UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Forgotten By History: The Panama Canal in World War Two

by

Andrew Robert Lefebvre

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFULMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

APRIL, 2009

©Andrew Robert Lefebvre 2009 Library and Bibliotheque et 1*1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition

395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Canada Canada

Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-49613-8 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-49613-8

NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par Plntemet, prefer, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. reproduced without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne Privacy Act some supporting sur la protection de la vie privee, forms may have been removed quelques formulaires secondaires from this thesis. ont ete enleves de cette these.

While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. Canada ii Abstract

The Panama Canal was one of the most important strategic targets in the Western

Hemisphere during World War Two and absolutely vital to the American war effort. The

United States expended valuable manpower and materiel to protect the Canal from a number of threats, perceived or real, during this time. The security of the Canal reinforced American fears that the Latin America was rife with subversion and that the

Canal itself was extremely vulnerable.

In its defense of the Canal the U.S. military had to prepare for a number of different situations. The military had to prepare the Canal for defense against a direct

Axis attack, not unlike the Japanese raid at Pearl Harbor. In order to do this it significantly escalated the American presence in Panama. The military also prepared a fortified perimeter consisting of air and sea patrols from islands that formed a thousand mile ring around Panama.

The Roosevelt administration and the U.S. State Department feared that the domestic political environment of Panama would cause problems for the security of the

Canal. The 1930s and early 1940s were tumultuous years for Panamanian politics. There were two coups that overthrew the democratically elected governments and a number of violent election campaigns. In addition to domestic politics, the election of the ultra- nationalistic Arnulfo Arias Madrid caused the U.S. government considerable anxiety due to his nationalistic and somewhat anti-American policies.

U.S. intelligence services feared espionage and sabotage by Axis subversives.

Intelligence officials watched and investigated operatives from all the Axis nations plus a

few associates. The Germans and Japanese had strong contingents in Panama. The

iii Spanish Falange and the Vichy assisted these primary belligerents with help for their espionage, propaganda and sabotage activities. In order to deal with the sabotage the U.S.

military instituted anti-sabotage measures throughout the Canal Zone.

IV TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval Page ii

Abstract iii

Table of Contents v

List of Maps vi

Maps vii

Introduction 1

Chapter 1: The 1930s 10

Chapter 2: U.S. Reaction to the Outbreak of War in Europe 38

Chapter 3; Political Instability on the Isthmus, 1939-1940 60

Chapter 4: Continued Political Instability on the Isthmus, 1940-1941 80

Chapter 5: Foreign Subversive Elements, 1939-1941 106

Chapter 6: War Comes to the Western Hemisphere 126

Chapter 7: Defense of the Canal, 1941-1945 153

Chapter 8: Foreign Subversive Elements, 1941-1945 180

Conclusion 211

Notes 219

Bibliography 252

v LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATAIONS

Map of the Panama Canal vii

Map of the Canal Zone viii

Panama Political Map ix

Map of Panama Showing Places Mentioned in the Text ix

Map of the Caribbean x

Map of Shipping Losses to U-Boats xi

Map of U-Boat Losses in Caribbean Theatre xi

Map: Location of Clipperton Island, Cocos Island, and Galapagos 24

Map: Location of Las Perlas 30

Map: Location of Pinas Bay 36

Illustration of Third Locks Project 45

Map: Location of el Tigre and Puerto Limon 186

VI MAPS

Map of the Panama Canal

(Source: http://www.panamaforum.com/images/panama-Canal-map.ipg)

vn tv*&h> 6 59'SO' C .«*'• f> »**>• !»*»'•. • F

••::GanaI.Zt)"iife;

T : M 1, 1 ".I'. :,.:* "| | ;j |j; i Ummmf*^*? IMoUry^wt6uniM&iMr 4 8*» t.i.M^t^.ll.1, »*»* 8 7»"6o'Um#n«.C *«K W*tt'»»w» DiiKCTtiWtrw' E !**»' (Source: http://etc.usf.edu/maps/pages/7000/7033/7033.jpg - edited by author)

Vlll Panama Political Map

Caribbean i #: "-^eklSF--^-^.w. - •^. '-• • f*h> 9*X*j*t»-~ti- I \ '

\

' T.-.7* . '•* jf Psmmn i '" "' ... Panama

* Nj- * 1 | 4l >• *

M fiHimw Caw1 *><*«*!»: •&**'*'(.*"*

s»80238S<54(BS

(Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/panama.jpg)

Map of Panama Showing Places Mentioned in the Text

Alnmiur* •*•**•

• .«**.« i*|J, g..,..

San A..*** ' Isia 1 Ma ~i* I afiRr"^ Pas- ' ttfcpfr

, flsiactfifflsy

if joss* Las Perlas "£f GawebhJ c=>

f Pnwtnhftfl IT"

(Source: http://www.worldheadquarters.com/panama/images/mappanamacountry.gif- edited by author)

IX The Caribbean

•lATLE STATFS

W 1TI. •

* •• THE *""*" BAHAMAS

•"rtRTifl:

tlUU tin! *h Vi-qir HAITI ij, „ MC1„ Sai • J etn.li. C ,ujr ., "" •' ,- «,| CHK-S'TCPHCR Viro' ' J AM) NEVIS P >Mr;: A cr (I, 5 1 Gassolerre ^ "gi j0f,ns

iiiiitiRAS DOMINICA Martin Q jc (Fur .Ciulriet Ipr Pu«rto ,'s , ST. LUCIA*

K,„B>,.1*ni •*»*««« St VINC1N1 AND * Bnogf l?»n NICARAGUA IKE GRENADINES „ , ^iCRENADA St C»ofQrtw

*on o*-Suai" TRINIDAD Puftl»«nn COSTA * AND PICA TORAGO

,Miirii v

COLOMBIA

fjuf!f>7v4nl.ifii* •c.i

16,000.000 200 Kikrtflftiers

MO hi • \

mwi (544517)4-88

(Source: http://www.caribpro.com/Caribbean Map/Caribbean Map Large.gif)

x Map of Shipping Losses to U-Boats

"' t «.., v . . UliHIM tilSM.S - t \::it.ilHN iliMTKE

»«W •'. ...

-•. * — * I * _ • I ••l—.l : • • • *V;*. •• •*:•'• :•. :• -.:.•

-•-. " , -.—••*W •-.".. ." I---.

•. •• • -.-•••«*- • •••* - ^ % • • ft.- —

(Source: Gaylord T.M. Kelshall, The U-Boat War in the Caribbean, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1994), following page 290.)

Map of U-Boat Losses in Caribbean Theatre

VRlMTtOSSES - CASimEAN tHEOJil 1

s M^a*

\ / • " .: • \-< ,v= * . -.-••if t ^v •» ». R,

IM',1.1

< w*^ ...J. ^ )rv **"**'' Wn'k

(Source: Ibid, following page 460.)

XI 1

Introduction

"Assurance of the impregnability of the inter-oceanic waterways is absolutely vital to the military security of the United States - - a nation which places its initial reliance upon naval forces." Henry Stimson, Secretary of War1

Much has been written about the United States during World War Two. The existing historical literature contains a common refrain: the Panama Canal was an integral component for the defense of the Western Hemisphere that should be defended at all cost.

However, few analysts have examined the measures which United States civilian and military officials took to secure the Canal and its outlying region on both the Pacific and

Caribbean sides. This dissertation examines the challenges which the administration of

Franklin Roosevelt confronted in maintaining the security of the Panama Canal in the late

1930s and during World War II. Clearly, the Panama Canal was an absolutely vital installation for the United States and the Allied war effort. In the years prior to the

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, United States policy tended to be isolationist and to concentrate on the security of the Western Hemisphere. The defense of the Panama Canal was a vital component in that strategy. With the outbreak of war in Europe, the American focus on the Canal intensified. The U.S. military expanded its defensive capabilities in the area, and U.S. officials sought to stabilize the political environment and counteract the influence of both domestic and foreign subversive activity on the Isthmus. The devastating impact of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the German declaration of war, and U.S. full engagement in a two ocean war reinforced the strategic importance of the Canal. U.S. military planners worried in World War Two, as they always had, that the continental United States was only as secure as its southern flank and what has been 2 termed the soft-underbelly. Latin-America formed this soft-underbelly, and many U.S. officials believed that Latin American republics were open to Axis intervention and corruption. This dissertation addresses that issue by examining the foreign and domestic threats to the Panama Canal, perceived or real, and whether the American response to those threats was proportionate to the strategic significance of the Isthmus and the Canal.

The defense of the waterway was one of the highest priorities for U.S. military planners because it was the most efficient means of moving men and materiel around the world. The Canal Zone was also located in a very important strategic position; U.S. control of the Canal enabled the Roosevelt administration to build up a military force in a region the United States considered politically and strategically vulnerable. U.S. officials believed that this show of force would help to reduce Axis influence among Latin

American republics. After the announcement of the Good Neighbor Policy and the non­ intervention pact earlier in the 1930s, the administration had sought to avoid the appearance of direct intervention in domestic Latin American affairs. The Canal Zone offered an opportunity to project military and political authority in the region without compromising the non-intervention commitments made at the Buenos Aires conference in 1936 or the symbolic commitment embodied in the Good Neighbor policy.

Latin America in general and Panama in particular by the time the United States entered World War II was a hotbed for clandestine operatives and Axis sympathy. There were large intelligence networks criss-crossing the region from all sides of the conflict.

The Depression hit many of the Latin American republics, including Panama, very hard.

This translated into an opportunity for the Nazis to make inroads in the mid to late 1930s.

It allowed them to build a base of support amongst Latin American leaders and people through economic and military incentives and aid. The residual effects of the Depression also included instability within the region. Latin American nations experienced coups and the rise of totalitarian leaders in the wake of the Depression - people who could take the reins as a result of the unhappiness of the people. All of these factors threatened the security of the Canal and the defense of the Western Hemisphere and stimulated action by the U.S. government and military.

Much of the history of the Panama Canal during World War Two is based on a set of assumptions. Authors assume that the reader understands the Canal was indispensable for the U.S. and Allied war effort. They assume that the reader understands the U.S. did everything in its power to protect and defend the Canal. Finally, they assume that the reader realizes the Canal was never actually attacked and survived the war intact.

Because of these assumptions the history of the Canal in World War Two is never fully explained. There are no discussions about the number of foreign agents and subversives on Panamanian soil endlessly trying to sabotage or gain information on the Canal. Nor is there any examination of the Axis-sympathies of the Spanish diplomats in Panama.

There are no discussions about the U-boat sightings and sinkings within striking distance of the Canal. Finally, there is no in depth study of the domestic political environment in

Panama and how it affected the day to day operation of the Canal during World War II.

There is a fair amount of literature that addresses the history of the Panama Canal and there is an abundance of literature regarding the history of the United States in World

War Two. However, historians have in the past not integrated the political and strategic aspects of the Panama Canal Zone in their analyses of the war as it impacted the Western

Hemisphere. Nor have historians of Latin America, writing on the World War II years, 4

dealt with the political dynamic in Panama itself as it impacted U.S. security policy. Only

one study to date has discussed the defensive development and importance of the Canal

in both world wars.l

One body of scholarship addresses the history of World War II and the history of

the United States in World War Two; it is to say the very least, massive. The majority of

these works simply glaze over the subject of the Panama Canal. Many of the works

acknowledge that the Canal was an integral part of the American war effort and essential

for the defense of the hemisphere; however, these works do not elaborate on the actual

role the Canal played. It seems that most authors believe the reader knows the Canal was

an important strategic target and few even attempt to elaborate on that fact. There are two

exceptions to this rule: the official History of the U.S. Army in World War Two and

Guarding the Crossroads: Security and Defense of the Panama Canal.2

1 John Major, Prize Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal 1903-1979. (New York: The Cambridge University Press, 2002 (1993)). For histories of the Panama Canal see: Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective, updated edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), and Michael L. Conniff, Black Labor on a White Canal; Panama. 1904-1981 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985). While the LaFeber work also deals with U.S.-Panamanian relations it does a very good job of outlining the history of the Canal. Other studies of the Canal are more specific and deal with certain issues such as economics, race relations, and points of tension between the United States and Panama. See: John Biesanz, "Race Relations in the Canal Zone," Phylon 11, 1 (1 st quarter 1950); Thomas M. Leonard, "The Commissary Issue in American-Panamanian Relations 1900-1936," The Americas 30, 1 (July 1973); Arthur E Rockwell, "The Lumber Trade and the Panama Canal, 1921 - 1940," The Economic History Review 24, 3 (August 1971); and Gustave Anguizola, "Negroes in the Building of the Canal," Phylon 29, 4 (4th Quarter, 1968)

For the best accounts of U.S. defenses in or surrounding the Panama Canal Zone during World War 11 see: Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, U.S. Army In Wold War 11. The Western Hemisphere: Guarding The United States And Its Outposts (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1964) and Charles Morris Brooks, Guarding the Crossroads: Security and Defense of the Panama Canal (Colombia: Imprelimbros S.A, 2003). Some excellent general histories of World War Two which glaze over the question of the Canal are: Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World War 11. New Edition. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005(1994)) and Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000). 5

A second body of literature discusses U.S. foreign policy and United States-

Panamanian relations. Works from this school deal in-depth with government and

diplomatic history. These works focus more on negotiations about the Canal and

economic prosperity. They do not look at the Canal from a military standpoint except to

note in general, that it was important for the U.S. military. These works are excellent for

setting the stage and understanding the challenges which both U.S. and Panamanian

officials faced in addressing issues related to the defense of the region. They also

demonstrate how unequal the relationship between Panama and the United States has been at times and give a much fuller understanding about why there was some deep-

seated resentment between Panamanians and Americans in Panama in the half-century

that followed World War Two.3

3 The best work regarding the relationship between the United States and Panama is Michael L. Conniff, Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992). Other works that study the special relationship between United States and Panama include: David N. Farnsworth, U.S. - Panamanian Relations. 1903-1978 A Study In Linkage Politics, James W. McKenney (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983); Lawrence O. Ealy, Yanqui Poltics And The Isthmian Canal (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971); Sheldon B. Liss, The Canal: Aspects Of United States Panamanian Relations (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967); Lester D. Langley, "Negotiating New Treaties with Panama; 1936," Hispanic American Historical Review 48, 2 (May 1968); Lester D. Langley, "US-Panamanian Relations Since 1941," Journal Of Interamerican Studies And World Affairs 12, 3 (July 1970)

The best works for U.S. foreign policy during World War Two are Robert Dallek, Franklin Roosevelt And American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), Cordell Hull, The Memoirs Of Cordell Hull. 1 vols. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948) and Cordell Hull, The Memoirs Of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948).Other works that deal with foreign policy of the time period include: J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States And Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961); Lars Shoultz, Beneath The United States; A History Of US Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Martin Sicker, The Geopolitics Of Security In The Americas: Hemispheric Denial from Monroe To Clinton (Westport: Praeger, 2002); Adolph A. Berle Jr, "Our Foreign Policy In Latin America," Proceedings Of The Academy Of Political Science 18, 3 (May 1939); Thomas M. Leonard, "Search For Security; The United States And Central America In The Twentieth Century," The Americas 47, 4 (April 1991); and Joseph S. Tulchin, "The Formulation Of US Policy In The Caribbean," Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science 533 (May 1994). 6

A final stream of literature deals specifically with World War Two and Latin-

America. There are numerous offerings in this area. None deal with Panama specifically, but many mention the isthmian republic. These works range from discussions on specific military engagements in or near Latin America to the numerous sources about clandestine warfare and the vast intelligence networks of South and Central America. These sources acted as excellent background to learn about the general situation in Latin America such as the numbers of German emigres or the Axis establishments of Chile and Argentina.4

This dissertation aims to fill the void left by the extant literature. It is a study of the Panama Canal in World War Two which analyzes the diplomatic and military responses to military and non-military threats, perceived or real, to the Canal. By analyzing diplomatic and military documents in the archives of the United States and

Panama, this paper gives a more complete picture of the perils in Panama. Due to the nature of the unique U.S.-Panamanian relationship the majority of the archival sources are from the United States. Panama did not have its own military during the Second

World War and the U.S. military was responsible for not only the defense of the Canal, but the isthmus in general. Furthermore, the records of the Panama Canal and the Canal

Zone are housed at the U.S. National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

To learn more about espionage and Axis penetration in Latin America see: Max Paul Friedman, Nazis & Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign Against the Germans of Latin America in World War IL(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Leslie B. and John F. Bratzel Rout Jr., The Shadow War; German Espionage And United States Counterespiopnage In World War II (Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 1986); Graeme S. Mount, Chile and the Nazis: From Hitler to Pinochet.(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2002); Thomas M. Leonard and John F. Bratzel eds Latin America During World War II, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007). To learn more about engagements that took place in Latin America see: Gaylord T. M. Kelshal, The U-Boat War In The Caribbean (Anapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994). 7

A. number of themes emerged during the research of this dissertation and the structure of the chapters reflect them. First and foremost, the Roosevelt administration effectively utilized the diplomatic tools at its disposal in order to secure the Canal as much as possible by non-military means. During the 1930s the United States became a

Good Neighbor, and it agreed to adhere to a policy of non-intervention. Through the inter-American conference series the United States worked to promote hemispherical unity, first through economic assistance and ultimately translated those gains to neutrality pacts and mutual defense agreements. The U.S. government also tried to right past wrongs when dealing specifically with Panama; the FDR administration successfully negotiated a new Canal treaty in 1936 and removed some of the most-hated clauses from the original 1903 treaty.

The second theme deals with the defensive preparations of the U.S. military for the protection of the Canal. The defense of the Canal Zone was not limited to the Zone itself or even Panama for that matter. The U.S. government and military combined to negotiate a defensive perimeter that surrounded the Canal out to a distance of 1000 miles to efficiently locate and prevent military threats from reaching the waterway. In Panama, the U.S. military utilized a number of defensive positions outside of the Canal Zone for anti-aircraft batteries, radar stations, secondary airfields and other necessities. In the

Canal Zone itself, the U.S. military vastly expanded the defenses and built up its military presence on the isthmus by exponentially increasing its troop and material strength.

Third, the domestic political environment of Panama played a large role in the defense of the Canal. Throughout the 1930s and during World War II the political situation within Panama was largely unstable. The republic experienced two coups and 8 one of the most violent election campaigns in its history. Each of these events and the resulting commotion after the fact caused U.S. officials endless worries. The responses from diplomats in Panama at the time were always the same - should we send in U.S. troops to quell the revolt? At the same time the government in Washington continually wanted to know if domestic events in Panama threatened the Canal. All in all the situation taxed the U.S. diplomatic corps and intelligence agencies as they tried to make sense of the circumstances and adequately advise their superiors on the relative security of the Canal and the state of the host country's political affairs.

The fourth theme examines subversive elements within Panama and what effect these spies and saboteurs had on the Canal both before and during the war. Panama and

Latin America in general were hotbeds for espionage in World War II. Much of that had to do with the so-called Fifth Column and the Axis belief that Latin America was the doorway to the United States. Each of the major Axis powers had a significant number of agents operating in and around Panama. There had been German, Japanese, and Italian populations in Panama for years before World War Two and many were completely integrated into Panamanian society. Other nations performed intelligence and propaganda duties for the Axis in Panama. The Vichy French played a small role in the Panama region and also posed a military threat to the Canal due to their forces in Martinique. The

Spanish Falange played probably the most significant role in Panama as it did elsewhere.

Spain was not technically a belligerent nation and her diplomats had free reign around the world. This benefited the Axis particularly well in Panama because of the nation's

Spanish roots. 9

This approach allows for a fuller examination of what transpired in and around the Panama Canal during World War Two. Too many times scholars have simply assumed that readers know the story of the Panama Canal, when in fact it has never truly been told. The Panama Canal has a rich history and this paper tells the story of one of its most important chapters. The Roosevelt administration believed that defense of the Canal was paramount for the success of the United States in World War II. This dissertation studies the obstacles, real or perceived, that the United States had to overcome in its goal to protect the Canal. This approach is significant because the security situation in Panama reinforced American fears about the perception of subversion and the vulnerability of the

Canal which led to the allocation of considerable resources to Panama.

Writing a dissertation of this nature is not something I could do on my own and many people have helped me over the years. First, and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Stephen Randall, for his patience and guidance. I am also deeply indebted to

Dr. Graeme Mount, who has been a friend and influence for years. The moral support from Dr. Ed Kaplan was irreplaceable, especially when things got frustrating. Alex Muir was a great friend throughout the process and always there to help. I am grateful to my parents and brothers who encouraged me every step of the way. Last, but certainly not least, I wish to thank my loving wife Susan, for the constant support, and gentle prodding

(when needed). 10

Chapter 1 - The 1930s

Throughout the 1930s the United States made efforts to better its relationships with Panama and the American Republics. At the start of the decade these efforts usually took the form of economic aid and cooperation for Latin America in order to promote unity in the Western Hemisphere. The Roosevelt administration utilized the Inter-

American Conference series to realize this goal. Both the Montevideo and the Buenos

Aires Conferences aimed to unite the hemisphere after the devastating effects of the

Depression and regional war. During the latter half of the 1930s the U.S. government, while hoping for peace, concerned itself with preliminary multilateral defense agreements for the Western Hemisphere. In addition to the defense agreements the U.S. government worked to improve its bilateral relationship with Panama. A better relationship with

Panama and the American Republics allowed the U.S. military to improve the Canal's defenses to deal with modern military threats and covert action by subversives or saboteurs.

The 1933 Inter-American Conference took place in Montevideo, Uruguay. It was the first of many Inter-American Conferences to take place during the Franklin Delano

Roosevelt administration. More importantly it was the first conference to take place after the U.S. government announced it would utilize the Good Neighbor policy in dealings with Latin America. The Good Neighbor policy combined economic, cultural, and political agreements in order to further American influence in the Western Hemisphere - an area vital to the security of the United States. Through this policy the U.S. government publicly denounced strong-arm tactics such as gunboat diplomacy and attempted to negotiate with the Latin American republics.

U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull led the American delegation at Montevideo.

The sole purpose of the conference, from the United States point of view, was to extend economic aid and promote the political ideals of the United States in order to better relations with the Latin American Republics. According to Hull: "There is nothing my

Government wants or is seeking down here except to carry forward the doctrine of the

Good Neighbor. We simply want to cooperate fully with all Latin American countries in promoting the political and economic ideals in which we are all alike equally and mutually interested." Judging from the year of the conference this was true; the

Roosevelt administration was not thinking about war in 1933. During the course of the

1930s U.S. concerns with hemispheric affairs gradually shifted from a focus on trade and economics to an increasing concern with hemispheric defense as the situation in Europe deteriorated. The United States was only as secure as the southern flank allowed it to be and the Latin American nations were the key to successfully defending the United States in the event of another world conflict.

At the close of the Montevideo Conference the American Republics were much closer together than they had been for decades. The U.S. government had demonstrated, with some reservations, its dedication to becoming a Good Neighbor. The agreements concluded at the Montevideo conference helped to lay the groundwork for hemispheric cooperation and defense. They showed the Latin American Republics that the United

States had in fact changed its policies in the region and this paved the way for future discussions regarding collective security. The Roosevelt administration made valuable 12 strides for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the security of the Panama Canal at the Montevideo Conference.

The condition of the world deteriorated after the 1933 Montevideo Conference.

The state of world affairs caused the Roosevelt administration to seek another Inter-

American conference two years earlier than the next scheduled meeting at Lima in 1938.

Several factors came into play in the three years after Montevideo; Hitler had removed

Germany from the League of Nations; he had repudiated the arms limitations clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and thus removed any controls on her military; Hitler had repudiated the German war debt; Germany had failed in an attempt to takeover Austria;

Mussolini had invaded Abyssinia; finally, the Japanese had repudiated the Washington

Naval Treaty that limited the size of her navy in relation to the other world powers. The time for action had come and the Roosevelt administration was justifiably worried about the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. Hull feared that these events were the signal of what was to come and thought that the sooner the United States could improve upon its revamped relationship with Latin America the better; "...we dare not wait. The newborn friendship among the American Republics required solidifying. A common attitude toward the dangers rising in Europe and the Orient was essential. The existing peace agreements in the Western Hemisphere had to be strengthened."3 On

January 30, 1936, as a result of fear and uncertainty, the Roosevelt administration sent invitations to the twenty Latin American nations that announced a conference in Buenos

Aires; the conference was officially titled the Inter-American Conference for the

Maintenance of Peace.4 13

In April 1936 the United States forwarded an initial agenda it wanted included for consideration at the conference. By this time, Hitler had remilitarized the Rhineland. Yet, congress continued to pass neutrality legislation and FDR continued to sign it into law.

Clearly, the Roosevelt administration did not believe that war was imminent, but it did want to initiate some preliminary defensive measures for the Western Hemisphere. The agenda was almost entirely dedicated to the security of the United States through the defense of the Western Hemisphere. The first few clauses specifically stated that the

United States wanted to look at neutrality and the rights and duties of states. In the wake of the Chaco War there was a movement to prohibit any wars between Latin American nations. This movement aimed to strengthen the stability of the Western Hemisphere by dealing with internal factors. The final clause gave Latin American nations financial incentives to align with the United States and become part of the American framework for defense of the Western Hemisphere. This working agenda demonstrated quite clearly the Roosevelt administration's focus for the Buenos Aires conference - the collective defense of the Western Hemisphere against external threats and incentives to make Latin

America on the whole less divisive.5

Once again Hull led the U.S. delegation and he observed that it was very different in Latin America than it had been three short years earlier. He noted that there was blatant Nazi propaganda everywhere. The Nazis used established German companies such as Lufthansa and Hapag Lloyd to promote their philosophy. In many cases the local

Nazi officials had more power than the official German ministers to the Latin American nations. The Germans were advanced in their preparations for war; they were trying to

5 Chaco War (1932-1935) - A war between Bolivia and Paraguay for control of the Paraguay River. It was named for the Chaco Boreal, the region where the majority of the fighting took place. The Paraguay River was important because both countries were landlocked and wanted an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean. 14 undermine American influence in Latin America through economic and cultural means; the Nazi military in Germany tried to establish better working relationships with the militaries of Latin America, even going as far as inviting officers to German military schools. U.S. officials in Latin America witnessed these developments and alarm bells sounded within the Department of State.6

Nazis and Nazi-sympathizers throughout Latin America attempted to undermine

U.S.-Latin American relations. They were part of a concerted project by the German government to weaken American ties with its sister republics. Germany had enough ties with Latin America to make this a serious threat. There were large German communities in many parts of Latin America, the largest being in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Due to

Hitler's idea of Volksdeutsche, the belief that Germans the world over were still devoted to the fatherland and would support the Nazi regime blindly, the United States viewed any enticements on Germany's behalf as serious threats. Beginning in 1935, Germany led an attack on the economic stranglehold that the United States held over Latin America.

Hjalmar Schacht, German Minister of Finance, engineered the program that aimed to displace the United States as Latin America's largest trade partner. The basis of this program was that Germany would import Latin American goods at higher prices than the

United States could match. More importantly, Germany paid for the goods with special marks that were only good for credit on German exports and could only be spent within

Germany. It was fairly ingenious, and increased Germany's percentage of Latin

American trade exponentially, which, in turn, increased German influence in the

American Republics.7 In places such as Guatemala and El Salvador this system allowed

Germany to displace Great Britain as a major trading partner by 1938.8 15

Using economic influence to gain a foothold in Latin America was not altogether out of character for the Germans. Earlier in 1935 and 1936, the German legation in

Panama filed a protest with the republic. It claimed that German immigrants were not being treated as equals along with Spaniards or Indo-Americans; the Panamanian government exempted Spaniards and Indo-Americans from making deposits when they entered Panama as immigrants. The German government wanted a similar exemption for

German immigrants. In this report the German minister declared that the German government would not pay Panama for imports until it felt that German immigrants could enter Panama unhindered. While this is not quite the same as Schacht's import/export special marks scheme, it had generally the same effect. The German government attempted to gain influence in Panama through German nationals resident there. U.S. officials viewed this influence as especially dangerous in such close proximity to the

Canal.9

In Buenos Aires, the Argentine delegation, under what the American representatives attributed to Nazi pressures, proved very uncooperative; the large German population of Argentina coupled with the restrictions of the Hawley-Smoot and Fordney-

McCumber Tariffs excluding Argentine goods from U.S. markets reinforced Nazi influence in Argentina. Regardless of the hostile atmosphere, the conference bore a number of important conventions. Most importantly, it laid the groundwork to discuss mutual defense of the hemisphere if any foreign actor endangered an American nation.

This was paramount for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the security of the

Panama Canal. Latin American cooperation and stability was essential in the case of war.

Argentina failed to block the mutual defense treaty, but was successful in crippling it by 16 having the words "if they so desire"10 inserted into the clause. This made the convention non-binding.11

Overall, the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace was a successful conference. It better prepared the countries of the Western Hemisphere to deal with an external military threat. While Nazi-influence in Latin America, specifically

Argentina, hampered the conference, the attendees still managed to create discussion about mutual security and defense. The American delegation felt that even with the

Argentine reservations the United States was more secure after the conference than it was before. The Roosevelt administration achieved some of its hemispheric defense goals through diplomatic negotiations.

1938 Lima Conference

The American Republics returned to their regularly scheduled meeting cycle with the 1938 Pan American Conference at Lima. The American plan for the conference was to expand the rough framework for defense made at the Buenos Aires Conference. The

Americans wanted a more-binding agreement for the security of the Western

Hemisphere. The Argentines were not happy about the conference and proposed that it be postponed for a year or two because of the world situation. They posited that the upheaval in the world would no doubt make it harder to approve controversial subjects

1 O such as a proposed Inter-American Court and any security agreements. The argument about the world situation was the same argument the United States used to promote the conference.13 By June 1938, the Argentine government agreed to attend the conference under the reservation that it felt the timing was inappropriate because of the aforementioned reasons.14 17

Cordell Hull led the American delegation once again at Lima. On the way to the conference Hull learned that Argentina planned to veto any initiative to establish a mutual security agreement for the Western Hemisphere. The Argentine government based this decision on the fact that it did not want to be tied exclusively to the United

States for defense and alienated from Europe. Furthermore, Jose Maria Cantilo,

Argentine Foreign Minister claimed that U.S. foreign policy was unstable due to problems within American internal politics. Cantilo clarified this position in his opening address to the conference. He said that the Western Hemisphere did not need to enter into pacts and agreements because there already was Pan-American solidarity. Cantilo used the Pan-American conferences as evidence of solidarity. The other delegations, led by the

United States, felt that there needed to be an official defense pact to counter the possibility of a European war.15

The American delegation's goal at the conference was to reach a formal declaration or convention about the solidarity of the American nations in the face of adversity and aggression. The exact wording could be a compromise, but it had to display basic criteria. The Western Hemisphere would not recognize any transfer of land taken by force, especially via a non-American foreign power. The United States wanted an official announcement that Fifth Column/clandestine activities by foreign nationals would not be tolerated. In his instructions to the U.S. delegation, Hull stated quite emphatically that

Latin America was extremely important to the United States and should be treated accordingly, "Among the foreign relations of the United States as they fall into categories, the Pan American policy takes the first place in our diplomacy."16 He also reminded the delegation that policy was meant to be mutually beneficial and follow in the 18 spirit of the Good Neighbor. After a number of disagreements with the Argentine delegation the members of the Lima Conference agreed on a formal declaration. The

Declaration of Lima had three main parts:

The Governments of the American Republics. Declare: First. That they reaffirm their continental solidarity and their purpose to collaborate in the maintenance of the principles upon which it is based; Second. That faithful to the democratic principles inherent in their institutional regime, and to its absolute sovereignty, they reaffirm their determined will to maintain them and to defend them against foreign (extranet) intervention or activity that may threaten them; Third. And in case the peace, safety, or territorial integrity of any American Republic is thus threatened by circumstances of any nature that may impair it, they proclaim their common concern and their determination to make effective their solidarity, coordinating their respective sovereign wills by means of the procedure of the inter-American Conference, using the measures which in each case the circumstances may make advisable. It is understood that the governments of the American Republics will act independently in their individual capacity, recognizing fully their juridical equality as sovereign states;17

The Declaration of Lima was not exactly what the U.S. contingent wanted, but it improved upon the agreements from Buenos Aires. The Declaration of Lima seemed to guarantee hemispheric security on an unprecedented scale, but still allowed flexibility due to the "individual capacity" clause. More importantly it protected against both overt and covert dangers to the Americas, something the United States was keenly aware of due to Germany's various adventures in Latin America. This was a strong agreement considering the Roosevelt administration still hoped to avoid war.

U.S. policymakers throughout the 1930s consistently recognized the importance of the Panama Canal to U.S. and hemispheric security. That perception was critical to

U.S. strategy in the years leading up the entry of the United States into the war in late 19

1941. Hemispheric security in other words hinged on the protection of the Canal as well as the support of the Latin American republics for U.S. goals. The U.S. government offered mutual defense agreements, neutrality agreements and economic aid packages to cement its position as the Good Neighbor to Latin America. The Inter-American

Conferences attempted to stabilize the region and stem Nazi influence in some of the more vulnerable Latin American countries. The defense of the Western Hemisphere and the security of the Panama Canal also required physical defensive fortifications and a defensive perimeter. To facilitate the Canal's defensive posture within Panama, the U.S. government ventured to better U.S.-Panama relations which had become strained during the interwar years.

United States - Panama Relations

Two events dominated United States - Panama relations during the 1930s. The first was a 1931 coup d'etat led by the Accion Comunal. The second was the negotiation of a new Canal Treaty that aimed to right some of the wrongs perpetrated on Panama by the original 1903 Canal Treaty. Both of these actions tested the resolve of the U.S. government. The coup had the potential to disrupt the day to day operations of the Canal and U.S. influence on the isthmus. The treaty negotiations reinforced to the U.S. government that Panama was a sovereign nation and that the U.S. government needed to cooperate with the Panamanian government to adequately secure the Canal.

Formed in 1923, the Accion Comunal was a moderately radical, nationalist group and its members were predominantly middle class. They included: lawyers, doctors, engineers, professors, and various bureaucrats. The Accion as a whole opposed the elite ruling class; it wanted more opportunity for the middle class and less corruption at the 20 top. The loss of middle class government jobs in the late 1920s and new property tax laws Rodolfo Chiari, President of Panama 1924-1928, introduced in 1925 were perfect examples of this complicity. The Accion's nationalist element concerned itself with complete capitulation to the United States. While the Accion Comunal was not wholly against the U.S. presence and the Canal, it did feel that the United States should not be allowed to run rampant throughout Panama. The Accion wanted the United States to have some accountability and treat Panama more like an equal.18

The Accion Comunal wanted a renewed Panama. It wanted Panama to be a part of the international community as a separate and distinct entity from the United States. On

January 2, 1931, the Accion overthrew the government of President Florencio Harmodio

Arosemena, president 1928-1931, and installed a new administration led by Harmodio

Arias. This event catapulted the Arias brothers, Harmodio and Arnulfo, into the political spotlight in Panama.19 Harmodio Arias was a lawyer educated at the London School of

Economics and a political power player in Panama for years after the coup. Arnulfo Arias was a doctor educated at Harvard. Arnulfo was far more radical and nationalistic than his older brother and destined to become President of Panama three times.20

The U.S. government sought to maintain neutrality during the coup. It did not order American troops from the Canal Zone into Panama proper, nor did it request reinforcements from the United States or any outlying naval bases. The coup tested the resolve of the Good Neighbor Policy and the policy of non-intervention, but the United

States held fast. In the past, the American military had invaded the isthmus for any number of reasons ranging from riots, and armed conflicts to renter's strikes; however, in this case U.S. soldiers remained on their side of the Canal Zone border. The official 21 reports from Minister Roy T. Davis (Panama did not get an Ambassador until 1939) shed some light on the happenings of January 2, 1931. From Davis' reports the coup did not appear to cause much of a disturbance. He denied a request by President Florencio

Arosemena to send U.S. troops into Panama. By 7:00 pm, that same day, Arosemena had

91 resigned and the new government had announced its initial members.

Out of necessity, the United States quickly recognized the new government and subsequently enjoyed a reasonably positive and stable relationship with the new

Panamanian authorities. After Harmodio Arias won the 1932 election and became president in his own right, he set a course to try and renegotiate the 1903 Hay-Bunau-

Varilla Treaty. The treaty had been a source of scorn for Panamanians for three decades and the focus of some of Arias' work during that time as well. Harmodio, an international lawyer, wrote a scathing indictment of the United States while at the London School of

Economics in 1911. His work was a comment on the Monroe Doctrine as an imperialist strategy more than a policy of self-defense. He claimed that U.S. expansion must be 99 stopped at the isthmus. Harmodio sought an audience with Roosevelt in October 1933.

During his visit to the White House Harmodio spoke with Roosevelt and learned of the steps that must be taken in order to amend the 1903 treaty. He then formulated a proposal for Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Harmodio fully realized that Panama's economic well-being was overwhelmingly tied to the Canal; most of Panama's other industries were left undeveloped due to the prominence of the Canal and the service industry tied to it.23

The negotiations for the new treaty began in 1934. The United States sent

Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles to the bargaining table. Welles was a highly 22 respected career diplomat and Latin American expert. The Panamanians sent Dr. Ricardo

Alfaro, another career diplomatic, and briefly, president of Panama. Both of these negotiators were nationalists, but both also realized that the strategic and security concerns affected both countries. The negotiations were long and drawn out and took place over the course of 110 conferences.24

The negotiations led to several changes in the specifics of the original treaty. The most important concession came in Article I; it dealt with US powers on the isthmus. The negotiators produced a new version of Article I that theoretically removed the United

States' ability to act unilaterally. The new article called for joint defense of the Canal. It also stated that either side could act unilaterally if there was an emergency and the Canal needed immediate protection.

In case of an international conflagration or the existence of any threat of aggression which would endanger the security of the Republic of Panama or the neutrality of the Panama Canal, the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Panama will take measures of prevention as they may consider necessary for the protection of their common interests. Any measures, in safeguarding such interests, which it shall essential to one Government to take, and which may affect the territory under the jurisdiction of the other Government, will be the subject of consultation between the two Governments.25

While not perfect, this clause did much to bolster Panamanian spirits because the offending 'protectorate' status was technically removed from the treaty and the emergency clause placated the United States.26

Other important changes took place in Articles II and III. Article II originally stated that the United States should have rights associated with the Canal in perpetuity.

Under the new agreement the countries agreed that if the U.S. government required new lands for the defense or operation of the Canal there would be joint discussions. Article 23

III addressed the contentious commissary issue. Panamanians wanted better access to

Canal traffic and business opportunities. They also did not want to lose out on business because goods were far more affordable in the Zone. Article III placed stringent restrictions on the access to discounted Canal Zone merchants, only Canal Zone employees and their families could purchase goods at the commissaries.

The Hull-Alfaro Treaties signed March 2, 1936 signalled a renewed relationship between Panama and the United States. Although they were not revolutionary and neither side received exactly what it wanted, both sides considered the treaties a success. Panama received some reassurance that she was an independent country and could act without

American permission and the United States essentially retained its right to protect the

Canal without permission from Panama, as long as there was some form of emergency that justified the intrusion. Other issues that Hull-Alfaro considered were the rights of

Panamanians to cross through the Canal Zone to the other side of Panama and to increase the annuity payment to $436,000 from the original $250,000. This last issue was in name only as the increase only compensated for Roosevelt's devaluation of the dollar aimed at combating the Depression. Most importantly the Hull-Alfaro Treaty improved the bilateral relationship between the United States and Panama, a good relationship was essential for the security of the Panama Canal.

The Pre-War Defense of the Canal

The U.S. military had decided by the mid-1930s that an effective defense of the

Canal could not be accomplished from within the borders of the Canal Zone or the

Republic of Panama. Instability within Europe and the world situation dictated that the

United States should branch out from the Canal Zone in order to secure defensive 24 positions. Some of these positions were in U.S. territories such as Guantanamo Bay,

Cuba and Puerto Rico, elsewhere the United States had to negotiate with the foreign owners of the properties. During this time the United States also increased the military presence in Panama and added enhanced protection against sabotage.

In order to protect the Pacific entrance of the Canal, General David L. Stone,

Commanding General of the Panama Canal Department, suggested a perimeter composed of some of the outlying islands. The three positions that made the most sense were: the

Galapagos, Ecuadorian possessions; Cocos, a Costa Rican island; and Clipperton Island, a French possession.

Clipperton(v)

Galapagos (|ft:,; The Galapagos were the best choice of the group due to their size and location; the archipelago lay roughly 1000 miles southwest of the Pacific entrance to the Canal. The

U.S. military planned to develop it into a significant base and radar station. Cocos Island 25 was a small island located approximately 500 miles west of the Pacific entrance. The

U.S. military thought it would be a useful location for an aircraft warning service. The last choice was a French possession named Clipperton Island. The American interest in this island stemmed solely from the fact that it was a French possession. The U.S. government preferred not to have a (possibly conquered) European territory within 2000 miles of the Canal. The U.S. military aimed to fortify these islands and form a proactive defense against aircraft carriers and long range aircraft. Stone wanted the United States to lease these islands for military bases, not acquire them outright. However, President

Roosevelt decided that it was not in the best interests of the United States to fortify these islands; annexation was not in the spirit of the Good Neighbor.29

The United States and Ecuador had held various levels of discussion regarding outlying islands since at least 1935. While Roosevelt publicly and officially disavowed any intention to acquire control over these territories, the story behind the scenes was somewhat different. The United States and Ecuador held preliminary discussions regarding the Galapagos Archipelago beginning in January 1935. At this time Roosevelt told R. Walton Moore, the Assistant Secretary of State, that he did not want any discussions with the Ecuadorian government regarding U.S. acquisition of the

Archipelago. Roosevelt stopped short of ordering Moore to halt negotiations; instead he instructed Moore to try a different approach with the Ecuadorians. Roosevelt suggested that due to the rare and interesting flora and fauna present on the Galapagos perhaps the islands should be internationalized and protected by a Pan-American committee. He also stated that the United States would bear most of the expense and patrol the islands." The

British heard about the plan and immediately backed it, stating that the British Museum 26 thought very highly of helping American institutions, such as the Smithsonian and

Natural History Museum, protect the islands' unique environment.31 Antonio C.

Gonzalez, the U.S. Minister to Ecuador, furthered the discussion when he suggested that many Ecuadorians "realize the strategic importance of these islands in connection with defense of the Panama Canal and that they are apprehensive as to possible Japanese movement in and about the islands."32 The Ecuadorian foreign minister welcomed the idea of an international group dedicated to protecting the Galapagos' environment, though the islands should still be Ecuadorian territory. Furthermore, he argued that if a war did occur in the future an international presence on the islands would make them less attractive to foreign powers. That was the end of correspondence until the next year.33

In 1936, the United States and Ecuador formulated another approach for the protection of the Galapagos. Ecuador asked the United States for permission to hire two naval officers to help set up an effective naval force for patrol and protection of the

Galapagos Archipelago. During the negotiations various departments in the U.S. government discussed the value of the Galapagos for either an attack against or the defense of the Panama Canal. After the discussion the U.S permitted two retired naval officers to be contracted by Ecuador based on the strategic value of the Galapagos and the potential benefit of a better relationship with Ecuador cemented by this cooperation.

Clearly, the United States thought about the protection of the Panama Canal during this endeavor.34

The situation with Cocos Island was somewhat different. In December 1937, the

Costa Rican Government offered to take an American expedition to Cocos Island so that it might inspect the island with the intent of purchasing it. The Costa Rican government 27 did not have any use for Cocos Island because it did not have any significant natural resources. In lieu of this, the government decided to try to sell the Island to the United

States as a strategic possession due to its position relative to the Panama Canal. Hull stated in no uncertain terms that the United States had no interest in purchasing Cocos.

However, later that year General Stone stated that the island was absolutely vital to the defense of the Canal and that the United States should use all the resources at her disposal to acquire the island. Stone confided in William H. Hornibrook, the U.S. Minster to Costa

Rica, that the preparations for the defense of the Canal within Panama were completely inadequate and that fortifying Cocos Island gave additional protection to that most valuable asset. Still, there were no further discussions regarding Cocos at that time and

Stone's concerns had to wait.

The U.S. government also thought that Easter Island west of Chile was ideal for the outlying defenses of the Panama Canal. There were rumors in 1939 that the Chilean government would sell the island to the United States because it was in a severely poor financial state. President Roosevelt, concerned about the possible negative reaction, once again prevented U.S. acquisition of the island, although, he stopped short of closing all negotiations with the Chileans and instructed Welles to try the approach the U.S. had tried with Ecuador in 1935 and 1936.

Have you considered a different angle? Easter Island is unique in possessing remains of prehistoric men—the great recumbent stone figures which have never yet been adequately explained. No serious scientific excavation work has been done on the Island. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that it be preserved to science for all time. In this respect it is a little like the Galapagos Islands. Would it be possible to tie up Easter Island and the Galapagos in a Pan-American trusteeship; the Islands to be preserved for all time against colonization and for natural science?36 28

Once again the United States put on a public show of distaste for territorial acquisitions but tried to gain influence over those islands by using other means.37

The U.S. military also had plans to guard against sabotage of the Canal.

Originally designed in 1936, the plans did not enter widespread distribution until August

1939, on the very eve of the war in Europe. They called for the inspection of all vessels transiting the Canal, and the use of guard parties on some vessels. The plans aimed to strengthen the locks and install a bomb and mine-proof layer inside the locks to try to soften the damage either of these munitions could cause. Finally, the Panama Canal

Company limited commercial traffic to one side of the locks in an effort to keep one side open should someone manage to scuttle a ship inside a lock. While this did not protect against an unruly captain scuttling a ship in any of the narrow passages of the actual

Canal, the hope was that the guard parties on board the vessels could discover those intentions in time to prevent damage.38

The U.S. military presence within the Panama Canal Zone was fairly large by

1939 and tripled by the time the United States was officially involved in World War II.

On the isthmus American forces consisted of: "Pacific Sector - 4th coast artillery regiment, 33d infantry, and a battalion of the 2d field artillery. Atlantic sector had 1st coast artillery regiment and the 14th infantry. Antiaircraft units made up part of both coast artillery regiments. Also 19th wing - about 28 medium bombers, 14 light bombers, 24 pursuit planes and a few trainers and utility planes total for Panama approximately 29

13,500 men."39 The number of troops and aircraft increased exponentially as war drew nearer.

Subversives

The 1930s were also a decade of political manoeuvring in Panama. Many of the future Axis powers had their tentacles in the country. The Japanese were probably the most active foreign group in Panama during the 1930s. There were numerous reports of suspicious Japanese activities in and around Panama throughout the 1930s. The Germans were not quite as visible in Panama as they were throughout the rest of Latin America, but there was a German element in Panama in the years before the Second World War.

While there was some Italian activity it paled in comparison to the other two. In addition to these foreign nationals there were home-grown Americans and Panamanians taking part in suspicious activities.

One of the earliest concerns for the United States regarding the Japanese in

Panama stems from a treaty negotiated by the Florencio Arosemena government. It was to be a treaty of commerce and navigation between Panama and Japan. Negotiated in late

1930, the treaty was a gentleman's agreement that would allow easier Japanese immigration into Panama (Panama had fairly strict immigration laws). The other main point of the treaty was the upgrading of Japan to most-favored nation status; a status that would give Japan most of the benefits that the United States received in Panama. The

U.S. government monitored the situation closely and wanted to avoid it for geopolitical and strategic reasons. The coming of the Accion Comunal coup helped the United States in this regard. The Harmodio Arias administration refused to ratify the treaty. The

Japanese were furious but Panama kept its most important ally happy.40 30

In Panama, there were numerous reports about suspicious Japanese activities. The first example comes from Las Perlas Islands about 50 kilometres south of the Pacific entrance to the Canal. In 1915, shortly after the Canal opened, a group of Japanese arrived at Las Perlas Islands.

Based at San Miguel, ostensibly as fisherman, the group of four men began to attract some attention by their actions. The Americans put them under surveillance and quickly realized that they did not fish; instead, they explored the coasts of Panama and its neighbors and photographed points of interest in their boat the Toga. The Panamanian government rescinded their fishing licenses as a result of American complaints. At this point three of the Japanese went to Panama City in their Imperial Japanese Navy uniforms and offered formal good­ byes to the President of Panama and the Governor of the Canal Zone. The fourth, a man named Dakouko, remained on San Miguel and started a retail business. Dakouko was well known in the islands and the Chief of Police in Panama was certain he was Japanese navy as well. The Chief of Police was a friend of Dakouko and once observed him 31 boarding a Japanese warship and being saluted by the whole crew, leading him to believe that he was a high ranking officer. Dakouko also had a knack for being in the right place at the right time; he watched at the mouth of the Canal when the U.S. fleet arrived. After that he disappeared but he left a Japanese presence in Las Perlas.41

In 1934, there were more suspicious activities by the Japanese in Las Perlas. The very same boat, the Toga appeared as soon as a U.S. submarine squadron reached the

Saboga anchorage. The squadron commander aboard USS S-48 reported that the Toga passed very close to his submarine when it reached Saboga on July 6, 1934. The commander sent a party ashore to investigate and discovered that the vessel belonged to a

Japanese man who ran a small retail business in San Miguel, named Marco. The similarities between Marco and Mr. Dakouko were uncanny; they were probably the same person. The locals told the commander that while they knew Marco they had not seen him for 48 days prior to the submarine squadron's presence. When the submarines arrived he anchored off the Saboga and watched them for five days. The locals observed

Marco on other occasions on shore in Saboga with large sheets of paper making sketches of the surrounding area. Either one of these incidents on its own might not prove too damning, but when taken together they definitely validate American and Panamanian suspicion of Japanese activities in Las Perlas.42

Beginning in 1935, other Japanese fishermen sailed every inch of ocean approaching the Canal under the pretence of fishing. The fishermen were in fact spies posing as fisherman so that they could take detailed depth soundings of the approaches to the Canal. They took exact readings, much better than those on standard sea charts available to the public, necessary for military strikes, and possibly submarine attacks on, 32 or within the Canal. The little fishing boats were too small for some of the deeper water along the coast or to reach the fortified islands guarding the Canal. In these cases the

Japanese also had their own fleet of tuna trawlers, conveniently these rarely returned with a catch. Yoshitaro Amano, Japanese Chief of Intelligence for Central and South America, was the operator of one of these tuna trawlers. Authorities reported his boat, the Amano

Maru, as far away as the Galapagos Islands, 980 miles from the mouth of the Canal.

Authorities also reported seeing the trawler along the coasts of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El

Salvador, and Guatemala.43

Other evidence supports the claims about Japanese fishermen in Panama. A

Panamanian source interviewed by the Office of Naval Intelligence shed more light on some Japanese activities. His home was on the waterfront and had an excellent view for observing the Japanese fishermen. The source reported that the Japanese fishing boats were the only ones equipped with gas motors and they all followed the same schedule; they left in the morning and came back in the afternoon and then left again at night. He showed the intelligence agent one of the fishermen's dwellings at 58 Carlos Mendoza

Street which was reportedly much larger and sturdier than any in the area, probably too expensive for mere fishermen, and had a sliding door built into the back so that it was easier to come and go without being observed. Another home occupied by the Japanese was again much larger and sturdier than the surrounding buildings. This house at 178

Central Avenue had a substantial rear entrance built into it as well. The neighbors reported that the two Japanese staying there routinely watched American planes taking off and landing at Albrook Field, which was well within their field of vision.44 33

The next meeting between the source and the intelligence agent revealed information about possible Italian-Japanese complicity in Panama. The source took the agent to the canteen El Vaticano and showed him the Italian owner Carmelo Vigna. He claimed that Vigna owned a Hudson automobile that he regularly lent to a Japanese barber. The barber normally took the car out to the Madden Dam and surrounding area.

Other than the Japanese skulking around the Madden Dam, the source stated that Vigna had never had any money in the past and that once he started chumming around with the

Japanese he bought a car and began to work less. While this was simply conjecture it does offer some interesting possibilities. A few weeks later, the Hudson that Vigna claimed he owned disappeared and then reappeared in the Canal Zone registered to the

Japanese Consul. 5

Other claims against the Japanese centered on their method of fishing. On those rare occasions the Japanese fishermen returned with a catch, the fish had broken bladders.

Broken bladders are one of the telltale signs that fisherman used dynamite and did not catch the fish legally. The dynamiting of fish allowed the Japanese fisherman to fill their boats in a fraction of the time required using normal methods. Thus they were free to go about their other pursuits during the remainder of the time allotted to fishing. The

American owner of a lumber mill complained to the government that a Japanese fishing boat dynamited fish in the bay where his operation was set up. Also an American and some of the locals in Darien reported that the Japanese dynamited fish from Chiman to

Pinas Bay.46

The U.S. military caught the Japanese with the proverbial smoking-gun in 1938.

Late one night the M/S Taiyu Maru, a tuna boat registered at San Diego, ran aground off 34

Fort Amador of the Fortified Islands. The boat had slipped within a restricted distance from the islands without running lights and had become hung up on a reef. The Japanese aboard the vessel did not have a chance to stow the sounding gear by the time the U.S. military reached the vessel. As a result of this incident and a backlash by Panamanian fishermen, the Republic of Panama again rescinded fishing permits granted to the

Japanese.47

Japan also used barbers to watch the harbors and Canal in Panama. One such

"barber" was Mixu Watanabe, also a Commander in the Imperial Japanese Navy. He lived in squalor in Panama, giving the impression of a poor hard working barber.

However, one of his well-to-do clients noticed him in full dress uniform at a gala hosted by the Japanese Legation, a stark contrast to his living conditions. Each day he walked down by the Canal and recorded vessels entering and leaving. He also noted which vessels sat in the harbor. Yoshitaro Amano, the intelligence officer mentioned earlier, also ran a small store in Panama. The Casa Japonesa sold cheap Japanese goods that many in Panama could afford. Amano had the particularly brilliant idea of running a monthly photography contest in Panama. The rules required pictures to be taken of buildings and installations within the Canal Zone. The contest received tens of thousands of entries and ran continuously until June 1941 when the United States restricted photography in the Zone.

The Japanese took part in activities other than outright espionage in Panama.

There are reports that the Japanese tried to buy up large tracts of land in the Bahia Honda region of Panama. Bahia Honda is a bay about 170 kilometres west of the Pacific entrance to the Panama Canal. The reports stated that Japanese interest in purchasing the 35 lands stemmed from an apparent manganese deposit. However, other reports stated that this was simply sensationalism on the part of the promoters trying to force investors or the government to buy their claims to prevent the "evil" Japanese from gaining a foothold in Panama. Manganese was essential for the production of aluminum and thus a valuable strategic resource; one that should be kept away from possible future enemies.49

Germany

Roots of German influence in Panama can be traced back to World War I and earlier. There were spies in Panama watching the Canal throughout the war and post-war economic problems caused mass emigration from Germany. Latin America was a favorite choice for German emigrants, there was and still are large German populations in

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and many other countries in the Western

Hemisphere. Panama received its share of Germans, and the resilient feelings for the fatherland that accompanied some of them. One group of Nazi-sympathizers in Panama opened a secret organization in 1937. The Der Deutche Auslandischer Nazi

Genossenschafft Bund, began to hold secret meetings in the back of the Kopke-Neuman

Hardware Store in November of that year. The Bund had several goals. It sought to promote Nazi Doctrine by organizing Nazi organizations throughout Central and South

America. Germany funded its projects in the Western Hemisphere. It was told to watch the Panamanian government closely in order to determine whether or not it was possible to rupture its relationship with the United States. However, Germany instructed the Bund to take a 'hands-off approach when dealing with the Canal Zone. Germany also used the

Hapag Line for transporting men and materiel to aid the covert Germans.50 36

Throughout the years, Panamanians and Americans heard rumors that Germans wanted to buy land on the coast of Pinas Bay. This would be a valuable asset as it is a fairly deep water anchorage. This rumor first surfaced in 1911 and the War Department dismissed it. The War Department and Navy Department agreed that the United States could simply seize the land in time of war, especially if a foreign national controlled it. In

1938, the rumors of Germans being interested in Pinas Bay resurfaced. The Director of

Naval Intelligence again dismissed the rumors basing his decision on the wisdom of the

War Department and Navy Department's 1911 decision. He also put forth that was more likely that the rumor resurfaced because some interested party wanted the United States government to buy seemingly worthless land at a premium in the name of national defense or because of its supposed strategic value. Pinas Bay is located southeast of the

Pacific entrance to the Canal closer to the Colombian border than to the Canal.51

Throughout the early 1930s, the U.S. government focused on repairing and strengthening relations with the American Republics. The Montevideo Conference was 37 the first test of the Good Neighbor policy and it demonstrated a positive change in U.S. policy toward the Latin American nations. It also introduced non-intervention and economic aid resolutions aimed at revitalizing United States-Latin American relations.

During the second half of the decade, while still hoping for peace, U.S. officials made some steps towards preparing for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the security of the Panama Canal. The U.S. Department of State believed that instability within

Europe could possibly lead to war and officials worried that German economic expansion into Latin America was a precursor to conflict and aimed to weaken the United States' soft underbelly. The Buenos Aires Conference advanced U.S.-Latin American relations further to the point that the republics would at least ponder multilateral defense. At that conference U.S. officials moved to stabilize and unite the Latin American Republics to prevent regional conflicts, such as the Chaco War, from weakening hemispheric security.

The Lima Conference 1938, and the Declaration of Lima, essentially a hemispheric defense agreement, displayed that renewed cooperation from the United States allowed for multilateral defense of the hemisphere.

The Roosevelt administration negotiated the Hull-Alfaro Treaty with the

Harmodio Arias Administration in an effort to better the bilateral relationship with

Panama. Although the U.S. government continued to hope for peace and neutrality, this treaty eased American efforts to increase the physical defenses of the Panama Canal during the latter half of the 1930s. Military planners agreed that the Panama Canal was vital for the defense of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. In light of this the

U.S. military revisited and began to update the defensive posture of the Canal. It realized that bombers, aircraft carriers, subversives, and saboteurs were the most viable threats to 38 the Canal and took measures to protect against them. Coastal artillery was no longer adequate for defense. Although, in reality the direct military threats to the Canal from either Germany or Japan in the 1930s were limited, the U.S. military and civilian officials in the Roosevelt administration took that threat seriously. 39

Chapter 2 - U.S. Reaction to the Outbreak of War in Europe

Immediately after the onset of war in Europe President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared American neutrality. The United States neutrality laws of the 1930s left the

Roosevelt administration little room for manoeuvring; the United States could not provide assistance to any of the belligerents, aggressor or victim. Roosevelt also issued an invitation to the American Republics to participate in an emergency meeting of foreign ministers. The purpose of this meeting was for the countries of the Western

Hemisphere, which belonged to the Pan American Union, to issue a joint declaration of their neutrality in the European conflict and to place some restrictions on the warfare they hoped would not infringe on their neutrality. The Roosevelt administration was particularly concerned with hemispheric defense and believed that defense began with its southern flank, and more importantly, with the security of the Panama Canal. Therefore, the U.S. government expedited and expanded the revamped defense program for the

Panama Canal which began in the mid-1930s. The U.S. military also increased its troop presence on the isthmus. Finally, the U.S. government dealt with labor issues and instability within Panama to accomplish its defense goals.

Previous historians have studied both the Panama Conference of 1939 and the pre-war defense of the Canal. However, no one has studied the two together and linked them with the labor problems that plagued the U.S. military in its Panamanian endeavors.

Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild performed an admirable job of studying the defenses of the Canal in U.S. Army In Wold War II, The Western

Hemisphere; Guarding The United States And Its Outposts. Charles Morris Brooks' 40

Guarding the Crossroads: Security and Defense of the Panama Canal, is excellent for more minute and technical details of the Canal defenses. The Foreign Relations of the

United States and Cordell Hull's The Memoir's of Cordell Hull, are useful for the analysis of the Panama Conference. Conniff s Black Labor on a White Canal, is a first- rate look at labor in Panama, but it neglects to examine the labor issues that dogged the defensive preparations of the Canal on the eve of World War II. This chapter provides evidence that the greatest strategic minds and the best defensive plans can not proceed without a large supply of cooperative manpower. Labor supply and racial tension hindered the military build up of the Canal Zone.

Panama Conference 1939

In response to Roosevelt's invitation all of the American Republics agreed to send representatives to Panama for the conference with the objective of developing a united response to the European war. The Panama Conference took place at Panama City beginning on September 23, 1939 and ended October 3, 1939. The American representative at the meeting was Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, since

Roosevelt and Hull decided that the world situation called for Hull to remain in

Washington. The American delegation presented six proposals at the conference. The first called for a neutrality zone encompassing all of the American Republics. The next called for the restricted use of Western Hemisphere ports by belligerent countries - no service for submarines or their tenders. The third called for all of the republics to declare their neutrality policies in an official forum. The fourth was to examine and propose solutions for those economic problems that might arise from the war. The fifth aimed to 41 maintain free trade as far as possible, and finally the sixth was an effort to prevent subversive activities by any foreign nationals.

These proposals received mixed responses from the Latin American nations. The neutrality zone was one of the most controversial. The nations wondered whether or not such a zone was legal, or if there was any legal precedent. They were also not sure how to patrol the entire zone; the U.S. military volunteered to assume most of the patrol duties to solve the problem. Another issue that arose involving the neutrality zone was that of foreign, belligerent flagged vessels which were already in Western Hemisphere ports at the outbreak of the European war. There were a few problems related to allowing these ships to remain within the neutrality zone. First of all, they would either be protected from British and French warships, or they could force the British and French to enter into action within the zone. Secondly, if the vessels received freedom within the zone they might act clandestinely as submarine tenders, or worse they might be secretly armed and act as raiders within the region. This was a fairly significant problem since there were an estimated eighty-two such vessels. In the end, the governments that harbored German ships either purchased or seized the vessels.

Some of the Latin American Republics, most notably Argentina, were suspicious of American intentions and questioned whether this was simply one more attempt at projecting hegemony within the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. military considered it a case of self-defense; it feared that any attack on the continent would come via Latin

America. Therefore, anything that could be done to try to prevent such an attack and keep the Western Hemisphere at peace was worth the attempt. The protection of the Canal was paramount to U.S. military strategy, and the neutrality zone was one means of making 42 sure that no Axis forces could easily reach striking distance of the Canal for a possible surprise attack. The U.S. military also secured strategic points in Latin America to prevent any enemies from gaining a foothold in the Americas. Two of the most important strategic points on the Atlantic side were Pernambuco, Brazil and the Windward Passage, between Cuba and Haiti. Pernambuco controlled the gateway to the South Atlantic shipping lanes, and the Windward Passage was the main entrance to the Caribbean. On the Pacific side strategic points included the Aleutians, the Galapagos, and anything in between.54

The results of the conference were favorable. The conferees agreed on a number of conventions and resolutions but none more important than the Declaration of Panama, and to a lesser extent, the establishment of the Inter-American Financial and Economic

Advisory Committee. The Declaration of Panama established the previously discussed neutrality zone. The zone provided a 300 mile buffer zone around the entire Western

Hemisphere south of Canada and excluded the territorial waters of French and British possessions in the Caribbean. The main text of the Declaration reads as follows:

As a measure of continental self-protection, the American Republics, so long as they maintain their neutrality, are as of inherent right entitled to have those waters adjacent to the American continent, which are regarded as of primary concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the commission of any hostile act by any non- American belligerent nation, whether such hostile act be attempted or made from land, sea, or air.55

If the belligerents respected the neutrality zone the Panama Canal would remain safe. The main goal of the zone was to keep warships and combat hundreds of miles from the coasts of the Western Hemisphere. The remainder of the Declaration dealt with the

American Republics' rights to call conferences and discuss their neutrality and their 43 relations with the belligerent nations. As promised, the U.S. Navy provided many of the vessels needed to patrol the zone, and it entered into agreements with most of the other

Republics to use their port facilities for replenishment. The foreign ministers designed the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee to tend to inter-

American financial and economic relationships. Initially, the major function of the committee was to provide assistance to Latin-American Republics which had suffered financially because of the European war. The committee tried to work out arrangements for the United States to replace the export markets that the American republics lost due to the war. There were sceptics who believed that this was once again an attempt by the

United States to project its hegemony on Latin America. Others did not think that the

United States could purchase enough goods from Latin America to relieve the burden. In the end the proposed financial arrangement died out because of these issues as well as resistance in the U.S. Congress.57

American and Panamanian Efforts to Protect the Canal

On the heels of the outbreak of war in Europe and Panama Conference, although the United States remained a neutral at this stage, the U.S. military began a concentrated effort to upgrade Canal defenses. The Canal was one of the United States' most vulnerable and most important strategic targets, and the reality of war reinforced that point. The U.S. military realized that the Canal required better defenses. During the initial years of the European war the U.S. military began an extensive construction program to better the defenses of the Panama Canal. The program included projects within Panama and other sites in the Caribbean and Pacific. 44

Between summer 1939 and December 1941, American authorities began numerous new construction projects within Panama. The most ambitious of these new projects were the third locks project and the transisthmian highway. The U.S. government approved both of these projects long before the actual construction began. Congress approved the third locks project in August 1939 on the eve of war; however, construction did not begin until the spring of 1940. The U.S. military initiated the third locks project to solve two problems; the possibility that sabotage or an attack might render the Canal inoperative for a lengthy period of time and to accommodate the navy which had ordered the new 'Montana' class battleship, at 58,000 tons it would not fit through the existing locks. With a planned length 200 feet longer and a width 30 feet wider, the new locks would be able to accommodate the larger vessels. The new locks were to run roughly parallel to the existing sets of locks but spaced a few hundred yards away and utilized different entrance channels. 45

http://www.czimaRes.com/CZMemories/thirdlocks/map 1 .htm)

The spacing aimed to prevent a single attack from destroying all of the locks. The engineers designed the new entrance channels to open at different angles so that a single submarine could not torpedo all of the lock gates at once. Construction of the third set of locks began on July 1, 1940 and the military estimated it would be complete by 1946.

The work progressed judiciously but labor shortages and changing priorities caused delays in the construction which delayed the initial completion goal.

The third lock project was never completed. The military re-evaluated the project after the United States entered the war. The War Department decided that the only way the locks could be finished in the allotted amount of time was to give the project top priority. The navy lobbied hard for the project because production had already begun on the Montana class ships. Accordingly, the third locks received a high priority and 46 construction flourished. However, in the spring of 1942 Lt. Gen. Frank Andrews compiled a report that displayed the third locks project as a hindrance to Canal defense rather than an additional safeguard. He considered the most effective way to damage the

Canal was an attack on any of the spillways that provided the water. A new set of locks increased the number of spillways and therefore increased the danger to the Canal.

Shortly thereafter the navy discontinued work on the Montana class and the third locks' two raisons d'etres ceased to exist. Construction on the third locks was effectively halted to provide other projects with men and equipment.59

The transisthmian highway was an additional high priority project of the U.S. military between the outbreak of the European war and Pearl Harbor. The military contended that a highway between Balboa and Colon would greatly enhance its mobility in Panama. Part of the highway was already completed in 1940; it linked Balboa with the

Madden dam on the Chagres River and could easily be extended to Colon. The 1936

Canal Treaty called for the completion of the road and stated that it should be within

Panamanian territory, not in the Canal Zone. The army wanted the road to run within the

Canal Zone so that it would be under full U.S. military jurisdiction and therefore easier to control. However, the treaty called for the road run through Panamanian territory, and the

War Department decided that the quickest and easiest way to have the road built was in accordance with the existing convention. Roosevelt approved the project and had $4 million allocated from his emergency fund to bankroll the construction.60

These were not the only ventures that taxed the capacity of the Army Corps of engineers and the local labor supply. They also built remote defense sites, new housing,

6 Sixty years later the project is finally being completed by the Republic of Panama to accommodate larger freight vessels and another road through Panamanian territory. Since military housing available in

Panama was not able to cope with the influx of new personnel, the military began an ambitious program of constructing new barracks. The money for the barracks project was not ready until a year after most of the new troops already lived in Panama, in tents.

Another project was a new searchlight and antiaircraft defense site located between the

Madden dam and Balboa. The searchlight site was approved and built but there was no access road because the Republic of Panama had yet to grant a right of way to the United

States. In the end, the Panamanian government approved the right of way and the U.S. military acquired further approval to connect the new road to the Madden dam so that local traffic could bypass the Canal Zone. All in all it was a very busy time on the isthmus; the U.S. military prepared for probable war and the Republic of Panama cooperated for the most part.61

American defense plans called for sufficient alternate and emergency airfields.

There were roughly 40 emergency airfields situated around Panama. Most of them were in such a state of disrepair that they were useless. Also the two main airfields, France

Field and Albrook Field needed to be upgraded in order to fulfill their combat potential.

Major General David Stone, Commander of the Panama Canal Department, had previously held discussions with the Panamanian government trying to acquire the rights to use additional space for airfields, but deliberations had not concluded by the time the

State Department took over negotiations in September 1939. The largest airfield in the plan was Rio Hato, a field American airmen had long been using unofficially for training and vacation. However, since the U.S. government wanted to make official use of the field, Panamanian Law required the agreement to be made with the Panamanian 48 government and not solely the owner of the property. The deal breakers on the official lease were length of term and compensation to the government. This process was even more complicated after the emergence of Arnulfo Arias. Arias wanted the length of term limited and wanted what he felt was adequate financial compensation.64 The

Minister of Foreign Relations at the time, Raul de Roux, noted that he expected the maximum possible compensation before Panama acceded to the request.

Even if the U.S. military was successful at acquiring and upgrading airfields, the air corps in the Canal Zone was not prepared to operate effectively. The Air Commander in Panama, Brigadier General Herbert Dargue, reported that the air corps were severely understaffed and could not have offered any real defense had the Canal been attacked in

September 1939. The 19th Air Wing had only 101 commissioned officers and there were

71 tactical aircraft stationed in the Panama Canal Zone; there were only enough officers to complete operations with about half of the aircraft. According to the air corps operating procedures, there should have been approximately 290 officers to effectively operate a fleet of 71 aircraft. To make matters worse the wing was in the process of accepting an additional 31 planes to augment its force of aging units. The lack of officers was not the only worry; the air wing a lso had to train all of the new recruits and enlisted men that had swelled the wing's numbers. General Dargue reported that he thought that two of the air wing's six squadrons would reach operational effectiveness by January 1940.66

Further evidence of Panama's importance for hemispheric defense was the steady stream of reinforcements who continued to arrive throughout 1939 and 1940. The

Panama garrison had some 21,500 troops by April 1940. The additional men and materiel prodded the Panama Canal Department to reorganize. Originally the forces had been organized into a two sector system, but General Stone deemed this system was too inefficient for defense of such a valuable target. He decided that the forces should be organized into a permanent mobile force. The new permanent force would have sectors within it. The first of the new operational sectors was the Panama Provisional Coast

Artillery Brigade (AA); the antiaircraft units combined to form a new cohesive unit.

When Major General Daniel Van Voorhis took command of the Panama Canal

Department in January 1940 another directive from the War Department asked that the commanders in Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone discuss the best defense against air attack. In Panama, General Dargue and Major General Ben Lear, commander of the

Pacific Sector, pushed for a mobile defense force. The previously created Panama

Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) united with the harbor defense units and became the Panama Separate Coast Artillery Brigade (Provisional); the remaining infantry and field artillery units joined some of the engineers and quartermaster corps to become the Panama Mobile Force (Provisional). The importance of the Canal can be gleaned from the new Coast Artillery Brigade; it was the largest and most heavily armed artillery unit in the entire U.S. Army. The reorganization of Canal defenses did not end within Panama, the military revamped its organization in the approaches to Panama as well.67

Puerto Rico was the site of one of the most important bases for the defense of the

Caribbean approaches to the Canal. The expansion of the Puerto Rican garrison began in early 1939; prior to this there were only two battalions stationed at Puerto Rico. The War

Department decided that Puerto could best aid in the defense of the Canal by housing an 50 air corps that could assist the navy in patrolling the sea lanes. The best location for an airfield on Puerto Rico was Point Boriquen at the island's northwest corner. The official mission of the Puerto Rican contingent was to fulfill the role of an outlying base and support the naval forces in controlling the Caribbean Sea. One of its missions was to patrol against hostile sympathizers. Furthermore the War Department decided that Puerto

Rico was significant enough for the defense of the Canal that it needed to be managed properly, and it established the Puerto Rican Department July 1, 1939. Headquartered at

San Juan, the new department commanded the forces in Puerto Rico and the Virgin

Islands.68

The forces in the Caribbean region continued to grow throughout 1940. The

United States received leases on additional bases in the Caribbean after the destroyers- for-bases deal with the British. The deal brokered by Roosevelt allowed the United States to circumvent neutrality laws and assist Britain. The British received 50 mothballed destroyers in exchange for allowing the United States to lease a number of military bases.

After the addition of new bases the U.S. military needed to reorganize the region once again. There were too many forces committed to the area to have only a Panama Canal

Department and a Puerto Rican Department. After the deal, the U.S. military had access to bases in Jamaica, British Guiana, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia, Antigua, and the

Bahamas. In order to manage effectively the new additions to the region the War Plans

Division suggested a new theater command for the Caribbean. It established the

Caribbean Defense Command on February 10, 1941 and named General Daniel Van

Voorhis the Commanding Officer. There were three local commands within the 51

Caribbean Theater: The Puerto Rican Department, The Panama Canal Department, and

Trinidad and British Guiana.69

As early as 1939, the air corps requested a base in Trinidad. Major General Henry

Arnold, Chief of the Air Staff, went on a tour of the Canal's air defenses that year and included Trinidad in his itinerary. The air corps decided that Trinidad would be a perfect base if Brazil, or parts of Brazil, fell to Nazi occupation. Volksdeutsche and Nazi aggression worried the U.S. military at this time as it displayed no signs of slowing down.

Northwest Brazil was well within bomber range of the Canal, and the Air Staff felt that a base on Trinidad could effectively protect against the threat. The request was finally granted due to the Destroyers for Bases agreement.

The U.S. military also fortified the Pacific approaches to the Canal in the years before the United States entered the war. The negotiations with Ecuador over the

Galapagos Islands finally concluded and the U.S. military obtained permission to build a base there in order to patrol the approaches to the Canal. The Guatemalan government gave the U.S. military permission to operate bombers from some of its airfields to take part in patrolling the coast. The Roosevelt administration also tried to acquire further base sites in Salinas, Ecuador and Talara, Peru. These bases would form a defensive curtain over the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal. Any reservations the Latin American countries had about the American military operating from their soil were dispelled after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. The attack displayed the vulnerability of targets that did not have an outlying ring of defense.71

During the two and a half years between the beginning of World War II and the

United States' entry into the war there were two periods of increased readiness at the 52

Panama Canal. The alerts took place in June 1940 and July 1941. The first took place shortly after Hitler had conquered most of continental Europe. The War Department issued an alert for the Panama Canal Department, the Hawaiian Department and the entire west coast of the United States to be on the watch for a possible surprise attack.

There were no other details given regarding the attack. General Van Voorhis simply received instructions to "take every possible precaution." Nothing happened and U.S.

79 forces stood down.

The second alert happened in July 1941. At least this time there was a specific threat; U.S. officials were worried about a surprise attack by the Japanese. The American

Military received intelligence that the Japanese planned to attack Russia and it thought this was a precursor to an attack on the United States. In addition to the intelligence there were some suspicious actions by the Japanese; they diverted shipping out of the Atlantic and told all Japanese vessels to be west of the Panama Canal by July 25; these actions seemed to infer that the Japanese did not want to have any vessels trapped and inaccessible should war break out. Another report stated it was likely the Japanese would attack the entrance to the Canal with torpedoes. Upon hearing this, Van Voorhis instigated additional security measures for ships transiting the Canal and ordered that ships had to use military approaches to the Canal through minefields and not the regular direct approaches. Whether by coincidence or not, the War Department also discovered that the Japanese shipping schedule had at least one vessel transiting the Canal every day between July 16-22. In order to combat this threat Van Voorhis told all Japanese vessels that approached the Canal that it was under repairs indefinitely and they would not be granted passage, although ships from other countries still used the Canal each day. 53

Although no attack came as a result of the two alerts, the U.S. military prepared for the worst.73

Panamanians did not welcome all of the measures the U.S. military undertook to protect the Canal. The American presence on the Island of Taboga caused a number of difficulties for Panamanian citizens. The U.S. military placed navigation restrictions around the island in order to prevent possible spies, saboteurs, and belligerents from reaching the local military installations. On one occasion the ferry from Panama to

Taboga sailed too close to the restricted area and the Canal Zone authorities threatened the pilot with a large fine and prison. U.S. officials knew the ferry was not a danger because it ran a regular route to Taboga, but apparently that was not good enough. In a separate incident, U.S. officials seized a boat carrying perishable food. By the time authorities returned the boat to its owners, all the produce had perished. Panamanians argued that the American restrictions were the cause of the incidents because they were too restrictive; if the weather or seas did not cooperate even experienced seamen could find themselves in violation of the American zone.74

Labor Issues and Instability 1939-1941

When governments attempt massive construction projects, there is a colossal need for labor; war complicates this problem because the project must be completed as quickly as possible. The third locks development and other construction works that were essential for Hemispheric Defense and the security of the Panama Canal were no exception. All these projects began before the United States entered the war, and they were undertaken in order to protect the Canal from a perceived imminent Axis threat. The U.S. government had to rectify the defensive posture of the Canal and it had to do so quickly; 54 otherwise it would compromise the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Unfortunately, these projects, mostly funded in their entirety by the American government, suffered from labor-related problems.

Any tension in the relations between Panama and the United States could compromise the security of the Canal. The new defense construction within Panama strained the relations between Panama and the United States for a number of reasons.

Many Panamanians were upset that all of the announcements regarding the new construction projects claimed that only American citizens could work in skilled positions.

Panamanians were also upset that the U.S. State Department felt it needed to import more workers from the West Indies in order to complete the projects in a timely, cost-efficient manner. Finally, the Americans worried that the lack of Panamanian labor would be a hindrance for the completion of the projects.

Panamanians felt, justifiably so, that they should be on an equal playing field with American citizens when involved with employment in and around the Canal Zone.

Panama had leased the Canal Zone, which divided the tiny nation in half so that the

United States could have a transisthmian waterway. Many Panamanians felt that that in of itself was generous and that they should reap some benefit from the Canal. As noted earlier there were decades-old problems such as the commissary issue that prohibited

Panamanians from receiving what many thought they were entitled. Therefore, the 1936

Hull-Alfaro Treaty provided that Panamanians should receive the same status as U.S. citizens. This regulation meant that Panamanians were eligible to hold gold roll or skilled level positions that until those times were almost exclusively given to white Americans.

Gold roll jobs included higher wages and an elevated status. 55

The American government dodged this responsibility when it announced the funding for the third locks project. Congress approved the third locks project on August

11, 1939. The Act stated that "all new personnel in such construction work occupying skilled, technical, clerical, administrative, and supervisory positions shall be citizens of the United States."75 Panamanians were noticeably outraged over their exclusion from the skilled positions in the new construction project. There were protests against the U.S. government by various groups within Panama and a never-ending exchange of diplomatic notes. There were two groups in Panama that protested most forcibly against the proposed construction: the Society of Panamanians Employed by the Panama Canal, and

Panamanian Society of Engineers. Both of these groups complained bitterly that they should be permitted to work at the same skilled jobs as Americans on the new projects.

The Society of Panamanians Employed by the Panama Canal were most vehement because some of them already held gold jobs and they could not understand why they were not permitted to work the same jobs on the new projects. The members of the

Society of Engineers protested the fact that they were well-educated engineers, the same as American engineers and they should not be excluded based on their nationality.76

The exclusions also set about an intense debate between the two governments. A number of notes passed between high level diplomats from both sides. Panamanian officials complained that the U.S. State Department reneged on a promise of equality of treatment it had made to the Panamanian people. The State Department argued that although in the past it had promised some forms of equality of employment opportunities, it did not promise anything with regard to the new defense contracts. Part of the problem was that the U.S. government would not pass the appropriations if it did not include 56 clauses that stated American citizens would be the ones benefiting from the contracts. In order to placate the Panamanians, U.S. lawmakers continually claimed that they would make an amendment to the act before the construction period. An amendment did come, but it was not what the Panamanians expected; it stated that "every contract entered into by the Quartermaster Corps of the Army for construction and installation of buildings flying fields, and appurtenances thereto in the Panama Canal Zone."77 Technically this clause opened the possibility that some Panamanians might get skilled positions. The wording of the amendment allowed contractors, but not the U.S. government, to hire

Panamanians. These issues were a defensive liability for the Canal; each day that various

Panamanian groups argued with the U.S. officials over employment and equity was another day that delayed or hampered construction. The United States was not under attack yet, but it also did not have the luxury of time; war was on the horizon.78

The second labor issue that raised tensions in Panama was the possibility that the

Americans would import more workers for the construction projects. As noted earlier,

Panamanians detested the number of Barbadians and Jamaicans, who were black

Protestants and spoke English, in the Republic. This issue returned periodically to

Panamanian politics and, although it did not begin because of American influence, it was generally linked to the United States. Panamanians did not want the Roosevelt administration to bring more English-speaking blacks into Panama. The most vocal group in this venture was the Afirmacion Nacional. It wanted Panama to forbid the importation of Antilleans. It said that it would consider allowing the importation of Spanish or Latin

American workers if, and only if, there were not enough Panamanian workers to fill the void. Part of the problem with this argument was that many Panamanians felt that the 57 unskilled labor offered by the Canal was below them and that it should be West Indian work. Panamanians thought that they were equal with Americans and as such they did not want to perform the menial tasks. At the same time they did not want the U.S. State

Department to import more black workers either. The ensuing battle of letters lasted for over a year with the State Department offering to try to import Puerto Rican workers instead. However, Puerto Rican workers were American citizens and therefore wanted the benefits accorded continental American citizens in the Canal Zone. As such, they would not work for the pitiful wages that the United States offered for unskilled laborers.

In the end the U.S. government offered only to import workers if it exhausted the labor supply from the Republic, and it would only import West Indian workers if it deemed either supply of workers was inadequate. It was very easy for the U.S. government to declare that the workers were inadequate due to the emergency nature of the construction

79 projects.

The Arias Constitution of 1941 made the situation in Panama even worse. The new constitution was highly nationalistic with strong overtones of racism. It placed many of the unmentioned feelings of the Republic out in the open for the world to see. The most offensive clauses affected labor and race, and included those that took away

Panamanian citizenship from children of West Indians and a clause that limited immigration. Under the new constitution blacks who did not speak Spanish were not allowed to immigrate to Panama. The Arias administration claimed that it was a nationalist movement trying to protect the cultural integrity of the Republic, and it was an effective method to limit immigration without appearing blatantly racist. As mentioned earlier, a separate clause disallowed many ethnic groups from owning businesses in Panama. Again, the Arias administration used the constitution to limit emigre's powers and caused turmoil in an already unstable environment. The 1941 constitution made an already complex political dynamic more entangled and less stable.

Throughout the entire episode, the U.S. State Department stated that it would do everything in its power to hire Panamanian workers. Nevertheless, the possibility that more West Indians would be imported to the Republic was enough to divide the populace. It was an interesting problem, especially when looked at from both sides; the

Panamanians wanted equality with the Americans and the ability to work the higher paying gold roll jobs and they wanted the U.S. government to limit the importation of workers to work the silver jobs, the jobs the Panamanians themselves did not want. The two positions countermanded each other. The very notion of conflict between Panama and the United States weakened the security of the Canal and hemispheric defense.

The outbreak of war in Europe warranted anticipatory preparations by the United

States for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the security of the Panama Canal.

The war also created the need for another extraordinary meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics. The Roosevelt administration took the lead in calling an

Inter-American Conference so that the United States could shore up its defenses. The

U.S. military needed all the time it could get to try to form an effective defensive perimeter around the Panama Canal since labor shortages and issues with available labor continually hindered projects within Panama and the Canal Zone. The Panama Canal

Department had many high priority projects that the U.S. military felt were essential for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, including: the third locks project, the Pan-

American Highway, and a defensive perimeter that consisted of island bases in places 59 such as Puerto Rico, the Galapagos archipelago, and Trinidad. The U.S. military's work at protecting the hemisphere was made a little easier because of the 1939 Panama

Conference of Foreign Ministers; the Declaration of Panama proved to be the cornerstone of collective defense for the hemisphere. It also allowed the neutral United States to give military and economic aid to the other American Republics. Armed with the conventions and agreements from the Panama Conference the Roosevelt administration, the U.S.

Department of State, and the U.S. military worked to improve the security of the Panama

Canal. 60

Chapter 3: Political Instability on the Isthmus, 1939-1940

Politics in Panama

In the years before the United States entered the war, political stability on the

Isthmus of Panama was a topic of grave concern. The U.S. government worried that developments within Panama would have serious consequences for the security of the

Canal. Threats to the Canal came in many different forms, including the challenges posed by political instability prior to and during the war itself. The Panamanian political scene was extremely turbulent in those few years. The trouble began when Juan Demostenes

Arosemena died in office. In the aftermath of his death, the Republic experienced a number of interim presidents and rampant political infighting. The culmination of domestic political disturbance was the explosive 1940 presidential election campaign between Arnulfo Arias Madrid and Ricardo J. Alfaro. The campaign was one of the most violent in Panama's history and threatened to throw the country into a civil war.

Previous historians have written only briefly about the 1940 Panamanian presidential election. There is no single comprehensive analysis of this crucial electoral campaign, nor have any of the accounts focused on the possible effect of the divisive campaign on the United States' ability to secure and defend the Panama Canal. Walter

LaFeber, noted simply that Arnulfo Arias, "pieced together a political coalition, including some oligarchs with fascistic tendencies and the growing, nationalistic middle class. He swept into power by a vote of 107,750 to 3,022."80 In Prize Possession, John Major noted only that the election campaign was brutally violent and Arias was the eventual winner.81

Michael Conniff did not cover the 1940 electoral campaign; he simply said that Arias 61 became president in Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance.82 At least

Thomas Pearcy explained, in We Answer Only To God; Politics and the Military in

Panama, 1903-1947, that there was significant violence in the campaign and most of it was the result of private militias used on behalf of the candidates.83 This chapter examines the election in full and sheds much needed light on possible consequences and the State Department's apprehensions about violence in Panama.

Juan Demostenes Arosemena won the election of 1936; he was Harmodio Arias' personal choice as his successor. In the beginning Arosemena was not overly loyal to the

United States, but he did little to stand in the way of American initiatives. He was in office when the new Canal treaty was finally agreed upon with the United States and when it was subsequently ratified years later on the eve of World War II. In order to have the United States government ratify the agreement Arosemena made many concessions; he virtually did away with all the benefits that Panama received under the reworked treaty. Among the amendments he accepted were American rights to lands outside of the

Canal Zone for military maneuvers and defense; unilateral intervention by the United

States - in the case of an emergency, such as a state of war, the United States was allowed to use all means necessary to protect the Canal and ask for permission from

Panama after the fact; and even the formal guarantee of Panamanian independence. In another move to appease the Americans Arosemena convened the 1939 Panama

Conference at the request of the Roosevelt administration. Unfortunately, Arosemena was not well; he died in office on December 16, 1939. His friendship with the United States would leave a legacy that lasted long after his presidency. He awoke nationalism among 62

Panamanians frustrated with American hegemony. This opened the door for the rise of one of Panama's most vociferous leaders Arnulfo Arias Madrid.

The next election in Panama was scheduled to take place in June 1940. In the interim the government needed to bring in an acting president to run the administration for the remaining six months before the election. Ezequiel Fernandez Jaen stepped into this role for the first few days after Arosemena's death, before the official first designate

Of could arrive. The first designate, Dr. Augusto Samuel Boyd, was in Washington serving as Ambassador when events unfolded. The U.S. military flew Boyd and his wife by military plane to Panama on December 18. The entire cabinet and acting President

Fernandez Jaen met them at the airport, and the transition to Boyd ran smoothly. The use of an American military aircraft to return the Boyds to Panama began the first of a series of confrontations between Arnulfo Arias Madrid and Boyd and the United States government. Arias, who had already announced his bid to run in the 1940 election, felt that Boyd received preferential treatment at the hands of the Americans. Arias was also on his way back to Panama; however his route was far slower because he was on a ship from Europe. He felt that the Grace Lines vessel should make an unscheduled stop at

Cuba so that he too could board a plane and arrive more quickly in Panama. He reasoned that if Boyd sought election in 1940 the special treatment and fanfare could give him an edge, especially among those who favored closer ties with the United States. One of the most amusing parts of this travel episode was that the U.S. State Department actually tried to have Arias' travel expedited. There were numerous telegrams between Sumner

Welles, Laurence Duggan and the Vice President of Grace Lines Robert Patchin. In these communications the American statesmen asked whether or not it was possible to have the 63 ship return to Havana to allow Arias to catch a plane to Panama. The responses from

Grace Lines were that it would be just as quick to drop Arias in Kingston as returning to

Havana would delay the ship's schedule by as many as two days. Patchin told Duggan that he would do everything in his power to allow Arias to connect with a southbound plane from Kingston.87

For all the fanfare surrounding his return Boyd did not plan on running in the upcoming elections; he served as President due to unexpected circumstances. He continued to run the administration as Arosemena had in the end, friendly to the United

States. Boyd had very strange bedfellows for someone friendly to the United States. He was influential in the Arnulfo Arias campaign, and Arias was definitely not a friend of the United States. At the beginning of the electoral campaigns Boyd did not openly show his support for either Arias or his competitor Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro. However, early on he leaned towards supporting Arias and even allowed the National Police full reign in trying to make sure Arias would win the election.

The electoral campaign for the 1940 election was one of the most explosive in

Panamanian history, literally and figuratively; it pitted the nationalistic Arnulfo Arias versus the more moderate Ricardo J. Alfaro. Both sides, the Arnulfistas and the

Alfaristas, had huge support groups and their own paramilitary forces; in addition Arias had the backing of the National Police. The Arnulfistas were intensely nationalist, while the Alfaristas continually played down fears and rumors that they were the Roosevelt administration's candidate in the election. All in all it made for a wild six months of campaigning rife with accusations, threats and violence. A campaign such as this created a very unstable atmosphere within Panama, and American authorities were greatly concerned over how it would affect the security of the Canal Zone and ultimately hemispheric defense.

Officially, Arnulfo Arias' candidacy for the Presidency began at a convention for the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, on October 21-22, 1939. However, Arias had been vying for a chance to become president since 1931 when he led the assault on the

Presidential Palace during the Action Comunal coup. Other members of the Action

Comunal, most notably his brother Harmodio, tried to keep him in the background since his views were a little too nationalist and provocative for their tastes. In the eight years between the coup and the announcement of his candidacy many things changed in

Panama. The promises for a new responsible government led by the Action Comunal never came to fruition. The United States concluded a new Canal treaty with the Republic of Panama and then refused to ratify it unless Panama made concessions on some of the more important points, and the government had had enough of attempting to placate the

West Indians and other black imported workers. It was time for change in Panama, and the Partido National Revolucionario felt that Arnulfo Arias would bring that change.

Incidentally, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario thought of Arias as its leader and

on creator, and it gave him the honorary title "the anointed of the Panamanian people."

In 1936, a coalition of three major parties formed to elect Juan Demostenes

Arosemena. The same three parties joined forces to name Arias as their candidate.

Following the announcement by the Partido Nacional Revolucionario two other national parties endorsed Arias, the Partido Conservador (October 28-29) and the Partido Liberal

Nacional (November 4). A fourth major party, the Partido Democrata joined the coalition as well and announced its support at a convention on November 11. In the 1936 65 election, the Partido Democrata was one of the leading parties in opposition to

Arosemena. Arias' support was not limited to these large political parties; he also had the support of the Action Comunal (what was left of it) and the Partido Liberal Unido.

Although a small party, the Partido Liberal Unido was led by a powerful ex-president of

Panama, Bellisario Porras. These parties openly gave their support to Arias because of backroom dealings that virtually guaranteed political clout. With all of this political support plus some from various media outlets at this early stage in the campaign, the election was seen as Arias' to lose. This worried the U.S. State Department as there were widespread rumors of his Fascist leanings and vindictive nature, not to mention his hostility towards the United States. Ambassador William Dawson tried to reinforce the point that the elections were still seven months away and that most people did not feel that Arnulfo was right for the Presidency. Most importantly there was speculation that his own brother might not support him, and Harmodio Arias held substantial political clout.90

In late November 1939, the opposition coalition backed the candidacy of Dr.

Ricardo J. Alfaro. Alfaro was a provisional president soon after the Action Comunal coup and he was also Harmodio Arias's chief negotiator for the 1936 Canal Treaty, otherwise known as the Hull-Alfaro Treaty. Dawson's informants told him that the

Arnulfistas viewed Alfaro as a formidable opponent because he was both prestigious and on very friendly terms with the U.S. government. The Arnulfistas worried that Alfaro might have the backing of Domingo Diaz who ran in the 1936 election; Diaz was considerably wealthy and could provide Alfaro with a large campaign fund. Other rumors began to surface that Diaz and his main collaborator Francisco "Pancho" Arias (no relation to Arnulfo and Harmodio) would try to seize power in some sort of coup. U.S. 66 officials could not confirm these rumors, but the U.S. government was right to be concerned with the events in Panama since the next few months promised to create more instability.

When Arias finally reached Panama on December 12, 1939, his supporters had a large reception waiting for him at the docks in Colon. Many politicians and cabinet officers made the trek from Panama to Colon to welcome him home. Arias acknowledged the greetings and then made his way to Panama where he was met by the remaining members of the government and President Boyd. He and the President then continued on to pay their respects for Arosemena at the cemetery. It was essentially a love-in for Arias.

He and President Boyd were on cordial terms among rumors that Boyd had decided not to run for election and would step aside for Arias to become the next president. For his part, the presidential candidate said all the right things in his public addresses. In order to placate his critics he spoke about the importance of Panama's relationship with the

United States, and even praised Roosevelt. He lauded the undermined Hull-Alfaro Treaty

Senate: "For us Panamanians it was crystallized in the Arias-Roosevelt (Hull-Alfaro in the United States) Treaty which, if it does not fulfill all the aspirations of the

Panamanians, at least alleviates greatly the situation which existed when the onerous

09 articles of the Treaty of 1903 were in effect." All in all, Arias seemed like the consummate professional in his first appearances in Panama since accepting the nomination as presidential candidate. He was on his best behaviour and played lip-service to the appropriate people and subjects, democracy, relations with the United States, and prevention and/or the prosecution of a war. 67

Both candidates based their campaigns on very different ideals. Alfaro wanted to increase the transparency of the government. He wanted to initiate reform within the power structure of the government and wanted to establish a more professional civil service. He felt that deceit and corruption within the government was abhorrent and a new standard of decency needed to emerge in order to make Panama a better country.

Arias on the other-hand stated that he wanted to govern with and for his friends; a statement that seems to reinforce the necessity for honesty in the government. He stated that he wanted to purify race in Panama by sterilizing 'unbalanced' blacks. All in all,

Arias' platform seemed to buttress Alfaro's calls for change.94

In the immediate aftermath of Ricardo J. Alfaro announcing his candidacy for

President, the Arnulfistas paid little heed to the opposition. Although this changed with time, the original plan was to barely acknowledge Alfaro's existence in an effort to show the public that he was just a political has been who offered nothing in the way of competition. Even the Arnulfista newspapers paid scant attention to him, in the first month or so of Alfaro's candidacy the opposition wrote only a few articles of acknowledgement, and these claimed he was a socialist puppet. They also attacked his first attempt at the presidency during the aftermath of the Action Comunal coup. The

Arnulfista press held him responsible for such things as reducing the salaries of government workers. Even though the competition took a break the Alfaro camp did not.

From the very beginning of the campaign the Alfarista press attacked Arias for being a

Fascist. It even went as far as to refer to Arias as the "Nazi-onal" candidate. The

Alfaristas also attacked the corruption of the Arosemena administration, mostly because it the same base of support would elect Arias. With virtually the same breath that the 68 reporters attacked Arosemena, they praised Boyd. Boyd shared all of Arosemena's ministers and administration and had been president for a total of six weeks; surely not much had changed. It is clear that during the early stages of the campaign the Alfarista camp was far more combative than its opposition. However, that changed in a matter of days as the campaign grew ugly.95

Ricardo J. Alfaro returned to Panama on January 24, 1940, after a lengthy stay in the United States. A small delegation greeted him at Colon when he landed, but the real welcome was due upon his arrival in Panama City. He took a train to Panama City where he was due to make a speech to a large crowd of supporters. As his speech began some people began throwing rocks into the throngs and a riot erupted. Some injuries and arrests occurred, but nothing substantial by the time the police restored order. The biggest problem was that the police dispersed the crowd in the middle of Alfaro's speech. There were two sides to the events of the day; the Arnufista media claimed that it was

Communist supporters of the Partido Socialista that began throwing rocks; the Alfarista press claimed that Arnulfista hecklers began throwing rocks at the crowd and did so with police protection. The second story seemed more likely since Alfaro was the candidate of a coalition that included the Partido Socialista and the Arnulfistas had the support of the

National Police.

The National Police was a strong supporter of the Arias campaign. One of the earliest examples of this came during a Liberal Renovador convention in Aguadulce. On

December 28, 1939, the National Police reinforced the local police of Aguadulce in preparation for the convention. The leader of the detachment, Captain Palacioa, rode around the town in a car decorated with photos of Arnulfo Arias. At the convention, the 69 delegates observed all of Panama's laws and even refrained from any alcohol in an effort to stay off Palacioa's radar. It seems that was not enough as Palacioa entered the hall and arrested Eduardo Morgan because the delegation applauded his speech; Palacioa believed that Morgan must have made derogatory comments about President Boyd and

Presidential candidate Arnulfo Arias in order to garner such a response. After the arrest the conference concluded and while the members exited the hall the police tried to provoke Francisco "Pancho" Arias and a riot ensued. In the end the Police asked for

Pancho's help in diffusing the situation, and released anyone they had arrested.

By early February rumors started to appear in Panamanian papers stating that

Alfaro was the candidate of the Roosevelt administration. Both sides used this to their advantage. The Arnulfistas used the claim to reinforce their beliefs that the U.S. government had too much power within the Republic of Panama and was the source of many of Panama's problems. By the same token the Alfaristas used the American angle as a promise of election victory for their candidate because he had significant support from the U.S. government. It was even made public that before Alfaro left the United

States a very prominent U.S. politician commented, "I know you are a democrat and that, if elected, you would carry out democratic principles. I hope you will be elected."97 The name of this mystery politician remained a secret. An article published in the Panama

America, Harmodio Arias' newspaper, put another Arnulfista spin on the rumor. It stated that this rumor was a ridiculous effort by the Alfaristas to add some credence to their campaign. The article continued by saying that the U.S. government should be appalled that the Alfaristas dragged its good name through the mud. Finally, the story made a jab at the United States when it stated that the American government could not have anything 70 to do with elections in Panama because of its current Good Neighbor Policy and the recently ratified Hull-Alfaro Treaty.98

The next chapter in the drama witnessed the Alfaristas request some form of

American guarantee to a free election. The Alfaristas claimed, not unjustifiably, that the

Arnulfistas controlled the National Police and the police would do almost anything to ensure Arias won the election. The Alfaristas feared violence against their supporters and many different forms of coercion by the Arnulfistas and the National Police. On February

10, 1940, the Alfaristas went so far as to ask U.S. Ambassador William Dawson to have the U.S. officials supervise the upcoming elections. This did two things for the Alfarista camp: it increased the distance between the U.S. government and Alfaro because the

United States had to publicly denounce the claim due to its policy of non-intervention; and two it gave even more fodder to the Arnulfista camp who could use the request as proof that Alfaro was or wanted to be the candidate of the U.S. government. Either way the appeal for help was a poor political decision by the Alfarista campaign."

In March, members of the Alfarista campaign repeated their request for American aid. Of course, the answer remained the same; the U.S. government could not interfere in another sovereign country's affairs. Two events could have sparked the renewal of the request. The first happened February 25, during a Partido Liberal Doctrinario convention in Chitre. The Arnulfista-supported police forces surrounded the area but did not cause a disturbance as they had in Agualdulce. Instead, the National Police simply turned some of the convention-goers away from Chitre and in other cases confiscated any

Partido Liberal Doctrinario related materials. While these actions were a far cry better 71 than the riot and arrests that took place at Agualdulce, they still infringed on the

Alfaristas rights to free speech and assembly.100

A second event that may have pushed the Alfaristas to ask for American aid was the formation of a Guardia Civica Nacional by the Arnulfistas on March 13. This force formed ostensibly to supplement the National Police and support the candidacy and administration of Arnulfo Arias. In truth, the Guardia Civica Nacional was nothing more than a government backed, private militia for the personal use of Arias. It was simply another tool used for coercion by the Arnulfista campaign and amounted to nothing less than storm troopers. U.S. officials were not overly concerned about the development of the Guardia. This was not the first time in Panamanian politics that a candidate had his own paramilitary unit. During the 1936 election campaign the Guardia Civica, funded by the National Revolutionary Party, backed the Arosemena campaign. The Guardia did not take up arms in 1936, and U.S. officials remained optimistic that they would refrain from armed insurgency in 1940. Together, these two events definitely seemed to justify the

Alfarista's fears, but asking for American intervention was still a political faux pas.101

The Alfaristas pushed the American angle even further through their lone publication, El Pueblo^ a political serial or newsletter that solely reported on Panamanian politics. In order to gain more credence the newsletter often carried news stories that it attributed to American press sources. In an effort to make Alfarista supporters believe that the outcome of the Panamanian election concerned the United States government some stories carried Washington datelines and purported to suggest that the U.S. authorities were on the verge of disarming the National Police or would intervene in the elections in order to make them legitimate. These fabricated stories included enough facts 72 to impress upon some Panamanians that the United States backed the Alfaro bid.

Unfortunately, while some believed the Americans liked Alfaro, it also played right into

Arias' anti-United States rhetoric.

In April, President Boyd finally let it be known publicly that he supported the candidacy of Arnulfo Arias. Before April 7, both sides courted the President for his official stamp of approval, although the Alfaristas fought an uphill battle. The President was a member of Arias' party and most of the high government officials were ardent

Arias supporters. President Boyd delivered a speech at Penonome, in Chiriqui Province that put his support behind Arias, although he announced that he still guaranteed fair results for all the parties involved in the election. This combination of statements elicited an angry reply from the Alfarista camp. Alfaro himself wrote and published a long letter in which he listed his complaints against the current administration and its handling of the electoral campaign. He pointed out various instances when the police had been less-than- ideal in their treatment of the Alfaristas. He asked President Boyd how he could give this sort of guarantee when the police targeted the Alfaristas even before the government openly announced its support for Arias; Alfaro believed that the open support for Arias gave the Police a virtual carte blanche when dealing with Alfaristas. In his reply,

President Boyd announced that there had been no undue treatment afforded to any group as long as events progressed in an orderly manner. Boyd also hinted that Alfaro might be biased in his judgement of the police. Any of the altercations listed previously seemed to back Alfaro's accusations and any of the misgivings he had about the National Police and

1 0^ its affiliation with Arias and the Boyd administration. 73

As the campaign continued the Alfaristas were wary of the amount of support the

Arnulfistas received from the government. Although many believed that Alfaro could win a fair election, virtually no one believed that he could win an election while Arias, the

National Police, and the Guardia Civica Nacional stood in his way. The end of April

1940 seemed to be a turning point in the campaign. Alfaro became less concerned with campaigning and did nothing but claim that corruption would be his downfall. While this was true there was nothing he could do as the Boyd administration was complicit in the crusade against the Alfaristas. This also led to some of the first rumors of a possible coup by the Alfarista faction. A U.S. intelligence report in March indicated that there was the possibility of a coup, but suggested it was unlikely. The stability of the country definitely came into question as the June 02, 1940 election grew closer. The U.S. State Department feared that the country it had so carefully groomed to be the perfect ally and host was beginning to break apart. All the preparations the U.S. military made to protect the Canal from Axis invaders might have been in vain as the electoral campaign threatened to destroy the country from the inside.104

The situation grew even more volatile in the last month of the campaign.

Concerned about the possibility of a coup either before or during the election, Augusto

Boyd informed U.S. officials. Boyd sent Dr. Narcisco Garay, a former Foreign Minister, to the American Embassy to talk about the situation with Ambassador Dawson. Dawson of course, knew something of the situation thanks to American intelligence forces and was not caught completely off guard. Dawson believed that the Alfaristas may take La

Chorrera and then try to seize Colon since it would be effectively cut off. However, at this point any talk of revolution was still conjecture. The war of words had not yet 74 become a shooting war. The Arnulfistas were vocal in their attacks of the Alfaristas for planning a possible revolution. The Alfaristas for their part stated they would not need to resort to violence if the election was fair and honest. By May 3, Ambassador Dawson was genuinely concerned that violence was inevitable. He did not think that it would split the country into a civil war, but he definitely believed that people would be killed and that the root of the problem was the Arnulfista faction and its followers including the government and the National Police. Therefore while the trouble brewed, the Panamanian authorities were on a heightened alert for any form of subversion and the American authorities in the Canal Zone simply waited to see if civil war would engulf Panama. 5

The tension rose so high that President Boyd, who backed the substantially anti-

American candidate Arnulfo Arias, requested aid from the U.S. government. On May 4,

Boyd sent a telegram to Ambassador Dawson that requested U.S. officials install a direct line from the Presidential Palace to the Canal Zone in case any violence broke out. The phone would allow him to immediately request U.S. troops should the situation arise.106

On the heels of this request from President Boyd, Dawson requested clarification of the

U.S. State Department's position with regard to violence during the election. Dawson wanted to know if he was to immediately make U.S. troops available to the Panamanians.

The answer he received kept with the official policy of non-intervention by the United

States. If there was violence during the election American troops were to protect and defend any territory that was under American jurisdiction - the Canal Zone. Any

American citizens in Panama would be allowed to enter the Canal Zone as a refuge from the violence. American troops would not enter the Republic of Panama even at the request of the Panamanian President. U.S. troops would only enter Panama if the 75 operation of the Canal was in jeopardy and then, only after consultation with the

Panamanian government. These instructions to Dawson show that the U.S. State

Department was very cognizant of the possibility for violence during the election and was sufficiently worried that it made preparations.107

The Panamanian government also prepared for the possibility of violence during the election. As noted earlier, Arnulfo Arias and his supporters re-established the

Guardia Civica. This added about 800 men, mostly armed, to effectively aid the National

Police in patrolling against the Alfaristas. The National Police added new members as well. The government bolstered the 1600 man force by 150 officers at the end of April and there were rumors that another 100 officers would be added before the end of May.

The new officers amounted to a significant 15% increase in force size. The government also ordered new weapons from Washington to deal with the impending violence. The

National Police requested 1000 new rifles and 250 new revolvers. It also ordered more than 300,000 rounds of ammunition of various calibers. The police force tried to enlist the new recruits as fast as possible and did not even have uniforms for all of the new members; they received their firearms and began drilling in civilian dress. Furthermore, by mid-May sandbags protected all the doors at the Central Police Station. Clearly, the

National Police force prepared for a war and the stability of the Republic of Panama was

• • 10R in question.

The Alfaristas made it known that they did not want any violence in the upcoming elections. They claimed that the rumors were not true and that as an organization they did not promote violence in any way, shape, or form. Although, they did not think that there was any chance of a fair election they would not protest the event in a violent manner. 76

There were rumors that the Alfaristas might completely boycott the elections in an effort to display the corruptness of the system. The Arnulfistas in turn spun the announcements of the Alfaristas as simply an official disavowal by Ricardo Alfaro should any violence happen.109

All of the speculation and rumor came to a head about a week before the June 2,

1940 election. The National Police discovered the first evidence of revolutionary activities on May 25. The Police arrested a plumber for making bombs for an Alfarista faction. In his interrogation he implicated 20 Alfaristas in the plot. The most senior member of this faction was "Pancho" Arias, the renowned agitator whom officials had already been watching in connection with possible Election Day violence. It is important to note that Ricardo Alfaro was not one of the people mentioned by the plumber. The

National Police arrested seven people in connection to the bomb-making plot, including

"Pancho" Arias.110

In the last few days before the June 2 election, diplomatic traffic increased noticeably. Dawson sent about three despatches a day from May 25 on; a marked difference from the one or two every few days during the rest of the election campaign.

During this time he sent a telegram to Hull that stated he was certain that "Pancho" Arias had planned a revolution when he and the others were arrested. Dawson believed that the revolution would have begun in Colon, a very anti-Arnulfo Arias city, and then spread throughout the rest of Panama. After the arrest of "Pancho" the rest of the country seemed fairly tranquil in the last few days before the election. There was one incident in the mountain region that the government tried to keep quiet. Unknown assailants ambushed and killed three police officers during a routine patrol. The government kept it 77 from the press so that it could not be used as a rallying cry for the revolutionary factions within the Alfarista campaign. The government circulated another rumor in what appeared to be an attempt to garner support from the United States against the Alfaristas; it reported revolutionaries had blown up a bridge near Rio Hato on the national highway.

The U.S. military sent an officer to investigate the claim and he noted that the report was false and that all of the bridges were intact.111

On May 31, the rumor about Alfaristas abstaining from voting proved true. A manifesto from Ricardo Alfaro and his supporters urged their supporters not to turn out for the election on June 2. The initial reports of this rumor surfaced in early May when the government issued the parties their ballots. In the Panamanian system each party was issued specially watermarked paper and they produced their own ballots. When the

Alfaristas received their ballot paper they tore it into smaller sheets and used it for scratch pads. Officially, the manifesto surfaced on May 31 and published by the Prensa Libre. It stated that the Alfaristas should abstain from voting in order to show their displeasure with democracy in Panama. Alfaro felt that the system never gave him a fair chance to be elected and that the government and various other authorities tried their best to hinder his campaign and install Arnulfo Arias into the Presidency at the cost of having fair and equal elections. The manifesto was tantamount to an announcement that Alfaro had dropped out of the race. Furthermore, the Alfaro camp continued to disavow any

i i fj revolutionary movement or coup attempt that may be taken following the election.

The election took place as scheduled on June 2, 1940. There were no reports of violence, riots or revolutions on the day and true to their word the vast majority of Alfaro supporters stayed home. As expected Arnulfo Arias won the election and became 78

President-elect of the Republic of Panama. The election results were still suspect even though the Alfaristas abstained from voting. The preliminary findings showed that

Arnulfo Arias polled 90,000 votes. The final tally showed that Arias received even more votes, 107,759 votes to Alfaro's 3,022."3 That figure was highly suspect as the total number of votes cast in the 1936 election came to approximately 90,000, divided up among numerous candidates. The numbers reinforced the Alfarista's argument that there would not be a fair election within the Republic of Panama. In previous unopposed elections, the winners received 20,000 votes (Porras, 1920), 40,000 votes (Florencio H.

Arosemena, 1928), and in 1936 Arosemena received 41,747 votes. Clearly, the

Arnulfistas doctored the results. Dawson mentioned in his telegram that even if each and every Alfaro supporter changed their mind and decided to vote for Arias it would have been nearly impossible to reach the total number of reported votes.114

Panamanian domestic politics, and more specifically the presidential election, were an unwelcome distraction to the U.S. State Department and the U.S. military; the war in Europe threatened to spill across the Atlantic and the British were in desperate need of assistance. The U.S. military attempted to strengthen the security of the Canal

Zone, but the furor caused by the election campaign hindered its ability to do so. The main problem with the election campaign from the United States' standpoint was the inherent instability it caused. The U.S. military felt that it would be hard-pressed to defend the Canal under perfect host conditions, let alone in a country that seemed as if it was at the brink of civil war. The volatility of the Arias-Alfaro battle retarded some U.S. attempts at fortifying the Canal Zone because the eventual outcome of the election was in doubt; moreover, neither candidate wanted to appear too friendly to the United States for 79 fear of hurting their chances at victory. In the wake of the election, the U.S. government faced a new challenge with regard to Panama, the first term of newly elected President

Arnulfo Arias Madrid. 80

Chapter 4: Continued Political Instability on the Isthmus, 1940-1941

The Presidency of Arnulfo Arias

The election of Arnulfo Arias increased tensions between the United States and

Panama. Although both governments breathed a sigh of relief when the elections proceeded relatively peacefully, the U.S. government had to deal with an intensely nationalistic, moderately anti-American president. Arnulfo Arias did not go out of his way to smooth American preparations for the defense of the Canal. When he took office he moderated some of his anti-American electoral rhetoric, yet Arias was no friend of the

United States. He surrounded himself with anti-American advisors and Nazi- sympathizers. Arias enacted a new constitution in Panama that sought to limit the rights of the United States on the isthmus and included numerous nationalistic clauses. He even tried to ruin his brother Harmodio, financially and politically, because Harmodio wanted

Panama to align itself closer with the United States. Arnulfo's final downfall was his resistance to allowing the U.S. military to occupy defense sites outside of the Canal Zone.

Shortly thereafter, a coup occurred and Ricardo Adolfo de la Guardia assumed the presidency of Panama. These events played a large role in the security of the Panama

Canal and the defense of the Western Hemisphere; while it was not impossible for the

U.S. military to secure the Canal with an inhospitable administration in office, it was certainly more difficult.

In the past, historians of U.S.-Panamanian relations have not fully analysed the first presidency of Arnulfo Arias. To be fair, Arias' first presidency is universally decried as terrible for the United States. The scholarly research on the topic varies in depth. 81

Conniff s Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance, barely scratches the surface of the problem, Arias' presidency and the coup that unseated him occupy only two paragraphs.115 LaFeber, Major, and Pearcy provide a better, although not extensive, analysis of the Arias Administration. This chapter reaffirms and expands their research. It highlights new information about some of Arias' more questionable acquaintances and

Nazi-sympathies and hopefully puts to bed the misconception that Arias was a Nazi. This chapter is the first to examine in detail some of the constitutional amendments that sought to limit U.S. authority on the isthmus. Furthermore, it looks at how the United States might have exploited the fractured relationship between the Arias brothers and how the

Axis nations used the coup for propaganda purposes.

After the election, the open hostility between the Arnulfistas and the Alfaristas subsided. There was still conflict between the two groups but, it no longer threatened to turn into a full scale civil war. One key element in the easing of tensions was the disbandment of the Guardia Civica Nacional. The 800-strong paramilitary force that supported both Boyd and Arnulfo Arias stood down. After the peaceful conclusion of the election Arias no longer required the Guardia. In September, Boyd smoothed the transition to civilian life when he announced that anyone arrested on charges of politically and electoral motivated crimes would be granted amnesty. The government of

Panama had settled down and returned to normalcy.'16

Ambassador Dawson had his first official meeting with Arnulfo Arias on June 5, a mere three days after the election. The meeting was what one would expect of an official meeting between diplomats. Arias made references to the greatness of the United States during the meeting; almost a complete reversal from many of his campaign utterances. 82

Arias spoke of the war ravaging Europe but did not hint one way or the other where his loyalties lay, other than to say he hoped Roosevelt could keep the war from the Western

Hemisphere. He also played lip service to the U.S. State Department by stating that

Panama may invite some American experts to help develop aspects of the country and even thanked Dawson for the construction projects and the Canal Zone because they helped the economic outlook for his administration. Arias thanked Dawson for the action of the U.S. officials in the Canal Zone in the pre-election revolution attempt. It should be remembered that this was the initial meeting with the President-elect and both had to have their best foot forward, but surely Arias did not come off as the militant fascist

117 many feared.

The Alfaristas took another shot at sinking the presidency of Arnulfo Arias at the end of July 1940. They informed American authorities that they had definitive proof that

Arias was a Nazi-sympathizer. The first of these claims came from an unnamed source that was apparently highly placed in the government and one of Alfaro's spies in the administration. The alleged evidence stated that a known German, Walter Hippenstiel, who had a visa, was a spy in Panama. Hippenstiel's visa stated that he was in transit via

Panama to Mexico. However, he did not leave Panama and the informant claimed that this obviously made him a spy. Hippentstiel then applied directly to the Secretary of

Government and Justice, Senor Leopoldo Arosemena, for permission to stay in Panama.

One of Arias' closest confidants, Licenciado Victor M. Villalobos, accompanied and vouched for Hippenstiel on behalf of the President. The Panamanian government allowed

Hippenstiel to stay in Panama and continue his job as a traveling salesman. He may very well have been a spy, but that does not prove that Arias was a Nazi. Panama was full of 83 spies from all countries during WWII. This episode shows a possible lack of judgement but is certainly not proof that Arias was a Nazi. The more important question is why senior Panamanian officials handled Hippenstiel's case in the first place? Surely, this type of situation normally fell under the purview of some minor clerk in administration.118

The Division of the American Republics received a similar report about a month later. This report came from Ambassador Dawson, a known reliable source. Dawson stated that it was too early too tell if Arias was a Nazi-sympathizer, although he did not think it was likely. Although, it was likely that Arias would name a Nazi-sympathizer to a very influential position in the government. Arias' personal secretary, Dr. Antonio Isaza, was a known Nazi-sympathizer. Dawson believed that Arias' Presidency would definitely have dictatorial overtones but that in itself was not a crime. Arias, for all of his anti-

American rhetoric, was an opportunist and he made his choices regarding relationships based on expediency. At this early juncture the ambassador was still taking a wait and see attitude about the effects of the Arias Presidency on U.S. - Panamanian relations and the security of the Canal. However, that soon changed when the honeymoon period ended.119

After his inauguration on October 1, 1940, Arias began to posture publicly for a new constitution. He claimed that the people of Panama insisted on a new constitution by voting for him. The changes to the constitution were not to be simple cosmetic issues, but a whole new constitution. The original document consisted of 148 articles and Arias' new proposal had some 187. Another significant, and controversial, change to the constitution was an article that limited immigration. It targeted certain undesirables in Panama, identified as "the colored race whose mother-tongue is not Spanish, the yellow race, and the races originating in India, Asia Minor, and Northern Africa." The proposed constitution also included clauses that limited American power on the isthmus.

Specifically, they targeted the right of the United States to lease additional lands in

Panama, and some of the authority and territorial rights accrued by the United States in the treaties of 1903 and 1936. Arias wanted to extend the presidential term and increase the powers of the executive branch of government. Both of these modifications worried the U.S. government, they could be seen as precursors to dictatorial or authoritarian rule; both aimed at giving the president more control over the government apparatus.121 Arias was noticeably steering Panama in a more hostile, authoritative, nationalistic direction.

He was far from a Nazi, but he was definitely less than democratic which was bad news for Panamanian-U.S. relations and the longevity of the Canal Zone.122

The State Department sent a note to Ambassador Dawson after learning of the proposed changes. It instructed Dawson to meet with Arias and his Foreign Secretary in order to discuss and rectify the omission of the United States' jurisdictional rights in the

Panama Canal Zone. In the original constitution Article 3 guaranteed American rights in

Panama: "The territory of the Republic remains subject to the jurisdictional limitations stipulated or which may be stipulated in public treaties concluded with the United States of North America for the construction, maintenance or sanitation of any means of interoceanic travel." The new draft treaty claimed that "The territory of the Republic consists of all that comprised between the Republic of Costa Rica and of Colombia within the respective boundaries which have been fixed or which may have be fixed in accordance with International Law and Public Treaties." There was no mention of the

United States or the Canal Zone and that understandably worried the State Department. 85

The State Department was also suitably concerned about eleven other articles of the

proposed constitution all of them related to the rights of the Panamanian government. "

From an American perspective it seemed that Arias was systematically removing

any rights or authority that the U.S. government held in conjunction with the Canal Zone.

Changes to the constitution included such things as Article 2: "Public authority resides in

the nation, which will exercise it in the manner established by this constitution. The

public authority extends over the territory of the republic, its air spaces, to its territory

waters, to its warships, and to commercial ships which navigate under the Panamanian

flag..." (This last remark was in direct response to a U.S. request to arm commercial

vessels). Again the State Department wondered why the new constitution omitted U.S. jurisdiction in the Canal Zone. The theme continued in Article 21: "The capacity, the

recognition, and, in general, the regime of the society and other foreign juridic [sic]

persons, shall be determined by Panamanian Law as regards the acts they execute under

the jurisdiction of the Republic." There was nothing inherently wrong with what the

Panamanians wanted in their constitution, in a normal situation; however, the Republic of

Panama was an exception to the rule due to the Canal that dissected the country. The

Canal and treaties brought inherent rights to the U.S. government and these were not

reflected by the new constitution. Article 139 was even more direct in attacking the

existence and rights associated with the Canal Zone:

There shall be considered public property and therefore not subject to private ownership: 1. The maritime, lake and fluvial waters; seacoasts, shores and banks of same and the ports and estuaries. All these properties are of public and common utilization, subject to the regulations established by Law. 2. The lands destined or which shall be destined to public services of land, telegraphic or telephonic traffic or communication. 86

3. The lands or waters which are devoted or devoted to public services of irrigation, dams, drainage or aqueducts. 4. The air. 5. All others which the law may give character of properties of public domain and use.

Article 162 was also offensive to the State Department. It stated that: "Only the

Government may import and possess arms and elements of warfare. For the manufacture and export of arms and elements of warfare the previous permission of the Executive

Power shall be required. The lawmaker shall define the arms which may not be considered as arms of warfare and shall regulate its importation, manufacture and use."

Article 162 had a perfectly reasonable domestic target, private militias. The State

Department worried that Panama would also try to target American military forces in

Panama as a by-product of the new constitution. None of these articles were horrific; the

U.S. State Department just felt that Panama needed to establish exceptions in the laws that allowed for American jurisdiction in the Canal Zone. On November 19, 1940 the day before Ambassador Dawson was to deliver a diplomatic note protesting the exclusion of

American rights to Arnulfo Arias, the Panamanian Legislature amended the proposed constitution. Article 4, included a new clause which recognized treaties and acts completed prior to the new constitution. This essentially grandfathered any rights the

United States received in the 1903 or 1936 treaties and solved most of the outstanding

124 issues.

Arnulfo's quest for power and change in Panama had another side effect closer to home; it strained his relationship with his older brother Harmodio. It must be remembered that Harmodio was himself a former president of Panama, and still held considerable sway in the country. He did not like the course that Arnulfo had chosen and 87 believed it was far too belligerent, especially in the uncertain conditions associated with the war in Europe. Arnulfo on the other hand believed that the war provided the perfect opportunity to advance Panamanian interests in relations with the United States, since

Panama and, more importantly, the Panama Canal were vital for the hemispheric defense of the United States. In Harmodio's eyes the U.S. government would stop at nothing to secure the Canal, and would not give in to Arnulfo's demands. The break began in late

September 1940 when Arnulfo began to hint at changing the constitution and at the same time began ignoring Harmodio's counsel. Harmodio was of the opinion that Arnulfo should shed some of his shadier advisors. As noted, Harmodio was very influential within the Panamanian government and among the people. He owned a newspaper, Panama

America, with which he voiced his opinion and denounced Arnulfo to the populace.

There were also rumors that Harmodio would try to depose Arnulfo himself, but these proved unfounded. Arnulfo must have heard these rumors as well; on December 19 he removed Colonel Pino, Chief of the National Police, and five of his top captains. Julio E.

Briceno, a supporter of the younger Arias, replaced Pino. Harmodio did not openly plan a coup, but he did have many discussions with members of the American government about his brother and his policies. U.S. officials worried about the integrity of

Harmodio's offers; he was an astute politician who would use anything to gain an edge.

Ambassador Dawson and Muccio feared that the dispute might be a setup and neither agreed to help Harmodio by interfering in Panama's domestic politics. Harmodio's efforts and criticism did not deter Arnulfo from continuing with his plans, but they did cause a drop in his popularity (which was debatable to begin with due to his underhanded methods).125 88

The war between Arnulfo and Harmodio intensified in the middle of January

1941. Some political commentators were wary that the battle was a ploy staged by the

Arias family in order to lull the opposition; however, the renewed vigor and length of the dispute convinced the most stubborn and suspicious pundits. In January, La Tribuna, ran violent attacks on Harmodio's character, something it had refrained from in the past. La

Tribuna was the newspaper of the administration and with that it had terrific political backing and power. It used this backing to urge the businesses of Panama to abstain from advertising in Harmodio's newspaper, Panama America. Everyone knows that advertisements keep newspapers in business and this assault aimed to shut down

Harmodio's paper. The suggestion from La Tribuna was essentially a government threat against any person or corporation who did business with Harmodio and Panama

America. With the weight of the government behind it La Tribuna certainly carried an inordinate amount of clout, regardless of Harmodio's political capital. In response to this latest series of attacks Harmodio counter-attacked. He claimed that the poor state of the government and the bad name which Arnulfo had acquired were both the direct result of

Arnulfo's private secretary Dr. Antonio Isaza. Isaza was a known Nazi-sympathizer and probably an active agent of Germany. At the end of the article Harmodio did not hide behind his newspaper, he signed the paper personally. The rift which began as a simple disagreement between the brothers became very serious. Harmodio was essentially persona-non-grata (he was in fact already living in the United States); this really hurt the

American government because it had hoped to use Harmodio's influence over his brother

1 Oft to try and control and tone down some of Arnulfo's more authoritative notions. 89

The battle escalated once more in February. Arnulfo Arias sent the National

Police to inspect and take note of all inventory in any shops and businesses that still advertised in Panama America. Furthermore, La Tribuna posted a list of all businesses that retained advertising space in Panama America and urged the public to boycott their wares. Arnulfo also prevented the delivery of his brother's paper in portions of the

Republic. This turn of events was relayed by Harmodio's son, Robert. He claimed that they could plot a coup against Arnulfo for about $50,000-$60,000. Once again, this news had to strike some members of the government as convenient. U.S. officials had to

• 197 wonder whether or not the Arias family was trying to entrap it.

By July, the Harmodio and Arnulfo battle reached a crescendo and it forced

Harmodio to discuss the matter with American officials; he made an appeal to Sumner

Welles through Ambassador Edwin C. Wilson, who replaced Dawson as U.S.

Ambassador to Panama in May 1941.128 Arnulfo had finished giving lip service to

Panama America and tried to purchase it outright from Harmodio. He told Harmodio that he wanted control of the editorials which up until this point had almost always been in favor of the United States. Arnulfo did not want the paper to continue to mention his totalitarian actions and friendships. In order to enforce the point he offered to purchase 1 90

Harmodo's 65% of the paper for a sum much greater than market value.

Harmodio buoyed the paper by siphoning money from his other businesses, mainly his law office and his family's slaughtering company. These other businesses felt the pressure from Arnulfo and his cronies as well. In the case of the law office, Arnulfo's supporters intimidated and threatened Harmodio's clients with ruin if they continued to do business with the elder Arias. Various mayors within Panama (who owed their 90 allegiance to Amulfo) either prohibited Harmodio from shipping cattle into their jurisdictions or severely restricted quantities. These restrictions permitted Harmodio's cattle company, Compania Pecuraria S.A., to sell ten cattle one day, then eight the next, followed by six and so on. The government was also hard on the employees of the

Panama America; two editors left the paper because of threats to their family and one was deported from the country for reporting about totalitarianism in Panama. The combination of these factors began to slowly suffocate Harmodio. He reiterated to Welles that he would not sell the paper to Arnulfo but that before long he would be forced to shut it down. Ambassador Wilson reminded Welles that the U.S. State Department needed

Harmodio Arias as an ally and it needed the Panama America as a counterpoint to the government backed La Tribuna. The loss of Harmodio's influence would be detrimental

IT] for the stability of the Republic of Panama, and its relations with the United States.

Harmodio discussed the allegations with several of the members of the

Panamanian Cabinet. He sent a letter to these ministers and the addressees included:

Ricardo de la Guardia, Ernesto Fabrega, Raul de Roux and others. In this letter, dated

July 31, 1941 Harmodio detailed the same information that he discussed with Sumner

Welles earlier that same month. He decided that it was time the ministers learned of some of the crooked dealings of which Arnulfo was capable. Harmodio relayed information about Arnulfo's thugs trying to ruin Panama America and his cattle business. He also noted that Arnulfo told his sons that if he did not sell the paper he would ruin the family financially. These actions did not paint a very pretty picture of the President, especially i in considering Harmodio was his brother. 91

One of the first repercussions for U.S. interests of the proposed constitution was its effect on the Compania Panamena de Fuerza y Luz (Panamanian Power and Light

Company). The Fuerza y Luz was an American owned concern that Panamanians felt treated them unfairly. Panamanians complained about the price of utilities as well as double-standards between Panama and the Canal Zone. One such complaint revolved around the telephone service (which Fuerza y Luz controlled as well). There was a toll of

5 cents when calling into the Canal Zone but anyone in the Canal Zone could call Panama free of charge. The new constitution included two provisions that hurt the Fuerza y Luz; the first centred on the government's new right to seize and control resources and utilities; while the second disallowed any privately-owned monopolies. This move was a public relations bonanza for Arnulfo among the Panamanian people who felt they had been cheated for too long. It also gave the government another source of income, while weakening an American stranglehold on the republic. It was a source of concern for the

U.S. State Department in a time when it needed all of the stability it could muster on the isthmus.133

In March 1941, Arias signed into law another restrictive government regulation.

The National Assembly, at the behest of Arias, passed the Retail Trade Nationalization

Bill. The law required all businesses and trades to have licenses issued by the Ministry of

Commerce. There were two types of licenses; those for big business, industry and banks, and those issued to retailers, restaurateurs, and similar businesses. The law forbade the issuance of the second type of licenses to anyone but Panamanian nationals or publicly traded companies, 50% of whose stock was controlled by Panamanians. The Arias administration continued down the slippery slope of excessive state regulation, not 92 because it required businesses to have licenses, but because of the restrictions placed upon those licenses.134

The Retail Trade Nationalization Bill did not have any grandfather clauses attached to it, and therefore it forced immigrants, mostly Chinese and East Indians, to give up businesses that they owned in Panama. Arias claimed that foreign businessmen made Panamanians pariahs in their own country. The initial attempt called for a 15 day turnover time, but this was met with so much hostility within Panama and from other nations with vested interests that Arias lengthened the turnover time to 180 days. Under this new rule Hindu and Chinese businesses were forcefully taken over. The buyout price was $1 for every $10 of inventory; failure to comply was punishable by a jail term. The government of Panama spared American businesses from the buyouts, but it required all

American owned operations to add Panamanian partners in order to remain in business.

More importantly, although the same law governed Japanese businesses, none were reported bought out by the Panamanian government, nor were the Japanese forced to take on Panamanian partners. It surely was another reason for the U.S. Government to worry about stability in Panama and the direction the government led the country.135 The same kind of events took place in Germany during the 1930s; businesses were bought out or simply closed outright for the good of the Reich. This is not a direct comparison between

Arias and Hitler but it is interesting to note that similarities between some of Arias' nationalistic doctrines. The U.S. government was justifiably concerned about developments in Panama. It led many Americans to brand Arias as a Nazi; in truth, Arias abhorred many of Hitler's policies, he was simply fond of nationalism and a Panama for

Panamanians.136 93

Concern over Arias' policies continued as the days and weeks progressed. The

Americans and some members of the Panamanian government were upset by developments later in April. A letter from Jorge Boyd, a former Ambassador to the

United States, to Sumner Welles detailed some of the newest issues. Most importantly,

Boyd thought that the Arias administration deliberately obstructed some of the U.S. government's wartime construction programs. Two highway construction programs, Rio

Hato and the Transisthmian, faced daily annoyances from Panamanian officials. It proved so disconcerting that the Chief Engineer flew to Washington to air his grievances with the

State Department rather than trying to come to some form of settlement via mail and telegram. Part of the reason for the flight was that the Panamanian authorities censored, or at least read, mail to the United States if it did not originate from the Canal Zone. By travelling to the United States at least the Engineer was sure his frustrations would be heard. Boyd also reported that Arias actively sought essentially totalitarian control of the country. He said that the new law would give legislative totalitarian powers to the president until the next regular session of Congress, a period of two years. These clearly anti-democratic developments logically concerned U.S. officials, but their primary concern was that the stability of Panama and the Canal Zone was under attack by the

Arias administration.137

The Arias Administration was cognizant of its reputation. The government was so concerned with the American media's portrayal of Panama that it sent Julio Briceno, the

Counsellor for the Panamanian Embassy at Washington, on a damage control tour.

Briceno replaced a guest speaker at a meeting of George Washington University's

Spanish Club in order to clear the air about Panama. He claimed during his speech that Arias was a wonderful humanitarian who loved the United States and the responsibility for protecting the Panama Canal. Briceno told the gathering that Arias never served in a

Foreign Service post with either Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. In fact, Arias was a roving Panamanian Minister to various European countries (including Nazi Germany and

Fascist Italy) from 1936 until his return for the Presidential campaign. Briceno made a point of noting that Arias was a Harvard graduate and therefore loved the United States.

Briceno gave much the same talk a day earlier to the wives of some U.S. congressmen.

The Arias administration was on the defensive and definitely concerned about American public opinion regarding the Canal Zone and the impending war.

More damage control from the Arias administration followed the U.S. State

Department's announcement of a blacklist. The State Department announced the creation of the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals on July 17, 1941. Popularly known as the blacklist, it delegated which businesses American interests were to refrain from associating with; most of these were German firms or firms that regularly completed business transactions with the Germans after the beginning of World War II. The U.S. government added firms to the list based on information from U.S. intelligence

1 ^Q assessments and diplomatic missions abroad."* The issuance of the blacklist and its enforcement in Panama and the rest of Latin America forced the Arias administration to take another look at its policies and practices. La Tribuna, the aforementioned Arnulfista newspaper, suddenly lightened its tone with regard to the United States. A once fiercely anti-American paper, it began to publish stories stating that the American media simply misunderstood the politics of Panama. It stated that the people of Panama have always loved the United States and the Arias administration was no different. La Tribuna felt 95 that the media created sensationalist stories about Panama to sell more papers. It should also be noted that the paper, which once vociferously attacked the "Good Neighbor

Policy," began to run articles in support of American policy. Finally, La Tribuna replaced one of its figureheads in a public relations move. It removed Antonio Isaza, Arias' pro-

Nazi personal secretary, from the masthead of the paper in order to make the changes within the pages more convincing to those who mattered. The damage control of the

Arias administration was an ongoing and steadily increasing venture the closer the United

States came to entering the war.140

While the Arias administration performed damage control Arias himself still proved difficult. The Roosevelt administration requested more land from Panama in order to protect the Canal from air attack. The Hull-Alfaro Treaty, negotiated in 1936, allowed for the U.S. military to acquire or occupy additional lands in Panama if war or some other volatile situation threatened the Canal. In 1941 the military wanted to occupy some of these additional sites to defend the airspace over the Canal. Most of the sites were less than an acre in size, the exception being a 19,000 acre airbase at Rio Hato that the

Americans had used since the early 1930s. Arias tried to make the acquisition of these parcels of land extremely difficult for the U.S. military. He would not grant the U.S. long term leases on the land and refused to commit to anything other than the, yet unknown, length of the war and asked for an incredible rent of $4000 per acre for the land. When arrangements were finally made with Arias' successor, Ricardo De La Guardia, the rent was a much more reasonable $50 per acre and $10,000 for the entire plot at Rio Hato.

The last requirement that Arias put on the lease of land was the completion of twelve projects within Panama at an expense of $25 million to the U.S. government, failing this 96 he asked for a fifty year advance on the Canal annuity so that Panama could fund the projects itself. Arias' foreign policy really seemed like a case of two steps forward one step back. On one hand his government finally tried to appease the U.S. government and prove that Panama was a safe place for the Canal, but on the other he tried to stall defense developments. However, if the situation was looked at from yet another lens Arias would emerge as a very shrewd politician. He tried to exploit the U.S. government for the benefit of Panama; Arias knew that the defense sites were a necessity in the face of war and assumed that the U.S. government would pay a king's ransom in order to get them.

Unfortunately, Arnulfo Arias miscalculated the value of the defense sites and American determination, and it cost him his presidency.141

The 1941 Coup in Panama

As early as January 1941 the American government caught wind of the possibility a coup might be staged against the new Arias administration. Arias had already prepared for such an eventuality by rehiring National Police strongman Jose Antonio Remon and a cadre of senior officers to fill important posts in Panama City. He believed that if he paid these select officers enough money and allowed them influential positions around the city, they would be loyal and protect him in the face of a coup. When American officials heard rumors of a possible coup in Panama they had the G-2 look into the feasibility of such an event. The resulting report outlined the history of violent revolts in Panama and the factors that led to them. It discovered that a coup could not be successful against the authoritarian government of Arnulfo Arias, unless the U.S. State Department lent its

'moral support' to the action. Furthermore the revolt would only get American support if the United States entered the war against the Axis powers and Arias still refused to 97 cooperate fully. Over the next few months Arias' continuation of nationalist policies and lack of cooperation with the U.S. government for the expanded defense of the Canal caused even more unrest among Panamanians and Americans. In April, Jorge Boyd wrote

Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and told him that the rumors of a revolt grew louder. He claimed that he had been approached numerous times by various people about the possibility of a coup. Boyd told Welles that the majority of the people would support a coup against the Arias administration. According to Boyd the most important mitigating factor for the coup to be successful was whether or not the Panamanians could count on

American sympathy. He said that a coup would not result in a full scale civil war fraught with bloodshed; it would simply involve removal of a few key leaders - the snake without its head argument.142

Talk of a coup attempt died down until the fall of 1941. Without a doubt, there were still rumblings throughout the spring and summer in Panama, but nothing as overt as Boyd asking for American permission. That changed after Roosevelt's September 11,

1941 Fireside Chat. This chat detailed the unprovoked Nazi submarine attack on the USS

Greer in international waters. Throughout the course of the chat FDR promised that the

United States would no longer sit idly by as Hitler's raiders patrolled international waters.

From that date forward U.S. naval vessels would fire at all German and Italian vessels deemed to be within waters necessary for the defense of America.143 On a couple of occasions prior to the September 11 Chat, Panamanian officials, including Harmodio

Arias, asked the U.S. State Department to intervene with the government of Panama but they were continually rebuked. Harmodio claimed that his brother would stop at nothing 98 to get full totalitarian control of the isthmus. A month after the Fireside chat the political landscape of Panama changed.144

The coup took place on October 8 and 9, 1941 while Arnulfo Arias was in Cuba.

The chief conspirators, Lt. Col. Rogalio Fabrega and Col. Manuel Pino, made the final arrangements for the coup during the day of October 8. They called on the Chief of the

Panama City police in order to ask for his support in the venture and the Chief concurred.

When he returned to the central police station the Chief called on the Minister of

Government Justice Ricardo Alfaro de la Guardia and informed him of the plot. De la

Guardia went to the station at 6:15pm and informed the conspirators if he was not included in the plan he would barricade himself inside the police station until Arias could return and resume his administration. The conspirators consented to de la Guardia's demands and included him in the plot. At about 7:30 that evening the conspirators fortified the police station and people in the city caught wind that a revolution was about to take place. The timing in the case was very interesting because Major Carter, Assistant

Chief of Staff, G-2 at the Panama Canal Department, filed a radiogram to the War

Department at 3:51pm that stated a coup was about to take place. That was hours before some of the chief conspirators even knew about the coup. Clearly, some American authorities had knowledge of the coup.145

On the morning of October 9 the conspirators met with the American Ambassador to Panama, presumably to make sure they still had the support of the U.S. State

Department and that the new government would be recognized. After receiving Wilson's blessing the leaders returned to the Police Station where Ricardo Adolfo de la Guardia announced publicly that he was taking over as interim President of Panama. His rationale 99 for the coup was that Arias was away from the country without leave. There was little violence during the coup and the new government insured its survival by arresting a few key members of the Arias administration. The most notable arrests involved Nicolas

Ardito Barleta, Mayor of Panama City, Antonio Isaza, Arias' private secretary (and known Naziphile), and Secretary General Cristobal Rodriguez. The final jail space was reserved for the staff of the government organ La Tribuna.

Later that day de la Guardia summoned the cabinet members to the police station for a meeting regarding the state of the government. He asked the members to vote on one of two proposals; 1. Since the president and the three vice presidents were absent and unaccountable he should be made the interim head of government; 2. They should locate

2nd Vice President Ernesto Jaen Guardia at his post in Mexico and ask him to take his constitutionally appointed spot as the head of the government. The members agreed to the second proposal and Jaen Guardia took over the Presidency long enough to appoint a new cabinet and resign leaving the new cabinet to elect Ricardo de la Guardia as President.

The process technically kept to the constitution despite the nature of the events and the

Supreme Court of Panama quickly approved the change of government.146 In a speech to the members of the Legislative Assembly on the day of the coup, de la Guardia stated that the coup was necessary for Panama to fulfill its unique role in defense of the hemisphere.1 7

While the Roosevelt administration welcomed the removal of Arnulfo Arias, there were some reservations about the coup and Arias' successor Ricardo Adolfo de la

Guardia. First and foremost, American officials questioned what effect the coup would have on stability in the region. Coups are not generally quick and painless and it 100 concerned officials that residual feelings for the Arias administration may cause violence and hardship on the isthmus. Initially the U.S. State Department feared that the outlying provinces may not fall into line or that Arias may return and try to reclaim the presidency. Arias left Havana for Panama on October 10 in order to judge the situation in the Republic. On October 14 when he arrived at Cristobal, authorities told Arias that he could stay at the port for one day and would be allowed to leave freely for any other destination. He was also informed that if he stepped foot in Panama he would most likely be arrested, which is what happened on October 15. At least when Arias was in jail with his most boisterous followers he was unable to incite a countercoup; especially since the leaders of the National Police had all been replaced.

Another result of the de la Guardia coup was the political firepower it gave the

Axis nations. The propaganda value of the coup was near limitless. The Axis immediately claimed that the United States was responsible for the coup and tried to use this as further evidence of American provocation. On October 10, 1941, the Deutsches

Nachrechten Buro reported: "It is clear and beyond doubt that the United States used a temporary absence of the President of Panama, who was inconvenient to it, to stage a putsch in the small Central American Republic."149 They also claimed that the United

States should be seen as an imperial colossus that pushed aside small countries for its own ends much the way that Nazi Germany did; Axis propagandists attempted to use this comparison to prove (to whoever would listen) that Hitler was not completely evil. While the United States and the Allies did not put much stock in the Axis claims, Cordell Hull issued an announcement and declared that the U.S. State Department was not involved in the coup. He stated that the U.S. State Department did not have any 'direct or indirect' 101 input into the events in Panama. However, Hull fell short of stating that the State

Department had no previous knowledge of the events that transpired.150

Even though Hull denied any American complicity in the incident there has been plenty of conjecture about U.S. involvement throughout the years. Walter LaFeber made mention of a document from John Muccio to Phillip Bonsai in The Panama Canal: The

Crises in Historical Perspective. In the document, Muccio noted that Panamanians consulted with U.S. officials prior to Panama's successful coups in 1931 and 1941.151

John Major found a similar document for Prize Possession; The United States and the

Panama Canal 1903-1979. It was a note from Wilson to Hull which stated that Mclntyre told de la Guardia that he was sure the United States would be welcome to a change in

1 ^9 authority in Panama. This dissertation reaffirms LaFeber and Major's research. A new document seems to implicate the United States even more directly in the Arias coup. A

1944 G-2 Report titled Political Trends in Panama 1931 to November, 1943 stated that:

"The role played by Mr. L. A. Mclntyre, Chief of Civil Intelligence Section, Panama

Canal, is significant. Speaking as a private individual and not as a spokesman for any

United States Government agency, he gave de la Guardia the necessary assurance that he believed the United States would be sympathetic to the move to seize the Executive

Power which the Minister of Government had in mind."153 Clearly, there were U.S. officials who had prior knowledge of the coup. Furthermore, the mere mention of

Mclntyre's actions in the coup with the accompanying proviso that he was "speaking as a private individual" reinforce the fact that the U.S. government attempted to distance itself from the truth. 102

The German media latched onto Hull's statement and called it even more proof of

American complicity in the coup. The Boersen Zeitung claimed, essentially, that

Secretary Hull had lost touch with reality and that he wanted the world to believe that the events in Panama were a hallucination and not a work of American imperialism. The

German media also noted that the U.S. government did not have to actually commit the coup in order to be guilty of complicity. The DAZ stated the proof was the remarkable change in Panama's attitude towards the United States in the days and weeks after the coup. Panama altered its policy from one of extreme nationalism to one of extreme friendship and cooperation within a couple of days, and no one missed a beat. Not to mention that the U.S. government immediately recognized and went to work with the de la Guardia administration. The circumstantial evidence definitely demonstrates that the

U.S. government surely had more to gain from this coup than the average Panamanian; defense of the Canal would be a much easier prospect when dealing with a sympathetic government; also the repression of the totalitarian tendencies of the Arias regime would make the civilian population more at ease and therefore increase the stability of the

154 regime.

After the initial uncertainty regarding de la Guardia's loyalties the American government was pleasantly surprised with many of his actions shortly after the coup. As noted earlier, he had the police arrest the most influential Arias supporters and Arias himself in order to keep the country stable. The new administration immediately repealed gambling concessions granted to Arnulfista cronies. This move was essential to try to end some of the corruption that was prevalent on the isthmus; it also dealt a financial blow to

Arias supporters. De la Guardia released a statement that signified he was on the same 103 page as the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere with regards to

hemispheric defense. To reaffirm relations with the United States de la Guardia

immediately resumed negotiations for the additional defense sites needed for the protection of the Canal. He rescinded the previous administration's decree not to allow

the arming of merchant ships. As of October 20, 1941 ships with a Panamanian registry

were allowed to carry arms in order to defend themselves against Axis attack.

Furthermore, he declared Eric O. Cerjack-Boyna, Civil Attache of the German Legation, persona non-grata. American intelligence officials were certain that Cerjack-Boyna was

the head of all Nazi espionage and propaganda for Panama. U.S. officials also believed

that de la Guardia would do away with most, if not all of, Arias' executive decrees. Each

of these elements helped to convince American authorities that de la Guardia was on their

side of the battle.155

Coup until U.S. Entry into War

After the coup the Republic of Panama quickly returned to normalcy. People returned to work and the government functioned as it should. Ambassador Wilson reported that the general air in the country was one of relief and he believed that Arias would cause no more trouble and simply bow away from the public eye. All of this worked relatively well for the United States; Panama returned to a stable host

environment for the Canal; the President of Panama proved to be more in tune with

American ideals for defense of the hemisphere and security of the Canal; and the public was at ease. The rest of the world, at least the rest of the Allied world, seemed to be at ease with the results of the coup as well. On October 15, 1941, less than a week after the

events, the new Foreign Minister held a reception for diplomatic corps within Panama. All foreign diplomats attended, thus signifying their acceptance of the new regime s legitimacy, save for the Germans, Italians, and the Mexicans. The Mexican diplomats were concerned with the legality of the change and were awaiting an analysis of the events, whereas the Germans and Italians claimed influenza. Clearly, the German and

Italian members of the diplomatic corps did not attend as an act of protest towards the new administration. However, all the missions, including the Mexican, German, and

Italian, met with President de la Guardia three days later.156

The Spanish Minister in Panama also reported to his superiors in Europe that the

U.S. government was complicit in the coup. Carlos Arcos wrote that certain Americans were at the very least aware of the coup before it happened. He singled out the Chiefs of

Intelligence of the Canal Zone Colonel Carter and Captain Maclntyre. He explained to his superiors that although the Germans and Italians held off on recognition of the new administration he did not; as he felt it would hurt Spain's influence in Latin America.

Arcos further reported on the pro-American changes the de la Guardia administration

i en immediately instituted and pointed at them as further proof of U.S. guilt.

Changes within Panama proceeded at a feverish pitch. The new administration wasted no time in renouncing the policies of the Arias administration. De la Guardia announced on the first day of his tenure, October 9 that any appointments made under the

Arias administration were subject to review. Any opportunities handed out by Arias were from that point on considered temporary pending review by the new government. The object of this move was to try to spread the political appointments out more evenly and to deplete the ranks of corruption-riddled Arnulfistas. De la Guardia also removed the tax on government employees' salaries that Arias had earmarked for the election fund of the 105

National Revolutionary Party. The government announced the next day that it would reinstate many of the fundamental rights and freedoms on which the 1941 constitution encroached. One of the divisive factors of the Arias administration was the gambling concessions that Arnulfo issued to his friends and admirers. The public did not like the concessions and rallied around their removal. De la Guardia cancelled the concessions and removed the slot machines from hotels and other venues on October 10. After that date the only legal form of gambling in the Republic was the national lottery. The net effect of this was to restore faith in the government, a faith that corruption associated with the gambling concessions had tainted.

Clearly, the domestic political climate of Panama was less than ideal for the host country of a waterway as vital as the Panama Canal. The government of Panama experienced many changes during Arnulfo Arias' first term. U.S. officials were instrumental in some of these changes and disavowed themselves of others. It seems that

Arnulfo Arias was the root of most of the problems that befell the Republic during this time. He was at times actively belligerent towards the United States and at other times he was so ultra-nationalistic that he was branded a Nazi. However, none of these details absolve Ricardo de la Guardia of any responsibility regarding the situation in Panama. He led a coup against the "democratically" elected government of Panama and regardless of early impressions, his administration was rife with corruption and dishonesty; however, he did not oppose the United States. Ricardo de la Guardia was definitely a stabilizing actor and welcomed by the Roosevelt administration in the fight to secure the Panama

Canal. 106

Chapter 5 - Foreign Subversive Elements, 1939 - 1941

The previous chapter noted the extent of corruption and political intrigue within the Republic of Panama. There were many domestic issues in Panama that caused U.S. officials to worry about the security of the Panama Canal. These included: political infighting, racism, or labor issues. However, the previous chapter dealt only with those issues that arose due to domestic politics in Panama. The threat of foreign intelligence agents and saboteurs brought new challenges for the defense of the Canal. This study has already demonstrated that there was significant espionage activity in Panama prior to

World War II. The beginning of the European war renewed and reinvigorated foreign actions against the vital waterway.

On the eve of the United States entry into World War II there were a number of foreign elements or organizations with foreign sympathies operating within Panama and the Canal Zone. Friedman touched on this issue in Nazis and Good Neighbors; he focused almost exclusively on German threats to Latin America during World War II. In

Panama, as well as other parts of Latin America, there were dangers other than the

Germans. Friedman's approach ignored the Falange, the Japanese, the Italians, and even the Vichy French. Any one of these elements constituted a viable threat against the security of the Canal. Bratzel and Rout's The Shadow War: German Espionage and

United States Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II, is a fantastic account of German agents in Latin America, but it includes only passing references to

Panama. There is a very interesting work by Ezequiel Dawson titled, Confmados:

Panama en el Vortice de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. It tells the account of Japanese 107 internees and a so-called Japanese super spy known only as Kioto-X3. Unfortunately, it is a novel based on historical fact and although some of the information is factual there are no sources and most is based on rumor. Alton Frye's Nazi Germany and the American

Hemisphere 1933-1941 focused on the Nazi propaganda machine throughout the

Americas, and not spies, sabotage and subterfuge. Finally, there is a very outdated work by Hugo Fernandez Artucio, The Nazi Underground in South America. Published in

1942, this book deals with Nazis throughout Latin America and deals briefly with

Panama and the Canal. This chapter expands on research by these and other historians and examines more fully subversive threats to Panama.

During the period that ran from the German invasion of Poland until Pearl Harbor, a number of foreign factions tried to establish an effective foothold on the isthmus. At that time none of the foreign organizations were at war with the United States; yet they all had a presence on the isthmus. Franco's Spain, a country that never declared war against the United States, had a sizable organization in Panama. Franco owed a debt to both Hitler and Mussolini for assistance he received during the Spanish Civil War; it has been well-documented that in return for this assistance Spain often looked the other way in matters that concerned the Axis or more often than not provided the Axis with espionage. Italy was a full partner in the Axis and at war in Europe during this time. The

Italians did not have a large contingent on the isthmus, but they did try to promote the

Axis cause by whatever means possible. Japan, while not at war with the United States, was certainly militarily involved elsewhere. Japanese operatives in Panama faced more challenges and more stringent examination than others in Panama after the debacles of the mid 1930s, but still they tried. The last group active in Panama was the Germans. The 108

Germans continually attempted to infiltrate the Canal Zone and Panama and in some cases were even successful.

The Panama chapter of the Falange Exterior was a nationalistic group which backed Franco. Founded in 1937, the Panama section was not very large compared to groups in other countries; yet, the organization was very active in Panama during the

Spanish Civil war. Among other activities it spent the majority of the time spreading nationalist propaganda and trying to counter perceived Communist influence. Other activities, at this early juncture, were limited to secret meetings and importing speakers from larger chapters or Spain herself. Near the end of the Spanish Civil War the chapter began to experience infighting and increased harassment from the Panamanian authorities. The largest contributing factor was Franco's friendship with the Axis dictators; it proved to be a decisive force.158

In 1940, Carlos Arcos became the Spanish Minister to Panama. While researching his new position he discovered that the Falange chapter in Panama was defunct. He sent a report to the Spanish Foreign Office claiming that the problems incurred by Franco's political positioning were too much for the organization to withstand in a very American- minded market such as Panama. Many of the Falangists in Panama sympathized with the intense patriotism and nationalism of the Falange but could not come to grips with the fascist element and military leanings. Arcos also reported that it was very hard to declare yourself part of a group that was synonymous with the idea of a Fifth Column. After the outbreak of the war, Falangists had a hard time ridding themselves of the title due to the obvious negative connotations in the Western Hemisphere. Arcos noted that he would investigate whether or not it was possible to resurrect a Falange in Panama in hopes of 109 supporting the cause. The prospect did not look good; Arcos stated that only about 10 of the 1000 Spanish citizens would show up for a Falange meeting. The other issue the

Falange faced in Panama was that Arcos estimated about 75% of the Spanish emigre population was Republican.159

Although the Falange lapsed in Panama it did not preclude the fact that Arcos was an ardent Falangist. In fact, he received his posting in Panama as part of a Spanish

Foreign Office directive that rewarded faithful Falangists by placing them in ministerial and ambassadorial posts all over the world. Therefore, even though Arcos lacked a dedicated local chapter of the Falange his position was powerful enough to provide service and support to the Axis powers; whether that included espionage or courier duties all were within his purview as Falange representative and minister of the Franco government. There is significant evidence linking Spanish diplomats with Axis representatives the world over; it would be naive to believe that Arcos did not perform those duties in a place deemed as strategically important as Panama.160

The change in internal politics brought about by the coming of the Arias administration made the idea of having an active chapter of the Falange in Panama a possibility. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) reported that as of May 1941, after a year of inactivity, the Falange was once again actively recruiting members in Panama.

The ONI believed that the secretary of the Spanish Legation was the catalyst for the project. Jose Luis Rubio y Bocanegra and some accomplices tried to 'persuade' non-

Falangists to join the cause. They offered the protection of the Panamanian government and threatened to have business permits rescinded if Spaniards refused to join. Arcos gave no indication that he was aware of the situation and when asked simply claimed that 110 he was anti-German and pro-U.S. However, he gave a speech that praised the Axis cause and claimed the war would be over by the summer of 1941 because the British would capitulate. Arcos cited statistics about the number of German submarines and the impenetrable nature of their blockade of the British Isles as proof. He was quite candid and claimed that he was anti-British because they chose the wrong side during the

Spanish Civil War. By that reasoning it can be gleaned that, contrary to his public utterances, he was anti-U.S. A number of American citizens as well as the Russians and others fought with the Republicans in Spain, although the U.S. government did not officially sanction the international brigades; foreign aid during the Spanish Civil War was not exclusively British.161

By August 1941, the Falange clandestinely reopened the Panamanian organization. Consequently it did not meet regularly; it met when there was some form of directive from Spain. The stated goal of the Falange in Latin America was to re-unite all

Spanish speaking peoples under Spain; an idea that hinted at Hitler's Volksdeutsche. It was also complicit in helping the various Axis nations with whatever they needed. The

ONI reported that it had discovered which members of the Falange were the possible leaders and which members performed other services such as couriers. The leadership consisted of the aforementioned Arcos and Jose Luis Rubio y Bocanegra, as well as Jesus

Gargallo and Jose Arboix. Because of their station in life Jose Luis Rubio y Bocanegra,

Jose Arboix, Antonio Zaldo, and Gustavo Trius were also believed to be the couriers; they travelled excessively and had ready access to funds. At this time the Falange consisted of roughly 100 dues paying members, a number that was significantly higher than the ten that Arcos believed he could recruit in 1940. Obviously the Arias Ill government was a catalyst for change and the protection it afforded the Falangists was a

1 f\0 welcome assistance.

Arias' relationship with the Falange is an interesting one. Arias, previous to his political career, was a medical doctor. In his papers in the Panamanian archives there was a fairly large section devoted to the health of Panamanians and the Red Cross. The laws that created the Red Cross had been on the books since 1917, but they were not enacted until Arias became President.163 In fact, his wife at the time, Ana Matilde Linares de

Arias, became the president of the Panamanian Red Cross.164 This gave Arias insights and the influence into the affairs of the Red Cross in Panama; presumably, he also told his wife where to send correspondence regarding the Red Cross. In January 1941, a time when the Falange supposedly did not exist in Panama, Ana Matilde Arias, sent a Red

Cross letter to the Manager of the Spanish Falange, El Conde de Bailen. The count responded to Mrs. Arias by noting that the Falange did not exist, but he would be happy to donate money to the cause.165 At the same time, the Panamanian delegate to the 4th

Inter American Conference of the Red Cross, called for all of Latin America to embrace

Hispanidad. He called for everyone with Spanish roots to unite and re-establish the

Spanish empire.166 This was a significant threat to the Western Hemisphere because

Franco was closest to the Axis at this time. Any collaboration between Latin American nations and Spain could have had considerable repercussions for the defense of the

Western Hemisphere and the security of the Panama Canal.

As mentioned earlier, the new Falange was a fairly low-key institution. In a letter to the Foreign Office Arcos explained that Panama was receptive towards Spanish propaganda, but not Falangist propaganda. He stated that Spain should step up all 112 methods of direct and indirect propaganda in Panama; direct included print and radio news while indirect included more subtle propaganda as Spanish-made films. Arcos cautioned that although the region was receptive to propaganda the Falange should do everything in its power to distance itself from Panama. The very mention of the word

Falange drew the curiosity of American and Panamanian authorities, with the result that its supporters argued that it should be gently reintroduced over time. Dedicated Falange or not Arcos' propaganda clearly drew the attention of the authorities since both the

Army and Naval Intelligence units in Panama investigated all of his actions. The Falange was not caught red-handed in any anti-U.S. ventures before the United States entered the war on December 7, 1941; however, it was clearly in a position to offer logistical support and intelligence to the Axis.167

Another relatively small subversive group in Panama were the few pro-fascist members of the Italian community. For the most part the one thousand five hundred or so strong contingent of Italians in Panama did not promote or believe in any fascist ideals.

Many of them renounced any ties to Mussolini since they felt he was a hindrance to their day to day lives. This can be attributed to the same label of Fifth Column that the Falange members received. Many Italians had lived in Panama for years and had grown to love the country. That is not to say that there were no Italian threats to security in Panama.

Many Italian-owned businesses were off-limits to U.S. personnel after the beginning of World War II, Italians owned some of the seedier establishments in Panama, including bars and houses of ill-repute. American officials prohibited servicemen from frequenting these establishments as much because of the clientele as for the establishments themselves. Some have attributed these restrictions to U.S. paranoia but, 113 saloons and 'cabarets' did occasionally host pro-Nazi Germans and pro-Fascist Italians.

The temptations associated with such places were too much of a security risk in the eyes of the American authorities. This angered the owners of the establishments who turned vehemently anti-American due to the lost income. American soldiers spent quite a sum of money in bars and the loss significantly impacted the owners. In this case the U.S. military fostered anti-Americanism by its own heavy-handed activities.

The fascist influence in the Republic mostly came in the form of propaganda, both direct and indirect. The Italian government spent large sums of money financing events and clubs in Panama in order to familiarize people with Italy and its culture and to try to convince the anti-Mussolini crowd to change their opinion of El Duce. The two most important Italian clubs in Panama were the Club el Facio and Sociedad Beneficancia

Italiana. Of the two, the Club el Facio was the only danger as the Sociedad Beneficancia

Italiana reportedly expelled any pro-Mussolini members in an effort to remain respectable. Club el Facio sponsored sporting events and an elementary school as a form of indirect propaganda. Located adjacent to the Italian Legation, the Club el Facio had the full support of the Italian minister.

The Italian legation limited direct propaganda in Panama to leaflets, word of mouth and replayed Nazi broadcasts. It prepared about 1000 copies of a pro-Axis newsletter each week for distribution to Italians in the Republic. Furthermore, Panama was the center for an Italian funded propaganda operation against Puerto Rico. Members of the fascist community in Panama disseminated leaflets and radio broadcasts trying to persuade Puerto Ricans to sue for independence. It was a move that aimed to weaken

American influence in the Caribbean basin, since Puerto Rico was seen by many, most 114 importantly the U.S. military, as the gateway to the region and the first line of defense on the eastern side of the Canal. The loss of Puerto Rico would be a direct blow to hemispheric defense and the security of the Panama Canal. The fact that the pro-fascist

Italians attempted to orchestrate the break made them a significant threat in need of

1 6R surveillance.

The Civil Intelligence Service for the Canal Zone had a list of Italians who were to be watched and immediately arrested if the United States entered the war. While the list was relatively short, comprised of only thirteen names, a large percentage of them held positions of influence within Panama. Renato Silenzi was the Minister and Marcello

Borgianni was the Charge d'Affaires at the Legation in Panama City and Giovanni Bruni was the Consul stationed in Colon. Others included owners of restaurants and cafes and many employees of the Italian Line. Giovanni Bruni was the most notorious on the list.

He had been arrested and deported from the Canal Zone for an incident that involved the sabotage of the SS Conte Biancamano an Italian liner that the U.S. military seized at the outbreak of the European war and put into service as a troopship. Even though the pro- fascist Italian population in Panama was relatively small, it was still on the watch list for

American authorities and various intelligence agencies watched their movements. It constituted a threat to the Canal by its simple existence and the fact that it forced

American authorities to expend valuable resources.169

The Japanese, while extremely active in Panama before the war, became a little less evident between 1939 and 1941. This was mostly due to the publicity and attention the fishermen/spies garnered during their espionage activities in the 1930s and the subsequent confiscation of their fishing licences. While that episode put the Japanese in 115

Panama on the defensive for some time, in the late 1930s they resurrected their position of privilege due to the election victory of Arnulfo Arias. Although much has been made about the ostracizing nature of Arias' new constitution and the retail nationalization bill, little has been made about some of the notable exceptions. The Japanese retained their rights to own stores and businesses and work freely within Panama; they were also allowed continued immigration to Panama, but were no longer allowed to become permanent residents. These notable exceptions to the rules allowed the Japanese a certain amount of autonomy within Panama.

The Casa Japonesa was once again at the forefront of Japanese activity within

Panama in the two years prior to Pearl Harbor. The owner of the store was the aforementioned Yoshitaro Amano. The American intelligence services believed that

Amano was the head of all Japanese espionage efforts for Central and South America.

Judging from some of his more well known exploits they could not have been far off.

Amano laid low for a couple of years after the exploits of the Japanese 'fishermen' made headlines. During this time he traveled to Japan where officials briefed him on the coming conflict. On his return to Panama he once again orchestrated moves against the

Americans and the Canal Zone. The Casa Japonesa ordered 250 copies of the tourist brochure "Souvenir of the Panama Canal" in November 1940. The booklets contained facts, figures, and maps about the Canal Zone and Panama. While purchasing the booklets definitely did not constitute any breach of law, it was suspicious in nature. The booklets were not delivered to the Casa Japonesa for sale, but to another address and they never made it to the store. Furthermore, the Casa Japonesa did not have any tourist traffic at all and was not the ideal place to sell such merchandise. This, coupled with past 116 exploits of Amano led the authorities to believe that Amano had purchased the booklets for another more sinister motive, such as intelligence gathering on the Canal. The souvenir booklets were clearly something the Japanese military could not pick up at home.

The actions of Amano and the Casa Japonesa became even more suspicious when

American authorities discovered that the Japanese government heavily subsidized its operations. The Japanese government needed to keep the store afloat so that the valuable intelligence would continue to pour in. Curiously, the Casa Japonesa was also counted among the donors for the Arias backed Red Cross in Panama. Amano was doing his part to become a respected part of Panamanian society, unfortunately it did not last.170 The

Panamanian government implicated a staff member of the Casa Japonesa in suspicious activities and he was consequently deported unceremoniously from Panama. Y. Sadahiro, widely reported as Amano's number two man met the ire of the Panamanian government by attempting to bribe several officials. In late November 1940, Sadahiro attempted to bribe Raul de Roux, the Secretary of Foreign Relations, the officer of the Legislature, and the former minister of Justice to insure that the exclusions in the 1941 Constitution did not include Japanese citizens. De Roux informed Arias of the effort and Sadahiro and his wife were promptly arrested and sent back to Japan on a Japanese ship. A twist of irony proved the Panamanian government was not without a sense of humor, it paid for the

Sadahiros' tickets with the bribe money and returned the rest so that they could use it for spending money on their passage back to Japan.171

In the end the bribe was superfluous, as Japanese nationals still received exceptions within the new constitution and new laws passed by the Arias government; 117 they just did not receive quite as many as they had hoped. They made out much better than the Chinese and West Indians who were stripped of everything and/or forced to hire

Panamanian partners and employees for their businesses.172 Arias was not a tool of the

Japanese; he might have been on friendly terms with the other Axis partners, but he did not bend to the Japanese will. Even after the Japanese received some exceptions in Arias' constitution the legation continued to protest. In one letter the Japanese legation protested how indignant it was that the government of Panama associated people of Japanese origin with the other yellow races and the Negroes. The author of the letter (no signature) ended his diatribe by stating that in light of the cordial relations between the two countries,

Arias should rethink his immigration policies.173

U.S. intelligence operatives discovered another Japanese plan in February 1941.

Although not yet at war with the Americans the Japanese devised a plan to destroy the locks of the Panama Canal and put them out of commission for a period of six months.

They planned to fit four tankers with secret compartments in the bottom of their hulls.

Once inside the locks the modified vessels would theoretically be able to covertly drop their payloads and continue on their way. The Germans designed the bombs and included specially designed fuses that would allow the bombs to drag along the bottom of the locks for a few cycles before exploding, hopefully in contact with the gates. However, the plans never came to fruition. This could be directly attributed to the anti-sabotage measures that the Americans adopted in the Canal Zone or faulty intelligence. The MID document noted that the German source had in the past provided both reliable and unreliable information. The military watches that accompanied Japanese vessels through the Canal would have prohibited any suspicious actions on board the tankers. In addition 118 to the watch parties, anti-bomb nettings were in place to prevent such an attack from happening or at the very least to try and lessen the damage such an attack could cause.

Japanese nationals continued to represent a threat in Panama in the two years before the

United States entered the war. Clearly their intelligence activities were less prevalent than they had been in the 1930s but they were an unwelcome distraction all the same.174

While each of the previous subversive elements had some form of organization in

Panama prior to and during World War II, the Nazi presence was by far the most pronounced. Unlike the Japanese, who had won some benefits from various government leaders, the Germans had a very functional relationship with members of the Panamanian government, especially during the Arias administration. Most of the benefits were the result of racial and ethnic discrimination at the hands of the Panamanians. The

Panamanian people were very proud and nationalistic and the Nazis fit very well into a society that celebrated its leaders based on how white they were.

Shortly after Arias won the 1940 election the news out of Germany was that

Panama was no longer an issue for the German war effort. Many higher echelon Nazis believed that Panama would simply submit to German pressures and thus be a hindrance to the United States. A German source shared this little tidbit of information with

Alexander Kirk the Counsellor at the American Embassy in Berlin. He relayed to the

State Department that the Nazis had apparently raised significant sums of money for

Arias' campaign so that he would win the election and then give them certain benefits after the fact. The Nazi war machine underestimated the loyalty of Arias; surely Germans received benefits from the Arias administration, yet these fell short of the Panamanian government rendering the Canal impotent. Kirk reported this without even knowing that 119 there had been an election in Panama, a fact that definitely adds to its credibility as a purely unsolicited remark with little value as misinformation. That being said, there is little evidence to support the notion that Arias' time in Europe transformed him into a

Nazi stooge. At worst he was a Panamanian nationalist who liked totalitarianism.175

The German Legation and Consulates administered the extensive Nazi organization within Panama. American authorities routinely acquired communications and letters from the German Consulate in Colon through clandestine means. These stolen documents provided a treasure trove of information for the various intelligence services attempting to watch Nazi agents in Panama. The information allowed the U.S. officials to keep lists of Nazis and sympathizers and to hone in on their activities and locations. One of the records discussed the future of the Hapag-Lloyd office in Cristobal after American officials arrested and charged some of its employees with espionage. The note stated that if convicted, they could easily be replaced by other spies waiting for the opportunity. The

Hapag-Lloyd office was in such a valuable location that since German shipping was no longer allowed to transit the Panama Canal in 1940 the German had to find a way to keep it open. The plan suggested by the head offices was to transform the Cristobal office into the regional training center for all Hapag-Lloyd depots in Central and South America.

The Cristobal Hapag-Lloyd office also imported and placed key German agents.

The office consistently offered positions to Nazi agents who needed to enter Panama. In order to make the relocation as painless as possible, Hapag-Lloyd found agents a place to live, whether it was an apartment or simply a room to share. It also organized employment for the new migrant that guaranteed they could remain in Panama and go about their ulterior activities. The company was adept at providing German agents with all of the necessary permits and papers and all were acquired through the proper channels so they were not suspect. In February 1940 alone, the Hapag-Lloyd office in Cristobal arranged for four German agents to relocate to Panama. K.G. Wandel, W.E.E. Alfed, K.

Hornkohl, and Deetz. In these cases the line did not have to offer them jobs but it did organize their passage and residency in Panama. Hornkohl was one of the agents that the

Germans sent to replace those arrested the American authorities.177

The Hapag-Lloyd office in Cristobal played a key role in the transportation of

German agents as well as the dissemination of propaganda. For transportation it communicated with a travel Agency in New York, the Amerop Travel Service, and paid for transportation with U.S. dollars in order for agents to receive Reichmarks and services, presumably clandestinely. The agents were then free to travel with few questions asked due to the circuitous route of the fare and arrangements. There were no numbers indicating the amount of propaganda that Hapag-Lloyd distributed but it must have been significant; in April 1941 the Compania Alemania de Agendas, in Guayaquil offered to store such items as globes, thermometers, barometers, and pictures so that they did not go to waste.178

In June of 1941, Arias once again proved he was no great friend of the United

States. On this occasion Ambassador Wilson requested a meeting with Arias to discuss people of German and Italian ancestry living in Panama. Wilson requested a list from

Arias so that U.S. officials could investigate and, in the case of war, detain any naturalized Panamanians who posed a threat. Arias refused to give Wilson a specific list, but told him sarcastically, he would create a list of all naturalized Panamanians and U.S. officials could try to figure out which ones were Germans or Italians. Arias told Wilson 121 that any naturalized Panamanian citizens were legally entitled to live freely in Panama regardless of their previous nationality.179 He did not give the same benefit to people of

Jewish extraction. Arias ordered his secret police to make a complete catalogue of all

Jews living in Panama. The list included their addresses, when and where they came from, and the value of their economic holdings. While this did not prove anything it definitely displayed that Arias agreed with some of Hitler's racist principles. Although, it

1 RO must be noted, anti-Semitism was not restricted to the Axis in World War Two.

Hapag-Lloyd was one element of the Nazi presence in Panama that suffered greatly after the de la Guardia coup. After the coup the Hapag-Lloyd office in Cristobal effectively shut down. A number of matters contributed to this but the latest was the refusal of Panamanian companies to insure the building. The building could not remain in use without insurance and while it had always been protected by Arias it could not get a new policy in late November 1941 when its existing policy expired. No companies would insure it based on Hapag-Lloyd's status as a member of the American Blacklist. Hapag-

Lloyd officials were not surprised by the turn of events. Earlier in November, E.

Hudeman, requested that the Hamburg-Amerika Line and Nordeutscher Lloyd send mail to his home address instead of the Cristobal office, for "certain reasons I do not want to take up here." It seems fairly obvious that Hapag-Lloyd finally realized the American intelligence services intercepted their mail. Under the Arias administration the Germans had much greater freedom and could operate openly.

The Nazi organization in Panama was thoroughly managed. There was a very large infrastructure in place to deal with the agents. Funds for clandestine activities or propaganda related missions funnelled from the legations and other official German 122 institutions. Nazis in the field also received instructions via coded messages broadcast over short wave radios from Germany. The Panama arm of the Nazi apparatus was equipped to receive these messages. The Nazis broadcast radio programming on ten different shortwave sets based in the motherland that had the range to reach Latin

America. While the broadcasts normally consisted of news, music, and other routine forms of radio broadcasts; two or three times a week they broadcast coded messages presumably to agents in the field. This programming ran under the guise of the German

Army request show and mixed coded instructions amongst music selections. The signals broadcast the world over, but Panama was one of the target audiences. The Panamanian contingent had the know-how and the means to receive these messages which put them at the front line of clandestine operations, operating within arms reach of their controllers in

182

Germany.

Another arm of the Nazi infrastructure was the German news agency Transocean.

Transocean provided stories for the media much the way United Press or American Press did. However, the vast majority of Transocean's stories were Nazi-centered propaganda that glorified the Aryan race. Stories reported on the hardships honest hardworking

Germans faced around the world, talked about German victories in the European war or disseminated information about the United States's imperial intentions regarding Latin

America and elsewhere. It seems the Panama office was much more than a simple propaganda agency. Military Intelligence infiltrated their offices and discovered documents that put Transocean right in the middle of the Nazi espionage ring operating in

Latin America. There were documents that updated each office on the progress of agents or the status of operations. Others detailed recent intelligence findings or failings. One 123 document noted that the Germans had female agents in place in France Field and Fort

Randolph, both in the Canal Zone. They had another agent in place in the Military

Hospital and revealed that his codename was Ludwig. The Nazi agents obtained photographs of the American Air Force assets in Panama in order to compare them with their own and Transocean transferred the pictures. The documents also included details of

Walter Giese, a Nazi agent that dealt with operations on the Pacific coast. Giese provided valuable intelligence until 1942 when he was asked to leave Ecuador.183

Transocean provided information that detailed safe places for agents to come ashore when they made their way across the Atlantic. Veracruz, Mexico and Valparaiso,

Chile, along with the usual Nazi haunt of Buenos Aires topped the list in 1941. The information was not all about agents and the missions, Transocean went to great lengths to explain what type of pressure they were under from local government and U.S. officials. In Panama, the American intelligence community actively watched many

Transocean employees, and some Panamanian and American newspapers began to spread more and more anti-Transocean propaganda in 1940 and 1941. Judging from these documents, none of the authorities' actions were unfounded.184

The labor shortage in Panama benefited the German war effort as well. The obvious benefit was that the U.S. military would not be able to build and fortify defenses before being forced to join the war. A less obvious benefit was that it allowed Nazi agents into Panama on a semi-legal basis and could get them close to sensitive areas. Eric

Cerjack-Boyna, the reputed leader of Nazi efforts in Panama used this labor shortage to import Germans from Costa Rica to work with the United Fruit Company. While this is only one example the possibility was real. The United Fruit Company could not retain employees because the Canal Zone was desperate for bodies and paid better.

Consequently, some of the United Fruit Company's hiring practises left a little to be desired. American authorities knew that Cerjack-Boyna had recruited these agents yet they could not discover their identities because they mixed with other laborers coming into Panama. If an informed U.S. military could not stop could not stop a few agents, what does it say about the opportunities for other agents of whom the authorities had no knowledge? The labor shortage and the ease with which the German legation could have paperwork processed under the Arias administration was very dangerous for hemispheric defense and the security of the Panama Canal.185

The German government's ability to operate freely within Panama ceased with the coming of de la Guardia. Almost immediately after taking power the de la Guardia administration declared Eric Cerjack-Boyna persona non-grata and the various authorities escorted him to a ship and then followed his movements to ensure that he in fact went back to Europe. In short order, the new government issued a declaration that barred the dissemination of Axis-propaganda in Panama. The decree forbid pro-Axis or anti- democracy propaganda from being distributed via letters, postcards, telegrams et al. and the postmasters were in charge of censoring mail. The Panamanian government fined offenders between $50 and $1000 per offense. All in all, the de la Guardia administration put the Nazi operations on notice that Panama was no longer a breeding ground for discontent and whatever subversive activities they sponsored. Arias' lackadaisical policies regarding defense and espionage ended. Panama fell in line with the United

States for defense of the Canal and the Hemisphere, and forced the Nazi apparatus in

Panama underground.186 Clearly, enemy agents were active in Panama after the outbreak of the European war and before Pearl Harbor. The three largest Axis nations each had a presence in

Panama prior to United States involvement in the war. Spain assisted these three countries, although she was officially a non-belligerent. Each of these groups provided their own unique threats to the Panama Canal, and none could be ignored. The Nazis had a large propaganda and intelligence operation aimed at destabilizing American influence on the isthmus. The Japanese continued their tradition of espionage in Panama and made plans to disrupt the Canal. The Italian community, while smaller than the others, still tried to do its part and spread propaganda in Panama. Finally, the Spanish Falange provided espionage and propaganda services to the Axis, operations which were made easier by Panama's Spanish roots. 126

Chapter 6 - War Comes to the Western Hemisphere

Between December 7 and December 11, 1941 - during which period the Japanese attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor and Hitler's government declared war on the

United States - the United States found itself fighting a war on two oceans. The attack proved more than ever that the Panama Canal was integral for the defense of the United

States. The destruction of the Pacific Fleet left the U.S. Navy with fewer vessels than it needed to fight a two ocean war. The Panama Canal was by far the most expedient route for ships to travel between the two theatres of conflict. The Japanese attack at Pearl

Harbor also illustrated the inherent danger of an aircraft carrier launched air raid against the Canal. If the Japanese navy could destroy the well-armored and defended Pacific

Fleet it should have been fairly simple for that same navy to damage the lightly armored

Panama Canal, or more specifically the Gatun spillway or one of the locks. The attack on

Pearl Harbor proved more than ever that the security of the Panama Canal was vital to hemispheric defense.

The U.S. government was quick to start the political negotiations necessary for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the security of the Panama Canal. The

Roosevelt administration's first move was to organize another extraordinary meeting of the Western Hemisphere's foreign ministers. The conference, which was to take place at

Rio de Janeiro, was instrumental in preparing the countries of the Western Hemisphere for war. It focused on gains made in earlier conferences and attempted to strengthen most of the existing multilateral agreements. Next, the U.S. government had to repair and reinvigorate relations with Panama. Relations had soured during the Arias administration, 127 but the de la Guardia government quickly proved that it was a willing ally of the United

States. At times, at least some Panamanians proved less than cooperative with the U.S. military and as a result a number of small disturbances affected U.S. - Panamanian relations between 1941 and 1945. Finally, the domestic politics of Panama played a role in the defense of the Canal. After the de la Guardia coup the political environment stabilized, but it was still far from perfect. During de la Guardia's term in office there were numerous rumors about counter-coups and a few domestic issues that caused unrest on the isthmus. Clearly, the state of Panamanian politics remained a question mark for the security of the Panama Canal and the defense of the Western Hemisphere even after

Panama and the United States entered World War II.

Several scholars have studied the Rio de Janeiro Conference. However, it is essential to set the stage for United States' entry into World War II. This short discussion of the conference outlines some of the key issues that troubled U.S. officials after Pearl

Harbor. The remainder of the chapter deals with the U.S.-Panamanian relations and

Panamanian domestic issues during the war. Previously, the best account of U.S.­

Panamanian relations during the war could be found in John Major's Prize Possession.

This chapter expands on Major's coverage of the Panama in World War II. He missed some significant issues that threatened the U.S. military's ability to secure the Canal, including: anti-American riots, and political upheaval and instability in the wake of the de la Guardia coup. Walter LaFeber's coverage of the war ends with the de la Guardia coup and Michael Conniff s account does little more than note Panama experienced an economic boom during World War II.187 In We Answer Only to God, Thomas L. Pearcy noted the de la Guardia coup and the presidency of Enrique Jimenez, but little else regarding the period.1 Finally, Max Friedman focused almost exclusively on the

American process of interning Germans in Panama, not on details of the war itself.

Rio de Janeiro Conference

The Roosevelt administration reacted swiftly to the onslaught of the war. One of the first orders of business for the American government was to organize yet another conference for the Western Hemisphere's foreign ministers. The Roosevelt administration invited the other foreign ministers in the Western Hemisphere to a conference a mere two days after Pearl Harbor. The Brazilian government agreed to host the conference in Rio de Janeiro which began on January 15, 1942 and concluded

January 28. Hull believed that the meeting would be fruitful and that the other American

Republics would repay American Good Neighbor generosity by immediately dropping all

Axis connections and supporting the Allied war effort. He felt that at the conclusion of the conference all the republics would be pleased to sign a joint declaration condemning the Axis and signifying the unity of the Western Hemisphere. By the time of the conference many of Latin American Republics had already severed relations with the

Axis.189 As of January 1, 1942 ten of the American Republics had declared war on the

Axis powers while three more had severed all relations.190

Hull and Roosevelt decided it would be wise for Sumner Welles once again to take the lead of the American contingent at the Conference. There was simply too much happening in the United States and the world for that matter, and the Secretary of State could not afford to leave his post. On the eve of the conference the U.S. State Department sent telegrams to the various American Republics outlining U.S. goals. This pre- conference message was sent to alleviate any sense of surprise when the ceremonies 129 officially opened. The draft included four points that the State Department felt were of the utmost importance for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, the security of the

Panama Canal and the prosecution of the war against the Axis nations. First and foremost, the State Department wanted the American Republics to take a united stand and collectively break off relations with the Axis powers. This did not necessarily mean that each state had to declare war on the Axis, but they had to break off all diplomatic relations. American authorities did not want any form of subversive or Fifth Column presence in the Western Hemisphere, especially one that was legally entitled to be there.

Hull explained that the presence of Axis diplomats undoubtedly included the presence of

Axis spies who would be in perfect position to report on shipping, troop movements, materiel and anything else related to the Allied war effort. The second part of the draft called for unity until the Axis forces had been completely destroyed. Thirdly, the State

Department wanted it known that all Axis nationals would forfeit any rights they may have had in the Western Hemisphere due to the war. Finally, Hull asked that the republics terminate all financial and commercial ventures with members of the Axis nations. War machines required significant resources in order to be effective and the U.S. officials did not want any of these strategic materials (eg. oil, guano, bauxite, platinum, etc.) to get into Axis hands.'91

In the weeks before the conference it became painfully obvious that the meetings were not going to go exactly as planned. While the majority of the American Republics supported the United States and her position, some of the usual suspects refused to cooperate fully. The main agitator in this case was Argentina. The Argentine government began to organize meetings amongst neighboring countries in an effort to gain support in 130 opposition to the United States. On December 25, 1941, three weeks before the start of the conference the Argentine Foreign Minister was busy trying to convince countries that had yet to break off relations with the Axis powers to hold the line. He met with the

Ministers of Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia and Peru during this time. Argentina's independent stance was consistent with its earlier posture.192

It soon became apparent that Argentina would not be the only problem at the forthcoming conference. The Chileans were hesitant about joining the other American

Republics in a new joint declaration. The State Department learned that, unlike the

Argentines, the Chileans feared a direct reprisal from the Axis nations. Chile is a very long and narrow country with a 6,435km coastline that is difficult to defend. It did not have the resources to protect the entire coast or even try to patrol her national waters in the case of any form of organized attack by the Axis forces. Axis diplomats used this to intimidate the Chileans who had the world's largest supply of nitrates, a mineral instrumental in creating gunpowder. There were also reports in the Chilean media during the conference, obviously planted, that the Japanese planned to attack Chile immediately should it sign the declaration. The Chilean contingent attempted to soften the resolution out of fear, in stark contrast to the Argentines who tried to soften their stance because of their close relationship with both Germany and Italy. The U.S. contingent in Rio believed

Argentina would quickly break relations and even declare war if it were allowed to do so only against Japan.

When the conference began, Argentina and Chile still refused to break diplomatic relations and the rest of the American Republics, including Panama, wanted to sign a joint declaration condemning the Axis nations and breaking relations. The rest of the 131

American Republics exhibited very little sympathy for Argentina's plight and continued to push for the joint declaration. They did not want to leave Rio de Janeiro without a declaration in place and it was agreed that the declaration had to be united and include all of the Republics. The pressure caused Welles to waver and finally bow to Argentine pressure. Argentina brokered a watered down agreement on January 23, 1942. All of the

American Republics signed the Joint Declaration, but the most crucial section of the agreement contained numerous loopholes that Argentina could exercise to abstain from severing relations with the Axis.

The American Republics consequently, following the procedure established by their own laws within the position and circumstances of each country in the actual continental conflict, recommend the rupture of their diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany, and Italy, since the first of these states has attacked and the other two have declared war upon an American country.196

The key issue with this version of the declaration is the word "recommend." The wording insinuated that everyone agreed to recommend the severance of relations but no one was actually bound by this agreement to sever relations. The declaration also earned

Welles the wrath of Hull, "I then spoke to him more sharply than I had ever spoken to anyone in the Department."198 Welles' action incensed Hull because he felt it was an unauthorized change in American government policy and believed that the conference was a failure.

In addition to the agreement recommending the severance of relations the Foreign

Ministers committed themselves to nine other resolutions to aid in the prosecution of the war. There was a resolution to sever all financial and commercial ties much along the same lines as the draft that Washington released prior to the conference. There was an 132 agreement on the production of strategic materials for defense of the continent. A number of economic matters were adopted in Rio de Janeiro that dealt with such topics as economic stabilization and price controls. Most importantly there was an additional resolution regarding subversive elements in the Americas. The Rio Conference was also responsible for the creation of the Inter-American Defense Board. The board dealt with such things as defense against sabotage, but also the logistics of raw materials and production. Judging from the sheer number of resolutions passed the conference was at least a moderate success; yet, it did not accomplish the united stand that Hull had envisioned.199

Each of the resolutions adopted at the Rio Conference were beneficial for the security of the Panama Canal and the defense of the Western Hemisphere. While many of these resolutions seem to give credence to Friedman's assertion that the United States used the reality of war to strengthen its hold over Latin America, they also strengthened the hemispherical unity essential for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Argentina and Chile aside, the remainder of the hemisphere was united for a single cause. Financial and commercial concessions by the United States were instrumental in allowing some of the smaller nations to help the Allies fight the Axis. U.S. economic assistance in its many guises filled the vacuum left when the American Republics halted trade with the Axis.

Agreements for the production of strategic materials helped the Allies and improved the economies of the republics, more importantly they prevented sensitive and valuable resources from legally finding their way to Axis. Finally, the resolution to combat subversives displayed that most of the American Republics worried about danger close to home and tried to combat it. 133

Panama-US Relations 1941-1945

The Republic of Panama and the United States of America have had a symbiotic relationship throughout their history. During the Second World War, the United States truly needed Panama; the Allied war effort would have suffered without the Canal. There would have been a lack of available warships to protect both coasts of the United States after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor and the shipping route around the southern cone was far less efficient at moving men and materiel than the Panama Canal. However, this relationship was not without its problems, there was always some form of give and take and the Roosevelt administration took all it could during the Arias Administration. The close relationship these countries experienced was not free from trials and tribulations and these were not always related to instability within Panama. Sometimes the problems were a direct result of American forces and American influence on the Isthmus.

On more than one occasion, rioting erupted between Panamanians and the

American personnel in Panama. One such event took place on May 3, 1942. On this day, a riot broke out in Panama City between U.S. servicemen and Panamanians. The riot broke out on a Sunday afternoon after crowds of Panamanians spent their energy irritating U.S. military personnel. There were various versions of what unfolded but the consensus was that Panamanian Police attacked the American soldiers which incited a general melee. Col. Francis E. Howard, Commanding the 760 Military Police Battalion, believed that the Panamanian Police had planned the riot. He felt that there were far too many police in the area for the day and time and that they looked for American servicemen to rough up. Howard also suggested it was highly unlikely that three separate fights involving American servicemen and the Panamanian Police could all begin at the 134 same moment. The riot ended when American Military Police from the Canal Zone entered Panama City and dispersed the crowds. The Panamanian Police arrested and charged a number of Americans and a few received short stays in jail.200

Riots between Panamanians and Americans were not new; there were anti-

American riots in Panama dating back to the 1850s. During World War II riots became more frequent and fights between soldiers and civilians became a security threat. If

American soldiers constantly had to look over their shoulders and worry about

Panamanians they would be less focussed in the job at hand, namely defending the

Panama Canal from the Axis. The war heightened tensions between Panamanians and

American military personnel because of the large influx of Americans on the isthmus.

The war also furnished the American military with more occupied land outside of the

Canal Zone which made the American military far more visible in day to day life than during peacetime. This combination of factors created a more volatile atmosphere in

Panama.

After the riot U.S. authorities declared the Republic of Panama off-limits to

American personnel serving in the area. The ban lasted approximately two weeks and ended only after the Panamanian Police and U.S. military reached an agreement. On May

12, 1942 both sides signed the agreement which dictated the relationship between

National Police and American personnel in Panama. The agreement called for cooperation between both forces. Small detachments of Military Police would aid the

Panamanian Police in patrolling those areas of the city that American personnel frequented. For their part the National Police would only assign specially selected officers to patrol the same regions. The police selected would be those who tolerant of the 135

American presence and did not harbor any ill-feelings. Meanwhile the Military Police took responsibility for policing their own and made sure that American personnel did not cause undo stress on the Panamanian authorities. Furthermore, U.S. officials requested that the National Police refrain from using extreme violence if the need arose to arrest

American servicemen. The agreement allowed American authorities to withdraw the ban on the Republic of Panama on May 14, 1942.201

American intelligence officials believed Fifth Columnists and Axis sympathizers initiated the May 3 riot. There was no conclusive evidence, but officials felt that the organized nature of the events and the extraordinary presence of the National Police at the time indicated malicious intent. At this time the National Police force was strengthening its position as the most powerful force in Panamanian politics. It was the

National Police that made or broke political regimes in Panama; it was impossible to lead the republic without the support of the police. Arnulfo Arias discovered that when he alienated some of the senior members of the National Police and was subsequently deposed. While the National Police did not support the Axis nations, it did like to control

Panama and that explains some of the anti-American sentiment displayed by this riot.202

Ambassador Wilson noted in his report that the riot broke out because of a fight between

American personnel. He said that as the police stepped in to stop the fight they proceeded to beat the three servicemen and more and more police arrived until the general riot began. During the riot Panamanians shouted anti-American slogans, thought to be provided by the Axis sympathizers. On May 9 the Mundo Grdfico reported that the Fifth

Column was responsible for the riot. However, this report was never proven and the

Mundo Grdfico was a fiercely pro-U.S. newspaper. Riots were an effective way for Axis 136 elements to cause a rift between Panama and the United States. They definitely created negative publicity for the United States when the average Panamanian saw images of

American military personnel fighting with the National Police.203

Another problem that plagued relations between Panama and the United States during the war was petty crime. Panamanians mugged or robbed American personnel fairly often in the Republic of Panama. While this happened during riots and when some

Americans had a little too much too drink on leave it also happened when soldiers were minding their own business. While muggings were certainly not commonplace

Panamanians mugged a number of American servicemen during the war, and each mugging strained relations between the two countries. Anything that strained U.S.­

Panamanian relations was detrimental to American efforts to protect the hemisphere.204

A battle involving Panamanian Police, Americans in uniform, and Panamanian civilians took place in the late afternoon of April 19, 1943. There were no conspiracy theories about the cause of this riot. A number of U.S. troops were in the Martinez

Alligator Skin Products Store and one of the soldiers accidentally broke a display case.

The proprietor of the store asked the soldier to pay for the case and he refused. As the soldiers left the store they happened upon a member of the National Police and a fight broke out which escalated into a forty-five minute riot. American authorities once again blamed Panamanian authorities for escalating the riot. They claimed that the riot would not have expanded had the Police been better prepared to deal with riots. U.S. authorities accused the National Police of indiscriminately using violence against American troops.

Once again American officials claimed that the riot worsened due to subversive groups within the periphery of the crowd inciting anti-American feelings. The ONI made a very 137 good point about the relations between Panamanians and Americans living in close proximity.

Riots of this type in Panama, however, should not be viewed as isolated events attributable exclusively to improper police technique. Inadequate training is the immediate but superficial cause. Basically these riots are the outward manifestation of deep rooted misunderstandings. Many Panamanians harbor a smoldering resentment toward Americans, a resentment which bursts into physical action when the stage is properly set. Various factors may be advanced in explanation of this mental attitude; any explanation however, if the resultant of a complex of motivations. Panamanians are very conscious that in the eyes of many Americans they constitute an inferior social group, composed in the main of "half-breeds" and "spicks." This is bitterly resented. Consequently the feeling of "revanche" is always present and when the occasion permits the Panamanian is apt to express his sense of equality by putting the "Gringo" in his place physically if not mentally.205

Clearly, the riots strained the relations between Panamanians and U.S. personnel on the isthmus. These tensions in turn strained the bilateral relationship between Panama and the

United States. It was certainly difficult for the two countries to have a great relationship while their citizens rioted against one another. These concerns worsened because of the bi-national nature of the Canal Zone, Americans and Panamanians worked side by side on a daily basis, any friction could cause the Canal to run less efficiently.206

In an effort to better relations with the Republic of Panama Roosevelt revisited an outstanding real estate issue in 1941. During the negotiations for the 1936 Hull-Alfaro

Treaty the two sides agreed that the United States did not need all land allotted to the

Panama Railroad Company in Colon and Panama City. While there was no official section of the treaty that stipulated the dispersal of these lands, the United States included it as an official note to have the treaty passed by Panama. The U.S. Senate did not approve the Treaty until 1939, on the eve of World War II. The delay left the excess 138

Panama Railroad lands in limbo; the U.S. State Department had agreed to let them go, but

907 had not moved on the issue since 1936.

In 1941, President Roosevelt requested Congress to address the dispute with

Panama over the excess lands. FDR wanted the United States out of the real estate business in Panama. The Panama Railroad Company made significant rental income from these non-essential properties; for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, it received

$336,241.98 in rental income. Roosevelt wanted all lands that were not vital for the protection or operation of the Canal and the operation of the Railroad returned to the

Republic of Panama. The only condition he attached to the return of the land was that the

Panamanian government permit the use of lands needed for defense sites in order to 90R protect the Canal.

In addition to railroad lands, the Roosevelt administration made a number of other special concessions to Panama to insure its cooperation with American defense plans. In response to earlier requests the Roosevelt administration finally agreed to transfer the water and sewer treatment plants at Colon and Panama City to the Panamanian government free of charge. The United States government finally acceded to the construction of a bridge over the Canal Zone so that Panamanians could easily move from one side of the country to the other. The Roosevelt administration directed Canal

Zone officials to crack down on the purchase of contraband goods from the Zone. It also promised to contribute to the cost of repairs for Panamanian roads frequented by U.S. military vehicles. Finally, the Roosevelt administration annulled Panama's $2.5 million debt to the Import Export Bank. These concessions illustrate some of the ways that the 139

U.S. government attempted to better relations with the Panamanian government in order to better protect the Canal.209

However, any goodwill that the Roosevelt administration created with good deeds was often reversed by fairly petty events that ballooned into larger ordeals. In Colon a riot began in the midst of the preparations for the return of land because of a completely unrelated disturbance. Panamanians in Colon harbored resentment towards the United

States in May, 1943, because of new regulations stipulated by the American military regarding venereal disease prevention. This sparked an incident between the Panamanian

National Police and the United States Navy Shore Patrol regarding the treatment of an

American sailor. Naturally, this evolved into yet another riot between Panamanians and the Americans which directly countermanded any gains the Roosevelt administration made in public relations due to the return of lands negotiations. Once again this created an issue that dealt with the stability of the host country for the Canal.210

The U.S. military continued to face challenges in its efforts to improve its public relations with the Republic of Panama. In November and December 1943 another high profile case came to light regarding American troops and Panamanians. U.S. authorities subjected American troops to numerous mock situations and drills in order to test their readiness. On one such occasion officials informed the troops that saboteurs had landed in Panama and there was an imminent threat to the security of the Canal. The troops involved did not know at the time that the situation was a drill. On this particular occasion the lieutenant in charge of the group decided that the best plan of action was to erect a barricade in Panama on a street leading to the Canal Zone. He reasoned that saboteurs would probably steal civilian transportation in order to reach their destination 140 quickly so he would effectively cut them off at the pass. However, one of the cars his squad detained and then treated in a less than dignified manner was the car belonging to

President de la Guardia. It was in fact the second occasion within the year that American personnel stopped de la Guardia's car in Panamanian territory. The soldiers did not recognize the President, and when informed they had detained the President of the

Republic even then they did not treat him with proper respect.211

The first incident was kept quiet and American authorities assumed the second incident would be treated in the same way. When he returned home President de la

Guardia informed Colonel Remon about the incident and he communicated with the proper American authorities. General Brett informed Remon that his troops had stopped the President during an exercise and that he would apologize for the unfortunate incident.

General Brett then telephoned the President and apologized and believed the incident was over. About a month later, December 19, 1943, the story broke in the Panama Star and

Herald and claimed all sorts of abuses at the hands of the Americans; most notably, the stoppage of the President's car, because it was clearly marked as the President's official automobile. Many people claimed that the leak was an anti-American stunt on the part of

Foreign Minister Fabrega; however, stunt or not, it portrayed the United States in an unfavorable light for the Panamanian people. President de la Guardia played down the story after it hit the press and noted that the United States was on the midst of a terrible war and certain inconveniences were necessary because the security of the Panama Canal was critical. The story also named some other incidents such as when a U.S. vessel fired warning shots over the bow of an authorized Panamanian vessel in the Canal Zone. The 141 general tone of the article requested that the U.S. military exercise a little more caution when protecting the Canal.212

In the end the incident was blown far out of proportion and authorities simply asked the offending members of the American forces to exercise more caution in their effort to protect the Canal, so long as the Canal was not at risk. The main fallout from the incident involved General Brett. General Marshall expressed his disappointment that the incident had not been completely taken care of before the press became involved. Once again these events played a part in hemispheric defense and the security of the Panama

Canal.213

The support of the Republic of Panama was essential for the protection of the

Panama Canal. Any disturbances, disagreements, or ill-will between the United States and Panama directly affected the ability of these two countries to work together. A harmonious bilateral relationship was indispensable for the well-being of the Panama

Canal and by extension the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Each of these incidents was a cause of concern for the authorities involved. This was especially true of any incident that led Panamanian officials to doubt the intentions of the U.S. government. The

Roosevelt administration obviously realized this and tried to do all it could to keep relations as amicable as possible.

Politics in Panama 1941 - 1945

The political environment within the Republic of Panama was still a problem for the United States after the events at Pearl Harbor. By all accounts Ricardo de la Guardia accommodated the Roosevelt administration more than his ousted predecessor, yet that did not necessarily mean that Panama was a perfect, hospitable location for the Panama 142

Canal. There was still some hostility between Panama and the United States and the

Republic itself experienced its fair share of internal instability. In short, the removal of

Arnulfo Arias was only part of the problem U.S. officials faced in Panama.

Regardless of his promises to repeal any and all of the Arias administration's more offensive legislation, de la Guardia did not always follow through on his commitment. When de la Guardia ascended to office in October 1941, he stated that all of

Arias' decrees and laws were subject to potential revision. One of the most controversial was the 1941 Constitution which de la Guardia stated would be reviewed and amended, especially the clauses that repealed minorities' citizenship and civil rights in the

Republic. The wholesale disenfranchisement of West Indians, Hindus, Chinese, or other visible minorities continued even without Arias in power. De la Guardia also announced that the Panamanian born offspring of these people would be allowed to apply for reinstatement as Panamanian citizens; however, he set a time limit on the process. De la

Guardia declared on January 16, 1942 that any disenfranchised West Indian children who had not requested reinstatement were no longer allowed to apply. This created an atmosphere similar to that which existed when Arias was still in power. There was widespread hostility and mistrust and it could prove to be breeding ground for dissent.214

In March 1942 new reports of a possible coup came to light in the Republic of

Panama. It seems that backers of Arnulfo Arias wanted to place him back in the presidencia. U.S. officials believed that the conspirators included: Harmodio Arias,

Arnulfo Arias, Octavio Fabrega (Foreign Minister), Ernesto Fabrega (Minister of

Commerce and Agriculture), and Rogelio Fabrega (Comandante of the National Police).

Harmodio Arias, who just a few months earlier attempted to help the State Department 143 remove his brother Arnulfo from office, was apparently upset by some of the de la

Guardia government's actions. Mostly, as a newspaper man, he did not like censorship as a result of war coming to the Americas. The National Police arrested some of those involved in the plot in order to learn more about the seriousness of the matter. One of those arrested, Police Captain Polanco chose to remain in jail in order to speak with de la

Guardia regarding some of the allegations.215

While some of the conspiracies sounded far fetched, the memories of the last coup were fresh in the minds of Panamanians. There was even more speculation about conspiracies when Arnulfistas hosted a dinner for Ernesto Fabrega on March 20, 1942.

Among the invitees were the Chief of police, Rogelio Fabrega, and his subordinates Lt.

Col. Jose Antonio Remon and Major Francisco Aued. The senior policemen refused to attend the dinner for two reasons; they felt it may be hazardous to their health if they attended; they believed that the dinner was a smokescreen for more nefarious events such as the takeover of the police and a subsequent coup attempt. Clearly the atmosphere

91 ft within Panama remained unstable in spite of the de la Guardia coup.

Conspiracies within the Republic of Panama continued throughout 1942. In

September 1942 the Military Intelligence Division (MID) reported on a scheme that would have allowed dissenters within the legislative assembly to force Ricardo de la

Guardia to call an election. The Arias and Fabrega factions used all of their available political acumen to try to garner enough support to force a new election in January 1943.

It was the first time the legislative assembly had met since the 1941 coup. This attempted ouster did nothing more than foster instability within the Isthmus. The collusion of various political powerhouses in Panama showed more than ever that stability was 144 necessary. On a few occasions Octavio Fabrega, Minister of Agriculture tried to impress upon de la Guardia that he should step aside and allow Arnulfo Arias back in power.217

When this approach did not have any effect on de la Guardia, his opposition changed to more dramatic and desperate measures. In order to gain more control over the legislative assembly and force de la Guardia out of office by calling a new election the opposition attempted to bribe the three most senior police officers. Colonel Rogelio

Fabrega, Chief of Police, Lt. Col. Jose Remon, Second in Command, and Major

Francisco Aued, Third in Command of the National Police were contacted by Arnulfistas and offered significant sums of money to stand aside and let them extend their influence.

Colonel Julio Ernesto Briceno, an avid Arias supporter, offered Major Aued $15,000 while he was on a trip to Washington; it is not clear whether or not Aued accepted the money but he was under suspicion by his superiors because he did not immediately report the incident. Fabrega and Remon on the other hand outright refused to waver in their support for the de la Guardia Administration. The opposition then attempted to kidnap the top two policemen. The attempt failed due to the alertness of Captain Maclntire, the

Chief of Civil Intelligence for the Panama Canal, who kept the National Police and de la

Guardia Administration informed of any and all conspiracies against the government. The

National Police arrested some of the individuals involved in the plot and found new evidence linking the opposition with plots against the government, including petitions and leaflets that denounced the administration. Those arrested were minor figures of the opposition; all of the leaders and chief conspirators caught word of the impending raids and fled to the Canal Zone. The Canal Zone offered a safe haven to many Panamanians because of bureaucratic red-tape and a political power struggle between the governments of Panama and the United States over jurisdiction.218

In the end nothing came of all of the backroom political manoeuvring, de la

Guardia remained president of Panama until 1945. Although it pleased the Americans that de la Guardia stayed in office they did not worry about change except possibly the commotion it would cause among the Panamanian people; "No politician in Panama today is going to be so absurdly stupid as to pursue an open policy of non-cooperation with us. A change of administration in January will not affect the present policy of

91 Q cooperation with out government". Clearly, some within the American government still believed that Latin America was theirs to do with what they wanted.220

This attitude carried over into other political matters on the Isthmus. The de la

Guardia Administration was closer to the Roosevelt administration than previous administrations but that did not translate into a perfect relationship. Just weeks after

American Intelligence officials prevented what would have amounted to a coup, the

Panamanian Foreign Minister logged a formal protest against the U.S. government. The complaint was yet another act in the saga that aimed to ruin the de la Guardia

Administration. The story broke January 12, 1943 in the Panama America, Harmodio

Arias' newspaper, at the same time that Foreign Minister Dr. Octavio Fabrega presented the American Ambassador with the formal protest. Coincidently, both of these events occurred while the Presidents of Costa Rica and Colombia visited Panama. The complaint lodged by the Republic of Panama was in reference to an incident that happened December 16, 1942; a Panamanian fishing boat entered the harbor at Taboga

Island during restricted hours and U.S. authorities detained the crew for questioning. The 146 official report stated that officials questioned and released the crew. A subsequent report that the Foreign Minister quoted in his protest claimed that U.S. naval officers harassed and ridiculed the crew. The whole episode was an attempt to embarrass the Roosevelt administration and cause tension. In this respect the ruse worked; the presidents of Costa

Rica and Colombia both questioned the relationship between the United States and

Panama and the atmosphere of the visit became tense. However, both realized that the protest was artificial and staged for their benefit by a dissident group within Panama; they felt the tension more as a result of the Foreign Minister's hostility because his attempt at subversion had failed.221

After this latest attempt at conspiracy, political upheaval within the Republic of

Panama calmed for a period of six months or so. In June there were rumors about yet another plot against the de la Guardia Administration. In this incident authorities named

Manuel Pino and Domingo Turner conspirators because they reportedly tried to bribe a member of the National Police to allow a revolution. The story later turned out to be false and the FBI believed it was a frame up. Those with political acumen in Panama believed that Turner's arrest was an attempt by the government to discredit Pino who was a close friend of Turner's and the Minister of Health and Public Works. These events display once again the tumultuous political atmosphere within Panama. No side was free of intrigue as the government tried to stage a coup against itself to disgrace one of its members. Even during periods of relative stability, instability was rife in Panama, and it worried U.S. officials.222

A few months of relative harmony in governmental affairs ended with a fresh dose of instability and rumors regarding a revolution to overthrow de la Guardia. At the 147 end of August 1943 the National Police foiled a plot by Dr. Jose Pezet to overthrow the government. Pezet was the Panamanian Ambassador to Costa Rica and a former First

Vice President to Arnulfo Arias. He bribed a few members of the police force in order to gain access to the barracks of the National Guard and the Central Police Station. He and his supporters were supposed to gain control of these establishments and then arrest de la

Guardia and his main supporters to allow a change in government. Two of the police officers that Pezet employed in his scheme actually acted undercover and alerted their superiors to the whole plan resulting in the arrests of Pezet and his conspirators. While this may seem like just another failed revolution in Panama it was very significant. The stability of the de la Guardia Administration began to be questioned more than ever. Even the U.S. State Department began to wonder if de la Guardia would last much longer. The attempted coup received plenty of press coverage and Panamanians began to feel that it was just a matter of time before the removal of de la Guardia. The same feelings resonated throughout the Republic on the eve of the Arias coup in 1941. This brought back all of the worries and issues that the Americans faced when dealing with the Arias coup; most importantly was the Canal secure? Even though the importance of the Canal and its threat level had declined by the fall of 1943, it was still essential for the United

States and the Allies.223

Even after the tremors from the Pezet plot subsided the Republic of Panama remained in a state of turmoil. The opposition forces that tried to force an election in

January 1943 latched on to latest unrest to try once again to force de la Guardia to call an election. The opposition consisted of various groups who were only united in their dislike for de la Guardia. The Arnulfistas were still upset that de la Guardia deposed Arnulfo 148

Arias and wanted their leader back in power while other Axis sympathizers wanted a share of the pie as well. The more liberal parties united because they felt that de la

Guardia was too much like his predecessor, mostly because he failed to repeal a number of Arias' laws and decrees including the controversial 1941 Constitution.

American intelligence estimates believed that although the situation was desperate a coup was not likely. The MID felt that the opposition would use all of the support from their united front to embarrass and harass the government into calling an election. Any shred of information or any piece of gossip was published by the press, who had almost completely united against de la Guardia, to try to discredit the government. This was fairly easy for the press as most of the major political candidates or groups had the support of a major newspaper in Panama and could have anything printed. Once again the

American's feared that the instability would cause problems for the security and efficient management of the Canal.224

De la Guardia began to take a more controlling interest in keeping power as 1943 progressed. By the fall, he became more and more like his predecessor Arnulfo Arias on the domestic front. Although there was still technically freedom of the press, he made it increasingly difficult for opposition members to criticize the government. De la Guardia supporters ransacked the offices of the press that published Accion Comunal and Critica after they printed an open letter that requested Ricardo Alfaro run for president. Alfaro had recently returned to Panama after a stint in the United States. Following the raid on the press offices Ricardo Alfaro, Raul Jiminez, Augusto Boyd Jr, among others purchased the Cia. Editoria Nacional and they used the new organ to criticize the de la

Guardia Administration.225 149

Yet another crisis hit the de la Guardia government in October of 1943. The students at the National Institute struck in support of a Law Professor Felipe Juan

Escobar. The school dismissed Escobar because of his criticism of the de la Guardia

Administration and some other radical tendencies. De la Guardia told the Minister of

Education Victor Florencio Goytia to remove him in yet another example of restricting the opposition. Escobar was well-liked by the students and they backed his cause while also picketing for freedom and autonomy from politics in the school. However, like all of his other crises throughout his term de la Guardia weathered the storm and actually came out ahead. He used the successful conclusion of the student strike to alienate some of his opposition. De la Guardia did not allow Harmodio Arias to sign the manifesto that concluded the strike. The manifesto was signed by 91 other political leaders of various parties and stated that politics would be officially removed from the governance of the

National Institute.226

De la Guardia continued to hold on to his tenuous presidency into 1944. He endured constant criticism and many conspiracies but sustained his administration. The

American authorities and the people of Panama believed change was imminent but by

March 1944 de la Guardia still sat in the Presidencia. The MID criticised the de la

Guardia administration as the most corrupt in Panama's history. The U.S. Department of

State considered it an even worse government than that of Arnulfo Arias, but the

Roosevelt administration took no action to remove it from office because it was friendlier towards the Canal and the war effort. The president's brother, Camilo de la Guardia, was probably the most corrupt member of the administration. Camilo was the Minister of

Government and Justice. He participated in all manner of schemes and oversaw bars and 150 houses of ill repute. However, one of his most profitable ventures was the insurance industry; in Panama all cars had to be insured and Camilo was the director of the only authorized insurance company in Panama. Since there was no organized opposition to de la Guardia American authorities began to believe that his presidency would last until the elections scheduled for January 1944. However, they worried what would happen at the election. Some felt that the opposition led by Harmodio Arias would have purchased enough votes to control the legislative assembly and oust de la Guardia in January 1944.

Others thought that de la Guardia may not give up his power that easily and it was

997 possible he would declare some form of dictatorial rule.

By 1944 the American authorities who had welcomed the de la Guardia coup in

1941 began to question whether or not de la Guardia served their interests better than

Arnulfo Arias. An MID report which discussed the stability of the government compared the administration with that of Arnulfo Arias. It claimed that in the end de la Guardia was not all that different from Arias; however, Arias was vilified by the American and liberal

Panamanian press for being a Naziophile and a Fascist while de la Guardia was welcomed after the coup. U.S. officials went as far as to 'unofficially' assure de la

Guardia that it would approve of the unorthodox change of government because it wanted rid of Arias. Roughly two and a half years later that same government declared that de la

Guardia may even be worse than his predecessor, especially in regards to domestic policy. It was clear by 1944 that de la Guardia, like Arias before him, could only hold onto his presidency by oppression and trickery and this did not bode well for stability and the United States.228 151

As 1944 continued the de la Guardia Administration began to make a concerted effort to improve its public image. The president became more active in the social scene, he held more banquets and attended more receptions and functions than he had in the past. He reconciled with some of the other political leaders of the Republic, most notably

Ricardo Alfaro and anyone else who opposed the Arias brothers. De la Guardia even received some good press from the Estrella de Panama which lauded his democratic achievements, few that they were. By September 1944, de la Guardia was genuinely concerned that the Legislative Assembly aimed to vote him out of office in January 1945 and he finally determined that he needed to change his unpopular image.

For de la Guardia it was a case of too little, too late; the National Assembly of

Panama finally exercised its powers under the Panamanian constitution and replaced de la

Guardia. In June 1945, it named Enrique A. Jimenez President of Panama; he was the choice of the Panamanian urban elite. To Jimenez, fell the task of trying to repair the damage that the corruption and avarice the de la Guardia regime perpetrated on the republic.230

Clearly, the political environment within Panama was integral to the security of the Panama Canal and the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Domestic politics in

Panama were still a subject for concern after the removal of Arnulfo Arias. Although the de la Guardia administration was more cooperative with the U.S. government it was not without fault and the way that de la Guardia came to power left him vulnerable to many rumored counter-coups and insurrections. These factors prevented the U.S. government officials from feeling completely at ease with the state of Panamanian politics. De la

Guardia was for all intents and purposes a willing ally of the United States, but that did 152 not translate into support from the Panamanian masses. The increase in the number of anti-American riots or crimes was, in part, a result of the wartime increase in the number of American service personnel in Panama. Finally, the Rio de Janeiro Foreign Minister's

Conference attempted to unite the Western Hemisphere in opposition to the Axis powers.

While it was not completely successful with its stated goals it definitely bolstered most of the multilateral agreements between the American Republics and provided a framework for defense. 153

Chapter 7 - Defense of the Canal, 1941 - 1945

The Panama Canal was integral to the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the

Allied war effort in general. In this light, it is easy to understand why the United States exhausted so much time and effort for the security of the Canal. The United States' entry into World War II opened the Canal to the dangers of war. In order to ensure the defense of the Canal the U.S. government required cooperation from the Republic of Panama and the de la Guardia administration. The U.S. military also had once again to improve upon the defenses of the Canal. Any and all Axis belligerents in the vicinity of the Canal needed to be tracked and, if possible, eliminated. Luckily for the United States, the Axis really only had about a two year window to strike at the Canal before the American war machine could crush any overt threat against the Canal. In 1943 the Allies could build ships faster than the Axis could sink them, allowing for the wholesale reinforcement of

Great Britain and staging of the European invasion force. After the success of Operation

Torch (North Africa November 1943) and the American bomber offensives the tides of war turned and the U.S. military felt secure enough in Panama that it began systematic force reductions in the Caribbean Defense Command.

With its entry into the war the United States redoubled its efforts to defend the

Panama Canal. The Republic of Panama was a willing partner of the U.S. military in defense of the Canal. One of the best examples of this was Panama's declaration of war against the Axis nations shortly after the United States declared war. The Panamanian government went through the process of officially announcing a declaration of war immediately after Pearl Harbor. The official declaration passed the legislative assembly on 10 December 1941. The declaration of war combined with Panamanian efforts to 154 control the citizenry and put the republic on a war footing displayed the extent to which the Panamanian government was prepared to go to cooperate with the United States.

Within ten days of Pearl Harbor, the government of Panama was firmly on a war footing. The employees of the government were all informed that due to the war they were on call twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week for any form of emergency service that needed to be performed. The government officially created a Committee for

Civilian Defense in order to aid in defensive preparations within the Republic on

December 17, 1941. This committee was in charge of projects such as constructing air raid shelters. Like other nations the Republic of Panama was also swift to react to price gouging and established price controls on selected items and commodities throughout the state. Another normal wartime precaution that the people of Panama began to experience after Pearl Harbor was nightly blackouts; blackouts were one method of ensuring that enemy bombers would have a much tougher time bombing with any accuracy.

Accompanying the blackouts were increased patrols by the National Police near any targets of opportunity; anyone judged to be acting suspiciously was required to produce identification. The last of the initial preparations by the Republic of Panama was a blood- typing registry which catalogued the volunteers to be called upon in case of an

232 emergency.

Even though the American military went to great lengths to improve the security of the Canal from air attack in the years preceding United States entry into the war, Canal air defenses were still insufficient after Pearl Harbor. The greatest concern for defense of the Canal was defense against a carrier-based air attack. A significant number of planes could be launched from a position hundreds of miles from the Canal and inflict a surprise 155 attack much like that at Pearl Harbor. This threat was enhanced because some thought it was possible the Japanese carrier group that attacked Pearl Harbor might have turned towards the Panama Canal and attempt an attack in short order. Estimates after the United

States entered the war still stated that an attack by a single carrier could theoretically put the Canal out of commission for a period of up to two years. Substantial damage to the

Canal would devastate the U.S. war effort, especially since the demise of a large portion of the Pacific fleet.

The best defense against a carrier-based attack was to prevent the carrier from launching the attack in the first place. One recommendation for the American Forces guarding the Canal was to extend and expand their outer patrols. The new plan called for the first ring of patrols to cover an area of ocean ranging from 600 to 1000 miles out from the Canal in an arc extending from the Central American coast to the coast in South

America. Planes that patrolled this route were to be based in Guatemala City, Salinas, and the Galapagos Islands. The patrols were to be supported by a standing force of long-range bombers, and flotillas of torpedo boats that could reach the invading carriers before they reached the launch point. One of the prime locations for these vessels was the Island of

Cocos. On the Atlantic side there was not as much need for an extensive long distance patrol as it was much harder to sneak an aircraft carrier into the virtually enclosed

Caribbean. These changes enhanced the existing long distance patrols and greatly increased the chance of intercepting an impending carrier raid. In general the solution to the gaps was increased equipment and bases.233

The inner patrol routes were also reinforced. The inner patrol reached an arc that covered the approaches to Panama out to 400 miles. These planes would not be able to 156 intercept a carrier before it launched an attack; however, they could provide warning of the attack and intercept instructions. In addition to the patrol planes the Americans set up an Airplane Warning Service (AWS) that would monitor approaches to the Canal. The

AWS consisted of early radar sets positioned around Panama for coverage of Panama

Bay. The early sets used by the American forces were fairly primitive and mostly ineffectual at distinguishing objects at any distance. Upon entering the war the U.S. military received assistance from Canadian and British radar experts. The experts repositioned the American sets to make them a little more efficient and also provided the

U.S. military with the most advanced radar the Allies possessed. The new Canadian sets greatly improved the capability of the AWS in Panama. A flotilla of fishing boats also patrolled the inner defenses at the entrances to Panama Bay, approximately 100 miles from the Pacific end of the Canal. All of these inner defenses supported the land-based defenses in the Canal Zone and the Republic of Panama. Defenses included: barrage balloons, smoke screen equipment surrounding locks and other strategic targets, torpedo nets, emergency gates meant to reinforce the Canal, coastal batteries, aircraft and of course numerous anti-aircraft guns. Many of these defenses were in some state of preparedness, but not all of them were completed and fully functional by March 1942.234

In April 1942, the military took at least token steps to act on these recommendations. Patrol planes flew the appropriate routes, although not quite as frequently as required. More planes arrived on a regular basis in order to improve the patrols. The radar sets continued to be tuned and tested so that they could spot anything abnormal along the approaches to the Canal. The fishing boat flotilla was at a quarter of 157 the strength recommended by the March report, but it was a start. While coverage of the

Pacific was still not complete it was much better than it had been a month earlier.

The outer defenses on the Caribbean side of the Canal consisted of two sectors; the Puerto Rico Sector and the Trinidad Sector. The Puerto Rico Sector included bases

Jamaica, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Antigua. The Trinidad Sector included: St.

Lucia, Trinidad, British Guiana, and Surinam. Both of these sectors were technically part of the Caribbean Defense Command headquartered at Panama and commanded by

General Frank Andrews. However, neither of the commands was responsible to General

Andrews. All the Caribbean bases had functioning airfields by March 1942, but only the base at Puerto Rico neared completion of its permanent installations. Robert P. Patterson,

Under Secretary of War, recommended to General Marshall and Secretary of War

Stimson that the bases could function efficiently with only their temporary structures completed as these were comparable to most bases located in the continental United

States. The use of the temporary structures would free up labourers and resources for other construction projects that the U.S. military desperately needed to complete. As noted above it was more difficult for a hostile aircraft carrier to enter the Caribbean than it was for a carrier to approach the Pacific side of the Canal undetected. Due to this the primary role of the Caribbean bases was anti-submarine operations and the protection of

Allied shipping within or approaching the Caribbean Sea. These forces played a much different role than trying to prevent carriers from launching clandestine attacks.236

Due to the submarine menace the Caribbean forces were almost exclusively tied to anti-submarine patrols. According to Rear Admiral J.H. Hoover, Commander of the

Puerto Rico Sector, his forces' focus on the submarine problem could possibly have 158 opened a window for a carrier attack. He worried that since his forces were equipped for anti-submarine warfare it was possible they would not be able to detect a carrier before it closed within range of launching on the Panama Canal. He noted that while the threat was remote, his focus on submarines could theoretically allow it to come to fruition. The addition of more long range bombers and surface radar could greatly enhance his ability to counter both threats no matter how remote the carrier threat.

One thing that played an important role in the drama that unfolded in the

Caribbean was the Vichy French force stationed at Martinique. The French naval vessels included two capital ships, a cruiser and a carrier, and their requisite attendants. U.S. officials worried that the forces might try to sortie and make a run for Axis naval coverage, a move that would give the Axis another aircraft carrier in the Atlantic.

Another aspect that the Americans needed to explore was whether or not the very same

French carrier could launch an attack against the Canal. It was already in the Caribbean and moored almost within range of the Canal. If the Vichy forces tried to make a dash for the Canal, American forces needed to be ready. There was a defense plan in place regarding these forces. The French forces were under constant surveillance and Admiral

Hoover had a flotilla of three destroyers and twenty-five bombers tasked with intercepting any French raid. Furthermore the Atlantic fleet knew of the situation and had sufficient vessels prepared to assist Hoover's forces if the need arose. While it was not a completely realistic scenario, the Americans did have to be wary of the French carrier.

In Panama, American forces continued to expand and upgrade their existence.

The Panama Canal Department increased its force levels significantly for the war. The garrison which was already strengthened to 21,500 troops in April 1940 was enlarged to 159

36,000 troops by April 1942. The air staff of the 6th Air Force (the new name for the 19th air wing that patrolled Panama) was increased to 15,000 troops. In 1940, the 19th air wing had a fleet of 71 aircraft, by April 1942 it numbered 59 bombers and 143 fighters plus a naval wing that included 24 PBYs. As for troop strength, the army expected another

15,000 troops while the Air Force expected a further 5,000. The rise in forces also included a rise in materiel. The defenses of Panama were definitely bolstered in the months following Pearl Harbor.239

In May 1942, the Roosevelt administration and the Panamanian government finally concluded the defense sites agreement. This was the conclusion of the negotiations that began while Arnulfo Arias had been in power; the agreement permitted the U.S. military to use up to 100 additional sites for radar and anti-aircraft artillery. It also included a clause that allowed American Forces to use Rio Hato airfield in an official capacity. On May 18, the two sides were finally in accord and the agreement was done. One of the largest sticking points between President de la Guardia's inauguration and May was the issue of which country had jurisdiction over the defense sites. The

Panamanians wanted to have control over the area unless an offense was committed by an

American citizen or against American equipment. The U.S. military on the other hand wanted complete jurisdiction over the sites in order to prevent anyone from even having a chance at sabotaging American materiel. U.S. officials suggested that the treaty acknowledge Panamanian sovereignty over the sites but that for the period of the occupation the United States held jurisdiction.240

The last sticking point before the deal was done was the question of when the

U.S. military would relinquish the bases. The agreement specified that American Forces 160 could occupy the sites for a period of one year after the termination of hostilities, unless both countries agreed that the world was still in a state of unrest or the security of the

Canal was at risk. In a perfect world the United States government would not have had a problem with that wording. However, after the agreement was signed Stimson informed

Hull that this wording was not altogether perfect. He stated that if the war ended in either total victory or total defeat the agreement was adequate. However, if the war ended in some form of negotiated settlement the U.S. military might be forced to relinquish some of its control and weaken its position vis a vis the Canal because Panama could claim that there was no imminent danger while strong enemy forces might still exist.241

Another long term project that came to a close in early 1942 was the third locks project. The third set of locks was under construction in order to provide passage to much larger ships, such as the 60,000 ton Montana class battleships that the Navy had on the books. However, in May 1942 the Navy deferred the project questioning the necessity for vessels of that tonnage and that the time and materials needed could be used better elsewhere. The third locks project suffered the same fate. Chairman of the War

Production Board, Donald Nelson, recommended that the time and materials needed to complete the third set of locks could be better used elsewhere and both Stimson and

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox agreed. The locks were large enough to transport the entire commissioned U.S fleet as of 1942, and their existence was tied to the Montana class battleship project. Without the Montana class battleships the third set of locks was merely an unnecessary use of time and resources. With other projects falling behind schedule the third locks project was deferred unofficially in May and officially in June 161

While the decision to defer the third locks project was an economic and resource based decision. It was also strategically viable. One of the arguments against the third set of locks was a direct contradiction to arguments for the locks. Originally, the new locks were being built to provide passage of larger vessels but also as a defense mechanism.

The American military anticipated that if an air raid was able to break through into

Panama and attack the Canal it was possible that that raid would make the Canal completely useless because the two sets of locks were side by side. The third lock project would solve this dilemma because the plans aimed to keep the new set of locks separated from the originals by a distance of a few hundred yards, far enough away that one bomb could not damage all three locks. Herein lay the problem; the locks and the Gatun Dam were the most vulnerable parts of the Canal; by adding more locks the Americans increased the targets of opportunity by 33 percent. Therefore a third set of locks would make it easier to render the Canal useless because attacking the new locks would destroy the water system needed to run the Canal just the same as attacking the original locks would. In the Canal's case the physical damage to the locks was not as worrisome as that damage emptying the reservoir. Since the Canal was not a sea level Canal, the reservoir

(Gatun Lake) was essential in order to keep the water levels constant and allow ships through the locks. Without a reservoir some parts of the Canal would be dry ground. The

Roosevelt administration tried to alleviate this problem by suggesting a sea level Canal in place of the third locks project. A sea-level Canal was researched and explored but never built due to resources and cost.

The Pan-American Highway was another long-term project that the U.S. State

Department had discussed prior to getting involved in the war. The goal of the highway 162 was to connect North and South America by a roadway capable of transporting vast quantities of military materiel as well as commercial and civilian travel. By 1942 the construction project was moving slowly at best and the War Department decided that the completion of the highway was not a military necessity and that construction of the full highway should be scrapped in favor of other more pressing issues, much in the same way the Third Locks Project was scrapped. Instead of a full scale highway, an all weather pioneer road could be completed within a year and fulfill the military's needs for the duration of hostilities. Although the U.S. State Department did promise to complete the

Highway as per treaty obligations and to foster 'continental solidarity' after the cessation of the conflict.244

While the U.S. government had the will and drive to complete the pioneer road version of the Pan-American Highway it was not always able to follow through exactly as planned. The completion of the road was dependent upon the United States receiving permission from the other countries through which the road travelled, these included:

Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico, Guatemala, and Panama.

Portions of the highway were completed long before World War II, but the road was not complete or passable in all-weather. As of September 1942 the Roosevelt administration only had final permission from Mexico and Guatemala. Before this point the War

Department tried to get approval from various countries to finish the road, but it was not forthcoming. In September, Stimson sent a letter to Hull asking that the State Department get involved in the diplomatic process. Stimson hoped that Hull could speed up the authorization and permit the road to be completed on time.245 163

One of the most worrisome threats against the Panama Canal was sabotage. U.S. officials were greatly concerned that some form of enemy infiltration or Fifth Column activity by Axis sympathizers was the most dangerous threat to the Canal other than an air raid. Due to the perceived danger of a saboteur there were many protective measures taken to thwart these attacks. Each different region and base in Panama and the Canal

Zone had its own anti-sabotage procedures and these differed dependent on the value and size of the post. The most basic of these protective measures were the foot and scooter patrols. The patrols regularly inspected vulnerable or strategically valuable areas of the posts from dusk till dawn. Any person caught by the patrols was arrested until he/she could prove they had a valid reason for being there. The next ring of the defense was generally the motor patrol. This patrol had responsibility to secure the roads outside of and approaching the bases. There were also guards stationed at all gates and entrances to the various posts.246 Bases also had specific Post Anti-Sabotage Officers whose job it was

947 to devise the anti-sabotage defenses of the base.

One specific method of sabotage that worried authorities in the Panama Canal

Zone was fire. Fire was considered dangerous whether it originated by accident, incendiary bombs, or sabotage. Due to the swiftness of the military build-up the majority of the Canal Zone's buildings were wooden. These structures were normally located fairly close together and the Canal Zone itself was significantly restrictive that fire crews may not get on scene before the fires got out of control. Fire prevention in the Canal Zone was necessarily a high priority for the Security Command. There were regular fire drills and exercises accompanied by excessive training for the firefighters. The Canal Zone also had extra water pumps and supply in addition to fire hydrants and water mains so that 164 there was a better chance of preventing a catastrophic fire. There was also extra training for post members regarding the recognition of fire hazards; the Panama Canal Zone definitely had a penchant for fire safety because it lessened the chance of a successful sabotage effort.248

The freshwater reservoirs throughout the Canal Zone were also sabotage-proofed.

Before the United States entered the war these reservoirs were guarded by an unarmed

Silver roll employee; Silver roll employees were at the bottom of the Canal Zone hierarchy and included West Indians and Panamanians. Throughout 1942 the reservoirs had their open tops covered to protect them from contamination. They were also surrounded by fencing and the guards were armed and trained in the use of their weapons.

The guard post at each of the reservoirs was also connected by telephone line the main guard post of the base so that they were not so isolated. The freshwater reservoirs were important for the Canal Zone since the Republic of Panama's water supply could not adequately supply the swelled wartime numbers that lived in the Canal Zone. Without freshwater the Canal Zone would grind to a halt.249

There were growing pains in the Panama Canal Department that the American military worked out over time. One of these glitches centered on the fact that the majority of air operations for defense of the Canal took place over water. The aircraft stationed in the Panama sector were not fully equipped for this form of sortie. In fact, there were a number of memos reminding the War Department that aircraft flying anti-submarine and other patrols off the coast of Panama needed to be equipped with both life rafts and radios. Granted the radios in question were portable radios needed for survival if the plane ditched in the sea, but they were still a necessity. It seems surreal that the War 165

Department had to be reminded that patrols looking for submarines or aircraft carriers took place over hundreds of miles of ocean. A B-17 and its entire crew were lost near the

Galapagos Archipelago in July 1942 and the Caribbean Defense Command placed the blame squarely on the lack of adequate radio sets. Certainly the U.S. military could have been more prepared for maritime patrols.250

In the fall of 1942, believing that a threat to the Canal from the Pacific side was imminent, U.S. authorities dispatched the 687th Air Warning Company to the Galapagos in order to protect against the threat. The 687th consisted of five radar sets and all of the manpower and equipment needed for sustained operations. The numerous radar sets would allow the 687th to detect threats and allow for interception before the attacks could pose any danger to the Canal.251

The Axis presence in the Caribbean was another mitigating factor in 1942. U- boats virtually decimated shipping in the Caribbean in 1942, and this led to the discussion of a pipeline project in Panama. Oil, then as now, was the resource that made modern warfare possible. It was needed to move supplies, transport troops, and conduct any form of offensive or defensive mechanized actions - land, sea, or air. The Allied nations worried that the Axis would be able to effectively close off any access to the Persian Gulf oilfields and then the Allies would be more dependent on oil from Venezuela. The problem with oil from Venezuela was that Axis submarines virtually controlled the

Caribbean in 1942; U-boats torpedoed oil tankers with alarming regularity. Presumably the use of a pipeline for oil to transit the isthmus would allow the Allies to use smaller faster tankers for the journey from the Caribbean refineries to the east coast of Panama.

The other issue with oil from Venezuela was that an attack on the Panama Canal could 166 make it virtually impossible for the west coast or forces in the Pacific to get enough oil.

The solution to this problem was a pipeline across the Isthmus of Panama. A pipeline would not only protect the oil supply against a blockage of the Canal but it would also make the transporting oil across the Isthmus far more efficient. The plan called for two, well-protected pipelines through Panama. Both of these were to be 36 miles in length and easily reparable should they be attacked. One of the pipelines was to be larger and exist almost exclusively to serve naval vessels.252

Smoke screens played a large role in defense of the Canal. Originally, antiquated smoke pots screened the Canal. These were basically oil drums filled with a combination of chemicals that produced a heavy white smoke when ignited. Smoke pots were not terribly efficient for screening something as large as the Panama Canal and all of its vital structures. Technology had improved enough by 1942 that the U.S. military had a plan to replace the smoke pots in Panama with new smoke generators. Generators could produce large and sustained volumes of smoke by burning oil. Even though generators created much larger clouds of smoke adequate protection of the Canal Zone still required 19,000 units. By June 1942, some 9,000 of these new type Ml generators had been installed in the Canal Zone, mostly around the Gatun and Miguel locks. However, the implementation of more smoke generators was put on hold because new technological advancements throughout the summer of 1942 produced a smoke generator that could produce as much smoke as 1,500 of the type Ml. Testing continued until November 1942 at the Madden Dam in Panama followed by a revised plan to protect the Canal.253

Military Action in and around the Canal Zone 1941-1945 Although the Panama Canal was not attacked during World War II there was a high level of military action in the vicinity of the Canal. Many of these actions while not directed at the Canal could have been precursors or feelers for a Canal attack and were almost as much of a threat as a direct attack. The majority of military actions that took place in the vicinity of the Canal were submarine attacks. They were by far the most serious threat to the United States and her Allies throughout 1942. The Allies lost hundreds of ships to submarines in the Caribbean region. Many of these were short haul tankers that transported oil within the Caribbean.

The Panama Sea Frontier was a very active region for submarine action. It seems that there was a submarine sighted almost weekly during 1942 - 1943. Military authorities also searched for other tell tale signs of enemy action in the region. An example of this would be a freighter or tanker style vessel that remained in the region for a suspicious amount of time without actually making it to port or offloading and loading any supplies. This was the case with the Spanish-flagged ZORROZA; it remained anchored in an area about eight miles from the Venezuelan coast approximately fifty miles from Curacao for over two weeks in February 1942. This would be a perfect position to meet submarines which had been raiding the short-haul tanker routes. It was certainly not a stretch that American Intelligence believed the vessel to be aiding Axis submarines especially considering the Franco government's international orientation during World War II.254

In a related incident the Spanish Charge d'Affaires in Panama had information regarding the increased Axis submarine menace. An MID informant discovered that Onos de Plandolit was told that the Germans had finally convinced the Vichy to turn over 168

French submarines for German use as early as April 12, 1942. The note also included a caption that stated the Nazis had informed the Spanish to keep all of their vessels out of the Atlantic because they were going to sink everything that moved. Clearly this warning showed that the Spanish were at the very least on good terms with the Germans and reinforced the notion that Spanish tankers and freighters were effective submarine tenders; the Allies could not sink them outright because of Spain's non-belligerent status.255

The submarine threat in the Panama Sea Frontier was very real. At one point in

July 1942, there were three submarines located in one week within sight of the

Panamanian coast. One of these submarines was detected by a listening apparatus and believed to be cruising on the seaward side of the Panama Canal's anti-submarine netting, very close to an oil storage site. When the navy searched the area with anti-submarine gear it could not locate the submarine. The same day another submarine was spotted near

Serrana Bank an atoll in the Caribbean off the Nicaraguan coast. The very next day a B-

18 bomber attacked a submarine just 100 miles from Cristobal at the Caribbean entrance to the Canal. It was a busy week in the Panamanian Sea Frontier; two more submarines were attacked within three days and on July 23, 1942 the crew of a patrol plane were certain they had finally sunk one. They reported spotting the submarine on the surface and dropping depth charges on target. About ten minutes later the plane spotted a significant oil slick that it considered the mark of a firm kill if not at least a debilitating hit. The next week, the week of July 25 to August 1, there were at least another six submarine sightings in the Panama Sea Frontier. The sightings were so diverse that the navy had to conclude they were all different submarines. They were spotted SSE of 169

Grand Cayman, NNW of Cristobal, NE of Colon, NE of Barranquilla, Colombia, among others. During the same month, a number of lookouts reported seeing flashing lights and flares where there were no Allied vessels reported. The region was apparently crawling with Axis submarines which definitely constituted a threat to the security of the Canal and the defense of the hemisphere.256

The beehive of activity prompted the War Department to take further action to protect the Panama Sea Frontier. General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, decided to reinforce the Caribbean Defense Command. He ordered the transfer of six ASV equipped

B-18A bombers to help combat the influx of submarines in the Panama Sea Frontier. He moved the planes from the Eastern Sea Frontier which protected the East Coast of the

United States in order to try and quell the imminent threat to the Canal. This move illustrated that the Panama Canal was an integral part of the American plan; it was important enough that they removed planes which patrolled the continental United States in order to protect the Canal.257

In November 1942 there were two more submarine sightings right along the coast of Central America. The first sighting took place off the coast of El Salvador near the

Gulf of Fonseca. A commercial pilot noticed the submarine about 10 miles from land but patrol planes could not find any trace of the submarine in the water. An investigation of the coast near where the submarine was sighted pointed to an area that looked like the submarine could have landed and discharged people or cargo. The next report from

November took place off Costa Rica. On November 12, 1942 a submarine surfaced and machine-gunned some Costa Ricans on shore. The incident took place near the mouth of the Parismina River, near Puerto Limon; the attack wounded one Costa Rican. The event 170 proved that the Western Hemisphere was not immune to attacks on her shores by foreign adversaries, even in a place as highly defended as the Panama Sea Frontier.

Over the next few months there were many reports of submarines in the Panama

Sea Frontier, not all of them credible. As is the case in times of stress, there were many instances of people seeing things that were not actually there. On a number of occasions reports from commercial vessels or even patrols and military watches were dismissed as not credible. This was not always because the people were not credible, but because they were looking too hard to see something. In one instance, a patrol noticed a light on a little uninhabited island 775 yards from shore. They shot the light with a machine gun to extinguish it and then believed they saw a submarine leaving the area. The Navy immediately patrolled the area with anti-submarine planes and could find no trace of a submarine. The submarine was so close to shore and the navy was on the scene so quickly that it was convinced of a false sighting. These type of 'sightings' happened often, especially when a commercial vessel had an overzealous lookout who's mind played tricks on him while he tried not to miss anything.

The Axis submarine presence in the Caribbean seemed to wane throughout 1943.

There were fewer and fewer sightings and sinkings attributed to submarines. However, that does not mean that they disappeared from the Caribbean altogether. In fact they also used a new tactic for the Panama Sea Frontier. Submarine mine layers began to lay mines in the approaches to the Cristobal entrance of the Canal in October 1943. While it was not exactly an all out effort and submarines had limited space for the storage and usage of mines, it was a credible threat to the Canal. Mines were used to attack vessels in what they believed was a safe route to the Canal. In the month of October 1943 alone, the U.S. 171

Navy discovered nine mines outside of Cristobal. While nine mines might not seem like a large number, they were still a significant threat to shipping.

In November and December 1943, submarine contacts in the Caribbean began to pick up again. During the week of November 20 - 27, there were four vessels torpedoed in the Panama Sea Frontier. The first vessel sunk was the Schooner Ruby, a small vessel from Colombia that sunk with four of its eleven member crew. On November 23, an

American oil tanker, the Elizabeth Kellogg, was damaged but not sunk by an enemy torpedo. The very next day the freighter Melville E. Stone was sunk off Cristobal.

Rounding out the week was a Panamanian freighter, the Pompoom, that was making a run from Cristobal to Barranquilla. On November 24, an Army Air Force bomber discovered a submarine running on the surface and was fairly certain it damaged or sunk it with depth charges. Therefore, the U.S. military got one possible kill for the four ships torpedoed in late November. Clearly the submarine menace had not quite run its course in the Caribbean.'''1

The upswing in submarine attacks and sightings continued into December. On five separate occasions between November 27 and December 4, American forces reported sighting and attacking submarines within 200 miles of the Cristobal Canal entrance. On one occasion a submarine was discovered within 50 miles of the entrance but the patrol planes and ships could not get a lock on it in order to engage. Soldiers on shore utilized radio triangulators to locate submarines but that did not always translate into a firm fix for patrols to attack the targets. The next week a Panamanian freighter was sunk and intelligence estimates decided that there were at least two U-boats operating in the Panama Sea Frontier at that time. At the end of December two more American vessels 172 were torpedoed and damaged off Cristobal. Both vessels, the Chapultepec and the Esso

Buffalo, were tankers en route to Cristobal with full loads. The November/December surge was almost the last hurrah for submarine action in the Caribbean. The United States lost only four262 vessels to torpedoes in 1944. While submarines did far more damage to ships in the Caribbean than to the Canal itself, they were a viable threat. The very fact that submarines were active close to the Canal was evidence of the threat they posed. The

American forces stationed in and around the Canal Zone clearly could not prevent submarines from sinking ships within the Caribbean. Therefore, the defenses surrounding the Canal must have been formidable enough to prevent these raiders from inflicting any damage on that vital installation.263

Force Reductions at the Caribbean Defense Command

The first year of the war for the United States was a very trying time. The destruction of the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor left the American military vulnerable but also fortified the American people into a war machine. While actions during the first twelve months of the war bordered on desperate and forced the United States to expend huge resources protecting the Panama Canal, slowly the Allies began to turn the tide in the conflict. Allied successes such as Operation Torch in North Africa beginning in

November 1942 began to pay off. The Allies stemmed the U-boat threat in the Caribbean and began to feel more at ease about the security of the Panama Canal. The American war machine also began to pump out large numbers of warships and other vessels to compensate for losses to the Japanese in Hawaii and elsewhere. Due to this combination of effort and success the Panama Canal lost some of its indispensability. 173

In the spring of 1943, the U.S. military began systematic force reductions in the

Caribbean Defense Command centered on Panama. It was decided that troops would be of more use elsewhere. The first reductions thinned out the Command HQ. There were too many redundant jobs within the Caribbean Defense Command and Headquarters was the first place to lose some of the excess manpower. The Inspector General who conducted the inquiry about where to reduce force levels suggested that many of the subordinate headquarters of the CDC could be reduced.

Throughout the entire Caribbean Defense area there is a multiplicity of headquarters and an overlapping of commands and staffs that could only be justified by the original strategic concept of the Caribbean Defense. Since the strategic situation has changed, a material reduction of troops and proposed installations has now been effected. However, the commands and staffs have remained practically intact. Some commanders stated frankly that certain subordinate headquarters were superfluous, and that they scarcely knew what to do with them. Many staff officers admitted freely that fifty per cent of their time was spent trying to find something to do, and when they did find work, it usually was not commensurate with the position they held. The number of civilian clerks seen sitting idle, reading magazines or otherwise engaged in unproductive occupations, was not actually tabulated, but a conservative estimate would amount to about one out of every four.264

He also suggested that all continental ground troops could be replaced by Puerto Ricans.

This allowed more English-speaking white troops to be moved to other theatres while keeping sufficient force levels of Latinos in Panama.265

By May 1943, the threat level for the Panama Canal Zone was reduced to a threat level of "B." This category dictated that there might by minor attacks in the region and that coastal defenses must be partially manned. This was a step down from category "C" which dictated full manning of defense sites because minor attacks were anticipated.266

The adjustment was a result of the changed strategic situation of the war. The 174

Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet used the new threat level to reduce naval forces in

Panama, namely the submarine force. In May 1943, the American military felt that the

Panama Canal was secure from submarine attack and withdrew the five 'S' class submarines stationed in the Canal Zone for use in other theatres. The Panama Canal, the military believed, no longer faced an imminent attack.267

Further reductions in force began to hit home by August of 1943. By that time the reductions in force levels were so extreme in the Caribbean Defense Command that the

Inspector General investigated the personnel of the Command. The investigation centered on the replacement policies of the military for the CDC. By August 1943, troops from the

CDC were continually reassigned to the United States where they could be put to better use. However, while the imminent threat to Panama had waned, the CDC still required adequate forces to defend the Canal even against a reduced threat. The replacement forces assigned to the CDC had very little, if any experience. This put the CDC in a precarious position; it was being asked to defend the Panama Canal with less and less troops, and the troops it did have were less and less experienced. Force levels in the CDC were reduced by 28% for the Army and 32% for the Army Air Force for the year ending in August 1943. After these reductions only 17% of the forces in the CDC had served for more than two years, the definition of long service. The main problem in the CDC was not that the replacements were inexperienced, but that very few of them were trained for any specialty positions. The Inspector General determined that replacement troops from

Puerto Rico would adequately replace basic troops in Panama, but that the U.S. military needed to continue to send specialty troops and experienced officers in order to defend the Panama Canal.268 175

Force reductions in the CDC began to move faster after the Inspector General's

August 1943 report. After August, Puerto Rican troops began entering the CDC at a fairly strong 1,500 a month. However, the continental troops left the CDC at an average of

5,000 a month between June and December 1943. Between June 1943 and December

1943 the total number of troops available to the CDC decreased from 111,000 to 90,000.

This reduced the forces in Panama by 30,000 continental troops and replaced those with

9,000 Puerto Ricans. This is another example of the decrease of threats to the Panama

Canal after the spring of 1943.269

While the troop strength and the importance of Panama continued to wane throughout 1943, the American military apparatus refused to completely give in. The

Republic of Panama had been requesting permission from America authorities to build by

December 1943, an international air field within Panama and near the Canal. However, the U.S. government had always blocked such a move claiming that it would lessen the security of the Canal; some of this rhetoric came from issues surrounding German owned-airlines servicing various South American Republics. The United States required that all international commercial and military flights made use of Canal Zone airfields that it controlled. This was an effort to track and be prepared for all flights coming into, leaving, or crossing over the Isthmus. It also allowed the American authorities of the

Canal Zone to permit only those flights they believed possessed no danger to the Canal to enter Panamanian airspace. However, at the end of 1943 when it was obvious to all that the Panama Canal was less likely to be attacked, the military still refused to reverse its policies regarding air traffic in and out of Panama. The War Department still felt that it was a strategic liability to allow international flights free reign in the Republic of 176

Panama. In December 1943, Pan American Airways was in negotiations with the

Republic of Panama for construction of an airport and flight operations to and from the

Republic. The War Department simply referred Panama back to the previous comments that it had made on August 5, 1941 which stated that the State Department felt it was a security risk and there was little room for discussion on the issue. This episode shows that even though the U.S. military had withdrawn troops and changed the threat level, the

Panama Canal was still an integral part of the American war effort that needed to be secure in order to ensure hemispheric defense.270

Throughout the course of the war there were at least two attacks planned against the Panama Canal. One plan by the Germans included a precision strike against the Gatun

Spillway in the fall of 1943. The mission, dubbed Operation Pelican, called for a Stuka dive-bomber strike against the Gatun Dam. Erich Gimpel, a member of the Abwehr, was in charge of the operation. He discovered, through a German engineer who worked on the

Canal, that the spillway for the Gatun Dam was susceptible to aerial bombardment. Built in 1907, there was little thought of an airplane dropping a bomb on the spillway. It was hardened from the sides in order to protect it from artillery, but not hardened against a direct overhead attack. The benefit to the Germans was that theoretically one bomb could destroy the spillway causing the dam to collapse, rendering the Canal useless for a period of about two years. The operation was set for fall 1943 and the actual plan was fairly simple, the two Stukas were disassembled and stowed aboard two u-boats for the trip from France to the Caribbean. After arriving in the Caribbean the planes were to be unloaded and reassembled on a remote beach within striking distance of the Canal. After the strike the pilots were to land or bail out over a South American country not at war 177 with Germany and interned for the duration of the war. The planned operation that probably did not have a high chance of success, fell apart because the Allies learned

971 about the idea and the u-boats never left France.

The Japanese planned an attack in 1943 during the time they fought the battles of

Guadalcanal and the Solomons. The plan called for a bomber raider launched from a new class of carrier-submarine, 1-400, then under development and construction in Japan.

Submarine carriers had to be utilized due to the extensive outlying defense system that the U.S. military employed for the Canal. The whole region was patrolled and under radar coverage for a thousand miles either side of the Canal. The first of the 1-400 series submarines rolled out of drydock on December 30, 1944, and the crew immediately began training. As in the German case, there were Japanese engineers who had worked on the construction of the Canal and knew many of the specifications and defensive structures. There were also the numerous reports from the Japanese fishermen and barber spies who were on the isthmus prior to the war.

The plan called for an attack launched by four submarines. Two of the submarines were the 1-400 class carriers and each carried three bombers, the other two were smaller modified vessels that could carry only two planes. The submarines were to surface off the

Colombian Pacific coast and outside of American radar coverage to launch their planes, after taking the two month voyage from Japan to reach that point. The target of the attack was the Gatun Lock gates which the Japanese believed would put the Canal out of commission for a period of six months. The plan called for both torpedo and bomb strikes against the locks. In order to get to the target the planes needed to launch from the Pacific coast of Colombia and fly east over the jungles of Colombia and Panama before making a 178 u-turn over the Caribbean in order to attack the locks from the east. It was believed that this route granted the greatest chance of success. The pilots hopefully would continue across the isthmus and then ditch their aircraft near the submarines and await pick up.

The final plans for the attack called for a kamikaze bomb run to achieve success. The teams practiced their attack runs on a wooden mock-up of the Gatun Gates that floated in the bay at Nanao Wan in June 1945. After a training accident destroyed two of the ten bombers needed for the raid, the usefulness of the project began to be questioned; especially after the United States conquered Okinawa and the carrier groups were organizing for the final assault on Honshu. The Japanese Naval Staff decided to abandon the attack on the Panama Canal in late June because it had simply run out of time; the

American carrier task force was a far more important target at that stage of the war.272

Clearly the U.S. military performed its due diligence in the preparations for the defense of the Panama Canal. Among other things it utilized a 1000 mile perimeter, built up extensive air defense sites, employed a smokescreen to obscure the Canal, and deployed tens of thousands of troops to the area. While the defensive positions may not have been perfect, as witnessed by the two planned attacks that in theory stood a chance of success, and numerous exercises, the theory was never tested. The American defense initiatives definitely played a large role in the failure of Axis nations to act on their planned attacks; simply put the risks outweighed the chance for success.

Following Pearl Harbor until about mid-year 1943, threats to the Panama Canal caused considerable anxiety among the defense forces. This chapter has illustrated the existence of numerous military engagements near the Canal. The U.S. military was constantly on the watch for Axis submarines in the Caribbean for a two year period. 179

Submarines seemed to enter the CDC territory at will and destroy Allied shipping with almost reckless abandon. The Axis utilized them for espionage and intelligence gathering as well as disembarking saboteurs or other agents along the Central American coast.

While submarines were not the best platform for attacking the Canal, without a doubt they were effective to soften up American defenses surrounding the Canal. Furthermore, they were ideal raiders that routinely disrupted the day to day operations of the Canal by their simple existence. The United States also utilized unprecedented cooperation from

Panama; the de la Guardia Administration performed due diligence in aiding the defense of the Canal. 180

Chapter 8 - Foreign Subversive Elements, 1941-1945

In his recent book, Nazis and Good Neighbors, Max Paul Friedman posits that there was no true Fifth Column threat to the United States in Latin America; he argues that the majority of the U.S. government's moves to combat German subversives in Latin

America were in fact aimed at weakening German owned businesses so that the United

States could be the sole economic provider in Latin America, thus solidifying its hegemonic position. To be sure, some of the U.S. government's policies aimed at solidifying U.S. economic superiority over Latin America; yet, to say that the U.S. government was concerned only about economics in World War II seems suspect. This chapter illustrates contrary to Friedman's views that there were numerous threats to the security of the Canal by foreign subversive groups, including Germans. There is some danger in relying heavily on U.S. intelligence sources. In the past they have proved to be less-than accurate in some of their assessments. Intelligence reports were corroborated to the best of the author's ability before being utilized in this dissertation.

Before the United States entered World War II, it collaborated with Panamanian authorities to arrest suspicious members of foreign nations in the event of war. If the imminent war included the Japanese, the Panamanian authorities agreed to detain all

Japanese citizens in Panama. By contrast, the Panamanian authorities agreed only to detain suspicious Germans and Italians. However, when war eventually came to the

United States, to the satisfaction of U.S. officials Panamanian authorities were amenable to arresting and interrogating any Axis national. After the interrogations some of the foreign nationals were kept for internment.273

Germany 181

The first targets in the Panamanian/American sweep of foreign nationals were

Axis diplomats. Axis diplomats probably should have been sent back to their respective

countries after the commencement of hostilities in December 1941 but the U.S. State

Department wished them interned. The first batch consisted of 41 Axis diplomats; twenty

Germans, thirteen Italians, and eight Japanese. The detainees came from all manner of jobs from the legations; there were clerks, maids, attaches, secretaries, and cooks as well

as the Japanese and Italian Ministers and the Charge d'Affaires from the German

Legation. Probably the most sought after Axis national in Panama was Erik O. Cerjack,

listed as an attache for the German Legation, he was widely recognized as the leader of

the Nazi espionage establishment in Panama. On January 12, 1942, American authorities

transported these prisoners to the United States.274

Almost immediately after the internships the Spanish legation and the Falange in

Panama began assisting the Axis cause, primarily its German wing. The first cases of this

involved the purchase of gifts for the German internees. The Falange collected items

ranging from cigarettes to tennis balls and flash lights for distribution in the internship

camp in Balboa, Panama. (Some internees were kept in Panama and some sent to the

United States at this stage of the war.) The Falange also collected books from the library

at the German Legation so the internees had reading material. The Spanish Legation also

became the official Protector of German affairs in Panama; this is customary when two

countries sever diplomatic relations. One of the first actions of the Spanish Legation

regarding German affairs was an investigation into the treatment of the detainees. The

Spanish Legation tried to determine whether or not all the internees received the proper

amount of care as stated in various international decrees. The committee assigned to the 182 case tried discover enough damning evidence so it could publish a German White Book about American atrocities. The Spanish investigated numerous reports in an effort to understand the treatment that the Germans received. Examples included information about the killing of Walter Klause's chickens after his arrest and investigators looked into the deaths of two internees. Sigmund Betelheim and Carl Friese died while in American custody, and members of the Spanish Legation tried to prove it was as a result of poor treatment at the hands of the Americans. All in all, the investigation tried to influence world opinion against the United States.275

Even after the purges of known German citizens, there were still considerable

German influences in Panama. In February 1942, an employee of the Office of

Engineering Division of the Panama Canal, a Mr. F. W. S. Hutton wrote a letter to Walter

Lippman. Hutton claimed that there were a number of pro-German employees who worked for the Panama Canal Company. The examples he provided were German-born

American citizens, one of whom was Jewish. The Civil Intelligence Section of the

Panama Canal claimed that even before the accusations levelled by Hutton it had these men under surveillance. Hutton wrote to Lippman that it was scary that the only test of loyalty a person had to pass to be employed in the Canal Zone was whether or not he/she was an American citizen. He said that there were many "Quislings" in the employ of the

Panama Canal Company from many of the Axis nations. Hutton reasoned that some of these employees could be just as valuable to the American war effort if they had jobs in

Indianapolis or some other portion of the country that was less strategically important than the Panama Canal Zone. Lippman forwarded the letter to a friend in the War

Department and the matter was investigated. In the end, officials reassigned one of the 183

German-Americans for reasons of security. However, the Civil Intelligence Section also made a point of stating that neither of the men that Hutton accused had worked on any sensitive areas of the Canal and that potential for damage was slight. Although that might have been true in this case, it was a very real danger to have an Axis-sympathizing

American employee working on the Canal and it was one that the Civil Intelligence

Section of the Panama Canal took seriously.276

Many suspicious Germans lived throughout Panama and continued to try to buy land for private use. Some of these were German-born Panamanians trying to live normal lives while others, such as Alfred Wilhelm Zegler alias Berchthold, were Axis- sympathizers trying to live clandestinely. In April 1942, Panamanian authorities arrested a number of Germans in Panama's Chiriqui province. During the arrests, two of the suspected Germans escaped custody; George Ell flew to Ecuador and Alfred Zegler told the police he was Swiss and abruptly disappeared. Zegler was the key member of this group. He originally held a German passport that listed Berchthold as his surname. Zegler bought a farm in Panama under the name Berchthold but then had the banker change the name to Zegler claiming that he had been adopted by some Swiss relatives. During the purchase process, he instructed his lawyers to keep this situation very low-key and not to notify anyone of the changes of names and nationalities. The whole episode was sufficiently bizarre that Emile Schwendener kept the correspondence and forwarded it to

Washington upon hearing of the arrests and escapes. Clearly it was not a crime for a

German emigre in Panama to own land, but the circumstances surrounding the

Berchthold/Zegler purchase were suspicious to say the least, especially considering he fled police custody.277 184

However, it must be noted that some of the suspected German agents in Panama were persons innocent of any and all charges. It seems that J. Edgar Hoover made frequent reports about suspected agents that contained little evidence or confirmation. For example, in a three month period in 1942, Hoover reported to Col. Donovan about seven

German agents in Panama. Two of them contained "facts" that displayed questionable characteristics about the named persons, the aforementioned Alfred Berchthold/Zegler and Ed Kliemann. Kliemann was a German-American suspected of being a spy because of frequent trips between Panama and the United States. He was a radio distributor for

Howard Radio Company and his frequent travel placed him on the FBI's radar. One trip was particularly suspicious. He traveled to Costa Rica before the American entry into the war and suggested that Howard Radio do business with the National Import Company of

Costa Rica. The National Import Company was subsequently placed on the Proclaimed

List by the U.S. State Department. While this was far from proof of wrong doing it was a much better explanation than what Donovan received about Herr Lage-Schulte, Otto

Schrunk-Wohlfahrt, or Fritz Ursprung; the entire text of their accusations included their names and totally unsubstantiated comments that they were suspected of being German agents. Some care is necessary while sifting through the numerous U.S. intelligence reports of German espionage agents in Panama.278

By May 1942, authorities within the United States and Panama decided that they had detained or investigated the majority of known Germans living in and around

Panama. Of these, most of the internees had already been transferred out of Panama and the Canal Zone to the United States. In January 1942, de la Guardia and the Panamanian

Cabinet decided that enemy aliens detained in Panama should be interned in the United 185

States because Panama lacked the proper infrastructure.279 Some remained in Balboa and this posed another threat for the Americans. The intern camp was close enough to the

Canal that the Germans could report on American and Allied ship movements, whether they were cargo or military vessels. The American intelligence officials realized that the

Germans could report on shipping through the recruit of intermediaries, such as garbage collectors, who could pass the information outside of the Canal Zone. Accordingly, the authorities tried to finalize the transfer of these internees to the United States, but had to wait for their preliminary Panamanian naturalization papers to expire prior to the transfer.280

Ambassador Wilson reported that a number of suspected German espionage agents tried to gain footholds in the jungle and outlying regions of Panama where there was far less chance of being caught. He stated that there were numerous reports of dynamite caches and the development of trails through the basically impenetrable jungle from Colombia. He was also under the impression that there were air and seaplane bases developed in the lightly patrolled interior as well as routine movement by boats along infrequently used portions of the coast. Most of these reports lacked any substantiated evidence, but Wilson attributed most of that to the intelligence agencies' almost exclusive focus on the Canal Zone. This was an oversight on the part of Military intelligence as jungle could be used as a clandestine staging ground. Furthermore, American authorities did discover a German radio transmitter under construction in the interior. Surely they could not have been nai've enough to believe that it was the only illicit activity taking place in the region. 186

During the week of September 12-19, 1942, two very curious intelligence reports reached the MID in the Caribbean Defense Command. The first dealt with three

German saboteurs who reportedly landed in Costa Rica. Puerto Limon was approximately

50km from the Costa Rica Panama border and a good place to enter the Republic unseen since it was far from the most widely used route further south.

Piwio Utmn

The three men were apparently sheltered and hid by the Bishop of Puerto Limon, a German. Locals reported the landing and the events coincided with other information the American Intelligence apparatus had already received about the possibility a German submarine may try to land saboteurs to attack the Canal. The American Military attache investigated the reports and found that the locals could identify the three men by photographs. Locals identified the saboteurs as Kappe, Barth, and Schmidt, Germans whom the Americans were already trying to locate. Some Costa Ricans informed the Americans that one of the Germans disguised himself as a priest and had been traveling around the area. After the U.S. military confirmed that Germans had in fact landed in Puerto Limon it sent a detachment from Cristobal to try and apprehend the saboteurs. The military detachment searched the 187 jungle and coastline around Puerto Limon for three weeks but could not find the would- be saboteurs.282

Another report from September 17 was even more suspicious. An islander was sent to collect some bananas for the AWS station at el Tigre Island just on the edge of the

Bay of Panama. He reported that he saw four unidentified planes and approximately twenty armed white men, who were not speaking English. Upon reporting the sighting the islander was sent back to confirm his finding and possibly gather more details of the men or machines. He did not return to the AWS station. The situation prompted the sortie of planes from France Field Panama. The American planes found no trace of planes or people on el Tigre. The only firm information they had was that the planes were not

American nor were they scheduled to be there, and the islander disappeared without a trace.283

More foreigners landed in Panama on December 29, 1942. The two men were stopped by a local at Puerto Guarare. They came ashore in a small launch that flew a red flag. They asked the local if they were near Iguana Island, site of a U.S. post, and how well the U.S. military guarded the coast. The men were not found but the Panamanian reported that they went back to their boat after speaking with him.284

Other reports identified more German saboteurs, this time originating from

Argentina. American authorities were on the lookout for two Germans, Westheimer and

Erhlert, from the beginning of November until the end of December 1942. The FBI identified Westheimer and Erhlert and noted they planned to sabotage the third locks project. Once again, these would-be saboteurs never materialized within the Canal Zone.

This might have more to do with the Third Locks project being cancelled than with a lack 188 of effort on the part of the saboteurs; why destroy something that was already defunct.

American intelligence agencies may not have found all of the people purportedly entering the Republic of Panama but they did have their hands full throughout 1942 and 1943.

They investigated numerous leads about espionage and any and all sabotage leads.285

While searching for the German saboteurs infiltrating from Argentina, the U.S. military also had to deal with a number of other suspicious incidents. A freighter lost all power while in the Canal and the military investigated the incident to see if it could be attributed to sabotage. Another vessel, a U.S. Army Transport, caught fire while at dock in Cristobal in preparation to join a convoy. In the first case, U.S. investigators decided that natural causes disabled the freighter, while the investigation into the fire was inconclusive. Meanwhile a B-17 stationed at Rio Hato, Panama had its brakes sabotaged, although the investigation could not locate the culprit. Intelligence agents also investigated numerous reports of radio transmitters during November and December. One of these belonged to Adolfo Ricor, a Nicaraguan shoemaker living in Panama. The investigation led the agents to a large store of radio equipment and a large transmitter that seemed highly suspicious. Authorities also investigated a house of ill-repute during

November. The investigation proved that it was definitely a brothel and, more importantly, that four Germans lived in the basement. The house was subsequently placed off-limits for military personnel who might inadvertently let out secrets. Undoubtedly, the Republic of Panama was a busy place for American Intelligence units.

January 1943 revealed more strange events in Panama. Throughout the month

American intelligence agents heard rumors and reports of foreigners interrogating U.S. military personnel near Obaldia. There were also reports of unidentified planes landing in 189 the Obaldia region at the same time. U.S. officials tried to verify any of these rumors in order to discover what happened in Obaldia. The same week an informant observed four

Germans taking the train to Puerto Armuelles. They spoke German and told the informant that they planned to look for work in the area. This raised warning flags among intelligence officials because there was absolutely no work in the area and the Germans claimed they were ex-employees of the Chiriqui Land Company and should have known better.287

At the end of March 1943, persons unknown stole 15 cases of dynamite and an assortment of blasting caps from a construction company in El Vocan, Chiriqui Province.

The U.S. military and the Panamanian National Police immediately investigated the breech of security. The 750 pounds of dynamite could have certainly damaged American interests in the Canal Zone. During the investigation authorities learned that three additional cases had been stolen some months before and never reported. Obviously, the

Americans wanted to find the dynamite since there was significant risk if it saboteurs stole it. In the end authorities discovered that natives in the David area bought the dynamite to use while fishing. While this event was obviously not a threat to the security of the Canal, it was worrisome in that it demonstrated the ease a potential saboteur could acquire explosives.288

Panamanian authorities caught and arrested a German spy in April 1943. Bruno

Grossman was not simply a member of the diplomatic corps; he was a self-confessed

German secret agent. Grossman traveled and lived under his own name and three aliases:

Johnny Vels, Johnny Wells, and Bruno Gross. During his time in Panama, he tried to organize resistance to the American military on the part of Panamanians. He ran a smear 190 campaign aimed at ruining the prestige of the American soldiers. The Panamanian

National Police arrested Grossman but soon released him on the condition that he must report daily to one of its stations. Grossman claimed he had not been in the employ of the

Germans since 1941 and had worked as a barber since then. It seems the Germans, like the Japanese, found the barber to be a fitting profession for a spy.

By the end of 1943, the reports about Nazi spies and saboteurs in Panama diminished in number and eventually disappeared. At this time the Allies had won the

Battle of the Atlantic, the Battle of Midway, and Operation Torch in North Africa was a success. The last mention of Nazi spies was an MID record of an interview between Lt.

Col. Jules Dubois and the Spanish Charge d'Affaires, Manuel Onos de Plandolit.

Plandolit noted that he had nothing to do with Axis spies in Panama; a point that Dubois clearly did not believe. Plandolit told Dubois that when the Spanish Legation assumed responsibility as Protector of German, Italian, and Japanese interests in Panama, it had nothing to do with espionage. Plandolit inquired about each nation's spy networks and they told him they employed mostly locals in order to arouse less suspicion. In order to drive home his point he informed Dubois that while he was the Charge in Colombia he was personally acquainted with the head of the Nazi spy organization, but that was not the case in Panama as he had no idea who to contact. During the conversation Plandolit tried to convince Dubois that Spain was America's friend and that it helped Hitler only in order to save Gibraltar from invasion. If nothing else his attempts to placate the American intelligence officer were comical.290

Falange 191

The Spanish Falange played a very important role in Panama, and other places in

Latin America, after the United States and Panama entered the war. As noted earlier, the

Spanish Legation became Protector of German, Italian, and Japanese interests in Panama.

American authorities knew that the Falange operated out of the Spanish Legation and that the Charge d'Affaires was an ardent Falangist. Therefore it does not take much of a stretch to implicate the rumored-to-be extinct Falange in day to day dealings in Panama.

The Spanish Legation did its best to prove that American and Panamanian authorities mistreated Axis nationals placed in internship camps. This information was the key for

Axis propaganda used to denounce the United States. The Falange, and by extension the

Spanish Legation, were openly partisan towards the Axis in Panama.

Manuel Onos de Plandolit became the Charge d'Affaires of the Spanish Legation in Panama on December 30, 1941. He replaced the recalled Carlos Arcos because the

Spanish government thought that he would be a less offensive Falangist. Prior to his duty in Panama, Plandolit had been the Secretary of the Spanish Legation in Colombia and also the head of Falangist espionage. In Panama he continued that same course under the banner of Charge. Plandolit's spent his first few months in Panama asserting his power and reaffirming his position to various people in the Republic. He met with the Vichy

French Charge d'Affaires Pierre de la Blanchetai, the Argenine Minister Ludovico

Loizaga, and a former Italian attache Emmanuele Conzani, all of whom were pro-Axis.

Plandolit was the force behind the collection of goods for interned Axis diplomats, and he even bragged about the allegiance of the Colombian army officers and Catholic priests.

By March 1942, Plandolit was thought to be thoroughly in control of all Spanish and

Axis interests in Panama. He was apparently the man with all of the power in the 192

Republic and punctuated this by stating that the Panama America would not print anything negative about Spain unless it was approved by him personally. This statement insinuated that Plandolit even had Panamanian political powerhouse Harmodio Arias in his pocket since Arias owned the Panama America. Plandolit had done all in his power to insulate Panama from negative propaganda about the Axis or Spain.

Plandolit moved to Panama to reorganize and repair the Falange in the Republic.

His predecessor, though an ardent Falangist, did more harm than good. It was partially due to Carlos Arcos that intelligence agencies placed extra attention on the Falange in

Panama. Madrid instructed Plandolit to ensure that the Falangists in Panama kept a low profile. It was his job to organize the clandestine Falange in Panama. Plandolit was an important member of the Falange in general and not just the Falange Exterior, he performed numerous important tasks. He had good relationships with many officials in

Panama, both Panamanian and American, and could apparently impress upon anyone that he was sincere no matter what he discussed. These were perfect credentials for the head of an espionage ring.292

American authorities detained and interviewed a Panamanian Falangist in May

1942. When the S.S. Cabo de Homos docked in Trinidad, U.S. authorities arrested Dr.

Antonio Alberola. After initially denying that he was a Falange member he admitted that he was on a mission to Madrid for Plandolit. Plandolit tasked Alberola with informing the

Spanish Foreign Office, via a verbal (and hence untraceable) report, about the circumstances relating to the deportation of the Carlos Arcos. U.S. authorities also suspected him of peddling currency for the Falange but could not find any evidence to support that charge.293 As for Arcos, after being declared persona non grata in Panama he left the isthmus for Cuba. He stayed in Cuba for some seven months after his deportation from

Panama. In Cuba, Arcos lived at the home of Alvaro Gonzalez Gordon a very wealthy

Spaniard. Gordon was another Axis-sympathizer and fervent supporter of the Falange.

The ONI cross-referenced his name with a list of notable Falange contributors it had received from another source in order to confirm this fact, since Gordon gave considerable money to the Falange. By July of 1942, Arcos had apparently overstayed his welcome in Cuba, his Visa had expired and the Cuban authorities grew wary of his continued presence in Havana. They arrested Arcos in July 1942, after the American attache reminded the Cubans that he was in the country. Cuban authorities photographed much of his personal correspondence when they searched his apartment, but could not locate his most confidential papers. These letters and memoranda included messages from the Japanese Minister in Madrid claiming that he was a victim of American politics in Panama. All in all, the Japanese were upset that authorities forced Arcos from the isthmus since he was a vital tool for the Axis. Arcos left Cuba aboard the Marques de

Camillas on July 27 by the order of the Cuban Government. An informant told the ONI that Arcos had hidden all of his confidential papers, which presumably included more evidence against him, in tobacco bundles onboard the same vessel. Unfortunately,

American authorities could not locate the specific bundles before the ship left port as the hold contained some 4,000 bales of tobacco.294

In September 1942, Manuel Onos de Plandolit received a suspicious package through the diplomatic pouch. The Spanish Legation and Falange members in Panama had been claiming for years that the Falange had dissolved on the isthmus and was no longer a threat to anyone nor could it be organized for Fifth Column activities. This package proved otherwise. The diplomatic pouch contained copies of a new Falange propaganda bulletin. Intelligence officials were aware that Plandolit was the head of the

Falange in Panama and that regardless what the Spaniards wanted the public and authorities to believe the Falange was still active in the country. Plandolit lent examples of the bulletin to an MID informant who examined the contents and made copies. The bulletins themselves contained standard propaganda articles relating to Hispanidad, the history of Spanish conquest in the Americas, and articles denouncing Communists,

Spanish republicans and the like.295

The most interesting part of the package from an American perspective was the inclusion of two letters; one from Franco and one from the Chief of the Press and

Propaganda Services of the Falange. The letter from Franco spouted the virtues of the

Falange and fascism - "one command, one discipline and one obedience." It also included passages that encouraged the readers to put petty differences aside in order to unite for the benefit of Spain and the Falange. The other letter was for Plandolit's eyes only and the informant found it tucked into the flap of the book. It spelled out the mission of the Falange in Panama.

From these bulletins, as well as from all others which may be sent to you, it would be most useful for the purposes of your own Mission, as well as for the notes and communiques sent to the Press and Radio, to use, in the whole or in instalments, all their contents, since one must realize that they portray the most lively and vigorous picture of Spain and the Falange. For better understanding in our common task, I would like very much to have your valued opinion on this, as well as a list of what articles would be of most interest to those in your country, so that future numbers may deal with each and all of these. With this motive and awaiting your reply, with arms lifted on high in salute,...296 195

Clearly the Falange continued to exist and promote itself in Panama long after it was outlawed and considered dissolved. The removal of Carlos Arcos did little to stop the

Falange in Panama; the movement simply adopted a new, more composed leader.

In November 1942, the Panamanian Government severed diplomatic relations with Vichy France. The Spanish Government instructed Plandolit to add the Vichy

French into his growing portfolio of Axis nations. Accordingly, Plandolit requested permission from the Panamanian Government to act on behalf of Vichy interests in the

Republic. Foreign Minister Octavio Fabrega denied his request because the government of Panama felt that he could not act for a government that no longer existed. In light of this Charles le Genissel, former Vichy Charge d'Affaires, gave Plandolit an undisclosed amount of funds and some confidential Vichy documents to keep in the Spanish Legation before he left Panama for Chile. Le Genissel believed that he could keep the French effects out of the Allied hands by leaving them with Plandolit.

Another Panamanian organization which tended to support the Falange and fascism was the Roman Catholic Church. Many of the Catholic priests in Panama had emigrated from Spain and continued to preach the message of their home country while abroad. A report from the week of November 21-28, 1942, painted a Catholic priest in a poor light. In Panama, authorities arrested a priest (no name) under the "Trading with the

Enemy Act" as he tried to enter the Canal Zone. The charge, which may have been a little harsh, stemmed from the fact that the priest tried to smuggle sealed envelopes containing letters and sermons into the Canal Zone. After his arrest, Plandolit personally guaranteed his bail and ensured that the priest would be released from prison pending his trial. While it is not conclusive that the priest was a Falangist, the circumstantial evidence certainly pointed in that direction. This was especially true once other shortcomings of the Church were disclosed after the war.299

The Falange in Panama also tried to spread propaganda through schools. Gervasio

Garcia, a Spaniard living in Panama City was pro-Spanish and believed that the

Panamanian and American media were overly biased. He authored articles to counteract

Allied propaganda, but more importantly Garcia sponsored a Spanish school in the interior of Panama. He ordered all the books and content for the school from Spain. The object of the school was to teach Hispanidad and the glory of Spain. During a field trip from the school, the principal and two of best students were guests of the top two

Falangists in Panama, Manuel Onos de Plandolit and Jose Luis Rubio y Bocanegra. Both were members of the Spanish Legation and had a vested interest in all things Spanish in

Panama. Both could have also had much more nefarious reasons for associating with the school. They could have been trying to grow Hispanidad from a grass-roots level within

Panama.300

American intelligence services caught a break in early 1943. A member of the

Civil Intelligence Service, who by the warnings placed on the report, seems to have been undercover in the Spanish Legation, managed to acquire some secret, coded messages from the Spanish Charge d'Affaires to the Spanish Foreign Ministry. The messages lent credence to many of the American suspicions regarding the Spanish Legation, such as that Plandolit was an active Falangist. The documents ranged in dates from December

1941 to early 1943. Carlos Arcos sent the first message dated December 3, 1941, it advised the Spanish Foreign Ministry that war between the United States and Japan was 197 imminent. The second message a day later stated that Arcos had destroyed many documents in the Legation because he was afraid of the sanctions the U.S. State

Department would place on Spanish diplomats in the hemisphere due to their less than neutral status. The subjects of the messages concerned all forms of Spanish and Falange undertones and proved much of what American intelligence services had already considered. One of the messages stated that the Spanish Charge d'Affaires should make certain to supply the Spanish School with texts so that the students could learn about the great patriots like Franco. The Ministry advised the Legation and the Charge that it would be reimbursed for any expenses by the "Cultural Section" of either the Falange or the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other documents backed up claims by the Americans that

Spanish priests acted in concert with the Falange or were full Falange members. After the

Panamanian government refused to allow certain Carmelite priests to enter Panama for service at a mission in Chiriqui, Plandolit requested that the Foreign Ministry respond in kind to Americans in Spain. Another claimed that Bishop Preciado in Colon was a bitter enemy of the Americans. All in all, the intercepted despatches unearthed a treasure trove of evidence against the Falange, the Spanish Legation, and the Charge d'Affaires.301

On February 14, 1943 ten days after the release of the intercepted despatches, members of the Spanish Legation found Juan Pons Oliver hanging in the basement of the building. Oliver had held a relatively minor position at the Legation as a waiter and cook.

Immediately after the discovery of the body Plandolit called a Panamanian Judge and

Coroner to the Legation to investigate the death. Plandolit sequestered the two

Panamanians in his office for some time and when they emerged they declared the cause of death strangulation and ruled the event a suicide. This incident was interesting for a 198 couple of reasons. When authorities released the photos of the body they did not contain any of the normal characteristics of a hanging. According to experts at the ONI the eyes should be bulged, the tongue should have protruded, and the face should show some signs of discoloration, but such was not the case. Furthermore, the chair under his body remained upright. Generally, one who commits suicide needs to kick the chair out in order to hang; also the thrashing of a person hanging would to knock the chair out of the way.302

A warning accompanied the intercepted despatches:

These enclosures were obtained with difficulty and at great personal risk by an operative of the Civil Intelligence Section. It is therefore urgently requested that both the source and existence of the enclosures be held in the greatest secrecy. A failure to observe this precaution may result in the loss of a source of information which is expected to be very fruitful and place in jeopardy the operative involved.303

It is plausible that the body found in the Spanish Legation was the American source.

Clearly, there is no proof and just a few circumstantial pieces of evidence, but the theory is at least possible. The person in question, Juan Pons Oliver, had worked at the Legation for only a few months, before that he had been employed at numerous anonymous jobs.

His death was suspicious to say the least and the circumstances fascinated the ONI. The

ONI felt that Oliver could have been killed because he was a security risk to the Falange.

He could have been all of these as well as an American agent without the ONI knowing his identity. The identities of agents were highly classified and only divulged on a need- to-know basis. Finally, the despatch of the intercepts was the last document from that source in the archival records. Obviously, these events were a conspiracy theorist's delight.304 199

Panamanian documents indicate that Plandolit stressed that the Spanish Legation dealt with the situation as quickly and legitimately as possible. He also took great pains to explain to Minister of Foreign Relations Octavio Fabrega that Oliver had been very nervous in the period before his death. Plandolit explained that Oliver was under investigation by Canal Zone Authorities because of his ties to the Falange. This could be true, but it is strange that it slipped the minds of the Americans intelligence operatives investigating the case of his death. Plandolit also focused on the fact that Oliver's wife was German and that he worried for her safety because of American investigations.

Again, this slipped past the ONI agents who did not even make a mention that Oliver had a German wife. It was possible that the American authorities truly did not know any of this information; nevertheless, it was also possible that Plandolit tried to exercise every available avenue to alleviate any suspicion that the Spanish Legation may be tied to

Oliver's untimely demise.305

More evidence of Spanish complicity in Panama surfaced in June 1943. A source who routinely spoke with Plandolit reported on Enrique Ruiz Vernacci. Vernacci was an editor for the Spanish section of the Panama America and an ardent Falangist and Axis sympathizer. The source prodded Plandolit about the propaganda that Vernacci published and asked how the Charge d'Affaires could allow such derogatory stories about the Allies reach the media. Plandolit, apparently exasperated by the barrage of questions, admitted that the stories published by Vernacci were exactly what the Legation wanted published.

He admitted that Vernacci censored the mail that reached Panama America. Plandolit showed the source letters in his desk written by Spanish Republicans in Panama who championed the Allied cause. One of the examples was a virulent criticism of Franco and the Axis. Plandolit stated quite simply: "Do you think we want letter like this published here?" Vernacci was not only an editor; he was also responsible to keep the Spanish

Legation informed on Spanish Republicans in Panama. The Falange and Falange sympathizers were a force to be reckoned with in Panama more than two years after the group was officially disbanded and outlawed.306

The Office of Naval Intelligence received a piece of corroborating evidence concerning Manuel Onos de Plandolit in September 1943. The report in question dealt with Plandolit's time in Colombia prior to his post in Panama. While in Colombia, he was in charge of the Falange and espionage in both Colombia and Panama but took care of Panama through his proxy Carlos Arcos. Plandolit acted as a liaison between the

Spanish, German, and Italian intelligence services in Colombia and Panama prior to

United States entry into the war. He did not take care of Japanese interests because the

Japanese intelligence gathering system was totally self-sufficient and did not rely on the other Axis nations. After the Americans entered the war Plandolit apparently destroyed any documents that connected him to the Fifth Column and espionage in Colombia. He noted that most of the agents who remained in Latin America after Pearl Harbor were locals recruited by the Axis nations since they would blend into the environment more effectively than Axis nationals. While this report dealt with Plandolit's exploits while still in Colombia, the ONI in Panama did not receive it until much later. It adds interesting insight into the role of the Spanish in Panama and the nature of espionage rings after

Pearl Harbor. Plandolit also noted that the majority of espionage agents in the Western

Hemisphere were in the United States, Panama, Argentina, and Brazil. The research of

Leslie Rout and John Bratzel in their book The Shadow War; German Espionage and 201

United States Counterespionage in Latin America during; World War II supports

Plandolit's claim.307

In November and December 1943, Plandolit initiated another campaign in

Panama. The campaign consisted of two steps; the first was a propaganda assault on

American businesses, the second an attempt to increase Spanish trade with the Republic of Panama. Plandolit's propaganda campaign centered on issues that had been on the minds of many Latin Americans for decades; they worried about an influx of American power and economic influence. Latin Americans worried that U.S. influence would slowly degrade their culture and that American commercial interests would retard local growth and development. Plandolit played on these insecurities and tried to convince

Panamanians that he had proof the Americans were doing exactly that. He then instigated the second part of his plan to increase trade with Spain. Plandolit wanted a trade agreement between Spain and Panama that would allow Spanish vessels to dock at

Panamanian ports and trade with Panamanians. He wanted the vessels to be allowed to call at Porto Bello well away from the prying eyes of the Americans. The majority of the local businessmen that backed Plandolit were at one time Falangists. The Falangist backing and isolated port definitely cast suspicion on the intentions of the new trade agreement. The incident once again reinforced the belief that the Falange actively tried to disrupt the American war effort in Panama.308

As the outcome of the war began to shape in the Allies favor, Spaniards the world over began to try to distance themselves from all things Axis. It began at the top and worked its way down. Franco became much less conciliatory to the Axis throughout 1944 and later and even tried to help the Allies on the odd occasion. The same can be said of 202 the diplomatic corps. In Panama, Plandolit knowingly committed himself to an interview with a senior U.S. intelligence officer. During the interview Plandolit spoke at length about Spain and the direction it should move now that an Axis victory was no longer certain. He praised Franco for keeping Spain out of the war, but said that his time was up and that the monarchy should retake the reigns. He vehemently denied that the Falange ever aided Axis espionage nets, although he did not mention the rash of anti-American propaganda that emanated from the Spanish Legation in Panama. Plandolit did admit he was the leader of the Falange in Colombia and even that he had frequent contact with the

Axis leaders in Colombia. This confirmed that much of the American intelligence regarding Plandolit was valid. Therefore, it was not a stretch to believe that he still performed these functions while serving in Panama and he was only granting the interview to initiate damage control.309

A couple of weeks after his meeting with Lt. Col. Jules Dubois on April 26, 1944,

Plandolit was at yet another Falange sponsored event. This time it was a picnic near

Colon at the home of a wealthy Falangist, Maximo Anton. The guests included

Monseigneur J. W. Preciado, the Bishop of Colon, and two priests, Padre Diez and Padre

Ricardo Velasco Ordonee, along with a number of other Falangists. The guest list once again reinforced the validity of the American assertion that Spanish priests were part of the problem in Latin America. Plandolit gave a speech that focused on the culture that

Spain shared with the Republic of Panama and the values of Franco. This was the very same Franco that he had denounced to Lt. Col. Dubois a couple of weeks earlier. Clearly, the belief in the Falange and Franco was not dead by this time regardless of the public persona of Plandolit.310 203

As the last phase of the war dragged on the Falange was still an active organization in Panama. It remained committed to Spain and Franco and was certainly still a threat to the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the security of the Panama

Canal; however, the threat was no longer as serious as it had been. Part of this was a result of damage control instigated by the Spanish Legation and part was due to the gradual decline of the Axis powers in response to the Allies turning the tide of the war.

The Charge d'Affaires focused more on the Hispanidad rather than pro-Axis and anti-

American propaganda. Throughout the war the Falange and the Spanish Legation played an important role in Axis efforts in Panama due to their legitimate presence in Panama and the fact that Spaniards could move unnoticed throughout Panama far easier than

Germans, Italians and Japanese.

Japan

Unlike the Spanish Falange, one group of people experienced a dramatic reduction in usefulness in Panama. After Pearl Harbor, the Japanese population in

Panama was no longer valuable as intelligence agents or saboteurs. This was in large part due to the efforts of the Panamanians and Americans to round up ethnic Japanese. Before

Pearl Harbor, Panamanian authorities made arrangements with the Roosevelt administration regarding the treatment of Axis nationals in Panama. They agreed to arrest and question any suspicious German or Italian national and stated that they would arrest and intern all Japanese nationals on the isthmus. There were a couple of reasons for the treatment of the Japanese. They were a visual minority and arresting them was a fairly easy process. Secondly, there was an underlying dislike of the Japanese and Orientals in general on the isthmus. Some of this could be seen in legislation enacted during the Arias Administration. Therefore, after the United States entered World War II, authorities arrested all the Japanese on the isthmus and did not release any after questioning. In contrast to this a number of German and Italian nationals were released after authorities deemed they were not a threat.311

The Japanese diplomats who populated the Legation prior to the outbreak of war were sent to the United States with the other Axis diplomats. The list of personnel included the Minister, Masatoshi Akiyama; the Second Secretary, Minoru Isaza; the

Commercial Attache, Takeshi Hara, and a few other lower ranked staffers. The

Spanish Legation assumed the responsibilities for Japanese affairs after the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Japan. However, unlike the Spanish Legation's efficient efforts in dealing with German affairs, its dealings with the Japanese were somewhat clumsy. The Spaniards assumed responsibility for Japanese affairs only as an afterthought and were not prepared they had been for the Germans. The Spanish Legation did not even have a person who could read or write Japanese by March 1942, a full four months after Pearl Harbor. This could be attributed to the fact that the Japanese tried to keep their affairs separate and did not integrate at all with the other Axis nations prior to

o 1 -i entering the war or simply that Spaniards were more likely to learn German or Italian.

Even though Panamanian authorities rounded up all the Japanese nationals they could find there were still concerns that a few were unaccounted for. According to

Panamanian records there were still an estimated 50 Japanese at large in the Republic in

February 1943. To be fair this number included women and children and did not rule out that Japanese may have left the country clandestinely or unnoticed. A few of those unaccounted were significant figures of the espionage world. Marcos Daikoku and the 205 two Aquima brothers were not among the Japanese whom Panamanian authorities managed to apprehend. American authorities were particularly worried after they received notice that the Japanese news agency Domei was broadcasting information regarding convoys leaving the Panama Canal. One particular report noted that a convoy of twenty transports and an accompaniment of warships had just left the Canal for the

Pacific. The information shows that the Japanese had agents in view of the Canal and equipped with a radio transmitter that allowed them to quickly communicate with Japan.

This was a threat to the Allied war effort since the enemy knew exactly which ships were in which parts of the world; a great advantage in the days before satellite coverage.314

In an attempt to locate rogue transmitters in Panama, the U.S. military imported radio-monitoring equipment. All those involved knew that there were transmitters located in Panama, but without monitoring equipment they were next to impossible to find.

Before the arrival of the equipment authorities only stumbled across one clandestine radio near Tocumen just outside of Panama City. Once the monitoring equipment arrived in early April 1942, the Americans began to intercept messages on a regular basis. The senders encoded most of the messages and they seemed to emanate near the Bay of

Panama, but the transmitter could not be located. At the end of April American authorities believed they had found a transmitter in the Japanese Legation. The building was empty and under the supervision of a caretaker at the time. On the morning of April

25, 1942, five people who identified themselves as Panamanian National Police entered the Legation and searched for what they believed was a hidden transmitter. The men

-11 r ransacked the Legation but could not find any signs of a radio, clandestine or legal. 206

The only other record of Japanese activities after the United States entered the war stemmed from February 1943. During that month there were reports that Japanese agents had been located on Rey Island. Rey Island is the largest island of the Las Perlas

Islands archipelago in the Bay of Panama. The discovery coincided nicely with the estimated location of the Japanese radio transmissions from the previous year. American forces flew over the island numerous times in an effort to find any signs of Japanese agents and to discover a good point to begin a land and sea search. A land search by a small force was not successful. Officials knew that some Japanese had lived on the island prior to Pearl Harbor, but those had long since sold their property and left. The force questioned natives on the island who claimed they had not seen or heard of Japanese agents on the island for some time. However, Rey Island was large enough that it would be possible for agents to live in hiding and perform their mission.316

Clearly, the coming of war to the United States made it increasingly difficult for

Japanese intelligence networks to function effectively. People of Japanese descent were far too noticeable to an alarmed population and easy for counter-intelligence officers to track. Certainly the Japanese did acquire some intelligence regarding the Panama Canal and the American war effort after Pearl Harbor, but the vast majority of their information resulted from the pre-December 7, 1941 efforts of the barbers and fisherman.

Italy

Italy was by far the least-busy Axis nation in Panama. Presumably, the Germans and Spanish performed the majority of the subversive activities on the isthmus.

Panamanian authorities arrested Italian nationals when the United States entered the war.

Authorities released the majority of the Italians on their own recognizance, but a number remained in custody for the duration of the war. Panamanian officials interned the Italian diplomatic corps en masse, including the minister, and sent it to the United States with the other Axis diplomats in Panama. There were only a couple of suspicious cases encompassing Italians in Panama after the United States joined the war. The most suspicious event included communications between Monsignor Antonio Taffi, the Papal

Charge d'Affaires in Costa Rica, and Italy. Taffi forwarded messages from Panama to

Italy on behalf of the Red Cross. He had permission from President de la Guardia although U.S. officials still investigated to see whether or not he had the authority to do so. The Americans must have been assured that he did as there was no more mention of

Taffi in the intelligence reports.317

There was one other mention of a suspected Italian fascist in Panama. The United

States interned Felice Marino and held him at Balboa. Marino was well-connected; there were two personal letters from P.A. Medina to his esteemed friend Ricardo Adolfo de la

Guardia, regarding the Marino situation. Medina also knew Captain Maclntyre of the

Canal Zone Civil Intelligence Service. He protested the internship of Marino because he insisted that he was innocent and could not possibly be a fascist subversive. There was no mention in the files about Marino's fate or any responses from de la Guardia. The references to Italians in Panama were few and far between and clearly indicate that Italy was not a major player in the Panama region after the United States entered World War

II.318

Vichy

Though the efforts of the Japanese and Italians waned over the years in Panama a new player did emerge after December 7, 1941. The Vichy French took on some 208 responsibility for espionage in Panama after the United States entered the war. The Vichy

Charge d'Affaires, Pierre Henri de la Blanchetai, was an Axis sympathizer and sent periodic reports concerning the situation in Panama. Blanchetai reported on a number of factors from the Canal Zone, in the limited time he was allowed to remain in Panama. He left the country in April 1942. However, he did manage to report on the effectiveness of blackouts and the movements of ships before that time.

In March 1942, the ONI intercepted a message from Blanchetai to the Vichy

French government. He noted that the U.S. imposed blackout over Panama and the Canal

Zone was fairly useless. Enough light reflected off the water to guide bombers to the

Canal when the blackout was in effect. Blanchetai thought that Axis bombers could exploit the dim light for an attack on the Canal until about 11:00 p.m. at which point the blackout seemed to become more effective. A couple of days later on March 15, there was a letter from Henry Stimson to Sumner Welles that insinuated Welles had spoken with the Panamanian government about the removal of Blanchetai. Stimson also stated that he knew of specific instances where Blanchetai had reported back to France about warships moving through the Canal. This was highly sensitive material that the U.S. military wanted to keep from Axis governments, especially after the reduction of U.S. naval power due to the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.319

J. Edgar Hoover was also suspicious of Blanchetai. While much that came from the desk of Hoover had to be taken with a grain of salt, he wrote to Col. Donovan on

March 18, 1942 about some of the dealings that involved Blanchetai. Judging from the other information regarding the Vichy Charge d'Affaires, Hoover seemed to be correct in this incident. He noted that Blachetai paid off a man named Barbat whom authorities arrested for spreading propaganda. After Barbat's release from prison, Blanchetai gave him a lump sum of money which he claimed was to reimburse Barbat for lost wages. The

FBI believed that the money was hush money as Blanchetai was the source of the propaganda. Furthermore, there was no reason for the Vichy Legation to reimburse

Barbat for lost wages as it did not employ him.320 Blanchetai left Panama shortly after this latest episode. There were no reports that stated he had been deemed persona non grata but the ONI did intercept a message where he claimed: "Our friends in the Zone were responsible."" Spanish Charge d'Affaires Plandolit shared this notion; he sent a report to Madrid that stated he believed the U.S. State Department pressured Panama into removing Blanchetai. It seems he was removed by backchannel discussions between ambassadors, not through the normal channels. When Blanchetai attended the Foreign

Office in Panama to retrieve his passport so he could leave they knew nothing of his being recalled.322

Blanchetai's successor was Charles le Genissel. Genissel was a close friend of

Spanish Charge d'Affaires Plandolit, and he too was under suspicion by American and

Panamanian authorities. However, his tenure as the Charge d'Affaries was fairly short­ lived; he left Panama on December 10, 1942. A couple of days before he left the

Panamanian National Police interned two of the staffers of the French Embassy for espionage activities. The police permitted Genissel to leave Panama if he agreed not to return. One of those arrested was Ernesto Castan, the code clerk from the Legation.

Authorities found messages concerning Allied ship movements in Castan's possession.

Although the Vichy French were far from the worst offenders in Panama, they did play a small role in the Axis espionage net that encompassed the isthmus.323 210

Many nations attempted to further the Axis cause in Panama during World War II.

Some of these nations, Germany, Japan, and Italy, were principal belligerents in the war; others such as Spain were non-belligerents who were sympathetic to the Axis. The Axis intelligence network was not adequately able to infiltrate the U.S. military's defensive perimeter of the Panama Canal. Surely, the Axis nations' gained some intelligence, but they did not gain enough information to affect the day to day running of the Canal and could not get saboteurs close enough to the Canal to do any damage. There were many small acts of sabotage against U.S. military materiel on the isthmus, but none of these did significant damage and none were confirmed as Axis in origin. Whether or not espionage and sabotage were successful did not lessen the U.S. military's perception of the threat against Panama. Friedman's book focuses on the past with an element of hindsight; we now know that the internship of Axis aliens was less than effective, but was it possible for the intelligence agencies involved to know that at the time? The United States made the defense of the Panama Canal a high ranking priority and it was successful in its mission to secure the Canal and defend the Western Hemisphere from Axis aggression. 211

Conclusion

The Panama Canal was vital to the United States and the Allied war effort for much of World War II. It was the most efficient route to move warships, men, and materiel from coast to coast within the United States or from the Pacific to Atlantic oceans. The American plan for the defense of the Western Hemisphere rested on the security and well-being of the Canal. The United States military felt that the Canal was the linchpin that would hold the hemisphere together and American war planners took that into account when they expended valuable resources securing and fortifying a Canal that cut through a sovereign nation over a thousand miles away. The strategic significance of the Canal can be gleaned from current literature regarding the United

States and Panama in World War Two; however, the existing literature has not explored sufficiently the foreign and domestic threats to the Canal, perceived or real, or analyzed the extent to which the response of U.S. officials was commensurate with the reality of that threat. This thesis, using military, diplomatic, and political records in the United

States and Panama is intended to fill that historical gap.

United States military planners and intelligence experts were rightfully anxious about the Panama Canal. Panama was a hotbed of clandestine activity involving agents from both sides of the conflict and home-grown sympathizers. Authorities worried that spies could learn far too much information about the U.S. and Allied war effort through watching the Canal and its two entrances. The U.S. military establishment also realized that regardless of the amount of men and materiel it had present in Panama, the Canal was still a vulnerable target. U.S. intelligence agencies believed there was a significant 212 threat to the Panama Canal during the first few years of the war and this alone guided their actions. The U.S. military perceived the Canal was in imminent danger and this forced it to expend far more resources protecting Panama than may have been necessary.

Since the military identified Panama as key to the defense of the hemisphere, especially after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, it had almost carte blanche when dealing with the defense of the tiny isthmian republic.

In the end, the belief that the Panama Canal was in danger of attack turned out to be correct. The Japanese and the Germans both planned aborted raids against the Canal.

The Axis did not abandon either of these two raids because of a fundamental flaw in their design. Theoretically, both of these attacks could have been successful. The German plan came to an end because U.S. intelligence agencies discovered its existence. However, the idea was sound and stood a valid chance of succeeding due to the German's knowledge of the Canal. Likewise, the Japanese attack faltered because the war neared an end not because it was impossible. The technology needed for the attack was not fully developed until the Allies were already pushing at the home islands of Japan, at which point it was too late and Japan too desperate to try to launch a submersible carrier attack half-way around the world. The United States was rightly paranoid that the Canal could be attacked and damaged by Axis forces; the threat was definitely real.

Historians such as Bratzel and Rout touched on espionage and Fifth Column activities in Panama through the course of dealing with German espionage in all of Latin

America. Friedman focused on the overzealousness of the American internship program in Panama in his work concerning the German populations of Latin America. This dissertation significantly expands on their work and extensively examines subversive 213 forces in Panama. There is an abundance of evidence that implicated a considerable number of suspicious characters and foreign subversives on the Isthmus. There were very active intelligence and propaganda networks in Panama; the Germans, the Falange, the

Japanese, the Italian fascists, and the Vichy French had agents in place on the isthmus.

Clearly, the Germans were not the only problem in Panama and their internship, overzealous or not, did not completely protect the Canal. A number of these spies and saboteurs were in a position to either damage the Canal or report on movements of men and materiel. It is a testament to the U.S. intelligence community's paranoia that none of these agents successfully damaged the Canal and that the enemy gained limited intelligence gained from within Panama. Surely, intelligence did leak from the republic as witnessed by Japanese radio broadcasts from Panama. Many of the Axis nations or their sympathizers found themselves in possession of detailed information regarding American and Allied war movements, but damage was kept to a minimum.

John Major's Prize Possession, and Stetson Conn et al, Guarding the United

States and its Outposts, provide excellent accounts of the defensive measures surrounding the Panama Canal. The outlying defenses that formed a thousand mile ring around

Panama were largely though not entirely effective. They were completely successful in that the Canal survived the war intact and no surface combatants or carrier groups approached within striking distance of the Canal. This paper expands their research and details the negotiations and behind the scenes manipulations that were necessary in order to acquire permission to use some of the sites. Furthermore, it illustrates some of the weaknesses of those defenses, particularly in the case of U-boats. German U-boats entered the Caribbean and wreaked havoc upon Allied shipping for almost two years. 214

While historians have looked at the U-boat campaign in the Caribbean, none have focused on the U-boat threat to the Panama Canal. This paper notes that Axis submarines were within striking distance of the Canal on more than one occasion. Fortunately for the

United States submarine deck guns did not have the power to inflict significant damage on the Canal and torpedo nets were in place to prevent a torpedo attack, although there were several mines dropped at the entrance to the Canal. Submarines were also known to transport spies and saboteurs throughout the Panama and other regions. The defensive precautions employed by the United States military in the Panama, while bordering on excessive, were a necessity that prevented damage to the vital waterway.

As much as the Axis concerned the U.S. military, it also had an enemy that was much closer to home. U.S. officials perceived political instability within Panama with almost as much caution as they did the Axis militaries and intelligence agents. The U.S.

State Department and the Roosevelt administration worked long and hard to cooperate with the Panamanian government and the Panamanian people. The 1936 Hull-Alfaro

Treaty was a good example of this cooperation; many in the State Department realized that the United States took some liberties when it negotiated the original 1903 Treaty, and it was an attempt to remedy some of those past wrongs. The State Department negotiated a treaty that appealed to Panama and amended some of the offensive language from the original deal. The State Department and Roosevelt went to great lengths, often against the advice of military commanders, because they realized that if the host country for the

Canal was unstable and inhospitable it would prove to be the Canal's undoing.

The 1936 Hull-Alfaro Treaty has been well-covered by existing literature but, the domestic political environment of Panama has often been overlooked. This dissertation 215 picks up where others have left off. It details the instability inherent in Panama during

World War II and explains the hurdles that the U.S. government faced. Among these hurdles were the presidential campaign and the subsequent first presidency of Arnulfo

Arias which pushed many American decision makers to their limits. Arias' heavy-handed tactics and Panamanian nationalism had him branded a Nazi by numerous media outlets and influential people in North America. His antics and posturing regarding the Canal eventually caused his downfall and de la Guardia removed him in a coup late in 1941, shortly before the United States entered the war. There has been much conjecture about the United States' government involvement in the coup and until now it has been just that conjecture. However, documents attained for this paper demonstrate that a senior

American official in the Panama Canal Zone was definitely involved "unofficially." This document, in addition to others found in Walter LaFeber and John Major's works, should finally end speculation of U.S. involvement. Clearly, there was a limit to the good- natured cooperation of the United States, especially in matters of hemispheric defense.

The ouster of Arias improved the domestic political situation in Panama, but did not completely solve the problem. The new President of Panama Ricardo Adolfo de la

Guardia proved much more accommodating to the United States; he approved the defense sites agreement soon after reaching office and even vowed to repeal Arias' policies.

These factors solved some the issues regarding the security of the Canal, but not all. After de la Guardia took office there were numerous rumors regarding assassination attempts and armed revolutions in Panama. Either of these events would have seriously destabilized the domestic situation in Panama. Destabilization factors did not end there, throughout de la Guardia's term there were a number of riots involving both 216

Panamanians and American military personnel. On other occasions American military personnel stopped de la Guardia's car and disrespected him prompting a complaint from the Panamanian Foreign Minister. U.S. forces routinely stopped Panamanian boats and interned the crews for numbers of hours causing an abundance of ill will between the locals and the American personnel. Finally, corruption within the de la Guardia

Administration burdened American officials who believed that de la Guardia was a better choice than Arias. By the end of his term de la Guardia had worn out his welcome among the Panamanian population and the U.S. government. Each of these factors increased the instability of the Panama and decreased the security of the Canal.

The United States government dealt with labor issues and racism in Panama while trying to shore up the defenses of the Canal Zone. Previously, scholars such as Michael

Conniff and John Biesanz have written on Panamanian labor and race relations. In

Panama, there was a clear relationship between race and labor issues. The Panamanian people did not take kindly to the West Indian laborers the French and then Americans imported to build the Canal. First of all they felt that these laborers took jobs away from

Panamanian workers, even when the United States demonstrated that there was a labor shortage; and secondly, Panamanians were upset because once the Canal was built the

West Indians were not repatriated. The whole situation was even more complex because

Panamanians felt that the jobs the West Indians did were beneath their station in life and would not do them anyway. This paper expands on their research to demonstrate how labor and race relations affected the defense of the Canal in World War II. The racial tensions created by this situation and the concurrent labor problems increased the 217 instability of the host country and threatened the smooth and efficient operation of the

Canal, a situation the United States could ill afford.

The combination of these factors permitted the United States military to proceed at a blinding pace with the fortification and military build-up within the Panama Sea

Frontier. It also allowed a few members of the United States government to take some liberties with Panama in the name of the defense of the Canal. All of this was possible because the members of the State Department and the U.S. military who made the decisions perceived a serious threat to Panama. This perception of danger coupled with the military's and Roosevelt administration's insistence that defense of the Western

Hemisphere rested on the security of the Canal resulted in the defense of Panama becoming a number one priority for the American military, especially after December 7,

1941.

This dissertation creates a more complete image of the importance of the Canal for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the U.S. military and State Department's attempts to secure it. Certainly, there were enemy agents and saboteurs trying to disrupt the everyday operation of the Canal and in the process deal the United States and her allies a serious blow. This paper has shown that the U.S. officials prepared for a threat to

U.S. security in the period leading up to and during the war. In spite of the fact that no significant attack on the Canal took place, U.S. officials had no option except to prepare for that eventuality. Between internal subversion and political instability in Panama and the actual threat posed by both German and Japan military forces, the threat to the Canal was real. Through a determination to defend the Canal at all costs the U.S. military and the State Department accomplished their goals, the Canal survived the war intact and the 218

United States and her allies defeated the Axis powers. As in the case of terrorism in the early twenty-first century, the fear of an attack on the Canal was sufficiently strong to justify the allocation of a disproportionate number of resources to defend against attack.

The thought that the Canal, a U.S. lifeline in the wake of Pearl Harbor, could be put out of commission was enough to stimulate the American government. 1 Kathleen Williams, AAF Historical Office, Air Defense of the Panama Canal; 01 January 1939 - 7 December 1941 Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 42, January, 1946. p.67

Notes to Chapter 1

2 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs Of Cordell Hull Vol.1. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948), p. 326. 3 Ibid, p. 493. 4 Ibid, p. 493. 5 Hull, The Secretary of State to the Argentine Ambassador (Espil), May 2, 1936, Foreign Relations of the United States 1936,(FRUS) Vol.V. pp. 16, 17. 6 Hull, Memoirs, Vol.1, pp. 494-496. 7 Ibid, p. 496. 8 Thomas M. Leonard, "Search For Security: The United States and Central America in the Twentieth Century." in The Americas 47, 4 (April 1991), p. 484. 9 "Alemania" Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1936, pp. 28-30; and "Flexer to SecState, Subj: Panamanian - German Commercial agreements. German allegations of Immigration discrimination," 20 October 1936; Folder - 719.622; Box C0030 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, MD. (NARA II) 10 Hull, Memoirs, Vol.1, p. 500. 11 "List of Treaties" FRUS 1936, Vol.V, pp. 33, 34. 12 Welles, Undersecretary of State, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Undersecretary of State" March 4, 1938, FRUS 1938 Vol.V. p. 3. 13 Hull, The Secretary of State to the Minister in Uruguay, Dawson, March 12, 1938, FRUS 1938, Vol.V. #10, pp. 4,5. 14 Weddell, The Ambassador in Argentina to the Secretary of State, June 13, 1938, FRUS 1938, Vol.V. #2065, pp. 6,7. 15 Hull, Memoirs, Vol.1, pp. 604, 605. 16 Hull, The Secretary of State to the American Delegation to the Eighth International Conference of American States, "Instructions to delegates," [undated], FRUS 1938, Vol.V. pp. 54. 17 Hull, The Chairman of the American Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, FRUS 1938, Vol.V. #47, pp. 83, 84. 18 Thomas L. Pearcy, We Answer Only to God; Politics and the Military in Panama. 1903-1947 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), pp.61, 65, 66. 19 Ibid, pp.61, 62. Robert C. Harding, The History Of Panama, The Greenwood Histories of the Modern Nations (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2006), pp.39-41. 21 "Davis to SecState, Telegram 12:15 pm, Subj: Revolutions of 1931," 02 January 1931; Folder - 819.00N; Box C0029 Roll 5; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II; and "Davis to SecState, Telegram 3:00 p.m., Subj: Revolutions of 1931," 02 January 1931; Folder - 819.00N; Box C0029 Roll 5; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II; and "Davis to SecState, Telegram 7:00 p.m., Subj: Revolutions of 1931," 02 January 1931; Folder - 819.00N; Box C0029 Roll 5; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II; and "Davis to SecState, Telgram 4:00 p.m., Subj: Revolutions of 1931," 03 January 1931; Folder - 819.00N; Box C0029 Roll 5; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II. 22 Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective, updated edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.64. ' "Davis to SecState, Subj: Am Article entitled "A Comprehensive Survey of Panama's Economic and Trade Problems" By Fridanque Brothers & Sons," 31 October 1932; Folder - 819.50; Box C0029 Roll 11; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II. 94 Lester D. Langley, "Negotiating New Treaties with Panama; 1936," Hispanic American Historical Review 48, 2 (May 1968), pp.225. 25 Ibid, p.229. 26 Ibid, pp.228, 229. 27 Ibid, pp.226, 227. 28 Ibid, pp.229, 230. 29 Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, U.S. Army In World War II, The Western Hemisphere; Guarding The United States And Its Outposts (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1964), pp. 304, 305. President Roosevelt Memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of State (Moore), February 4, 1935, FRUS 1935, Vol.IV P. 519. 31 Lindsay, The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State, June 21, 1935, FRUS 1935, Vol.IV, No. 176, pp. 519, 520. 32 Gonzalez the Minster in Ecuador to the Secretary of State, July 11, 1935, FRUS 1935, Vol.IVNo.85, p. 521. Gonzalez, the Minister in Ecuador to the Secretary of State, September 19, 1935, FRUS 1935, Vol.IV, No. 133, pp. 526, 527. 34 Gonzalez, the Minister in Ecuador to the Secretary of State, January 13, 1936, FRUS 1936, Vol.V, pp. 533, 534. Welles, For the Secretary of State to the Minister in Costa Rica (Hornibrook), January 4, 1938, FRUS 1938, Vol.V, No.34, p. 466; and Welles, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Undersecretary of State, January 28, 1938, FRUS 1938, Vol.V, pp. 467, 468; and Hornibrook, The Minster in Costa Rica to the Secretary of State, December 29, 1938, FRUS 1938, Vol.V, No.522, p. 471. Costa Rica approached the United States again in April 1939 when nothing came of this first attempt - Duggan, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of the American Republics, April 5, 1939, FRUS 1939, Vol.V. pp. 520, 521. 36 President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State (Welles) March 25, 1939, FRUS 1939, Vol.V. pp. 461,462. 221

Armour, The Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State, February 22, 1939, FRUS 1939, Vol.V, No.519 p. 461; and President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State (Welles) March 25, 1939, FRUS 1939, Vol.V. pp. 461, 462. Conn et al., Guarding The United States And Its Outposts, p. 310. 39 Ibid, p. 302. 4 "Williams to SecState, Subj: Panama Continues to Refuse to Exchange Ratifications of Treaty with Japan," 21 April 1934; Folder - 719.942; Box C0030 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II; and "Wilson to SecState, Subj: more discussion about the treaty between Japan and Panama," 27 March 1934; Folder - 719.942; Box C0030 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II. 41 "15ND to DNI, subj: Japanese in Perlas Islands, Republic of Panama," 15 May 1935; Folder - A8-5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8-5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II; and "Chief of Naval Operations to 11ND, subj: Japanese Activities in the Perlas Islands and Fishing Vessels in Costa Rican Waters," 24 June 1935; Folder - A8-5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8- 5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II; and "Freeman to DNI, subj: Japanese in Perlas Islands, Republic of Panama," 10 May 1935; Folder - A8- 5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8-5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II. 42 "15ND to DNI, subj: Japanese in Perlas Islands, Republic of Panama," 15 May 1935; Folder - A8-5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8-5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II; and "Chief of Naval Operations to 11ND, subj: Japanese Activities in the Perlas Islands and Fishing Vessels in Costa Rican Waters," 24 June 1935; Folder - A8-5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8- 5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II; and "Freeman to DNI, subj: Japanese in Perlas Islands, Republic of Panama," 10 May 1935; Folder - A8- 5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8-5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II. 43 Jules Dubois, Danger Over Panama, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), pp.92-96. 44 "Williams to DNI, subj: Activities of Japanese in Panama," 13 December 1937; Folder - A8-5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8-5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II. 45 "Williams to DNI, subj: Activities of Japanese in Panama," 13 December 1937; Folder - A8-5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8-5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II. 46 "Williams to DNI, subj: Activities of Japanese in Panama," 13 December 1937; Folder - A8-5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8-5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II. 47 "Williams to DNI, subj: Foreign "Fishing" Activities in Panama, probable discontinuance of," 09 January 1938; Folder - A8-5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI 222

Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8-5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II; and Dubois, Danger, pp.92-96 48Dubois, Danger, pp.85-95

49 "Chief of Naval Operation to 15ND, subj: Foreign Activities in Panama," 21 December 1937; Folder - A8-5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8-5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II; and "15ND to DNI, subj: Foreign Activities in Panama," 17 January 1938; Folder - A8- 5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8-5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II. 50 "15ND Intelligence report, Subj: Political Parties, Groups, or Factions; Stability of Party in Power," 03 December 1937; Folder - 819.00N; Box C0029 Roll 5; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II. 51 "DNI to Director, Central Division, subj: German Interest in Pinas Bay," 27 June 1938; Folder - A8-5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8-5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II.

Notes to Chapter 2

Hull, Memoirs. 1 vols., p. 689. 53 Duggan, "Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of the American Republics," September 21, 1939. FRUS 1939, Vol.V p. 28; and Hull, "The Secretary of State to the American Delegate (Welles), September 27, 1939. FRUS 1939 Vol.V p. 30; and Welles, The American Delegate (Welles) to the Secretary of State, September 28, 1939. Foreign Relations of the United States Vol.V. pp. 31-32; and Welles, The American Delegate (Welles) to the Secretary of State, October 3, 1939. FRUS Vol.V. pp. 33-34. 54 Martin Sicker, The Geopolitics Of Security In The Americas: Hemispheric Denial from Monroe To Clinton (Westport: Praeger, 2002), p. 97. 55 Declaration of Panama, October 3, 1939, FRUS Vol.V, pp. 36-37. 56 J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States And Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 194; and The Secretary of State to the Charge in Guatemala (Cabot), December 12, 1939. FRUS Vol.V. pp. 48, 49. 57 The American Delegate (Welles) to the Secretary of State, October 4, 1939. FRUS Vol.V. p.42; and Lester D. Langley, The United States And The Caribbean In The Twentieth Century. 4th (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), p. 150. 58 Conn et al., Guarding The United States And Its Outposts, pp. 319-320. 59 Ibid, pp. 319-321. 60 Ibid, pp. 316-317. 61 Ibid, pp. 315-317. 62 Kathleen Williams, AAF Historical Office, Air Defense of the Panama Canal; 01 January 1939 - 7 December 1941 Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 42, January, 1946. p. 11. 63 Conn et al, Guarding The United States And Its Outposts, p. 316. 223

Arnulfo Arias Madrid, subj. Memo of Arnulfo Arias, 29, March 1941; Box 2, File 3 Ministerio de relations exteriors; Arnulfo Arias Madrid; ler Periodo (1940-1941); Archivos Nacional de Panama, Panama, Republic de Panama. Raul de Roux to the Panamanian Embassy in Washington, (no date); Box 2, File 3 Ministerio de relations exteriors; Arnulfo Arias Madrid; ler Periodo (1940-1941); Archivos Nacional de Panama, Panama, Republic de Panama. 1 Williams, Air Defense of the Panama Canal, pp. 38-40. Conn et al, Guarding The United States And Its Outposts, pp. 314-316. ; Ibid, pp. 323-324. ' Ibid, pp. 328-333. 1 Williams, AAF Historical Office, Air Defense of the Panama Canal, pp. 21-22. Conn et al, Guarding The United States And Its Outposts, pp. 339-343. Ibid, p. 327. Ibid, pp. 335-336. "Jose M. Hernandez to Cristobal Rodriguez" 19 September 1941; Box 7, File 1 Ministry of External Relations; (conferences, Canal Zone, general); Arnulfo Arias Madrid; ler Periodo (1940-1941); Archivos Nacional de Panama, Panama, Republic de Panama. "Memorandum, Subj: Amendment To Law Regarding Engaged In Construction In The Canal Zone," 08 February 1940; Box Box 4087; General Records of the Department of State; Decimal File 1940-1944; 811C.51/17 - 811F.111/3-1444; RG59; NARA II, p. 2. "Dawson To SecState, Desptach No.282, Subj: Proposed Legislation Restricting Employment Opportunities For Panamanians On Military Construction In The Canal Zone," 26 January 1940; Box Box 4087; General Records of the Department of State; Decimal File 1940-1944; 811C.51/17 - 811F.111/3-1444; RG59; NARA II; and "Memorandum, Subj: Amendment To Law Regarding Engaged In Construction In The Canal Zone," 08 February 1940; Box Box 4087; General Records of the Department of State; Decimal File 1940-1944; 811C.51/17 - 811F.111/3-1444; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson To SecState, Despatch No. 273, Subj: Communication Addressed To Undersecretary Welles By J. A. Panay, President Of Society Of Panamanians Employed By The Panama Canal," 22 January 1940; Box Box 4087; General Records of the Department of State; Decimal File 1940-1944; 811C.51/17 - 811F.111/3-1444; RG59; NARA II. "Memorandum, Subj: Amendment To Law Regarding Engaged In Construction In The Canal Zone," 08 February 1940; Box Box 4087; General Records of the Department of State; Decimal File 1940-1944; 811C.51/17 - 811F.111/3-1444; RG59; NARA II, p. 2. "Memorandum, Subj: Amendment To Law Regarding Engaged In Construction In The Canal Zone," 08 February 1940; Box Box 4087; General Records of the Department of State; Decimal File 1940-1944; 811C.51/17 - 811F.111/3-1444; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson To SecState, Despatch No. 273, Subj: Communication Addressed To Undersecretary Welles By J. A. Panay, President Of Society Of Panamanians Employed By The Panama Canal," 22 January 1940; Box Box 4087; General Records of the Department of State; Decimal File 1940-1944; 811C.51/17 - 811F.111/3-1444; RG59; NARA II. 224

"Dawson To SecState, Despatch No.277, Subj: Proposed Importation Of Jamaican Labor For Work In The Canal Zone; Communication Addressed To President Boyd By "Afirmacion Nacional" And President's Reply," 23 January 1940; Box Box 4087; General Records of the Department of State; Decimal File 1940-1944; 811C.51/17 - 811F.111/3-1444; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson To SecState, Despatch No.231, Subj: Transmitting Copy Of Note To Panamanian Foreign Office Regarding Contemplated Importation Of Jamaican Labor For Canal Zone," 03 January 1940; Box Box 4087; General Records of the Department of State; Decimal File 1940-1944; 811C.51/17 - 811F.111/3-1444; RG59; NARA II; and "Welles To FDR, Subj: Panama Objects To The Importation Of Black Labor," 11 January 1940; Box Box 4087; General Records of the Department of State; Decimal File 1940-1944; 811C.51/17 - 811F.111/3-1444; RG59; NARA II.

Notes to Chapter 3

LaFeber, The Panama Canal, p. 74. 1 John Major, Prize Possession; The United States and the Panama Canal 1903-1979 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002 (1993)), p. 262. 2 Michael L. Conniff, Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1992), p. 92. 3 Pearcy, We Answer Only to God, pp. 84-86. 4 Ibid, pp. 76-79; and David N, Farnsworth, U.S.-Panamanian Relations, 1903-1978: A Study in Linkage Politics, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 27. 5 "Muccio to SecState, Subj: request to have Arias arrive by special plane," 17 December 1939; Folder - 819.00; Box C0029 Roll 3; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II. 6 "Stone Paraphrase of code Radiogram, Subj: President Boyd induction," 18 December 1939; Folder - 819.00; Box C0029 Roll 3; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II. 7 "Duggan to Welles, Subj: transportation of Arias by Grace," 18 December 1939; Folder - 819.00; Box C0029 Roll 3; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II; and "Duggan to Welles, Subj: plane that brought Boyd to Panama also brought his wife," 18 December 1939; Folder - 819.00; Box C0029 Roll 3; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II; and "Duggan to Patchin, Subj: problem with travel of Arias," 18 December 1939; Folder - 819.00; Box C0029 Roll 3; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II. 8 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Political Developments in Panama; Campaign Activities of Arnulfistas and Alfaristas," 23 January 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Political Situation and Developments; Proclamation of Presidential Candidacy of Dr. Arnulfo Arias by Partido Nacional Revolucionario and Probable Endorsement by other parties," 24 October 1939; Folder - 819.00; Box C0029 Roll 3; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II. 90 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Political Situation and Developments; Proclamation of Presidential Candidacy of Dr. Arnulfo Arias by Partido Nacional Revolucionario and Probable Endorsement by other parties," 24 October 1939; Folder - 819.00; Box C0029 Roll 3; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Presidential Candidacy of Dr. Arnulfo Arias proclaimed at conventions of Four Political Parties," 14 November 1939; Folder - 819.00; Box C0029 Roll 3; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Candidacy of Arnulfo Arias endorsed by Partido Liberal Unido; Personnel of Directorate of Party," 30 November 1939; Folder - 819.00; Box C0029 Roll 3; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II. 91 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Political Situation and Developments; Candidacy of Arnulfo Arias; Rumors of Opposition Candidacy of Ricardo J. Alfaro," 24 November 1939; Folder - 819.00; Box C0029 Roll 3; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II. 92 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Arrival in Panama of Dr. Arnulfo Arias, Presidential Candidate; Reception; Relations with President Boyd; Speeches, including remarks Friendly to the United States and European Democracies," 22 December 1939; Folder - 819.00; Box C0029 Roll 3; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II, p. 4. " "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Arrival in Panama of Dr. Arnulfo Arias, Presidential Candidate; Reception; Relations with President Boyd; Speeches, including remarks Friendly to the United States and European Democracies," 22 December 1939; Folder - 819.00; Box C0029 Roll 3; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Internal Affairs, 1930-1939; RG59; NARA II. 94 "15ND Intelligence Report, subj: Panama, Political Forces, Political Parties," 18 August 1941; Folder - 6090 to 6149; Box 27; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 6090 - 6250; RG226; NARA II. 95 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Political Developments in Panama; Campaign Activities of Arnulfistas and Alfaristas," 23 January 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 96 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Arrival in Panama of Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro; Street Demonstration; Minor Disturbance; Charges and Countercharges," 29 January 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "unknown, Subj: Memorandum Concerning Political Situation in Panama," 07 February 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Political Developments; Rumors and Reports concerning alleged American Attitude towards Candidacy of Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro," 05 February 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Political Developments; Rumors and Reports concerning alleged American Attitude towards Candidacy of Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro," 05 February 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Article of Panama American regarding reports concerning alleged American Attitude towards candidacy of Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro," 06 February 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and Eduardo, "Interesting If True" in the Panama American February 5, 1940. "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Request by supporters for Ricardo J. Alfaro that United States disarm National Police and Supervise Presidential Elections," 12 February 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Political Situation; Attitude of Government and authorities toward Candidacy of Arnulfo Arias and towards Opposition; Little Prospect of Free Elections," 12 February 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Am Rep. to Finley and Duggan, Subj: Appeal for US aid in upcoming elections," 17 February 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Hull to Embassy Panama, Subj: US will not disarm National Police or Supervise Elections," 20 February 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 0 "Am Rep. to Finley and Duggan, Subj: Panama's Political Campaign," 06 March 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 1 "Am Rep. to Finley and Duggan, Subj: Presidential Campaign in Panama," 26 March 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 2 "Am Rep. to Finley and Duggan, Subj: The Panamanian Presidential Campaign," 10 April 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. "Am Rep. to Finley and Woodward, Subj: open letter complaining about political conditions in panama," 22 April 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Am Rep. to Finley and Duggan, Subj: Panamanian Presidential Campaign," 18 April 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. "Am Rep. to Finley and Bursely, Subj: Alfarista Leaders have left company," 24 April 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Am Rep. to Finley and Duggan, Subj: The Panamanian Presidential Campaign," 18 March 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 105 "Am Rep. to Finley and Duggan, Subj: Panama Political Campaign," 02 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Politcal Conditions: Discussion of certain Aspects of Situation with Reference to Talk or Serious Disturbances," 03 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 106 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Urgent Request of President Boyd for Zone Telephone," 04 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. "Am Rep to Welles, Subj: State Department position in possible Panama election violence," 07 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 108 "Am Rep. to Finley and Duggan, Subj: Panama Politcal Campaign," 08 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Am Rep to Finley, Subj: Panama Political Campaign," 15 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 109 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Political Situation; Alfarista Account of Conference held by President Boyd with Political leaders representing both sides," 23 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 1 !0 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Plumber Arrested for making bombs for the Alfarista leadership," 25 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 111 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: still no disturbances," 27 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Panamanian Foreign Minister Officially requested the Transfer of detained subversives," 27 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson to SecState, Subj: No Reports of Disturbances," 29 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Alfaro telegram to state department re-extradition," 29 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 1 1 9 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Political Situation: Indications that Alfaristas intend to abstain from voting," 17 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential 228

US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson to SecState, Subj: manifesto published that political groups backing Alfaro should abstain from voting," 31 May 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Am Rep to Finley, Subj: copy of Manifesto annoucing Alfaristas abstention of voting," 04 June 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. in " "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Presidential Elections of June 2: Official Count Shows 107,759 Votes for Arnulfo Arias," 05 July 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 114 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: peaceful election," 02 June 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson to SecState, Subj: preliminary election results," 04 June 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Elections of June 2; Preliminsry returns show vote of 90,000 for Arnulfo Arias," 06 June 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II.

Notes to Chapter 4

115 Conniff, Panama and the United States, pp. 92, 93. 116 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: National Civic Guard Disbanded," 12 June 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Part of General Van Voorhis Order Urging Panamanians taking refuge in Zone to depart after elections," 06 June 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 117 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Part of General Van Voorhis Order Urging Panamanians taking refuge in Zone to depart after elections," 06 June 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 118 "Chapin to Col. Crane, Subj: Pro-Nazi Activities by Present Gov't and Pres-Elect Arias," 01 August 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 119 "Am Rep to Daniels and Duggan, Subj: President-Elect Arias," 26 August 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 120 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Plans of President Arias regarding Constitutional Reform; Draft of New Constitution distributed to deputies but not yet formally introduced in 229

National Assembly.," 18 October 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59;NARAII. 121 "Am Rep to Finley and Duggan, Subj: Political Developments in Panama," 27 September 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Plans of President Arias regarding Constitutional Reform; Draft of New Constitution distributed to deputies but not yet formally introduced in National Assembly.," 18 October 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Am Rep to Finley and Duggan, Subj: Proposed Panama Constitution," 30 October 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 123 "Welles to Amembassy, Subj: seek a meeting with President Arias," 15 November 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "State to American Ambassador, Subj: instructions re: new panama constitution," 18 November 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 124 "State to American Ambassador, Subj: instructions re: new panama constitution," 18 November 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Am Rep to Barber, Finley, and Duggan, Subj: Dawson meeting with Foreign Secretary and President," 27 November 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 125 "Am Rep to Finley and Duggan, Subj: Political Developments in Panama," 27 September 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Am Rep to Duggan and Welles, Subj: Intentions of New President," 01 October 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Am Rep to Finley and Duggan, Subj: Proposed Panama Constitution," 30 October 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Am Rep to Barber, Finley, and Duggan, Subj: Political Conditions in Panama," 16 December 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Colonel Pino removed as head of national police," 21 December 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 126 "Am Rep to King and Finley, Subj: Political Situations," 15 January 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. "Deegan to State Dept, Subj: Unpatriotic to Panama National Movement," 08 Feb 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 128 U.S. Department of State website - Office of the Historian - Chiefs of Mission by Country - Panama http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/po/com/l 1139.htm 1 9Q "Welles to the President, Subj: personal letter from harmodio arias," 07 July 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 130 "Harmodio Arias to several cabinet ministers including: Ricardo de la Guardia, Raul de Roux, Ernesto Fabrega, subj: persecution by Arnulfo" 31 July 1941; File 3: Presidential Election Campaign (1940), Caja 5; Archivos Nacionales de Panama, Panama, Republic of Panama. 131 "Welles to the President, Subj: personal letter from harmodio arias," 07 July 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 132 "Harmodio Arias to several" 31 July 1941; Box 5, File 3 Presidential Election Campaign (1940) Arnulfo Arias Madrid; ler Periodo (1940-1941); Archivos Nacional de Panama, Panama, Republic de Panama. 133 "Dawson to SecState, Subj: Transmitting Memorandum prepared by commercial attache concerning Panamanian light and power company, an American concern, which is expected to experience difficulties with the government under the new constitution," 15 December 1940; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 134 "Information Series 78a subj: The American Republics," 01 June 1941; Box 3066; General Records of the Department of State; Decimal File 1940-44; RG59; NARA II. 135 "Boyd to Welles, Subj: Panameno and Anti-US feeling to Panama," 15 Apr 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Am Rep to Barber and Finley, Subj: Antonio Isaza - friend of President Arias," 18 May 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 136 "Boyd to Welles, Subj: Panameno and Anti-US feeling to Panama," 15 Mar 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, MD 137 "Boyd to Welles, Subj: Efforts by Arias Administration to make life in Panama difficult for Americans," 24 Apr 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 138 "State Dept to Charge ad Interim, Subj: Remarks made by Sefior Julio E. Bricello," 08 May 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 231

Max Paul Friedman, Nazis And Good Neighbors; The United States Campaign Against The Germans Of Latin America In World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge Univerity Press, 2003), p. 88. no "15NPJ intelligence Report Serial _ 137-41, Subj: Panama - Social Forces - Important Newspapers & Periodicals," 23 August 1941; Folder - Populations & Social 3; Box 2731; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 2100; RG165; NARA II. 141Langley, The United States And The Caribbean, pp.158, 159. 142 "MID Military Attache Report No. 61, Subj: Stability Of Government," 13 March 1941; Folder - Political Stability; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Boyd to Welles, Subj: Panameno and Anti-US feeling to Panama," 15 Mar 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 143 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, On Maintaining Freedom of the Seas Radio Address of the President, Broadcast from the White house, Washington, D.C. September 11, 1941. http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/091141 .html 144 "Welles to the President, Subj: personal letter from Harmodio Arias," 07 July 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 145 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 203-41, Subj: Panama - Social Forces - Revolutionary Forces," 10 October 1941; Folder - Revolt October 1941; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Carter, Paraphrase Of Code Radiogram, No.277, Subj: Arias Travel Plans," 08 October 1941; Folder - Revolt October 1941; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. 146 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 203-41, Subj: Panama - Social Forces - Revolutionary Forces," 10 October 1941; Folder - Revolt October 1941; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. 147 Ricardo de la Guardia, subj: Honorables Diputados, 2 January 1943, p.2; Seccion Administracion del Estado Ricardo A. de la Guardia, 1941 - 1945; Caja 5; Archivos Nacionales de Panama, Panama, Republic of Panama. 148 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 209-41, Subj: Panama - Social Forces - Revolutionary Forces," 15 October 1941; Folder - Revolt October 1941; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, MD 149 "Hull, Statement, Subj: Statement Of The Secretary Of State Regarding Recent Events In Panama," 16 October 1941; Folder - Revolt October 1941; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II, p.2. 232

"Hull, Statement, Subj: Statement Of The Secretary Of State Regarding Recent Events In Panama," 16 October 1941; Folder - Revolt October 1941; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Latin American Internal, Subj: Overthrow Of Arias," 10 October 1941; Folder - Revolt October 1941; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. 151 LaFeber, The Panama Canal, p. 77. 152 Major. Prize Possession, p. 267. 153 "G-2 Report, Subj: Political Trends In Panama; 1931 To November, 1943," 24 January 1944; Folder - Panama 3020; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II, p. 16. 154 "Morris to SecState, Subj: German Reaction to Hull Statement," 18 October 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 155 "MID Military Attache Report, No.290, Subj: Overthrow Of Arnulfo Arias," 21 October 1941; Folder - Revolt October 1941; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "MID Military Attache Report, No.289, Subj: Overthrow Of Arnulfo Arias," 21 October 1941; Folder - Revolt October 1941; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 209-41, Subj: Panama - Social Forces - Revolutionary Forces," 15 October 1941; Folder - Revolt October 1941; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. 156 "Daniels to Welles, Subj: Panama calm after coup," 15 October 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Wilson to SecState, Subj: official reception for diplomatic corps," 15 October 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II; and "Wilson to SecState, Subj: President received diplomatic corps and all missions were present," 18 October 1941; Folder - 819.00; Box C0031 Roll 01; Confidential US State Department Central Files: Panama; Foreign Affairs, 1940-41; RG59; NARA II. 157 "OSS report 8395, subj: Carlos Arcos, Spanish Minister in Panama," 31 October 1941; Folder - 8390 - 8449; Box 36; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 8300 - 8616; RG226; NARA II.

Notes to Chapter 5 "Arcos To Unknown, Subj: Falange In Panama," 10 January 1941; Folder - Panama Misc; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. 159 "Arcos To Unknown, Subj: Falange In Panama," 10 January 1941; Folder - Panama Misc; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. 160 "Sharp To A.C. Of S., G-2, Subj: Letter from United Fruit Company Talking About Political Situation In Panama," 17 January 1941; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 161 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 59-41, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 13 May 1941; Folder - 3850 PanamaHist; Box 2735; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3600 - 3850; RG165; NARA II. "15ND Intelligence Report, subj: Panama, Political Forces, Foreign Penetration," 20 August 1941; Folder - 6090 to 6149; Box 27; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 6090 - 6250; RG226; NARA II; and "Carter To Assistant Chief Of Staff, G-2, Subj: Officials Of The Spanish Falange At Time Of Dissolving," 29 August 1941; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 163 "Juan A. Bernal, M.D. Director de la Section de Salubridad to Arnulfo Arias, subj: Red Cross", 14 November 1940; File 1: Ministerio de Trabajo Prevision Social Y Salud Publica; Arnulfo Arias Madrid; ler Periodo (1940-1941), pp. 81, 82. Caja 1; Archivos Nacionales de Panama, Panama, Republic of Panama. 164 "Cruz Roja Nacional de Panama, subj: Ana Matilde Linares de Arias" 15 January 1941; File 1: Ministerio de Trabajo Prevision Social Y Salud Publica; Arnulfo Arias Madrid; ler Periodo (1940-1941), pp. 110, 111. Caja 1; Archivos Nacionales de Panama, Panama, Republic of Panama. 165 ^gj £on(je ^ Baii£n to Ana Matilde Linares de Arias, subj: Cruz Roja" 28 January 1941; File 1: Ministerio de Trabajo Prevision Social Y Salud Publica; Arnulfo Arias Madrid; ler Periodo (1940-1941), p. 112. Caja 1; Archivos Nacionales de Panama, Panama, Republic of Panama. 166 "Lius de la Barra Lastarria, Panamanian Delegate to the 4* Inter American Conference of the Red Cross" January 1941; File 1: Ministerio de Trabajo Prevision Social Y Salud Publica; Arnulfo Arias Madrid; ler Periodo (1940-1941), pp. 125, 126. Caja 1; Archivos Nacionales de Panama, Panama, Republic of Panama. 167 "unknown intelligence report OSS doc 7427, subj: Carlos Arcos," 05 November 1941; Folder - 7415 - 7484; Box 32; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 7281 - 7484; RG226; NARA II; and "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 151-41, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 05 September 1941; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 168 "Street To Military Attache At Havana, Cuba, Subj: Principe Rospoli," 14 November 1940; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 169 "Street To Military Attache At Havana, Cuba, Subj: Principe Rospoli," 14 November 1940; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 227-41, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 07 November 1941; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 170 "List of Donors to Red Cross March 1941" March 1941; File 1: Ministerio de Trabajo Prevision Social Y Salud Publica; Arnulfo Arias Madrid; ler Periodo (1940-1941), p.l 16, Caja 1; Archivos Nacionales de Panama, Panama, Republic of Panama. 171 "Carter To Assistant Chief Of Staff, G-2, Subj: Casa Japonesa," 09 November 1940; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Memorandum For Chief, Latin American Section, Subj: Bribery Of Panamanian Officials," 30 November 1940; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "unknown Extract, Subj: Deportation Of Japanese Y Sadahiro By President Arias," 02 December 1940; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 172 "Carter To Assistant Chief Of Staff, G-2, Subj: Casa Japonesa," 09 November 1940; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Memorandum For Chief, Latin American Section, Subj: Bribery Of Panamanian Officials," 30 November 1940; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "unknown Extract, Subj: Deportation Of Japanese Y Sadahiro By President Arias," 02 December 1940; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 173 "unsigned letter from Japanese Legation in Panama to Panamanian Foreign Office, subj: Japanese immigration" 23 October 1940; File lAsuntos Exteriores; Arnulfo Arias Madrid; ler Periodo (1940-1941) Caja 10, Archivos Nacionales de Panama, Panama, Republic of Panama. "MID Military Attache Report No. 9692, Subj: Japanese Subversive Activities," 02 August 1941; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. '5 "Kirk To Welles, Subj: Pro-Hitler President Of Panama," 18 September 1940; Box Box 4087; General Records of the Department of State; Decimal File 1940-1944; 811C.51/17-811F.111/3-1444; RG59; NARA II. 6 "Muccio To SecState, Despatch No. 679, Subj: Records Found In German Consulate, Colon," 14 February 1942; Folder - Political Information; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II, p. 3. 7 "Muccio To SecState, Despatch No. 679, Subj: Records Found In German Consulate, Colon," 14 February 1942; Folder - Political Information; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 8 "Muccio To SecState, Despatch No. 679, Subj: Records Found In German Consulate, Colon," 14 February 1942; Folder - Political Information; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 9 "Memorandum of a Conversation between Ambassador Wilson and Arnulfo Arias, subj: naturalized Germans and Italians, 28 June 1941; File 3: Ministerio de Relationes Exteriores: Zona Del Canal—Bases o Sitos de Defenso; Arnulfo Arias Madrid; ler Periodo (1940-1941), Caja 8; Archivos Nacionales de Panama, Panama, Republic of Panama. 0 "Juan Ramon Ramirez, jefe de la policia secreta nacional, subj: Hebrew residents living in Panama" 23 April 1941; File 1; Arnulfo Arias Madrid; ler Periodo (1940- 1941), Caja 4; Archivos Nacionales de Panama, Panama, Republic of Panama. 1 "Muccio To SecState, Despatch No. 679, Subj: Records Found In German Consulate, Colon," 14 February 1942; Folder - Political Information; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II, quote on page 10. 2 "Dawson To SecState, Despatch No. 1039, Subj: Possible Use Of Ostensibly Commercial Messages By The German Government To Communicate with The German Agents In The Other American Republics," 01 April 1941; Folder - Political Information; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 3 Rout Jr, Leslie B. and John F. Bratzel, The Shadow War; German Espionage and United States Counterespiopnage in World War II (Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 1986), pp. 16, 128, 132, 180; and "MID Military Attache Report, No. 94, Subj: Activities Of Foreigners In Country - German," 14 April 1941; Folder - Political Information; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. ' "MID Military Attache Report, No. 94, Subj: Activities Of Foreigners In Country - German," 14 April 1941; Folder - Political Information; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 5 "Street To Military Attache At San Jose, Costa Rica, Subj: Unknown Germans Coming To Panama," 23 May 1941; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2735; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3600 - 3850; RG165; NARA II; and "Smith To Assistant Chief Of Staff, G-2, PCD, Subj: Axis Activities In Panama," 10 June 1941; Folder - Political Information; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Carter To A.C. Of S., G-2, War Department, Subj: Variois Nazis In Panama," 24 June 1941; Folder - Population and Social; Box 2730; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 1000-2100; RG165; NARA II. 6 "15ND intelligence report, subj: Panama, Social Forces, Censorship," 22 November 1941; Folder - 6800 - 6829; Box 29; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 6569 - 6844; RG226; NARA II; and "unknown intelligence report OSS doc 6798, subj: Eric O. Cerjack Persona non grata," 30 October 1941; Folder - 6761 - 6799; Box 29; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 6569 - 6844; RG226; NARA II; "Carter Paraphrase Of Radiogram, Subj: Eric O. Carjack-Boyna," 21 November 1941; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2735; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3600 - 3850; RG165;NARAII.

Notes to Chapter 6

LaFeber, The Panama Canal pp. 74-77; and Conniff, Panama and the United States. pp.92-97. 188 Pearcv, We Answer Only to God, pp. 93-100. 189 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs Of Cordell Hull. 2 vols. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948), pp. 1143, 1144. 190 Hull, "The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Uruguay (Dawson)" January 1, 1942. FRUS 1942, Vol.V, p. 10. 191 Hull, "The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Uruguay (Dawson)" January 1, 1942. FRUS, 1942.Vol.V, pp.10, 11. 1 09 Hull, "The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Bowers)" December 25, 1941. FRUS 1941, Vol.V, p. 6. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ci.html Welles, "The American Representative (Welles) to the Secretary of State" January 25, 1942, FRUS. 1942, Vol.V, pp. 39, 40; and Armour, "The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State" January 5, 1942. FRUS. 1942. Vol.V, p. 16. 5 Armour, "The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State" January 15, 1942. FRUS. 1942. Vol.V, p. 27; and Welles, "The American Representative (Welles) to the Secretary of State" January 19, 1942. FRUS, 1942. Vol.V, p. 30. 6 Welles, "The American Representative (Welles) to the Secretary of State" January 25, 1942. FRUS, 1942, Vol.V, pp. 40, 41. 7 Welles, "The American Representative (Welles) to the Secretary of State" January 22, 1942. FRUS, 1942, Vol.V, pp. 32, 33; and Welles, "The American Representative (Welles) to the Secretary of State", January 22, 1942. FRUS. 1942. Vol.V, pp. 33, 34. 8 Hull, Memoirs. 2 vols., p. 1149. 9 Welles, "The American Representative (Welles) to the Secretary of State" January 25, 1942. FRUS. 1942, Vol.V, pp. 40, 41; and Robert D. Tomasek, "Defense of the Western Hemisphere: A Need for Reexamination of United States Policy." Midwest Journal of Political Science #3 November 1959: p. 376. 0 "MID Military Attache Report, No.399, Subj: Riots In Panama City," 16 05 1942; Folder - Populations & Social 2; Box 2731; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 2100; RG165; NARA II; and "MID Military Attache Report, No.358, Subj: Weekly Stability Report," 09 May 1942; Folder - Political Stability; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. 11 "MID Military Attache Report, No.399, Subj: Riots In Panama City," 16 05 1942; Folder - Populations & Social 2; Box 2731; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 2100; RG165; NARA II. 2 Pearcy, We Answer Only to God, pp. 80-82, 94-99 3 "Wilson To SecState, Despatch_ 2300, Subj: Transmitting Copy Of Military Police Report On Disturbance In Panama City On May 3, 1942," 29 05 1942; Folder - Populations & Social 2; Box 2731; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 2100; RG165;NARAII. 4 "Theroux To Commanding Officer, Hq & Hq Sq., VI Bomber Command, APO No. 825, Subj: Robbery," 05 November 1942; Box 190; Records of the Panama Canal Department; RG338; NARA II; and "James To Commanding Officer, APO No. 826, Subj: Report Of Robbery," 12 December 1942; Box 190; Records of the Panama Canal Department; RG338; NARA II; and "Tremarello To Commanding Officer, Air Base, APO No. 825, Subj: Report Of Armed Robbery," 31 December 1942; Box 190; Records of the Panama Canal Department; RG338; NARA II. 5 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 64-63, Subj: Panama; Political Forces; Foreign Penetration," 28 April 1943; Folder - Populations & Social 2; Box 2731; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 2100; RG165; NARA II, pp. 2, 3. 238

"15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 64-63, Subj: Panama; Political Forces; Foreign Penetration," 28 April 1943; Folder - Populations & Social 2; Box 2731; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 2100; RG165; NARA II "Stimson to Smith, Subj: joint resolution about turning over Panama Railroad Company property," 07 July 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security- Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 208 "Stimson to Smith, Subj: joint resolution about turning over Panama Railroad Company property," 07 July 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security- Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 209 "de la Guardia - Address, Subj: Honorables Diputados," 02 Enero 1943; Caja 5; Seccion Administracion del Estado Ricardo A. De La Guardia Periodo Republicano, 1941-1945; Archivo Nacional de Panama, Panama City, Panama. 210 "Briggs, Periodic Report, No.49, Subj: Panama," 05 June 1943; Folder - Political Stability HQ; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. 211 "Strong to George C. Marshall, subj: Panama Incidents," 31 December 1943; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II; and "Brett to Muccio, subj: criticism of US military in Star and Herald," 19 December 1943; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security- Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 212 "Brett to Muccio, subj: criticism of US military in Star and Herald," 19 December 1943; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942- 1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. TIT "Marshall to Lt General Brett, subj: Incident Involving President of Panama," 04 January 1944; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 214 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 17-42, Subj: Panama - Social Forces - Oppressed Minorities And Disappointed Groups," 17 January 1942; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 215 npcj) jo G-2 Caribbean Defense Command, Subj: Arnulfista Actions In Panama," 31 March 1942; Folder - Political Information 2; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 16 "pep j0 Q_2 Caribbean Defense Command, Subj: Arnulfista Actions In Panama," 31 March 1942; Folder - Political Information 2; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 217 "MID Military Attache Report, No.389, Subj: Panama Political Situation," 23 September 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 218 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 4-43, Subj: Panama - Political Parties - Strength Of Party In Power," 03 January 1943; Folder - Political Information 2; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 219 Colonel J.K. Cockrell - comments on "MID Military Attache Report, No.389, Subj: Panama Political Situation," 23 September 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 220 "MID Military Attache Report, No.389, Subj: Panama Political Situation," 23 September 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 221 "15ND Intelligence Report, subj: Panama, Government, Relations with Other Nations, Protest to US," 07 February 1943; Folder - 29200 - 29207; Box 288; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 29150 - 29256; RG226; NARA II. 222 "Naylor To Col. Strong, Subj: Reported Revolution Attempt - Panama - Request For Comments," 22 July 1943; Folder - Political Information 2; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Cockrell To Col. Strong, Subj: Reported Revolution Attempt - Panama," 23 July 1943; Folder - Political Information 2; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 223 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 134-43, Subj: Panama - Political Parties - Strength Of Party In Power," 07 September 1943; Folder - Political Information 2; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 224 "MID Military Attache Report, No.422, Subj: Resume Of Panama Political Situation," 05 November 1943; Folder - Political Stability HQ; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. 225 "G-2 Report, Subj: Political Trends In Panama; 1931 To November, 1943," 24 January 1944; Folder - Panama 3020; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II, pp. 23, 24. 226 "MID Military Attache Report, No.422, Subj: Resume Of Panama Political Situation," 05 November 1943; Folder - Political Stability HQ; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "G-2 Report, Subj: Political Trends In Panama; 1931 To November, 1943," 24 January 1944; Folder - Panama 3020; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II, p. 24. 227 "MID Intelligence Report, Subj: Panama Political Situation," 07 March 1944; Folder - Political Stability; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165;NARAII. 228 "MID Military Attache Report, No.454, Subj: Stability Of Panama Government," 25 March 1944; Folder - Political Stability; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. 229 "Warren to SecState, subj: Political Situation in Panama," 06 September 1944; Folder - 96958 - 96961; Box 1112; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 96841 - 97012; RG226; NARA II. 230 Pearcy, We Answer Only to God, p. 100.

Notes to Chapter 7

9^1 Republica de Panama, subj: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores - Informacion Numero 3, (no date); Seccion Administracion del Estado Ricardo A. de la Guardia, 1941 - 1945; Caja 6; Archivos Nacionales de Panama, Panama, Republic of Panama. 9^9 "Wilson to SecState, subj: Supplementary Account of Measures Taken Since Declarations of War," 26 December 1941; Folder - 10300 - 10340; Box 45; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 10250 - 10340; RG226; NARA II. 233 "unknown to FDR, Subj: cursory outline report of (someone's) visit to Panama," 14 March 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. ' "unknown to FDR, Subj: cursory outline report of (someone's) visit to Panama," 14 March 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. ' "Stimson to Frank Knox SecNavy, Subj: summary of some naval defenses panama," 14 April 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 236 "Eisenhower to Marshall, Subj: Paraphrase of Attached Airmailgram," 30 March 1942; Folder - Caribbean Def Comnd; Box 115; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General 241

Correspondence, 1942-1943: Project Defense Comm-Anti-Aircraft Southern Defense; RG 165; NARA II; and "Patterson to Stimson, Subj: Memorandum for the Secretary of War" 8 April 1942; Folder - Caribbean Def Comnd; Box 115; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security- Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1943: Project Defense Comm-Anti-Aircraft Southern Defense; RG 165; NARA II. "Andrews to Marshall, Subj: general conditions in the Canal Zone," 14 April 1942; Folder - Caribbean Def Comnd; Box 115; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1943: Project Defense Comm-Anti-Aircraft Southern Defense; RG 165; NARA II. "Handy to Stimson, Subj: forces available in case the French in Martinique try to sortie," 21 April 1942; Folder - Caribbean Def Comnd; Box 115; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security- Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1943: Project Defense Comm-Anti-Aircraft Southern Defense; RG 165; NARA II. 9 "Eisenhower to Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Defenses in Panama," 24 April 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942- 1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 0 "Eisenhower to Marshall, Subj: Defense Sites Republic of Panama," 25 April 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 1 "Strong to Marshall, Subj: Treaty Between the United States and Panama regarding Defense Installations," 13 July 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security- Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II; and "Wilson to SecState, subj: Letter from Secretary of State, May 28, 1942, and inclosures, regarding purchases by post exchanges in the Panama Canal Zone," 16 July 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 2 "Eisenhower to Marshall, Subj: Deferment of Construction of the Third Set of Locks for the Panama Canal," 21 May 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security- Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II; and "Handy to Marshall, Subj: Deferment of Completion of Third Locks Project for the Panama Canal," 15 June 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security- Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 3 "Andrews to Marshall, Subj: Construction of the Third Set of Locks," 18 May 1942; Folder - Caribbean Def Comnd; Box 115; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1943: Project Defense Comm-Anti-Aircraft Southern Defense; RG165;NARAII. 244 "Eisenhower to Marshall, Subj: Pan American Highway," 04 June 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 245 "Stimson to SecState, subj: Pan-American Highway," 12 September 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 246 "Hathaway Report, Subj: Anti-Sabotage Plan For Fort Sherman, Canal Zone," 14 May 1942; Box 190; Records of the Panama Canal Department; RG338; NARA II. 247 "Stackpole To Army Post Commanders, Subj: Anti-Sabotage Plans," 16 May 1942; Box 190; Records of the Panama Canal Department; RG338; NARA II. 248 "Patrick To Post Commanders, Subj: Fire Prevention And Counter-Sabotage," 10 September 1942; Box 190; Records of the Panama Canal Department; RG338; NARA II. 249 "Stackpole To The Governor, The Panama Canal, Balboa Heights, CZ, Subj: Anti- Sabotage Protection Of Vital Installations," 22 October 1942; Box 190; Records of the Panama Canal Department; RG338; NARA II; and "Stackpole To Commanding General, Panama Canal Department, Quarry Heights, CZ, Subj: Reservoir, Engineer Hill, Corozal," 22 October 1942; Box 190; Records of the Panama Canal Department; RG338; NARA II; and "Stackpole To Commanding General, Panama Canal Department, Quarry Heights, CZ, Subj: Security Of Reservoir, Herrick Heights," 20 November 1942; Box 190; Records of the Panama Canal Department; RG338; NARA II. 250 "Handy to CD, AAF, Subj: Radio Sets SCR-578," 29 July 1942; Folder - Caribbean Def Comnd; Box 115; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1943: Project Defense Comm-Anti-Aircraft Southern Defense; RG 165; NARA II. 251 "Handy to McNarney, subj: Shipment of Air Warning Company to Panama," 18 November 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 252 "Robins to Marshall, subj: Pipe Line Across the Isthmus of Panama," 07 August 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II; and "Handy to Marshall, subj: Pipe Line Across the Isthmus of Panama," 11 August 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 253 "Handy to Marshall, subj: Generators for Panama Canal," 08 November 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - 243

Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II; and "Marshall to Stimson, subj: Smoke generators for the Protection of the Canal," 09 November 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 4 "Strauss To G-2, Subj: Spanish Tanker," 24 February 1942; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 5 "Cockrell To War Department, Subj: Atlantic Submarine Menace," 12 April 1942; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165;NARAII. 6 "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.4, Subj: Panama," 25 July 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Marshall to CominC US Fleet, Subj: AS V Equipped Airplanes for the Caribbean Area," 21 August 1942; Folder - Caribbean Def Comnd; Box 115; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security- Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1943: Project Defense Comm-Anti-Aircraft Southern Defense; RG 165; NARA II. 7 "Marshall to CominC US Fleet, Subj: ASV Equipped Airplanes for the Caribbean Area," 21 August 1942; Folder - Caribbean Def Comnd; Box 115; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security- Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1943: Project Defense Comm-Anti-Aircraft Southern Defense; RG 165; NARA II. 8 "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.20, Subj: Panama," 14 November 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Cockrell Periodic Report, No. 19, Subj: Panama," 07 November 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 9 "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.34, Subj: Panama," 20 Februaryl943; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 0 "Strong, Periodic Report, No.70, Subj: Panama," 30 October 1943; Folder - Political Stability HQ; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. 1 "Strong, Periodic Report, No.74, Subj: Panama," 27 November 1943; Folder - Political Stability HQ; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165;NARAII. American Merchant Marine at War, www.usmm.org 244

'". "Strong, Periodic Report, No.75, Subj: Panama," 04 December 1943; Folder - Political Stability HQ; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Strong, Periodic Report, No.77, Subj: Panama," 18 December 1943; Folder - Political Stability HQ; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Strong, Periodic Report, No.79, Subj: Panama," 01 January 1944; Folder - Political Stability HQ; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. 4 "McNarney to CG, CDC, Subj: Possible Reduction in Personnel within the Caribbean Defense Command," 14 April 1943; Folder - Caribbean Def Comnd; Box 115; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1943: Project Defense Comm-Anti- Aircraft Southern Defense; RG 165; NARA II. 5 "Hull to Deputy Chief of Staff, Subj: Attached Papers," 10 April 1943; Folder - Caribbean Def Comnd; Box 115; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942- 1943: Project Defense Comm-Anti-Aircraft Southern Defense; RG 165; NARA II. 6 Conn et al. Guarding The United States And Its Outposts, pp. 81, 82. 7 "Hull to Marshall, subj: Reassignment of Submarines Now Based at Panama," 12 May 1943; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942- 1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II; and "Marshall to Admiral King, subj: Reassignment of Submarines Now Based at Panama," 17 May 1943; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 8 "Nelson to the Inspector General, Subj: Investigation of the Operation of Personnel Replacement Policies in the Caribbean Defense Command," 01 August 1943; Folder - Caribbean Def Comnd; Box 115; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942- 1943: Project Defense Comm-Anti-Aircraft Southern Defense; RG 165; NARA II. 9 "Hull to Deputy Chief of Staff, Subj: Reduction in Garrison Strength CDC," 13 October 1943; Folder - Caribbean Def Comnd; Box 115; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security- Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1943: Project Defense Comm-Anti-Aircraft Southern Defense; RG 165; NARA II. 0 "Hull to CEO Panama Canal, subj: Executive Order - "Aircraft, Air Navigation, Air- Navigation Facilities, and Aeronautical Activities Within the Canal Zone.,"" 17 December 1943; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II; and "Stimson to SecState, subj: Panamanian Commercial Airline," 09 December 1943; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 1 Erich Gimpel, Agent 146: The True Story of a Nazi Spy in America. Mass Market Edition (New York: Berkley Rose, 2003), pp.47-53.

n Henry Sakaida, Gary Nila, and Koji Takaki, 1-400 Japan's Secret Aircraft-Carrying Strike Submarine: Objective Panama Canal. (England: Hikoki Publications Limited, 2006), pp. 35-50.

Notes to Chapter 8

' "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 299-41, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 20 December 1941; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 4 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 11-42, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 14 January 1942; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 5 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 18-42, Subj: Panama - Social Forces - Foreign Penetration," 21 January 1942; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 30-42, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 28 January 1942; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 6 "Lippmann to Harvey Bundy, War Department, Subj: letter from Frank Hutton to Walter Lippman," 27 February 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security- Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II; and "Andrews to Colonel John R. Deane, Subj: letter from Frank Hutton to Walter Lippman," 14 March 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security- Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. "Hoover to Donovan, subj: Alfred Wilhelm Zelger, alias Berchthold," 10 April 1942; Folder - 14650 - 14655; Box 71; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 14622 - 14747; RG226; NARA II. "Hoover to Donovan, subj: Spanish citizen arrested in Costa Rica for being Nazi spy,' 06 February 1942; Folder - 11150 - 11179; Box 49; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 11100 - 11300; RG226; NARA II; and "Hoover to Donovan, subj: German 246

agents in Panama," 23 February 1942; Folder - 12750 - 12780; Box 54; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 12415 - 12780; RG226; NARA II; and "Hoover to Donovan, subj: Ed Kliemann," 11 April 1942; Folder - 14693 - 14706; Box 71; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 14622 -14747; RG226; NARA II. 9 "Wilson to SecState, subj: Internment of Enemy Aliens in Panama," 14 January 1942; Folder - 10300 - 10340; Box 45; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 10250 - 10340; RG226; NARA II. 0 "Wilson To SecState, Despatch No.2168, Subj: Subversive Activities In Panama," 11 May 1942; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 1 "Wilson To SecState, Despatch No.2168, Subj: Subversive Activities In Panama," 11 May 1942; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 2 "Cockrell Periodic Report, No. 12, Subj: Panama," 19 September 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.13, Subj: Panama," 26 September 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Cockrell Periodic Report, No. 17, Subj: Panama," 24 October 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 3 "Cockrell Periodic Report, No. 12, Subj: Panama," 19 September 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 4 "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.27, Subj: Panama," 02 January 1943; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 5 "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.20, Subj: Panama," 14 November 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.26, Subj: Panama," 26 December 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 6 "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.20, Subj: Panama," 14 November 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; 247

NARA II; and "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.26, Subj: Panama," 26 December 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 7 "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.31, Subj: Panama," 30 January 1943; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.32, Subj: Panama," 06 Februaryl943; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 8 "Cockrell, Periodic Report, No.40, Subj: Panama," 03 April 1943; Folder - Political Stability HQ; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. 9 "Cockrell Periodic Report No.43, Subj: Panama," 30 April 1943; Folder - Political Stability; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II. "Dubois Report Of Interview, Subj: Interview with Manuel Onos De Plandolit," 10 April 1944; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 1 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 88-42, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 23 March 1942; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II; and "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 96-42, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 02 April 1942; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2735; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3600 - 3850; RG165;NARAII. 2 "Wilson To SecState, Despatch No.2168, Subj: Subversive Activities In Panama," 11 May 1942; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 3 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 134-42, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 18 May 1942; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 4 "ONI Intelligence Report, Serial_ R316-42, Subj: Spain - Axis Nations - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 18 July 1942; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II; and "Briggs To SecState, Despatch No. 547, Subj: Confidential Correspondance Of Sr. Carlos Arcos Former Spanish Minister To Panama, Seized By Cuban Police," 24 July 1942; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2735; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3600 - 3850; RG165; NARA II; and "ONI Intelligence Report, Serial_ R323-42, Subj: Spain - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 27 July 1942; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 5 "MID Intelligence Report, Subj: Manuel Onos De Plandolit," 09 September 1942; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165;NARAII. 6 "MID Intelligence Report, Subj: Manuel Onos De Plandolit," 09 September 1942; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165;NARAII. 7 "MID Intelligence Report, Subj: Manuel Onos De Plandolit," 09 September 1942; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165;NARAII. 8 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 234-42, Subj: Panama - Foreign Relations - Relations with Vichy France," 21 November 1942; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 9 "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.22, Subj: Panama," 28 November 1942; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 0 "Intelligence Report," 17 January 1943; Folder - Free Movements; Box 2730; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 1000-2100; RG165; NARA II. " "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 24-43, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 04 February 1943; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 2 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 37-43, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 08 March 1943; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 13 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 24-43, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 04 February 1943; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 4 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 37-43, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 08 March 1943; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 249

Manuel Onos de Plandolit to Octavio Fabrega, despatch No A:20, dated March 27, 1943, Panama. In Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1943-1944. Archivo Nacional de Panama, Panama, Republic of Panama, pp. 232-235. 306 Hj^D Intelligence Report, Serial_ 75-43, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 05 June 1943; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 307 HJ^J) intelligence Report, Serial_ 129-43, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 02 September 1943; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 308 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 274-43, Subj: Panama-Spain - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 20 December 1943; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II; and "Strong, Periodic Report, No.75, Subj: Panama," 04 December 1943; Folder - Political Stability HQ; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Strong Periodic Report, No.82, Subj: Panama," 22 January 1944; Folder - Political Stability; Box 2732; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3000 - 3020; RG165;NARAII. 309 "Dubois Report Of Interview, Subj: Interview with Manuel Onos De Plandolit," 10 April 1944; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 310 "Briggs Intelligence Report, No.468, Subj: Activity Of Spanish Falangists In Panama," 26 April 1944; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 311 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 299-41, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 20 December 1941; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II; and "Baldwin To Cockrell, Subj: Axis Nationals In Panama," 20 February 1942; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 312 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 11-42, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 14 January 1942; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 313 "Wilson To SecState, Despatch No.952, Subj: Subversive Activities In Panama," 13 March 1942; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II, p. 3. 250

314 "Wilson To SecState, Despatch No.952, Subj: Subversive Activities In Panama," 13 March 1942; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II, pp. 5, 6. 315 "Wilson To SecState, Despatch No.2168, Subj: Subversive Activities In Panama," 11 May 1942; Folder - Political Information 3; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II, p. 6; and "Hoover to Berle, subj: Search of Jap. Legation big by Panamanian District Police Republic of Panama," 22 August 1942; Folder - A8-5/EF37/EF53; Box 222; ONI Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942-1946; A8-5/EF37/EF46 to A8-5/EF37/EG3; RG38; NARA II. 316 "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.35, Subj: Panama," 27 Februaryl943; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II; and "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.36, Subj: Panama," 06 March 1943; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 317 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 11-42, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 14 January 1942; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II; and "Baldwin To Cockrell, Subj: Axis Nationals In Panama," 20 February 1942; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II; and "Cockrell Periodic Report, No.35, Subj: Panama," 27 February 1943; Folder - Stability HQ; Box 2733; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3020; RG165; NARA II. 318 "P.A. Medina to de la Guardia, subj; personal letter," 11 February 1942; Caja 6; Seccion Administracion del Estado Ricardo A. De La Guardia Periodo Republicano, 1941-1945; Archivo Nacional de Panama, Panama City, Panama; and "P.A. Medina to de la Guardia, subj; personal letter," 5 March 1942; Caja 6; Seccion Administracion del Estado Ricardo A. De La Guardia Periodo Republicano, 1941-1945; Archivo Nacional de Panama, Panama City, Panama. 319 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 76-42, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 13 March 1942; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2735; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3600 - 3850; RG165; NARA II; and "Stimson to Welles, Subj: actions of French Minister in Panama," 15 March 1942; Folder - Panama; Box 112; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs - Office of the Chief of Staff; Security-Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1947 - Palenstine - Rumania; RG 165; NARA II. 320 "Hoover to Donovan, subj: La Blanchetai, representative of French Government to Panama," 18 March 1942; Folder - 13702 - 13720; Box 62; Records of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development Branch; Intelligence Reports ("Regular" Series), 1941-45 13630 - 13758; RG226; NARA II. 251

"15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 87-42, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 21 March 1942; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2735; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3600 - 3850; RG165; NARA II. 2 "Cockrell To War Department, Subj: M. De La Blanchetai," 11 April 1942; Folder - Politicallnf; Box 2735; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3600 - 3850; RG165; NARA II. 3 "15ND Intelligence Report, Serial_ 257-42, Subj: Panama - Political Forces - Foreign Penetration," 14 December 1942; Folder - Politicallnf 2; Box 2734; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Military Intelligence Division "Regional File" 1922-1944 Panama 3030 - 3600; RG165; NARA II. 252

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Government Documents - Unpublished

Archivos Nacionales de Panama. Seccion Administracion del Estado - Arnulfo Arias Madrid ler Periodo Republicano, 1940-1941. Archivos Nacionales de Panama. Seccion Administracion del Estado - Ricardo A. de la Guardia Periodo Republicano, 1941-1945. Archivos Nacionales de Panama. Seccion Administracion del Estado - Enrique A. Jimenez Periodo Republicano, 1945-1948.

National Archives and Records Administration. Record Group 38. Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. National Archives and Records Adminisrtation. Record Group 59. General Records of the Department of State. National Archives and Records Administration. Record Group 84. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. National Archives and Records Administration. Record Group 165. Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs. National Archives and Records Administration. Record Group 181. Records of Naval Districts and Shore Establishments. National Archives and Records Administration. Record Group 185. Records of the Panama Canal. National Archives and Records Administration. Record Group 226. Records of the Office of Strategic Services. National Archives and Records Administration. Record Group 338. Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations (World War II and Thereafter) National Archives and Records Administration. Record Group 395. Records of the U.S. Army Overseas Operations and Commands, 1898-1942. Government Documents - Published

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931. Vol. II. Washington: GPO, 1946.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932. Vol. V. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1948.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933. Vol. IV. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1950.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933. Vol. V. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1952.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934. Vol. V. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1952.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1936. Vol. I. General, British Commonwealth. Washington: GPO, 1953.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1936. Vol. V. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1954.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937. Vol. V. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1954.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938. Vol. V. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1956.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939. Vol. V. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1957.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940. Vol. I. General. Washington: GPO, 1959.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940. Vol. V. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1961.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941. Vol. VII. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1962.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942. Vol. V. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1962.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942. Vol. VI. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1963. 254

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943. Vol. VI. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1965.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944. Vol. VII. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1967.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945. Vol. IX. The American Republics. Washington: GPO, 1969.

Memoria Que el Ministro de Gobierno y Justicia, 1943. Panama: Imprenta Nacional, 1943.

Memoria Que el Ministro de Gobierno y Justicia, 1945. Panama: Imprenta Nacional, 1945.

Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1936. Panama: Imprenta Nacional, n.d.

Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1938. Panama: Imprenta Nacional, n.d.

Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1940. Vol. I. Panama: Imprenta Nacional, n.d.

Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1940. Vol. II. Panama: Imprenta Nacional, n.d.

Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1943-1944. Panama: Imprenta Nacional, n.d.

Williams, Kathleen. AAF Historical Office, Air Defense of the Panama Canal; 01 January 1939 - 7 December 1941 Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 42, January, 1946

Secondary Sources

Books

Aguilar, Alonso, translated by Asa Zatz. Pan-Americanism from Monroe to the Present: A View from the Other Side, Revised English Edition. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.

Berle, Adolf A. Latin America - Diplomacy and Reality. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated, 1962.

Berle, Adolf A. and Beatrice Bishop Berle and Travis Beal Jacobs eds. Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973. 255

Biesanz, John and Mavis. The People of Panama. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.

Brooks, William Morris. Guarding the Crossroads: Security and Defense of the Panama Canal. Colombia: Imprelibros S.A., 2003.

Bykofsky, Jospeh, and Harold Larson. U.S. Army In Wold War II. The Technical Services; The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1957.

Castillero Reyes, Ernesto J. Historia de Panama. Panama, R. de P.: Editoria Renovacion, 1986.

Chong M, Moises. Historia de Panama. Panama, Rep. de Panama: Textos Escolares Chong-Ramar, 1997.

Conn, Stetson, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild. U.S. Army In Wold War II. The Western Hemisphere; Guarding The United States And Its Outposts. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1964.

Conniff, Michael L. Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992.

— Black Labor on a White Canal; Panama, 1904-1981. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985.

Dallek, Robert. Franklin Roosevelt And American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Dawson, Ezequiel. Confinados: Panama en el Vortice de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Panama: Impreso en los Talleres de la Imprenta ARTICSA, 2003.

Dubois, Jules. Danger Over Panama. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964.

Duggan, Laurence. The Americas: The Search for Hemisphere Security. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949.

Ealy, Lawrence O. Yanqui Poltics And The Isthmian Canal. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971.

The Republic of Panama in World Affairs 1903-1950, First Greenwood Reprinting. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1970.

Farnsworth, David N. U.S. - Panamanian Relations, 1903-1978 A Study In Linkage Politics. James W. McKenney. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983. 256

Fernandez Artucio, Hugo. The Nazi Underground in South America. Toronto: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1942.

Findling, John E. Close Neighbors, Distant Friends; United States-Central American Relations. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987.

Friedman, Max Paul. Nazis And Good Neighbors; The United States Campaign Against The Germans Of Latin America In World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Frye, Alton. Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, 1933-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.

Gimpel, Erich. Agent 146: The True Story of a Nazi Spy in America, Berkley Mass Market Edition. New York: Berkley Book, 2003.

Harding, Robert C. Military Foundations of Panamanian Politics. New Brunswick: Transaction Publications, 2001.

The History Of Panama. The Greenwood Histories of the Modern Nations. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2006.

Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs Of Cordell Hull. Vol. I. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948.

The Memoirs Of Cordell Hull. Vol. II. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948.

Humphreys, R. A. Latin America and the Second World War: Volume One 1939-1942. London: Athlone, 1981.

Latin America and the Second World War: Volume Two 1942-1945. London: Athlone, 1981.

Kelshall, Gaylord T. M. The U-Boat War in the Caribbean. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

LaFeber, Walter. The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective, Updated Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Langley, Lester. The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century, 4l Edition. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989.

Leonard, Thomas M. and John F. Bratzel, eds. Latin America During World War II. Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007. 257

Leonard, Thomas M. Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1991.

Liss, Sheldon B. The Canal: Aspects of United States Panamanian Relations. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967.

Maingot, Anthony P. The United States And The Caribbean. London: The MacMillan Press, 1994.

Major, John. Prize Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal 1903-1979. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002(1993).

Mecham, J. Lloyd. The United States And Inter-American Security, 1889-1960. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961.

Murray, Williamson and Allan R. Millet. A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 3r Printing. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001.

Pearcy, Thomas L. We Answer Only to God; Politics and the Military in Panama, 1903- 1947. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998.

Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, 60th Anniversary Edition. Toronto: Penguin Books, 1991.

Randall, Stephen J. and Graeme S. Mount. The Caribbean Basin: An International History. New York: Routledge, 1998.

Rippy, J. Fred, The Caribbean Danger Zone. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1940.

Ropp, Steve C. Panamanian Politics; From Guarded Nation to National Guard. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.

Sakaida, Henry, Gary Nila and Koji Takaki. 1-400 Japan's Secret Aircraft-Carrying Strike Submarine: Objective Panama Canal. England: Hikoki Publications Limited, 2006.

Shoultz, Lars. Beneath The United States; A History Of US Policy Toward Latin America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.

Sheinen, David. Argentina and the United States; An Alliance Contained. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006.

Soler, Ricaurte. Panama: historia de una crisis. Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1989. Martin Sicker, The Geopolitics Of Security In The Americas: Hemispheric Denial from Monroe To Clinton (Westport: Praeger, 2002)

Watson, Mark Skinner. U.S. Army In Wold War II. The War Department: Chief Of Staff: Prewar Plans And Preparations. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1950.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, New Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Articles

Anguizola, Gustave. "Negroes in the Building of the Canal." Phylon 29, 4 (4th Quarter, 1968): 351-359.

Bailey, Norman A. "The United States As Caudillo." Journal Of Inter-American Studies 5, 3 (July 1963): 313-324.

Berger, Mark T. "Civilizing The South; The US Rise To Hegemony In The Americas And The Roots Of'Latin American Studies' 1898-1945." Bulletin Of Latin American Research 12, 1 (January 1993): 1-48.

Berle Jr, Adolph A. "Our Foreign Policy In Latin America." Proceedings Of The Academy Of Political Science 18, 3 (May 1939): 13-22.

Bidwell, Percy W. "Ideals In American Foreign Policy." International Affairs 22, 4 (October, 1946): 479-487.

Biesanz, John. "Cultural and Economic Factors in Panamanian Race Relations." American Sociological Review 14, 6 (December 1949): 772-779.

"Race Relations in the Canal Zone." Phylon 11, 1 (1st quarter 1950): 23-30.

Biesanz, John and Luke M. Smith. "Panamanian Politics." The Journal of Politics 14, 3 (August 1952): 386-402.

Castle, William R. "The Monroe Doctrine And Pan-Americanism." Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science 204 (July 1939): 111-118.

Connell-Smith, Gordon. "Latin America In The Foreign Relations Of The United States." Journal Of Latin American Studies 8, 1 (May 1976): 137-150. 259

Culbertson, William S. "Economic Defense Of The Americas." Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science 211 (September 1940): 186-196.

Gatell, Frank Otto. "The Canal In Retropect-Some Panamanian And Colombian Views." The Americas 15, 1 (July 1958): 23-36.

LaFeber, Walter. "The 'Lion In The Path': The US Emergence As A World Power." Political Science Quaterly 101, 5 (1986): 705-718.

Langley, Lester D. "Negotiating New Treaties with Panama; 1936." Hispanic American Historical Review 48, 2 (May 1968): 220-233.

"US-Panamanian Relations Since 1941." Journal Of Interamerican Studies And World Affairs 12, 3 (July 1970): 339-366.

Leonard, Thomas M. "The Commissary Issue In American-Panamanian Relations 1900- 1936." The Americas 30, 1 (July 1973): 83-109.

"Search For Security; The United States And Central America In The Twentieth Century." The Americas 47, 4 (April 1991): 477-490.

Major, John. "FDR And Panama." The Historical Journal 28, 2 (June 1985): 357-377.

Manduley, Julio. "Panama: Dependent Capitalism And Beyond." Latin American Perspectives 7, 2/3 (Spring/summer 1980): 57-74.

Matthews, John M. "Roosevelt'S Latin American Policy." The American Political Science Review 29, 5 (October 1935): 805-820.

Pastor, Robert A. "The US And The Caribbean; The Power Of The Whirlpool." Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science 533 (May 1994): 19- 32.

Perez Jr, Louis A. "Dependency." The Journal Of American History 77, 1 (June 1990): 133-142.

Rippy, J. Fred. "German Investments In Latin America." The Journal Of Business Of The University Of Chicago 21,2 (April 1948): 63-73.

Rockwell, Arthur E. "The Lumber Trade And The Panama Canal, 1921 - 1940." The Economic History Review 24, 3 (August 1971): 445 - 462.

Tomasek, Robert D. "Defense Of The Western Hemisphere: A Need For Reexamination Of United States Policy." Midwest Journal Of Political Science 3 (November 1959): 374-401. 260

Tulchin, Joseph S. "The Formulation Of US Policy In The Caribbean." Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science 533 (May 1994): 177-187.