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Lessons in Disaster: Mcgeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam Pdf, Epub, Ebook LESSONS IN DISASTER: MCGEORGE BUNDY AND THE PATH TO WAR IN VIETNAM PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Gordon M. Goldstein | 320 pages | 25 Dec 2009 | Henry Holt & Company Inc | 9780805090871 | English | New York, United States Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam PDF Book That was because LBJ was focused on getting elected and could therefore not afford to withdraw troops and risk being perceived as soft on communism nor expand the war and lose votes because of that. Attrition is a brutal measuring stick," he affirmed. The last chapter seems a little excessive in defending a big "what-if" arguing that things would have been better had Kennedy not died , but I'm told that that is unsurprisingly a traditional topic for debate in Vietnam literature. Why did they not listen to the analysis they had? A chilling look at the precarious line between success and tragedy. Lessons in Disaster provides a wonderful behind-the-scenes look at the political machinations and gamesmanship roiling in the White House. Goldstein October 6, , PM. Decide policy based on popularity. Turns out that the incredibly wealthy Boston elite do, you know, like the Lowells who talk only to Cabots, or the Cabots who talk only to God. This expert piece of journalism by a brave man about brave men follows three soldiers Some of the highlights for me were the Bay of Pigs review. I made mistakes of perception, recommendation and execution. Details if other :. He endured so much, including being a POW for a time, and was part of the team that set up the Hamburger Hill nightmare. They assured the President that the population would join up with the invading force and take back their country. In that context, presidential decision- making became increasingly focused on the imperatives of a local war and less on its damaging impact on America's world role. In the end, though, I felt like the book was let down by Goldstein's ra This is something of an unusual book in that it is primarily concerned not with narrative history, but with the lessons of Bundy's involvement in the Vietnam escalation—or more aptly, the lessons Bundy tried to draw about Bundy's involvement. And while bundy at the time thou not easily, justified his support of Americanizing the Vietnam war, in hindsight he saw how wrong he was. Despite his remarkable intellect, Bundy ultimately failed to grasp the fundamental novelty of the historical challenge posed by a communism fanatically driven by nationalistic anticolonialist passions. What makes this one hit home though, is right in the second chapter where it explains how often Bundy went to the DC Vietnam memorial and ran his hands over the names etched in stone, constantly re-evaluating his role in such a costly mass of human life. You can assuredly tell that Bundy is an educated man, but it seems he never asks all of the questions about what the fallout of it all may be. Return to Book Page. Frustrated by a deteriorating relationship with President Johnson, he was on the precipice of resigning as national security advisor. McNamara was vague, however, in delineating the causal logic of his proposed strategy, positing the escalation not as the military means to a military objective but simply as an end in itself. Trying to explain so that you can justify your decisions while making more money thanks to book sales in My dad was a Vietnam vet. Bundy would ruminate out loud, reconstructing the power structure of the two different administrations and the proximity of the key players to the president. Wisdom for a few of them came after Vietnam. Let's see. Three weeks later JFK was assassinated and no one knows how he would have dealt with Vietnam. The code name for the invasion was "Operation Zapata. George Bush's War. Between this and Fog of War , I'm a little tired of nicely packaged "lessons" from Vietnam. Goldstein, the co-author of a history of the war started by Bundy but left incomplete due to Bundy's death. Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam Writer In this original and provocative work of presidential history, Gordon M. When discussion resumed that afternoon, Ball was given the floor to present his challenge to the Pentagon escalation plan. His mission, Bundy retrospectively concluded, was to negotiate a deal with the U. He inherited the Bay of Pigs concept from his predecessor Dwight D. McGeorge Bundy, a genius: Look, losing the war is fine, as long as we sacrifice ,00 lives first. He advised me to be wary of the "paper trail way of missing the political point. Goldstein's book helps us comprehend how Americans were led, step by step, into the abyss of Vietnam. But these first discussions had a deeper value as well. More from Foreign Policy. Overall, it works as a rough sketch of the dynamics contributing to the war, and an introduction to the major players and events. He died before the project was completed, but Goldstein has used Bundy's notes and a number of detailed interviews to provide a compelling and sympathetic, although hardly uncritical, account of the slide into the morass. This is a solid story, but better told in H. In this original and provocative work of presidential history, Gordon M. Click here to learn more. It is a facinating study of contrasts thou to see the steps and arguments that take place when debating whether to enter the arena in a war. Bundy had, for example, previously undermined the secretary of state. McNamara was vague, however, in delineating the causal logic of his proposed strategy, positing the escalation not as the military means to a military objective but simply as an end in itself. It was clear from the beginning that Bundy was distinctly uninterested in the topics of Vietnamese nationalism and the origins of the communist insurgency. Some leaders are willing to flip sides depending on the deals on offer or the momentum on the ground. The most celebrated were Secretary of Defense Robert S. In , Bundy became dean of the faculty at Harvard — an astonishing responsibility for someone still only Kennedy and Lyndon B. Rating details. There has to be another format. I make the time because it's important. Bundy spoke only occasionally about Vietnam after he left government, but when he did, he supported the war. And while bundy at the time thou not easily, justified his support of Americanizing the Vietnam war, in hindsight he saw how wrong he was. You can assuredly tell that Bundy is an educated man, but it seems he never asks all of the questions about what the fallout of it all may be. The project was halted after Bundy's sudden death, and the final product is probably not the book that Bundy and the author had originally planned. Members save with free shipping everyday! It also offers key lessons to the deciders of tomorrow: should America choose to enter a war, it should have clear objectives to accomplish and know why it is doing so. As the Obama administration rethinks its strategy in Afghanistan, officials are turning to Gordon M. The lessons that Goldstein learns from Bundy's mistakes are simple and elegant, yet far too easily ignored. Sep 29, Peter rated it really liked it Shelves: non-fiction. Maybe for another book. The president-elect was searching for counselors with whom he felt comfortable but who were "also acceptable to what was then called the Establishment," Bundy observed. Surely, if Obama has a Vietnam moment, it will come in Afghanistan. Why was Bundy in a position as national security advisor, when he was clearly not qualified? Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam Reviews He advised me to be wary of the "paper trail way of missing the political point. From the evidence in this book, it seems possible. Imperial Ambitions: Conversations with Noam Chomsky on the. Oct 21, Garrett Burnett rated it it was amazing Shelves: war , history , politics. William Westmoreland, delivered a bleak report from the front. But for five years, he had been present at the most critical moments of the escalation, and he had supported all of them; he was one of the primary architects and defenders of the war. In both periods, the U. He examines the choices that led to the expansion of the Vietnam War. To ask other readers questions about Lessons In Disaster , please sign up. I don't know the history of that time period to , roughly well enough to comment on the accuracy and thoroughness of what was covered, but as a reader I felt like I got a fairly thorough timeline of important events. Bundy would ruminate out loud, reconstructing the power structure of the two different administrations and the proximity of the key players to the president. It is hard enough to get kids to give reading a chance without the President of the United States implying that reading is not necessary to be successful. Not a bad book, per se, but one almost entirely redundant. This voluminous chronological compilation of documents about Vietnam policy—memoranda, meeting summaries, cables, correspondence, intelligence estimates, defense analyses, mission reports—was unexplored historical territory for Bundy. I didn't get a good sense of why he was considered one of the architects of the war when he seemed to write a lot of memos that presidents seemed to ignore. The primary argument that Goldstein advances is one that defends the reputation of Kennedy at the expense of Johnson.
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