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Project Tasks 3&4 Final Draft Report Reconstruction Of PROJECT TASKS 3&4 FINAL DRAFT REPORT RECONSTRUCTION OF HISTORICAL ROCKY FLATS OPERATIONS & IDENTIFICATION OF RELEASE POINTS AUGUST 1992 Prepared by: ChemRiskB A Division of McLaredHart 1135 Atlantic Avenue Alameda, CA 94501 S W-A-0056 12 c I TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1 1.1 The Rocky Flats Toxicologic Review and Dose Reconstruction Project ..... 1 1.2 Documentation of Rocky Flats History .................................5 REFERENCES ...................................................... 8 2.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS ...................... 9 2.1 Review of Classified and Controlled Access Records ...................9 2.1.1 The Building 706 Technical Library . : ....................... 11 ... 2.1.2 The Building 881 Archives ................................. 12 ... .. 2.1.3 Classified Safety Analysis Files .............................. 13 .. 2.2 Unclassified Rocky Flats Information Sources ....................... 13 ..... 2.2.1 The Environmental Master File ............................. 13 2.2.2 Industrial Safety Office Files ............................... 16 2.2.3 Occurrence Management Department Records ................. 16 2.2.4 Federal Government Information Sources ..................... 17 2.2.4.1 The Federal Records Center ......................... 17 2.2.4.2 DOE Effluent Information System .................... 23 2.2.4.3 DOE On-site Discharge Information System ............. 25 2.2.4.4 The DOE Energy Library in Germantown, Maryland ...... 25 . 2.2.5 Pertinent Regulatory Documents ............................ 26 2.2.5.1 Colorado Department of Health Files .................. 26 2.2.5.2 Air Pollution Emission Notices ....................... 26 2.2.5.3 Waste Stream & Residue Identification and Characterization Reports ..... ..................... 27 2.2.5.4 Information Related to Section 104(e) of CERCLA ....... 27 2.2.5.5 Safety Analysis Reports ............................ 28 2.2.6 Records Related to Litigation .............................. 29 2.2.6.1 The Legal Database ............................... 29 2.2.6.2 The LegaVEnvironmental (Church Litigation) Files ........ 30 2.2.6.3 Files Gathered by Attorneys for Jim Stone .............. 33 TABLE OF CONTsENTS (Continued) 2.2.7 Records of Concerned Individuals and Organizations ............ 34 2.2.7.1 The Cobb Files ................................... 34 2.2.7.2 The Johnson Files ................................. 35 2.2.7.3 The Martell Files .................................. 35 2.2.7.4 Rocky Flats Environmental Monitoring Council .......... 35 2.2.8 Citizen Contributions .................................... 36 2.2.9 Other Information Sources ................................. 36 . ... 2.2.9.1 CSU Dept of Radiology and Radiation Biology ........... 36 .... ... 2.2.9.2The City:of Broomfield Water Department ............... 36 ........ 2.2.9.3 Aerial Photographs ................................. 36 . 2:2.9.4 EG&G Employee Communications Department ....... : .. 37 I . 2.10 Interviews and Inspections ...................................... 37 .REFERENCES ..................................................... 42 3.0 A HISTORY OF ROCKY FLATS PLANT OPERATIONS ................... 43 3.1 Missions .................................................... 43 3.2 Site Development ............................................. 47 3.3 The Main Functions of Rocky Flats and their Development .............. 53 3.3.1 Material Recovery and Purification ........................... 59 3.3.2 Component Manufacturing and Assembly ..................... 72 3.3.3 Waste Processing ....................................... 80 3.3.4 Research and Development ................................ 85 3.3.5 Plant Support ............................................ 91 REFERENCES ..................................................... 97 4.0 USES OF MATERIALS OF CONCERN ................................ 103 4.1 Key Information Sources ...................................... 103 4.2 Emission Source Maps and Material Use Profiles .................... 104 4.3 Grouping of the Material Use Profiles ............................. 106 I REFERENCES .................................................... 162 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 5.0 HISTORICAL RELEASE POINTS .................................... 167 5.1 Airborne Emissions ........................................... 168 5.2 Waterborne Emissions ....................................... .. 177 5.3 On-Site Waste Disposal Practices ................................ 184 5.4 Waste Received from Off-Site Sources ............................. 198 REFERENCES .................................................... 206 .... - 6.0 ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS AT THE ROCKY FLATS PLANT .. .......209. .... ... ,.I .. 6.1 Sources of Accident Information ..................... ...........209! :,:,:, ,.,,..'t 6.2 Accidents of Potential Interest .................................. 214 . t. .. .. ... 6.2.1 Plutonium-Accidents .................................... 2 1 5 ... .>.. 6.2.2 Tritium Accidents ...................................... 24 1 ..... 6.2.3 Chemical Accidents .................... : ................ 248 .. : '.: 6.3 Conclusions Regarding Rocky Flats Accidents and Incidents ......: .... 251 REFERENCES ................................................... 252 7.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ................................... 256 INDEX ............................................................... 259 APPENDICIES -APPENDIX A: ROCKY FLATS HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION INTERVIEWS' APPENDIX B: BUILDING SUMMARIES APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1-1 Tasks of the Rocky Flats Toxicologic Review and Dose Reconstruction Project ..... 2 1-2 Elements of the Rocky Flats Historical Investigation ...........: ..............6 2- 1 Rocky Flats Facility Main On-Site Information Sources ...................... 10 2-2 Off-Site Information Sources .......................................... 18 2-3 The Interview Process ............................................... 39 3-1 Schematic Diagram of Gun Type and Implosion Weapon Systems .............. 46 3-2 1953 Site Map ...................................................... 48 3-3 1954 Aerial Photo of the Rocky Flats Plant ............................... 49 ... 3-4 Rocky Flats Plant Employment Level Trend ................................. 50 ... : . 7.... 3-5 .. 1964 Site.Map' .....: ....':. ........................................ i. .. .I...... '.,.52 : 7....... .... 3-6 1971 Site Map : ................................................. :: .... 55% . 3-7... 1980 Site Map . '..... it . ; ...................................................%; .... 56 ....,. '.a.L......... .. 3-8 ... 1990 Site Map ................................................. .....: ........ ' ::;.5 7 . ...... 3-9 The Modern-Day Rocky Flats Facility ................................... 58 . ... - . ... 3-10 .I. A Typical Glove-Box Line ......................................... :::;v62' : ... 3- 1 1 . Plutonium Recovery Process ............................................... 64 3- 12 Historical Americium'Extraction, Recovery, and Purification Processes ........... 70 4- 1 Americium Air Emission Sources ...................................... 110 4-2 Beryllium Air Emission Sources ....................................... 112 4-3 Carbon Tetrachloride Air Emission Sources .............................. 114 4-4 Chloroform Air Emission Sources ..................................... 116 4-5 Methylene Chloride Air Emission Sources ............................... 118 4-6 Plutonium Air Emission Sources ........................................ 120 4-7 Tetrachloroethylene Air Emission Sources ............................... 122 4-8 Thorium Air Emission Sources ........................................ 124 4-9 1, 1 , 1 -Trichloroethane Air Emission Sources .............................. 126 4- 10 Trichloroethylene Air Emission Sources ................................. 128 4- 1 1 Tritium Air Emission Sources ......................................... 130 4-12 Uranium Air Emission Sources ........................................ 132 4- 13 Benzene Air Emission Sources ............................... : ........ 136 4- 14 Benzidine Air Emission Sources ........................................ 138 4- 15 173-ButadieneAir Emission Sources ..................................... 140 4- 16 Cadmium Compounds Air Emissions Sources ............................. 142 4- 17 Chromium Compounds Air Emission Sources ............................. 144 4- 18 Ethylene Oxide Air Emission Sources ................................... 146 4-19 Formaldehyde Air Emission Sources .................................... 148 4-20 Hydrazine Air Emission Sources ....................................... 150 4-2 1 Lead Compounds Air Emission Sources ................................. 152 4-22 Mercury Compounds Air Emission Sources .............................. 154 4-23 Nickel Compounds Air Emission Sources ................................ 156 4-24 Nitric Acid Air Emission Sources ...................................... 158 4-25 Propylene Oxide Air Emission Sources . 160 .. ... ,. ' -. ... .. .. .. .:. .:. ." ... .. ., . .. .. I ,.. , . .. ! < '.. ' . 9 ., ., LIST OF FIGURES (Continued) Figure Page 5- 1 Rocky Flats Ponds and Creeks ........................................ 178 5-2 The Rocky Flats B-Series and A-Series Retention Ponds .................... 180 5-3 Major Reservoirs Near Rocky Flats .................................... 182 5-4 On-Site Waste Disposal Sites ........................................
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