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TITLE PAGE

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION AND REGULATORY AGENCIES IN NIGERIA: A FOCUS ON THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIME COMMISSION (EFCC), 2000-2010

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APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that this research work has met the requirements of the Department of Political of Science, for the Award of a Masters of Science (M.Sc.) Degree in Political

Science of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, and is approved.

BY

------Prof. Jonah I. Onuoha Date (Project Supervisor)

------Prof. Obasi Igwe Date Head of Department

------Prof. Emmanuel O. Ezeani Date Dean of Faculty

External Supervisor ------Date

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DEDICATION

To the

Well Being and Good Health of my Parents,

Mr. and Mrs. Nkemegbunam Anselem Uzendu. iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

To the Glory of God. I am immensely grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Jonah I. Onuoha whose effort ensured the success of this work. Prof, your cordial relationship with your supervisees and the students at large, speaks much of your professionalism and kind spirit, I cannot thank you enough.

To my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Nkemegbunam Anselem Uzendu, my siblings (Henry Chukwujike, Colombus Udochukwu, David Ifeanyi, Rosemary Ifunanya and Augustine Chimobi), my uncles and aunt, (Boniface Uzendu, Okezie Uzendu and Marcy Ndu, nee Uzendu and their respective families) etc, I appreciate all of you for seeing me through to the end of the turnel, as the light shines upon me now.

To my room-mates, friends and well-wishers: Ukanwa Oghajie E., Ogbu Ejike C., Adibe Raymond C., Eze Ojukwu Onoh, Okoye Kingsley E., Anya Okoro Ukpai, Ukeka Chinedu D., Dickson Agwuabia, Chris Onyekachi Omenihu, Sampson Eziekeh, Ogochukwu Nnaekee and host of others whose influences have helped to shape my life to better. I appreciate the communal living and mutual understanding that exist amongst us. Your company provides me comfort and, makes me feel at home away from home. Thanks to all of you for helping me overcome part of my greatest life challenges. I cannot still forget my special friend, Miss. Roseline Akuabia Emoh, please thanks for everything. All the 2009 Post Graduate Students of the University of Nigeria, particularly those from the Department of Political Science, I wish all of you the best.

I extend my gratitude to all the lecturers and staff of the political science department as well as all the staff of Nnamdi Azikiwe Library, University of Nigeria, Nsukka for their big assistance. Please bear with me if your name does not appear on this page, our space is limited. Always remember that you will remain on the limitless page of my heart till eternity.

Uzendu Anselem Chinedu. Department of Political Science. University of Nigeria, Nsukka. v

LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Logical Data Framework (LDF) for the Study------26 Table 2. Abacha’s Loot Profile------38 Table 3. Individual Loot Profile in Naira------41 Table 4. Nigeria’s Position in Transparency International Perception Index --- 78 Table 5. Twenty-One Wire Transfer by Nnamani in Foreign Banks------83 Table 6. Loot by Public Officials Discovered in Foreign Accounts ------86 Table 7. EFCC’s High Profile Cases in Nigeria------96

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ABSTRACT

This study is concerned with the political economy of corruption and regulatory agencies in Nigeria. It focused on the critical assessment of the performance of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in its fight against political corruption in Nigeria since its creation. Thus, this study is guided by the following research questions: (1) Has the EFCC accomplished its statutory mandate in terms of reducing the rate of political corruption in Nigeria between 2000 and 2010; (2) To what extent does dual legitimacy of criminality influence the performance of the EFCC in Nigeria. To achieve our objectives of this study, we relied on the observational technique and documentation as our method of data collection. This implied that data were generated from the secondary sources, which were analyzed with the use of qualitative descriptive analysis as well as table presentations and percentages. We adopted the theory of social production and reproduction as the viable framework of analysis that explained how the activities of the EFCC have been constrained by certain environmental conditions. We observed that the EFCC has remained a tool of social and economic domination of the ruling class over the rest of the society. The study concluded that political corruption will remain unabated in this current social structure of dependence of the EFCC on the ruling class and that EFCC has not accomplished its statutory mandate in terms of reducing the rate of corruption in Nigeria. Unless these environmental conditions change, the EFCC will not accomplish its statutory obligation. However, we recommend that there is need to review the penal codes in our constitution, which will stipulate in clear terms the procedure and punishments for all categories of corrupt practices especially within the public sector.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page------i Approval Page------ii Dedication ------iii Acknowledgement ------iv Abstract ------v List of Tables ------vi Table of Contents ------vii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study ------1 1.2 Statement of Problem ------6 1.3 Objective of Study ------8 1.4 Significance of Study ------8 1.5 Literature Review ------9 1.6 Theoretical Framework ------20 1.7 Hypotheses ------24 1.8 Method of Data Collection ------24 1.8.1 Method of Data Analysis ------25 1.8.2 Logical Data Framework for the Study ------26

CHAPTER TWO: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION AND THE ORIGIN OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIME COMMISSION (EFCC) IN NIGERIA.

2.1 Introduction ------28

2.2 A Historical Overview of Corruption in Nigeria ------28

2.3 The Origin of EFCC in Nigeria ------42 viii

2.4 Establishment of the EFCC Act 2002 ------44

2.5 The Institutional Structure of the EFCC ------47

CHAPTER THREE: EFCC AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: THE JOURNEY SO FAR .

3.1 INTRODUCTION ------51 3.2 EFCC and Political Corruption in Nigeria ------52 3.3 EFCC and Obasanjo’s Anti-Corruption in Nigeria ------55 3.4 EFCC and Yar’dua War Against Corruption in Nigeria ------60 3.5 EFCC and Plea Bargain Issue in Nigeria ------62

CHAPTER FOUR: DUAL LEGITIMACY OF CRIMINALITY AND THE PERFORMANCES OF THE EFCC IN NIGERIA.

4.1 INTRODUCTION ------72 4.2 Dual Legitimacy and Political Corruption in Nigeria ------72 4.3 The Performance of EFCC in Nigeria ------76 4.4 The Ineffectiveness of EFCC in fighting Corruption in Nigeria ------91 4.5 The EFCC’s high Profile Cases in Nigeria ------95

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 5.1 Summary ------113 5.2 Conclusion ------116 5.3 Recommendation ------117 BIBLIOGRAPHY ------120

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CHAPTER ONE

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is one of the most acclaimed anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria saddled with the responsibility of fighting and reducing the rate of political corruption (financial crimes) in Nigeria. Over the years, their activities and performance have raised unending debate and intellectual controversies on whether they have actually performed or not based on the accomplishment of their statutory mandate since their creation. Hence, there is no agreement among scholars and commentators on the performance of EFCC. Consequently, two contending intellectual divided or schools of thought have emerged to explain the nature and character of the EFCC and how their performance have affected the state over the years in terms of reducing the rate of corruption or not. The first is the bourgeois school while the second is the radical school of thought.

Essentially, the bourgeois scholars believe that the EFCC is instituted to curb the menace of corruption in Nigeria. According to them, EFCC has succeeded in accomplishing its statutory mandate by fighting and reducing the rate of corruption involving financial crimes in Nigeria. One of the proponents of the bourgeois scholars, Babafemi, in Alli

(2010:1) observed that the EFCC is an enduring institution that is better equipped to deal with all forms of economic crimes in a way that will impact and enhance positively a sustainable national development. He further observes that since June 2008, when Mrs.

Farida Waziri assumed office, she had been doing a lot with her team to break records and surpass past records. That in both administrative and operational angles, EFCC has placed 2

several measures and strategies to chart a new course for the anti-graft agency, but has equally and painstakingly commenced processes of revitalization, restructuring, re- orientation, repositioning and re-building among others to build an institution around structures and processes rather than individuals. In line with the above, other bourgeois scholars believe that EFCC, as an agency established to fight corruption has indeed taken up the gauntlet in reducing the rate of political corruption in Nigeria. For them, generally,

EFCC has made tremendous success in accomplishing its mandate in terms of fighting and reducing the rate of corruption in Nigeria.

On the other hand, the radical scholars are of the view that EFCC has not accomplished its objectives in terms of curbing the menace of political corruption. For them,

EFCC has failed, it is seen as an instrument in the hands of the ruling class to fight and dominate its oppositions whose interest is not in conformity with that of the ruling class. On of the laudable proponent of the radical scholars, Adamu (2005:1) opined, reading “EFCC: justice, not politically persecuted”, by one Yashau Shaib and published in the punch newspaper of January 9, 2006, that:

I am compelled to make a comment. I wonder how one can commend government for the establishment of agencies and institutions whose creation is questionable. What is government’s ulterior motive behind the establishment of those agencies? But since we are in a democracy, we can’t do without having divers opinions. Though the Olusigun Obasanjo administration, by some of its policies, might seem to love the values of democracy, It is quite glaring that it is afraid of its principles. For example, when the president instituted the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) many Nigerians applauded his effort. The hope of Nigerians then was that all those who had hand in the looting of the nation’s treasury, thus depriving ordinary 3

Nigerians their share of the national cake, would be brought to book, irrespective of their social, economic and political stand. While commending the acts of former police IG, Tafa Balogun, and the impeached governor of Bayelsa state, Dr. Diepreye Alamieyesiegha, in their totality, events around the EFCC have clearly shown that it is nothing more than a tool with which the government hunts and persecutes its political opponents. Generally, the radical scholars believe that the EFCC has not accomplished its statutory mandate; rather it is served as a tool of persecution of oppositions in the hands of the ruling class.

For us, EFCC’s performance has not addressed the problems for which it was created. Thus, we attribute this poor performance of the EFCC to certain environmental conditions which influence their performance in terms of accomplishing its statutory mandate in reducing the rate of political corruption in Nigeria. Such environmental conditions that impede EFCC’s performance include Dual legitimacy of criminality and the irony or paradox o fighting corruption by corrupt individuals. It is assumed that one does not make laws against his own will. Unless these environmental conditions change, EFCC performance will not change from what it is at present.

However, form the other side of the variables of this study, we will not fail to understand that corruption is a necessary condition that gave birth to the establishment of the

EFCC. Corruption is not a recent phenomenon that pervades the Nigerian state. In all ramifications, it is one fundamental problem confronting Nigeria today. Particularly, political corruption has manifested in various means such as embezzlements, mismanagement, nepotism, military coups, looting of public treasury, bribery, vote buying and other abuses of office etc. Nigeria has been independent for 50 years now and recently 4

celebrated her Golden Jubilee anniversary, which in my own opinion was a celebration of poverty in plenty and continual success in dominance of the group that captured the state shortly after independent. Nigeria had experimented about seven military and five civilian administrations since independence and the high incidences of corruption in about all sectors in the country pose a serious threat to development efforts in Nigeria.

Since the creation of modern public administration in the country, there have been cases of official misuse of resources for personal enrichment. Hence, the rise of public administration and the discovery of oil and natural gas are two major events seen to have led to a litany ignoble corrupt practices in the country. Over the years, the country has seen its wealth withered with little to show in living conditions of the average human being.

Following the stupendous oil wealth, comes political corruption, mismanagement and incompetence in government. Corruption brought about instability, insecurity, and failure of institutions. Hence, politics in Nigeria has become a do or die affair since political power is now a strategy for stealing public funds. For instance, it is common practice for top government jobs to be filled with cronies who serve as conduit for siphoning public funds to foreign accounts.

As Dudley noted, that political power provides a rare opportunity to acquire wealth and prestige to be able to distribute jobs, contracts, gift of money, etc, to allies (Dudley,

1982: 30-31). The implication of Dudley’s argument is that the communities and relatives of the politicians who control political power support the stealing that is prevalent in the political system since they are directly or indirectly, the beneficiaries of such political corruption. 5

Indeed, corruption is dangerous and inimical to the systemic existence of any polity.

It is socio-political, economic and moral malaise that may permeate and cripple, as a result of its contagiousness and malignancy, the nerves of any polity. It is an intolerable characteristic that should be discouraged in governance because once it sets into any part, it automatically contaminates all the strata of the system’s multidimensional hierarchy in ways symmetrical to the spread of a bush fire (Akindele, 1995:37).

Equally, Ifesinachi (2003:27), captured these debilitating effects of corruption in terms of the argument on the prevalent social values, corruption appears to have overthrown and defined commonsense and logic both in the public and private realm in some African

States like Nigeria. It is in recognition and the effort to stem these ugly trends that the

Obasano’s administration had responded by lunching a number of campaigns and strategies against corruption. Meanwhile, despite the laudable measure and strategies by the

Obasanjo’s administration to curb corruption, the concerns of various eminent citizens and scholars in the country and outside is that the previous regime left a horrendous stinking legacy of covering up for current and potential looters of Nigerian treasury since it is those who set up the regulatory institutions are still the same people that loot the public treasury.

The implication of this scenario is that the regulatory institutions will be ineffective and weak. These facts have necessitated the background to the emergent of this research, which we shall try to accomplish through the study of one of the mostly acclaimed anti- corruption institutions, the Economic and financial crime commission (EFCC), and how far their activities have hindered or helped to curb the incidence of political corruption in

Nigeria. 6

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Political corruption is the major challenge facing Nigeria today, and its debilitating ancillaries such as graft, nepotism, embezzlement, looting, abuse of office, etc. These factors have stunned the growth of the country in all areas of her endeavors. In order to curb the menace cause by political corruption in Nigeria, former President of Nigeria, Chief

Olusegun Obasanjo, in 2002, instituted the Economic and Financial Crime Commission

(EFCC), after other attempts to stem corruption had been proven abortive. Abumere, quoted in Ezeani and Elekwa (2006:339), recollected that President Obasanjo had declared in his inaugural speech on May 29, 1999 that “corruption, the greatest bane of our society today will be tackled head on at all levels and there will be no sacred cows; nobody, no matter who and where, will be allowed to get away with the perpetuation of corruption”. Meanwhile in today’s experience, the reverse seemed to be the case. Observation proves that corrupt public personnel are usually convicted when they have a contradicting interest with the power that be.

Furthermore, political corruption is pervasive in Nigeria and has been institutionalized such that not only that, officials are corrupt, but corruption is official

(Clark, 1995:125). Corruption has taken different forms and shapes in Nigeria such as endemic planned and developmental corruption (1991:47), to comment with obvious impatience that these forms of corruption, notably; endemic, planned and developmental corruption is a classic vicious circle capable of destroying Nigeria completely.

However, the effect of political corruption in any given society can never be over- emphasized, especially as in the case of contemporary Nigeria where political corruption has 7

eaten deep into the fabrics of our national life and where political power is used to expropriate loot and plunder public wealth. Public officials use their positions to extend undue favour to their Kith and kin as well as their political loyalists. Worse still, the

Nigerian state is deeply immersed in political corruption (Okolie, 2003:338).

Despite the enormous and detailed investigations conducted into this work, there still exist hitherto some gap, lapse and unanswered questions by scholars and commentators to which this research hopes to address and therefore, add to the incremental body of knowledge and debates towards finding a viably inbuilt mechanism which can effectively checkmate the incidence of political corruption and fraudulent financial transactions within the public sector. Thus, there are two major strands of analysis which help to explain our problematique. The first is to assess in EFCC performance in accomplishment of their statutory mandate in curbing corruption in Nigeria. The second is the of dual legitimacy of criminality. In this regard, the members of the ruling class legitimize corruption on one hand and the members of the communities encourage political corruption since they lack the moral and legal support against corrupt officials. Political power provides the public officials with the opportunities to extend undue favour to their communities; distribute jobs, contracts and gift of money which they got from illegitimate means. On the other hand, the second strand of analysis is the strong and ineffective state in Nigeria. This implies the conditions of political instability, incompetence in government, low productive forces, insecurity, failure of institutions, low level of transparency and accountability in the

Nigerian state. 8

These problems are the central concern of this emergent research, and can be specifically stated in the form of those research questions below:

1. Has the EFCC accomplished its statutory mandate in terms of reducing the rate of

political corruption in Nigeria from 2000 and 2010?

2. Does the dual legitimacy of criminality influence the performance of EFCC in

fighting political corruption in Nigeria from 2000 and 2010?

1.3 OBJECTIVE OF STUDY

The central concern of this study is to assess dispassionately the achievement of the

Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in their fight against political corruption in Nigeria. Therefore, the specific objective of this study includes the following:

1. To examine if the EFCC has accomplished its statutory mandate by reducing the rate

of political corruption in Nigeria from 2000-2010.

2. To assess how the dual legitimacy of criminality has influenced the performance of

the EFCC in Nigeria from 2000-2010.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The significance of this research will manifest in both theoretical and practical levels, since it will be useful to our society where political corruption is pervasive. At the theoretical level, the study will provide with scholars and commentators, the idea and knowledge to understand the debilitating damage and various dimensions corruption has taken in Nigeria society. Also, contribution from this study will not only consolidate the existing body of knowledge in our discipline but will also serve as a veritable reference material to students, academics and researchers who have interest on this issue. This 9

research work will equally serve as a good reading material for all the people who desire to enrich their knowledge.

In the practicable aspect, the value of the study will at the first place, provide

Nigerians with the fundamental reliability and understanding of the unabated nature of political corruption in Nigeria, thereby keeping them disposed to contribute their quotas towards its reduction. Secondly, the study will facilitate the process of restoring sanity in this society by serving as a basis for building structures that will promote an additional checks and balances alongside other existing structures.

Finally, this study when implemented will help to restore confidence in our government as well as the economy. This is because the cost of government will be reduced and funds hitherto diverted for private use will be made available for our infrastructural development which in turn will create an enabling environment for economic growth in the different sectors of government.

1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW

For the purpose of accommodating the two variables of the hypotheses as contained in this research, this literature review will be divided into two themes; the first theme will evaluate the existing literature on political corruption in Nigeria. The second theme will review author’s works on the operation of the regulatory institutions like the EFCC in fight against political corruption in Nigeria.

10

Political Corruption in Nigeria

An attempt has been made by Ikejiani-Clark, to trace the origin of corruption in

Nigeria to the on set colonialism, which bastardized the traditional Nigeria values.

According to her, traditional Nigeria society was fairly well organized around such values and ideals as honour, prestige, respect for elders and constituted authorities, integrity and public interest rather than selfishness (Clark,1995:128). In her analyses of political corruption, she sees corruption as an inducement in cash or kind to secure services or goods from public officials or other agencies through illegitimate, unlawful or irregular means.

Consequent upon the bastardization of these values that regulated individual and group conduct of private and public lives, the way was paved for political corruption which as at then simply found expression in giving to court carks and interpreters in order to revert justice. Ikejiani-Clark further examined how previous regimes have tackled political corruption in the past and postulated that since post-independent, Nigeria consolidated these colonial imposed values, Nigeria needs a reform of her political structure and institutions.

Obviously, one of the laudable hallmarks of Ikejiani-Clark’s perspective to corruption in

Nigeria is its historical specificity. Meanwhile, her appraisal of how corruption has been tackled in Nigeria was restricted to previous governments and regimes only thus, inadequate in our explaining the basic concern of this study.

Aluko (2002:393-402), critically examined how corruption became institutionalized and manifested mostly in the political arena. Its approach was from a sociological perspective as he sees corruption largely as a social problem and not emanating from individual disposition. He concluded that the nation as such has the responsibility to educate, 11

mobilize, socialize, enlighten and sensitize its citizens towards a tradition of honesty, excellence, diligence, integrity, honour, reputation, good name and other moral virtue that will lead to the establishment of a new social order.

Although, Aluko’s recommendations are quite commendable, it however, lacks practicability in Nigeria as both past and present leaders had been bereft of such self- discipline and indeed has remained the source of corruption.

Equally, as observed by Ugwu (2002:23), the nation was deeply immersed in corruption arising from poor and weak leadership, which regarded some people as sacred cows. The result was embezzlement and defraud “kick back and kick front”, rigging election, selection and not election syndrome, 10% to be paid to a government official for any contract awarded, murder cases during election to public posts, sectionalism, favoritism, nepotism, sex scandal, incarceration of innocent but vociferous citizens etc.

These were the offspring of political corruption in Nigeria. The blazing heat of the fire of political corruption sent so many Nigerians packing. Hence, Odey in 2001, wrote that

“politically, the turmoil, the repression and the general insecurity that pervaded the country forced thousands of Nigerians to flout all international border laws and get out of Nigeria by hook or by crook. As a result, Nigeria’s image suddenly slumped to infamy” (Odey,

2001:41-42), quoted in (Ugwu, 2002:23).

In the forefront of the critic against political corruption in Nigeria, Achebe (1983:1) has this to say; “there is no problem with the Nigerian soil, climate, water or even air, the only problem facing Nigeria is the problem of leadership”. The corrupt practices by the 12

Nigerian leaders at all levels of government have been the major reasons for the country’s underdevelopment. Corruption is a cankerworm that has eaten deep into the fabrics of our leaders, to the extent that when they go to bed, they go with corruption, they dream corruption, they think corruption, they eat corruption, live with corruption and practice corruption at every moment. Corruption has become a culture in the Nigerian society and the people celebrate it. Any leader that wishes to uphold the dignity of transparency, accountability and due process is seen as an uncivilized person, and sabotage (Achebe;

1983:3). Achebe actually captured the debilitating incidence of political corruption, but failed to proffer solutions on how to revolutionalize the mentality of the people as well as enhance mechanism for fighting corruption.

Apparently alluding to the result of a double standard approach to anti-corruption measures, Klitgaard, (1998:55) noted that if people especially the big shots get away with political corruption, the others would not be afraid to do it because after all, the commission would not remove the big shots and may be, is not sincere. Constantly, Klitgaard, observes that a double standard approach is an incentive to corruption and this fact cannot be denied.

Be that as it may, Klitgaard’s approach is contradistinction to the basic concerns of this study, which aims at determining if the EFCC fight against corruption actually reduced the rate of corruption in Nigeria since its creation. Daniel Kaufmann, argues that despite myriad contributions on this topic by various authors, serious unresolved questions and debates still exist not only about the importance of governance and corruption but also about the unwillingness and ability of the international community including the private sectors to help countries improve in these areas. He equally presented eight myths, which are very helpful in resolving some misunderstood issues concerning governance and corruption. His 13

work therefore, focused on the intervention in the area of transparency reform complimented by improvement in freedom of the press and gender equality and when implemented such reforms could have a major impact on improving governance and anti-corruption.

(Kaufmann, 2002:9-24).

The 2001 transparency international (TI) corruption perception index lists Nigeria as the second most corrupt country in the world behind Bangladesh. Nigeria alone is reported to be responsible for over 30% of the incidence of corruption in Africa. The same report notes that corruption in Nigeria has accelerated since the civilian government of Obasanjo came to power from 1999-2007. Staggering $36 billion in public money is report to have disappeared with a few traces. (Business in Africa, December 2002/January 2003:6).

Robert Payne in 1975 raise doubts as to their effectiveness in checkmating the incidence of corruption society and pointed out that in both cases, of the “corruption and decay sets in first at the top” this is the head in the case of the corpse and the leadership in the case of the society. According to Payne (1975:4), the brain cells are only alive for four

(4) minutes after the head had stopped beating… and even though the heart beat may be revived, the infinitely complex machinery of the brain begin to be dismantled within four minutes and exists no medicine is capable of reviving the dead man. But unlike the corpse,

Payne (1975:4) observed that “societies afflicted with it (corruption) sometimes yield to treatment but the cure involves a radical re-orientation of the society away from the sources of corruption”.

Deriving from this, Payne (1975:5), admonished that “there is only one battle cry against corruption and that is, resist to the uttermost as you would resist death itself”. But 14

this, according to Payne “is only possible when we help one another with all our strength because, the intensity of life is the intensity of helpfulness and the ceasing of help is what we call corruption” (Payne 1975:5).

Still on political corruption, Shah (2006:14), provides one of the most elaborated and extensive research, dealing with a wide range of issues on the causes and possible solutions to corruption. A critical examination of his work reveals that “localization of power helps to break the monopoly of power at the national level by bringing decision making closer to the people” (Shah, 2006:14). Also he noted that this measure strengthens government accountability, since the citizens can then monitor the performance of government officials and equally demand corrective actions. He however, pointed out that in such areas where feudal and industrial interest dominate and institution of participation and accountability are weak and political interference in local affairs rampant, localization may increase opportunities for corruption. He maintained that rule of law and citizen’s empowerment should be the priority in any reform effort.

Nonetheless, Achebe (1983:38), wrote that the corrupt nature of the Nigerian society is such that keeping an average Nigerian from being corrupt is like keeping a goat from eating yam.

Corruption in Nigeria has passed the alarming and entered the fatal state; Nigeria will die if we keep pretending that she is slightly indisposed.

The above statement seems to suggest that corruption is inherent and quite inevitable in the nature of Nigerians. But is it really correct? Perhaps, if we were fatalists or were to be compelled to believe in predestination, that line of argument could have been seen to be sound, but since it is not an established case that corruption is naturally inherent on inborn in 15

human beings, Nigerians cannot be exceptional since they are not naturally or fundamentally different from other human beings.

Equally, following Momoh (1991:115), a corrupt practice can sometimes be a sole undertaking as in some cases of embezzlement of public funds where an official uses his or her position to swindle the nation or his employers. But we will take an ideal corrupt practice to be one which at least involves two individuals. The first individual involved in the corrupt practice is the one who accepts something in the form of cash, presents, gifts or bodily pleasures in order to perform an act.

Momoh (1991), further maintained that in so far as the business of corruption is concerned, the stronger party, mentioned above, is always referred to as the one who occupies the strategic position to perform or cause an act in question to be performed, whereas the second individual, usually referred to as the weaker party is the one in need for favour, who is on the other hand gives something in the form of cash, presents, gifts or bodily pleasures in order to induce the performance of an act. In essence, both parties are guilty of corruption and ought to be punished by the law of the land. But for the fact that corruption has been taken to be part of life in Nigeria, the perpetrators of the act are indirectly permitted to celebrate with impunity and thereby propagate the erroneous impression that corruption is a value to be cultivated and appreciated in Nigeria.

Corruption triumphs in Nigeria because of the desire to get rich quick that has been prevalent among Nigerians. It is no news any longer to hear that policeman, directors, teachers and even traditional rulers can openly and unashamedly demand for and accept gratifications of different kinds before doing the whatever they are supposed, or in some 16

cases, genuinely employed to do for the development and progress of their country.

Moreover, there is no doubt that a number of factors are instrumental to the lingering crises of corruption among the Nigerian populace. However, the basic and most central to the causes of this phenomenon are due to lack of exemplary leadership, greed and inordinate ambition for material wealth, power and glory. There is also a great deal of support by the government authorities. Therefore, it is true to say that one of the most agonizing aspects of

Nigeria’s problems that has actually given license to corruption is the problem of ineffective leadership. For some decades, Nigeria has not been opportune to enjoy the dividends of good and exemplary leadership, be it military or civilian, who have the interest of the people at hearth and also ready to sacrifice personal gains for the greater number of citizens.

Meanwhile, on critical evaluation of his argument, it is obvious that his position were valid but he, however, failed to advance any particular method through which measures he outlined can be achieved and sustained. This becomes necessary based on the fact that those principles are usually accepted by every government but are hardly put into practice. To this extent, his view has failed to address the problem in this research.

Regulatory Institutions on Corruption in Nigeria

Iheanacho, (2005:14) made a critical examination of the speech by Justice Akanbi and lamented on the abysmal performance of the anti-corruption commission, The

Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Commission (ICPC), blaming it on poor funding, limited jurisdiction power, corrupt and opaque judicial system. Iheanacho, therefore, wonders how it has all these landmines buried along its way an administration that says one thing to the International Community and does another thing at home. As a 17

solution, he advocated for an anti-corruption seats in the executive council meeting and broadening the scope of those that should be investigated by the commission regardless of their position.

The major flaw in his work had been his belief that such government that is deeply involved in corrupt practices will be willing to constitute any genuine institution that will have the power to subject for investigation. Hence, his stand is logical inadequate for this work.

Invariably, Umez (2000:36-38), began by arguing against the assumption that corrupt leaders cannot address the fundamental problem of why Nigerian politicians and administrators are corrupt. Hence, it is already obvious that most of those leaders were corrupt before they assume public office. For him, a better and more comprehensive focus should be on what are the sources of corruption and ways of eradicating them. In some, he argued that “the prevalent people’s value system is mostly responsible for the leadership corruption, which in turn produces problem of development in Nigeria” (Umez, 2003:38).

Although, his analysis is both correct and useful but it is however, difficult to clearly explain, following his argument why, despite all the publicity and mass orientation, political corruption still persist. Therefore, in the context of this work, his views are equally considered inadequate.

In order to evaluate the anti-corruption records of Obasanjo’s administration, Olori and Adams (2005:7), listed a number of ministers that have been relieved of their positions following certain allegations of political corruption. In any case, their general assessment on the performance of the regime in combating political corruption was that it has been highly 18

ineffective and in their own words, “a mere effort by Obasanjo to boast his waning popularity” (Olori and Adams, 2005:7). Having provided these insights, they failed to categorically state any policy that can make an impact towards a sustainable fight on corruption.

Ribadu N. in 2004, outlined some of the difficulties facing the Economic and

Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), which began with a brief discussion on the state of political corruption in Nigeria and thereafter focused entirely on legal and prosecution difficulties hampering on the activities of the commission. The basic problem with the analysis is its limitations in tracing the actual cause of political cause and its impact in the country. Besides, this points a critical examination of the Act Establishing the Commission, which reveals whole lot of contradictions.

In effect, his focus is on prosecution rather than providing a preventive solutions or addressing the causes of the problem. Thus, at best, his work can only provide a penal code for corrupt practices which is basically outside the immediate concern of this study.

USAID, (2003) examines the impact of political corruption on development challenges both in political and economic spheres, the outlined various anti-corruption programmes which fall into a number of categories and their applications depending largely on the types of corruption within a local environment. Furthermore, it views decentralization of authority and responsibility as useful tool for achieving transparency and accountability.

However, this article failed to explain why these measures hardly bring any positive result in most of the developing countries just like Nigeria. This entails that the analysis is ineffective. 19

On the 16 th commonwealth law conference 2009 held between 5 th -9th April, 2009 at the Hong-Kong convention, it is noted, by the present chairman of the EFCC, Mrs Farida

WAziri, that the constraints of law enforcement within the rule of law are drawn mostly from the work of the Economic Financial Crimes Commission in Nigeria. She further stated that in fighting corruption, it is necessary to recognize that in the long run, what matters is the institution and not the individual. It is therefore necessary to build institutions that will last and sustain the fight. Where the institution is built around individuals, results tend to be short lived in nature. Recognizing this fact, the EFCC has commenced the process of building structures and process that will sustain the institution and outlive individuals. It is important that the legal environment is sufficiently populated with requisite laws that will facilitate that fight against corruption. The absence of specialized courts and legislation on assets forfeiture tends to hamper the fight against corruption. Where an agency faces these difficulties, it has to be at the forefront of championing the enactment of the requisite legislations and the EFCC has been championing the enactment of key legislations like the establishment of special Economic Crimes Courts and an Assets Forfeiture Act.

Having gone so far, we wish to summarize by stating that a number of scholars have carried out investigations into the activities of the anti-corruption agencies including the

EFCC and other institutions on the mechanisms for reducing the rate of political corruption in Nigeria, but none of these scholars has substantially analyzed why this measures had failed and at the same time provide an alternative measure that can bring about positive change. In other words, most scholars whose works were reviewed presented only superficial views on the impact of the anti-corruption (EFCC) profile in Nigeria and those that identified these weaknesses failed to proffer viable alternatives. 20

Having rigorously and systematically x-rayed what scholars have examined and what they have not adequately addressed in the existing literature as concerned with the relationship between the EFCC and Political corruption in Nigeria, it is evidence to note that scholars are yet to address in concrete terms the effects of political corruption on the EFCC.

The hallmark and the logic of the above is that there still exist hitherto gaps in the existing literature with regards to Political corruption in Nigeria. From the foregoing, the existing literature has failed to explain how the paradox of dual legitimacy of criminalizing financial crimes and communally legitimatizing it affect the regulatory institution like the

EFCC and how the strong but ineffective state in Nigeria contribute to the increase in political corruption. The imperative demand for filling these gaps forms the logical point of departure for this study.

1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In studying how the activities of the government officials, who criminalize financial crimes (political corruption) but also steal from the government coffers weaken the regulatory agency like the EFCC and how the strong but ineffective state in Nigeria has led to increase in political corruption, we will have recourse to the Marxist theory of social production and reproduction.

Marx and Engels (1884:456), argued that ‘according to the materialist conception, the determining factor in history is, in the last resort, the production and reproduction of immediate life. But this in itself is of a twofold character. On one hand, the production of the means of subsistence, of food, clothing and shelter and the tools requisite therefore; on the 21

other hand, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species. The social institutions under which men of a definite historical epoch and of a definite country live are conditioned by both kinds of production: by the stage of development of labour, on the one hand, and of the family, on the other. The less the development of labour, and the more limited its volume of production and, therefore, the wealth of society, the more preponderantly does the social order appear to be dominated by ties of sex (Marx and Engels

1884:456-457).

The choice of this approach stems from the fact, as Ogban (2005:16) noted, that what can be produced and reproduced at each point in time depends on a combination of the quality of labour power (physical strength, knowledge and skills), non-human physical resources for production (tools and objects for applying the tools and interpersonal relations of production (who decide what is to be produced, exchanged, distributed and consumed, as well as who does what and gets what is produced. In every social production and reproduction system, there must be someone or people to make binding decisions on what is produced, distributed, exchange and consumed by who and for who. Those who decide what to produce also control the social production process and in their favour. They generally have the most of what is produced and they are often satisfied than the other group within the production process and tend to protect their position in the production process (Ogban,

2005:16).

The implication of the above is that a student of social phenomenon like political corruption and its effects must pay particular attention to the totality of the relations of production, which constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundation upon 22

which arises the legal and political superstructures like the EFCC and (financial crime) political corruption.

Thus, the productive system in Nigeria is largely based on rentierism. As a result, the ruling class that control political power see the apparatus as instrument of primitive accumulation. Hence, class relations both within the ruling class and between the ruling and dominated classes in a peripheral economy like Nigeria is highly fractious and antagonistic.

The relation within the ruling class is factious because access to political power is not seen to arise from the actual control of the social relations of production but a matter of opportunity or sheer luck.

In this light, the social institutions of the state becomes a repressive instrument of the advantage fraction of the ruling class in subjugating the rest of the society and fostering primitive accumulation of the advantaged ruling class as well as protecting their relations in the production process. EFCC, as an institution of the state, saddled with the responsibility of fighting corruption has become notorious for double standard practices is its fight against corruption. On the one hand, it has prosecuted many corrupt officials “whose interests or activities have been perceived to threaten the interest (primitive accumulation) of the dominant class. And on the other hand, it has conspicuously ignored or failed to prosecute other corrupt officials whose interests are in harmony with that of the dominant class.

In this regard, the state apparatus (EFCC) and laws were manipulated in favour of the ruling class’ interest and at the expense of the other classes within the state. Basically, the logic of the foregoing is that the EFCC shall be conceived as the instrument of domination in the hands of the ruling class who are the controller of the means of 23

production. By implication, the regulatory institutions would be weak and ineffective. In order to maintain the domineering influence of the ruling class, over the dominated class, there would be a continuous primitive accumulation to strengthen the power. This implies also that there would be increase in political corruption.

Thus, the inevitable tendency of one class to struggle for maintenance of domination over another, accounts for the of dual legitimacy of financial crimes; first it is legitimized within the ruling class and secondly, within the communities where the individual politician comes from. This is in exemplified in reported cases in Nigeria where the EFCC fails to prosecute the members of the ruling class whose interests are in conformity with the power that be. Also, the community of such individual politician seems to encourage and protect their member in phase of corrupt practices as in the case of Alamieyesiegha and Ibori.

Obviously, dual legitimacy of criminality and the irony of fighting corruption by those who are assumed to involved in corrupt practices are does environmental conditions that has greatly influenced the performance of the EFCC in accomplishing its statutory mandate.

Unless these environmental condition changes, EFCC will not make wave in achieving its pursuit in terms of reducing the rate of financial crimes in Nigeria. Thus, the prerequisite for the maintenance of domination is solely based on their position in relations of production and the state power. Hence, the political corruption and the attendant regulatory institution like the EFCC can be best appraised in the context of Marxist theory of social production and reproduction.

24

1.7 HYPOTHESES

This research is predicated on the following hypotheses:

1. The EFCC has not accomplished its statutory mandate in terms of reducing the rate

of political corruption in Nigeria from 2000-2010.

2. The dual legitimacy of political corruption has greatly influenced the performance

of the EFCC in its fight against corruption in Nigeria from 2000-2010.

1.8 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

The reliability and validity of our data for this study lie in the use of observational techniques and documentations as our major method of data collection. This implies that, in the course of this research, data shall be gathered through secondary sources like materials from the internet, relevant textbooks, magazines, newspapers, conference papers, seminar papers, and statements of commentators as concerns the issue at hand. Equally, government documents, white papers, a report of panels of enquire will also be of importance to this research.

This method of data collection as adopted in this research will enable us to understand the comparative opinions of scholars and commentators concerning the operations of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the incidence of political corruption in Nigeria. However, in view of limited reliability of this method, serious efforts will be made to ensure that scientific objectivity overrides the research process. 25

The use of documentaries forms our empirical source of data. This is because the use of documents allows the researcher on areas where he cannot have access to the respondents and this cannot study what is concerned with decisions and dispositions among government officials. This goes on to rule out the possibilities of using survey methods like questionnaire and interview methods. Irrespective of the above argument, interview and questionnaire would have been conducted, but the actors may decline to respond. Reliable and expressible documents are capable of bringing the significant information which cannot be gotten through other methods. The issue is that where reliable documents exist, generations appear more reliable than those emanating from limited data from the primary source.

Finally, another justification is that this method will assist to collect data stored in files, government archives, libraries, bookshops and other international documents .

1.8.1 METHOD OF ANALYSIS The nature of this study makes the use of qualitative descriptive analysis quite imperative. This method of Analysis according to Asika (1991:118) essentially has to do with summarizing the information generated in the research verbally. This method of analysis is not limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in which the data are created or presented since other method of analysis like table presentation is equally adopted. Thus, analysis of materials collected from secondary sources such as textbooks, journal, article, magazine, newspapers, and overall documentaries etc, will subscribe strictly to the use of qualitative descriptive analysis and tables. 26

The use of these methods of analysis as stated above is to read meaning into the information gathered from materials and other secondary sources as well as to categorize data in their scale of measurement where necessary. 27

1.8.2 LOGICAL DATA FRAMEWORK (LDF) FOR THE STUDY

S/n Hypothesis Variables Empirical indicators Theoretical Method of data Method of Sources of framework collection Analysis Data 1. EFCC has not (1) EFCC’s • Reduction of the rate of • Theory of • Observation • Qualitative • Secondary accomplished its statutory corruption in Nigeria social • Documentaries Descriptive source statutory mandate mandate. • Prosecution of production and analysis • Library in terms of offenders. reproduction. • Tables • Internet reducing the rate • Thorough investigation presentation materials of political of corrupt cases. • Journals corruption in • Arresting the suspects. • Newspapers/ Nigeria. • Recovery of looted magazines assets.

(2) Reduction in • More accountability. • Theory of • Observation • Qualitative • Secondary the rate of • Increase in social • Documentaries. Descriptive • Library political infrastructural production and analysis • Internet corruption development. reproduction. • Table materials in Nigeria. • Low level of corruption presentation • Journals cases • Newspapers/ • Low possibility level of Magazines. looting.

28

S/n Hypothesis Variables Main indicators of the variables Data/sources Method of data Method of data collection analysis

2. The dual (1) Dual • Corruption is legitimized within the • Secondary sources: • Documentaries • Tables legitimacy of legitimacy of ruling class and within the political political communities. • Library • Observations • Quantitative corruption has corruption in • Lack of transparency and Approach • Textbooks greatly Nigeria. accountability • Qualitative influenced the • Political officials are corrupt but • Internet materials Descriptive performance of criminalize financial crimes. Analysis. the EFCC in its • Absence of moral and legal support • Magazine fight against against political corruption • political • General criminalization of Journal corruption in corruption but communities Nigeria. embrace corrupt officials. (1) Influence of • Fear of prosecution of public • Secondary sources • Documentaries • Tables dual officials • • • legitimacy of • Favour in exercising duties Library Observations Qualitative criminality on • Lack of autonomy of the regulatory descriptive • Textbooks the institution analysis. performance • Dependency of the regulatory • Internet materials of EFCC institution • Non-prosecuted cases of corruption • Magazines • Selective justice • Journals • Preferential treatment to alleged corrupt officials 29

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION AND THE ORIGIN OF THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIME COMMISSION (EFCC) IN NIGERIA.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we shall evaluate the historical overview of the incidence of corruption in Nigeria and the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the anti-graft agency like the

Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), as well as the institutional structure of the commission.

Thus, the story of corruption in Nigeria is nearly apocryphal; it is indeed stranger than fiction. Perhaps this account for why “some Nigerians are tempted to say that corruption should be legalized so that its proceeds could be taxed. Some also believes that every Nigerian is a corrupt individual while others say corruption is now adored rather than abhorred”.

Granted that corruption is a universal problem which was not invented in Nigeria but the

Nigerian environment has become a fertile ground where it is nurtured to the extent that the few who are not corrupt are seen as odd people who are not “true” Nigerians.

2.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE PHENOMENON OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA.

In Nigeria, corruption has grown alarmingly over the past two decades, though its growth has been traced earlier through the court messages and native authority court members.

It was also during the colonial period that Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was charged for mismanagement and corrupt practices in the African Continental Bank (ACB). However, following the report of the commission which investigated the charges, it was revealed that the 30

colonial office only wanted to embarrass Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and his supporters by the trumped up charges of misconduct, hence no established case of corruption against him.

First Republic

During the first republic, chief Awolowo and some leading members of his party was equally charged for corruption and diversion of funds into the party funds and also into private use. The Cooker commission of enquiry investigating this allegation stated that the movement of this money was effected through the marketing board and national investment and

Properties Company, which were government controlled. The commission condemned Chief

Awolowo’s direction of the use of funds, but exonerated him.

According to Ikejiani,(2001)

It is interested to note that in these cases, as in the case of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, charges of corruption could not stick. The two foremost nationalists proved that they could use their positions to advance the interest of their people. The change in orientation in leadership perhaps came with the stiff competition for political power, which characterized the post-independence Nigeria, especially after 1963. It is possible that the keen competition led to pervasion of rules to gain advantage and to the damaging mobilization of ethnic primordial ties to ensure victory. Obviously, this development necessitated the emergence of corruption in Nigeria public service.

Aguiyi Ironsi’s Regime (January – July 1966)

The first coup d’etat in Nigeria in January 1966, led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna

Nzeogwu was therefore, to rid Nigeria of a group of lawless and corrupt politicians who as it 31

seemed then had misappropriated a lot of public funds. At this time, it was still unethical to enrich oneself by illegal means. The actions of the government of Prime Minister, Sir Alhaju

Abubakar Tafawa Balewa confirms Fanon’s argument that;

In the African State, once independence has been won, government becomes no more than holding company of the national bourgeoisie intent only on sharing out the national booty. The military regime led by Major General Aguiyi Ironsi was too brief to rid Nigeria of the infectious national disease known as corruption. It was too brief for one to assess its involvement in corrupt practices.

General Yakubu Gowon’s Regime (July 1966 – July 1975)

Against the expectations that the essence of Gowon’s regime would be to correct the ills of the first republic, for which military had to intervene in the first instance, ironically,

Gowon’s tenure witnessed an unprecedented rise on corruption in the country’s body polity, nurturing a coterie of powerful Nigerian millionaires- the veritable fat cats. For instance the cement armada of 1974 is a ready example of corruption during the Gowon’s regime. The federal government had ordered through the Nigerian national supply company two million metric tones of cement from various countries. The Minister of defense also ordered for 16.23 million metric tones when it only needed 2.9 million metric tones for its project.

Although, the total cost per tone was only $40, Nigerians were paying $115 per tone.

This means that through this singular cement business, someone or some people were being enriched by $75 per tone for 16.23 million metric tones. “This is hard to believe at a time when 32

despite the oil boom workers takes home pay was nothing to write home about”. This example is one out of the several cases of corruption during the Gowon’s regime.

Fortunately and unfortunately, the period of Gowon’s regime was the beginning and probably the climax of ‘oil boom’ in Nigeria. A Central Bank of Nigeria annual report has it that the value of Nigeria oil produce rose from N 262 million in 1969 to N 5356.7 million in

1974, the year just before the overthrow of Gowon. The masses of course never benefited from this increase in revenue rather than continued to languish in poverty and deprivation in the midst of plenty. According to Dudley, “the effect of the ‘oil boom’ was to convert the military political decision makers and their bureaucratic aids into a new property owing, rentier class working in close and direct collaboration with the sole aim of expropriating the surplus derived from oil for their private and personal benefits”.

There are many examples of unfathomed greed among the officials of the Gowon regime Mr. Ukpabi Asika as reported by New Nigerian of December 3, 1975, during his tenure in office had acquired the following property illegally (a) Bladi Court, Warri valued at

N120,000; (b) Plot K, in the GRA, GRA Onitsha, valued at N 76, 000 (c) an apartment, 1229

Latorre on Spain (d) another property, in Spain, 9 Torremeloes Spain (e) a house, 6 Mayhaung

Road, GRA Kano. These in addition to several others landed property(s) scattered across strategic locations in different cities with the country. The point here is that at that time, no

Nigerian could earn such a huge salary that could afford him all these, Asika was not alone, some others had even more than this.

General Gowon, himself was corrupt and inefficient and so could not influence or address the serious cased of corruption and indiscipline, Gowon only would say “if there be 33

any of you who has abused in any way the confidence I and the nation response in him to enhance some unworthy ends, I leave such person to his conscience and to God and to posterity”.

General Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo’s regime (July 1975 – September

1979).

General Murtala Mohammed terminated the inefficiency of Gowon’s regime in July

1975. His was a corrective attempt and clean-up exercise involving the examination of the assets of dismissed military governors and other public officers. Over 10, 000 persons (judges, civil servants, university dons, military etc) were retired/dismissed from public services, for reasons ranging from old age, health reasons, inefficiency, incompetence and corruption. And in contrast to Gowon, he said that commissioners and public officers who were found to own assets over and above what could reasonably be computed to represent their legitimate earnings would forfeit all such excess assets by certification.

Some analysts believe that Obasanjo was not as firm as Murtala Mohammed and that if he had maintained the spirit and tempo of his predecessor’s crusade, the story would have been different today. Falana accusing Obasanjo of corrupt practices explained that as soon as

Murtala died the succeeding regime institutionalized corruption in Nigeria by promulgating decree No 11 of 1976, public officer’s protection against Accusation. From all indication, the regime of Obasanjo saw a rise in corruption too. Records showed that it was his tenure that N

2.8 billion oil money got missing from the NNPC account. Thanks to Justice Ayo Iriefe probe panel, which believe in “let the sleeping dog lie”, thereby, covering the misdeeds of that 34

regime. It could be because corruption lingered during the Obasanjo’s regime that the Shehu

Shagari’s regime picked and enlarged it.

Shehu Shagari regime (second republic).

According to Prof. Ikejiani, “the accounts of corruption during Shagari’s regime would fill the archives if recorded”.

Corruption indeed held sway at all levels of government during his regime, large mobilization fees were paid before any real work began and in most cases those projects are never completed. There were alleged fraud in the account of the federal capital development authority and disappearance of millions of naira worth building materials from the Nigerian national supply company. The mysterious and epidemic fires in government buildings were equally alleged to be deliberate plots to cover up corruption and fraud. Some of those building included; ministry of external affairs, the thirty seven stories Lagos headquarters of Nigerian external telecommunications and federal capital development authority Abuja. These fire incidences happened when these establishments were under investigation of corruption and financial fraud.

Furthermore, contracts amounting to N795 million for the Ajaokuta steel projects were awarded in 1980 to Fougeroue (N329 million), DUMEZ (N179 million) and Julius Berger

(N297 million). These contracts were awarded with the understanding that Kickbacks and commissions would be paid to the national party of Nigeria (NPN). The kickbacks paid amounted to N59.625 million. The state governments were equally not left out in this looting spray, notable among them was ‘JMB affairs’ and Anambra State government was ripped off 35

by cross oceans limited London and some Nigerians. This amount was for the building of fiber filament and carpet manufacturing complex in Ihiala a contract signed by the then Governor

Chief Jim Nwobodo in 1982.

The Gross Oceans limited never executed the contract despite the fact that it drew from Samuel Montaqu Bank the 7.36 million pounds from the loan provision made from the contract. Mr. Audu Ogbeh, the then federal minister of communication revealed that the federal government was loosing N50 million every month as salaries to workers that did not exist in the post and telegraph department”. Also under the guise of state security Governors gulped millions of taxpayer’s money by enriching themselves.

General Muhammed Buhari – December 1983 – August 1985

The generality of the masses had become fed up with the moribund second republic of

Shagari that had become rotten with corruption, hence he had learnt nothing from the past mistakes of the first republic General “Buhari’s Maiden speech to the nation read in part as thus”… the corrupt, inept and insensitive leadership of the past four years have been the source of immorality and impropriety in our society since what happens in any society is largely a reflection of the society. We deplore corruption in all its facets. Indeed corruption becomes a deity, which was worshipped by the Shagari’s administration.

“The problems of Nigeria were too numerous that the Buhari’s regime was fully engaged with things to do to put the nation on course”. His institution of the War Against

Indiscipline (WAI) was therefore, an ethical revolution aimed at inculcating in every Nigerian citizen abhorrence for corruption and economic sabotage. The task was not easy and before the 36

regime could grapple with the situation, surprisingly the General Ibrahim Babangida coup had taken place. The Buhari regime could not be said to be visibly corrupt.

General Ibrahim Babangida (August 1985 – August 1993)

When General Babangida took over government accusing General Buhari of slow

‘pace action’ and high-handedness to the people of Nigeria thought that Babangida and his men would tackle the hydra-headed problems of Nigeria particularly that of corruption with speed and accuracy. On the contrary, Babangida provide himself in every thing he did as a dribbler who turned the political and socio-economic clock of Nigeria backward by many years. According to Nwala:

Under Babangida’s regime corruption became Nigeria’s nickname and young men carried their banner to the international scene through cocaine pushing, Advance fee fraud (called 419) and other sophisticated corrupt practices. Babangida sins with regards to corruption are many and may outnumber those of

Abacha but because he is still alive, most of those atrocities are covered. Babangida, capitalized on the Lukewarmness of Nigerians and brazenly spent public funds. He was the first leader in Nigeria to maintain what he called “dedicated account” into which he channeled the proceeds from the sale of 105,000 barrels of crude oil per day. It was not until his exit from office that Nigerians were made to know that the ‘dedicated account’ were in actual sense dedicated to Babangida.

It was Pius Okigbo the chairman of a panel of enquiry set up by General Sani Abacha in 1995 to review the activities of the CBN that let the cat out of the bag. Babangida never swindled in small units. According to Okigbo while submitting the report of the panel “… of 37

the $12.4 billion that went into the report of the dedicated account when Babangida was in charge, $12.2 billion much of which was a windfall from the Gulf war, was spent on what could never be adjustment genuine high priority nor truly regenerative investment…

Babangida and Abdul Kadir Ahmed, the Governor of Central Bank, accounted to none of these massive extra-budgetary expenditures”.

Babangida started the sabotage in the oil sector in Nigeria. In order to make smooth business, which brings huge amount of money without tears, the refineries across the country must not be in operation continuously. The NNPC was continuously manipulated so that it continues to play the big fool. Any managing director who did not compromise was thrown out of job. A good example was that of Aret Adams “he was relieved of his duty, because he refused to be manipulated by Babangida”.

In the area of foreign debt, Nigeria was plunged into the heaviest debt during his regime. An available record reveals that, the debt stock increased from $17.765 million in

1983 to $32.584 billion in 1995. The truth about these loans is that they were not used for anything meaningful to the nation. IMF managing director Micheal Camdeseaus confirmed this when he publicly declared that… much of the money borrowed by Nigeria from foreign creditors went directly or indirectly into the foreign accounts of some Nigerians, others to military spending, and some invested on unproductive projects.

It is no use enumerating the different choice properties illegally acquired by

Babangida, since the fact remains that in terms of physical cash he may be richer than the country itself. Babangida’s regime marked in a certain tragic sense, the most outstanding point 38

of decline of Nigeria’s value system. The height of corruption that saw him out office in 1993 was the annulment of June 12, 1993 presidential election.

His wife Mirian Babangida added more sophistication to the life-style of the Victoria

Gowon as a first lady. Through her self carved office of “Better life for rural women” she siphoned the national treasury as much as possible because she was not accountable to anyone.

General Sani Abacha (November 1993 – June 1998)

According to Jibrim Ibrahim, “The Abacha regime was not just a continuation of

Babangida regime, it signaled a qualitative transformation of the Nigerian state into a fully criminalized and indeed, rogue-state”.

The regime of Abacha built an empire for corruption while he and his cronies were growing fatter and fatter from ill-gotten wealth the masses were growing leaner and leaner from poverty and deprivation. General Abacha in addition to other avenues of looting has a field day with the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Billions of dollars and pounds were carted away from the Central Bank since he was going for ‘money run’. Tell magazine reveals the number of times Abacha directly took cash from the CBN as represented in the table below:

39

ABACHA’S LOOT PROFILES

Date Amount ($)(000,000)

Feb,15, 1995 $ 4million and 2million

Feb, 17 1994 $ 4million and 2million

Dec, 29, 1995 $5 million

March 26,1996 $5million and £3million

May 29, 1996 £12.57 million

Sept.24, 1996 £50 million

April 22, 1997 £60 million

July 18,1997 $60 million and £30 million

Nov.29,1997 $120 million and £30 million

Dec.11, 1996 $50 million and £30 million

Feb.18,1997 $6 million

Feb.18, 1997 $3 million

March 3, 1997 $3.27 million

March 6,1997 $1.21 million 40

April 29, 1997 £147 million

June 30, 1997 £4.9 million

August 8, 1997 $ 10 million

October 18, 1997 £12.3 million

October 21, 1997 £5.88 million

October 23, 1997 £14.76 million

October 29, 1997 £11.76 million

Nov.14,1997 $10 million

Nov.26, 1997 $24 million

Dec.10,1997 $24 million

Dec. 18, 1997 £6.15 million

This was how the treasury of the nation was looted and Nigeria then ranking very low among the countries at the bottom of world’s poorest nations.

It is on record that Abacha and his family own 57 companies including the Chaouris, a notorious oil bunkering company. Abacha perfected on what IBB started with the oil industry.

Things actually went off-hand that investigators preferred to refer to the then number one

Nigerian family as “the Abacha’s criminal organization”. Abacha’s wife Maryan took after 41

Mirian Babangida and looted without sympathy the national treasury when some of her fellow women could hardly afford one meal a day.

In terms of external debt and its management, external creditors put debt owned by

Nigeria at $34.7 billion. Like his predecessor Babangida, “the loans were either diverted or utilized for projects which were unable to generate funds for servicing the debt. The magnitude of the swindling in Nigeria became clearer when we examine critically the federal ministry of finance appraisal of the 145 projects in the then 30 states for which the sum of 513. 150 billion was borrowed from the Paris Club and London club. It reveals that out of the 145 projects, 18 projects were described as failed projects; engulfing $836.17 millions were not executed. 44 projects, categorized as distressed and financed with $4.811 million were implemented up to the commissioning stage.

Shortly after Abacha’s death, officials were reported to have identified $1.8 billion placed by the late dictator in Brazil, Lebanon, Britain and Switzerland. On 9 th Nov. 1998,

Mohammed Haruna, press secretary to the head of the state announced that $675.2 million,

£75.3 million and N 22 million of funds had been recovered from the family of Abacha.

Indeed Abacha’s corrupt practices cannot be exhaustively discussed in a small chapter as this. Meanwhile the table below shows why Nigeria is poor as a nation while some individuals in it are richer than some countries of the world including Nigeria itself.

42

INDIVIDUALS LOOT PROFILE IN NAIRA

NAME AMOUNT LOOTED

IBB N2462.35 billion

Abubakar N493.85 billion

Mike Akhigbe N549.645 billion

Jerry Useni N805.9 billion

Ismalia Gwazo N517.0 billion

Umaro Dikko N894.65 billion

Paul Oguwma N53.00 billion

Sani Abacha N1218.137 billion

Mohammed Abacha N210.7 billion

Abdulkadir Abacha N338.42 billion

Wada Nas N237.4 billion

Tom Ikimi N252.553 billion

Dan Etete N327.43 billion

Dan Etiebet N567.47 billion

Al-Mustapha N199.793 billion

Anthony Ani N688.95 billion

Bashio Dachatu N555.49 billion

Gen. Wushishi N228.695 billion 43

Hassan Adamu N130.5 billion

T.Y Danjuma N342.7 billion

Ishayi Bamayi N94.0 billion

Total N1.130657 trillion

SOURCE CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE, EDITED BY DR. C.O UGWU (2002) P-125.

The table above shows that apart from Umaru Dikko others are military made billionaires, the offshoot of bad leadership. The military has indeed done the nation much disservice for roughly 30 years. Fundamentally, Nigeria needs ethical revolution to check this ugly trend and to the extent other subsequent regimes aims to achieve this, we shall be examining in subsequent chapters.

2.3 THE ORIGIN OF EFCC IN NIGERIA

The enthronement of a democratic government in 1999 after more than two decades of military rule in Nigeria has posed a formidable challenge particularly along the direction of combating national development. The Obasanjo’s administration appeared to have a full awareness of the disturbing nature of the enigma. The first bill proposed to the national assembly within a few months of its assumption of office was the corruption practices and other related offence bill 1999, which later was passed and became the corrupt practice and other related offence (ICPC) Act 2000. However, despite the ICPC Act and other legislation to regulate the conduct of both public officers and the private sectors for corrupt practices, the vices were still very much within the system. Bank fraud were in the upsurge, forex abuse and 44

manipulation were still the stock in trade of many banks, 419 still bloomed large, money laundering from corrupt proceeds were still visible and apparent. It was in these circumstances that Nigeria was pressurized especially by the international community to update her laws and steps to check the perpetration of economic and financial crimes. Acknowledging that all these have contributed in keeping investors away, it is for this reasons and the international dimension which these crimes had assumed that the promulgation of the Economic and

Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act 2000 became inevitable (Ribadu, 2004:2-3).

WHAT IS EFCC?

EFCC is an acronym for Economic Financial Crimes Commissions. The commission is charged with the responsibility of investigating and the enforcement of all laws against economic and financial crimes in all its ramifications. The commission is also the designated financial intelligence unit (FIU) in Nigeria, which is charged with the responsibility of coordinating the various institutions involved in the fight against money laundering and enforcement of all laws dealing with economic and financial crimes in Nigeria.

The EFCC Act, which was re-enacted in 2004 is revolutionary in three (3) basic aspects:

1. Power of co-ordination and enforcement of varied but related economic and financial

crimes laws are vested in one body.

2. Because the nature of the crimes handled by the commission is at the heart of the

economy, all critical stakeholders including security, law enforcement agencies and

apex financial regulations are made members of the commission. 45

3. Apart from the offences created by the responsibility to specially enforce the provisions

of other principal laws bordering on economic and financial crimes including: a. The money laundering Act, 2004. b. The advance fee fraud (and other related offence) Act, 2005. c. The failed banks (recovery of debts and financial malpractices in banks) Act, 1991. d. The banks and other financial institution Act, 1996. e. The miscellaneous offence Act, 1985. f. Any other law or regulation relating to economic and financial crimes including the

penal code and criminal code. (see section 7 EFCC Act).

2.4 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EFCC ACT OF 2002 IN NIGERIA

The EFCC was established by the National Assembly in 2002 under the EFCC Act of

2002; while there was an amendment of the Act in 2004. Section 5 of the EFCC Act 2002, stipulates the following as the functions of the EFCC:

(i) The investigation of all financial crimes including advance fee fraud, money laundering

an counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers, market fraud, fraudulent encashment of

negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, contract scam etc.

(ii) The coordination and enforcement of all economic and financial crimes laws and

enforcement functions conferred on any other person or other authority.

(iii) The adoption of measures to identify, trace, freeze, confiscate, or seize proceeds derived

from terrorist activities, economic and financial crimes related offences or the

properties, the value of which corresponds to such proceeds. 46

(iv) The adoption of measures to eradicate the Commission of Economic and Financial

Crimes.

Section 6 of the EFCC’s Act confers the EFCC such special powers as to enforce:

(a) The money laundering Act 1995.

(b) The Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud related offences act 1995.

(c) The Failed Bank (recovery of debts) and financial malpractises in banks Act 1994 as

amended.

(d) The banks and other financial institution Act 1991 as amended.

(e) Miscellaneous offences act.

(f) Any other law or regulations relating to economic and financial crimes.

(g) Cause investigations to be conducted as to whether any person has committed offence

under this act.

(h) With a view to ascertaining whether it has been in offences under this act, or in the

proceeds of any such offences, cause investigation to be conducted into the properties

of any person, if it appears to the commission that the person’s lifestyle and extent of

his properties are not justified by his source of income.

In terms of its organization and for the effective conduct of the functions of the

Commission, section 11 of the Act 2002 established the following units:

(a) The General and Asset unit.

(b) The Legal and Prosecution unit.

(c) The Research unit

(d) The Administrative unit.

(e) The Training unit. 47

While section 7 of the Act stipulates that the members of the Commission include:

(a) The Chairman

(b) The Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria or his Representative

(c) A Representative each of the following Federal Ministries not below the Rank of a

Director.

(i) Foreign Affairs

(ii) Finance

(iii) Justice

(d)The Chairman of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies.

(e)The Director-General of:

(i) The National Intelligence Agency

(i) The Department of State Security Service

(f) The Director-General of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

(g) The Commissioner of Insurance.

(h) The Postmaster-General of Nigeria Postal Services

(i) The Chairman Nigerian Communications Commission.

(j) The Comptroller-General Nigeria Customs Services

(k) The Comptroller-General Nigeria Immigration Services. 48

(I) A representative of the Nigeria Police Force not below the rank of an Assistant Inspector-

General of Police.

(m) A Director-General who shall be the Head of Administration.

(n) Four eminent Nigerians with cognate experience in any of the following: finance, banking,

or accounting. (Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette: the EFCC Act,2002).

EFCC MISSION STATEMENT

The EFCC will curb the menace of corruption that constitute the cog in the wheel of progress, protect national and foreign investments in the country; imbue the spirit of hard work in the citizenry and discourage ill gotten wealth, identify illegally acquired wealth and confiscate it; build upright work force in both public and private sectors of the economy and; contribute to the global war against crimes.

2.5 THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMISSION

The EFCC is structured in such a way that it encompasses critical stakeholders including security, law enforcement agencies and apex financial regulators alongside members of the commission, for its effective functioning. To this regard, the commission is made up of the following bodies/members: a) A chairman, who shall be the chief executive and accounting officer of the

commission. He is to be a serving or retired member of any government security or law

enforcement agency. b) The governor of central bank or his representatives. c) A representative each of the following federal ministries not below the rank of director: 49

i) Foreign affairs

ii) Finance

iii) justice d) The chairman national drug law enforcement agency e) The department of state security services f) The director-general security and exchange commission g) The commissioners for insurance h) The post master general of the Nigerian postal services i) The chairman, Nigerian communication commission j) The controller-general Nigeria immigration services k) The controller-general Nigeria custom services l) A representative of the Nigerian police force not below the rank of an assistant

inspector general of police. m) Four eminent Nigerian’s with cognate experience in any of the following – financial,

banking or accounting, and n) A director general who shall be the head of administration.

The members of the director-general shall be part-time members.

The president subject to the confirmation of the senate shall appoint the chairman and members. The commission may make standing order regulating its proceeding or those of any of its committees. Presently, the executive chairman of the commission is Mrs. Farida Waziri.

Operationally, the commission is structured as having various departments/units, which includes: a) Office of the executive chairman 50

b) Office of the commission secretary c) Organizational support department d) Zonal office e) Audit office f) Operational department g) Legal and prosecution unit h) Financial and accounting unit i) Media and publicity unit j) Information communication technology unit k) Nigerian financial intelligence unit (NFIU) l) Service/integrity unit m) Training and research institute department

HOW PETITIONS ARE ACCEPTED

The most common way of accepting cases by EFCC is through a petition written by an individual or organization. The petition will be evaluated and if the case falls within the jurisdiction of the commission’s mandate, it will be accepted, invested and where necessary prosecuted. Petitions that do not fall within the purview of the commission are sent to the appropriate agency, bait police, security and exchange commission (EFCC), ICPC, CBN etcetera (Salim, 2002).

CONCLUTION 51

We have studied in this chapter, the historical background of political corruption in

Nigeria since independence based on different political dispensations. Essentially, we further studied the origin of the EFCC. In doing so, we explain the meaning of the acronym- EFCC, the establishment act of the EFCC, the duties and responsibilities of the commission, the mission statement of the body etc.

Furthermore, we explained the institutional structure and formation of the commission and how petitions are accepted. Having examined the nature and functions of EFCC, and how the institution has functioned overtime in the anti-corruption struggle of the Obasanjo’s administration, we will therefore, futher our studyby looking at the EFCC’s journey so far in fighting political corruption in Nigeria.

52

CHAPTER THREE

EFCC AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: THE JOURNEY SO FAR

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Political Corruption is concerned with the illegal tendency of using or diverting public treasury for private purposes. Corruption is dangerous and inimical to the systemic existence of any polity. It is a socio-political, economic and moral malaise that may permeate and cripple the nerves of any polity as a result of its contagiousness and malignancy. Corruption is political when it involves public servants who are supposed to serve the public interest, end up using public offices to propagate their own selfish interest thereby enriching themselves.

Governments in developing countries including Nigeria have tended to be pre-occupied with power and its material perquisites. Given the conditions of underdevelopment, power offers the opportunities of a lifetime to rise above the general level of poverty and squalor that pervade the society. It equally provides a rare opportunity to acquire wealth and prestige to be able to distribute jobs, contacts, gifts of money among others to one’s relatives and political allies (Dudley, 1982:130-31). 53

Given the above notion as explained by Dudley, the implication is that the communities of the public officials who in one way or another benefit from the looted public treasury tends to encourage political corruption. Political corruption as could be manifested in the form of money laundry, looting, nepotism etc, seem to benefit certain segment of a society who in turn benefit from it. The segment of a society who benefits from it and also encourages it is said to have legitimized it even though it is a ‘generally’ prohibited act among public officials.

This argument can be validated with reference to the report of (daily sun, November

23, 2005:5), about Alamieyeseigha, the former governor of Bayelsa state who disguised as woman to beat British security after arresting him for money laundering.

Following his escape, which the British high commission described as a breach of bail condition, it was reported that there was jubilation in Yenagoa. This is an indication of communal legitimization of political corruption in Nigeria.

However, in this chapter, we attempt appraising the Obasanjo’s ant-corruption measures as well as Yar’adua’s war against corruption and the plea bargain policy of the economic and financial crimes commission (EFCC).

3.2 EFCC AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA

Political corruption is a very big problem in the country, and all hands must be on deck to frontally confront the recurring menace, in fact, the Obasanjo’s government has at various times said, it will wage a relent war or the scourge that has continued to under-develop the polity in all its ramifications. However, with the benefit of hindsight, it is very obvious that not only is the government of the day merely playing lip service to the critical issue of political 54

corruption in Nigeria, but the agencies set up to fight, as well as the personnel are more corrupt and rapacious than those they claim are corrupt. In the true sense, those that are fighting corruption do not only lack the moral right and legitimacy to fight corruption, they do not know what corruption is. For instance, when it became obvious that president Olusegun

Obasanjo brought about 600 million shares in the Transcorp and the denial they had offered in the past could no longer hold, they argued that it was an error of judgment or a conflict of interest and not a corruption issue, so, if this is not corruption, what then is corruption? (Jide,

2006:1).

This takes us to another very germane and interesting issue in the fight against corruption, which is the fact that, the fight against corruption since 1999 has been lopsided, vindictive, selective, biased, one sided and meretricious. That is why the EFCC campaign against corruption has been counter-productive, instead of it abating it is festering controllably, and this is because when the president or those close to him commit an act of corruption, it is usually glossed over, because the agencies put in place to fight corruption in the country,

(EFCC), think the president can do no wrong, in other words, the president is above the law, therefore cannot be subjected to the due process or the rule of law. But when it involves people that are opposed to the president Obasanjo politically then, it is corruption and they must be summarily dealt to serve as example to others. The point here is that these double standard, these warped treatments are in themselves corruption, and if those who claim to be fighting corruption like the EFCC among others cannot get over this basics, then they are not fit and proper to do the job they have been given, (Jide, 2006:1). 55

However, observers and commentators have advanced a number of instances of injustice on the part of EFCC. According to Ayobola, what has the EFCC done about the N 84 billion that was missing in NPA? What has EFCC done about N 311 billion that was missing in the Nigeria national petroleum company NNPC? What did EFCC do about the N 50 million brides that were given to pro-third term legislators, during the tenure elongation debate in the national assembly? What did EFCC do to Senator Ibrahim Mantu, when he mismanaged N 400 million in the failed haji operations in 2005? These and many more instances are the selective procedure of the EFCC, which is also political corruption in the real sense.

Another very important issue when talking about corruption in Nigeria, is the fact that

EFCC is not an independent agency of government, that could discharge its duties and responsibilities without fear or favour, this is because it is the president that appoints the chairman of EFCC, and since, the president has the power of hire and fire, the top shot in

EFCC cannot but be loyal to the president that approves the funding for the agency, if they want to be too assertive or discharge the functions independent of the president, the president can cut them to size by starving them of funds. It is a well known fact today that, before EFCC undertakes any task or even commence any investigation, it must sought the official permission of the president, also when investigations are concluded, reports are submitted to the president for perusal. The implication of this is that, EFCC cannot do anything outside what the president wants it to do, and this had been the bane of the fight against political corruption in Nigeria.

Apart from the above assertions which represents the views of majority of Nigerian people on the state of affairs in the country presently. This is why the same token, the action 56

congress recently said that president Obasanjo and his group have blatantly turned Nigeria into a unitary constitutional state while the centre reserves the right to remove elected leaders by reckless deployment of soldiers and mobile policemen from the barracks. Never in our national life, not even at the height of undiluted military dictatorship have we witnessed this level of flagrant, callous and unbridled dictatorship. Nigeria, under Obasanjo’s administration, was a private estate with one ruthless landlord who deals with his helpless tenants as he pleases. The

Action Congress, (AC) further stressed that, EFCC has become an agency with powers to investigate, arrest, try, imprison, overrule court orders and detain in prison for month without trial, all in the name of fighting corruption. Equally, Asuquo Ekeng, highlighted how the

EFCC, under Obasanjjo, refuses to go after James Ibori, the former governor of Delta State, who was alleged to have been tracked by EFCC in connection with N 120 billion in 2005. But at the moment, with Obasanjo out of office, Yar’Adua had come under intense pressure, within and outside the country to bring Ibori to Justice (Ekeng, 2007:24).

From the foregoing, and in appreciation of this chapter, we can easily note that despite the creation of EFCC, its institutional structure has not been able to curb political corruption because those who benefit from it encourage it while those who are affected by it kick against it. These results therefore validate our second hypothesis, which states that the dual legitimacy of criminalizing political corruption but communally legitimizing it affect the regulatory institution like EFCC.

3.3 EFCC AND 0BASANJO’S ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES IN NIGERIA

The Obasanjo’s regime had instituted the anti-corruption campaign with its coming to power in 1999. The government gave legal backing to that through the anti-corruption act. 57

First was the establishment of the ICPC-independent corrupt practices (And other related offences) commission and EFCC-economic financial crimes commission as agencies vested with powers to investigate and arraign those indicated over corruption and financial crimes before the court of law.

Creating institution however, does not ensure effective fight against corruption.

According to Mike Stevens, a World Bank specialist on public reform:

far form lacking institutions to fight corruption, many the strength of the fight against corruption is largely determined by political will of all stakeholders particularly those vested with governance (in sani, 2000:12)

we shall therefore, examine some of the reported case of gross corrupt practices in both public and private sectors since the beginning of Obasanjo’s administration (1999-2007) with a view to assessing the role played by the anti-corruption agencies, particularly the EFCC.

Among the financial scandals in 1999, was a sum of N850,000 (about S6,000), which was allegedly paid to some senators in exchange for their votes for Evans Enwerem, president

Obasanjo’s choice as senate president. The senators had favored Chuba Okadigbo, the charismatic and recently deceased orator, the scandal kicked off what has since become the hallmark of the chamber incidentally, neither ICPC nor EFCC had been established then but of course the nation had already been washed by the presidents proclamations, of his war against the same vice (corruption), which he initiated by this single action.

Following the passage of the ICPC bill in June 2002, the nation was again greeted with a number of incidences of corruption. This includes the I.D card scam, which involved the late minister of internal affairs, Sunday Afolabi and some permanent secretaries, minister 58

Akwanga and others. The amount involved in that scam was about N 81.4 billion. Sadly too, the Julius Makanjuola’s trial and the withdrawal by “Nolle prosequi” by the Attorney general was all we could see in the case of the then permanent secretary and minister of defense who had embezzled over N 400 million. While the case of Makanjuola had been dropped without any cogent reason to the nation that of the I.D card scam for several years now has remained inconclusive since the death of the chief culprit. Indeed, reports of fraudulent financial transactions in the legislative houses at federal, state and local government levels have remained unprecedented in the history of the nation. Describing these incidences, Gani, in an interview with the vanguard newspaper in 2002 pointed out that this is the first time in the history of Nigeria that we shall hear of this level of corruption, government bribing government to do government bidding. We equally, recall the “Ghana must go” bags that were displayed in the House of Representatives, brought by the presidency to influence the house in one regard to the other. Similarly, there was also allegation by Nzeribe that he was given N

300 million by the president with regard to certain action of the senate to remove somebody from office. Amazing none of the allegations was investigated by the EFCC.

The Newswatch magazine equally reported how both members of the senates and house of representatives were reportedly given sums of money to either facilitate against impeachment of Obasanjo, at least on two occasions in the lifetime of the administration

(Newswatch 15 November 2004:17).

Embarrassingly too, senators and members of the House of Representatives were equally known to have engaged themselves in physical confrontation over sharing of money.

In October, 2004, Isa Mohammed, a senator from Niger State slapped Iyabode Anisulowo, his 59

female colleague from Ogun Senatorial district over the management of money allocated to the senate committee on state and local government. Barely one week after that ugly incident, Iquo

Inyang and Emmanuel Bwacha repeated that slapping episode through, this time the slap came from the counter-part. The problem however, remain the inequitable sharing of their look

(Ugwoke 2006:56).

Also in April 2005, there were reported cases of money being paid into the account of senator by an unknown creditor. The national assembly source told tell magazine, that there had been occasions when executive had tried to influence the job of the legislature for instance, “after we had been coerced into passing the Commonwealth Heads of Government

Meeting (CHOGM) we just discovered that our accounts had been credited with N 250,000 each. How this money came about nobody could tell. There was another occasion we discovered N 1 million each in our accounts” (Sementari, in Tell magazine, April 11,

2005:25).

At the executive arm, the stories are not different, we recall that Obasanjo’s administration with its anti-corruption agencies (EFCC), had also looked the other way against all cries that the former work minister, should be probed for squandering over N 300 billion

(US $2.25) meant for federal road construction and maintenance with nothing to justify the huge sum, the former minister, close confidant of the president rather than being investigated was promoted to the chairman board of trustees of the ruling party PDP – Peoples Democratic

Party.

In another related events, the privatization programme carried out by Bureau of Public

Enterprises and national council of privatization, resulted in huge financial misconducts. The 60

culprit in this case was El- Rufai and all efforts from several quarters including the national assembly, to probe El- Rufai for the privatization scandal in Nitel- pentascope deal, Ajaokuta steel, debt buy back and Sheraton hotel yielded no result. It should be noted that the losses incurred in these deals ran into billions of Naira. Despite all these scandals “EL-Rufai is still the apple of the president’s eye”.

However, the approach of the president to the fraudulent sale of the 207 choice properties of federal government at Ikoyi, Lagos was slightly different following the scandal that erupted from the sale of those properties by the then minister Osomo, the president quickly stepped in by sacking the minister. This was due to the complexity of his (Obasanjo) involvement, it was revealed that his brother, sister and in – law as well as his choice top government officials, including serving ministers, governors and senator were indicted

(Guardian Newspaper, April 2005:10).

Nigerians were equally shocked when intelligence report revealed that 26 out of 36 state governors among other top government officials have been laundering more abroad. For the first time the EFCC in collaboration with the national intelligence agency undertook an investigation of the state governors of millions of dollars. Their findings were mind bogging; eight out of those 26 identified have become stupendously wealthy with huge investment in

Nigeria and abroad. These eight governors became the focus of investigation, they are; Orji

Uzor Kalu, Obong Victor Attah, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, Alli Modu Sheriff, James Ibori,

Lucky Igbinedion, Bola Tinubu and Peter Odili. In fact, one security report concluded that, of all the governors only Umararu Yar’adua and Donald Duke were apparently clean. Suffice it to mention here that the only high profile case which has been recorded so far by the 61

EFCC/Obasajo’s anti-corruption campaign was that of former inspector General of police, Mr.

Tafa Balogun; the former senate president, Adolphus Wabara; former governor Bayelsa state,

Diepreye Alamieyeseigha; and former minister of education, professor Fabian Osuji respectively.

From the foregoing, we can easily note that despite the creation of the EFCC, its institutional structure has not been able to effectively reduce the rate of corruption in Nigeria.

However, applying the qualitative descriptive analysis in validating our data, the results clearly reveal a steady increase in the incidence of political corruption in Nigeria.

3.4 EFCC AND YAR’DUA’S WAR AGAINST CORRUPTION

Yar’dua vowed to continue with war against corruption but insisted that it was not going to a “no holds barred” war as it was degenerating to under Obasanjo. Yar’dua’s zero tolerance for corruption was going to be within the context of respect for rule of law and human rights. However, it was observed that the change of approach resulted in “slow-down” of the war. Complaints became rife that the war was losing momentum by the day. Some reasons have been put forward by the author as accounting for the deceleration and loss of the grounds gained under the Obasanjo era:

• Slow down in the prosecution of top public officials

• Harassment of former anti- corruption crusader

• President Yar’dua’s close relations with ex-governors

• Anti-corruption campaign as non-priority. 62

• Slow down in the prosecution of top public officials- there was the perception that the

yar’dua government was vacillating concluding the conclusive prosecution of top

government officials already investigated under the Obasanjo administration, especially the

ex-governors and other politically exposed persons (PEPs). However,

The paper agrees that this charge was not borne out by the facts the EFCC continued with pending cases and indeed initiated several fresh investigations and prosecutions. Notable prosecution and conviction of Mr. Lucky Igbinedion, an ex-Governor.

• Harassment of former anti-corruption crusader- another criticism is that Yar’dua

deliberately set out to harass and hound Obasanjo’s main anti-corruption crusaders into

exile. The cases of Malam el-Rufai and Mr.Nuhu Ribadu were cited in support of this

assertion. But it must be noted that Malam el-Rufai left office as minister of the FCT at the

end of Obasanjo’s administration and was later indicted by the senate for acts bordering on

abuse of office for personal gain. The senate conducted a public hearing pursuant to its

oversight powers in the constitution, the EFCC picked up from there and sought to charge

the el-Rufai to court but he was unavailable to face the charges then, because he was

attending a course of studies abroad. It will, therefore, not be a fair to say that he was being

harassed because of he was an anti-corruption crusader. In the case of Mr. Ribadu, there

can be no doubt that the EFCC would have become more effective if he had continued as

chairman during yar’dua’s administration. He was better placed to consolidate on the

successes recorded under the Obasanjo years and built up the commission as formidable

institution. However, we should not aim at building institutions around persons; the EFCC

should be able to function, no matter the person that happens to be in the saddle of 63

administration. Clearly the arguments and counter-arguments as to whether Mr. Ribadu

was entitled to remain as chairman of EFCC contributed in no small measure to the

perceived ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the EFCC under Yar’dua.

• President Yar’dua’s close relations with ex-governors- before he later became the

president, Yar’dua was the Governor of Katsina state for 8 years. In the run up to the 2007

general elections, it is generally believed that some of his fellow governors then facilitated

his emergence as the PDP candidate and subsequent election as president, thus it was only

natural that they should remain his political allies. It did not help matters that some of this

people happen to be Governors already investigated by the EFCC waiting to be charged to

court. There was justifiable disquiet in many circles when the names of some of this

people, especially Mr. James Ibori, did not appear on the EFCC’s list of “Ongoing High

Profile Cases”. The attitude of the EFCC to the Yar’dua’s allies heightened the perception

that rather than fight an all war against corruption, the commission was pandering to the

dictates of the government in power.

• Anti-corruption campaign as non-priority- the war against corruption was on course

under Yar’dua and has continued under his successor, President Jonathan; but it no longer

appears to be governments No.1 priority. The war has lost its sense of urgency. The paper

attributes the relaxation of efforts to the near absence of local and international pressure on

the government.

3.5 EFCC AND PLEA BARGAIN ISSUE IN NIGERIA 64

Currently, the Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, AIG

Farida Waziri (Rtd) has been commenting against the plea deal or negotiated plea, otherwise known as plea bargain. This strategy was employed by the Commission to “punish” those who have openly and shamelessly pleaded guilty for selfishly helping themselves with the public and entrusted funds. What is plea bargain? Simply put, it is a quasi criminal judgment and or an outright court verdict in a criminal case, whereby a prosecutor offers the defendant an opportunity to plead guilty on his own volition, based on a mutually satisfactory disposition to ensure that the accused pleads guilty to one of the counts he is being charged for a lesser punishment. In other words, the accused, having agreed that he has committed an offence, for some obvious reasons, pleads with the prosecutor that he should be charged in such a manner that he will not bear the full brunt of the offence(s) committed or be subjected to the rigors of court trial processes. In practice, it can occur at any stage of the criminal trial, that is, either prior to court trial or at any stage of the court trial but certainly before a verdict is given. It sometimes involves charging bargaining (negotiating on what count to be charged on), sentence bargaining (negotiating on the count to be sentenced on) and fact bargaining

(agreeing on the facts to be concerned with during the trial). In whichever situation, both

Parties usually agree that offences have been committed, but that there must be a waiver to make room for lighter punishment for some reasons.

According to the Legal historians, plea bargain dates back to the early 19 th century in

America, as an instrument of the State to promote social order necessary for social and political stabilization. What an elitist discretion over sentencing policy! Ordinarily, one is presumed innocent until he pleads guilty or pronounced guilty as charged by a competent court, based on evidence before the court or as it circumstantially pleases the court. In each of 65

the situations, the accused knows fully the charges against him and will be judged accordingly.

At the end of the trial, if found guilty, may make a plea of mitigation, which if when accepted by the presiding judge, only allows his full punishment to be reduced. This is different from plea bargain, as erroneously being canvassed and interpreted presently in Nigeria. In certain countries, where plea bargain operates, proponents favour it, according to them, because it saves precious time for the judges, intends to decongest the Prisons, saves resources for the

State, among others. But to the critics, their position is that any offence dully proved or agreed to have been committed deserves full wrath of the law.

In Nigeria, plea bargain, as an instrument of justice, crept into our legal lexicon three years ago. In fact, it was first mentioned during the trials of the retired Inspector General of

Police, Mr. Tafa Balogun and some ex-governors who were involved in financial and economic crimes. In the case of Balogun, he entered a plea bargain in view of his ill health during his trial. He was said to have agreed to forfeit money, stocks, and property worth N17 billion in exchanges for mitigated punishment. He was being prosecuted by EFCC, then chaired by Nuhu Ribadu, at the Federal High Court, for a 50 count charge of theft and money laundering involving over N13 billion and at the Abuja High Court for 92 count charge of gratification. According to newspaper reports, Balogun and the EFCC Counsels struck the plea deal because “the trial is bad for the both Parties”; whatever that means. The then Inspector

General of Police, whom the EFCC recovered N17.7 billion from, handsomely helped himself with the Police funds to the tune of N13 billion, which he invested in Nigeria Breweries, First

Bank, Union Bank PLC, Fountain Trust Bank and Guinness Nigeria Plc and bought landed properties at Park view estate Ikoyi, Victoria Garden City, Victoria Island, Garki, Wuse and

Maitama areas of Abuja. 66

Tafa’s case was quickly followed by that of D.S.P Alamieyesiegha, former Gorvernor of Bayelsa State. The once strongman of Bayelsa Politics embezzled so much that he was convinced that his State deserved a refund. He accordingly confessed that he over looted and gentlemanly lured his Prosecutors, the EFCC, to a plea bargain deal. As a result of the deal, he forfeited some of his properties at V & A waterfront, Cape town, South Africa, at 32 Amazon

Street, Maitama, Abuja, N 1billion worth of shares in Former Bond Bank, $160,000 in account number 005482562491 with an American bank and N 105 million in account number

201006285006 with former bond bank. However, he justified his negotiated sentence or plea bargain by saying that “I have been through this journey since 15 January, 2005. I was brought into this country by the British people brought me here and what Obasanjo (former President) could do was to send a battalion of Army to take over the State Government in Bayelsa.

Within this time, I have signed the contract of my life times”. As if that was not enough to convince the judge to grant him plea bargain, he continued thus “I am 55 years old. I am carrying the matter which I am opposed to. If I am a young man, I would not have pleaded guilty to these charges because I could have defended myself. If I was much younger, this cannot be the case now” with these persuasions, aptly reinforced by his Counsel, Chief

Solomon Okpoko, (SAN), he sealed the plea bargain deal which the EFCC lawyer, Rotimi

Jacobs. The EFCC then, never opposed him.

In order to justify their position then, EFCC, was alleged to have relied on section (2) of the EFCC (Establishment), Act 2004, which states that subject to the provision of section

174 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (which relates to the power of the Attorney-General of the Federation to institute, continue or discontinue criminal proceedings against any persons in any court of law (nolle prosequi), the Commission may 67

compound any offence punishable under this Act by accepting sums of money as it thinks fit, not exceeding the sum of the maximum fine to which that person would have been liable if he had been convicted of that office” to give acknowledged looters of the Governments’ treasuries a “soft landing” or “a slap of the wrist”. Perhaps, judging from the experiences of

Tafa and Alameiyesiegha, the ex-Governors who were being prosecuted after handing over in

2007, were alleged to have initiated plea bargain as a sure strategy of ensuring their freedom then. In order to buttress this, former Governor Lucky Igbinedion of Edo State whom the

EFCC arraigned for looting billions of Naira, in the spirit of plea bargain, was asked to pay a paltry sum of N3.5 million and walk away.

It is then, as a result of the foregoing that every right thinking Nigerian, should salute the courage and good sense of judgment of the current EFCC Chairperson, Madam Farida

Waziri, for openly accepting that plea bargain is an insult to the Nigerians’ sensibilities.

Honestly, one can feel her genuine intention and disdain for plea bargain when she said “you cannot be using part of the public funds you stole to set yourself free and go home to enjoy the loot. Plea bargain is used in some developed countries of the World like United States and

United Kingdom but that does not make it proper choice. I never like it (sic)”. She further reechoed the case of Chief Lucky Igbinedion, former Governor of Edo state, who after being tried for stealing billions of Naira, “the court eventually imposed a fine of N 3.5 million on him, which was paid on the spot there… we appealed against the case”. She then unequivocally affirmed that “I will not go into plea bargain again”. Even Ribadu objected to the idea initially until, perhaps, he was compelled to accept it. On hearing of plea bargain then, he said “you are talking about plea bargain; we are talking about a country that had never held any conviction of a single person for corruption in our history. But today, we are getting them 68

convicted and punished and money returned, so how can somebody be talking about plea bargain”. While accepting the negative psychological implication of plea bargain, a renowned jurist, Prince Bola Ajibola, a former judge of the International Court of Justice at the Hague, agreed that “the reading of it is that it will make people feel that I can steal money from

Nigeria and I can use it to my own advantage left, right and centre once I can get into this plea bargain. It is something that is not just morally right. It is something that will induce corruption. Let those who are found guilty serve their terms. None is above the law”. He maintained.

It is in fact, heart-warming that the EFCC under Madam Waziri leadership has accepted the illogicalities embedded in the plea bargain doctrine, at least as it affects Nigeria.

In the first instance, based on the shameless disposition of the Nigerian public office holders to completely milk the country, even if plea bargain is the best in the advanced countries, one thinks that we are not developed enough to accept it in our criminal justice administration. In the present Nigeria, it reasonably appears that the primary aim of going into politics or seeking for public office is to amass wealth, more so, when no treasury looters go unpunished. As such, plea bargain will not only encourage corruption but will also constitute a financial conduit pipe for selfish and unscrupulous leaders to siphon public funds. Besides, in the said advanced countries, it is not strictly applied to protect looters of public fund and those who abuse public fund and those who abuse remorseful and unintentional cases/acts.

Moreover, in those countries any public indicted or convicted often times apologizes for wrong doing but in Nigeria, ex-convicts or indicted office holders are treated like heroes.

For example, Chief Alamieyeseigha publicly celebrated his release from jail instead of hiding 69

his face in shame. The Nigeria public should also arise to support the EFCC in condemning plea bargain because of the observed idiosyncrasies of the beneficiaries of said plea deal and those standing trial, especially, the ex-governors. It is a common knowledge that those who escaped being in jail, then courtesy of the plea are not only seen currently at the corridors of power but still have the influence and powers to dictate political bureaucracies both at the state and federal levels of government in Nigeria. Those of them standing trial openly boast of their powers and contact to at worst, negotiate themselves out of severe court verdicts. Political intelligence and surveillance have also revealed that the same enemies of Nigeria 2011 political dispensation and even beyond, if not pardoned by then, will install their stooges, whom they can easily secure electoral tickets for and bank roll their campaign for positions of authority and power.

The implication of this emerging dangerous political funding is that criminals will continuously be perpetuating themselves in governance, thereby rubbishing our democracy and sustaining political corruption. As a retired Senior Police Officer, I am pretty sure Waziri clearly understands the psyche and dispositions of Criminals when she maintained that plea bargain can never be the best approach in treating the public office holder who loot treasuries entrusted in them. I believe her totally: judging from the temerity with which public fund is being looted these days and the expenditure and life styles of the culprits, something more serious needs to be done to deter others who intend to emulate plea bargain beneficiaries” in modern crime management, all the experts in criminal justice system have agreed that only deterred strategies that can prevent public offices from staining their hand with the entrusted funds. For this national shame to be curbed, these known criminals, despite being ex-convicts, must, apart from forfeiting their loots, spend reasonable period of time in the jail houses. This 70

will, despite the alleged comfort they may enjoy in the Prisons, deter them to a large extent from seeking offices for the purpose of enriching themselves with public funds.

Based on empirical evidences, deprivation of associated freedoms and liberties involved in imprisonment will elicit the requisite deterrence. Mere persuasions and/or giving them soft landing will only encourage more havoc to the society. Besides, if they are not strictly sent to jail, our youths, who are leaders or tomorrow (assuming there is any tomorrow for them), based on precedent, will erroneously be following their footsteps. It is pertinent to reveal, also, that the near secret manner with which the plea bargain is negotiated and secured does not help matters. Sadly enough, Nigerians only wake up to hear that the deal has been brokered. As a court process, its negotiation should be openly canvassed in the court.

This will enable enlightened and informed Nigerians, perhaps, to make contribution(s) towards frustrating it. Although, some social commentators have argued that is saves judicial time and other resources, plea bargain, currently in Nigeria, certainly does more harm and will continue to do so, if Nigerians and all the relevant Stakeholders fail to join the EFCC to influence public and policy makers’ opinions to quickly discard it from our criminal justice system. Though, one is not holding brief for the EFCC Chairperson, but based on her observed focus and determination, it is commendable that she is becoming highly pragmatic in her job.

Instead of waiting to receive complaints before carrying out investigations, EFCC is becoming strategic in carrying out its statutory responsibilities as enshrined in section 5 (f) of its Act, which empowers it in the “adoption of measures which includes coordinated preventive and regulatory actions, introduction and maintenance of investigative and control techniques on the prevention of economic and financial related crimes”. 71

Recently, the Commission said it will start carrying out assets forfeiture activities, security scrutiny on bank accounts and at the Corporate Affairs Commission. These strategic assignments, undoubtedly, will surely reveal many financial and economic crimes, usually perpetrated with the connivance of Officers of the concerned Organizations. It is equally worthy of mention that the Commission should boom its search light on public procurement corruption because all the monies being embezzled, diverted, misappropriated, laundered, amongst others, come from yearly appropriation, being expended from the public procurement of goods, works and consultancy services.

In recognition of their efforts so far, instead of always condemning the Commission, this writer is of opinion that the public should examine their statutory and operational powers that may be affecting their performances. At the moment, the Commission operates under the

Attorney General of the Federation (AGF), which may be part of their structural problem resulting to public criticisms. Also the mandate that it must submit the results of its investigations to the Presidency before prosecution, in all ramifications, cannot grant efficiency, effectiveness and the requisite independence to the Agency.

Moreso, the Board of the EFCC has more Federal government appointees, who are accountable to the Government. With all these operational bottlenecks and other Nigerian factors, much honestly cannot be expected from the Commission. This is a clarion call for all the lovers of this country to do something, no matter how little, to help the Agency. This can be done now by making inputs to the amendment of the EFCC Act in a manner that will satisfy the yearnings and expectations of the general public by submitting memoranda in addition to advocacy visits during the public hearing at the National Assembly. That is, if our legislators 72

will deem it necessary to do justice to the said amendment, in view of the cases of corruption and EFCC investigations arising from the purchase of vehicles, power probes, rural electrification and others scams involving some members of the National Assembly.

Lastly, despite all the blames being heaped on the Commission by some Nigerians, it is my candid view that the Commission should be encouraged. The Commission, no doubt, has its own challenges that may have hindered its performance which has drawn the attention of its critics. But one can imagine what the situation would have been, if it does not exist at all. The

Commission, we should remember, is part and parcel of the Nigerian system that requires all hands to be on deck if it must be taken to the next level. Hence, instead of outright condemnation and calling of names, Nigerians should use the EFCC, ICPC and other related anti-corruption structures to contribute their quotas in fighting corruption in all perspectives in

Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

Having gone that far, we wish to conclude this chapter by making reference to the variables investigated under this chapter. From the onset of this chapter, we try to assess the extent to which the EFCC has gone in accomplishing its statutory mandate in terms of reducing the rate of political corruption in Nigeria. In the course of our study, we subjected the

Obasajo’s and Yar’dua’s anti-corruption struggle into empirical verification and we find out that the EFCC, one of the regulatory institutions under Obasanjo’s administration was used as a tool by the president when it serves his interest. However, we also observe that the EFCC has not accomplished its mandate due to certain environmental and socio-political conditions such as dual legitimacy of criminality and interest propagation of the ruling class. 73

74

CHAPTER FOUR

DUAL LEGITIMACY OF CRIMINALITY AND THE PERFORMANCE OF

THE EFCC IN NIGERIA

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter four, we are going to dwell more on the assessment of the performance of the EFCC within the period of years under this study. By so doing, we will explain the concept of dual legitimacy of criminality and how the performance of the EFCC has been weakened by the phenomenon of dual legitimacy. Thus, dual legitimacy of criminality refers to the environmental and socio-political conditions where by political criminality is, de facto, legitimized from the two strands of social structures – the ruling class and the communities of the members of the ruling class. We will also examine the tendency of accumulation of wealth by public office holders and how the EFCC has reacted to such situations. We will further assess the performance of the EFCC under Ribadu and Waziri and their general ineffectiveness in fighting political corruption because of those environmental and socio-political conditions.

4.2 DUAL LEGITIMACY AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA

In Nigeria today, there is a tendency of dual legitimacy of political corruption, hence, the community where the individual corrupt public official come from legitimizes political corruption on one hand, and the ruling class where the corrupt public servants belongs to also legitimizes political corruption on the other hand. In view of the above propositions, corruption is logically accepted both within the ruling class and the community of the members of such ruling class (politicians). This proposition is exemplified by the fact that 75

corrupt cases are not brought to public notice until there seem to be a kind of conflict of interest within and among the members of the ruling class. It is only on this note that the

Regulatory Agency (EFCC) is directed to act and arraigned that corrupt individual whose interest is not in harmony with the dominant section of the ruling class. The phenomenon of political corruption in developing countries like Nigeria has been explained to be genetically inscribed in the gemology and dialectics of the global capital movement (Ifesinachi, 2003).

The inevitable tendency of reoccurring nature of corruption account for why some Nigerians are tempted to say that corruption should be legalized so that its proceeds could be taxed.

Some also believe that every Nigerian is corrupt while others say that corruption is now adored rather than abhorred. Corruption, though a universal phenomenon appears to have become so endemic in Nigerian body politic that most discourses about the country, here and elsewhere, center more on the high ascendancy of corruption in our public life. Corruption is institutionalized such that not officials are corrupt, but corrupt is official. It has been contended that Nigeria is beyond doubt the most corrupt nation I have ever reported on or from.

International fraud in this African nation has reached epidemic proportions and there is no sign of it abating (clark, 1995:135)

The contradiction of strong and ineffective state in Nigeria is reflected in the nature and character of Nigerian state. We can understand the character of Nigerian state by tracing the formation of social class in the post – colonial states like Nigeria. Ekekwe (1986:1) remarks that the state expresses the unity of the various institutions in the society, which crystallizes the total class relations in that society. Social classes are the aggregates of individuals who are commonly related to the mean of production and who, ceteris paribus, share common ideological and political dispositions. Class relations are contradictory relations. Class 76

relations are marked with conflict and antagonisms. In his analysis, Ekekwe, (1986:1) reveals that the existence of class has its origins in the division of labour and property ownership in the economy. So too do the state, both are inextricably linked; it is impossible, in fact, to explain one without reference to the other. However, the production and distribution relation in a society, following Marx, is expressed in class struggle and manifest in unending succession of modes of class domination. Thus, Ake (1985:105) sees the state as a specific modality of class domination, one in which class domination is autonomized. By autonomization is meant that the institutional mechanism of domination are differentiated and dissociated from the dominant class and the rest of the society such that they appear as an objective force seemingly stranding alongside society. The state’s institutions or apparatuses, for example, the army, bureaucrats, state schools, and public corporations etc, are those organizations through which state intervention in society takes place. Each is material condensation of class relations in society (Ekekwe, 1986:2).

Nnoli (1981:97) observes that the most significant consequence of colonialism on social and economic progress in Nigeria lay in the impact on the production system. It replaced the subsistence economics of the pre-colonial societies with a capitalist one motivated and dominated by foreign private capital, and responding to and serving the needs of this external capital rather than the needs of the local populations. The point of our argument is that the ruling class, who control the state power after independence in 1960, inherited the patterns of social relations inherent in the colonial society.

The state under colonialism was used to advance the economic interest of the British colonialists as reflected in the primitive accumulation of capital. Hence, the state is simultaneously a product, instrument and specific manifestation of class struggle in the 77

historical development of the society. The Nigerian state is a product of capitalism. The intensive growth of capital in Europe led to the emergence of monopolies, the emergence of monopolies led to decrease of production. In the long run, the decline in production led to a fall in the rate of profit. The ubiquitous tendency for profit maximization led to the expansion of capital to other territories. The expansion of territories is called imperialism (Ake, 1981:19

– 20). According to Ake, (1981:20) imperialism is the economic control and exploitation of foreign lands arising from the necessity for counteracting the impediments to the accumulation of capital engendered by the internal contradiction of the domestic capitalist economy.

Thus, the Nigerian state appears to have emerged out of a century of colonial domination, distribution and exploitation. The Nigerian state emerged in 1960 was immersed in class struggle instead of rising above it. The colonial era in Nigeria was marked by the rules of companies such as the Royal Niger Company (RNC), which acted as the state and from this tradition, the colonial state developed as a tool of capital. This implied that under colonialism, state power was used for primitive accumulation of capital. At independence, the emergent dominant class exploited their privileged power position for forceful or primitive accumulation of capital. This meant that the post-colonial state of Nigeria inherited and retained the character of the colonial state. The productive forces of the post-colonial state are still at the rudimentary level and therefore, unproductive. The ineffective productive forces had caused the state to become the major means of production. This explains why the struggle for state power has become so imperative since it (state power) serves as an instrument for personal economic aggrandizement. We have to note at this juncture, that since the sovereign authority does not make laws against its will, it is therefore ironical to argue that EFCC was instituted by 78

the political officials (the ruling class), to checkmate and encounter fraudulent economic transactions in the public sector, this phenomenon accounts for the ineffective state in Nigeria.

However, as we noted earlier, in spite of all the natural endowment in Nigeria, there have been a seeming ineffectiveness of the state. This is because the contemporary ruling class of the Nigerian state has enormously indulged in primitive accumulation of capital thereby weakening the strength of the country economically and institutionalizing regulatory agencies as a camouflage.

In the light of the above, Ibeanu, (2003:1) explains that oil and gas have brought wealth to some in Nigeria… But the oil industry has historically provided opportunities for corruption on a massive scale. According to him, when Nigeria became a petroleum exporting country at the eve of independence, the general expectation was that petroleum held the key to the country’s development, since more petroleum would mean more wealth and therefore, more development. However, the optimism of the vast majority of Nigeria has however, waned.

This happened not because there has not been more petroleum; rather the disillusionment arose because petroleum has created an illusion of development (Ibeanu, 2003:1).

4.3 THE PERFORMANCE OF THE EFCC IN NIGERIA

4.3.1 EFCC UNDER NUHU RIBADU

The ICPC was constrained by the limited coverage of its Act, which provided that

ICPC can only investigate corruption involving public officers. These corrupt acts must have also occurred after the inauguration of ICPC, not before. However, the EFCC is endowed with wider power and responsibilities which include: conducting investigations of crimes of financial and economic nature, including corruption, money laundering, advance fee fraud or 79

419, bank fraud etc, whether in the public or private sector; and arresting and prosecuting the perpetrators of such crimes (EFCC Act 2002:5). The EFCC under Nuhu Ribadu adopted the

Confrontational policy/approach to corruption .This is approach which may be described as having been adopted for political witch hunting. According to Anyanwu ( Sunday Sun , May

11,2008:5):

Between April 2004 and June 2006, EFCC recovered over $5billion (or 725 billion Naira) from financial criminals both in form of cash and assets. The proceeds from the recovery were returned to individuals who have been defrauded or to the public treasury, in the case of assets seized from corrupt officials or private companies who had defrauded the government in such areas as tax evasion or contract inflation. The EFCC’s superior achievement under Nuhu Ribadu was even more glaring in the area of criminal investigations, prosecution and convictions. Between 2004 – 2006, the EFCC arraigned more than 300 persons and won a total of 92 convictions. By 2007, (January – September) a further 53 convictions were secured, reaching 350 in December 2008. Making reference to the EFCC report card of 2006/2007, it should be noted that “the EFCC in 2006 arraigned 300 persons, convicted 145 persons in 2007 and recovered fund/assets worth

N 725 billion as at June 2006” (EFCC, 2007).

What may be described as the achievement of the EFCC under Nuhu Ribadu brought the organization and its leadership a lot of public support but at the same time caused considerable discomfort among members of the political elite, notably federal legislatures and state governors who had supported its creation. There were at least two plausible explanations for the political elite’s initial acquiescence, if not open support, for the creation of the EFCC.

One was mounting external pressure. Secondly, the EFCC was not considered as a threat by members of the Nigerian political class. They simply saw it as a weapon against fraudsters in 80

the banking industry or individuals specializing in Advance Fee Fraud, commonly known as

419 in Nigeria (Enweremmadu 2010:10). This thinking however proved to be a big mistake.

Contrary to the expectation of the political class, the EFCC under Ribadu, made the political leaders, which it correctly identified as the major drivers of corruption, its first and principal target. The activities of the EFCC under Nuhu Ribadu still led to the positive changes in

International Perception of Nigeria. This is indicated in the annual Transparency International

Corruption Perception Index after 2004, Paris Club debt forgiveness, massive foreign financial grants and flattering commendations to Nigeria.

NIGERIA’S POSITION IN TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL’S PERCEPTION INDEX.

Year Position Score

2009 130/180 2.3

2008 121/180 2.7

2007 147/180 2.2

2006 142/179 2.2

2005 152/158 1.9

2004 144/145 1.6

2003 132/133 1.4

2002 101/102 1.6 81

2001 90/91 1.0

2000 90/90 1.2

1999 98/99 1.6

1998 81/85 1.9

1997 52/52 1.7

1996 54/54

Source :Transparency International Corruption Perception Index:1996-2009

The table above shows that among the countries surveyed by the Transparency International,

Nigeria is ranked among the most corrupt. The recent dropping to nine (9) places from

121/180 to 130/180 in 2009 indicates that corruption is not reducing despite EFCC’s policies.

Another policy under Nuhu Ribadu is the Plea Bargain. The strategy was employed by the Commission under him to punish those who have openly and shamelessly pleaded guilty for selfishly helping themselves with the public and entrusted funds. Under Ribadu, the plea bargain was mentioned during the trials of the retired Inspector General of Police, Mr. Tafa

Balogun and some ex-governors who were involved in financial and economic crimes.

According to Belgore (2007:2-3):

In the case of Balogun, he entered a plea bargain in view of his ill health during his trial. He was said to have forfeited money, stocks and property worth N 17 billion in exchange for mitigated punishment. Tafa Balogun’s case was quickly followed by that of D.S.P Alamieyesiegha, former Governor of Bayelsa State. DSP Alamieyesiegha embezzled so much fund and the EFCC 82

entered a plea bargain deal with him. As a result of the deal, he forfeited some of his properties at V &A Waterfront, Cape Town, South Africa, at 32 Amazon Street, Maitama, Abuja, N 1 billion worth of shares in Former Bond Bank, $160, 000 in account number 005482562491 with an American Bank and N105 million in account number 201006285006 with former Bond bank. Former Governor Lucky Igbinedion of Edo State was arraigned by the EFCC for looting billions of naira; again in the spirit of plea bargain was asked to pay a paltry sum of N3.5 million and was let off the hook. Though a large number of top public officials, including a handful of former governors, have been charged by the EFCC for corrupt practices, only two senior public officials were convicted by the EFCC under Ribadu for using their positions to enrich themselves. The two were Mr. Tafa Balogun, former head of the Nigerian Police and Mr. D.S.P Alamieyeseigha, former Governor of Bayelsa State, both of whom were convicted by the EFCC for corruption and money laundering offences in 2005 and 2007 respectively. The conviction of Mr. Tafa

Balogun and ex-governor D.S.P Alamieyeseigha showed that with some political will, the

EFCC could still live up to their responsibilities.

However, the EFCC under Ribadu came under a damaging criticism when it was observed that the Obasanjo administration was employing the EFCC as a weapon for destroying political rivals. This became more noticeable as the second term of President

Obasanjo drew to a close. The crusade against corruption by the EFCC became an instrument for disqualifying unwanted political aspirants and paving the way for the smooth election of

Obasanjo’s chosen candidates into the various elective offices. The best known example was the widely criticized bid to prosecute Obasanjo’s Vice-President, Atiku Abubarkar, and his close political and business associates over allegations of corruption. The political motives in the EFCC’s case against Atiku Abubarkar were underlined by the provisions of section 37 (1) 83

(i) of the Nigerian Constitution which states that “any person indicted for corruption can not stand in any election in Nigeria”. The haste with which the EFCC’s Report indicting Atiku

Abubarkar was accepted and Gazette by Obasanjo who was known to be strongly opposed to his participation in the 2007 presidential elections was suspicious. This action was taken just few weeks to the election. Contributing his opinion, Nkemjika, while condemning the acts of former Police Inspector General Tafa Balogun and the impeached Governor of Bayela State

Dr. Diepreye Alamiesiegha, in their totality, stated that:

recent events around the EFCC have clearly shown that it is nothing more than a tool with which the government hunts and persecutes its political opponents, the culprits are mainly those who openly make known their inclination to the vice-president, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar political ambition. Worse still, they are seen as those who are against the President’s third term agenda.Where was the EFCC when Obasanjo was probing the NPA of N56 billion, while accepting N1 billion, as gift from the same NPA for his library project? Why did the EFCC keep quiet on the case of Olumuyiwa, the 25 year old son of Mr. President who owns a property worth $500,000 in New York? The EFCC is not by any way credible; it is only an instrument of political witch-hunt” ( Daily Sun, December12,2006:3). The EFCC had in 2006 announced that 33 out of 36 state governors were being investigated for corruption related offences. Besides, the Agency came out with a list of 135 politicians indicted of corrupt practices, the list included former Vice-President Atiku Abubarkar,

Abubakar Hashidu, Chris Ngige, Peter Okocha, Orji Uzor Kalu, Danladi Baido, Rabui

Kwankwaso, Bello Gwandu, Rotimi Amaechi, Abubarkar Audu, Usman Albishir, Mahmud

Shindafi, Ali Modu Sheriff, Isah Yuguda, Ibrahim Shekarau, and Senator Bola Tinubu and others ( Ribadu 2006:2). The list was considered to contain the names of those who were opposed to Obasanjo’s bid to stay in power for third term. The issue of corruption was the 84

major weapon Obasanjo’s administration was using in dealing with the opponents who might have disagreed with him over political beliefs and state policies.

Specifically, the ultimate aim of Obasanjo was to stop the Presidential ambition of

Atiku using the EFCC under Ribadu to execute the project through a phony indictment. To underscore the argument that EFCC then was used as a tool of political persecution, Obasanjo had while flagging off the PDP campaign in Akure, the capital of Ondo State in 2006, declared that Dr. Olusegun Mimiko (former Housing Minister, now Governor of Ondo state, refused his entreaties to support governor Olusegun Agagu for second term, and he then threatened him with EFCC arrest. The statement according to Adeyemo (2009:3) “was an indication that

EFCC under Ribadu was nothing but a willing tool in the hands of Obasanjo”. Therefore, all those who appeared on the corruption list of EFCC, many were those who disagreed politically with Obasanjo.

It should be noted that the EFCC under Ribadu, with the application of the confrontational policy was very effective and popular but, the effectiveness and popularity were undermined as a result of political interference by the Obasanjo’s administration in the activities of the EFCC. Nigeria, according to Transparency International Perception Index

(TIPI), is the second most corrupt country in the world. It is also at the top of the table as one of the poorest countries in the world. In the midst of this poverty, Nigeria is believed to have realized, from the oil sales, in the last three decades, a fatal of about US$300 billion, out of which about US$100 billion had been stashed away by her rulers in foreign accounts through embezzlement and looting of public treasury (Ali and Musa 2002). For instance, Lawrence

Njoku, (2005:4) reported in the guardian newspaper that the federal government takes over 85

Chimaroke Nnamani’s assets, which were illegally acquired during his tenure. Nnamani, who formerly represents Enugu East in the national assembly, was a two – time governor of the state between May 1999 and May 2007. Nnamani had been alleged to have corruptly enriched himself through the state’s treasury to the tune of over N 60 billion alongside to the state and elsewhere. Following the allegations, the economic and financial crimes commission (EFCC) had indicted him and is currently prosecuting him at the Lagos Federal high court over the alleged loot. Equally, the court had recently frozen about 20 bank accounts belonging to the former governor and his two former officials, chief Sam Ejiofor and Peter Mba, who are still held at the Ikoyi prisons for their alleged roles in the scandal. Acting on the order of the court,

EFCC operatives stormed and had confiscated Nnamani’s companies in Enugu State, which include Rainbownet Telecommunication Company, Cosmo FM Station, Autos and

Renaissance hospital. Other investments located in his village, Agbani, Enugu, visited by the operatives are the Renaissance University and Mea Mata Elizabeth High School. Government also appointed Jide Taiwo and co., an estate management consultant firm based in Lagos, as receiver, until the matter is sorted out.

THE TWENTY-ONE WIRE TRANSFERS MADE BY NNAMANI THROUGH VARIOUS NIGERIAN BANKS TO TWENTY (20) SUBJECT AMSOUTH BANK ACCOUTS:

DATE ORIGINATOR ORIGINATING AMOUNT AMSOOUTH AMSOUTH MM/DD/ INSTITUTIONS OF WIRE BANK BANK A/C YY TRANSFER ACCOUNT NAME NO.

3/15/07 Boskel Nigeria Diamond Bank Plc $14,975.00 7966914604 Rainbow assoc. Ltd LLC.

3/15/07 C.A.D Platinumhabib $62,214.00 7966914612 Elizabeth Group Bank Plc. LLC. 86

3/15/07 Universal- S/Citingla $24.985.00 7966914752 The Ferguson Sodexho Nig. Group LLC Ltd

3/15/07 C.A.D Platinumhabib $63,964.00 79669146420 Intercontinental Bank Plc. Association LLC.

3/15/07 Parmon oil and Fidelity Bank Plc $26,971.65 7966914620 Intercontinental gas ltd. Association LLC.

3/15/07 F.A.O Platinumhabib $55,714.00 7966914639 C and C Project Bank Plc.

3/15/07 Parmon oil and Fidelity Bank Plc $24,474.28 7966914639 C and C Project gas ltd.

3/15/07 C.E.O Platinumhabib $57,189.00 7066914647 Rock City Group Bank Plc.

3/15/07 Parmon oil and Fidelity Bank Plc $23,775.01 7066914647 Rock City Group gas ltd.

3/15/07 B.A.S Platinumhabib $53,220.00 796691455 Jasmine Group Bank Plc. LLC

3/15/07 Boskel Nigeria Diamond Bank Plc $19,975.00 7966914663 Jasmine Group Ltd. LLC

3/15/07 B.A.S Platinumhabib $64,964.00 796691466146 Jefferson LLC. Bank Plc. 63

3/15/07 Parmon oil and Fidelity Bank Plc $25,772.91 7966914655 Jefferson LLC. gas ltd.

3/15/07 Parmon oil and Fidelity Bank Plc $26,472.17 7966914671 Cooke LLC gas ltd.

3/15/07 F. A. O. Platinumhabib $60.964.00 7966914728 Hill Gate LLC Bank Plc.

3/15/07 F. A. O. Platinumhabib $62,964.00 7966914752 The Ferguson Bank Plc. Group LLC

3/16/07 Tolman Allied NAMENGLA $19,975.00 796691412 Elizabeth Group service LLC 87

3/16/07 Capital Index Standard Charter $1,000.00 7966914752 The Ferguson Ltd. Bank Ltd. Group LLC

3/16/07 Capital Index Standard Charter $8,400.00 7966914752 The Ferguson Ltd. Bank Ltd. Group LLC

3/21/07 Adamo Engr. Sterling Bank LLC $23,975.00 7966914728 Hill Gate LLC

3/30/07 Intercon United Bank for $8,974.00 7966914612 Elizabeth Group partnership Ltd. Africa LLC

SOURCE: Newswatch Magazine, May 19,2008. In a related development, EFCC operatives arrested the chairman of the National

Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) in Imo State following a petition against him over embezzlement of about N 26 million, which was got, from the sales of emblems. This and many more are cases of corruption in public sectors and by the politicians who controls the affairs of the state.

It is important to note at this point that primitive accumulation of capital among

Nigerian politicians is the major bane of ineffectiveness of Nigerian state, which also weakens its ability to punish offenders. According to Erasmus, culled from the Daily Champion, days after the chairman of the EFCC, Mrs. Farida Waziri, revealed that over N 3 trillion was misappropriated by local government chairmen across the country during the tenure of former president Olusegun Obasanjo affected council chairmen are now signing before officials of the antigraft body. It is now a common notion that the system of social production and relations of production of the colonial era has taken effect in the dimension of the contemporary politics in

Nigeria. This is owing to the fact that the state power is used for accumulation of capital since the state is now the means of production and the ruling class seek to continually advancing and protecting their economic interest with the aid of other apparatuses of the state. 88

From the argument so far, we can identify that primitive accumulation of capital in

Nigeria by politicians has led to the weakening of the economic statute of the Nigerian state, in spite of its natural endowment.

LOOTED MONEY BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS DISCOVERED IN FOREIGN BANKS

NAMES Of LONDON SWISS USA GERMANY

DEPOSITORS

Gen. IBB ₤6.256b $7.41b $2.00b Dm9.00

Gen. Abubakar ₤1.31b $2.33b $8.00m -

Real.A.Mike.A ₤1.24b $2.42b $671m -

Gen. Jerry Useni ₤3.04b $2.01b $1.01b -

Alj. Ismalia ₤1.03b $2.00b $1.30b Dm1b

Gwarzo

Alj.Umaro Dikko ₤5.01b $1.4b $700m -

Paul Ogwuma ₤300m $1.142b $200m Dm700m

Gen.Sani Abacha ₤600m $4.09b $800m Dm345m

Mohammed ₤400m - - Dm500m

Abacha

Abdukadir ₤1.12b $1.2b $150m Dm3.01m 89

Abacha

Alj. Wada Nas ₤2.5b $1.21b $900m Dm535m

Tom Ikimi ₤600m $1.32b $153m Dm471m

Dan Etete ₤2.9b $1.39b $400m Dm300m

Dan Eliebet - $1.03b $700m Dm371m

Maj.AlMustapha ₤2.3b $1.06b $360m Dm1.72m

Tony Aninih ₤700m $1.001b $161m Dm361m

Basir Dahatu ₤300m $1.09b $700m Dm1.66m

Alj.Hassan ₤120m $200m - Dm1.42b

Adamu

T.Y. Danfuma - $1.02b - -

Gen. Ishaya - $800m - Dm190ms

Bamayi

SOURCE: Newswatch Magazine, May 19,2008.

From the above table, we can understand that the military has indeed done the nation much disservice for roughly 30 years. Fundamentally, military officials under military government only changed military uniforms to continue their looting in the civilian regime.

The Obasanjo’s anti – corruption campaign, which brought the EFCC into being, was a mere 90

camouflage in order to mask primitive accumulation of his government. However, as discussed in the previous chapters, Obasanjo used the EFCC arbitrarily when it serves his interest.

4.3.2 THE EFCC UNDER FARIDA WAZIRI

Mrs. Farida Waziri was appointed the substantive Chairman of the EFCC on May 15 th ,

2008, following the controversial removal from office of Nuhu Ribadu as Chairman of the

EFCC in December 2007. Ribadu, who enjoyed much support from the Obasanjo administration and was greatly patronized by the International donor community, was initially said to be on course which implied that he would be allowed to return to his position. But this was never the governments’ intention .In what looks like an afterthought, on June 26 th , 2007, the Attorney –General and Minister of Justice, Mr. Michael Aondoaaka informed the public that Mr. Ribadu was removed as a result of human rights violations perpetrated by the EFCC (

The Nations, June 27,2008:4). Even then, the government’s own position was not helped by the untidy manner in which the former EFCC Chairman was demoted and later dismissed from his main job in the Nigerian Police. Mr. Ribadu’s removal as Chairman of the EFCC and subsequent brush with the police authorities was itself preceded by many months of open tussle for power pitching the former EFCC Chairman and Yar’ Adua’s Attorney-General and

Minister of Justice Mr. Michael Aondoaaka over who should be in control of the trial of the ex-governors ( The Nations , December 8,2007:19). This Attorney General had once served as a defense lawyer to James Ibori the former Governor of Delta State being tried by the EFCC and, George Akume of Benue State. George Akume was alleged to have facilitated his appointment to his new job. The Attorney General and Minister of Justice’s role in this matter was therefore, understandably tilted in favour of the former governors. Indeed, in the cause of 91

his duties as a Minister, he left no one in doubt about his determination to protect not only his benefactor, but also all the other accused former governors. One way he tried to do that was to take over the trial of the ex-governors under the pretext that this was premised on the administrations respect for the rule of law and the need for government to obey all judicial orders ( The Punch, September 18,2007:12). In the end, the Nuhu Ribadu led EFCC managed to resist the move by the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, insisting with the support of a greater percentage of the public and majority of Nigerian legal practitioners, that it had the powers to prosecute the former governors. This action worsened relations between the EFCC and the office of the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, culminating in the removal of

Mr. Nuhu Ribadu as Chairman of the EFCC in late December 2007. Mrs Waziri having been appointed by the late Umar Yar’Adua as the EFCC Chairperson, the President himself promised to take the fight against corruption to a new height, vowing to run a ‘clean government’ based on the ‘rule of law’, he stated that:

if the federal government is to take action against any person for any act of corruption which has been determined without doubt, the government will act … As it stands, I assure you that the federal government has zero tolerance for corruption. But also in the process, the rule of law and due process must be followed” (Presidential Inaugural Speech, May 27, 2007). There is no universally accepted methodology for preventing, investigating or prosecuting cases of corruption. However, the EFCC under Waziri had developed a number of policies such as the Anti-Corruption Revolution (ANCOR), the Operation Eagle Eye and

Eagle Claw, and laid much emphasis on the rule of law and the due process. The Anti-

Corruption Revolution was developed to sensitize the public and is built around “see something, say something, do something”. And according to Waziri (2009:2) “this has started 92

yielding positive results as several cases including a major scam of over $1 million by a bank was brought to the attention of the EFCC by a whistle blower in 2009”.

Eagle Eye as an anti-corruption instrument turned the heat on corporate organizations, that had been robbing the federal government on tax payment. In just three months, the project replenished the federal purse with over three billion naira, recovered from tax evading

Nigerian corporate organizations. This is besides the weight of the law, which the EFCC has brought to bear on this tax dodgers, through the Eagle Eye project. The Eagle Claw is dedicated to battling internet fraud. And with the Eagle Claw according to Egbulefu (2011:1)

“no fewer than 800 scam Websites and e-mail addresses have been successfully shut-down by the EFCC. Eagle Claw has also led to a haul of 18 fraud syndicate leaders by the anti- corruption agency”.

The EFCC under Waziri claim to respect the rule of law and due process as enshrined in the Constitution. Under Farida Waziri, the arrest and investigation of individuals and officials suspected of corruption did not cease. The trial of officials and individuals investigated or charged to court by the anti-corruption agency during the Ribadu administration continued. Similarly, a number of new cases involving politically exposed person (PEPs) were started under Waziri. Many of these new cases were taken to court.

According to statistics published by the EFCC on May 1, 2010, the number of high profile cases being prosecuted in the courts by the EFCC were only 10 in May 1, 2008. However, two years later, the number has increased to over 50. Within the same time frame, the EFCC added a total of 100 new convictions, bringing the total to 400, while also recovering some illegally acquired funds in excess of $ 3.5 billion (EFCC, 2010). 93

Some of the officials involved in the over 55 new high profile cases include two former

Ministers of Aviation, Professor Babalola Borishade and Femi Fani – Kayode who were arrested and charged to court in July 2008 for their misappropriation of 19.5 billion naira

Aviation Intervention Fund. The list also includes the daughter of former president, Iyabo

Obasanjo – Bello (May 19, 2008) who was a Senator, former Minister of Health Adenike

Grange, her deputy and several senior officials of the Ministry of Health (April 7, 2008), docked over allegations of sharing of N 300 million belonging to the Ministry of Health.

Dr.Iyabo Obasanjo-Bello was said to have received N 10 million, part of the N 300 million, in her capacity as the Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Health. Also, the former Governor of Plateau State, Michael Botmang who was arraigned on the 17 th of July 2008 for allegedly stealing N1.7 billion in the six months he ruled as Governor following the brief suspension in

2006 of the substantive Governor, Joshua Dariye, as well as Boni Haruna, former Governor of

Adamawa, who was charged on the 5th of August on 21 count charges of corruption. Appendix

1 shows a list of EFCC on-going high profile cases from 2007 to 2010.

4.4 THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF EFCC IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN

NIGERIA.

The consequences of political corruption in Nigeria today are largely rooted in an economic management, abuse of human rights, ethnic conflicts and capital flight, among others. Democracy was restored in Nigeria in 29 th May 1999, which brought the administration of president Obasanjo into being. One cardinal program of the Obasanjo’s administration was the fight against corruption and waste in the public service. This, he has demonstrated by the establishment of two major anti-graft institutions; the Independent Corrupt Practices (And

Other Related Offences) Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes 94

Commission (EFCC) in 2000 and 2003 respectively. However, the EFCC, which is the arrowhead in the fight against corruption in Nigeria, under Obasanjo’s administration was part of the national reform programme established to address money laundering and other financial terrorism in Nigeria, especially in the public service (Ribadu, 2006:1). It is obvious that this expectation has today become an illusion. The EFCC is, today being perceived by majority of

Nigerians as a failure. The perceived by majority of Nigerians as a failure. The perceived ineffectiveness of the EFCC in fighting political corruption has continually engendered the increasing incidence of political corruption in Nigeria. The ineffectiveness of the EFCC in combating political corruption in Nigeria can be attributed to the lack of autonomy of the commission to function independently of the executive arm of government discharging their legal duties. The EFCC is not independent of the executive government, and that has, in a greater extent contributed to the ineffectiveness of the commission in fighting political corruption in Nigeria.

Equally, the president makes the appointment of the members of the commission. The implication of such scenario is that the EFCC will not prosecute any case in which the president has an interest. However, we can equally validate this argument by looking into some cases of the state governors in Nigeria under Obasanjo’s administration, such as the former governor of Enugu State, Dr. Chimaroke Nnamani. Olumide Bajulaiye, (2007:6) observes that a federal high court, sitting in Lagos struck out 107 charges of money laundering preferred against the former governor of Enugu state and ten other governors in Nigeria.

However, 103 fresh charges were immediately filed against the senator. The ruling of the court regarding the withdrawal of the earlier charges was sequel to an oral application raised by the

EFCC counsel, Mr. Kelvin Uzozie that the charges should be withdrawn. No reason was given 95

for the withdrawal of the charges. (See Daily Trust, December 10, 2007). With regard to the situation, the EFCC has not really executed their normal duties regarding the case and many other cases of the same nature, and this was as a result of lack of autonomy of the commission in performing their functions. Another factor that accounts for the ineffectiveness of the EFCC is attributable to the fact that the president is the source of revenue to the commission. It is general notion that “who pays the piper dictates the tune” – since the president is responsible for the finance of the EFCC, it assumes that the president has the power to influence the policies of the commission.

However, E.E Imohe, minister and head of the economic and commercial desk,

Embassy of Nigeria, highlighted a number of challenges, confronting the commission in curbing political corruption. According to him, the major problems of the commission include:

1) An entrenched and institutionalized phenomenon.

2) Failure of law enforcement agencies/workforce.

3) Constitutional constraints (some provisions of our constitution seem to over protect the

accused against the state)

4) Attitude of defense lawyers – all manner of delay tactics are employed to stall the trial.

5) Congestion and slow pace as enumerated above, effort have been made by the previous

government in Nigeria, to strengthening the institutions. Some example of these

strengthened institutions are the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the National Deposit

Insurance Corporation (NDIC), the national drug law enforcement agency (NDLEA), the

National Agency for Food and Drug Administration Commission (NAFDAC), the

Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), etc. in spite of these institutional and 96

legal efforts, political corruption seems unabated. (See; article for the society of

government economists, 2005:12).

Moreover, (Imohe, 2005) concluded that Nigeria has always been adjudged to be corrupt. Systematic corruption, in both the public and private sectors has been ascribed to

Nigeria. Past administration in Nigeria tried in fighting corruption with the EFCC, but to no avail. This failure of the past administration in fighting corruption, which it was immersed in, proves the ineffectiveness of the EFCC in fighting political corruption and increase in political corruption in Nigeria.

It is public knowledge, at least from later developments and comments emerging from the Nigerian senate, that Mr. President Olusegun Obasanjo as an opening gambit mobilized a huge amount of tax payer’s scarce resources to bribe senators to abandon their overwhelming support for Dr. Chuba Okadigbo to become senate president during the first term of

Obasanjo’s administration the year 1999. Obasanjo was to return to the senate chambers mouths later with loads of “Ghana – must go bags” stacked with millions of Naira in public funds to orchestrate evil and to bribe members into heaping all manner of allegations on senate president, on account of which he was removed from office in a kangaroo arrangement, through the instrumentality of Kuta Panel Report. In this case, what did EFCC DO? Nothing!

The EFCC has not done any thing about the N11 billion worth of stadium, which Obasanjo claimed to have spent over N 50 billion for. Also the N 300 billion road project funds which

Obasanjo claimed was given to Chief Anthony Anenih for road construction and rehabilitation, of which Anenih went before the House of Representatives and denied receiving any such money, the EFCC has not done anything about that (Onuoha, 2005:3). 97

However, the EFCC is ineffective in fighting corruption because it serves only the interests of the president and his clique. Those who think that they are in good terms with the president Obasanjo, perceives themselves to be in a safer side to misappropriate public funds without being hunted by the EFCC. For instance, this was the case, as reported in the Daily

Sun that Obasanjo aids Andy Uba in money laundering mess. This situation has continuously contributed to the increasing rate of political corruption in Nigeria. The results of these is the weakening of the state and its regulatory institutions, and which validates our second hypotheses, which posed that if there is strong and ineffective state in Nigeria, then, it is likely that political corruption would increase.

4.5 THE EFCC’S HIGH PROFILE CASES IN NIGERIA, 2007-2010

Recently, the economic and financial crimes commission, EFCC has reported the series of cases that have been handled within the last three years. This phenomenon is what we refer to as the EFCC’s high profile cases in Nigeria. However, with the aid of the table below, we will capture the current EFCC’s profile cases within the period of 2007-2010 for explicit analysis. 98

LIST OF EFCC ON-GOING HIGH PROFILE CASES BETWEEN 2007 AND 2010

NAMES TRIAL CASE STATUS AMOUNT STATUS REMARK COURT INVOLV OF ED SUSPEC T (S) 1. Ayo Fed. High Arraigned on 51 state N1.2 granted Inherited Fayose(Former Court, Lagos. counts. Plea already Billion bail by Case filed Governor of Case now taken but defence court since 17 th Ekiti State) transferred to lawyer keeps filing since Dec.2007 Ekiti for trial frivolous applications 2007 after the for long adjournments accused to frustrate and prolong opposed his trial. trial in Lagos.

2. Adenike FCT. High Arraigned on 56 state N300 granted Inherited Grange(Former Court counts. Plea already million bail by Case filed Minister of Maitama taken. Defence lawyer court since 2 nd Health) often seeks long since April.2008 adjournments to 2008 prolong trial. Matter adjourned to Oct 27

3. Joshua FCT High Arraigned on 14 state N700 granted Inherited Dariye(Former CourtGudu counts. Plea already Million bail by Case filed Governor taken but defence court since13 th Plateau State) lawyer challenged court since July 2007 jurisdiction. Case 2007 stalled at HC while on appeal for stay of trial. This is part of calculated attempt to prolong trial

4. Saminu FCT High Arraigned on 32 state N36 granted Inherited Turaki(Former CourtMaitama counts. Plea already Billion bail by Case filed Governor, taken but defence court since13 th 99

Jigagwa State) lawyer challenged court since July 2007 jurisdiction. Case 2007 stalled at HC while seeking stay of trial at appeal court. It is part of usual attempt to frustrate and prolong trial

5. Orji Uzor Fed. High Arraigned on 107 state N5 Billion granted Inherited Kalu(Former Court counts. Plea already bail by Case filed Governor, Abia Maitama taken but defence court since11 th State) lawyer raised since June 2007 preliminary objection 2008 against charges. Lost at trial court but has gone on appeal to stay trial. It is part of usual attempt to prolong trial. Further hearing for Nov 3

6. James Federal High Arraigned on 170 state N9.2 granted Inherited Ibori(Former Court Asaba counts. Defence lawyer Billion bail by Fresh Governor, challenged Kaduna court charges Delta State) Fed. court jurisdiction since filed In ,lost at trial court but 2008 August won at appeal court. 2009 Case re-assigned by CJ to Asaba FHC. Without taking plea, suspect applied to quash charges, prosecution opposed application and ruling for Nov.6

7. Iyabo FCT High Arraigned on 56 state N10 granted Inherited Obasanjo- Court, counts. Plea already Million bail by Case filed Bello(Serving Maitama taken but case stalled as court since April Senator) defence lawyer filed to since 2 2008 100

challenge charges. 2008 Application pending for determination. This is part of frivolous applications to delay trial .

8. Lucky Fed. High Arraigned on 191 state N4.3 Case Inherited Igbinedion(For Court, Enugu counts. Applied for Billion determine Case filed mer Governor plea bargain d 2008 on23 rd of Edo State) &Convicted but EFCC Jan.2008 has appealed the judgment to seek for stiffer sanctions

9. Gabriel FCT. High Arraigned on 56 state N300 Case Inherited Aduku(Former Court, counts. Court judgment Million determine Case filed Minister of Maitama on no case against d in 2008 onApril 2 nd Health) suspect under review 2008 by EFCC

10. Jolly Fed. High Arraigned on 21 state N180 granted Inherited Nyame(Former Court, Abuja counts. Plea already Million bail by Case filed Governor of taken but case is stalled court since13 th Taraba State) as defence lawyer since July 2007 challenged court 2008 jurisdiction. Lost at HC, Appeal court, now before supreme court. This is a typical example of frivolous appeals to buy time and prolong trial.

11. Chimaroke Fed. High Arraigned on 105 state N5.3 granted Inherited Nnamani Court, Lagos counts. Plea already Billion bail by Case filed (Former taken but case is stalled court since11 th Governor of as defence lawyer filed since Dec.2007 Enugu State) to transfer case to 2007 another judge on allegation bias against 101

trial judge even as counsel has again filed to challenge court jurisdiction. This is equally an attempt to prolong trial. Case comes up Oct.22

12 Michael Fed. High Arraigned on 31 state N1.5 granted Commence Botmang(Form Court, counts. Plea already Billion bail by d by er Governor of Maitama taken but trial stalled court Waziri on Plateau State) due to suspect’s since 18 th July ailment, on dialysis. 2008 2008 Trial billed to resume October 16

13. Roland Iyayi FCT High Arraigned on 11 state N5.6 granted Commence (Former Court, counts. Plea already Billion bail by d by Managing Maitama taken. Trial on-going court Waziri in Director of Court taking since June 2008 FAAN) prosecution witnesses 2008 testimony

14. Nyeson Wike FCT High Arraigned on state N4.670 granted Commence (Serving Chief Court counts. Court quashed Billion bail by d by of Staff to Maitama charges. EFCC already court Waziri on Governor of appealed judgement. since Oct.9 Rivers State) Appeal pending at 2008 2008 appeal court.

15. Eider George FCT High Arraigned on 11 state granted Commence (Austrian Court, counts. Plea already bail by d by Business man) Maitama taken and trial on- court Waziri in going. Prosecution since June2008 witnesses undergoing 2008 cross-examination. Continuation of trial fixed for Nov.17 102

16. Kenny Martins FCT High Arraigned on 28 N7,740 granted Commence (Police Court amended state counts. Billion bail by d by Equipment ,Maitama Plea already taken and court Waziri in Fund) trial on-going. since June 2008 Witnesses under cross- 2008 examination. Continuation of trial fixed for Nov.9

17. 13 Filipinos Fed. High Arraigned on state N300 EFCC Commence (Charged for Court, Benin counts, convicted at the Million returns to d by Oil Bunkering) close of trial and court to Waziri in sentenced to 65 Years seek 2009 altogether forfeiture of vessel used for oil theft Oct 23 slated for adoption of written addresses on that

18. 6 Ghanaians Fed. High Arraigned on state N250 granted Commence (Charged for Court, Benin counts and trial Million bail by d by Oil Bunkering) Commenced. court in Waziri in Prosecution closed 2009. 2009 case, matter adjourned to Nov.4&5 for defence to close.

19 Patrick Fed. High Arraigned on 56 state N32 granted Commence Fernadez Court, Lagos counts. Plea already Billion bail by d by (Indian taken and trial court in Waziri in Buisnessman) commences Nov. 2009 June 2009

20. Prof. Babalola FCT High Arraigned on 11 state N5.6 granted Commence Borishade Court,Maitam counts. Plea already Billion bail by d by (Former a taken and trial on-going court Waziri in Minister of (N5.6 billion) since 103

Aviation) Prosecution witnesses 2008 June 2008 under cross- examination. Nov.17 fixed for continuation

21. Boni Haruna Fed. High Arraigned on amended N254 granted Commence (Former Court 28 state counts. Plea Million bail by d by Governor, Maitama taken. Adoption of court Waziri in Adamawa motion slated for Nov since 2008 State) 2008

22. Femi Fani- Fed. High Arraigned on 47 state N250 granted Commence Kayode Court, Lagos counts . Plea taken but Million bail by d by (Former case stalled as a result court in Waziri in Minster of of trial court’s refusal 2008 2008 Aviation) to admit e-print of suspect’s statement of account as evidence. EFCC on appeal against the decision. Matter pending at appeal court

23. Prince Ibrahim FCT High Arraigned on 28 N7,740 granted Commence Dumuje (Police Court, Abuja amended state counts. Billion bail by d by Equipment Plea taken and trial on- court Waziri in Fund) going. Prosecution since June 2008 witnesses under cross- 2008 examination. Continuation fixed for Nov.9

24. Bode George Fed. High Arraigned on 68 state N100 granted Commence (Chieftain of Court .Lagos counts. Plea taken and Billion bail by d by the ruling party, trial concluded. court Waziri in PDP) Judgment being since Dec.08 awaited 2008

25. Rasheed Ladoja Fed. High Arraigned on 33 state N6 Billion granted Commence (Former Court, Lagos counts. Plea taken and bail by d by Governor of trial on-going court 104

Oyo State) Prosecution witnesses since Waziri slated for cross- 2008 examination in Nov.

26. Four Snr Zenith Fed. High Arraigned on 56 state N3.6 Granted Commence Bank Managers Court, Port counts. Plea taken but Billion bail by d by Harcourt case stalled over an court in Waziri injunction by Rivers 2009 State Govt, which is a party in the case to stop EFCC. Injunction being challenged at appeal court

27. Mallam Nasir Fed. High Arraigned on 8 state Suspect at Commence El-Rufai Court, Abuja counts. Suspect charged large d by (Former for corruption and Waziri Minister of abuse of office. Plea Federal Capital not taken because Territory) suspect has refused to put in appearance and papers for extradition filed.

28. Sen. Nicholas FCT High Arraigned on 158 state N5.2 Remande Commence Ugbade,(Servin Court Abuja counts. Plea taken Billion d in d by g Senator)Hon. while prosecution has Prison Waziri in Ndudi Elumelu filed more Custody May2009 Hon. charges against and later Mohammed suspects. Matter stalled granted Jibo,Hon. due to medical bail Court Paulinus treatment of Hon. Igwe in 2009 Igwe,(Serving who was shot by Members of robbers.Oct.29 slated House of for taking of plea on Representatives fresh charges )Dr Aliyu Abdullahi (Serving Fed.Perm.Sec) 105

Mr. Samuel Ibi.Mr. Simon Nanle,Mr. Lawrence Orekoya,Mr Kayode Oyedeji,Mr. A. Garba Jahun,(This is the Rural Electrification Agency Case involving a serving Senator, 3 serving members of the House of Representatives , the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Power and other high profile public officers)

29. Prof B. Federal High Arraigned on 64 state N636 Suspects Commence Sokan,Molkat Court, Abuja counts. Plea taken Million remanded d by Mutfwang,Mic while more charges in prison Waziri on hael Aule were filed against custody May ,Andrew suspects due to and later 192009 Ekpanobi,(All appearance of Prof granted Directors) Alex Sokan. Matter bail by ander adjourned to Nov 9 for court in Cozman(MD,In suspects to take plea on 2009. termarket amended charges Ltd).(This is the UBEC case where high 106

profile public servants connived with an American, Alexander Cozman) to defraud the Government.

30. Dr Ransome Federal High Arraigned on 196 state N1.5 granted Commence OwanMr. Court, Abuja counts. Plea taken. Billion bail by d by Abdulrahman Trial billed to court in Waziri on Ado, Mr. commence while more 2009 April22 Adulrasak charges were filed 2009 Alimi,Mr. against suspects. Onwuamaeze Further hearing slated Iloeje, Mrs for Oct 29 Grace Eyoma,Mr. Mohammed Bunu,Mr. Abimbola Odubiyi (This is the Nigeria Electricty Regulatory Commission case where the Chairman and his 6 Commissioners corruptly enriched themselves)

31. Tom Iseghohi, Fed. High Arraigned on 32 state N15 Suspects Commence Muhammed Court,Abuja counts. Plea taken. Billion Remande d by Buba, Mike Matter adjourned for d in Kuje Waziri in Okoli,(GM&M commencement of trial Prison May 2009 anagers of and later 107

Transcorp Nov 9. granted Group PLC) bail by court in 2009

32. Dr Albert Fed. High Arraigned on 4 state N43 Suspects Commence Ikomi, rtd perm Court, Ikoyi, counts. Plea taken and Million Remande d by sec, his firm, Lagos Matter adjourned for d in Ikoyi Waziri in satelite town hearing Prison 2009 dev co Ltd and later granted bail by court in 2009

33 Dr Yuguda Taraba State Arraigned on 37 state N17 Suspect Commence Manu High Court 5, counts . Plea taken and Million remanded d by Kaigama, Jalingo Matter adjourned for in prison Waziri on Chairman, trial custody. Oct.10200 Taraba State Co- 9 Civil Service accused, Commission Yakubu Danjuma Takun, at large.

34 Chief Joe FCT High Arraigned on 12 state N1.012 Suspects Commence Musa, DG Court, counts . Plea taken and Billion Remande d by Natioanl Lugbe(Justice defence lawyer filed d in Kuje Waziri in Gallery of Art, Olukayode applications to stall trial Prison July Olusegun Adeniyi) but lost the bid. Matter and later 202009 Ogumba, adjourned for trial Nov granted Chinedu Obi, 19/20 bail by Oparagu court in Elizabeth, 2009 Kweku Tandoh,(All Directors of NGA). 108

35 Dr Dayo Fed. High Arraigned on 17 state N479 Suspects Commence Olagunju, Court, counts. Plea taken and Million Remande d by Ex.Sec.Nationa Abuja.Justice Matter adjourned for d in Kuje Waziri 24 l Commission Anuli Chikere commencement of trial Prison July2009 for Mass Oct 22 and later Literacy, Adult granted &Non-Formal bail by Education. court in Joshua Alao, 2009 Alice Abang, Jibrin Waguna, Ahmed Abubakar, Shehu Abdullahi, Dr Victoria King- Nwachukwu, Adamu Khalid, Moses Oseni, Francis Awelewa &Bashir Suleiman

36 Hamman Bello Fed. High Arraigned on 46 state N2.5 Suspects Commence Hammed, Ex- Court , Lagos. counts. Plea taken Billion Remande d by CG Customs, Justice Ramat Matter adjouned to Nov d in Waziri on Hannatu Mohammed for trial Kirikiri& 14 th Aug. Sulaiman, Ikoyi 2009 Tajudeen Prisons Olalere, and later Lukman granted Hussain, bail by Popular Foods court in Ltd & Silver 2009. Maritime shipping coy ltd 109

37 Professor Fed.High Arraigned on 14 state N145 Suspects Commence Innocent Chuka Court, counts. Plea taken Million Remande d by Okonkwo, fmr Abuja.Justice Adjourned to Nov for d in Kuje Waziri on VC Imo state Mohammed trial. Prison July30,200 Univ, Uchechi Garba Umar and later 9 Nwugo & granted Wilfred bail by Uwakwe court in 2009

38 Dr (Mrs) FHC, Ikoyi, Arraigned on 25 state N160.2 Suspect Commence Cecilia Lagos. Justice counts. Plea taken and Billion remanded d by Ibru(Fmr Dan Abutu case adjourned to Nov in EFCC Waziri on CEO,Oceanic for trial custody, Aug31 Bank PLC) but 2009 granted bail on 14/9/09

39 Dr FHC, Ikoyi, Arraigned on 28 state N187.1 Suspects Commence Bartholomew(F Lagos.Justice counts. Plea taken and Billion remanded d by mr CEO,Union Dan Abutu case adjourned to Nov for in EFCC Waziri on Bank PLC) trial custody, Aug31 Bassey Ebong, But 2009 Henry granted Onyemem & bail on Niyi Albert 14/9/09 Opeodu(Ex- Directors, UBN)

40 Raymond FHC, Ikoyi, Arraigned on 18 state N131.8 Suspects Commence Obieri,(Fmr Lagos.Justice counts. Plea taken and Billion remanded d by Chairman,Inter Dan Abutu case adjourned to Nov in EFCC Waziri on continental for trial custody, Aug31 Bank PLC But 2009 Hyacinth granted Enuha, Ikechi bail on Kalu, C.A 14/9/09 Alabi, Samuel 110

Adegbite, Isyaku Umar, Sanni Adams.

41 Sebastian FHC, Ikoyi, Arraigned on 36 state N277.3 Suspects Commence Adigwe, Peter Lagos.Justice counts. Plea taken and Billion remanded d by Ololo, Falcon Dan Abutu case adjourned to Nov in Prison Waziri on Securities Ltd for trial custody, Aug31 But 2009 granted bail on 15/9/09

42 Okey Nwosu FHC, Ikoyi, Arraigned on 11 state N95.1 Suspects Commence Lagos.Justice counts. Plea taken and Billion remanded d by Dan Abutu case adjourned to Nov in Prison Waziri on for trial custody, Aug But 312009 granted bail on 15/9/09

43 Alex Nkenchor, Lagos High Arraigned on 10 state N860 Suspects Commence Ex-Bank Court, Ikeja. counts. Plea taken and Million remanded d by Manager, Ebi Justice M.O suspects still remanded in ikoyi Waziri on Odeigah & Obadina in prison custody prison. Oct. 13 GMT Securities pending consideration Bail 2009 & Assets Nig of bail application. applicatio Ltd n for considera tion Oct 20

44 Francis Atuche, Fed High Arraigned on a 26 N80 billion Suspect Commence count charge. Plea remanded d by Former CEO, Court, taken. Suspect and later Waziri on Bank PHB Lagos challenged charges but granted Oct 28, court upheld charges. bail by 2009. Matter set for trial in court. His Nov. assets 111

frozen.

45 Adamu Fed High Arraigned on 149 count N15 billion Suspect Commence charge. Suspect granted on court d by Abdullahi, Court, bail by court. Case bail. Waziri on Former Gov of Lafia, slated for trail in Oct. March 3 Nasarawa 2010. State. Nasarawa. Justice I.N. Buba.

46 Attahiru Sokoto State Arraingned on 47 count N15 billion Suspect Commence Bafarawa, High Court. charge. Matter stalled remanded d by Former HC due to accused in prison Waziri on Governor of application at appeal custody December Sokoto State. court. and later 16, 2009. granted bail by court. Case slated for trial.

47 Francis Fed. High Arraigned on 6 count N2.4 Suspect Commence Okokuro, Court, Abuja charge. Matter stalled billion remanded d by Bayelsa State due to accused in prison Waziri on Accountant application for stay custody March 24, General till April 2010. 13.

48 Dr. Charles Fed. High Arraigned on 6 count N2.4 Suspect Commence Silva Opuala Court, Abuja charge. Matter stalled billion arraigned d by due to accused and Waziri on application for stay. remanded March 24, in Kuje 2010. prison custody on April 112

13 till he meets bail condition s

49 Chief Osa Fed. High Arraigned on 33 count N55 billion Suspects Commence Osunde (fmr. Court, Lagos charge. Matter adjourn arraigned d by Chairman to November for trial on April Waziri on Afribank), and 21, 2010. April 21, 4 directors: Remande 2010. Jibrin Isah, Isa d in Zailani, EFCC Chinedu Onyia custody and Henry and later Arogundade granted bail by the court.

50 Mr. Oladele Fed. High Arraigned on 136 count N139 Suspect Commence Shittu, CEO of Court Kaduna charge. Matter million arraigned d by Credence Justice Mohd adjourned for trial on March Waziri on Investment Shuaibu 23, 2010. March 23, Remande 2010. d in Kaduna prison custody till July 12, 2010

51 Mr. Sunday Lagos High Arraigned on 30 count N90 billion Suspects Commence Akinyemi, fmr Court. Justice charge. Application for arraigned d by CEO Texas J Adebajo bail rejected, trial March Waziri on Connection commenced. 11, & March 11, Ferries April 11, 2010. 2010. Remande d in prison. 113

52 Hon. T. Faniy, FHC, Abua, Arraigned on 30 count N3 billion Suspects Commence Albert Soje & Justice Adamu charge (14,10 & 6), arraigned d by others Bello/Justice trial commenced. on April Waziri on David 1 2010. April 1, Remande 2010. d in prison custody and later granted court

Source: 2010 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission - EFCC, Powered by Information and Communication Technology Department

CONCLUSION In this chapter, we have examined the phenomenon of political corruption by explaining the contradiction of strong and ineffective state in Nigeria. In order to achieve our objective in this chapter, we traced the nature and character of Nigerian state from the colonial era. We also examine the concept of primitive accumulation, and concluded that the inherited character of the colonial system of production relations by the ruling class after independence has affected the temporary mode of production in Nigeria since the state is seen as the means of production and the state power becomes the tool for amassment of wealth and advancing primitive accumulation of capital.

Specially, we discussed the contradiction of strong and ineffective state in Nigeria in chapter 4.1, and in 4.2 we highlighted the phenomenon of primitive accumulation and linked it with political corruption. In doing so, we used some of the cases of Nigerian governors, local government councils and federal public officials as our case study. Also in 4.3, we discussed the 114

weakness of the EFCC in fighting corruption by discussing with empirical evidence certain factor that impede on the effectiveness of the regulatory institutions in their struggle against political corruption in Nigeria. Finally in 4.5, we explicitly discussed, with the aid of table presentations, the current EFCC’s high profile cases in Nigeria covering between 2007-2010.

These variables are what harmonized our argument and validated our second hypothesis in this study.

115

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 SUMMARY

The thesis of this work is that environmental condition like dual legitimacy of criminality influence the performance of the EFCC in fighting corruption in Nigeria, unless this condition changes, EFCC will not accomplish its statutory mandate in terms of reducing the rate of corruption in Nigeria. An attempt to achieve our objectives in this research we formulated two hypotheses. The hypotheses are as follows:

a. EFCC has not accomplished its statutory mandate in terms of reducing the rate of

political corruption in Nigeria from 2000 to 2010.

b. The dual legitimacy of political corruption has greatly influenced the performance of the

EFCC in its fight against political corruption in Nigeria from 2000 to 2010.

This work comprises of five chapters; chapter one treated the introduction, under the following subheadings: Background to the study, statement of problem, objectives of study, significance of study, literature Review, theoretical framework, hypotheses, method of data collection and analysis and the logical data framework. Writing on the background to the study, we stated what necessitated the study and what we intended to do. Our statement of problem was drawn from the gap established in our literature review, the gap was problematised and we came up with our research questions. We stated what the work aimed at achieving in our objectives of study, while the usefulness of the study are clearly stated in the significance of study. We adopted the theory of social production and reproduction as our theoretical framework of 116

analysis. In our hypotheses, we gave tentative answers to our research questions, and adopted the observational technique and documentations as our method of data collection, which means that we gathered data from secondary sources, and the data were analyzed using the qualitative descriptive method and table presentations. Then the logical data framework is used to summarize the totality of our work at a glance.

In chapter two, we treated the historical overview of corruption and the origin of the

EFCC in Nigeria, as well as the establishment Act of the EFCC 2002 and institutional structure of the EFCC. We noted that the EFCC was established in 2002 under the Obasanjo’s Regime and is saddled with the responsibility of fighting corruption both at the public and private sectors and has structural units as well as officials, headed by the chairman.

In chapter three of the work, we examined the journey so far on the issue of political corruption and EFCC in Nigeria. Under this heading, we assessed the Obasanjo’s anti-corruption measures in Nigeria in relation to the Yar’adua’s war against political corruption in Nigeria as well as the EFCC’s plea bargain policy in Nigeria. And under the Obasanjo’s Regime (1999 –

2007) as treated in this chapter, we tested our first hypothesis, which stated that: EFCC has not accomplished its statutory mandate in terms of reducing the rate of political corruption in Nigeria from 200 to 2010. Going through the different regimes, we found out that the fight against corruption by the different regimes was hampered by the factors:

Short live of some regimes, lack of the political will to effectively implement the policies, the pursuit of selfish interest and the use of the anti-graft policies to protect associates and punish enemies. In the case of Obasanjo’s Regime (1999 -2007) there are several cases as written in chapter three that clearly prove that the EFCC has not performed by meeting up with the 117

requirement of its statutory mandate in Nigeria thereby weakening the fight against political corruption between 2000 and 2010. Such cases include: the N81 billion identity card scam involving late Minister of Internal Affairs Sunday Afolabi and some permanent secretaries,

Akwanga and others, the Julius Makanuola trial and the withdrawal by Noelle prosequi by the

Attorney General, the uninvestigated N250,000 credited into the accounts of the members of the

National Assembly after passing the commonwealth Heads of Government meeting budget, the

N300 billion scam involving Tony Anenih and the privatization scandal involving El-Rufai the former Federal Capital Territory Minister. The above cases were not taken seriously by the

EFCC due to presidential involvement intervention and fear of indictment. As those involved were either relatives or political associates of the then President. The above cases are evidence that EFCC’s activities are being hampered by the condition of dual legitimacy of political criminality which we investigated in chapter four.

In chapter four, we tested our second hypothesis which states that the dual legitimacy of political corruption has greatly influenced the performance of the EFCC in its fight against political corruption in Nigeria from 2000 to 2010. We did that by assessing the EFCC’s performance and challenges. We observed that the condition of dual legitimacy of political criminality from the two social strata of political organization (the ruling class and the communities) has greatly influenced the performance of the EFCC in fighting corruption in

Nigeria. Suffice it to mention here that the only high profile cases which have been recorded so far as being successfully prosecuted by the EFCC/Obasajo’s anti-corruption campaign were that of former inspector General of police, Mr. Tafa Balogun; the former senate president, Adolphus

Wabara; former governor Bayelsa state, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha; and former minister of education, professor Fabian Osuji respectively (see pages 59, 60). Also, as we noted earlier under 118

chapter four that corruption cases involving high ranking politicians are not brought to public notice unless there is a disagreement within the ruling class and against the interest of the dominant section of the class, confirms our argument that dual legitimacy of political corruption affects the performance of the EFCC.

5.2 CONCLUSION There has been a fascinating excitement at the inception of the Obasanjo’s administration, following his efforts to combat political corruption in the country. However, a study of this research shows the persistence of endemic political corruption in the country in spite of all the anti-corruption policies by the Obasanjo’s administration. In the course of this study, we posed two research questions and formulated two hypotheses. We gave recourse to the theory of social production and reproduction, which was a part of the the political economy theoretical framework in examining the emergence of class and state in Nigeria and how the state power was used by the dominant class to enhance their personal aggrandizement. This is where we locate the relationship between political corruption and EFCC.

We used observational technique and documentations as our method of data collections. Hence, date for this study were gathered with the aid of secondary source of date collection like documentaries, internet sources, textbooks and articles, newspapers and magazines etc. Also, qualitative descriptive analysis and tables were used to read meaning and categorize those date in their scales of measurement.

From a chapter two of this work examined the phenomenon of political corruption in

Nigeria, which gave us the insight on the historical overview of political corruption and origin of the EFCC. We further examined the nature of the Obasanjo’s anti-corruption struggle in relation 119

with the Yar’dua’s fight against political corruption in Nigeria. The study finally revealed that the dual legitimacy of political corruption and communal legitimization of same weakens the performance of the regulatory institution like the EFCC and that accounts for its inability to fulfill its statutory mandate by reducing the rate of political corruption within the period under this study. These premises were captured in the first and second hypotheses of this study and were also thoroughly examined and tested in the chapter three and four of this work.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on our findings in this research, we therefore, recommend the following:

1. There is need to review the penal codes in our constitution, which will stipulate in clear terms

the procedure and punishments for all categories of corrupt practices, especially within the

public sector,

2. There is need for public enlightenment about the effect of corruption especially in the rural

areas. This will go along way in minimizing the communal legitimizing of political

corruption.

3. There removal of the immunity clause for all the elected and appointed public officials is

equally recommended. This is because the immunity clause protects the corrupt officials

from being prosecuted when it is necessary.

4. The passage of the freedom of information act. This will enable a free or easy access to

vital information about the public officials. In addition, the Act will make it a criminal

offence for public official who fails to publicly publish his asset before assuming office. 120

5. As a corollary to the above, the president and legislatures must as a matter of their statutory

obligation publish (publicity) reports of committee/commission of enquiry into alleged

corrupt practices in not more than one week after the conclusion of such investigation.

6. The constitution must also prohibit the president and any of his officials from creating and

operating any special account for logging or distribution of any revenue accrued to the

nation. In the past, this had been the major avenue through which leaders has defrauded the

nation. For instance, Babangida, through the “dedicated account” for oil windfall during the

gulf war had dedicated to himself about USS12.3 billion. The administration appeared to be

the worst culprit; it had created not less than three (3) of such account, which are now used

to milk the nation. This is mostly facilitated by the fact that even national financial

stakeholders are hardly aware of the transactions in such accounts.

7. There is need to have a constructional provision of the powers excisable by the regulatory

institutions like the EFCC, in term of financial revenue. This will enhance the autonomy of

the EFCC and other regulatory institutions in their effort to curb political corruption with

little or no interference from the executive.

8. Public official(S) convicted of corrupt practice should in addition to whatever punishment

is stipulated in the penal code, be barred form ever holding any public office or given a

minimum of 25 years ban.

9. There is the need to reduce the enormous powers conferred on the president by the

constitution. This will regulate his unnecessary interference in almost all aspects of

authority through which he maintains a larger than life posture in addition he will cease to

be an umpire in the game in which he is equally a player, 121

10. Finally, Nigeria needs ethical revolution to check this ugly trend and to an extent, the

present administration of Yar’dua should aim at sincerely fighting corruption as he

preaches rule of law, this will go along way in promoting economic development in

Nigeria. Though because of Obasanjo’s influence in the present administration, his cases of

financial corruption is yet to be exposed.

The salient points we have been trying to make in all these recommendations is a de- emphasis on the creation of anti-corruption agencies which over time has become so easy for leaders to manipulate for clandestine purposes. So our focus is rather on the strengthening of our constitutional provisions for combating this menace caused by corruption in our society.

122

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