitive tider 2014/16 Tobias T (2000) Chief Kerry’s moose: a guidebook to land and occupancy mapping, research design and data collection. Available online at: https://www.ubcic.bc.ca/chief_kerry_s_moose Tobias T (2009) Living proof. The essential data-collection guide for indigenous use- and occupancy map surveys. Ecotrust, Vancouver United Nations Inter-Agency Support Group (2014) The knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and policies for sustainable development: updates and trends in the second decade of the World’s Indigenous People. http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/68/pdf/wcip/IASG%20Thematic%20 Paper_%20Traditional%20Knowledge%20-%20rev1.pdf Usher P (2003) Environment, race and nation reconsidered: reflections on aboriginal land claims in Canada. Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe canadien 47:365–382. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.0008-3658.2003.00029.x Voorhees H, Sparks R (2012) Nanuuq: local and traditional ecological knowledge of polar bears in the Bering and Chukchi seas. Alaska Nanuuq Commission, Anchorage Vorren Ø (1980) Saamisk bosetning på Nordkalotten, arealdisponering og ressursutnytting i historisk-økologisk belysning (Saami settlement at the north calotte, area disposition and resource use in historical-ecological terms.). Evert Baudou, Umeå Wainwright J, Bryan J (2009) Cartography, territory, property: postcolonial reflections on indigenous counter-mapping in Nicaragua and Belize. Cult Geogr 16:153–178 Woodward D, Malcolm Lewis G (eds) (1998) Cartography in the traditional African, American, Arctic, Australian, and Pacific societies. The history of cartography, vol 2. Book 3. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Young-Ing G (2008) Conflicts, discourse, negotiations and proposed solutions regarding transformation of traditional knowledge. In: Eigenbrod R, Hulan R (eds) Aboriginal oral traditions: theory, practice, ethics. Brunswick Books, Toronto, pp 61–78. http://scholar.google.com/schol ar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:No+Title#0 Building Capacity: Education Beyond Boundaries 14

Molly B. A. Douglas, Yekaterina Kontar, Malgorzata Smieszek, Allen Pope, and Inna P. Zhuravleva

Abstract To arrive at holistic policy solutions, decision-makers require comprehensive and comprehensible decision support tools based on coherent science-based assessments (Tesar C, Science 353(6306):1368–1370, 2016). The actors involved in decision-making in the Bering Strait (BeSR) and Barents Sea (BaSR) Regions include representatives from all levels of government, NGOs and other civil society organizations, the private sector, and Indigenous and local residents. As consistently acknowledged in the previous chapters, holistic decision-making in both regions is often hindered by a lack of dialogue and understanding among these actors. In this chapter, we address the importance of inclusive and informed decision-making and identify key skills and experiences necessary for early-career scientists situated in the classic science space to communicate decision-support tools to decision-makers (Table 14.1). In the context of this paper, “classic science” represents traditional academic research and training programs, which are bounded by disciplinary silos. We ground our

M. B. A. Douglas (*) Independent Researcher and Consultant, Boston, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected] Y. Kontar AAAS Science and Technology Policy Fellow, National Science Foundaton Office of Polar Programs, Alexandria, USA M. Smieszek Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Finland A. Pope International Arctic Science Committee, Akureyri, Iceland I. P. Zhuravleva State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University), Moscow, Russia

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 321 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_14 322 M. B. A. Douglas et al.

recommendations to early-career scientists and the institutions shaping their development in response to the broad emerging issues currently facing decision-makers in the BeSR and BaSR.

14.1 Introduction

To arrive at holistic policy solutions, decision-makers require comprehensive and comprehensible decision support tools based on coherent science-based assessments (Tesar et al. 2016). The actors involved in decision-making in the Bering Strait (BeSR) and Barents Sea (BaSR) Regions include representatives from all levels of government, NGOs and other civil society organizations, the private sector, and Indigenous and local residents. As consistently acknowledged in the previous chapters, holistic decision-making in both regions is often hindered by a lack of dialogue and understanding among these actors. In this chapter, we address the importance of inclusive and informed decision-making and identify key skills and experiences necessary for early-career scientists situated in the classic science space to communicate decision-support tools to decision-makers (Table 14.1). In the context of this paper, “classic science” represents traditional academic research and training programs, which are bounded by disciplinary silos. We ground our recommendations to early- career scientists and the institutions shaping their development in response to the broad emerging issues currently facing decision-makers in the BeSR and BaSR.

14.2 Setting the Scene

Scientific knowledge is considered a critical component of decision-making in addressing contemporary issues such as climate change and sustainable development. As the role of science in society continues to evolve, scientists are increasingly asked by decision-makers—and require of themselves—to contribute directly to the needs and for the benefit of society. Science can provide insight into the nature of challenges that communities face, allow assessment of their consequences with respect to desired outcomes, and, in some cases, facilitate the creation of new and innovative policy alternatives (Pielke 2007). Ultimately, however, classic science and decision-making constitute two distinct systems of behavior, and their goals are different. For example, whereas science is the systematic pursuit of knowledge, the purpose of policy-making is to produce authoritative decisions on behalf of society and to reduce uncertainty about the future in a preferred direction (Andresen et al. 2000; Pielke 2007). How to bring the two together in a manner that does not compromise the credibility and legitimacy of either process is a continued subject of study and has spurred numerous discussions on the science-policy nexus and interface. One conclusion to emerge is that the uptake of scientific knowledge in decision-making occurs most effectively when relationships between are multi- directional and iterative. Yet, the interaction mechanism between classic science 14 Building Capacity: Education Beyond Boundaries 323

Table 14.1 Training and independent learning resources Skills & tools Why necessary and avenues & resources for acquisition Science Effective science communication improves the quality of interactions Communication between scientists and non-scientific audiences, as well as between scientists from different fields. Training in science communication helps early-career scientists make their science messages understandable, frame their messages to resonate with audiences’ pre-existing values, and build trust, credibility, and understanding. Improved communication skills also help early-career scientists provide potentially useful guidance on policy debates. Academic Institutions Alan Alda Center for Communicating Science at Stony Brook University The New York Academy of Sciences’ The Sciences High North Academy (HNA) at UiT The Arctic University of Norway Communication Partnership for Science and the Sea (COMPASS) Scientific and Policy Societies The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)’ Science and Policy Programs American Geophysical Union (AGU)‘s Sharing Science & Science Policy Programs Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (APECS) Webinars Websites Climate Communication: Science & Outreach Cross-Cultural Cross-cultural awareness, sensitivity, and understanding skills Awareness, Sensitivity, position scientists to develop proficiency in the cultures of peoples & Understanding directly involved in and/or impacted by research projects, and to consequently communicate and collaborate effectively across cultures in gathering and analyzing data. This also ensures that research design, implementation, tool development and delivery, and evaluation are appropriately informed by, respectful of, and meet the unique needs of the involved cultures. These skills can also be applied in the context of working across different business cultures and with government leaders. Further, these skills engender respect for and incorporation of diverse ways of knowing (e.g. Indigenous knowledge) into research projects. Structured Immersive or Experiential Training White Eye Traditional Knowledge Camp led by Gwich’in Elders (accessible via the University of Alaska Fairbanks Center for Cross-Cultural Studies) University of the Arctic (UArctic) Model Arctic Council Thematic Network (limited to participating students) The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)’ Science & Technology Policy Fellowship (limited to U.S. citizens) Websites Arctic Research Consortium of the United States (ARCUS)’ Conducting Research with Northern Communities (includes an extensive resource bank) Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (APECS)’ Traditional Knowledge resources (continued) 324 M. B. A. Douglas et al.

Table 14.1 (continued) Skills & tools Why necessary and avenues & resources for acquisition Partnership & It is valuable for scientists to familiarize themselves with partnership Capacity-Building or support-driven approaches to research and tool development. These Approaches to approaches are pertinent to working with knowledge holders and Research Processes & decision-makers at community to macro levels and across Tool Development government, civil society, the practice space, and more. Research Methodologies (Participatory) Action Research Knowledge Co-Production Studies The Arctic Council’s Meaningful Engagement of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in Marine Activities (MEMA) project Network Engagement Membership in key professional and peer networks dedicated to & Leverage supporting informed decision-making can position early-career scientists to better access diverse resources and collaborators not readily or incompletely available at their home institutions. Professional and Peer Networks University of the Arctic (UArctic) Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (APECS) International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA) American Geophysical Union (AGU) Societal Impacts and Policy Sciences (SIPS) section The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)’ Science and Policy programs and policy is still commonly assumed to be a one-way linear transfer of knowledge, where science is speaking ‘truth’ to ‘power’ and where it often fails to influence policy-making or public behaviors (van Kerkhoff and Lebel 2006 in: Sarkki et al. 2015; Watson 2005). Furthermore, “science” continues to be commonly thought of as classic science, which does not necessarily include or integrate multiple ways of knowing, promote inclusive research processes, or drive toward production of tangible, implementable, and evidence-based tools, as opposed to simple delivery of data. While the limitations of the above model are well-recognized, formal education systems have not kept pace and, as a result, do not always prepare students for greater and more constructive engagement with decision-making circles. The present structure of academia is largely based on disciplinary silos. Junior scholars more easily gain professional credit and recognition for building their expertise in nar- rowly defined fields than in studies inherently drawing from and contributing to multiple fields and sectors. They also gain greater credit for producing research articles targeted at their colleagues, rather than decision-support tools developed in collaboration with and targeted at non-academic audiences. 14 Building Capacity: Education Beyond Boundaries 325

At the same time, there is need for interdisciplinary collaboration within the scientific community itself. While the need for in-depth knowledge of single elements of ecosystems remains beyond question, there is also a need for greater understanding of coupled human-environment systems and the scale and cross- scale dynamic in addressing regional and global environmental change. Such knowledge is certainly pertinent to the ecopolitical systems (see Chap. 1) characterized by complex interplay among their constituent elements, as well as interactions with the broader environments within which they are situated. In the case of marine ecopolitical regions, as with the BeSR and BaSR, the knowledge required to address challenges they face goes beyond the limits of any single discipline. Instead, these challenges call for collaboration between scientists across the humanities and the social and natural sciences divide, as well as a broad array of other knowledge holders. We argue that only such expertise brought together with decision-making in the region can help in effective handling of emerging issues and ensuring sustainable outcomes of developments in the BaSR and the BeSR.

14.3 Synthesis of Emerging Issues in Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions

As introduced in Chap. 1, the BeSR and BaSR are experiencing rapid and sustained environmental and socioeconomic transformations due to dramatic sea-ice loss and increasing levels of human activities. Transformation is expected to persist in the coming decades, generating both opportunities and risks (i.e., emerging issues to regional decision-makers (Clement et al. 2013)). Review of the preceding chapters revealed four broad sets of emerging policy-relevant issues common to the two regions:

• Ensuring protection of ecosystems, while also supporting regional economic development; • Preserving local languages and cultures; • Promoting and facilitating adequate and just information and knowledge exchange between researchers and local knowledge holders; and • Supporting and facilitating inclusive decision-making and governance.

Effective decision-making in the BeSR and BaSR requires understanding and responding to the aforementioned issues. These issues are results of complex interactions between natural processes and human activities. Therefore, their resolution depends upon understanding of a wide spectrum of natural and social processes (e.g., climatological, political, economic, social, and cultural). Accurately assessing these issues requires interactive analysis that combines diverse areas of expertise, including natural and social scientists, practitioners, and Indigenous and local knowledge holders. In addition, effectively resolving these issues with creation and implementation of policy—whether within or outside of formal governing structures—requires cross-institution and cross-border collaboration. 326 M. B. A. Douglas et al.

14.4 Recommended Skills, Tools, and Experiences Needed to Respond to Emerging Issues

Below, we outline practical skills and tools we recommend scientists acquire to effectively develop and communicate decision-support tools in response to emerging issues in the BaSR and BeSR. Drawing from our own experiences of currently operating within the academic space, but representing backgrounds in the natural science, social science, and practitioner communities, we have highlighted the following as core competencies: Science Communication; Cross-Cultural Awareness, Sensitivity, & Understanding; Partnership & Capacity-Building Approaches to Research Processes & Tool Development; and Network Engagement & Leverage. In Table 14.1, we briefly introduce these skills and tools before expanding on each. Early-career scientists are well-positioned for education and training that will prepare them to think and act flexibly and holistically—and thus effectively assess and respond to society’s needs in the BaSR and BeSR through meaningful, sustainable impact. However, we acknowledge that students actively seeking preparatory education and training to contribute to informed decision-making may find inade- quate support and resources at their home institutions for developing the right skills and tools as academia continues to encourage siloed, self-reinforcing pursuits. We therefore also cite alternative avenues, resources, and reference points for their acquisition, as a starting point for seeking growth opportunities. As this volume is composed primarily from the perspective of the classic science community, the recommendations below are catered toward preparation of scientists emerging from that space. The table is meant to serve as a starting point; we acknowledge it is neither exhaustive in its recommendations nor in its resources that include primarily circumpolar organizations and English-language materials and trainings. There are also numerous approaches and accompanying skills and tools that fold within or overlap with the areas identified.1 Furthermore, emerging professional development opportunities and surrounding discussion range widely within the Arctic science community, and they are colored by individual scientists’ and organizations’ perspectives and decision- support goals.2

1 Tondu et al. (2014), sharing their own perspectives as early-career researchers invested in community-level decision-support, identified broad categories for development of “Northern community-collaborative relationships”: dedicating time, being present, communicating, listening, respect and understanding, and building trust for collaborative efforts and knowledge exchange. These same categories could productively apply to effective engagement with many other types of decision-makers. 2 For example, negotiation is commonly cited as a key tool for scientists seeking to support formal policy-making processes within and between national governments. 14 Building Capacity: Education Beyond Boundaries 327

14.5 Science Communication

The greatest impact of research stems from clearly communicated findings to those who need them to make relevant informed decisions. Science communication training is vital to improving the quality of interactions between scientists and nonscien- tific audiences. It helps to render science messages understandable, build trust and rapport between scientists and decision-makers, and enhance scientific credibility. Communicating scientific information to diverse audiences is a difficult skill that many scientists lack, due to increased specialization over time and the absence of formal training in science communication. Although there is a myriad of opportunities for scientists to advance their communication skills with their peers (e.g., scientific conferences), there are often fewer required avenues for them to communicate, in written or oral format, to and receive feedback from audiences outside of their research fields. Science communication is a growing area of research and practice. During the past two decades, the number of activities, courses, and practitioners has steadily increased. Yet, very few higher education institutions offer formal communication training to aspiring scientists. We argue that incorporating formal communication training into undergraduate and graduate scientific curricula will enhance the quality of discourse between scientists and non-academic audiences. We support this notion. In the meantime, we recommend aspiring scientists take advantage of communication courses, even if they are not part of the curricula. Policy-makers have identified poor communication and dissemination of scientific findings as key barriers to evidence-based policy-making. Policy-makers and other non-academic audiences often lack understanding of technical data and jar- gon. A starting point for improving science communication skills is learning to package research results in a comprehensive and comprehensible format. Words are powerful and can mean different things to different people. It is particularly important for researchers to learn how major terms are interpreted and utilized both within their peer networks and by the actors—from civil society leaders at the community level to national policy-makers—they seek to support through their work. For example, the term “participation” can be used by some researchers and practitioners to signify some level of engagement of individuals in a research process largely defined and led by outside researchers. Alternatively, it can be used to signify equal partnership between the two groups. Initiating and fostering a continuous dialogue with decision-makers will allow scientists to determine their level of technical compre- hension and begin to bridge communication gaps. Crucially, science communication needs to be seen as an iterative conversation rather than one-way dissemination of information (Timm, et al. 2017). We encourage early-career researchers to initiate a series of continuous dialogues with audiences in the BeSR and BaSR who could benefit from their research and analysis; such discussions can shape not just how science is communicated, but also how research is conducted. In addition to learning how to communicate one’s research in a comprehensible manner, it is also important to learn to listen to one’s audience, thus accurately identifying their concerns and needs for scientific data and information. 328 M. B. A. Douglas et al.

14.6 Cross-Cultural Awareness, Sensitivity, and Communication – Through the Lens of Community- Based Research

Understanding and responding to the emerging issues in the Arctic requires interactive and interdisciplinary research that comprises multiple inputs from diverse areas of expertise (Bromwich et al. 2010; Werner et al. 2016). This requires improved collaborations between natural and social scientists, as well as enhanced dialogue with local and Indigenous knowledge holders (Bultitude 2011; Werner et al. 2016). Engaging communities in the research process has proven to be vital, as it allows incorporation of critical insights into research questions, data interpretation, and decision-making (Mayan and Daum 2016). Collaborative research efforts between scientists and communities are known as community-based research. Ideally, community-based research should be a cyclical process with continual involvement by community members in all key phases of the research process, from conceptualization of the research issues to analysis and interpretations of results (Baldwin et al. 2009). As will be discussed in the next section, community members, from both ethical and practical standpoints, should be understood as scientists and as decision-makers. Unfortunately, much research in Native Arctic communities has been predominantly directed by outside researchers with a role of communities reduced to data collection (Bromwich et al. 2010; Werner et al. 2016). This can lead to ineffective crafting of research questions, poor data collection and analysis, and outcomes that yield little utility to the community. Yet, Arctic communities recognize the importance of appropriate and meaningful research on their land and among their people and appreciate research that is designed to promote sustainable development in the Arctic and improve their communities’ overall well-being (Straits et al. 2012). We advise early-career researchers to be mindful of and sensitive to the history of researcher-community interactions before they approach a community. To successfully conduct ethical and meaningful research with local communities, researchers foremost must commit to a sustained process of relationship-building, as well as cross-cultural learning and respect (Straits et al. 2012; Native American Center for Excellence [NACE] 2014). Below we summarize other guiding principles for engaging in research with Native Arctic communities. As with potentially any community, each Native Arctic community is unique in their culture, their priorities, and their views on research and the structure of their research regulation process. These differences require a community-specific, highly-tailored approach. For this reason, the guiding principles below should not be viewed as a simple checklist for engaging in community-based research, but rather a support kit. Before approaching a community, researchers should take the time to learn and understand the culture and economic, social, environmental, and political values and priorities of its people. Early-career researchers are strongly advised to participate in cultural awareness and sensitivity training or workshops at their home institutions, with practitioner organizations, and/or via pre-established relationships with communities to enhance their intercultural understanding and communication 14 Building Capacity: Education Beyond Boundaries 329 skills. If it is possible to acquire some measure of language skills, this is also always recommended. It is also crucial to identify formal and informal leaders, as they can guide and shape broad community involvement in the project and help to ensure its appropriateness. With these leaders, and with other community members, researchers should seek to build genuine and thoughtful relationships. Especially if a researcher will spend significant time in a community, this is key to integration. With cross-cultural awareness, sensitivity, and understanding, researchers are better prepared to take a nuanced, respectful approach to engaging with a community. They are also much better prepared to work productively with a community toward a beneficial outcome. The initial step of establishing rapport with the community can take a great deal of time and effort, but it is a crucial and compulsory element of the community-based research (Straits et al. 2012). When approaching a community, it is important to initiate the study as a partnership project between community and researchers (Straits et al. 2012). Community members should be active participants and collaborators in the entire research cycle—from conducting community needs assessment and shaping the research agenda in a way that will address those needs to determining how the outcome (tools generated, implementation methodologies and practical, post-implementation evaluation) can be practically benefit the community—and further empowered to develop their own work through the research process. Once research is underway, it is important to continue the dialogue. For example, a good practice in community- based research is to schedule feedback sessions with community members to ensure correct collection and interpretation of data and evaluation of findings (NACE 2014). Straits et al. (2012) further recommend inviting community members to participate in peer review. It is important to pursue continued dialogue in ways and through avenues that work best for the community. The same principles of cross-cultural awareness, sensitivity, and understanding are key to working effectively with and for other actors in other contexts. Demonstrating cross-cultural awareness, sensitivity, and understanding with any actor is key to researching, developing, and communicating decision-support tools that will best meet their needs. We recommend researchers to take the same approach when, for example, seeking to engage with policy-makers in formal government structures in the BaSR and BeSR. Formal pathways for immersive experience range from interaction with policymakers in multi-stakeholder fora, such as the Arctic Circle Assembly and on the margins of Arctic Council meetings, to internships and fellowships embedded in governmental and intergovernmental bodies in the region. Learning the culture and procedural mechanics of government and the policy- making process, as well as the values, priorities, and views of governing administra- tions and their constituencies, can help researchers more effectively approach decision-makers and interpret government literature and policy trends. Identifying decision-makers – both on the institutional level as well as in terms of concrete persons – with interest in and potential influence over given issues is another practical and useful step. Through those ways scientists can better engage decision- makers in shaping and contributing to the research process and potentially integrate into the policy-making community. In doing so, they can conduct research that will 330 M. B. A. Douglas et al. both anticipate future policy priorities and meet decision-making needs. They will also be better positioned to develop, pitch, and communicate highly-tailored end products, such as policy papers, in ways most likely to reach and resonate with policy-makers.

14.7 Partnership and Capacity-Building Approaches to Research Processes and Tool Development

The trajectory of activities in the BeSR and the BaSR is continuously framed in terms of sustainable development or sustainability. The spectrum of actors supporting such efforts through research, analysis, and tool generation includes ranges from academics to sustainable development organizations and NGOs. There is an ever-converging effort among these actors to improve the value they seek to yield to society. While scientists are increasingly focused on pursuing research for meaningful societal impact, sustainable development practitioners are increasingly focused on grounding interventions in sound evidence. In doing so, both communities are continuously updating their objectives and methodologies to place the people directly involved in or otherwise impacted by the research process and its outcomes at the center of the process. These actors can include national policy-makers toward whom recommendations will eventually be targeted, community or local government leaders and residents who have commissioned research, and/or people some- how within the research environment. All of these actors may have a stake in the process and its outcomes. Building on the previous section addressing cross-cultural awareness, sensitivity, and communication through the lens of community-based research, scientists and practitioners are increasingly recognizing that these actors—especially those whose lives are most directly impacted by the research process and its outcomes—are more than “stakeholders.” They should be respected and supported as independent agents and as both the primary clients and decision-makers in development and sustainability activities. Further, they should be at least equal partners—if not the drivers and leaders—in setting the research agenda and subsequent design, implementation, and evaluation of any research processes and end products. At the 2017 Arctic Frontiers Conference in Tromsø, Norway, Carolina Behe, Indigenous Knowledge and Science Advisor for the Inuit Circumpolar Council, addressed those gathered on this very issue: “So should there be development or not? How do we protect life in a rapidly changing environment? What research questions should be developed to aid in guiding decisions making? Key to these questions and more is balance and including Inuit in a meaningful way. ‘Meaningful Way’, means partnerships. Partnerships from the beginning to the end. This means that instead of only being introduced tools or regulations for adaptation, our Peoples are allowed to and supported to use the adaptive mechanisms that they have had for thousands of years. It means that instead of capacity building, we need empowerment of our Peoples to allow for equitable partnerships. It means moving into the 14 Building Capacity: Education Beyond Boundaries 331 future creating stronger platforms that will allow for equitable partnerships, allow for a co-production of knowledge, and an understanding that balance is needed.” Arctic and Northern Indigenous peoples have underscored these points many times. Advancing both dialogue and action, the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), Canada’s national Inuit organization, released its landmark National Inuit Strategy on Research in 2018. It lays out research priorities and guidelines and also envisions strategies for cross-sectoral partnership. The NISR notes that just as there is growing recognition within the science and policy-making communities that Indigenous peoples must play a greater role in both processes, the ITK also intends to meet those actors in their respective spaces, to productively engage with and reshape processes (ITK 2018). Indicative of this rapprochement from the science and policy side, the Second Arctic Science Ministerial Joint Statement acknowledges the importance of research that “…respect[s] the values, interests, priorities, culture and traditions of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and local communities,” notes that “Indigenous Peoples should be involved as appropriate… in the assessment and definition of Arctic research priorities,” and “recognize[s] the importance of appropriate involvement of local communities in relation to Arctic science” (2018). We recommend that early-career scientists familiarize themselves with the epistemologies, corresponding standards and terminology, and practical tools on how to effectively support Arctic residents, as decision-makers, in their own sustainable development narrative. These continue to evolve and converge and include, but are not limited to, community-based research, (participatory) action research,3 and knowledge co-production. We encourage scientists working on issues in the BaSR and BeSR to familiarize themselves with the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches, as briefly introduced below, and to seek opportunities to incorporate— and improve upon—them in their work. Further, we encourage scientists to seek out experiences in which they can partner with or shadow practitioners to learn from their organizational philosophies, tools, and methodologies—which often, either directly or indirectly, coincide with many aspects of the aforementioned scientific epistemologies.

14.7.1 Action Research

Beyond community-based research, action research frames and takes a more nuanced approached to the relationships between outside scientists and the actors, who would otherwise traditionally be thought of as research subjects or recipients of interventions or policy recommendations. Action research requires these actors to be co-researchers (Reason and Bradbury 2008). It also requires questions and issues treated in the process to be significant to co-researchers. It further stipulates that change may be a result of co-inquiry (Reason and Bradbury 2008). Action research implies an iterative process, in which the researchers are also the

3 Variably referred to as “participatory action research” and “action research” by different scientists and practice organizations. 332 M. B. A. Douglas et al. practitioners and the recipients. As action research is driven by or in close collaboration with the community seeking change, the same actors conduct research and intervention design, implementation, and evaluation in their own environments. Essentially, there should be no (otherwise detrimental) disconnect between “knowing” and “acting” in a continuous cycle of research, practice, and evaluation (Reason and Bradbury 2008). What can be problematic with this framework is the term “participatory.” Though not always used, it is commonly associated with this framework and can suggest or lead to a negative power dynamic, in which scientists invite or allow the participation of other knowledge holders in a research process dictated, explicitly or implic- itly, by classic science.

14.7.2 Knowledge Co-Production

Unlike (participatory) action research, knowledge co-production explicitly positions scientists alongside other actors as holders of knowledge in an equal partnership approach to research. In the Arctic, this is typically applied to establishing partnerships between scientists and Indigenous knowledge holders, where “…a special role belongs to indigenous researchers, who have been extensively contributing to engaging traditional ecological knowledge” (Petrov et al. 2016). The practice can include other knowledge holders, such as actors within the business and policy- making communities. Knowledge co-production technically resolves the issue of persistent negative power dynamics between scientists and indigenous researchers (Petrov et al. 2016) with its discarding of “participation” and elevation of “co-research.” However, there is still the issue of scenarios in which research should be locally initiated, and local actors should be primary researchers. Questions then arise of how scientists could be helpful in a supporting role. Also, whether in a partnership or support capacity, there always remain the challenges of combating inherent prejudices, explicit and underlying power imbalances, lack of contextual knowledge and understanding between the two communities, and fundamental cultural and value-system differences. A divide will always exist, and it is important for early-career scientists to be aware of this, acknowledge it, and strive to minimize it.

14.7.3 Partnership and Support-Driven Practice

Early-career scientists would benefit from familiarizing themselves with the practice community. There is much to learn from practitioners’ strengths and weaknesses. Significant strides have been made in ensuring that research and decision-support tool development appropriately, practically, and measurably benefit the right decision-makers, with an ever-growing emphasis on highly-rigorous data-driven approaches. Exposure to many different finely-tuned approaches (e.g. Lean Research; Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL); Human-Centered 14 Building Capacity: Education Beyond Boundaries 333

Design) helps scientists cultivate a nuanced lens they can then apply to identifying and adapting (or even developing new) tools for their own decision-support projects in the BaSR and BeSR. Ideally, early-career scientists would gain this kind of exposure through immersive opportunities at practice-focused organizations. They could partner with or shadow core staff on teams including: research, training, policy, external stakeholder relations, program and project design and implementation, and MEL. As a starting point, we recommend scientists approach community to region-level actors focused on sustainability and sustainable development issues.

14.8 Network Engagement and Leverage

Professional and peer network membership affords early-career scientists opportunities to test and debate world views and opinions outside of academic silos, access practical skills training resources (e.g. short video courses, online tutorials, workshops, etc.) not available at home institutions, initiate interdisciplinary collaborations, join communities of practice related to bridging science-policy divides, gain exposure to decision-making communities beyond the sciences, build coalitions for action, and take on extracurricular leadership and project roles (Pain 2011). Within an Arctic context, one particular network to highlight is the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (APECS) (Baeseman and Pope 2011). At many levels, APECS has worked to create a continuum of polar research leadership that is both international and interdisciplinary. APECS provides resources to help train early-career scientists in many of the core competencies described above (through webinars, panels, sessions, etc.). Due to the breadth of APECS members, engaging with APECS also encourages interdisciplinary and international thinking and understanding. APECS and similar networks serve to elevate the profile of early-career scientists, and through their advocacy provide opportunities for leadership and experience that would otherwise be unavailable; with its partners, APECS gives early-career scientists opportunities to work on international science planning, development of scientific assessments, and experience at the science-policy interface. In addition, as a grass-roots organization, participation in APECS leadership provides another opportunity for early-career scientists to build and hone skills not otherwise developed in a traditional academic education track. The University of the Arctic (UArctic), the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), and the International Arctic Social Science Association (IASSA) are other organizations which help Arctic-interested academics cross national and disciplinary boundaries. The desire to collaborate internationally on Arctic science has also been formalized at the government level by the ‘Arctic Science Agreement’ (Berkman et al. 2017), but it will rely on both nations and networks to successfully implement this intention. Each with slightly different audiences, these organizations facilitate Arctic education, science, and research through a wide range of forums, programs, and opportunities. Like APECS, however, 334 M. B. A. Douglas et al.

Table 14.2 Summary of main points 1. Responding to the complex Arctic Sustainable responses to complex emerging issues in the BeSR and BaSR require holistic and collaborative approaches to research, analysis, and decision-support. 2. Critical skills, tools, and experiences Early-career scientists seeking to support the decision-making behind sustainable response require a critical set of skills, tools, and experiences: Science Communication; Cross-Cultural Awareness, Sensitivity, & Understanding; Partnership & Capacity-Building Approaches to Research Processes and Tool Development; and Network Engagement & Leverage. 3. Preparatory gap However, support for and access to resources for growth in these areas can be limited within academic institutions. The need to address this significant preparatory gap is urgent. 4. Re-frame education We encourage institutions to begin rebuilding the classic model for science education and training to include prioritization of—And reward for—Holistic thinking and transdisciplinary collaboration. 5. Streamline the conversation We also encourage the Arctic science community to streamline discussions surrounding the skills and tools necessary for effective decision-support.

participation is entirely voluntary, and so, increased initiative and effort are required by early-career scientists. Arctic science is moving towards systems thinking and extending such thinking to research impacts in a natural next step. As such, in addition to network participation, network analysis skills (e.g., systems thinking, power-mapping) position early- career scientists to effectively identify and map key actors, the resources they represent, and their relative power and relationships to one another within a given community, organization, or field. The resulting map can reveal previously hidden connections, resources, and leverage points (Meadows 1999). Developing an understanding of a network provides insight into the context in which an early-career scientist is operating, which is crucial for developing decision-making strategies (Austin 2010). This tool can be applied to research populations, environments, collaborators/partners, peer resource groups, and clients to better inform research design, implementation, and tool development and delivery (e.g., Schiffer 2007). It can also better position early-career scientists to integrate into networks and think deliberately about how they can most productively engage with—and perhaps build new—networks (Table 14.2).

14.9 Conclusion

The BeSR and BaSR regions are undergoing sustained change, which yields both opportunities and risks (i.e. emerging issues). Within our colleagues’ work in this volume, we identified four broad categories of emerging regional issues: 14 Building Capacity: Education Beyond Boundaries 335

• Ensuring protection of ecosystems, while also supporting regional economic development; • Preserving local languages and cultures; • Promoting and facilitating adequate and just information and knowledge exchange between scientists and local knowledge holders; and • Supporting and facilitating inclusive decision-making and governance.

These issues exist within overlapping and intertwined systems and impact diverse actors, such that sustainable responses require holistic and collaborative approaches to research, analysis, and decision-support. In particular, collaboration is vital to effective and timely response. We recommend early-career scientists acquire a set of cross-cultural and interdisciplinary skills and tools to ensure they are adequately equipped to contribute to sustainable responses. Specifically, we point to Science Communication; Cross-Cultural Awareness, Sensitivity, & Understanding; Partnership & Capacity-Building Approaches to Research Processes and Tool Development; and Network Engagement & Leverage. We recognize, however, that support for and access to resources for growth in these areas can be limited within academic institutions. In the context of an increasingly dynamic and rapidly changing Arctic, the need to address this significant preparatory gap is urgent. While motivated early-career scientists with the right exposure might independently encounter and consider our recommendations, academic institutions might well also consider how to better emphasize, introduce, and enable access to critical skills, tools, and experiences. We encourage institutions to begin rebuilding the classic model for science education and training to include prioritization of—and reward for—holistic thinking and transdisciplinary collaboration. Specifically,

• Invest in furthering the actual research and practice surrounding effective interdisciplinary and sustainability studies; • Expand instructional, curricular, and extracurricular capacity to support students in acquiring practical skills, tools, and experiences within their home institutions; • Allocate financial support for participation in workshops, short courses, and immersive cross-cultural and cross-sectoral experiences oriented toward practical skill acquisition; and • Extend membership in international and interdisciplinary Arctic networks.

An investment in the above not only yields better scientists, but also ensures graduate degree programs will evolve with the changing Arctic to remain relevant and accountable to decision-makers. Further, investment in the above will ensure graduate degree programs position themselves competitively to prospective students interested in yielding practical value to society. Building on this theme, we also encourage the Arctic science community to streamline discussions surrounding the skills and tools necessary for effective 336 M. B. A. Douglas et al. decision-support. In partnership with policy-makers, Indigenous and local residents, academic institutions, and practitioner organizations, the science community can consider practical forward steps for better defining and coordinating education and training priorities and resources.

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Oran R. Young, Paul Arthur Berkman, and Alexander N. Vylegzhanin

Abstract To distill the principal contributions of our work on governing Arctic seas, this concluding chapter focuses on two themes: the governance of ecopolitical regions and the practice of informed decisionmaking. We organize our discuss of governance around five key issues: (i) going beyond panaceas, (ii) dealing with institutional interplay, (iii) avoiding institutional rigidity, (iv) joining institutions and infrastructure, and (v) developing new tools. Our key observation regarding the practice of informed decisionmaking concerns the importance of developing an end-to-end relationship between analysts and practitioners. Whereas many discussions dealing with decision support tools focus on helping practitioners to assess the likely consequences associated with specific options, we broaden the discussion of the roles of science diplomacy to include contributions relating to the stages of the policy cycle dealing with agenda formation and the evaluation of the results arising from choices made in policy arenas.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 341 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_15 342 O. R. Young et al.

15.1 Introduction

What have we learned from our work on governing Arctic seas that is relevant beyond the confines of the two cases we have explored in depth? More broadly, can we draw lessons from these cases that are of general interest to the challenge of promoting informed decisionmaking for the sustainability of ecopolitical regions? And are there insights arising from the work we have reported in this book that can help us not only to seed our thinking about subsequent volumes in the series on Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability but also to improve the practice of informed decisionmaking and strengthen the role of science diplomacy in that practice? We began this project with a commitment to clarifying the contributions analysts can make to informed decisionmaking pertaining to the sustainability of what we call ecopolitical regions and to coupled human-environment systems more generally. Our purpose has been to provide early warning regarding emerging issues, formulate questions about these issues, compile data and evidence pertaining to the issues, and identify options for responding to them, all without engaging in advocacy. We see it as the role of analysts to cooperate with decisionmakers in identifying key questions and to assist in formulating and evaluating the options available to them rather than to make recommendations regarding what choices decisionmakers should make as they review the menu of options in specific situations. The result is an end-to-end relationship that starts with the identification of newly emerging issues requiring policy responses and runs through the evaluation of results arising from choices once the relevant policies have been put in place. We understand that those who make decisions are constrained by the roles they play, operate within complex national and international legal environments, are responsive to the interests of a range of stakeholders, are influenced by a variety of epistemic narratives (sometimes thought of as ideologies), and are under pressure to make choices about numerous issues appearing on policy agendas at the same time. It is not our purpose to become stakeholders, advocating specific choices on the menu of options available to policymakers who must make decisions about specific issues. Nevertheless, the use of the decision support tools we have developed and deployed in this book may prove helpful both to policymakers confronted with the need to make choices about complex issues and to administrative officials responsible for implementing the decisions made in a manner that maximizes the attain- ment of the relevant goals. Our goal throughout is to provide input without advocacy. We seek to enhance the capacity of those who make decisions by ensuring that they have access to the fullest and most up-to-date information about the relevant issues. Decisionmakers can adopt or reject this input as they see fit. In the course of our work, carried out under the auspices first of the Arctic Options Project and then the Pan-Arctic Options Project, we have learned a lot about the nature of informed decisionmaking for sustainability. In substantive terms, we have developed the concept of ecopolitical regions and applied this concept to an analysis of issues relating to two important and dynamic parts of the Arctic that we describe as the Bering Strait Region (BeSR) and the Barents Sea Region (BaSR) whose distinctive features are summarized in Table 15.1. In the 15 Informed Decisionmaking for the Sustainability of Ecopolitical Regions 343

Table 15.1 Holistic characteristics of ecopolitical regions with informed decisionmaking to couple governance mechanisms and built infrastructure for sustainability Ecopolitical region characteristics Bering Strait region (BeSR) Barents Sea region (BaSR) International Russian Federation and United Russian Federation and States Norway Local-global connections Maritime ship traffic gateway to Significant marine living and the Arctic mineral resources Cultural and historical Small predominantly Large population with settler heritage indigenous communities majorities and close links to national governments System dimensions for Defined explicitly with the Defined explicitly with the intercomparisons over polygon boundaries mapped in polygon boundaries mapped in time and space Chap. 1 and Berkman et al. Chap. 1 and Vylegzhanin et al. (2016) (2018) Operating across a Decisionmaking at security to sustainability time scales with ‘continuum of urgencies’ skills, methods and theory as described in the book series preface Common-interest building Framework to facilitate inclusive dialogues among allies and adversaries alike process, we have developed a methodology and a set of tools for contributing to informed decisionmaking in a variety of settings. The selection of the BeSR and the BaSR as cases for in-depth analysis has proven beneficial in a number of ways. As regional seas, the BeSR and the BaSR are subject to a complex combination of endogenous and exogenous forces. In both cases, a major concern is safeguarding the well-being of regional socioeconomic and biophysical systems in the face of external pressures ranging from climate change to the expansion of commercial shipping. At the same time, the two cases differ in important respects. The BeSR is a region far removed from the centers of policy making in Russia and the United States and thinly populated by human communities a majority of whose residents are Indigenous. The BaSR, by contrast, encompasses areas that have long loomed large in the thinking of both Norwegian and Russian national policymakers. It has a much larger population of human residents the majority of whom are settlers. The fact that Russia is a key player in both regions has played a key role in our effort to develop a robust practice dealing with informed decisionmaking for sustainability. As the authorship and the content of the preceding chapters makes clear, this work features in-depth collaboration between Russian analysts on the one side and Norwegian and American analysts on the other. The result is a product that reflects the spirit of cooperation that we deem essential in the practice of informed decisionmaking for sustainability. We start this concluding chapter with a general observation arising from our study of governing Arctic seas that we believe is critical to any effort to address needs for governance in what we characterize as ecopolitical regions or areas featuring shared authority and responsibility by virtue of the fact that they lie beyond national jurisdiction or are bisected by political boundaries separating two or more states. We then proceed to a discussion of two sets of insights arising from our work 344 O. R. Young et al. on the governance of marine ecopolitical regions or what we call regional seas. This involves two distinct sets of observations: one dealing with key issues that pertain to the character of institutions and infrastructure required to address needs for governance effectively and the other involving improvements in the practice of informed decisionmaking for sustainability that have grown out of our applied work on the governance of Arctic seas.

15.2 Building Common Interests to Achieve Sustainability

Unlike geopolitics, a mode of analysis that draws attention to the spatial determinants of the distribution of power and to strategies that actors can use to exercise power effectively in situations highlighting competing interests, ecopolitics emphasizes the importance of building common interests across a continuum of urgencies on a scale ranging from short-term matters of security to long-term matters of sustainability as an essential element in the development of effective governance systems. Our point is not to assert that the interests of actors operating in ecopolitical regions can be expected to be fully compatible. As is typical of human affairs in all settings, the activities of actors in ecopolitical regions normally reflect a combination of incentives to cooperate and to compete, a fact that explains why we generally speak of mixed-motive interactions and the tension between what Schelling has described as micromotives and macrobehavior in thinking about needs for governance and how to fulfill them (Schelling 1960, 1978). But what emerges as a central insight in thinking about ecopolitical regions is the importance of creating institutions that set the rules of the game within which actors compete in pursuing their own interests and that constrain processes of escalation that could otherwise lead to increasingly polarized confrontations involving entrenched interests. Whereas competition in the absence of the constraints associated with the presence of suitable governance systems is apt to devolve into a free-for-all in which all participants end up as losers, competition that takes place within mutually accepted rules of the game is a normal element of human affairs and may generate results that are beneficial to all members of the community, especially as we shift our thinking from the short-term issues of security to the longer-term issues of sustainability. Thinking about governance for sustainability also draws our attention to the need to strike a balance between narrow calculations regarding gains and losses in strategic interactions and broader considerations regarding spatial and temporal impacts in thinking about the consequences of human actions. Whereas geopolitics is about the exercise of power in the here and now, ecopolitics is about the pursuit of sustainability over time. Projecting the long-term effects of actions launched today is always difficult and all the more so in the world of complex systems in which we operate today. High levels of uncertainty make it impossible to predict specific outcomes flowing from current choices with any certainty. But uncertainty does not rule out paying careful attention to the long-term consequences of current actions or to opportunities to put in place governance systems that are capable of self-correc- tion in the light of experiences across time. This observation suggests the 15 Informed Decisionmaking for the Sustainability of Ecopolitical Regions 345 importance of developing analytic techniques like the use of models to explore the behavior of complex systems and to test the sensitivity of such systems to small perturbations in the value of key variables. It is important, of course, to avoid attach- ing too much significance to findings derived from the use of such tools. A prominent feature of complex systems is the frequency of developments that are surprising. But the use of these tools does make us aware of the importance of broadening our knowledge base and lengthening our time horizons in thinking about the relative merits of the options available to those responsible for making decisions today.

15.3 Governing Ecopolitical Regions

The work reported in this book deals with what we have called joint spaces or areas that feature a lack of congruence between biogeophysical boundaries on the one hand and jurisdictional boundaries on the other. Spaces of this sort are scalar; they occur at many levels. For example, the boundaries of municipalities often bisect ecosystems that are important to the welfare of residents of the relevant communities; the boundaries of states, provinces or oblasts frequently bisect larger ecosystems creating a need for interjurisdictional coordination when it comes to addressing needs for governance regarding matters like the allocation of water from rivers that flow through multiple jurisdictions. In this book, we have directed attention to regional seas or shared marine spaces where the relevant boundaries delimit the jurisdictional reach of coastal states and the ecosystems in question are large marine systems and their associated coastal zones.1 But many of the issues we identify and the tools we have developed to enhance capacities to engage in informed decisionmaking for sustainability in these regional seas will be of interest to those interested in similar concerns arising at other spatial levels. Our study of governing Arctic seas highlights five crosscutting issues that require explicit attention in identifying and responding to emerging needs for governance in joint marine spaces or what we call regional seas wherever they occur: (i) going beyond panaceas, (ii) dealing with institutional interplay, (iii) avoiding institutional rigidity in dynamic settings, (iv) integrating institutions and infrastructure, and (v) developing and making use of new tools to build capacity and encourage end-to-end collaboration between practitioners and analysts. These issues constitute central threads running through all the chapters of this book; they tie the various contributions together into a coherent package. Here, we call out these threads explicitly and seek to capture some key insights relating to each of them.

1 We are aware, of course, of the work of Kenneth Sherman and his colleagues on the idea of large marine ecosystems (LMEs) and of the effort of the Arctic Council’s Working Group on the Protection of the Marine Environment to apply this idea to Arctic marine systems (Sherman et al. 2009; PAME 2015). Our general view is that there is no standardized and agreed upon basis for specifying the boundaries of shared marine areas, a fact that accounts for differences in efforts to determine the precise boundaries of specific regions. For our purposes, however, the essential point is that there is a mismatch between political boundaries and biogeophysical boundaries. 346 O. R. Young et al.

15.3.1 Going beyond Panaceas

To be effective governance systems for ecopolitical regions like the BeSR and the BaSR must go beyond generalized formulaic prescriptions or panaceas that fail to take into account both the existing biophysical, economic, and sociocultural features of these regional seas and anticipated developments relating to these features during the near to medium term future (Young et al. 2018). This introduces what analysts working on governance systems have come to regard as the problem of fit and calls for an exercise in institutional diagnostics to develop options for governance systems that are well-matched to the circumstances in which they operate (Young 2002, 2019; Ostrom 2007). This is why we examine the ecological, economic, and sociocultural features of the BeSR and the BaSR in some depth as a basis both for identifying emerging needs for governance and for considering options available to meet these needs in such a way as to produce sustainable results. With regard to regions that are complex and dynamic, avoiding formulaic thinking is particularly critical. The marine ecopolitical regions of the Arctic provide striking examples. The impacts of climate change are surfacing more quickly and dramatically in the Arctic than anywhere else on the planet. The ice regime of the BeSR is changing dramatically; Atlantification (or borealization) is leading to rapid warming of the waters of the northern part of the BaSR. These developments are affecting the biota of the two regions and, as a consequence, both the economic and sociocultural systems operating in these regional seas. They are also attracting the attention of outside actors interested in matters like the potential of commercial shipping passing through both the BeSR and the BaSR. All this means that the occurrence of change is one of the most important features of these regions when it comes to thinking about ways to address needs for governance and the associated infrastructure required to administer the governance systems adopted. Any governance system that becomes frozen in place or locked into a particular set of standard operating procedures and does not include an advanced capacity to identify and respond to change is bound to fail in settings of this sort.

15.3.2 Dealing with Institutional Interplay

There is a need also to develop holistic approaches well-suited to addressing the interplay among sectoral arrangements dealing with specific human activities like fishing, shipping, oil and gas development, tourism, protected areas, the conduct of scientific research, and so forth. It is not sufficient in ecopolitical regions like the BeSR and the BaSR to focus on the development of institutional arrangements on a sector-by-sector basis without considering how these arrangements are likely to impact one another. Effective governance will require the development of regimes that are able to accommodate interactions across issue areas, without compromising their ability to meet needs for governance arising within individual issue areas (Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Oberthür and Stokke 2011). A particularly important consideration in such situations is the search for ways to promote synergistic interactions. In thinking about the pursuit of 15 Informed Decisionmaking for the Sustainability of Ecopolitical Regions 347 sustainability in the two regions, therefore, we explore options for coordination across issue areas, ranging from informal mechanisms designed to address such concerns on an ad hoc basis to more formal arrangements that could evolve in due course into regional management authorities. This feature links our study of governing Arctic seas to the rapidly growing literature on what are known as regime complexes (Alter and Raustiala 2018). Regime complexes are collections of institutional arrangements that deal with human activities occurring in the same spatial or functional domain and involve overlapping sets of actors but that are not arranged in a hierarchical relationship to one another. Often, there is no prospect that the individual elements of such complexes can be melded together into larger integrated institutions. But there is clearly a need to manage the resultant interactions in order to avoid conflicts and to take advantage of opportunities for synergy (Oberthür and Gehring 2006). A particularly interesting opportunity in this regard arises when it is possible to construct infrastructure that is useful in providing services (e.g. secretariats or monitoring systems) to two or more elements of a regime complex at the same time (Raustiala and Victor 2004). In settings where resources are limited and the proliferation of bureaucratic red tape constitutes a growing problem, the pursuit of efficiency in managing regime complexes looms as a matter of rising concern.

15.3.3 Avoiding Institutional Rigidity/Enhancing Institutional Responsiveness

There is a natural tendency to cast governance systems in the form of legally binding arrangements that acquire substantial staying power once they enter into force. The source of this preference lies in the common assumptions that actors are more likely to take seriously obligations spelled out in legally binding instruments than similar obligations that are more informal in nature and to make adjustments in their behavior needed to comply with formal requirements. But there is a price to be paid for this preference in situations featuring complex systems that are prone to rapid and nonlinear change and that frequently generate surprises in the form of emergent properties. To remain effective in settings of this sort, institutions must be able to adapt to changing circumstances in an agile manner (Young 2017). In actual cases, there may be a tradeoff between the benefits to be derived from making arrangements legally binding and the need to avoid institutional rigidity in dynamic settings. Finding the right balance in specific cases often emerges as one of the most important challenges facing those responsible for crafting the provisions of governance systems. Experience in other issue areas suggests a variety of mechanisms for avoiding institutional rigidity. The Arctic Council is an informal body based on the provisions of a ministerial declaration that could be adjusted or superseded whenever the signatories to the 1996 Ottawa Declaration reach agreement on desired changes. The Polar Code, an arrangement developed under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization, takes the form of amendments to existing treaties subject to approval 348 O. R. Young et al. on a no protest basis rather than requiring formal ratification by all parties. Accelerated phaseout schedules under the regime dealing with the depletion of stratospheric ozone can be adopted and added to the provisions of the regime by majority vote, so long as the relevant chemicals are already subject to regulation under the regime. Expanding the list of banned chemicals under the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants does not require any changes in the provisions of the convention itself. More generally, customary rules of international law arise from the de facto practices of states that are recognized as legally binding only over the course of time. There is no general formula for avoiding institutional rigidity; specific mechanisms are applicable to particular cases. Nevertheless, the essential point is that it is critical to find ways to avoid institutional lock in, especially in settings like those prevailing in marine ecopolitical regions that are highly dynamic.

15.3.4 Joining Institutions and Infrastructure

It is essential, in such settings, to consider systematically the relationship between the design and establishment of institutions that form the core of governance systems on the one hand and the administration of these arrangements on a day-to-day basis on the other. Whereas governance systems themselves are institutions, the administration of these systems involves not only the provision of the built infrastructure needed to operate regimes (e.g. ships, port facilities, salvage capacity, search and rescue services) but also the development of additional types of infrastructure dealing with matters like monitoring, reporting and verification, administering arrangements relating to liability and insurance, handling issues of compliance on the part of subjects, and addressing disputes relating to the application of the provisions of regimes to specific situations. While analysis of needs for governance often focuses on the design and establishment of institutional arrangements, there is no substitute for devoting attention to the practical concerns of implementation and day-to-day administration to ensure that governance systems prove effective in practice (Biermann and Bauer 2005; Jinnah 2014). New technologies offer attractive opportunities for addressing issues of this kind. A striking case in point, considered in some depth in Chap. 11, deals with uses of satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) data in managing ship traffic in a safe manner and enhancing compliance with prescriptive requirements relating to commercial shipping. Satellite observations make it possible to track individual ships operating in areas like the BeSR and the BaSR in real time. With these data in hand, officers on board ships can receive early warning of potential hazards, and authorized officials can easily check relevant databases to determine whether specific vessels are in possession of licenses to operate in the form of up-to-date Polar Certificates of the sort required under the provisions of the Polar Code that entered into force for ships exceeding 500 gross tons at the beginning of 2017. In the event that a vessel is out of compliance, the officials can notify port authorities who may refuse to allow violators to enter their ports or demand compliance with the provisions of the Polar Code as a condition for granting permission to enter the relevant 15 Informed Decisionmaking for the Sustainability of Ecopolitical Regions 349 ports. What is striking about this example is not only that it takes advantage of advanced technologies but also that it provides an effective means of promoting compliance with regulations at the international level where traditional means of monitoring are costly and often dangerous and there is no overarching government in the ordinary sense of the term that is able to enforce regulations.

15.3.5 Developing New Tools

There is no cut-and-dried way to eliminate conflicts of interest, to build cooperative relationships, or to avoid uncertainty in efforts to make informed decisions about ecopolitical regions. But we can make use of a suite of methodological tools analysts and practitioners have developed in efforts to address needs for governance in regions like the BeSR and the BaSR and refine these tools through applications to current issues relating to the governance of specific ecopolitical regions. We consider both qualitative and quantitative methods and illustrate their use as decision support tools in identifying needs for governance in ecopolitical regions and generating options worthy of consideration in efforts to meet these needs (see Chaps. 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14). We apply these methods to current issues arising in the BeSR and the BaSR. Our purpose is not to make specific recommendations or to become advocates urging decisionmakers to adopt specific courses of action. Rather, we identify emerging policy-relevant issues, suggest constructive ways to frame them for purposes of policy analysis, and explore the likely consequences associated with a range of options for responding to these issues. The role of pan-Arctic, synoptic, and secure satellite observations, which we have explored in depth, is an obvious case in point. But it is by no means the only example. Integrated ocean management is moving from the conceptual stage to the applied stage as our examination of Norwegian and Russian practices relating to the BaSR makes clear (see Chap. 10). A particularly interesting tool in this realm centers on the development of Indigenous mapping techniques (see Chap. 13). Not only are such techniques important in establishing the extent of Indigenous use and occupancy in areas like the BeSR and the BaSR; they also provide an additional source of understanding regarding the dynamics of human-environment interactions that can produce insights that mainstream natural and social science procedures fail to identify. We have found that mapping exercises can provide an effective method for integrating Indigenous knowledge into analyses of needs for governance and the options available for meeting these needs. Using the exploration of analytic tools as a point of departure, we also consider matters pertaining to education and training for those who will assume positions of responsibility in the establishment and administration of governance systems created to facilitate transboundary cooperation regarding ecopolitical regions (see Chap. 14). While there is no substitute for on-the-job training in settings of this sort, it is possible to inculcate respect for the value of multiple streams of knowledge as well as to develop the skills required to make proper use of the increasingly sophisticated techniques of analysis that can be brought to bear on governing ecopolitical regions. 350 O. R. Young et al.

15.4 Improving the Practice of Informed Decisionmaking

While these insights regarding governance systems and associated infrastructure are of obvious interest to those concerned with meeting needs for governance relating to ecopolitical regions, we have also learned a good deal in the preparation of this book about the practice of informed decisionmaking for sustainability more generally. We began in 2013–2014 with an interest in sharpening decision support tools and a general sense that the role of analysts is to help in framing questions and identifying options rather than to become advocates pushing decisionmakers toward the choice of any specific option. But our thinking about the practice of informed decisionmaking for sustainability has grown steadily throughout our work on this project. Here we draw attention to some of the most important developments in our thinking about the contributions of analysts to informed decisionmaking. Most decision support tools come into play once an issue has made its way onto a particular policy agenda; their purpose is to assist decisionmakers in considering the importance of the issue, exploring the likely consequences associated with the selection of one option or another, and evaluating tradeoffs arising from the pursuit of multiple objectives. Consider the following examples for illustrative purposes. Scientific assessments are intended to distill and make available the best judgment of the science community regarding the significance of issues that have arisen in policy arenas. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for example, engages in sustained assessments designed to aggregate scientific findings regarding developments in the Earth’s climate system and the extent to which these developments are anthropogenic in nature. It does not purport to tell decisionmakers how to respond to the issue of climate change. Scientific modeling exercises provide a means for investigating the behavior of complex systems and, more specifically, for exploring the extent to which these systems are sensitive to small changes in key variables. For example, scientists working in this area have developed the idea of planetary boundaries, a concept that introduces what are called “safe operating spaces for humanity” along with tipping points in complex systems beyond which dramatic nonlinear changes become increasingly likely (Rockström et al. 2009). Mapping software makes it possible to engage in rigorous analyses of options in cases where there is a need to designate areas in spatial terms open to different human activities. Analyses dealing with options for siting marine protected areas in such a way as to maximize their effectiveness while minimizing interference with other human activities exemplify the application of such tools. Clearly, all these tools are useful; they have contributed to informed decisionmaking in a variety of settings. But they all focus largely on the stage of the policy process centered on making decisions regarding more or less well-defined issues. Our work has convinced us that there is a need to go beyond the development and use of these tools in support of informed decisionmaking for sustainability. One way to address this point is to think in terms of an end-to-end relationship between practitioners and analysts throughout the policy process. In doing so, we can expand the scope of our thinking to include the stages of the policy process normally referred to as agenda formation, implementation, and evaluation. 15 Informed Decisionmaking for the Sustainability of Ecopolitical Regions 351

Analysts can play helpful roles in identifying emerging issues, thinking about different ways to frame them in policy settings, and determining how to prioritize these issues in specific arenas. Of course, practitioners must make the final decisions about such matters. Still, analysts can provide inputs that help practitioners to come to terms with such matters. In the work reported in this volume, for example, we have introduced the idea of ecopolitical regions and showed how this lens directs attention to the cooperative element of competitive-cooperative interactions in contrast to geopolitical thinking which directs attention to the competitive element. Recognizing that there are many issues arising in an ecopolitical region like the Bering Sea Region, we also devised a method for engaging representatives of different stakeholder groups in both identifying and prioritizing concerns arising in the region (see Chap. 5 for details). Of course, decisionmakers may choose to ignore these contributions. But the point is that what we have come to think of as science diplomacy can play a constructive role at the stage of identifying and framing issues rather than simply waiting until issues are inscribed on policy agendas to begin to think about the role of decision support. The role of analysis in moving policies from paper to practice is more straightforward in some ways, though it is critical to recognize that implementation itself is often a politicized process (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). Consider the analyses reported in Chap. 11 as a source of specific examples growing out of our work on governing Arctic seas. The construction of a large dataset derived from satellite observations relating to ship traffic makes it possible to observe trends over time in the volume and distribution of ships and to make informed decisions about the need to activate the provisions of procedures to manage ship traffic in congested areas, such as the recently adopted Bering Strait routing measures (see Chap. 5). At the same time, data relating to specific ships can be used to determine whether a vessel is in compliance with requirements articulated in the Polar Code for ships operating in polar waters. Similar observations are in order regarding the contributions of analysis to operationalizing policies in a variety of other domains. This is an area in which our observations about the need to join governance systems with appropriate infrastructure become particularly relevant. There is some tendency to overlook the stage of evaluation in thinking about the role of decision support tools. Once a decision is made about a particular issue, we often move on to address the next issue on the policy agenda, forgetting about the importance of assessing the results of prior decisions. Nevertheless, it is critical to ask about the results of policies once they have been put in place, especially in highly dynamic situations in which important conditions change in relatively short order. Evaluating the effectiveness of specific regimes is challenging not least due to the difficulties of establishing causal connections between the establishment of a regime to address a specific issue and the actual course of events relating to that issue (Young 2011). Analysts have no panaceas to offer when it comes to providing methods to meet this challenge. But they can provide input that helps not only to raise questions about assertions relating to effectiveness in specific cases that are politically motivated but also to provide careful assessments that are useful in adjusting policies over time in the interest of maintaining or even improving their effectiveness. 352 O. R. Young et al.

15.5 Conclusion

Science diplomacy and its engine of informed decisionmaking involve a language of hope to build common interests among allies and adversaries alike with tactical and strategic considerations across a ‘continuum of urgencies.’ Common-interest building as a negotiation approach stands in contrast to conflict resolution, which is best suited to addressing issues at security time scales. Applying both approaches is necessary to facilitate holistic (international, interdisciplinary and inclusive) solutions that balance national interests and common interests, as illustrated by efforts to address needs for governance in the BeSR and BaSR which we conceptualize as ecopolitical regions (Table 15.1). This book is Volume One in the Springer series of books on Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability (see the Series Preface included in this volume for a description of the series). As such, it helps to set the stage for subsequent addi- tions to the series. The next volume, currently in preparation, is tentatively entitled Building Common Interests in the Arctic Ocean with Global Inclusion. Once again, we are thinking in terms of ecopolitical regions and turning to the Arctic as the empirical focus for our work. But in the terminology introduced in Chap. 1, the emphasis in the second volume will be on what we call international spaces in contrast to joint spaces. The Arctic is an area of growing importance from the perspective of informed decisionmaking for sustainability. We expect the Arctic to be a continuing focus of attention among those who contribute to the series. But the scope for science diplomacy to contribute to informed decisionmaking extends well beyond the confines of the Arctic. Future contributions to the series may address analogous issues occurring both in other international regions and on a global scale.

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A Automatic Identification System (AIS), Action research, 324, 331, 332 20, 63, 111, 112, 242, 246–258, Adaptation, xxxii, 103, 104, 135, 216, 272, 260–263, 348 273, 282, 330 Adaptive systems complex adaptive system, 210, 271, 272 B Adjacent states, 4, 5, 188, 201 Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) Alaska Coastal Water (ACW), 28 Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), Alaska Native Place Names Project, 299 197, 200 Aquaculture see Fisheries Barents Sea Arctic agreements Barents Sea Regional Authority, 201 agreement on cooperation on aeronautical Beaufort Sea, 5, 26, 28, 38, 61, 62, 68, 69, and maritime search and rescue (SAR 99, 296 agreement) 2011, 13, 17, 245, 260 Bering Sea, 4, 5, 8–10, 26–28, 31–36, agreement on cooperation on marine oil 38–40, 43, 56–58, 61, 62, 67, 82–84, pollution preparedness and response in 98, 100–102, 106, 134, 286, 294, the arctic (MOSPA agreement) 2013, 296–300, 351 13, 17 Bering Strait agreement on enhancing international Bering Strait Regional Authority, arctic scientific cooperation (science 96, 113, 114 agreement) 2017, vii, xvii, 13, 17, 84, 245, 247, 333 international agreement to prevent C unregulated high seas fisheries in the Chukchi Sea, 8–10, 13, 26, 28, 31–33, 35, 36, central arctic ocean (CAOFA) 2018, 38–40, 42, 43, 58, 59, 62, 68, 69, 82, 106 101, 106, 112, 113 international code for ships operating in Chukotka, 11, 34, 36, 38, 50–53, 60, 61, 78, polar waters (polar code) 2014, xxxi, 85–90, 298 13, 17, 100, 105, 243, 244. 247, 252, Climate change, ix, xxxii, xxxvi, 7, 13, 16, 17, 256, 260, 347 19, 26, 38, 43, 62, 83, 89, 98, 99, 103, Arctic council 108, 112, 129, 131, 138, 168, 169, arctic marine shipping assessment 180–182, 187, 189, 191, 221, (AMSA), xxxi, xxxvi, 39, 81, 135, 136, 229, 238, 282, 303, 312, 322, 241–264 343, 346, 350 Arctic Information Ecosystem (AIE), 269–289 Co-management see Management plans Arctic Options Project, xxvii, 97, 342 Commercial shipping see Marine shipping Association of Polar Early Career Scientists Cross-cultural awareness, 323, 326, 328–330, (APECS), 323, 324, 333 334, 335

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 355 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6 356 Index

D H Data, 20, 29, 42, 48, 63, 77, 84, 96, 111, 125, Human security, xxxii, 165–182 130, 171, 186, 189, 211, 239, 242, 262, Hydrocarbons, 4, 9, 19, 49, 59, 70, 129, 151, 270, 288, 296, 314, 323, 329, 342, 351 153–157, 161, 162, 174, 187, 192, 193, Decisionmaking 195, 229, 235 decision support tools, xxv, 20, 322, 324, 326, 329, 332, 342, 349–351 informed decisionmaking, v, vi, vii, viii, xi, I xii, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, xix, xx, xxi, Indigenous knowledge, x, xvi, xvii, xxxv, 85, xxxvii, 20, 96–104, 186, 187, 189, 242, 245, 260, 294, 295, 300, 308, 242–245, 250, 253, 256, 260–264, 309, 311, 313, 323, 328, 330, 341–352 332, 349 informed decisions, 20, 96, 104, 186, 189, Indigenous mapping, 20, 294, 295, 304, 306, 242, 263, 268, 278, 310, 322, 327, 342, 308–314, 349 352 Indigenous peoples Chukchi, 52, 86, 89 Inupiaq, 75 E Sami/Saami, 8, 166, 170–172, 201 Ecopolitical regions Siberian Yupik, 9, 76 common spaces, 4, 5, 345, 350, 352 St. Lawrence Island Yupik, 76, 84 international spaces, 4, 6, 352 Yu’pik, 9, 12, 51, 52, 76, 85, 86, 89 Ecopolitics, xvi, xxv, xxvi, 4–7, 12, 15, 19, Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations 187–189, 191, 197, 198, 202, 325, Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission 341–352 (AEWC), 103, 108 Ecosystem-based management (EBM), 26, Eskimo Walrus Commission (EWC), 108 40–43, 136, 208–210, 213–215 Kawerak, 78, 81, 84, 294, 296, 297 ELOKA Project, xxxv, 299, 313 Information ecology, 269–289 Evidence, vii, x, xiii, xiv, xv, 20, 69, 96, Information ecosystem, 269–289 98–104, 131, 186, 189–193, 242, 243, Infrastructure 245, 250, 256, 260, 262, 272, 304, 324, built infrastructure, v, vi, vii, xi, xiii, xv, 327, 330, 342 xvi, xx, xxi, 104, 109–111, 199, 200, Exclusive economic zones, xix, xxi, 4, 8, 11, 242, 245, 250, 261–263, 343, 348 174, 190, 195, 218, 235, 236 Institutions institutional diagnostics, 346 institutional interplay, 198, 202, 263, F 345, 346 Finnmark Act 2005, 171, 303 Integrated ocean management, 20, 193, 194, Fisheries 197, 200, 207–239, 349 aquaculture, 132, 144, 145, 150, 159, 160, Interests 174, 187, 199, 212, 304, 305 common interests, 6, 152, 193, 243, 245, commercial fishing, 9, 32, 38, 42, 49, 260, 264, 270, 343, 344, 352 53–57, 59, 61, 62, 64, 70, 71, 106, 110, International agreements 128, 132, 139, 151, 191, 232 convention for the protection of the marine environment of the north-east Atlantic (OSPAR) 1992, 196 G international convention for the prevention Geopolitics, 6, 65, 111, 114, 167, 168, 170, of pollution from ships (MARPOL) 172, 175, 178, 180, 182, 188, 344, 351 1973-1978, 13, 17, 101, 105, Governance 109, 192, 243 governance mechanisms, v, vi, vii, xi, xiii, international convention for the safety of xv, xvi, xvii, xx, 10, 111, 242, 245, life at sea (SOLAS) 1974, 13, 17, 101, 250, 260–263, 343 105, 111, 242, 243 Index 357

international convention on standards of Marine mammals training, certification and watchkeeping seals, 32, 37, 60, 76, 77, 79, 82, 86, 100, for seafarers (STCW) 1978, 101, 243 108, 124, 128, 129, 138, 144, 145, 148, Norwegian-Russian boundary treaty 2010, 208, 295–298 5, 16, 199 walrus, 31, 32, 37, 39, 60, 76, 82, 86, 89, treaty of Paris/Spitsbergen treaty 1920, 100, 102, 108, 128, 296, 298 14, 17, 188, 190, 195 whales, 7, 30–32, 35–38, 60, 76, 78, 86, UN convention on the law of the sea 87, 100, 102, 103, 108, 109, 126, 128, (UNCLOS) 1982, x, xix, 4, 11, 13, 17, 129, 144, 145, 148, 298 105, 114, 188, 194, 195, 201, 242 Marine shipping International arctic science committee (IASC), arctic marine traffic system, 246, 258 xvii, 42, 123, 276, 277, 324, 333 ship traffic, 26, 43, 97, 100, 102, 110, International association of arctic social 114, 138, 192, 200, 242, 246–250, scientists (IASSA), 324, 333 252, 253, 256–258, 260, 261, 263, International council for the exploration of the 343, 348, 351 sea (ICES), 128, 131, 132, 144, 145, vessel routing systems, 100, 104 161, 174, 190, 194, 199–201, 210, vessel traffic, 7, 9, 39, 63, 68, 69, 80, 81, 211, 232 83, 84, 89, 100, 106, 110, 112 International court of justice (ICJ), 14 Marine transportation, see marine shipping International maritime organization (IMO), Migratory birds, 12, 34, 38, 39, 100, 222 13, 84, 100, 101, 104, 106, 192, 242, Mining 243, 247, 248, 252, 256–258, Red dog mine, 54, 56, 58, 63, 64, 66, 82, 260, 261, 263, 347 99, 101 Invasive species, 20, 26, 33, 105, 109, Murmansk, 9, 15, 16, 120, 132, 133, 136, 137, 135, 221 151–157, 160–162, 166, 167, 171–173, 177–179, 187, 215, 221

J Joint Norwegian-Russian commission on N environmental cooperation, 18, 188, Northern sea route (NSR), 12, 16, 53, 63–65, 194, 197, 211–212, 239 67, 71, 99, 101, 112, 138, 147, Joint Norwegian-Russian fisheries 155–157, 180, 182, 191, 193, 234, 236, commission, 145, 152–153, 159, 181, 245, 254 188, 190, 191, 194, 199, 210 Northwest passage, 63, 67, 81, 99, 112, 195, 245 Norwegian Sea, 9, 12, 15, 120, 121, 125, K 128, 132, 136, 161, 166, 173, 174, 198, Knowledge co-production, vii, xv, xvi, xvii, 212, 238 xx, 294, 309, 324, 331, 332 Kola peninsula, 134, 154, 155, 157–158, 167, 172, 173, 177, 180, 187, 189, 226, 234, O 236, 301, 303 Ocean acidification, 32, 33, 43, 125, 149, 221 Oil and gas, see hydrocarbons Opposite states, 4, 5 L Options, 4, 20, 65, 96, 114, 186, 194, 200, Large marine ecosystems (LMEs), 15, 19, 40, 235, 243, 263, 277, 283, 311, 342, 350 41, 43, 120, 136, 208, 239, 245, 345 OSPAR, 15, 134, 194, 196, 197, 201

M P Management plans Panaceas, 345, 346, 351 co-management, 38, 39, 82, 84, 85, 88, Pan-Arctic Options Project, vii, 4, 20, 257, 108, 120, 131, 171, 313 277, 278, 286, 289, 342 358 Index

Partnerships and capacity building, 312, 324, Science communication, 323, 326, 327, 326, 330–331, 334, 335 334, 335 Pechora Sea, 137, 153–155, 226, 234–236 Science diplomacy, vi, vii, viii, ix, xiii, xv, xvi, Polar bears, 13, 14, 17, 37, 79, 88, 108, 124, xvii, xxii, xxvi, xxviii, 242–243, 260, 128–130, 138, 194, 221, 222, 298 262, 264, 342, 351, 352 Polar silk road, 180, 252 Sea birds, 8, 144, 148, 225 Protected areas Sea ice, 7, 19, 26, 43, 63, 66, 75, 89, 97, 108, marine protected areas (MPAs), 109, 134, 121, 138, 187, 189, 208, 222, 242, 261, 135, 137, 193, 197, 198, 235, 282, 350 295, 301, 325 Social network analysis, 281, 284, 286 SpaceQuest, 242, 246–249, 251, 256, 261 Q Spacetime cube, 242, 248, 249, 251, 253, 261 Questions, viii, ix, xiii, xv, xvi, xx, xxi, xxvi, Subsistence, 7, 9, 19, 29–31, 34–39, 42, 20, 82, 96–98, 100, 103, 105, 131, 138, 43, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 56, 59–62, 171, 186, 187, 189–191, 193, 242, 243, 69–71, 78–81, 83, 86–91, 97, 99, 245, 249, 252–254, 256, 258, 260–263, 100, 102, 103, 108–110, 137, 250, 274, 278, 283, 286, 287, 297, 303, 307, 294, 296, 298, 299, 312, 314 325, 328, 330–332, 342, 345, 350, 351 Sustainability Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), xi–xiii, xv, xvi, xvii R Svalbard Regime Svalbard Archipelago, 5, 14, 137, 144, regime complex, 96, 112–114, 186, 198, 151, 190, 191, 193, 195, 197, 254 200–202, 347 Regional seas, 5–8, 18–20, 343–346 Reindeer, 52, 85–88, 144, 158, 171, 172, T 302, 303 Tourism, 9, 39, 48, 49, 58, 59, 67–68, 70, 71, 81, 99, 109, 143, 144, 148–150, 159, 192, 220, 254, 255, 346 S Tromsø, xxvii, xxviii, 9. 16, 120, 143, 167, Satellite AIS record, 242, 246, 250, 251, 257, 175, 183, 187, 188, 243, 301, 260–262, 348 306, 330