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Home , Operation Olympic Games, Operation Praying Mantis, Sanctions against Iran, Stuxnet

J O I N T C R I S I S C H I L D R E N O F S T U X N E T COUNCIL

Introduction

Traditionally, espionage has been an activity that takes advantage of humanity’s faults in order to gain valuable information. We are all familiar with its tropes—the beautiful foreign woman sleeping with the gang leader to gain intelligence for her superiors, the dashing young man who infiltrates a foreign ministry by befriending its members and gaining their trust. The human element of intelligence has long been a large part of its success.

However, the rise of the web has made this human element somewhat obsolete: many of the dangerous and expensive activities performed by foreign operatives are now doable from a computer keyboard. Cyber surveillance and, therefore, cyber terrorism have rapidly become the status quo in the intelligence and counter-intelligence worlds. Governments, terrorists and even civilians are now able to control a nation’s infrastructure, military and intelligence from the comfort of their own home, assuming they possess the required set of skills. The effect this has had on statecraft and war making in recent years is incomparable.

The United States National Security Council, therefore, intends to use its nation’s place as home to some of the world’s most cutting edge technology firms and innovations to carry out their plan to infiltrate the Islamic Republic of . In the interest of international security, it is paramount that the actions taken by the NSC are not traceable by the target nation, and that they maintain their classified status domestically. If successful, the United States will prevent an extremist takeover of the Middle East, most notably the US’ ally, . As the moral protectors of the world, it is paramount that the NSC comes together and asserts their role as a global superpower to achieve these ends.

Historical Overview

Current relations with Iran notwithstanding, communication and collaboration between the two states were once diplomatic. In fact, it was the United States that helped launch Iran’s nuclear program under Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program in 1957. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, nuclear cooperation between Washington and continued to be positive and productive, with US President Gerald Ford even offering to sell Iran a US-built reprocessing facility to complete the nuclear cycle. Meanwhile, the USA, after having overthrown Mohammad Mossaddegh with the help of Britain, helped Iran set up SAVAK, the new Shah’s secret police. From 1953 to 1979, SAVAK enjoyed virtually limitless power and freedom throughout Iran, and was noted for its torture and execution practices, in addition to running intelligence operations in Iran and abroad,

often in conjunction with the CIA. Note, however, that after the 1979 , the US-backed Shah of Iran Mohammed Reza Pahlevi was forced to leave. With Pahlevi’s departure from power, SAVAK ceased operations, and an era of difficult relations between the USA and Iran had begun.

Since the revolution, the United States ceased its alliance with Iran. During the 1980-1988 Iran- war, the United States aided Saddam Hussein by providing diplomatic, monetary and military support. The most notable aid from the US came in the form of covertly sharing satellite footage and information form radar planes. This footage revealed locations of Iranian troop movements, logistics facilities and details about Iranian air defenses. This information allowed Hussein’s military to attack the Iranians with chemical weapons, resulting in mass casualties. Although the US denied their involvement with the chemical attacks for years, declassified documents show that the Iraqis kept US intelligence officials up to date regarding the matter. Although Hussein proved to be a gruesome leader, the Iraqi win was necessary for Reagan America in order to subvert the Iranians and bring them back to the negotiating table. It was the same need that drew the US to conduct against Iran, the largest engagement of surface warships since WWII.

In 2002, it was revealed by an Iranian opposition group that Iran was secretly developing nuclear facilities, which the US maintains is part of a nuclear weapons program. Iran has repeatedly denied these claims. These discoveries led to four rounds of UN-ratified . In 2012, the US, as well as the EU, stepped up these sanctions to include the financial sector, causing Iran’s currency to lose two thirds of its value by 2013. A 2010 satellite photo of Iran’s nuclear facility at

All the while, intelligence research in the Unites States has been a key factor in dictating our relations, both domestically and globally. This was, however, put to a halt in 2013, when former NSA contractor downloaded an estimated 50,000-200,000 NSA documents, and began releasing them to the press and to the public. The files, many of which were part of a secret intelligence operation called PRISM, provided proof that the United States government was monitoring millions of its own citizens, though private phone calls, text messages, emails and Internet activity. These revelations sparked outrage from the American public, and created distrust with the system that set the American Government back. The leaked files also included information on US military and intelligence capabilities, which prompted several terrorist organizations to change their security measures to avoid American interception. Snowden then fled to , where he has currently found temporary asylum.

As the fight against terrorism continued, the United States and its allies made small advances in the war on ISIS. Unlike its predecessors Al Qaeda, ISIS has far more structure, training, and access to weapons that have allowed it to take over land in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Nigeria. Particularly savvy in the technological realm, ISIS conducts much of its recruitment using social media, and shares its acts of terror on the Internet. With individuals like Snowden seeking refuge within America’s enemies, it is quite clear that ISIS can possesses the power to conduct cyber attacks against the United States if they recruit the right personnel to their cause. The potential outcomes of such a breach are numerous: infiltrating American intelligence, accessing the US’ weapons, and tampering with American industry are among the possible outcomes of a cyber attack. Seeing as Iran’s ultraconservative government shares ISIS’ ideals of Islamizing the globe, these capabilities, paired with Iran’s nuclear arsenal, presents a clear threat to the security of the United States, and to Western ideals. While the US is a world leader in security and intelligence, the presence of people like Snowden make it very clear that the US is not invincible, and that even non-state actors can become credible threats. With no allegiance, these can easily become the mercenaries of the cyber age, selling their talents to the highest bidder, or whoever offers them asylum.

In an attempt to thwart Iranian plots, the United States has had many intelligence operations to attempt to infiltrate Iran remotely. Among these are , which, with the help of regional ally Israel, targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities by creating a computer virus, known

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as , which allowed officials to monitor and control industrial facilities remotely. The operation was started by President George W. Bush’s administration in 2006, but has accelerated under the Obama administration due to increasing security concerns. Carried out with the help of Israel, Stuxnet succeeded in destroying roughly one fifth of all of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges. The success of this operation provides hope for the United States to be able to conduct similar operations in the future, and to improve on domestic security to keep operations such as Olympic Games secretive.

The , Iran, , and United States announce the JCPOA

On April 2, 2015, the USA, in conjunction with other world powers, signed the Iranian nuclear deal, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This agreement places significant limits on what Iran is permitted to do in its nuclear plan for the next 10-15 years. However, the deal failed to resolve the actual issues created by Iran’s nuclear capability, and left many loopholes that many felt failed to solve many of the main issues concerning Iran’s nuclear program. Furthermore, there is a chance that Iran may be tempted to cut corners and not comply with the agreement, both in letter and spirit. Considering the fact that the deal did nothing to prevent Iran from still sponsoring Assad and , among other groups, there is no guarantee that such official agreements will do much to shape Iran’s actions.

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Current Conditions

Since the American-Iranian nuclear deal, relations between the two nations appear to be on the rise. Since Iran’s implementation of their end of the bargain was verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency on January 16th, the US President signed an lifting some of the nation’s sanctions on Iran, a move that allowed the Iranian economy to be stimulated by long-awaited sanctions relief. Furthermore, a successful prisoner exchange on the eve of implementation day proved to be the first time the long-time enemies had seriously negotiated between their security and diplomatic establishments in decades.

Despite this rosy image of cooperation, however, tensions remain very high between the two states. In the aftermath of the Stuxnet attack, Iran’s relations with the rest of the world remain shaky at best, with many states waiting to see the longer-term effects of the nuclear deal before reversing their sanctions. Notably, Texas continues to prohibit American investment in Iran, and Texas governor, Greg Abbott has vowed to continue to do so until all US sanctions are reversed. Furthermore, the upcoming American presidential elections have kept US-Iran relations at the forefront of all foreign policy debates, with many candidates expressing varying views on the deal’s future. Former US Secretary of State and Democratic frontrunner Hillary Clinton has promised voters that she will be “tougher on Iran,” while the Republican camp has expressed their plans to scrap the deal altogether. Whatever the outcome, current conditions suggest that the current trend of hope in US-Iran relations is merely a passing phase, and that a newpresidency will bring a new era of tougher US-Iran relations than ever before.

Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear capabilities after Stuxnet have improved. Despite enriching to 3.5% before the attack, Iran was successfully able to enrich uranium to 20% following the operation. And, despite the fact that Iran has shipped all of its to Russia, the fact remains that Iran possesses the knowledge to enrich more uranium. They have built secret facilities that have gone unnoticed for years by the international community, have gone against UNSC resolutions, and have broken agreements in the past. Despite the current signs of hope, the US remains weary of any and all claims on Iran’s part that they are complying with the current agreements. The IAEA is currently charged with inspecting any and all nuclear facilities with full access, and also has the right to visit and inspect all non-declared sites where nuclear development is suspected. The following would be possible, however, if an IAEA commission

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found those suspicions to be justified and the motion pass with a majority vote. This presents a loophole where the Iranian government might be able to continue secret work, so long as IAEA officials cannot come up with enough evidence to sway the commission. In summary, current US relations with Tehran outwardly appear to be on the mend, with the hope of lifted sanctions in the near future. Digging deeper, however, the situations remains as tense as ever, perhaps even more so–Iran is currently benefitting from positive media attention regarding their recent bout of political goodwill towards their long-time American enemies. While these actions could be genuine, it is up to the United States to ensure that Iran does not merely make token agreements to boost their global image, but rather complies with the full terms of the JCPOA.

Analysis and Job of the Committee

As the situation in the Middle East worsens, and as regimes such as Iran’s prove to be more of a threat, it is paramount that the NSC comes together to devise a strategy with which to infiltrate Iran. However, it is just as important to keep these actions a secret. Whistleblowers like Edward Snowden inadvertently help America’s enemies by divulging our secret information, and these leakages must also be put to a stop.

There is always a chance that Iran may be tempted to cut corners and not comply with the nuclear agreement, both in letter and in spirit. Considering the fact that the deal did nothing to prevent Iran from continuing to sponsor Assad and Hezbollah, among other militia groups, the United States must not let its guard down. The promises and plans for transparency under the JCPOA are not enough—the USA needs effective espionage operations now more than ever. These operations must not only monitor Iran’s internal operations, but its relations with its satellite groups and its trading partners to ensure that this state is not violating the terms of their agreement, and consequently placing the United States, and Western thought, in danger. In other words, espionage is just as important after agreements are made as during and before.

With nations like Iran plotting to take over nations and spread their backwards morals to the globe, it is the job of the United States to prevent these actions. This involves working with

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regional allies, namely Israel, to coordinate intelligence efforts on the ground as well as remotely. And while the committee is tasked with infiltrating Iran, it must also do its best to maintain international security. This means not forgetting groups like ISIS, who, if not stopped, will be able to achieve their goals with the help of Iran and its nuclear program.

The committee has at its arsenal the combined portfolio powers of all present members, as well as any advantages and help contributed by other organizations or allies. The committee is urged to reach out to relevant actors; in particular it’s regional ally and Stuxnet partner Israel, to ensure a more foolproof infiltration. If necessary, the committee may place spies on the ground, kidnap relevant individuals for information gathering, and conduct other related activities. However, it must be noted that such actions may only be taken as a last resort, or to exert necessary pressure on our enemies. Furthermore, such actions create more risk of public leakage, and delegates must, therefore, take precautions to ensure that such actions remain as secret as their infiltration.

Issues to be addressed

Infiltration of the Islamic Republic of Iran a. Infiltration of the Government Delegates are advised to place some monitoring and reporting systems within Iran’s government structure to: - Ensure that the Islamic Republic’s true sentiments match their outward actions - Gain inside knowledge of any covert operations, nuclear or otherwise, that the government may be enacting.

Delegates are advised to place intelligence efforts in the following ministries:

1. Intelligence and National Security

2. Economic Affairs and Finance

3. Commerce

4. Foreign Relations

5. Defense and Armed Forces Logistics

6. Roads and Transportations

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7. Industries and Mines 8. Science, Research and Technology b. Infiltration of the Ministry of Energy Given the nature of the conflict and the possible ramifications of strengthened nuclear capabilities in Iran, delegates are strongly encouraged to focus their government monitoring on Iran’s Ministry of Energy. Delegates may want to consider pursuing the following suggested courses of action:

1. Planting false officials within the ministry 2. Installing malware that hacks into internal database of the ministry, tracks personal messages of high-up officials, flags messages containing unknown terminology, and redirects said messages to US intelligence officials

3. Make use of satellite technology to locate any suspected undeclared nuclear sites

Monitoring Iran’s Relations with Satellite Groups

• Considering that Iran has previously sponsored Assad and Hezbollah, among other groups, it is imperative that delegates monitor any and all interactions between such groups and the Iranian government. These groups contain the power to conduct attacks on individuals, groups, and cause mass terror that the Iranian government can use an excuse to re-arm.

• Furthermore, it is imperative that these groups do not conduct attacks on or cause damage to US ally Israel, which could at the very worst lead to Israel no longer wanting to cooperate with the United States on the matter, but is far more likely to slow down any operations being run from that state.

Upholding the JCPOA

• On the Iranian Side Iran made many hefty promises in the JCPOA, which if fulfilled would strongly decrease their nuclear capabilities. Though current reports show that Iran is complying with the orders of said agreement, the Islamic Republic’s past history of ignoring or secretly

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reversing previous orders, treaties and agreements necessitates the active monitoring on behalf of the United States and its allies to assure the terms of the agreement are being met.

• On the American Side The USA also made agreements and concessions in the JCPOA, the most notable of whom being the lifting of sanctions. In the wake of a new set of sanctions imposed against Iran due to a test, the American government must take care to show outward signs of cooperation and diplomacy with the Islamic Republic of Iran, lest the global community deem them greedy, liars or aggressors.

Relations with Israel

The previous Stuxnet attack was made possible with the help of America’s strongest regional ally, Israel. Despite initially including them to prevent Israel form running an attack on Iran on their own, they have proved a useful ally and partner in the fight against Iran’s nuclear programme. The importance of a regional ally cannot be stressed enough in this situation, and it must be noted that any physical espionage operations will likely be based out of Israel, due to their proximity to Iran. It is the responsibility of the United States, then, to assure that Israel remains protected, as well as that the Israeli government is not conducting intelligence operations of their own, either on Iran or the USA, without their knowledge and consent.

Testing and Dealing with Potential Bugs in Operations

Part of what made Stuxnet so effective was the discreet, continuous testing of the operation in the United States prior to its delivery to Natanz. Despite this rigorous testing process and superior coding, an error in the code caused the virus to replicate itself and spread. Although Stuxnet did not, ultimately, cause widespread damage due to its extremely targeted nature, this episode serves as a warning for delegates that even with vigorous testing, mistakes can and do happen. Delegates are urged, then, to ensure the highest possible testing standards for any and all cyber malware they construct, in order to avoid such an event repeating itself. Failure to do so might result in the virus spreading so that it alerts Iranian officials of its presence, and

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perhaps even allows them some insight into how to tap into US security. Furthermore, the public outing of such intelligence operations (especially ones that mistakenly target large portions of Iran’s information) could result in negative consequences for the United States, both in their relations with Iran, the rest of the global community, and at home.

Points of Consideration

▪ Whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden have no formal allies. Snowden himself claims to have an undisclosed amount of files from the NSA that could expose further US operations. Despite the fact that he is currently wanted for treason, among other crimes, delegates must consider the ramifications of upsetting such unpredictable characters. Delegates must, therefore, consider the possibility of appeasing Snowden to ensure that

further information is not released. ▪ Thus far, Israel has proved to be a good ally in the fight against extremism in the Middle East, notably with its large role in operation Olympic Games. However, delegates must not forget that such inclusion was allowed to prevent Israel form conducting their own attack on Iran’s nuclear arsenal. While we want to take advantage of Israel’s proximity to the issue and capable intelligence operations, the NSC must not let them get too much information or power.

▪ Although the operations in this committee will focus primarily on cyber espionage, the need for in-person covert operations remains. As with any foreign operative mission, there comes a risk of capture. If Iran follows their current trend, they will most likely demand prisoners in return for American operatives, assuming they are not killed. Delegates must, then, decide their policy when it comes to foreign operatives in these circumstances: should they terminate themselves, resist torture and attempt to stay alive long enough to return to the USA and share whatever intelligence they have captured, or even feign cooperation with the Iranian government and become double agents?

Conclusion

In short, the task that lies before the delegates of the NSC today is a simple one: infiltrate the Islamic Republic of Iran, and do so without getting caught. However, delegates

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must take care to not be fooled by this simplicity—the nuances of the issue, detailed at length throughout this background guide should be proof enough that actual execution of the given objective shall be far more difficult than expected, and require far more finesse and discretion than ever before. Despite these difficulties, however, it is imperative that delegates achieve their goal. Failure to do so may result in an enemy too powerful to coerce, a second Cold War, or even full on nuclear attacks. It is up to the NSC to hold the government of Iran to the promises made in the JCPOA, by whatever means possible.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

US/USA United States of America Iran/Islamic Republic Islamic Republic of Iran NSC United States National Security Council SAVAC Iranian Secret Police CIA Central Intelligence Agency NSA PRISM Data-collection effort conducted by the NSA ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

Additional Resources

Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon, by

@War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex by Shane Harris

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