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The Case of Iran's Nuclear Program
Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs Volume 2 Issue 2 November 2013 The Prohibition on the Use of Force for Arms Control: The Case of Iran’s Nuclear Program Mary Ellen O'Connell University of Notre Dame Law School Reyam El Molla Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, International and Area Studies Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Political Science Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, Rule of Law Commons, Social History Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons ISSN: 2168-7951 Custom Citation The Prohibition on the Use of Force for Arms Control: The Case of Iran’s Nuclear Program, 2 Penn. St. J.L. & Int’l Aff. 315 (2013). The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs is a joint publication of Penn State’s School of Law and School of International Affairs. Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2013 VOLUME 2 NO. 2 THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE FOR ARMS CONTROL: THE CASE OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM Mary Ellen O’Connell and Reyam El Molla* In many discussions of Iran’s nuclear program, there seems to be an implicit assumption that states have a right to use military force to end the program. For example, the Institute for National Security Studies,1 an Israeli think tank, in an article titled, The Legality of an Attack against Iranian Nuclear Facilities, places emphasis on proving the necessity of an attack as a last resort but fails to indicate any accepted legal basis for resort to military force as an initial matter.2 In fact, international law does not permit the use of military force without United Nations Security Council authorization for arms control of any kind, whether to end a nuclear program, to end a chemical weapons program, or to prevent missile shipments. -
Focus On: Sanctions Against Iran, Libya and Syria July 2011
Focus on: sanctions against Iran, Libya and Syria July 2011 The worsening situation in Libya and Syria and the need to prevent sanction busting by Iran have provoked further tight- ening of international sanctions. The main measures approved by the EU, UN and US in recent months will have im- pacts on the economies and diplomatic relations of the above-mentioned countries. Iran . Iran’s efforts to bypass international sanctions by using foreign companies and other countries (a practice known as sanction busting) have resulted in the EU and US tightening sanctions and adding more institutions and indi- viduals to their blacklists. The aim of the sanctions, which target Iran’s finances, is to force Tehran to re-open ne- gotiations on its nuclear development programme and resolve the stalemate. Having adopted Regulation 961/2010 in October 2010, in May 2011 the European Council approved Council Im- plementing Regulation (EU) No. 503/2011 adding more people and entities to its blacklist. Among theme is the Iranian Europäisch-Iranisch Handelsbank (EIH) bank based in Hamburg, Germany, accused of breaching EC regulations and UN Security Council resolutions. In a move to raise pressure on Iran, at the beginning of June the US also decided to apply the principle of extra- territoriality. Having imposed sanctions against seven foreign companies (including the PDVSA and an Israeli group) for supplying fuel to Iranian companies, the US has continued to revise its blacklist, which includes the Iranian state-owned Bank of Industry and Mine accused of providing services to Bank Mellat and EIH already subject to US sanctions. -
Iran's Gray Zone Strategy
Iran’s Gray Zone Strategy Cornerstone of its Asymmetric Way of War By Michael Eisenstadt* ince the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has distinguished itself (along with Russia and China) as one of the world’s foremost “gray zone” actors.1 For nearly four decades, however, the United States has struggled to respond effectively to this asymmetric “way of war.” Washington has often Streated Tehran with caution and granted it significant leeway in the conduct of its gray zone activities due to fears that U.S. pushback would lead to “all-out” war—fears that the Islamic Republic actively encourages. Yet, the very purpose of this modus operandi is to enable Iran to pursue its interests and advance its anti-status quo agenda while avoiding escalation that could lead to a wider conflict. Because of the potentially high costs of war—especially in a proliferated world—gray zone conflicts are likely to become increasingly common in the years to come. For this reason, it is more important than ever for the United States to understand the logic underpinning these types of activities, in all their manifestations. Gray Zone, Asymmetric, and Hybrid “Ways of War” in Iran’s Strategy Gray zone warfare, asymmetric warfare, and hybrid warfare are terms that are often used interchangeably, but they refer neither to discrete forms of warfare, nor should they be used interchangeably—as they often (incor- rectly) are. Rather, these terms refer to that aspect of strategy that concerns how states employ ways and means to achieve national security policy ends.2 Means refer to the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and cyber instruments of national power; ways describe how these means are employed to achieve the ends of strategy. -
2016 8Th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Cyber Power
2016 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Cyber Power N.Pissanidis, H.Rõigas, M.Veenendaal (Eds.) 31 MAY - 03 JUNE 2016, TALLINN, ESTONIA 2016 8TH International ConFerence on CYBER ConFlict: CYBER POWER Copyright © 2016 by NATO CCD COE Publications. All rights reserved. IEEE Catalog Number: CFP1626N-PRT ISBN (print): 978-9949-9544-8-3 ISBN (pdf): 978-9949-9544-9-0 CopyriGHT AND Reprint Permissions No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence ([email protected]). This restriction does not apply to making digital or hard copies of this publication for internal use within NATO, and for personal or educational use when for non-profit or non-commercial purposes, providing that copies bear this notice and a full citation on the first page as follows: [Article author(s)], [full article title] 2016 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Cyber Power N.Pissanidis, H.Rõigas, M.Veenendaal (Eds.) 2016 © NATO CCD COE Publications PrinteD copies OF THIS PUBlication are availaBLE From: NATO CCD COE Publications Filtri tee 12, 10132 Tallinn, Estonia Phone: +372 717 6800 Fax: +372 717 6308 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.ccdcoe.org Head of publishing: Jaanika Rannu Layout: Jaakko Matsalu LEGAL NOTICE: This publication contains opinions of the respective authors only. They do not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of NATO CCD COE, NATO, or any agency or any government. -
Issue No. 486 AUGUST 2021
Issue Brief ISSUE NO. 486 AUGUST 2021 © 2021 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. The Limits of Military Coercion in Halting Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Programme Kunal Singh Abstract Israel believes that the use of force is essential to stopping Iran from making the nuclear bomb. A vocal section of the strategic affairs community in the United States agrees with the proposition. This brief argues that military means are unlikely to sabotage the nuclear weapons programme of an advanced-stage bomb-seeker like Iran. Moreover, use of force could be counterproductive as it can incentivise Iran’s pursuit of the bomb, and it may erode the confidence required for diplomatic negotiations that can possibly help cease the weapons programme. Attribution: Kunal Singh, “The Limits of Military Coercion in Halting Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Programme,” ORF Issue Brief No. 486, August 2021, Observer Research Foundation. 01 n early April in Vienna, the Biden administration initiated efforts with Iran to reinstate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, from which the United States (US) had exited during the tenure of former US President Donald Trump. A week later, an explosion at Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment Ifacility caused a power blackout. Israel, the state most vocally opposed to the JCPOA, is widely believed to have -
Iran: Recent Incidents Likely a Coordinated String of Deliberate Attacks
The Cambridge Security Initiative IRAN: RECENT INCIDENTS LIKELY A COORDINATED STRING OF DELIBERATE ATTACKS JULY 2020 Richard C. Baffa Since early May, Iranian critical infrastructure and national security facilities have been subject to at least nine fires, explosions, and apparent cyberattacks; eight of these have taken place since 26 June. The nature of the targets and the short period of time in which they have occurred is unprecedented, strongly pointing to deliberate attacks and/or sabotage. Tehran has downplayed many of the incidents as accidents, but unofficially blamed the United States, Israel, and an unnamed Arab state (likely Saudi Arabia and/or the United Arab Emirates), and has vowed to retaliate. Two of the sites, the Natanz enrichment facility and Khojir military base, are highly secure national security facilities, harbouring sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, including the IR-4 and IR-6 generation of modern centrifuges. At Natanz, an explosion and fire damaged a new, high-value centrifuge production/assembly plant on 2 July; the building is adjacent to underground fuel production facilities where the U.S. and Israel conducted the Stuxnet cyberattack a decade ago. An unnamed Middle Eastern intelligence official claimed Israel was responsible, using a powerful bomb. On 26 June, another explosion took place at Khojir missile production site, a highly secretive facility for missile engines and propellant development and testing near Tehran. In addition, on 10 July, local witnesses in Garmdarreh, west of Tehran, reported a series of explosions followed by widespread power outages. Multiple reports claimed the explosions occurred at Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) missile depots, possibly the Islam IRGC Aerospace military base; there are also other military facilities, a chemical weapons research site, and power plants in the area. -
THE FUTURE of US-IRAN RELATIONS by Jenny Gan
THE FUTURE OF US-IRAN RELATIONS By Jenny Gan INTRODUCTION Over the past fifty years, the United States and Iran have experienced a tumultuous relationship that has sometimes revealed itself as a close international partnership and other times a contentious rivalry. Since 1953, the United States has helped conduct President Trump a coup d’état in 1953 to overthrow Iran’s prime minister, navigated imposing sanctions the US Embassy hostage crisis, and dealt with the Iran-Contra on Iran following scandal (“US-Iran Relations”). Despite a rocky end to the 20th the dissolution of century, following sanctions in the early 2000s, the US and Iran the US-Iran Nuclear entered a state of peace following the rising global concerns over the Deal. development of an Iranian nuclear arsenal (“US-Iran Relations”). Saul Loeb/AFP via However, the United States’ relationship with Iran took a sharp Getty Images turn following rising tensions in the Gulf, including new economic sanctions, explosions targeting oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman, and US military drone surveillance over the Strait of Hormuz (“US-Iran Relations”). Tensions rose to a fever pitch after the assassination of Coup d’état – the General Qasem Soleimani by a US drone and resulted in Iran pulling forcible removal of an out of the nuclear agreement while also promising revenge against existing government the United States (Ward). from power through Best described as tumultuous, the relationship between Iran and violent means. the United States has major implications for global peace, as Iran has nuclear capabilities and is a key player in the Middle East, a region where the United States has vested economic and political interests. -
Duqu the Stuxnet Attackers Return
Uncovering Duqu The Stuxnet Attackers Return Nicolas Falliere 4/24/2012 Usenix Leet - San Jose, CA 1 Agenda 1 Revisiting Stuxnet 2 Discovering Duqu 3 Inside Duqu 4 Weird, Wacky, and Unknown 5 Summary 2 Revisiting Stuxnet 3 Key Facts Windows worm discovered in July 2010 Uses 7 different self-propagation methods Uses 4 Microsoft 0-day exploits + 1 known vulnerability Leverages 2 Siemens security issues Contains a Windows rootkit Used 2 stolen digital certificates Modified code on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) First known PLC rootkit 4 Cyber Sabotage 5 Discovering Duqu 6 Boldi Bencsath Announce (CrySyS) emails: discovery and “important publish 25 page malware Duqu” paper on Duqu Boldi emails: Hours later the “DUQU DROPPER 7 C&C is wiped FOUND MSWORD 0DAY INSIDE” Inside Duqu 8 Key Facts Duqu uses the same code as Stuxnet except payload is different Payload isn‟t sabotage, but espionage Highly targeted Used to distribute infostealer components Dropper used a 0-day (Word DOC w/ TTF kernel exploit) Driver uses a stolen digital certificate (C-Media) No self-replication, but can be instructed to copy itself to remote machines Multiple command and control servers that are simply proxies Infections can serve as peers in a peer-to-peer C&C system 9 Countries Infected Six organizations, in 8 countries confirmed infected 10 Architecture Main component A large DLL with 8 or 6 exports and 1 main resource block Resource= Command & Control module Copies itself as %WINDIR%\inf\xxx.pnf Injected into several processes Controlled by a Configuration Data file Lots of similarities with Stuxnet Organization Code Usual lifespan: 30 days Can be extended 11 Installation 12 Signed Drivers Some signed (C-Media certificate) Revoked on October 14 13 Command & Control Module Communication over TCP/80 and TCP/443 Embeds protocol under HTTP, but not HTTPS Includes small blank JPEG in all communications Basic proxy support Complex protocol TCP-like with fragments, sequence and ack. -
Reimagining US Strategy in the Middle East
REIMAGININGR I A I I G U.S.S STRATEGYT A E Y IIN THET E MMIDDLED L EEASTS Sustainable Partnerships, Strategic Investments Dalia Dassa Kaye, Linda Robinson, Jeffrey Martini, Nathan Vest, Ashley L. Rhoades C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA958-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0662-0 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover composite design: Jessica Arana Image: wael alreweie / Getty Images Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface U.S. -
Iran'in Siber Güvenlik Stratejisinin Saldiri Ve
See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334583513 İRAN’IN SİBER GÜVENLİK STRATEJİSİNİN SALDIRI VE SAVUNMA KAPASİTESİ BAKIMINDAN ANALİZİ Article in Turkish Studies - Social Sciences · January 2019 DOI: 10.29228/TurkishStudies.22799 CITATIONS READS 0 225 1 author: Ali Burak Darıcılı 35 PUBLICATIONS 21 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE All content following this page was uploaded by Ali Burak Darıcılı on 25 July 2019. The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. Turkish Studies Social Sciences Volume 14 Issue 3, 2019, p. 409-425 DOI: 10.29228/TurkishStudies.22799 ISSN: 2667-5617 Skopje/MACEDONIA-Ankara/TURKEY Research Article / Araştırma Makalesi A r t i c l e I n f o / M a k a l e B i l g i s i Received/Geliş: 04.02.2019 Accepted/Kabul: 10.06.2019 Report Dates/Rapor Tarihleri: Referee 1 (15.03.2019)-Referee 2 (11.03.2019)- Referee 3 (18.03.2019) This article was checked by iThenticate. ANALYSIS OF IRAN'S CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY WITH REGARD TO THE ATTACK AND THE DEFENSE CAPACITY Ali Burak DARICILI ABSTRACT The Stuxnet Virus was released in June 2010 and has affected Iran's nuclear facilities in Bushehr and Natanz. It was claimed that the United States of America (USA) and Israel secret services together have a role in the planning of this cyber-attack. Following this cover activity, also known as Operation Olympic Games in the literature, Iran considered the need to take serious measures in the field of cyber security and aimed to reach an effective cyber security capacity in cyber space with the investments made in 2010. -
Stuxnet, Schmitt Analysis, and the Cyber “Use-Of-Force” Debate
Members of International Telecommunications Union and UN Institute for Training and Research confer on cyber security UN (Jean-Marc Ferré) UN (Jean-Marc Stuxnet, Schmitt Analysis, and the Cyber “Use-of-Force” Debate By ANDREW C. FOLTZ All Members shall refrain in ne of the many seemingly advance the specific criteria states will use in intractable legal issues sur- making such determinations. their international relations rounding cyberspace involves As discussed in this article, several ana- from the threat or use of force O whether and when peacetime lytic frameworks have been developed to help against the territorial integ- cyber operations constitute a prohibited use of assess when cyber operations constitute a use force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations of force.3 One conclusion these frameworks rity or political independence (UN) Charter. Notwithstanding a significant share is that cyber operations resulting in of any state, or in any other body of scholarly work on this topic and physical damage or injury will almost always manner inconsistent with extensive real-world examples from which to be regarded as a use of force. When these draw, there is no internationally recognized frameworks were developed, however, there the Purposes of the United definition of a use of force.2 Rather, what has were few, if any, examples of peacetime, state- Nations. emerged is a general consensus that some sponsored cyber coercion. More importantly, cyber operations will constitute a use of force, the prospect of cyber attacks causing physical —Article 2(4), Charter of the but that it may not be possible to identify in damage was largely theoretical.4 Beginning United Nations1 Lieutenant Colonel Andrew C. -
Andrew Futter Nuclear Weapons .Indd
# 56 VALDAI PAPERS September 2016 www.valdaiclub.com NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE CYBER AGE: NEW CHALLENGES FOR SECURITY, STRATEGY AND STABILITY Andrew Futter About the author: Andrew Futter Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester ; Fellow of the UK Higher Education Academy The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not represent the views of the Valdai Discussion Club, unless explicitly stated otherwise. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE CYBER AGE: NEW CHALLENGES FOR SECURITY, STRATEGY AND STABILITY The safe, secure and reliable management of nuclear weapons has always been a complex and complicated business, plagued by uncertainty and risks. But these challenges are being magnified and aggravated by new cyber tools, dynamics and capabilities, and from the threat posed by hackers seeking to gain access to, or interfere with, nuclear systems. The challenge is myriad in its scope, and ranges from the safe, secure and reliable nuclear C2, through fresh problems for information security, proliferation, and the safeguarding of highly sensitive nuclear secrets, to new complications for strategic deterrence and escalation, and the emergence of a cyber-nuclear security dilemma. While cyber threats may not currently undermine or supersede the role of nuclear weapons as the ultimate symbol of national security, increased uncertainty about the integrity and security of these systems raises questions for nuclear force management, thinking and strategy for all nuclear-armed states. The cyber challenge is nuanced and subtle, complicating and obfuscating the intrinsic difficulties of nuclear C2 and nuclear strategy rather than fundamentally transforming them.