Summer Selections

Revisiting Air Defense Australian Air Doctrine “Downtown” Once More

Acting Secretary of the Air Force John J. Welch, Jr.

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Ralph E. Havens

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Sidney J. Wise

Editor Col Keith W. Geiger

Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson. Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett. Contributing Editor John A. Westcott. Art Director and Production Manager Steven C. Garst. Art Editor and Illustrator

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions exú pressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carú rying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government.

Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproú duced, the Airpower Journal requests a courú tesy line. JOURNAL SUMMER 1989, Vol. Ill, No. 2 AFRP 50-2

Editorial 2 Developing a Long-Term National Strategy: Shifting Imperatives \laj Gen Perry M. Smith, USAF, Retired 4 The Royal Australian Air Force Writes Its Doctrine Wing Comdr David J. Schubert, RAAF Wing Comdr Brian L. Kavanagh, RAAF 1 6 Barrage Balloons for Low-Level Air Defense \Iaj Franklin J. Hillson, USAF 2 7 Hold, Withdraw, or Advance: The Role of Tactical Airlift in AirLand Battle Brig Gen Billy \1. Knowles, Sr., USAF, Retired 4 1 Clausewitz for Beginners Maj Michael W. Cannon, USA 4 8 Targeting for Victory: The Rationale Behind Strategic Bombing Objectives in America’s First Air War Plan ClC Steven A. Parker. USAFA 5 8 The Right Reaction: A Consideration of Three Revisionists Maj Earl H. Tilford, Jr., USAF 7 2

Ricochets 3 Letters Net Assessment 9 3 Reviews of Current Literature Notams 9 4 Notices of Interest Contributors 95 "owner” of the resources that they would EDITORIAL not be loaned because of the potential deg- radation to the owner’s "primary” mission. After pointing out that the owner’s com- mander himself had directed the loan, the A Matter of Mission junior officer was informed that the re- sources existed in the first place because of HE challenge of the senior cadet to the the foresight of a functional community underclassman was, "Mister, what are within the Air Force and they were not Tthe three most important things to an of- meant to service every “pop-up” operation ficer?" The expected reply was, "Sir, mis- that might occur. The owner vowed to fight sion, mission, and mission, sir!” What was the order to the very top of his functional so magical about those words? Why did management chain, if necessary. How far senior cadets and the institutional wisdom up that particular avenue he progressed is of the corps that they represented place so unknown, but the equipment was turned much emphasis on that repetitive, rote re- over the next day. What had happened was sponse? a breakdown in the more senior officer’s In that simple formula, it seems now, was appreciation of mission. Charged with the the distilled legacy of a thousand engage- judicious use of the resources entrusted to ments, the hard-won wisdom of legions of him, he had reasoned that using those re- predecessors. It was the fundamental, guid- sources on something not mandated by ing principle on which all were expected to “regulation” would be an abrogation of conduct their professional and private lives his responsibility to husband his capabili- in the military. ties. What was missing, of course, was the The mission: the only valid yardstick by need to consider the larger ramifications of which one’s motives, concepts, and actions “mission,” the ultimate purposes for which can be measured in the world of military the resources might exist in the first place. reality. The mission is the manifestation of There are positive examples of mission the collective result sought. It may be as appreciation, and the following is freely delightfully obvious as dropping the center purloined from another as best it can be span of a high bridge or as abstract as recalled. While conducting a walk-through affecting an enemy’s will to continue the inspection of a communications repair fight. The definition of one’s mission varies shop, the commander asked a technician considerably in scope and complexity, but what his mission was. Hearing that it was there are some corollaries to one’s mission to repair and maintain “widgets,” our ex- that must always be considered. What are emplar of mission appreciation replied that the missions of other people and other while true, the answer was not altogether units? What are the missions at higher correct. As explained, the real mission of levels of activity? What are the priorities of the technician was to ensure that the air- the missions that abound in any complex craft cocked on the alert ramp became air- military operation? borne in the prescribed amount of time. These are important considerations, for it Anything in which the technician might is only in the context of the aggregate engage himself that did not contribute to mission that one can begin to truly appre- that timely takeoff was inappropriate effort. ciate the place and importance of one’s Did the technician’s “job" change? No, but own. Perhaps a few examples can bring this rest assured that his appreciation of his concept into focus. mission did, and to the overall advantage of While coordinating the directed loan of his unit and the Air Force. One should add some mobility equipment, an officer was that it didn’t hurt the officer either, having dismayed to hear from the more senior now passed into the flag ranks.

2 RICOCHETS 3

So. what does it all mean? Only that to this quest that the real richness of the :ullv appreciate one's mission, one must officer trainee's rote response will become look beyond immediate requirements and evident. imperatives to find the context that will “Sir. mission, mission, and mission, sir!” provide the true meaning of mission. It is in .:*

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Letters to the editor are encouraged. All correú have made potentially disastrous inroads into spondence should be addressed to the Editor. Air Force capabilities. Airpower Journal. U’aJker Hall. Maxwell AFB Army and Navy commanders have long rec- AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit the ognized the absolute necessity of air power for material for overall length. the successful prosecution of their campaigns. To remedy what they consider to be ineffective air support by the Air Force, they have sought to develop indigenous air power in the form oi VIRPOWER STRATEGY Navy Marine air wings and, most recently. Army ! believe the Air Force, as an institution, has attack helicopters. With each addition to their tailed to exploit the potential of air power across air forces, a backward step has been taken, and he spec trum of conflict, and until such time as today we face a multiservice attack on the con- the Air Force develops an air power strategy, the tinued existence of an independent Air Force. control of air power will continue its migration Congressionallv mandated programs, such as to the sister services. the current drive to develop joint doctrine, at- Whereas the Xavv and Army use the maritime tempt to reshape the US force structure, making strategy and AirLand Battle as operational blue- it trimmer, more effective, and better capable ol prints for their force development, the Air Force addressing the lower-spectrum threats. In re- -.eems to rely upon technological breakthroughs sponse. the services have employed various to chart its course As a direct result of this stratagems to ensure that these programs result process, we have failed to achieve our potential in end products that are supportive of existing -xcept at the upper end of the spectrum of organizations and doctrine. The Air Force has conflict, where air power continues to domi- been hampered in this process in that it lacks a nate. For -10 years the Air Force has invested maritime strategy or an AirLand Battle to serve neavily in this upper-spectrum force structure as a unifying foundation for its efforts. rnd continues to do so in systems like the B-2 Such a foundation is not provided by our bomber and MX missile, bur efforts have re- basic doctrine. AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doc- sulted in systems whose exceptional respon- trine of the United States Air Force, tells but a .iveness and combat capability have removed partial story of air power. It focuses on what the he reasonable expectation of their actual em- Air Force does—almost to the complete exclu- ployment. sion of why and how. Without clear top-down Rather than securing our national interests for guidance, these questions of why and how are dl time this situation has produced a perceived answered in as many ways as there are com- stalemate of nuclear forces that serves to empha- mands and theaters. When critical questions ol size the threats posed bv lower-spectrum con- organizational command and control are raised •lict. Our limited successes against these threats during joint-doctrine development, the other lave eroded the nation's former confidence in services can cite as many Air Force supporters ur power, replacing it with a near-total reliance of their "Air Force-only-for-support" role as we >n land and naval actions. In the process, seru- ms challenges to the organizational effective- ness and command and control of air power Continued on ptige HO DEVELOPING A LONG-TERM NATIONAL STRATEGY Shifting Imperatives

M ai G en Perry M. S mit h , USAF, R et ir ed*

HIS article seeks to yank people out of a mind-set that assumes that an extrapolation of the present into the future is good enough for purposes T of planning and making strategy.1 This aim is particularly important because the pres- sures for continuity of planning and policy will be quite strong now that George Bush is president. Most long-range planning as- sumes that things will pretty much remain the same in the future. Thus, all we have to do is examine a few variables, such as tech- nology and the changing nature of the So- viet threat, and we will be able to make good forecasts, plans, and programs. Be- cause we and our allies in Western Europe assume that the Soviet Union will remain the predominant adversary for the foresee- able future, there is little point in spending

*1 would like.to acknowledge my debt to Herman Kahn. During the two years preceding his death in 1983. I was with him quite often. He always seemed ahead of his time, always searching for a better future and working hard to reach it. His ability to extend his intellectual grasp beyond the present, his keen interest in retrospective histories, and his willingness to devote his time (in early 1983) to concentrate on long-range prospects for the Air Force all contributed to my thinking and planning, both then and now.

6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989 time thinking about emerging adversaries. and militarily formidable as well as one This mind-set has served us well in the past that is considerably less threatening. A because the Soviets have remained the big stronger Soviet Union might serve to threat; however, it is time to go through the strengthen our system of alliances but agonizing process of identifying other po- might also require us to increase spending tential adversaries as our relationship with on national defense. On the other hand, a the Soviet Union changes. weaker Soviet Union could undermine our Continuation of current planning, strat- alliances and probably lead to a consider- egy, and policy will not be adequate if the able reduction of US forces stationed over- United States aspires to be the preeminent seas. actor on the world stage during the next century. Over the next two decades, we can expect explosive technological transforma- Dealing with tions in the developed world together with changing patterns of economic, financial, Changing Threats political, and military interplay among all We must also examine possible new nations. Good old American pragmatism threats and pay particular attention to those and muddling through by the use of tiny, involving high technology. The United incremental steps to avoid risk are no States would then have to respond by pur- longer tenable practices. We need visionary suing a sustained, vigorous program of re- leadership, innovative strategic planning search and development to be competitive at many levels of government, and risk- in this area. Clearly, dramatic changes in taking— both in Washington and interna- the next 20 years will make forecasting, tionally. Unless we set specific, long-term planning, and programming more difficult goals and priorities and stick with them, we and challenging than it has been since the are doomed to slide— like the dinosaurs— end of World War II. One danger is that the into a morass of posthistoric mud. US military may begin to resemble the French military of the 1920s and 1930s; that is, we may learn the wrong lessons Alternatives from previous wars and make the wrong choices regarding our options and the de- for the Future velopment of strategies, doctrines, and tac- Planners must consider a number of al- tics. Equally disastrous, we may become so preoccupied with routine, day-to-day activ- ternatives for the future so that planning ities that we will not think, conceptualize, and programming will involve more than a simple 'extension of current practices into the distant future. For instance, they should consider a possible collapse of the world’s major economies, leading to a worldwide depression. If this should occur, planners must anticipate the emergence of radical leaders who promise simplistic so- lutions to desperate populations. They must study the lessons of the 1930s so that democratic states— though weakened by the depression—can prevent the rise of any future Hitlers or Tojos. Further, we should allow for a Soviet Union that would be both economically DEVELOPING LONG-TEHM STRATEGY 7 and plan. In any case, we must not allow velopment cycles, and a highly politicized budgetary austerity, doctrinal rigidity, bu- system of programming, budgeting, and reaucratic infighting, and Washington ‘‘ac- congressional approval, the United States tivity traps’’ to prevent us from doing some will likely stay ahead of the Soviets in creative thinking and bold planning. If our overall military technology for at least the planning is nothing more than the extrapo- next 20 years. lation of present policy, we will soon be in Further, the Soviet political and eco- serious trouble. We should examine our nomic system is so badly flawed that it long-range plans to see if they have the will not be able to deal as creatively with same goals and priorities as our short-range the information/computer age as will the plans and programs. If they do, the long- United States, Japan, Korea, and a number range plan is probably of little value. of states in Western Europe. This weakness, which is endemic to all totalitarian or au- thoritarian systems, will have an even more A Long-Range View of the Soviet Threat The United States has been rather fortu- nate, in that its principal adversary—for all its impressive military power—has for over 40 years remained a mediocre military threat in terms of technology, a modest economic competitor, and a model of di- minishing attractiveness to both developed and underdeveloped nations. The massive Soviet military threat has been worrisome indeed and is likely to remain so for some time. But in many areas, the Soviet Union has lagged behind the United States—par- ticularly in its incorporation of modern pronounced effect on Soviet economic and technology into military systems. military strength in the years to come. For For example, the introduction of the example, the personal computer (PC) is F-15—representing a revolution in aviation making an enormous impact on many na- technology—to Europe in 1977 created a tions. As of 1988, the Soviets had approxi- US advantage over Soviet and Eastern Eu- mately 200,000 personal computers—most ropean aircraft and aircrews that seemed of which are primitive by our standards— almost insurmountable, at least for a few but Americans are buying that many PCs years. We have continued to widen the gap per month. The best memory chip that in some areas, but the Soviets have man- the Soviet Union can mass-produce has a aged to close it in others. Although they 32-kilobyte capacity, whereas the United have made some progress on their own States and Japan are now mass-producing initiative, many advancements are the re- megabyte chips. Furthermore, the tele- sult of their stealing our secrets. Signifi- phone system in the Soviet Union is so cantly, none of our progress derives from unreliable that the use of modems, elec- our stealing their secrets. Any nation that tronic mail, and electronic bulletin boards must rely heavily on pilferage is doomed is only a dream. In view of the state of to lag behind in its military capability. computer technology in the United States, Despite Department of Defense (DOD) bud- Japan, and much of Western Europe, we getary squeezes, lengthy research and de- can see why many international econo- 8 AIRPOWER IOURNAL SUMMER 1989

mists consider the Soviet Union one of the underdeveloped nations of the world.

Dealing with High-Tech Threats in the Future If a high-tech threat from some nation other than the Soviet Union should emerge in the next couple of decades, the United States will have a very difficult time staying ahead of that threat. Hence, we should begin to devote some time and effort to dealing with the possibility of emerging dence from ethnic groups, and the rise of threats— nations or alliances of nations that Islamic fundamentalism within the Soviet would compete with us across the entire state, the hard-liners felt that they had no spectrum of national power and not just in choice. The pattern of 1,000 years of au- military and political areas. We must shift thoritarian control over a diverse popula- our attention, at least in part, away from tion overcame the few years of openness the Soviet Union and develop strategies, and freedom of expression that Gorbachev weapon systems, tactics, and doctrines that encouraged. An additional rationale from will allow us to deal with different and the hard-liners was that they feared people potentially more dangerous threats. The who were not under tight control. Histori- arms races that we will be engaged in by the cally, Russian and Soviet leaders have year 2010 will not necessarily lead to war, favored compliance over consensus. When but one or more will be high-tech races, and the hard-liners realized that they were it is time we began to prepare for them. losing both elements, Gorbachev was re- moved.

A Retrospective A Return to Authoritarian Control View of the World After Gorbachev was ousted, tight controls from the Year 2010 on the population returned, but “putting the genie back in the bottle” caused much What follows is a brief retrospective his- agony and bloodshed. The Soviet political tory of the more important highlights of the and economic system paid a very high next two decades, looking back from the price for the return to tight authoritarian autumn of 2010. control: (1) many of the country’s best and brightest people fled in the 1990s and are now making significant contributions in The Fall of Gorbachev Western societies (the United States has The fall of Gorbachev in the early 1990s been the nation of choice for about 50 remains, almost 20 years later, an important percent of the emigres): (2) because the event in world history. From the perspec- Soviet military played a prominent role in tive of 2010, we can now fully under- restoring order, training in the more tradi- stand why the hard-liners tossed him out. tional military skills suffered for a feu Because of the rioting throughout the years: and (3) Soviet ethnic groups, who Soviet Union, the demands for indepen- were so brutally suppressed in the 1990s. DEVELOPING LONG-TERM STRATEGY 9

continue to harbor a residual hatred of the vation for this slow but steady military military. buildup was quite complex. First, the Since the end of glasnost and pere- United States encouraged the Japanese to stroika. the Soviet economy has stagnated. bear a larger portion of the defense burden Access to personal computers and copying in East Asia. Further, the reduced faith machines remains a privilege for trusted in American deterrence, the increased elites, and the flow of ideas and informa- power and prestige of the People’s Republic tion throughout the society is almost as of China, the diminished memories of Jap- difficult now as it was in the period prior to anese militarism during the 1930s and Gorbachev. The Soviet Union has had a 1940s, and the natural tendency of an eco- terrible time dealing with the information/ nomic superpower to have a defense pos- computer age, which has now been in full ture adequate to defend vital interests all bloom in developed nations for more than a had some effect on this buildup. In fact, decade. (Historians now date the entry of the Japanese now make the best fighters, a country into the information/computer helicopters, tanks, destroyer-sized surface age from the time there is at least one com- ships, radars, sensors, lasers, and photonic puter and one communications modem in systems in the world. 50 percent of the country’s households.) A fascinating arms competition is going Japan and the United States entered this on between the United States and Japan for information computer age in the 1990s, and the high-tech side of the arms-sales busi- a number of Western European and Asian ness. Underlying that competition is the nations reached it soon after the turn of the potential for a high-tech military arms race. century. However, much depends on the evolution in political and economic relationships during the second and third decades of the lapan's Rise to Military Prominence twenty-first century. Up to now, the first In the past 20 years, the road for the Japa- decade has seen more cooperation than nese has been quite rocky in a number of competition between the United States and ways. There has been a resurgence of anti- Japan. Japanese leaders, realizing how im- Japanese feeling throughout East Asia portant the American market is to their and, to a lesser extent, in the United States economy, have fought hard against the and Western Europe. In addition, the wave of emerging nationalism in Japan. But Japanese have experienced a considerable the fact that the United States and Japan are brain drain, as many of the more talented, now the world's greatest superpowers, mil- younger Japanese have taken lucrative po- itarily as well as economically, makes the sitions in the United States, Western Eu- status of their relationship an extremely rope, Brazil, Canada, and elsewhere. This important and delicate issue for the fore- exodus, in combination with the heavy seeable future. social overhang of a large elderly popula- tion, has slowed the rate of economic Explosive Growth of growth in Japan to about 3 percent in the the Chinese Population first decade of the new century. In fiscal year 2011 the Japanese will China has avoided the return to totalitarian spend slightly more than 3 percent of their control that took place in the 1990s in the gross national product (GNP) on defense. Soviet Union. Many factors have helped Although they do not have nuclear weap- the Chinese avoid most of the turmoil of ons, most knowledgeable observers give openness: (1) over 90 percent of the Chi- them credit for having a capable military, nese are ethnic Hans, and the dissident ranking second worldwide in overall tech- minorities have not been a major problem, nological capability. The Japanese moti- except in a few outlying areas: (2) Maoism 10 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

did not experience a major resurgence, item veto and the 30-cent federal tax on largely because of the “never-again” atti- gasoline—renewed the confidence of the tude that emerged from the Cultural Revo- world's financial centers in the health of lution; (3) the Chinese have a cultural the American economy and helped stabi- affinity toward entrepreneurial pursuits; lize the dollar at 100 yen and 1.50 deutsche and (4) communism was not the predomi- marks. nant political system in China long enough Breakthroughs in solar-cell technology to overcome the centuries of Confucianism (the Japanese hold the key patents), heavy that preceded it. pressures from environmental groups, and But the Chinese evolution toward a freer a few terribly hot summers all played a role society has been costly in one sense. The in getting congressional approval of the baby boom of the late 1990s and the first radical legislation on private automobiles. decade of the twenty-first century pro- Most of us already have at least one electric duced many two- and three-children fami- car, and many of us have a solar car. Nev- lies that pushed the population of China ertheless, much oil is available because past the 1.5 billion mark in 2008. China’s world consumption has been decreasing in very considerable economic growth has recent years and because better technology been offset by this increase in population, helped locate additional sources of petro- and the per capita GNP has risen only leum throughout the world prior to the modestly. More significant from the point passage of the automobile law. of view of defense policy is that feeding, The population of the United States has housing, and clothing 1.5 billion Chinese passed 300 million. The relaxing of restric- takes up most of the nation’s energy. The tions on immigration in the early 1990s Chinese military remains quite large and to alleviate a shortage of workers in the China is clearly an important regional United States seems to have paid off. in that power, but it has not been able to catch up the quality of immigrants in the past 20 with the United States and Japan in tech- years has been higher than in any compa- nological capability. Further, military train- rable period. Moreover, the flow of talented ing remains generally second rate, largely young people from Korea. Japan, Taiwan, because of a lack of funds for operations, India, and especially China has contributed maintenance, and a rigorous training regi- significantly to our ability to make scien- men. As in the past, many Chinese soldiers tific progress over the past two decades. spend at least half their time and effort The impressive work ethic of these immi- planting, nurturing, and harvesting food for grants has inspired many Americans to themselves and their fellow soldiers. increase their own intensity and productiv- ity. Thirty percent of US businesses, real Changes in the United States estate, banks, private universities, and non- The two most significant pieces of legisla- profit corporations is now owned and op- tion of the first decade of the twenty-first erated by the Dutch, British, Germans, century were the passage of a value-added Japanese, Koreans, and others. Their man- tax law and a law mandating that no pas- agerial talents, combined with the entrepre- senger automobile powered by petroleum neurial skills of Americans, have helped products would be built in or imported sustain the growth of the American econ- to the United States after the year 2014. omy at an average of 3 percent per year— The value-added tax, which is now at 7 somewhat higher than the 2.5 percent percent, was quite helpful in solving the growth of the first nine decades of the chronic budget deficit that had plagued our twentieth century. Hence, the American country since the early 1980s. In retrospect, economy remains the largest in the world, this law— in combination with the line- with the Japanese a close second and all DEVELOPING LONG-TERM STRATEGY 11 other nations considerably behind. The So- The Maturation of viet Union, for instance, has slipped to fifth Compartmentalized Systems place. Systems resulting from compartmentalized programs that were initiated in the 1980s Changing Military Realities and 1990s are now deployed in consider- of the New Century able numbers by operational commands. Most of these black (clandestine) programs Changing threats as well as changing eco- emerged from the US Air Force. That ser- nomic and political realities have made vice’s experience in dealing with various planning and programming even more compartmentalized programs (many in the challenging than in the past. Justifying a space and surveillance arenas) in the 1960s large US military budget each year since and 1970s facilitated its development of so the turn of the century has been quite dif- many black programs in the 1980s and ficult since the Soviet Union, mired down 1990s. There has been a greater willingness with internal problems, is perceived as a to be doctrinally innovative in these black nuclearly armed Ottoman Empire—more to programs than in white (open) ones. For be pitied than feared. The US defense bud- instance, compared to the white programs get has slipped below 4.5 percent of the of the 1980s and 1990s, the commitment to GNP, and the size of the active duty mil- manned systems in black programs has itary is down to 1.5 million and still de- been markedly reduced. clining. Enlightened military and civilian leaders in DOD, aware of changing threats, Conceptual Developments have correctly decided to reduce force structure in order to maintain excellent In the past 20 years, some important con- training, a decent pay and benefits pro- ceptual and doctrinal developments have gram, and a stable retirement system—the changed the military services and their incentives required to recruit and maintain interaction with each other considerably. A a highly motivated and professional mili- key ingredient of this doctrinal evolution tary force. Further, the military services has been the role of the Joint Staff in the have shifted a greater portion of the defense development of joint doctrine as well as the budget to research and development in greatly enhanced power of the chairman order to compete in the super-high-tech and vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of arena. And the most delicate exercise of all Staff. Only now can we judge the revolu- has been to carry out a vigorous arms com- tionary impact of the Goldwater-Nichols petition with high-tech countries that re- Law of 1986. For example, military reform- main our friends and allies. ers have attained many of their goals: each service academy cadet and midshipman spends a full semester at another academy, each new flag officer spends a full year at the restructured National War College, and each commander in chief in the field is a product of the Joint Staff system. Clearly, the relationship between military services is more harmonious than it was from 1946 to 1986. The services are showing a will- ingness to work cooperatively and to de- velop joint doctrine that will serve the greater good of the nation. In particular, the Air Force has become more important in some areas of warfare 12 AM POWER IOURNAL SUMMER 1989 and less important in others. In the late This focus on the economy will be trau- 1980s. both the National Defense Univer- matic for many military people who cor- sity Press and Pergamon Brassey’s pub- rectly see national security as our most lished The Air Campaign by Col John important priority but who incorrectly see Warden. This book had a considerable im- it in narrow terms. National security is not pact on the thinking of leaders from all the just guns, ships, and aircraft to meet a military services as well as on civilian well-established military threat; it is also a leaders in DOD. Warden argued that air robust national economy. In order to bring superiority would be the primary combat the national budget into near balance, the mission in the AirLand Battle of the future, military will have to take some budgetary pointing out many examples of the primacy cuts well beyond those that Frank Carlucci of this mission from the history of warfare. mandated. Those people who argue that we Additionally, a series of analytical histories must build our military solely in response of air combat began to appear, and by the to military threats are misinformed and early 1990s the US Air Force, for the first fail to serve the nation. The “threat” is time, began to develop an intellectual base becoming more and more an economic one, firmly grounded on historical, wartime ex- and the stakes—our national sovereignty— periences. The use of experience in combat are enormous. Aggressive divestiture of as a proving ground for the development of obsolescent systems, organizations, doc- doctrine and theories of war—something trines. and tactics—as well as the cancella- that is so well understood by leaders from tion of one or more major procurement other services— began to become part of Air programs—will be necessary between now Force methodology by the mid-1990s. Al- and the mid-1990s, or we will have a very though acceptance of Warden’s concepts “hollow” military. A historical parallel may was difficult for all of the military services, be in order. President Jimmy Carter’s can- it is quite well established in the year 2010. cellation of the B-l in 1977 was a blessing Developments in technology and the evo- in disguise, for it allowed the Air Force— in lution in doctrine have placed air power in a time of great budgetary austerity—to buy the forefront as far as conventional warfare the fighter and attack aircraft that it so is concerned. However, space and naval badly needed to shore up its conventional systems now dominate the nuclear arena, capability. and highly trained soldiers and marines The second major imperative for the fu- dominate the low-intensity arena. ture is clearly technology, but not just mil- itary technology. We must find incentives to dramatically increase innovation in ci- vilian technology so that we can compete Shifting with the aggressive technologists in other Imperatives of Strategy nations. The most important of these civil- ian technologies is in the area of energy Returning to the late 1980s and the era of production. We must take aggressive steps, the Bush administration, we need to reex- including tax incentives and seed money, amine the various elements of national to pursue opportunities in superconductiv- power in light of present-day realities and ity and solar energy. A somewhat less im- the challenges and opportunities of the portant technology that we must pursue future. Economics has finally forced its just as aggressively involves waste disposal wav to the top of the national agenda, and and pollution control. If the United States the new president must subordinate all can make breakthroughs in these two re- other issues to getting our national econ- lated areas, the world will beat a path to its omy in order and solving the problem of door. For example, the Corning Glass our trade deficit. Works of Corning, New York, makes ce- DEVELOPING LONG-TERM STRATEGY 13 ramie filters for catalytic converters in au- teams some useful ideas on how to plan for tomobiles. Corning is the only company in and implement creative divestiture.) We the world that makes this device, and now must look for innovative ways to fund that nations around the world are passing programs, including having the Japanese, laws that make pollution-control devices Germans, and Koreans underwrite some of mandatory, Corning sales are booming. So. our major programs, such as the one involv- for all the right environmental reasons as ing the C-17. We could propose a buy-lease well as the great opportunity for export arrangement whereby foreign sponsors sales, we should hotly pursue these tech- fund the procurement program and the nologies. United States agrees to lease the airplanes Budget-based national strategy can be a from those sponsors. After 25 years, the dangerous approach because it can weaken sponsors could take over the airplanes, or us appreciably; however, national security the United States could extend the lease. planning and programming based almost Granted, this is a radical approach, but exclusively on expectations of military there are many advantages to this type of arrangement. threats can bankrupt the United States. In 1941, even though the world was in What is the answer? Fundamentally, we flames, we did not have the force structure, must reassess our national strategy. We the training, the alert posture, or the intel- must reduce our formal and informal com- ligence coverage to deal with the surprise mitments throughout the world, gradually attack at Pearl Harbor. But we did have a but systemically bringing a sizable number long-term grand strategy and military strat- of troops home unless the host nation is egy that served us well once we entered the willing to pay much more of the costs of war. Thanks to such visionary leaders as having them on its soil. We must seriously Gens George Marshall and Henry "Hap” reexamine our quasi-alliances and slowly Arnold, we were able to identify and ana- reduce the burden of these arrangements.' lyze our enemies, establish strategic prior- We must begin and sustain a serious and ities for Europe, and create the necessary systematic divestiture to rid ourselves of war plans, logistics support plans, and pro- the "coast artillery cannons” as soon as curement programs. possible. (To use the coast artillery analogy, Today the situation is largely reversed. we should have divested ourselves of that We have the training, intelligence re- mission and equipment in 1925, when it sources, force structure, and alert posture was clear that aircraft carriers would be the that were sadly lacking that Sunday morn- primary capital ships of the future rather ing in 1941. But we do not have the long- than in 1942, when we finally made a term strategy and plans that will serve as concerted effort to close down the 16-inch beacons for our decisionmakers. In the late gun units throughout our nation and our 1930s and early 1940s, we had the time territories.) We must open up all of our (and, more important, took the time) to compartmentalized programs to divestiture think, plan, and make decisions based on teams so that they will be playing with a these plans. We must return to this pattern full deck of cards. (An examination of the of careful, long-range planning and strategy divestitures—in the early 1980s—of the Ti- making. We need to identify, nurture, pro- tan missile, the B-52Ds, and the mid- mote, and take full advantage of the George Canada radar line may give the divestiture Marshalls in our midst.'

Moles 1 This article is a small part of my efforts to plan seriously who would like to join me in charting our future national for the future, including a series of books on future warfare— interests to contact me directly. currently in the process of commissioning. I invite anyone 2. Terry L. Dei be Is "Hidden Commitments." Foreign Policy, 14 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989 no. 67 |Summer 1987): 46-69. is highly recommended read- ton. D.C.: National Defense University Press. 1987); and Rich- ing. ard Cohen and Peter Wilson. "Toward a National Security 3. At the end of my books and papers. I usually make a Strategy' for the 1990s: Assuring 21st Century Competitive- number of specific recommendations to readers who would ness." in press (Comparative Strategy). Third, watch the like to pursue the issues I raise. For those of you interested in excellent television series "Nova." Fourth, buy a personal long-range planning. I suggest a number of things. First, join computer, some sophisticated software, a modem, and use the World Future Society (a subscription to Futurist magazine them all—often. Fifth, identify, support, nurture, and listen to comes with this membership), and try to attend the upcoming the innovators in your organization. Sixth, hold brainstorming conference "Futurevievv: The 1990s and Beyond" from 16 to sessions on a regular basis, and follow carefully the basic rules 20 July 1989 at the Sheraton Washington Hotel. Washington. of brainstorming: there are no bad ideas in a brainstorming D.C Second, read a few books and articles on long-range session, the wilder the idea the better, and the more ideas the planning, such as the following: George A. Steiner, Strategic merrier. Seventh, when you or your organization is about to Planning: What Every Manager Must Know (New York: Free make an important decision, be sure to consider the long-term Press. 1979); Noel Capon, john U. Farley, and James M. implications of that decision. All of us should be interested in Ilulbert. Corporate Strategn Planning (New York: Columbia the future, for that is where we will spend the rest of our lives. University Press. 19871; Perry Smith et ai.. Creating Strategic Americans have the unique opportunity to frame that future. Vision Long Hunge Planning for National Security (Washing- What a shame it will be if we fail to do so. Ƞ

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15 *» 1 V 16 THE RAAF WRITES ITS DOCTRINE

W in g Comdr David J. S chubert, RAAF W in g Comdr Brian L. Kavanagh, RAAF

We find ourselves con- stantly in a dilemma as to whether too much de- tail has been presented or whether we have become so terse that the meaning [of doctrine] is clouded and darkness descends upon the reader . . .

N a reference to doctrine and the writing of doctrine, US Air Force Gen William W. Mornyer—then a colonel—once wrote, ‘“ We find ourselves constantly in a dilemma as to whether too much detail has been presented or whether we I have become so terse that the meaning [of doctrine] is clouded and darkness descends upon the reader.’”1 Even a casual

17 18 AJRPOVVER IOURNAL SUMMER 1989

discussion of doctrine causes some people cepts used in Australia— such as “the bal- to shudder, others to expound at length on anced air force”—were derived from this the many different views of its meaning, useful manual, once considered the unoffi- and the remainder to sink slowly and inter- cial bible of air operations in the RAAF. minably into the darkness that Momyer Times have changed. Major shifts in refers to. The mention of doctrine within world politics—the US Guam doctrine of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) will 1969 and the emergence of regional eco- elicit, at best, confusion, and, at worst, nomic and national powers, to name just looks of derision. In the words of the in- two— have altered Australia’s strategic domitable Professor Julius Sumner Miller, circumstances. Because Australia’s na- "Why is it so?”2 tional strategies and defence policies have changed, old reliances are now irrelevant, and the absence of a specifically Australian A Borrowed Doctrine doctrine is becoming apparent. The RAAF can no longer rely on the doctrinal precepts The straightforward answer is that, in the of larger, broader-based air forces that past, the RAAF has not perceived a need for support fundamentally different national an Australian doctrine. That is, Australia’s policies and military strategies. Their doc- earlier "forward defence” policy allowed trines are at times outdated, but— more the RAAF to adopt, wholesale, the air force important—they are inappropriate to Aus- doctrines of "big league" sponsors such tralian conditions. Moreover, looking to as the United Kingdom (UK) and the other air forces for direction in the use of United States. This luxury has, at the same air power in future hostilities is contrary to time, proved an impediment to the inde- the fundamental principles of Australia’s pendent development of strategic thought recently adopted defence policy of self- on air power in Australia. RAAF doctrine, reliance. therefore, has been the doctrine of other There is another, more important, philo- nations— neither directed specifically at sophical reason why an increasingly self- Australia nor influenced significantly by reliant fighting force should have its own members of its air force. In short, few unique, formalised doctrine. Unless a fight- members of the RAAF have thought about ing force has a definitive doctrinal state- doctrine; of those who have, even fewer ment of how it is going to fight in war, it has have contemplated it in an Australian con- no explicit and absolute basis on which to text. focus its strategy and planning. Of equal An example of borrowed doctrine was importance, without a doctrine that fosters the Britis.h Royal Air Force (RAF) Air Pub- broad-based understanding, a fighting force lication (AP) 1300, Operations. This man- lacks those shared assumptions among ual had a significant influence on the commanders and subordinates that enable RAAF until a major shift in UK strategic them to know intuitively what each is strike defence policy in the 1960s rendered likely to do under the pressures of combat. much of it obsolete. Until that time, con- Doctrine, if it is sound, is the means of reducing the fog and friction of war and is the foundation of all successful military Editor’s Mote: enterprises. The Royal Australian Air Force has recently set itself the task of developing a comprehensive air doctrine from "scratch." The authors are taking the opportunity, at selected milestones in the process, to report the essence of their thinking and the Doctrine—The Holy Writ? status of their progress. This article is their first effort in that regard and offers us in the US Air Force the fascinating opportunity to observe as another air force struggles with the Contrary to popular folklore, doctrine is complexities of defining and writing its own air doctrine. neither some kind of codified law enunci- THE RAAF WRITES ITS DOCTRINE 19

AUSTRALIA'S REGIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

Australia is an island nation with a doctrine but dogma. The rigidity of dogma vast area of national interests. Air asú inevitably leads to failure, as history and ღ sets are increasingly important as the new Australian defence policy empha- experience show. Military operations do sizes coverage of the enormous geo- not aim to fail, so dogma has no place in graphical distances over which their domain. potential threats could emanate. Military doctrine is a body of central beliefs about war that guides the applica- ღ tion of power in combat. Although author- itative, it is only a guide and requires judgment in its use. Doctrine is derived ating immutable rules on how to fight war, from a synergy of two sources: fundamental nor a dusty book of commandments kept in principles and innovative ideas about the an old trunk in a deep, dark cellar, guarded best use of combat power. Fundamental by monks and brought out only for Kanga- principles draw on experience and are roo Exercise washups. These myths suggest time-honoured as the optimum way to suc- something sacrosanct—that is to say, un- ceed. They are the guidelines that have changing and unchallengeable. This is not worked best in the past. Conversely, inno- vative ideas look only to the future and Air Power Doctrine include theoretical as well as practical ap- plication. Fundamental principles evolve Having defined doctrine generally, as it slowly and are, by nature, relatively perma- applies to any combat power, we must now nent, whereas innovation embraces contin- give air power doctrine a more specif it uous change. The overall interaction of focus. First, we should consider what air these two elements, therefore, makes mili- power is. The widely recognised definition tary doctrine a particularly dynamic pro- by R. A. Mason and M. J. Armitage in cess bounded only by the limits of our Airpower in the Nuclear Age proclaims air imagination. power as “the ability to project military Australia has traditionally looked to Great Britain and the United States for both aircraft (clockivise /rom left: RAAF C-130, F-l 11, and F-18 air- craft) and for its doctrine. The Australians now perceive their national defence requirements as significantly different from those of its traditional partners, requiring a careful examination and development o/ air doctrine specifically designed to meet Australian needs. 22 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989 force by or from a platform in the third opment of operations exclusively within dimension above the surface of the earth.’’3 the air. Air power can be applied in support Thus, air power doctrine can be described of other combat forces; it can also be ap- as the central beliefs about the conduct of plied independently. Both applications are war that guide air services in the applica- vital to a nation’s security, yet history sug- tion of military power within this third gests that the latter has received a dispro- dimension. portionate emphasis in the past. Second, we must note that air power An unrelated but parallel development doctrine is neither restricted to air war nor has been the change in attitude toward confined solely to air forces. Air power warfare since the end of World War II. The doctrine concerns itself with the best use of idea of global confrontation, either conven- air services to exploit the intrinsic qualities tional or nuclear, was the driving force of air power in the achievement of national behind Western military doctrine immedi- objectives. The characteristics of air power, ately after World War II and for the next including its advantages and limitations, 20 years. This concept has steadily given must be conveyed within the context and way to greater emphasis on limited war- form of future warfare. Although air power fare. For political or military reasons, mod- doctrine may logically be based on past ern warfare now seeks limited objectives events and established in the present, its rather than the total victory of the past, and prime concern is with the future. Lord conflicts may take the form of counterin- Arthur W. Tedder, marshal of the RAF and surgency, guerrilla warfare, or counterter- an exponent of air power, encapsulated the rorism. The invasion of Grenada and the concepts of doctrine when he stated, “We raid on Libya are examples of the modern must look forward from the past . . . not use of combat force and are described in back to the past.”4 today’s warfare lexicon by the phrases low- intensity conflict or (in Australia's case) escalated low-level conflict. These changes The Shaping in attitude toward warfare over the four decades since World War II have had a of Air Power Doctrine major impact on the application of air in Australia power. Technology, too, has had an effect on the Let us take Lord Tedder’s advice and application of air power. Because it has dwell for a moment on the historical events improved the performance of military that have shaped air power doctrine, both equipment, the number of weapons and globally and nationally. In this way we will weapon systems within military invento- have a better understanding of where ries has decreased—but not without corre- RAAF doctrine is today and where it sponding and dramatic rises in costs. Also, should go. the cost of training and retaining personnel Throughout the relatively short history of has increased, relative to the past. In short, air power, there have been few opportuni- past capabilities can now be matched with ties for the development of air power doc- fewer resources, but rising costs and dimin- trine. Specifically, the efficacy of air power ishing numbers of assets are matters of doctrine was harmed by some overearnest, concern within a modern military force. politically motivated proponents of air There is no doubt that the RAAF today is power who actively sought the indepen- a high-technology force, but it is still a dence of air forces. Further, some people small force with a decreasing inventory emphasised air power’s traditional respon- and, paradoxically, is subject to increasing sibility to support land and maritime demands for air services. This latter point forces, often to the detriment of the devel- is exemplified in the Royal Australian Na- THE RAAF WRITES ITS DOCTRINE 23

vy's (RAN) need for fleet protection follow- chiefly arise from combat experience, they ing disbandment of the Fleet Air Arm. At provide an ideal foundation from which to the same time, strategic guidance from the develop air power doctrine. We then meld 1987 defence white paper emphasises how this foundation with innovative ideas, and the newly adopted Australian defence pol- the two elements react to form the core or icy of self-reliance and defence in depth philosophical basis of doctrine. But a work- "gives priority to the air and sea defences in ing doctrine cannot end there because in our area of direct military interest.”5 Fur- this form it is sterile. To be effective for the thermore, the rather large geographical area organization, it must be adjusted to the of Australia’s direct military interest is un- dominant, influencing factors and realities likely to decrease in the future. of the organization. To reiterate, air power in Australia today The realities that directly influence the faces different challenges than those of the doctrine of a military organization are the past in terms of perceived threats, forms of nation’s defence policy, geography, and combat, and tasks. Air power is now re- geostrategic perspectives. An offensive na- sponsible for the defence of an enormous tional defence posture, for example, would area of military interest, using more lethal engender a far different military doctrine but more expensive air assets that are grad- than would a posture that is intrinsically ually decreasing in number. Allocation of defensive. Similarly, a doctrine for protect- these limited assets is now the most signif- ing an island nation with a vast area of icant issue of command and control within national interest and regional influence the Australian Defence Force (ADF). This must be different from that of a small, last point is controversial because there is landlocked country with hostile neighbors. increasing pressure to unnecessarily divide Other influences, such as economics and Australia’s air service among the service threat assessment, add to the equation, but components—a concept that defies doctri- they shape defence policies ana geostrate- nal precepts on the best use of air power. gic perspectives rather than directly influ- ence military doctrine. The influence of force structure—or the current, existing force—must be considered Considerations in writing air power doctrine. No military When Writing Doctrine organization starts from a clean slate, be- cause existing conditions are already part Although the theoretical aspects of doc- of the central body of beliefs. Once doctrine trine are important and necessary, they do is written, based on the present organiza- not determine whether it will be success- tion, force structure should then be subject ful. The practical consideration must be to the guidance of the doctrine rather than that doctrine is recorded in order that a vice versa. body of central beliefs be accurately re- One might use a still to represent the flected and correctly perceived. The right complexities and dynamics of a viable, perspective is an integral part of the revi- continuous doctrine (see figure). The con- sion and refinement that make doctrine a tainer is both the framework of a nation and dynamic process. Recording the collective its perspectives on warfighting. The fluid memory of central beliefs enforces a disci- to be distilled—a mix of national defence pline and clarity of thought that help sus- policy and national geostrategic perspec- tain this dynamic process. tives— is both activated and fed by a As discussed earlier, the relative perma- “yeast” containing the core elements of nence associated with fundamental princi- fundamental principles and innovative ples is the keystone to writing doctrine. ideas, both theoretical and practical. This When we distill these principles, which core is alive, volatile, and capable of crys- 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

to begin to answer these questions is to determine what we in the RAAF believe a doctrine should achieve and why we think we need to formalise our doctrine. Surely an organization the size of the RAAF,* which shares responsibility for the security of the nation, should have a com- mon set of assumptions, ideas, values, and attitudes as a guide to its future actions. Furthermore, all members—from the initial trainee through the operational aircrew to the highest-ranking leader—should share an understanding of how air power can best be applied in an Australian context. We can achieve that aim by documenting our un- derstanding. Once recorded, central beliefs tallization or precipitation, depending on provide a common baseline for educa- the state of the solution. The distilled prod- tion and the dissemination of collective uct is doctrine, which slowly reacts with a force-structure solution, thus changing the thought. Should nothing else be accom- force structure over time. Eventually, the plished, recording a doctrine is at least a modified force structure feeds back, matur- common starting point from which to edu- ing and mellowing the original distillation cate RAAF personnel. process. Further, a recognised, accepted, and duly This analogy shows the interactions of recorded doctrine will provide a common various dynamic elements and stresses that framework for planning within the RAAF we should view the development of doc- and will influence its future force structure. trine as if it were an ongoing chemical Thus, establishment of a doctrinal frame- reaction or a continuum. That is, the pro- work gives direction to force structure and cess of distilling doctrine is perennial: the to development of the most appropriate end product, after all. is a body of thought. strategies. From these strategies evolve the Similarly, although the distillation process operational art and. at the unit level, the may operate udthout all the ingredients, the best tactics for using resources. Once again, end product may not be the best available. doctrine is only a guide and merely directs. In Australia's case, defence self-reliance It is not a panacea, but a particular, neces- has changed the content of the ingredients, sary part of the planning process. and now there is a need to critically exam- Viewed simplistically. planning can be ine the quality of the yeast used previously. likened to developing a playing field. That Given the changed ingredients, the most is, the Australian National Defence Policy appropriate yeast, and the continuing dictates the range of games to be played. chemical reaction, the best doctrinal distil- Doctrine corresponds to selecting and late will flow as a matter of course. clearing a patch in the wilderness, leveling the ground, and growing the grass. Long- range planning assures that the correct lines are drawn on the ground and the Relevance of appropriate goalposts are erected. Team Doctrine to the RAAF leaders and members can then determine

How is all this doctrinal moonshine rel- *The RAAF consists of approximately 29,000 personnel (including reservists anti civilians) anil operates 373 aircraft evant to the RAAF, and what does it have to Air Marshal R. G. Funnell AO, chief of the Air Staff. RAAF. do with aeroplanes? Perhaps the best way "The 1987 Sir Ross anti Sir Keith Smith Memorial Lecture." THE RAAF WHITES ITS DOCTRINE 25

the best strategies, operational art, and tac- for the most part, will remain separate tics to play the game. There is nothing to because of basic differences in equipment prevent a team from working out its plays and operating conditions. Second, the pe- in advance, provided these plays are for the culiarities of the land, sea, and air will range of games dictated. However, playing demand different skills, applications, and he game involves more than strategies and tactical thinking of the people who operate tactics, and the outcome may not be satis- in these environments; consequently, train- factory. particularly if the game has to be ing requirements will continue to differ. played in the wilderness. Third, and most important, each service’s So. in answer to the skeptics, doctrine role will remain aligned with its environ- has much to do with the RAAF and is not mental dimension and in many cases can lust about flying aeroplanes. It gives all be carried out as a single-service task rather RAAF personnel a common understanding than a joint-service task. of why the service exists and how air power Jointness, therefore, does not necessarily can best be used to protect the nation. As a imply integration of the three armed ser- guide, doctrine encourages the best em- vices. Neither does it mandate a reduction ployment and support of aircraft at every in the roles of these services. The differ- level of planning. Furthermore, it directly ences between land, sea, and air as operat- affects the RAAF’s air power capabilities ing media are too vast to permit an and the selection of future aircraft and amalgamation of their essential functions, weapon systems. and the applications of land, sea, or air pow'er cannot simply be lumped together for economic or technical expediency. Per- haps such consolidation may be feasible if Why a Single-Service and w'hen w'e build a military vehicle that Doctrine? is capable of operating across the full spec- trum of the w'orld’s operating environ- Most military commanders in Australia ments, including space. Until then, for the recognise that the ADF is at present firmly sake of overall defence efficiency, some committed to joint operations and that its support functions can either be joint en- future defence commitments will most deavors or assigned to one service. But, as likely be joint in nature. Why. then, should long as functional divisions remain, single the RAAF write a dedicated, single-service services will alw'ays carry out specialised doctrine in a joint-service environment? In roles and tasks unique to their own operat- the context of military operations, jointness ing environments. denotes two or more independent services Justification of single-service doctrine functioning in their own operational would not be necessary if its critics viewed environments—whether land. sea. or air— jointness from a historical perspective. In under a single point of command to meet a 1942, during the North Africa campaign of common aim. Although command is cen- World War II. Field Marshal Bernard L. tralised. each service still functions in its Montgomery and Air Marshal Arthur Con- unique realm. Further, each one strives to ingham created the allied tactical air force complement the combat powers of the and introduced AirLand Battle doctrine. other two by exploiting its own combat They showed that the quintessence of joint- power within its operating medium. ness in an AirLand Battle is cooperation— As long as ships ply the seas, tanks roll in this case, between land and air forces over the ground, and aircraft take to the and among allied nations. Without cooper- skies, there will be fundamental differences ation. all the joint doctrine and procedures between the three arms of the defence in the world will not bring together three force. For example, their force structures, organizations as disparate as the lighting 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989 arms of a nation. With cooperation, how- The chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air ever, jointness will triumph with even a Marshal Ray Funnell, has taken the initia- modicum of preordination. tive and nominated two officers from RAAF Unfortunately, this perspective of joint- Development Division as project officers to ness is nonexistent. Jointness builds a mo- develop RAAF doctrine. These two officers mentum of its own, almost as an end in (the authors of this article) are tasked di- itself rather than a means to an end. It tends rectly by CAS and now work in relative to de-emphasise the need for single ser- isolation at the RAAF Staff College. Their vices yet avoids full-fledged integration of project is to develop a manual of air power the services. And, all too often, initiatives doctrine for use within the RAAF and to that are in the “interests of jointness” are determine a means by which this recorded considered sacrosanct. To challenge them doctrine can be continually verified and borders on heresy. Perhaps we need to updated within the organization. rigorously question some joint initiatives, The task is a first for the RAAF; it is also particularly those that may reduce a ser- rather onerous because, as General Momyer vice’s capacity to operate effectively within pointed out, “The writing of manuals is its own medium. Perhaps we need to en- perhaps one of the most difficult tasks in gender a sense of cooperation among the the field of military writing.”6 Yet, the services that will pave the way for joint stakes are high. The future of air power is operations in war, rather than manufacture vital to Australia. The RAAF has a compel- an artificial construct that compromises ling responsibility to enlighten and align individual performance. its personnel. Equally, the RAAF has a moral duty to make air power better under- The Way Ahead stood and appreciated within the defence community of Australia. We can accom- Where, then, does RAAF doctrine go plish both aims by writing on air doctrine. from here? If, as stated, single-service doc- The alternatives are ignorance, suspicion, trine is still necessary and written doctrine misemployment, and inefficiency—char- is important, then we must surely write a acteristics that nestle comfortably under doctrine suitable for the RAAF. That is the mantle of General Momyer’s dark- precisely what is happening. ness. Ƞ

Notes 1 Quoted in Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doc- Age (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1983). 2. trine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air 4. Lord Arthur W. Tedder, "The Unities of War." in The Force. 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB. Ala : Air University, 1971). Impact of Air Power: National Security and World Politics, ed. 197. Eugene M. Emme (Princeton. New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand 2. This phrase is the catchcrv of Professor Miller, a well- Co.. Inc., 1959). 339. known academic in Australia who uses simple experiments to 5. The Defence of Australia. 1987 (Canberra. Australia. explain scientific phenomena to children. Australian Government Publishing Service. 1987), viii. 3. M. J. Armitage and R. A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear 6. Quoted in Futrell, 196. BARRAGE BALLOONS FOR LOW-LEVEL AIR DEFENSE i $ M aj Franklin J. H illson, U S A F HE United States and its NATO the utility of barrage balloons today in allies would be at a distinct disad- helping to protect a vital NATO asset—the vantage during a conventional war airfield.2 in Europe: they lack numbers. They Tare outnumbered in the air and on the ground. Yes, the debate over quantity ver- The Low-Level Threat sus quality continues, but the vast number of Soviet aircraft and armored vehicles pre- and SAM Limitations sents a major dilemma to the West. Specif- Modern technology allows aircraft to fly ically. NATO faces a large number of high and fast, but it also permits them to fly Warsaw Pact attack aircraft whose primary at very low altitudes—perhaps their most objective is the airfield—a target as impor- advantageous capability. Radar, antiaircraft tant to the East to destroy as it is to the West artillery (AAA), and particularly SAMs to defend. The West’s potent ground-based make today’s air defenses extremely for- antiaircraft system—consisting mainly of midable, but these systems are vulnerable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)—can be to ultra-low-level attack by enemy aircraft. countered by electronic jamming and espe- Because SAMs and other antiaircraft sys- cially by low-level flight. In fact, a high- tems are deadly to high-flying aircraft, both speed, low-level attack at 100 feet or less NATO and the Warsaw Pact emphasize makes NATO airfields and other vital tar- low-level attacks. This tactic helps negate gets terribly vulnerable.1 If the West is to the effect of SAMs, decreases enemy re- improve its defenses against low-level air sponse time, and enhances the element attack, it needs another element of the air of surprise. For example, a MiG-27 can defense team—something that can enhance complete a low-level flight from Berlin to current antiaircraft weapons while provid- Bitburg AB. West Germany, in only 30 ing an extra measure of protection to cru- minutes.1 Fast, low-flying strike aircraft cial areas. That something is the barrage present a serious problem to our air de- balloon. fenses, especially in view of the large num- Many people remember or have seen ber of the Warsaw Pact’s attack aircraft. pictures of barrage balloons floating majes- Squadron Leader Peter D. John of the Royal tically in the skies over England in mock Air Force (RAF) elaborates on the low-level peacefulness during World War II. These threat in his article “Aerial Barrages to large, airborne barriers protected impor- Enhance Airfield Defences”: tant installations in both Great Britain and Over the past 20 years, tactical strike/attack the United States against low-level air aircraft have been designed by the Soviet attack. They complemented the existing Union and by western nations to deliver air defense system and—particularly in weapons from low-level, where they can England— proved their worth on numerous achieve surprise and pose most problems to occasions dv helping to thwart low-flying defensive systems. The speed at which such enemy aircraft. Barrage balloons disap- aircraft operate has been steadily increased, peared after World War II as newer, more as has their capability to fly and drop weap- sophisticated air defense weapons were in- ons from progressively lower levels: speeds of troduced. The threat from low-flying air- 400 to 500 knots at a height of 100 feet or less craft, however, continues to be a problem. [emphasis added] are now regarded as stan- dard operating parameters. Facing NATO’s Aerial barrages still offer a viable deterrent Central Region, the WP (Warsaw Pact) de- against this form of attack, and we should ploys specialised ground attack squadrons use them. This article first examines the with the range to tackle targets in the UK as current low-level threat and the limitations well as continental Europe. Flogger D and of SAMs. Then, after a brief historical re- Fencer are operational in large numbers, and view of balloons in "combat,” it discusses the latter carries terrain-avoidance radar to

28 BARRAGE BALLOONS 29

Barrage balloons were first used in World War I la deter Ion -level bombing at lucks by German Gotha bombers. The technology of military aircraft has im- proved significantly since then, but the barrage bal- loon defense-simple though it may be-remains viable even today.

improve its ultra-low-level capability. These third-generation aircraft . . . pose a consider- able threat to the survivability of NATO air forces during a conventional war.'1 The Falkland Islands War offers a solid example of the effectiveness of high-speed, low-altitude tactics in negating SAMs. The Argentinians put most of their ground- based antiaircraft weapons at Port Stanley and at the nearby airfield. Potentially very dangerous, these defenses consisted of a Roland missile unit, three units of Tigercat missiles, and a good sprinkling of Blow- pipe shoulder-launched weapons as well as a collection of 20-mm and 35-mm rapid-fire guns.5 The area seemed fairly well pro- tected. but the British still believed they could successfully attack this target. Trav- eling at 550-600 knots, their Sea Harriers flew 50 feet above the ocean, successfully completed the mission, and suffered no losses.b During the course of the war, Brit- ish pilots flew even lower to break radar lock once their radar warning receiver in- dicated SAM activation. Throughout the entire war, SAMs destroyed only two Brit- ish aircraft. Argentine pilots also used these tactics to good effect. When attacking British ships, they flew “so low en route to their targets that salt water drops evaporated on their windshields, obscuring vision."8 Against ground targets, they hugged the contours of the land to shield them against early warn- ing systems and SAMs. In Lessons of the South Atlantic War. Gen Sir Frank King stated that with one exception, all aircraft which at- tacked ground forces flew at less than 100 feet, using the ground contours. They were seldom exposed to surveillance radars until at a maximum of four kilometres range and there was often very little warning of their ap- proach. The problem was exacerbated by bad 30 AIRPOWER IOURNAL SUMMER 1989

weather, low clouds, mist [and] low light levels in valley bottoms for the last two to three hours of daylight.‘J The Argentine air force scored some nota- ble victories during the war despite the 400-mile flight from their bases on the mainland, a lack of coordination, defective bombs, and a relatively strong British air defense system. A good part of the British air defense consisted of Blowpipe shoulder-launched guided missiles, and many people see such portable SAMs as the answer to the low- level threat. Indeed, this lightweight, low- cost weapon offers flexibility of use in battle and is available in large numbers. "Their main missions,” according to Chris- tian Poechhacker, a Defense International Update writer, "are to ensure the anti- aircraft protection of units and sensitive locations, and to create above the battle zone an airspace so insecure that the chances for survival of low and very low flying aircraft will be extremely small."10 Unfortunately, this weapon may be over- rated for several reasons. First, the user must “eyeball" the target and then align it in the optical sight. Visual conditions, then, are extremely important in acquiring the target. Second, firing time is limited. The Blowpipe operator has approximately 20 seconds to locate, acquire, and engage high- speed, low-flying aircraft.11 Because the aircraft can travel over three miles in those 20 seconds, it may be out of range by the time the missile is ready to fire. The last disadvantage concerns the small, one- kilogram (kg) warhead, the standard weight for most portable SAMS. Poechhacker points out that a 1 kg warhead is not powerful enough to obtain a destructive effect when the missile does not actually hit the target. . . . Experience in recent conflicts has revealed that a large percentage of aircraft hit by missile warheads of about 1 kg have been able to regain their bases. For example, a Super Etendard was able to return to its aircraft carrier after being hit by an SA-7 while supporting French troops in Beirut in 1984. Another lesson with BABBAGE BALLOONS 31

the same SAM-type was learned in the Yom Kippur War, when almost half of the Israeli A-4 Skyhawks hit by SA-7s returned to base.12 Even though the Blowpipe is armed with a 2-kg warhead, a combination of the other factors still caused the British Blowpipe to perform rather poorly during the Falk- lands war. Of the 100 Blowpipe missiles launched at the enemy, only nine destroyed their targets,13 and those nine success- ful strikes claimed only slow, low-flying Pucara ground-attack aircraft and heli- copters.14 Air defense weapons will improve— witness the excellent Stinger missile—but there is no doubt that low-flying aircraft continue to be extremely difficult to com- bat. Their performance in the Falkland Is- lands attests to that fact. Interestingly, the British had a similar problem with low- flying enemy aircraft during World Wars I and II. but they countered this threat by employing a wonderfully simple weapon— the barrage balloon.

The Barrage Balloon Defined and Employed The barrage balloon was simply a bag of lighter-than-air gas attached to a steel cable anchored to the ground. The balloon could be raised or lowered to the desired altitude by means of a winch. Its purpose was ingenuous: to deny low-level airspace to enemy aircraft. This simple mission pro- vided three major benefits: (1) it forced aircraft to higher altitudes, thereby decreas- ing surprise and bombing accuracy: (2) it enhanced ground-based air defenses and the ability of fighters to acquire targets,

Many people's im age of barrage balloons conies from W orld W ar II scenes such as this. These bal- loons significantly reduced the number of attacks on Allied ports. In fact, when the Germans determined that the dam age done to the A llie s did not justify losses caused by barrage balloons, they halted those attacks. 32 A1RPUWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

Prior to W orld W ar II. the U S A rm y had already deú veloped and tested a num ber of barrage balloons far aerial protection, including the type A -1 (rightj deú veloped by the Air Service's Engineering Division at McCook Pield. Dayton. Ohio. The D -2A (far right) was developed in 1939 and was designed to rise to 15.000 feet. Unfortunately, these balloons were not available in large numbers because of a prewar shortage of funds. since intruding aircraft were limited in altitudes and direction; and (3) the cable presented a definite mental and material hazard to pilots.la Many people think that a barrage balloon system was designed to snare aircraft like a spider web capturing unwary flies. Not so. Any airplanes caught in these aerial nets were a bonus; the real objective of the balloons was to deny low- altitude flight to the enemy. Mindful of these capabilities, the British saw the bar- rage balloon as a viable means to counter

At the beginning o f W o rld W a r II. n e a rly 300 balloons of various types, including this D -3 (below ), were available. Orders had been placed for 2.400 more. BARRAGE BALLOONS 33

low-level attackers during the world wars. force in World War 1, received a report During the last years of World War 1. the stating that the balloons made attacks very British employed the barrage balloon in difficult and would make future raids on response to attacks by German Gotha bomb- London virtually impossible if balloon de- ers on London. Called an “apron." the bar- fenses continued to improve.1" In fact, an rage consisted of three balloons 500 yards increase of 3,000 feet in the operational apart joined together by a heavy steel height of the barrage balloons would have cable.16 These balloons had an operational effectively stopped German heavier-than- height of 7,000 to 10,000 feet, and by June air bombardment of London since the 1918 10 apron barrages shielded the north- Gotha's combat altitude was only 13,000 ern and eastern approaches to the capital.17 feet.1'1 Maj Gen Edward B. Ashmore, the Although there is no record of these bal- London air defense area commander, val- loons ever directly bringing down an en- ued the barrage balloon system and the emy aircraft, they did permit British services of its 3,587 personnel.2'1 Although fighters and AAA to concentrate their ef- the barrage balloon flew for only a year in forts in a smaller expanse of airspace England during World War I, it was a fully (above 10.000 feet), and they prevented the integrated component of the British air de- Gothas from flying low. The Germans them- fense system and performed its important selves thought the barriers were very effec- mission very well. tive. Gen Ernst Wilhelm von Hoeppner, the The success of the barrage balloon in the commanding general of the German air First World War paved the way for its use in 34 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

airfields also requested them during the early months of the war, the balloons were not available because of slow production and losses due to combat and bad weather. However, thanks to a new balloon plant, the barrage system had 2,368 balloons by the end of August 1940 and would main- tain approximately 2,000 operational bal- loons until the end of the war.22 These numbers demonstrate the extent to which the British valued their balloons. They even formed Balloon Command, an independent command under the leader- ship of Air Marshal Sir E. Leslie Gossage, to control the 52 operational barrage balloon squadrons stationed across Great Britain.23 Eventually, this command consisted of 33,000 men.24 The amount of equipment and the number of personnel, however, tell only part of the story. Performance in com- The Skynet is a modern barrage balloon designed to bat is the principal indicator of a weapon rise to 3,000 feet within four minutes. When used system’s success, and the balloons received with antiaircraft weapons, balloons can channel atú tacking aircraft away from the target and into defenú a thorough test during World War II. sive weapons. Skynet can remain on station for up During the Battle of Britain and through- to two weeks. out the war, balloons proved their worth, time and again. Besides protecting strategic cities and ports, barrage balloons mounted the Second. This time, however, instead of in boats defended estuaries against mine- a mere handful, thousands of balloons dot- laying aircraft. A declassified wartime ted the British skies. Again, the balloons report assessed their performance: "Fol- provided a partial solution in countering lowing the aerial sowing of mechanical fast, low-flying German bombers and fight- mines, the reallocation of various units of ers and in protecting key installations. The the balloon barrage system to places like British belief in an integrated air defense the Thames Estuary, and certain other system meant using every viable air de- channels, has resulted in effectively reduc- fense weapon for self-protection—a combi- ing the aerial mine sowing operations of the nation that'included the principal means of German Air Force.”2d Barrage balloon ca- fighters, antiaircraft artillery, and balloons. bles also successfully frustrated German The only modification in balloon usage attempts to achieve surprise, low-level pen- from World War I concerned the apron etration at Dover. concept. Instead, single balloons were used The Dover incident deserves elaboration because they could be sent aloft more because it provided, in the words of Air quickly and were easier to operate. Thus, in Marshal Gossage, "a clear indication of 1936 with war clouds darkening the hori- their [the Germans’] respect for the British zons. the Committee of Imperial Defense balloon barrage.”26 In an attempt to clear authorized an initial barrage of 450 bal- the balloons from Dover, the Germans loons for the protection of London.21 launched a major effort in late August 1940. With the capital securely covered, bar- They destroyed 40 balloons but lost six rage balloons also flew at fleet anchorages aircraft in the process. Much to the Ger- and harbors in threatened areas. Although mans’ chagrin, 34 new balloons appeared BARRAGE BALLOONS 35

the very next day. Air Marshal Gossage rudimentary stages of development, so commented on the action: “The protective guns and balloons had to do most of the balloons still fly over Dover. The attack on work against German bombers. Even after the barrage has proved too costly. . . . In advances in night-fighter technology, it was general, major attacks on balloon barrages the opinion of London that "balloons and have ceased, the enemy having realised guns were still essential, not so much to that the game is not worth the candle. The bring the enemy dowm as to keep him up so fact, however, that he hoped to destroy our that point blank bombing was impos- balloons is in itself proof of the utility of sible."2‘‘ Two examples illustrate London's the barrage.”27 During the height of the sentiments. First, a recently installed aerial blitz. 102 aircraft struck cables, resulting in barrage at Norwich surprised the Germans 66 crashes or forced landings.28 and diffused their bombardment by forcing After the Battle of Britain, balloons con- them to attack above 8,000 feet.30 Second, tinued to prove their effectiveness in com- the barrage balloons at Harwich saved that bat. Because of heavy losses during the day. city from an attack by 17 bombers because the Germans switched to night attacks. De- the Germans went after their secondary fensive night fighters were still in their target at Ipswich-Felixstowe, a place not protected by balloons.31 Overall, balloons lessened the severity of night raids on Eng- The Stinger surface-to-air missile proved its value in land by deterring point-blank bombing. In- the Afghanistan War. Nonetheless, low-flying airú craft remain extremely difficult to shoot down. Bar- cidentally, they also had some tangible rage balloons provide an inexpensive way to results in February and March of 1941, in enhance defenses for high-value targets. that seven enemy aircraft crashed after 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989 striking cables in various parts of Great existing antiaircraft defenses. For example, Britain.32 in August 1943 the air defense region pro- Even though German aerial activity over tecting Oran, Algeria, "requested 60 bal- England gradually decreased. British bal- loons for its sector in order to discourage loon activity did not. Balloon Command torpedo, dive bombing, and low level units accompanied troops in North Africa bombing attacks.”37 By October 1943 three and Italy, where they protected beachheads American barrage balloon batteries (each against low-level attack. Four thousand bal- with 45 balloons) operated in various ports loon personnel even took part in the inva- in North Africa and Italy.38 When the port sion of Normandy, crossing the channel on of Naples was captured, a battery of bal- D-day to protect artificial harbors, captured loons operated there as part of the overall ports, and ammunition dumps of the protection of that harbor from air attack. Allies.33 But perhaps the best example of Naples was crucial to Allied operations in "balloons in combat" occurred during the Italy: “Among [Mediterranean] ports Na- V-l offensive against London in 1944. Once ples was the most important in the Allied again, balloons were an integral part of the line of communications; during January air defense system and, in this case, formed 1944 the port handled more tonnage than the third and last line of defense against any other port in the world with the excep- tion of New York.”39 Although it was close this low-flying weapon. Approximately to the German lines and received many air 1.750 balloons from all over Great Britain attacks, Naples had a solid air defense were amassed around London, forming system and suffered only slight damage. A what one British officer called "the largest Fifth Army antiaircraft officer stated that a balloon curtain in history.”34 Although good port defense consisted of several ele- guns and fighters destroyed most of the V-l ments, including an ample number of bar- bombs (1.878 and 1,846, respectively), bal- rage balloons.40 The AAF Air Defense loons were credited with 231 “kills."3 ’ Ba- Activities in the Mediterranean summa- sically. that was the last hurrah for British rized balloon operations in that theater: barrage balloons, and as the war gradually “Although American barrage balloons were wound down in 1945, so too were the not of primary importance in the Allied air balloons of Balloon Command. defense system, they were undoubtedly Great Britain was not the only country valuable as a supplementary device to interested in aerial barriers. Many Ameri- fighter aircraft and AA.”41 cans would be surprised to know that the United States had its own extensive barrage balloon defense during the early part of World War II. In fact, many areas of the Barrage Balloons; West Coast-had "balloon curtains” protect- Their Applicability Today ing cities, factories, and harbors. By August 1942 approximately 430 balloons defended British and American experiences with important areas in California, Oregon, and barrage balloons reveal two major facts: (1) Washington against low-level attack.35 Sev- the low-level air threat is a continuing eral balloon units were also sent overseas problem, and (2) barrage balloons can aid into combat. In late 1943, for example, in countering that threat. Therefore, it is Army balloon batteries deployed to the rather surprising that aerial barrages are not fighting in the Mediterranean. mentioned in the history books. Balloons The North African campaign covered a would be just as useful today as they were fairly large front, and, as expected, many in the forties and would effectively comple- areas lacked sufficient air defenses. Bal- ment the SAMs, rapid-fire AA guns, and loons provided protection to several impor- fighters of the modern air defense system. tant ports, effectively enhancing the Based on the performance of barrage bal- BARRACK BALLOONS 37

loons during World War II—when they suc- With the attacking aircraft forced higher, cessfully defended ports and factories from the balloons then provide almost simulta- low-level attack—it seems logical to em- neous force enhancement. Active air de- ploy aerial barriers today to protect one of fense personnel receive early warning and NATOs most important installations—the ready their weapons, taking advantage of airfield. The Soviets fear the aerial might of the fact that balloon positions and altitudes the United States and its allies and will do are known. SAMs and other weapons will everything possible to destroy it quickly be only partially effective in the ultra-low, and completely. Therefore, a massive low- almost supersonic melee over the airfields. level attack on NATO air bases, which An aircraft forced higher is an aircraft many have called the Achilles’ heel of air closer to destruction. In addition, the bal- pou'er, is a certainty. These targets deserve loon obstacles would divert the flyers’ at- extra protection, and barrage balloons offer tention from their targets, causing them to that capability. As mentioned earlier, the either inaccurately bomb their objectives or barrage balloon offers several distinct ad- to reattack.45 Another attack, of course, vantages that have been proven in wartime: increases the probability of acquisition and it denies the low altitude to enemy aircraft, destruction by a SAM. enhances air defense systems, and presents Possibly the most ominous aspect of the a definite mental and material hazard to the barrage balloon—at least in the mind of the enemy pilot. attacking pilot—is the physical and psy- Strategically placed, balloons can easily chological hazard the cable presents to him and effectively deny low altitudes to the and his aircraft. During World War II, aerial attacker. Three locations warrant balloon cables did in fact destroy aircraft, and the protection. One would be the suspected threat of hitting a cable was nerve-racking. ingress routes located some distance away In Berlin Diary William L. Shirer wrote of a from the airfield.42 Valleys, mountain German pilot who, during the night bomb- passes, rivers, and canals are only a few ing of London, always dropped his bombs sites where barrage balloons could be effec- too high because he feared the barrage tively placed at altitudes ranging from 300 balloons at lower altitudes.46 Allied pilots to 1.000 feet. Next, some balloons could be felt the same way about cables according to placed closer to the air base in small, irreg- a declassified World War II intelligence ular groupings. Peter D. John states that 'a bulletin: “In 1940, the RAF was encounter- staggered pair of lines, or small groups of ing an increasing number of barrage bal- randomly positioned balloons, would pro- loons over their bombing objective in vide a better obstacle than a single line of western and northwestern Germany, and closely-spaced balloons.”42 Experience these balloons were a major cause of worry confirms his observation: balloons placed to RAF pilots.”4' An American pilot ech- at irregular intervals and altitudes are effec- oed the same feelings in another declassi- tive barriers, whereas an orderly arrange- fied report: ment of rows of balloons at uniform altitude is easy to outflank or overfly. Fi- Unknown balloon cables are a very consider- nally. other balloons could be positioned able mental hazard, regardless of anyone's throughout the air base itself. Since the ideas to the contrary. The undersigned had Warsaw Pact lacks large numbers of stand- the opportunity to fly a Hurrican [sic] II out of off weapons, their aircraft must overfly the a balloon-defended factory field last week, and in spite of having a corridor cleared by target to deliver their bombs.44 All three lowering one balloon, the mental reaction balloon emplacements should prove dis- against all the remaining cables was distract- ruptive to attackers, forcing their aircraft ing. Later on. during the same journey, when higher and denying them the safety and bad weather was encountered near Birming- surprise of low altitude. ham, the same cable worry was present. It is 38 AJRPOVVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

not believed that hostile aircraft will know- cellent environment for balloons.) Cer- ingly come down within close range of a tainly, the balloons would be exposed balloon barrage/8 on clear days, but their deterrent value Aerial barriers are also cheap and dura- more than compensates for this drawback. ble. Wallop Industries of Great Britain has Last, balloon cables are indiscriminately developed a balloon called the Skysnare.4'* hazardous—friendly aircraft may inadver- and a barrage of six costs approximately tently be caught in them. However, Peter D $18,000. Maintenance and training are John suggests using “procedural control” to equally inexpensive, and the only “fuel" reduce the chance of a friendlv aircraft's for the system would be the helium or hitting a cable."” This method worked very hydrogen gas to lift the balloon.50 Con- well during World War II when hundreds ol sidering the price tag of modern weapon friendly planes safely negotiated aerial bar- systems and ammunition, the cost- riers. effectiveness of the balloon is impressive. Furthermore, the balloon is just as durable as it is affordable. Consisting of a cable, a Conclusion single-ply plastic envelope, and a winch, the system is extremely robust and can In our search to build a better mousetrap, remain airborne for up to two weeks per we often neglect the lessons of history. inflation/1 The 4-mm Kevlar cable gives Technology has produced a marvel of engi- the Skysnare system extraordinary strength neering in the modern fighter plane, en- and destructive power should an aircraft abling it to fly higher, faster, and lower than strike the cab le/2 ever before. In battle, the jet fighter’s forte is The advantages of the barrage balloon are high-speed, low-level attack—a tactic diffi- many, but—as with any weapon system— cult to combat. Even weapons such as there are drawbacks. First, it is susceptible highly advanced SAMs have trouble de- to high winds: during the Battle of Britain, fending against low-level attacks, as dem- a heavy gale destroyed or damaged approx- onstrated in the Falkland Islands War. More imately 250 balloons/* A similar mishap technology always seems to be the answer, occurred in the United States in 1942 when but a simple solution to the low-level threat 57 balloons broke loose in a storm and is the barrage balloon. caused substantial damage to the Seattle Barrage balloons were developed in area. ’4 In each case the balloons were flying World War I to counter one of the most at operational altitudes. Subsequently. advanced technological threats of the American balloons were simply hauled in time—the airplane. The Gotha bomber, when storms approached. In Great Britain, which raided the countryside of southeast- however, they were only lowered because ern England from 1917 to 1918, represented the threat of German aircraft was still too the apex of German aircraft engineering great to bed them down completely. Timely skill. But this airplane was effectively de- weather reports could help solve this prob- nied direct and low-level access to the lem. A second disadvantage of balloons is target by a balloon and a wire. Although the fact that their very presence signals the English balloons destroyed no enemy air- enemy that a target must be nearby. This craft, they hindered German pilots bv con- drawback was partially corrected in World fining them to altitudes above 10.000 feet. War II by camouflaging both balloon and Consequently, antiaircraft guns and fighters "balloon bed." Moreover, the balloon was could more easily engage enemy planes hidden in the clouds with only the near- flying at the higher altitudes. invisible cable showing. (The typically Balloons gained even more prominence overcast European theater, then, is an ex- during World War II and performed well in BARRAGE BALLOONS 39

combat. That the British used over 2.000 are not a cure-all, but they can enhance balloons manned by 33,000 personnel dem- existing air defense systems. Col R. E. Tur- onstrated their faith in the capabilities of ley, an American advocate of barrage bal- the system. The United States shared this loons during World War II, emphasized the confidence. During the war. nearly 430 bal- team approach to air defense in an article loons protected the West Coast. Further- written in 1942: more, several US Army balloon units saw When employed alone, barrage balloons ordi- ••combat" in North Africa, providing effec- narily would not be effective. . . . In conjunc- tive protection against low-level attack on tion with other arms, barrage balloons captured ports. constitute an element in the antiaircraft de- The barrage balloon disappeared after fense system complementary to antiaircraft World War II, but this capable asset de- artillery and pursuit aviation, the balloons being most effective at low altitudes where serves to be used again. Naturally suited to the complementary arms are least efficient. If defend small, important areas, barrage bal- maintained at effective strength in spite of loons would be perfect for NATO's vital losses of balloons from storms . . . and enemy airfields. Here, balloons can offer both tan- action, barrage balloons constitute a depend- gible and intangible benefits. Expertly po- able and ever ready defense against low-flying sitioned. they provide a real hazard to aircraft.5b enemy aircraft, forcing them up or around Simply stated: barrage balloons optimize into awaiting SAMs. Chances of surprise air defenses. attack and low-level approach are reduced. While technology changes, some things The intangible benefit concerns the pres- remain the same. Just as a balloon and a ence of the balloon itself. It makes the wire could deter a Gotha over London 71 enemy think twice about trying to destroy a years ago, so can they deter a Soviet Fencer balloon-protected target. Barrage balloons over Bitburg in the future. Ƞ

Notes 1 Peter D. John. "Aerial Barrages to Enhance Airfield 16. Christopher Cole and E. F Cheesman. The Air Defence of Defences." The Hawk. The Independent Journal of the Royal Britain. 1914-1918 (London: Putnam Press. 1984). 307. Air Force Staff College, March 1984. 40. 17. Ibid. 2. Ibid.. 39 18. Leslie Gossage, "Balloon Command." Flying and Popu- 3. Laurence Martin. .VATO and the Defense of the West: An lar Aviation 31. no. 3 (July-December 1942): 100. Analysis of America's First Line of Defense (New York: Holt. 19. Ian V. Hogg. Anti-Aircraft: A History of Air Defence Rinehart and Winston 1985). 79 (London: Macdonald and Jane's Publishers Ltd., 19781. 166. 4. John. 40. 20. Gossage. 99. 5 Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic 21. Basil Collier. History of the Second World War: The (New York. Macmillan. 1983). 30. Defence o] the United Kingdom. United Kingdom Military 6 Ibid.. 56. Series, vol. 5 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Oflice. 1957). 7 Ibid.. 249-50. 44. 8 Bruce W Watson and Peter M. Dunn. eds.. Military 22. Ibid.. 153. Lessons of the Falkland Islands War Views from the United 23. Ibid.. 475. States iBoulder. Colo.: Westview Press. 1984), 45. 24. Barrage Balloon Development in the United States 9 Lessons of the South Atlantic War. Proceedings of the Army Air Corps 1923-1942. Army Air Forces Historical Study Conference on the Anglo-Argentine War of 1982 (Washington, 3 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: USAF Historical Research Center). 100. D.C. Defense & Foreign Affairs Ltd.. 1982). 88. 25. G. N. Robinson. "Barrage Balloons" (Maxwell AFB. Ala : 10. Christian Poechhacker. "Low Level Air Defence Aircraft USAF Historical Research Center. 1941), 14 Hunters: A Critical Survey of Modern Man-Portable Surface- 26 Gossage. 98 to-Air Missile Systems." Defence International Update, no. 70 27 Ibid. (April !986|: 10 28. Donald Dale Jackson. The Aeronauts. Epic of Flight 11. Lessons of the South Atlantic War. 89. Series, vol 4 (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1980), 102. 12. Poechhacker. 11. 29. Collier. 311. 13. Watson and Dunn. 91. 30. Ibid., 308. 14. Poechhacker. 12. 31. Ibid . 517. 15. Tactics Department of the AAA School. "Notes lor AA 32. Ibid., 277. Tactics." in Pamphlet 20. Barrage Balloons. 15 June 1943. 5-7. 33 R F Delderfield, "A Study in Passive Defence," The 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

Roya1 A i r Force Quarterly 16, no. 3 (December 1944 44. Ibid.. 40. September 1945): 167. 45. Ibid., 45. 34. Ibid.. 169. 46. William L. Shirer. Berlin Diary: The /ournal of a Foreign 35 Capl Norman MacMillan. The Royal Air Force in the Correspondent. 1934-1941 (New York: A. A. Knopf. 1941). World War. vol. 4, 1940-1945 III) (London: George G. Harrap & 516. Co. Ltd.. 1950), 194. 47. Air Forces General Information Bulletin 7. British Sr 36. History. 4th Antiaircraft Command, 9 lanuary 1942-1 German Balloon Barrages, December 1942. 16. July 1945 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Historical Research 48. Robinson, 14. Center). 153. 49. "Tethered Anti-Aircraft Balloon." International Defense 37. C. L. Grant. AAF Air Defense Activities in the Mediter- Review 20, no. 5 (1987): 687 ranean 1942-September 1944. USAF Historical Study 66 50. John. 49-50. (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: USAF' Historical Research Center). 87. 51 Wallop Systems Limited. "Rampart Low Level Defence 38. Ibid. System." London. 1987, an advertisement. 39. Ibid.. 103. 52. Ibid. 40. Ibid.. 104. 53. Robinson. 14. 41. Ibid.. 88. 54. History. 4th Antiaircraft Command. 146. 42. |ohn, 45. 55. )ohn. 51. 43. Ibid., 49. 56. R E. Turley. "Barrage Balloons," Coast Artillery /ournal 85. no. 1 (January-February 1942): 21-22.

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B rig G en Billy M. K nowles, S r ., USAF, R et ir ed

RE we fully prepared to prosecute a ! % major war by effectively integrating combined (i.e., multinational) M m. forces? We sav we ace. On the one hand, we regularly tally allied air, ground, and naval forces; we array these forces by sector and region for quick response; and we design command structures for inte- grated employment. On the other hand, some Americans regularly criticize certain NATO partners for devoting too little to their own defense, and the resolve of some allied leaders may vacillate from time to time. This question of readiness, therefore, is neither irrelevant nor off the wall. After all, in 1940 France capitulated in just 41 days even though their forces, combined with those of Great Britain, were equal to or

HOLD. WITHDRAW. OR ADVANCE 43

tor was an open letter from Gen Robert D. mean the integrated use of multiple disci- Russ, commander of Tactical Air Command plines of one service (a narrower concept of (COMTAC), to his commanders reiterating combined and joint arms). Specifically, is the tactical air force’s (TAF) commitment the TAF trained and prepared to provide to providing battlefield air interdiction massive en route and objective area protec- [BAI), close air support (CAS), and offen- tion to intratheater tactical airlift that is sive counterair (OCA) for the Army. Es- directly supporting engaged ground forces? sentially. General Russ stated. “We fly I think not. I, along with others, have writ- and fight to further the joint forces com- ten about the many laments of a frustrated manders’ objectives. . . . Everything that tactical airlift community.2 Those writings TACAIR does directly supports the airland identified five basic concerns of intrathe- battlefield. . . . Our commitment to the ater tactical airlift: 1946 agreement to support the Army re- mains chipped in granite."1 This should be 1. The Air Force and Army must recom- welcome news for those who are suspi- mit themselves to tactical airlift as an in- cious of COMTAC's acceptance of AirLand gredient of air power that is essential to Battle as the core doctrine for large-scale AirLand Battle. conventional war. If these attitudes are gen- 2. The TAF must be trained and prepared uine. the proof will be manifested through to provide massive en route and objective joint exercise scenarios that are free of area protection for tactical airlift that is interservice barriers and artificialities that directly supporting the AirLand Battle. have thus far served as excuses for im- 3. No master airlift plan should pay for proper employment or misuse of air power the C-17 at the expense of intratheater air- and for Army recalcitrance. Let’s see if the lift. National Training Center (NTC) begins to 4. Tactical airlift must be provided min- integrate air and ground forces properly. imum essential defensive systems for the As if these weighty concerns were not envisioned electronic combat/electronic enough, what about integrating composite warfare (EC/EW) threat. forces in war? 1 use the term composite to 5. Deliberate, dedicated, long-range plans for a successor to the C-130 must be as vigorously pursued as those for any other weapon system. Two documents address the first two concerns, albeit in broad terms: the Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRA- DOC) draft publication entitled Joint Sup- pression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD), 14 March 1988, and the Military Airlift Command (MAC)-TRADOC Airlift Con- cepts and Requirements Agency (ACRA) draft publication entitled joint Airlift for Combat Operations (JACO). 14 December 1987. It remains to be seen whether these documents’ acknowledgment of the first two concerns will ever be incorporated into joint execution planning and exercise sce- narios. thereby resulting in tactics develop- ment. As slated in a Soviet adage, “One of the serious problems in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do It took a decade of major effort to bring the B-lB on That was the intent of congressionallv di- line. The same kind of support may be necessary to rected reorganization (reform). fund replacement aircraft for the Air Force's aging The Air Staff, Headquarters MAC, the Air fleet of C-130s. Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard are all addressing the need for defensive systems, the fourth concern. We are evalu- ating a number of off-the-shelf defensive not read their manuals nor do they feel any systems. Existing technical problems ap- obligations to follow their doctrine.” pear to be manageable, and it is highly As regards the third concern, we should probable that electronic defensive equip- not be surprised if the theater commanders ment will be operational on tactical airlift in chief fCINCs) inject themselves into any aircraft in the near term. planned diminution of tactical airlift re- At this stage, the fifth concern—a succes- sources. We should expect the commander sor to the C-130—is no more than a twinkle of European Command (CINCEUR) to be in the eye. Maintaining the sincere resolve concerned about plans to draw down in- necessary to obtain this aircraft can be tratheater airlift assets. The CINC’s require- difficult in the face of shrinking defense ments must be considered when the budgets. It takes commitment of a high services develop or adjust force structure. order to see a B-l, B-2, advanced tactical

44 HOLD. WI THDRAW. UR ADVANCE 45

fighter (ATF), or C-17 reach fruition, and the West would be ordered to assassinate this proposal demands no less determina- key political and military figures. The So- tion. Certainly, proponents of AirLand Bat- viets would also insert Spetsnaz teams tle should be strong advocates of this deep into the West to eliminate command initiative. and control facilities, disrupt lines of com- But this paper principally addresses the munications, and create as much confusion first two concerns, without which the other and panic as possible. These forces are three serve as Band-Aids. A hypothetical specially organized and trained to destroy scenario involving AirLand Battle and ma- missile storage sites, communications and neuver warfare will best illustrate our pur- resupply lines, and air base facilities (the pose. The setting is Europe (whether or not two latter targets are especially important base-case execution ever occurs), with a to our scenario). Each Soviet frontal army forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and contains a Spetsnaz brigade consisting of forward line of own troops (FLOT) stretch- 900 to 1,200 troops that can break off into as ing some 1,000 to 1,500 miles from the many as 135 separate groups. southern region to northern flank extremes. Once frontal forces are engaged, Soviet Warsaw Pact (WP) and NATO forces are doctrine calls for air assault units to attack arrayed from one end to the other. our second echelon. These WP forces are One of the players on this stage, the basically heliborne air cavalry units de- Soviet Union, has indicated that it will signed to attack tactical targets and bases attack our rear echelons prior to the first that are 30 to 60 miles in front of WP main engagement of forward deployed forces. forces but to the near rear of our own main Before any border assault, KGB agents in forces. Still another force that will threaten the NATO rear is the operational maneuver group (OMG), a highly mobile, division- sized force organic to first-echelon forma- Modern warfare requires airlift support, as would be provided by these proposed C-17 aircraft. In turn, tions, whose sole function is to exploit any airlift requires air defense support—an area for gaps created at the front by the first-echelon which we may not be fully prepared. forces. Once the OMG has penetrated, it 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

can create havoc operating 30 to 300 miles been disrupted by enemy actions in our to our rear. rear area. No matter the difficulty of the If all of these concepts are implemented task, to become a viable fighting force once throughout the length and breadth of an again, the army must be resupplied and elongated FEBA, and since there is such a sustained. Consequently, air lines of com- low density of in-place NATO forces, how munications (ALOCs) and tactical airlift are will we respond? We certainly cannot al- again part of the total equation. low WP armies to pour through a ruptured Hopefully, the advantage somewhere FEBA/FLOT. That is their AirLand Battle along the FEBA is ours, and our forces plan and maneuver strategy. Ours is to hold advance. We break through and attack the back the thundering herd, attack the enemy enemy’s rear echelon. Initially, we expend rear echelons, and stack them up before and attrit and then must move forward they can be brought to bear at the front. quickly and with purpose. Such a maneu- How do we identify and simplify the pos- ver may very well require our forces to sible courses of action for our ground forces travel lighter for speed and leave stores and that directly affect joint and composite re- equipment behind. Since the enemy does sponse by the Air Force, particularly in- not intend to leave lines of communica- tratheater tactical airlift? Well, with all the tions intact for our advance, we again need challenges in store for our armies, they tactical airlift to provide resupply, rein- might hold their ground, withdraw, or ad- forcement, and sustainment. vance. Regardless of the circumstances, the Ar- Let’s say that they hold. Such an intense my’s organic capability, or the relative con- action expends mountains of materiel and dition of landlines of communications, incurs heavy casualties. Wherever this oc- engaged ground forces will depend heavily curs, throughout the entire theater, the en- upon Air Force intratheater tactical airlift gaged frontal forces must be sustained, and ALOCs. All the while, the TAF is resupplied, and reinforced. Our forces plan equally pressed in battle, providing OCA. to use an inordinate Army network of trans- portation equipment, road-rail-water lines BAI, and CAS in direct support of the joint of communications, and rotary-wing air- forces commander’s overall strategic and craft. Under the best or worst of conditions, tactical objectives. Nevertheless, tactical these logistical accomplishments become airlift needs en route, high/low combat air turning points of battles, campaigns, and, patrol (CAP) and must have a semibenign indeed, wars. The victor performs minor objective area for airland or airdrop opera- and major logistical miracles by the hour tions, to deliver intact precious reinforce- every day. However, if the WP is even ment and resupply, survive, and repeat its partially successful, its forces will be to our essential function. rear, disrupting command and control, The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Air Force, landlines of communications, air bases, and Army do indeed recognize that ALOCs and supply depots. So, if we are to hold are indispensable. JCS publications, joint very long, we will sorely need the versatil- and service doctrine, and designed opera- ity. range, and capacity of intratheater tac- tional capability (DOC) statements ac- tical airlift daily all up and down that knowledge the necessity of tactical airlift. 1.000- to 1,500-mile front. Thus, certain persistent mind-sets are all What if the army cannot hold but must the more vexing: that airlifters had best withdraw and reposition to fight again? It train themselves in single ship, terrain not only expends and attrits as in the first masking, jinking and juking to avoid case but also withdraws-Ieaving goods of threats and show up when propitious; that war behind for sound tactical reasons-and integral formations of airlift aircraft are not must traverse and occupy territory that has required: that the popular use of A-lOs for HOLD. WITHDRAW, OB ADVANCE 47 en route CAP is effective; that acquiring icated BAI and CAS. Missile warning sys- enough electronic defensive capabilities tems, radar warning receivers, and chaff/ can offset deficits in composite strike pack- flare dispensers on the Marines’ main airlift ages. and tanker craft provide additional self- The truth is that resupply and reinforce- protection, but the Marines fully under- ment airlift operations will frequently call stand and intend that their organic fighter for mass deliveries at specified coordi- force provides primary protection to their nates during critical time windows, satis- airlifters and tankers. The Marines are a fying rates of acceptance dictated solely composite fighting force! We might argue by ground tactical considerations. Ingress the wisdom of allowing the Marines to and egress corridors must allow target ac- maintain a semiautonomous doctrine, but quisition. thus requiring en route, fast- high marks must be awarded their compos- flier fighter protection (not A-lOs). The iteness. objective area must be softened up and rea- Rather than directing the air component sonably permissive for tactical airlift oper- commander to execute these unique com- ations. Self-contained, rearview plastic posite operations for which his tactical bubbles and electronic countermeasures do air forces are untrained, it would be most contribute to survivability but are not in wise for MAC and TAC to aggressively themselves panaceas. create meaningful training opportunities The Marine Corps is a suitable example that develop, pretest, and validate effective of a composite force. Everything about tactics. Since COMTAC has stepped up their four divisions and four air wings to the TAF's recommitment to the Army, relates directly to the combat Marine, the can CINCMAC be far behind? That would "jar head.” Their doctrine writers, their take care of jointness, but what of TAC’s developers of manuals and training, their and MAC’S composite responsibilities to exercise managers, their budgeteers, their one another? Excellent opportunities for acquisitors, their combat support and com- joint and/or composite employment exist bat service support people are all devoted through Red Flag, Green Flag. Air Warrior 1 to directing their efforts to the point of (NTC). and select JCS-sponsored field- conflict. training exercises but not without firm For example, when the Marines execute commitment and exercise redesign. their equivalent of the AirLand Battle, com- Combined . . . Joint . . . Composite. Care- bat troops are put ashore or deeper inland ful study of modern principles of war by amphibious vehicles or helicopters. would reinforce the essence of training and They are then sustained and reinforced by preparedness in these three types of combat air-land-rail-water lines of communica- operations. Yet. intratheater tactical airlift tions. The primary rotary-winged air sup- has not been afforded full integration with port is in turn supported bv organic KC-130 its combined, joint, and composite part- tankers, and both are protected by ded- ners. That one oversight might very well icated air power. Sea-based firepower, adversely tip the scale when attempting to artillery, and armor are augmented by ded- hold, withdraw, or advance. Ƞ

N' otes 1 AFRP 190-1. Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, Airlift Tactics and Doctrine: More Carts. More Horses.” Air April 1988. 1-2 University Review. Mav-|une 1986. 21-27; and Maj Ronald G. 2. See Brig Gen Billy M. Knowles. "Tactical Airlift," Air- Boston. "Doctrine by Default: The Historical Origins of Tacti- poiver Journal. Fall 1987. 41-47; Col Paul L. Wilke, "Tactical cal Airlift." Air University Review. May-June 1983. 64-75 CLAUSEWITZ FOR BEGINNERS

M aj M ic h a el W. C annon, USA

INCE the close of World War II, the study of Clausewitz in the United States—particularly in Army cir- cles— has seen a marked resurgence. TheS latest version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, is practically oozing Clause- witzian terminology: the concepts of fric-

48 CLAUSEWITZ FOB BEGINNERS 49

tion. culminating points, and centers of innovator in matters relating to warfare and gravity all see the light of day in a form its conduct but also he was a practitioner. readily attributable to the Prussian phi- His career was remarkable both for its losopher.1 Unlike other military theorists, longevity (almost 43 years) and for the however, Clausevvitz set down no hard and breadth of its experience. More important, fast maxims or principles but invited the it spanned two remarkably different eras of reader to explore with him the phenome- warfare. non known as war/ As a young ensign of 12 or 13, he was The study of Clausevvitz, therefore, is not part of an army that had been brought to the easy. According to Peter Paret, an acknowl- pinnacle of perfection under the tutelage of edged expert on the subject, anyone who Frederick the Creat for use in what has "opens On War with the expectation of been termed the age of limited warfare. easily separating the valuable kernels of Armies of this period represented an in- pure gold from the chaff of antiquarian vestment of capital and manpower that detail will be frustrated."3 Even distin- monarchs could ill afford to squander in guished soldiers have had difficulty not large, set-piece battles. Maneuver in lieu of only with what Clausevvitz had to say but battle and the use of the military for limited also with the manner in which he said it. gains had. therefore, come to be the over- Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery is re- riding characteristics of warfare during this puted to have stated. “I did make attempts era. Fourteen years later, in 1806, he was an to read the writings of Clausevvitz and adjutant of an infantry battalion. In this Jomini . . . but I couldn’t understand him position, he fought in his “first great Napo- [Clausevvitz] myself."4 Bernard Brodie, a leonic battle . . . an experience so shatter- prolific writer and theorist on strategic mat- ingly different from the tedious marches of ters. was also attuned to this problem: "The his boyhood that it was hard for him to price of admission to the Clausewitzian comprehend them both belonging to the alternative of intensive rumination [as single activity, war.”7 During the battles of opposed to merely perusing established Jena and Auerstedt (in Prussia) and the formulas] . . . is a commitment to be subsequent pursuit, the Prussian army was responsive."3 virtually destroyed, and Clausewitz was Peter Paret once wrote that attempts to captured. After several months as a pris- provide what he called the “essential oner of the French, Clausewitz returned to Clausevvitz" in the form of excerpts or to Prussia and became the personal assistant represent his theories in outline form have to Gerhard von Scharnhorst, a senior officer been less than successful and that it was who was deeply involved in the attempt to not necessary to "attempt the impossible reform and reconstruct Prussia’s army.8 once again.”6 In accordance with this ad- This part of his life contained a number vice. my purpose here is a modest one. 1 of unexpected benefits. His early cam- hope to provide a means by which someone paigning in the 1790s included experience who has received no exposure or only a in linear warfare and operations against limited exposure to the works of this phi- French partisans in the Vosges mountains, losopher can begin a study of On War giving him knowledge of the "small wars" without being confused by his method or or “wars of detachments” that most Prus- overwhelmed by the voluminous literature sian officers never acquired. Along with available. Toward this end, it is necessary this practical education. Clausewitz was to have a feel for the man. understand some exposed to a broad-ranging education in aspects of his theory of war, and appreciate history, literature, and professional sub- his influence. jects due to intensive schooling within his Clausewitz was one of a rare breed of regiment and subsequent time as a student soldiers Not only was he a synthesizer and at the War College in Berlin from 1801 to 1803. He also began to write and published here, with time on his hands, that he “re- his first piece, a scathing review of a work turned seriously to theoretical work.”11 on military theory, in 1805. Paret claims During the past decade, “he had been very that "it would not be inappropriate to re- close to important and varied actions and gard his writings before 1806 as essentially yet always somewhat detached from isolated insights—building blocks for a them. . . . When eventually peace was re- structure that had not yet been designed.”9 stored, his role became more and more that Clausewitz remained involved in the of a critical and synthesizing observer.”12 It struggle against Napoleon as a reformer in was at this point in his life (at approxi- Prussia but most actively as a staff officer in mately 36 years of age) that he began to the Russian army. After the Prussian mon- consolidate from the thousands of his arch sided with Napoleon in 1812, many of handwritten manuscript pages "a collec- the reformers— including Clausewitz— tion of essays . . . which gradually coa- sought commissions from the czar. Due lesced into a comprehensive theory that apparently to his inability to speak Rus- sought to define universal, permanent ele- sian, Clausewitz was relegated to the role of ments in war.”13 This material was later to a staff officer. In this position, he was become his most influential work. On War. present at the battle of Borodino and the Perhaps the most important factor affect- crossing of the Berezina River (both in ing On War, however, was Clausewitz’s Russia) in 1812, two scenes of violence and personality. Michael Howard claims that tragedy that were to affect him greatly. He Clausewitz “was always something of an continued to fight with the Russians until introvert; solitary, bookish, shy, intellectu- 1814 when he was finally readmitted to the ally arrogant.”14 Yet, based on letters writ- Prussian army.10 During the Waterloo cam- ten to his wife, we also know that he was a paign of 1815, Clausewitz once again served as a staff officer. This time he was passionate man—one who was sensitive to chief of staff in the Prussian III Corps, the the sufferings inherent in war. Thus, he unit that held the attention of Marshal paid far more attention to the human side Emmanuel de Grouchy long enough for of warfare than did many of his contempo- Napoleon to be defeated at Waterloo by raries (such as Jomini and Bulow, whose Marshal Gebhard von Bliicher and the writings about war gloss over this impor- Duke of Wellington. tant consideration). But the effect of his Subsequently, Clausewitz was appointed personality on his work was possibly even to the largely administrative post of the more acute than this example suggests. director of the War College in Berlin. It was Bernard Brodie felt that Clausewitz

50 “seems to have had something more than the usual psychological need for recogni tion. which for him could come [only] through some mode of excellence in the profession in which he found himself.”10 Marie von Clausewitz hinted at the source of his motivation when she wrote of her husband that although he was free “of any petty vanity, of restless egotism and ambi- tion, he nevertheless felt the need to be truly useful, and not let his God-given abilities go to waste.”16 Throughout his career, however. Clausewitz served as a staff officer and never as a commander. This man. appointed to the rank of major general at the age of 38. “still felt not sufficiently noticed.”17 Bernard Brodie goes so far as to suggest that "the intriguing question is how much this man's neurosis affected his final work.”18 Lack of recogni- tion may, therefore, have spurred Clause- 52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

open to question. Brodie states that Clause- witz. “in his desperate hunger for knowl- edge read Kant . . . [but] the one he obviously followed with the most respect and whose dialectical method he unfortu- nately adopted . . . was clearly Hegel.”20 On the other hand, Roger Parkinson, an English biographer of Clausewitz, does not even mention Hegel, crediting Kant as the philosopher who influenced him the most.21 To a large extent, the argument is immaterial because “Clausewitz’ lifetime coincided with the golden age of modern German scholarship, science, letters, and music.”22 Michael Howard points out that "Clausewitz did not need to read the works of his contemporary Kant . . . to become familiar with the ideas that formed the basis of Kant’s philosophy. He had also reabsorbed those ideas that had re-entered philosophical thought with the revival of Hellenism . . . the S o c r a tic d is tin ctio n s between the ideal and its manifestations, between the absolute, unattainable concept and the imperfect approaches to it in the real word.”21 Clausewitz’s methods, there- fore, came "second and third hand from his cultural environment.”24 His intent with On War was “to write a book that would not be forgotten after two or three years, and that might possibly be vvitz's intellectual efforts. Although the ef- picked up more than once by those who are fects of his personality on his work are interested in the subject."2’ According to debated, one thing is certain: Glausewitz Paret. Clausewitz planned to accomplish maintained an interest in a variety of intel- this purpose by penetrating “by means of lectual disciplines throughout his mature logical analysis to the essence of absolute years—in -particular, philosophy. [or ‘ideal’] war . . . [in order] to under- There has been a great deal of discussion stand war in the various forms it actually concerning which philosophers affected takes, as a social and political phenome- Clausewitz. The three that are normally non, and in its strategic, operational, and bandied about are Montesquieu. Hegel, and tactical aspects."26 Unlike many of his con- Kant. The contribution of Montesquieu is temporaries. Clausewitz felt that war was not normally challenged. From him, inevitable and an “integral part of the Clausewitz developed a desire to write in world order” and so was something that an uncluttered, direct fashion as free from was to be analyzed and understood, not ambiguity as possible. His success is evi- shunned.2. dent. yet perhaps underrated, in that short During Clausewitz's lifetime, the conduct sections of On War can be quoted to explain of war had been transformed. In order to entire chapters.19 come successfully to grips with this The influence of Hegel and Kant is more change, he needed to reexamine the subject CLAUSEWITZ FOB BEGINNERS 53

thoroughly. We can see the direction of to come to grips with this problem, Clause- Clausewitz’s analysis in On War as it was witz used a modified form of Hegel’s dia- organized for final publication. The first lectic. book. "On the Nature of War." defines war R. N. Carew Hunt defines the dialectic as and its place in the world order. It also “the theory of the union of opposites.” identifies those elements that are always Essentially, this definition means that a present in war. The next book, "On the certain idea, proposition, or condition Theory of War," discusses the possibilities (thesis) contains in it certain weaknesses or and shortcomings of theory. Books three flaws (contradictions). As these faults are through seven discuss aspects of war at exposed over time, there develops a what today would be termed the opera- counter or opposite (antithesis). The anti- tional and tactical levels. It is here that he thesis itself contains certain contradictions goes into a detailed discussion of the as well, and slowly a synthesis arises that themes developed in the first two books. embraces the truths involved in both.35 The final book. "War Plans," once again Clausewitz did not use this method exactly, takes up the themes of the dual nature of however, because this “formal, highly war and in "a sweep of theoretical and structured” approach “would have seemed historical essays of great originality” looks inappropriate.”36 Clausewitz viewed the at “the political character of war and the dialectic as “a continuous interaction be- interaction of politics and strategy.” This tween opposite poles, each fully compre- organization "does not. however, constitute hensible only in terms of the other.”37 One a sure guide for the reader” because the of the benefits of this approach was that “it "distinctions between the parts are less defines each element as sharply as possible important than is the network of themes while insisting on the absence of discrete and arguments that links them."28 limits." Moreover, the poles “are never ab- The first, and most important, problem solute opposites; rather one flows into the was to define war and its nature. Clause- other."38 witz attempted to develop a concept of war The opposite of the “pure” form of war as a Socratic ideal, stripped of all its out- and the other part of its “dual” nature was side influences.29 From this standpoint, war constrained by limits. The primary war became a duel on a large scale, "an act factor that limited conflict was its subordi- of force to compel our enemy to do our nation to politics, for the “political object will.”30 War. then, tended to become a . . . will . . . determine both the military series of “reciprocal actions" as each con- objective to be reached and the amount of testant attempted to overwhelm the other effort it r e q u i r e s .”39 War was not " a c o m - by the use of force. Once begun, this contest plete, untrammeled, absolute manifestation led to extremes (in theory) in that there was of violence (as the pure concept would no "logical limit” to the application of require), [for otherwise] war would of its force.11 The aim of this violence, at least own independent will usurp the place of from a theoretical standpoint, was to bring policy the moment policy had brought it about the complete overthrow of the into being.”41’ Another factor that acted to enemy.32 force war further from its ideal form was Clausewitz felt that the role of theory was the play of chance and probability.41 “No to assist in the comprehension of reality other human activity is so continuously or and, more specifically, history. However, universally bound up with chance. And his historical studies convinced him that through the element of chance, guesswork this view of war as always moving to an and luck come to play a great part in absolute form was incorrect,33 because war war."42 was “often far removed from the pure con- Thus, Clausewitz identified the three cept postulated by theory.”34 In an attempt dominant tendencies of war (or paradoxical 54 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989 trinity as he called them): war’s “pri- invasion fleet fired at the airborne armada mordial violence,” its subordination to pol- causing serious loss—planners routed aii icy, and chance. In order to be completely corridors away from friendly naval forma- understood, wars must be fully analyzed tions. Certain measures aided in the iden- using these elements, for this “trinitarian tification of friendly troops on the ground: definition still contains a decisive inno- American flags were sewn onto the upper vation—it alone is valid for real wars and it arms of uniforms, and a special order was is valid for all real wars."4'1 placed for thousands of children’s noise- Yet, to take advantage of this framework makers called “crickets” to enable friendly and not overwhelm it with the mass of soldiers to identify one another in the available data, Clausewitz realized that the dark.48 "principal details] must be grouped and Notwithstanding all this detailed prepa- abstracted.” Accordingly, Clausewitz de- ration, a glance at the dispersal patterns of veloped other concepts to help explain individual planeloads or “sticks" presented specific operational characteristics or gen- in The West Point Atlas of American Wars eral ideas.4-4 It is here that soldiers have shows that jumpers were still widely tended to focus their reading because scattered.4‘J Some of the pathfinder equip- Clausewitz offers “certain ideas and con- ment failed to work, and several of the victions” that are presented "like small pathfinder groups were improperly placed. nuggets of pure metal.”4:} Two of the most These problems were compounded by intriguing and interesting are the concepts heavy antiaircraft fire over the Cotentin of friction and the culminating point. Peninsula, patchy cloud cover, and re- To some extent, the concept of friction is cently arrived and inexperienced transport merely an elegantly stated predecessor of pilots. As a result, many of the paratroopers Murphy’s Law: “Countless minor inci- were dropped miles away from their drop dents— the kind you can never really zones, some even in the English Channel. foresee— combine to lower the general level Gen Maxwell Taylor, commander of the of performance, so that one always falls far 101st Airborne Division, found himself short of the intended goal.”46 It is “the force alone for several minutes after he hit the that makes the apparently easy so diffi- ground. Several hours later, he had gath- cult."4' Anyone who has been on a military ered together only 90 soldiers. Their skills exercise can recount countless incidents of ranged from those of military policemen to friction in action, but it is best illustrated clerks to infantrymen. Moreover, the con- by the parachute drops into Normandy tingent was heavy on officers, causing Tay- prior to the D-day landings on 6 June 1944. lor to remark that “never were so few led Planning for this operation had been un- by so many.”50 In this case, a combination der way for many months (some elements, of planned-for and unforeseen incidents for years) prior to the execution of the plan. caused operations to go awry and almost The almost disastrous Allied parachute doom several thousand highly trained Al drop into Sicily had prompted a great deal lied soldiers. of thought about how to make the D-day Somewhat related to the concept of fric- insertions error free. In order to reduce the tion is that of the culminating point, (ust as dispersion of the jumpers, specially trained friction detracts from the efficiency and pathfinders were to land prior to the arrival combat power of the force so does the of the main elements of the airborne forces. concept of the culminating point deal with They were to mark the drop zones with the gradual decrease in a unit’s available lights that, based on various patterns and combat power. Losses, extension of an area colors, would indicate what units were to of operations, and the requirement for gar- drop where. To avoid repeating the debacle risons all cause an attacking force to get to at Sicily—where a nervous, trigger-happy the "point where their remaining strength CLAUSEWITZ FOR BEGINNERS 55 is just not enough to maintain a defense witz instantly became fashionable.”55 and wait for peace. Beyond that point the Moltke looked primarily at the operational scale turns and the reaction [counterattack] aspects of Clausewitz’s writing and insisted follows with a force that is usually much that the concept of military subordination stronger than that of the original attack.”51 to political control should be reversed. Un- In 1942, the forces of Gen Erwin Rommel fortunately, “it was Moltke’s view of the had defeated the British in the North Afri- matter, not that of Clausewitz, which be- can battles around El Gazala and Bir came dominant in Imperial Germany Hacheim. The German pursuit lasted until . . . even though it was during these years the British reached the strong natural de- that Clausewitz was being most widely fensive position at El Alamein. The Qattara acclaimed.”56 Colmar von der Goltz, in The Depression to the south and the Mediterra- Nation in Arms (1883), pushed for the nean to the north effectively restricted adoption of the idea (in theory adopted Rommel's room to maneuver and chan- from Clausewitz) that wars should be neled him into a narrow corridor, depriving pushed to their utmost limits.57 Although a him of the advantages he had enjoyed in direct contradiction of Clausewitz’s idea the more open arenas to the west. Here the that effort in wars should be proportional to pursuit stalled, and the race began to see political goals, von der Goltz’s proposal which side could first reconstitute and re- was in accordance with the theoretical con- plenish its forces. Rommel's supply lines cept that wars will always seek the ex- were stretched along the coast of North tremes in violence.58 Africa and from there back across the Med- iterranean. The British were able to draw upon their system of bases in Egypt, and their possession of Malta enabled them to interdict Rommel’s supply lines, thus giv- ing them a marked advantage. By October, when the British had achieved clear supe- riority in all classes of weaponry, supply, and manpower, they attacked—driving the Germans back to Tunisia far to the west.52 The Germans had reached beyond their culminating point and paid the price. Rom- mel gambled at El Alamein and lost. Clearly, Clausewitz has lessons to offer the practicing professional, but how did he influence those who followed him? Bernard Brodie once wrote that, in his view, Clausewitz’s influence “was rather low, perhaps very low."53 The 1,500 copies of the first edition of On War were not sold until 20 years following its publication in 1832.04 The European discovery of Clause- witz was slow and closely related to the emergence of Helmuth von Moltke as chief of the General Staff of the Prussian army and Prussia's successes in the wars of 1866 and 1870. Moltke claimed that Clausewitz, the Bible, and Homer had influenced him tremendously. The result was that "Clause- VOM M O L T K E 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

Similar notions were developing in the 1960s emphasized “the rationalistic France. The popularity of Ardant du Picq’s side of the equation. A concern with the writings on the value of the moral force in quantifiable [that] may have led to an un- war coincided with the introduction of a derestimation of the intangible.”63 The course of lectures on Clausewitz given at result was a “routinization, the bureaucra- the Ecole de Guerre in 1884, “which was to tization of the application of force.”64 influence an entire generation of French The trauma that the nation and the armed officers; the generation which was to mold forces suffered in Vietnam has turned the the thinking of the French army at the turn attention of many people to a more detailed of the century and to lead it during the study of Clausewitz. It is interesting to Great War.”59 These “wrong-headed” ideas note, however, that Clausewitz can be ap- of war pushed to the upper limits of vio- plied to the same situation but yield differ- lence and the superiority of moral forces ent results. In On Strategy, Col Harry G. were to bring about the bloodbaths on the Summers argued that we failed to view the Western Front in World War I. As Sir B. H. war in Clausewitzian terms and thus were Liddell Hart wrote, generals became "intox- unable to determine its true nature. The icated with the blood-red wine” that they United States, in this view, focused on the thought they saw in On War.60 counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam, But World War I turned the attention of dissipating effort that should have been soldiers in the United States to Clausewitz, directed against the actual source of the and by 1928 his "stature as an oracle” had problem—North Vietnam.65 Lt Col William “risen rapidly” even though the first Amer- Staudenmaier. on the other hand, argued in ican translation of Clausewitz was not pub- Parameters that we performed poorly in the lished until 1943.61 However, Russell war by not recognizing that its true key was Weigley persuasively argues in The Amer- the support of the people in the south.66 ican Way of War that Clausewitz’s teach- The issue has yet to be resolved and will ings neither coincided with the American provide a fertile ground for generations of temperament nor were suitable to the next scholars. war (World War II) this country was called In the last 150 years. Clausewitz has been upon to fight because it was total in condemned, maligned, misunderstood, nature.62 praised, and hailed as a genius. It is too Following World War II, the United early to tell whether or not the current States turned to its nuclear monopoly as a “Clausewitzian revival” is transient or per- guarantor of peace and safety. The war in manent. Paret, however, claims that “Eu- Korea, confrontations around the globe ropean and American defense analysis no with communism in “nonshooting” wars, longer finds Clausewitz as an obstacle to be and dissatisfaction with the options offered overcome or avoided. Often without realiz- by the policy of massive retaliation led to a ing it, writers are pursuing the goals indi- surge of criticism during the late 1950s. cated by Clausewitz: the defining of means, When John F. Kennedy became president ends, and implications, so that they can be in 1961. he wholeheartedly adopted the used theoretically and applied in the for- strategy of flexible response. Although it mulation of policy."67 What is certain is appeared that the Clausewitzian concept of that both “as theorist of war and as an linking the use and amount of force to interpreter of Europe entering the modern political goals was finally realized, there age. Clausewitz has come to mean more to were problems in its application. Instead of this century than he did to his own."68 weighing the imponderables of war as Today's officers should study Clausewitz Clausewitz insisted, military thinkers in and draw their own conclusions. Ƞ CLAUSEWITZ FUH BEG1NNEHS 57

Notes 38. Paret. "Genesis." 15. 39. Clausewitz. 81. I. Amos Perlmutter. "Carl von Clausewitz: Enlightenment 40. Ibid.. 87. Philosopher: A Comparative Analysis." The Journal of Strate- 41. Ibid.. 89. gic Studies 11, no. 1 (March 1988): 7—19. 42. Ibid.. 85. 2 Bernard Brodie. "In Quest of the Unknown Clausewitz." 43. Raymond Aron. "Clausewitz' Conceptual System." International Security 1. no. 3 (Winter 1977): 66. Armed Forces and Society 1, no. 1 (Fall 1974): 56. 3 Peter Pare!. "Clausewitz' Bicentennial Birthday." Air 44. Paret. 202. University Review 31 (May—June 19801: 18. 45. Clausewitz. 62. 4 Russell Weiglev. The American Way of War (New York: 46. Ibid.. 119. Macmillan Publishing Co.. Inc , 1973). 511. footnote 38 5. Bernard Brodie. "The Continuing Relevance of On War." 47. Ibid.. 121. in On War. ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 48. Clay Blair. Ridgeway's Paratroopers (Garden City. N Y ; (Princeton. N.J Princeton University Press. 1984). 58. Doubleday & Co.. Inc., 1985), 176-252 6. Peter Paret. “Clausewitz: A Bibliographical Survey." 49. Brig Gen Vincent | Esposito, ed.. The West Point Atlas of World Politics 17 (October 1964): 272 American Wars Vol II (New York: Praeger Publishers. 19721, 7. Michael Howard. Clausewitz (New York: Oxford Univer- chart A following map 49. sity Press. 1983). 8. 50. Maxwell D. Taylor. Swords and Plowshares (New York: 8 lames King. "On Clausewitz: Master Theorist of War." W. W. Norton & Co.. Inc.. 19721. 80. Naval War College Review 30 (Fall 1977): 9. 51. Clausewitz. 528. 9 Peter Paret. "The Genesis of On War." in On War. ed. 52. Esposito. 75-80. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton. N.J.: 53. Brodie. "In Quest." 63. Princeton University Press. 1984). 3. 54. Strachan, 98. 10. King. 9. 55. Howard. 59. II. Paret. "Genesis." 19. 56. Michael Howard. "The Influence of Clausewitz." in On 12. H. Rothfels. "Clausewitz." in Makers of Modern Strat- War. ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Prince- egy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward ton. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). 31. Mead Earle (Princeton. N.J : Princeton University Press. 1944). 57. Howard. Clausewitz. 63. 96. 58.Ibid. 13. Paret, "Genesis." 3. 59. Howard. "Influence." 37. 14. Howard. 5. 60. Rothfels. 93. 15. Brodie, "Continuing Relevance." 49 61. Weigley, 210-11. 16. Carl von Clausewitz. On War. ed. and trans Michael 62. Bernard Brodie offers an interesting definition of total Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University war in "Strategy' Versus Tactics in a Nuclear Age." in Brassey's Press. 1984). 66. Annual (New York: The Macmillan Co.. 1956). He claims that 17. Bernard Brodie. "On Clausewitz: A Passion lor War." there is a distinction between the "hackneyed" phrase lota) World Politics 25. no. 2 (January 1973): 300 war and unlimited or unrestricted war (which he refers to as 18. Ibid. Paret. however, "disputes the commonly expressed "war out of control"). Total war in this view represents a war opinion that Clausewitz was embittered by his failure to in which every last resource of the state, "moral and intellec- achieve greatness" (King. 11-12). tual as well as physical would be mobilized and coordinated 19. Peter Paret. "Clausewitz." in Makers of Modern Strategy: by the government. . . . It tended to emphasize the totalitar- from Machiavelli to the .Nuclear Age. ed. Peter Pare! (Prince- ian administration of the war rather than the rejection of any ton. N.J.: Princeton University Press. 198B). 187. hereafter inhibitions or restraints in the conduct of fighting or in the cited as Paret. See also Clausewitz. 63. choice of objectives" (145. footnote). Weigley states that Amer- 20. Brodie. "On Clausewitz.” 290 icans tended to fight wars in a manner that had the objective 21. Ibid. of overthrowing the enemy. Weigley sees this overthrow 22. King. 5. as being aimed at the complete destruction of the enemy's 23 Howard, 13-14. armed forces and not the destruction of the opposing society. 24. Paret. 194 Aiming at a goal such as this resulted in the "strategy of 25. Clausewitz. 63. annihilation . . . [becoming] characteristically the American 26. Paret. 198 way in war" (xix to xxii). From both of these standpoints. 27. Hew Strachan. European Armies and the Conduct of World War II was. therefore, a total war. But perhaps the only War (Boston: George Allen and Unwin. 1983). 94 truly total war was the Third Punic War. where the victorious 28. Paret. 197-98. Books three through seven are "On Romans pulled down the walls of the city of Carthage, Strategy in General." "The Engagement." "Military Forces." slaughtered the population or sold them into slavery, and Defense." and "The Attack" Clausewitz regarded only chap- salted the earth so that this power could no longer threaten ter 1 of book 1 as completely finished (Clausewitz. 70). The them. Not only was the enemy's army overthrown, but also the unfinished nature of the work has led to much discussion society was destroyed. about what Clausewitz meant on a number of issues. 63. Robert Miewald. "On Clausewitz and the Application of 29. Howard. 13. Force." Air University Review. Julv-Augusl 1968, 78. 30. Clausewitz. 75. 64. Ibid.. 77. 31 Ibid . 77. 65. Col Harry G. Summers. Jr.. On Strategy (Novato, Calif.: 32 Ibid., 69. 77. 91. Presidio Press. 1982). xiv. 4. and especially 94-95. 33. Paret. "Genesis." 23. 66. Lt Col William Staudenmaier. "Vietnam, Mao. and 34. Clausewitz. 91. Clausewitz." Parameters 7. no. 1 (1977): 79-89. 35 R N. Carew Hunt. The Theory and Practice of Commu- 67. Paret, "Bibliographical Survey." 284, nism (Baltimore. Md. Penguin Books. 1963). 42^14 68. Peter Paret. "Clausewitz and the Nineteenth Century." in 36. Paret. "Genesis." 15. The Theory and Practice of War, ed. Michael Howard (New’ 37. Howard. 34. York: Frederick A. Preager. 1965), 39. 9m TARGETING FOR VICTORY The Rationale Behind Strategic Bombing Objectives in America’s First Air War Plan

C I C Steven A. P arker, USAFA

N 9 July 1941 President Frank- authorship of a military document is sel- lin Delano Roosevelt sent let- dom known." This fact was especially ap- ters to the secretary of war and parent in the development of AWPD-1, the secretary of the Navy asking since "a number of officers from the sev- forO “an estimate of the ‘overall production eral staff agencies of the AAF [Army requirements required to defeat our poten- Air ForcesJ . . . contributed information lial enemies.’ " 1 Wesley F. Craven and which went into AWPD/I.”'* In the end, lames L. Cate note that, “within the War however, the creative genius of four indi- Department, responsibility for giving effect viduals was primarily responsible for to the President's directive . . . devolved AWPD-1. Barry D. Watts writes that the upon the War Plans Division.”" Within the “theory of precision bombardment . . . air arm. it fell to the newly created Air War called for the identification, by scientific Plans Division. On the morning of 3 August analysis, of those key links in the enemy’s 1941. the division—less than four weeks economy whose elimination would either old at the time—set out to create what cripple his capacity to wage war or else would become a blueprint for the Ameri- shatter his will to continue fighting.”4 In can air campaign in the approaching war constructing the war plan, the four men ith Germany. This document would he drew upon years of doctrinal analysis and known as Air War Plans Division—Plan 1 theoretical application of the principles of (AWPD—1). war, relying heavily upon their years of According to Craven and Cate, “actual instruction and education at the Air Corps 60 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

Tactical School (ACTS) at Maxwell Field, efforts contributed to shaping the general Alabama. Donald Wilson notes that the key nature of Air Force thinking for years to concept taught at the school was that a come. nation's ability to pursue war “would de- Gen Henry "Hap” Arnold, chief of theNAir pend on maintaining intact a closely-knit Corps at the time of AW PD-l’s conception and interdependent industrial fabric.” Pre- and—after March 1942—commanding gen- cision bombing, however, could destroy this fabric.3 By concentrating Allied bomb- ing against objectives vital to the German war effort and the German people’s liveli- The planners, AWPD-1 hood, AWPD-l's planners aimed to accom- Gen Henry H. Arnold, chief of the Air Corps (right), was well plish the primary goal of any war—to served in the development of AWPD-1 by a group of excep- defeat the enemy by breaking his will to tional officers. These men (pictured left to right, below) began fight. To accomplish this goal in the sim- to write AWPD-1 only four weeks after the Air War Plans Division had been formed. Maj (later Lt Gen) Laurence Kuter plest and most efficient manner, Allied had worked on earlier Air Corps plans. The chief of the bombers were tasked with destroying the Air War Plans Division was Lt Col (later Brig Gen) Harold enemy’s forces before they deployed into George. Maj (later Maj Gen) Haywood Hansell became a the field.b AW PD-l’s developers sought to driving force in the air war plans against both Germany and Japan. Lt Col (later Brig Gen) Kenneth Walker was a major destroy Germany’s capability to fight by proponent of strategic bombing. He was posthumously attacking it at the home front and, in doing awarded the Medal of Honor for his part in a bombing so, wreck the country’s will to resist. These mission that cost him his life.

Kuter TARCFTINC FUR VICTORY bl

oral of the AAi\ "had chosen wisely in selecting Harold George to head the new Air War Plans Division of the Air Staff."7 George possessed an extensive background in air power, and years of instruction at ACTS gave him the experience required to lead the Air War Plans Division in the development of a sound war plan.8 In ad- dition, Colonel George had testified at the 1925 Morrow hearings, which covered the force requirements of the US Army Air Service in detail. At this point in his career, he had developed a great deal of knowledge on aircraft capabilities and Air Corps con- straints. George was pleased to find that he would be working with Lt Col Kenneth Walker, who had taught George at ACTS.5' Walker served as a bombardment instructor at the school, and during his stay he coined the "rallying cry" of the entire bombardment

Gen. Henry H. Arnold The training and experience gained at the Air Corps Tactical the Air War Plans Division. James C. School, such as instruction in using maps (above), allowed Gaston notes that Hansell. whose contribu AVVPD-1 to be produced in nine days. Major General Hansell tions to AWPD-1 were tremendous, had attributed the ability of the Air War Plans Division to ac- complish this difficult task to the concepts of air warfare gathered "intelligence about the economic developed at the school, which the division's members held industrial systems and air forces of foreign in common. powers." This allowed him to coordinate targets, based on his own familiarity with the general pattern and potential of various division: “A well planned and well orga- industrial components.12 He combined this nized air attack once launched cannot be knowledge with the practical information stopped.” This motto became the “creed of that he had obtained through British Intel- the bomber," and the doctrine it repre- ligence to provide insight into the specific sented was largely inspired by Colonel nature of the German economy. Walker.111 Maj Laurence Kilter, another graduate ol Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., recalls ACTS, was on the faculty with Hansell. his introduction to the project: “The day Gaston points out that Kuter had worked following his assignment as Chief of the Air extensively with the "first major expansion War Plans Division George learned that I. of the Air Corps into a force for hemi- who was then in General Arnold's Intelli- spheric defense,” and his vast experience gence Division, had just returned from En- qualified him to develop similar plans uti- gland where I had been in contact with lized in AWPD-1.11 officers of the Intelligence Group of the The four men worked well together. They Royal Air Force."11 General Arnold wasted had to, since they had only nine days to no time in having Hansell transferred to accomplish their mission. "We had one

H2 TARGETING FOR VICTORY 63

definite asset going for us." stated Hansell accomplish the air mission in Europe. in his memoirs. "We had spent years to- These options included, in order of prior- gether as instructors in Bombardment and ity. the disruption of a major portion of Air Force at the Air Corps Tactical School. Germany’s electric power system, the dis- We embraced a common concept of air war- ruption of the German transportation sys- fare and we spoke a common language."1'* tem, the destruction of German oil and Years of studying and preaching the doc- petroleum systems, and the undermining of trine of precision bombing came to a climax German morale by air attack on civil con- in August of 1941 when General Arnold centrations. A list of intermediate options tasked these four men to develop a war was cited that would be used to improve plan. Kuter later commented that “'when the chances of success against the major the time for critical decision arrived the objectives. These options included the neu- American concept [of air warfare] was tralization of the German Air Force and wholly indorsed, completely accepted, and diversionary bombing attacks. These tar- officially implemented in the approval of a gets would continue as appropriate bomber paper entitled “AWPD-1”.'" 13 objectives in the final phase of warfare if “Strategic plans involve, of course, a con- invasion became necessary. In this case, stant accommodation between desires and additional targets of opportunity in the capabilities,” Hansell noted.!b AWPD-1 combat zone and battlefield proper would was the result of numerous struggles be- be added according to the situation, since tween such desires and capabilities, and selecting such targets would not be feasible the first step was to examine overall condi- during the drafting of the basic plan.19 tions in Germany. At the time of AWPD-1's The air-war planners placed German conception, over 8 million men served in electric power at the top of the list on the the German military. An additional 8.5 mil- basis of current intelligence information. lion were estimated to work in armaments At the time of the plan’s conception, the works alone, with over half of them in the German electric system was the second steel industry. In all, nearly 17 million largest in the world, and it expanded con- people supported the German war effort— siderably for the war.20 Initially, the sys- not including civil pursuits and produc- tem’s output was adequate to maintain tion—and the perceived result was a tre- German productivity. But as mobilization mendous drain on the social and economic increased—especially after 1939—power structure of the nation.17 The most effective shortages became serious enough to force method of waging war against Germany the rationing of electric power to homes appeared to be by destroying this inner and industries nationwide.21 Electric structure and thereby breaking down the power affected every production aspect of country’s capacity to wage war. As George the war—from aircraft manufacture to ur- had stated in a lecture at ACTS, "There is ban transportation—and it was closely in- ane thing certain: air power has given to the tegrated into a "power grid" that, if world a means whereby the heart of a destroyed, would theoretically isolate prin- nation can be attacked at once without first cipal manufacturing and population cen- having to wage an exhaustive war at the ters from their sources of electric energy.22 nation's frontiers.”18 Germany had to be Capt Robert Webster, an instructor at destroyed from the inside so that the outer ACTS during the 1936-37 school year, had walls would crumble, and the first step in noted the importance of electric power to planning was to determine a list of targets an advanced industrial nation. Basing his within the heart of the nation that would assessments on research he had done on bring about the desired collapse. the electric structure of New York City, The target selection process used in Webster concluded that approximately AWPD-1 evaluated four possible options to one-tenth of the people in the United States 64 AJRPOIVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989 depended daily on the electric power pro- The destruction of the German transportation system, inclui vided by 20 power plants in New York. At ing the rail yards at Ulm (right, above), was a major priorit the cost of one accurately dropped bomb on of AWPD-1. Attacks by Allied bombers against German cities such as Nuremberg (right, below) adversely affectec each of these potential targets, 90 percent of German morale. the power in the city would be destroyed, causing its immediate evacuation.2* By comparing this information with what was known about the German electric system of the time, Webster demonstrated the advan- tage of destroying this potential target.24 In December 1942 General Arnold issued a directive to the director of management services to have a group of operational analysts submit a report " ‘analyzing the rate of progressive deteriorization that could be anticipated in the German war effort as a result of the increasing air oper- ations we are prepared to employ against its sustaining sources.'”2n The resulting committee of operations analysts (COA) reevaluated what George and his staff had painstakingly developed. A good example of key transportation targets is shown in this picture (below) of bridges over the Rhine River at Neuwied. The target systems most carefully consid- Rail, road, and river-barge traffic all had to be stopped if the ered bv the COA closely resembled those of Allies were to effectively hinder the German transportation AWPD-1 and its successor, AWPD-42. system, the target of second highest priority in AWPD-1.

66 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

However, some significant differences ex- Railroads appeared to be profitable stra- isted between the COA’s target selection list tegic targets for several reasons. The major- and the list that George and his crew had ity of the railroads served the Ruhr, which developed in AYVPD-1. Hansell points out possessed 70 percent of the nation’s steel that Germany’s electric power system be- industry. Bombers could therefore restrict came 13th in priority.26 According to their operations to a smaller area, thus Hansell, this shift of priorities constituted performing the majority of attacks with “one of the tragic mistakes of the war.”27 He optimal results. Additionally, an estimated speculates that two possible motives con- eight marshaling yards handled all of the tributed to this change: the COA had deter- traffic to the Ruhr, and these potential tar- mined that attacking German electric gets were only 350 miles from Great Brit- power systems would have no effect on ain. The railroad targets, however, were setting a date for the invasion of Europe, or more easily repaired than other targets. available forces did not have the “opera- This factor meant that Allied forces would tional capability’’ to destroy the targets.28 have to make repeated attacks.32 Hansell’s treatment of the subject in the Inland waterways were essential to Ger- years following the war indicates that the man transportation as well, since they car- civilian analysts and intelligence personnel ried what the railroads could not handle. operated out of their proper province in The locks and ships chosen by the air-war making such a decision. He contends that planners were precision targets, as opposed military operations analysts—who had al- to the area targets represented by the rail- ready evaluated the force’s capability to roads. But their destruction—unlike the destroy each target system—should have destruction of the railroads—would have a made the final targeting decisions.29 relatively permanent effect on the German The second-priority target in AWPD-1 transportation system due to the increased was the German transportation system. amount of time required to return them to George noted that the selection of transpor- operation.33 tation systems as a target came from the Total destruction of the transportation realization that “the trend in modern na- system would sever Germany from the rest tions has been towards industry and agri- of Europe, leaving only its own inadequate culture, which makes for large territories supplies of foodstuffs, raw materials, and which are not self-supporting.”30 Mobili- the like. Forty-seven targets were chosen zation highlighted the interdependency be- in AYVPD-1 to accomplish this task, and tween the city dweller and rural commu- their selection highlighted the fact that nities. By cutting off the vital lines of two-thirds of Germany’s iron ore arrived transportation. Allied forces could appar- from external sources.34 Transportation re- ently eliminate an important source of eco- mained a primary target throughout the nomic stability and military strength, and development of an American air strategy, tax the enemy’s will to wage war. and—to many observers—this choice of tar- AYVPD-1 divided the transportation sys- gets appeared to deliver the decisive blow tem into three main components. Railroad to the German economy.35 operations took up 72 percent of the total, AYVPD-1 listed synthetic oil as the third- and waterways and long-haul truckage took priority target system. The effects of a deci- up 25 percent and 3 percent, respectively. sive attack on the petroleum-producing One of the key factors in choosing transpor- industries of an enemy nation seemed ob- tation targets was that the railroad systems vious. YVithout petroleum, planes could not were already operating at maximum capa- fly, tanks could not roll, and a good per- bility, so they could not handle any excess centage of the transportation of vital war requirements in the event of breakdown in materiel could not occur. Essentially, all any of the other areas.31 German forces were dependent on oil, and TARGETING FOR VICTORY 07 its destruction would render helpless an The fourth priority listed in AWPD-1 industrialized nation waging total war. was to undermine German morale by air Oil and petroleum products were prom- attack on civil concentrations. This aim ising bombardment targets from the start. coincided with the prime directive of the Approximately 60 percent of Germany's war, which was to defeat the enemy by aviation gas was synthetic, and 80 percent destroying his will to fight. However, it did of this total came from 27 plants located not go along with the basic concepts taught 400 to 1,000 miles from Great Britain. at ACTS and, therefore, was never actually Twenty-two percent of its aviation gas applied in the American bombing cam- came from Romania, delivered by water paign. Although in several instances civil- transportation up the Danube.JB In fact, ian populations were devastated by well over 50 percent of Germany's imports inaccurate bomb drops. German civilians came directly from Ploesti. Therefore, the were never directly targeted by American destruction of all the synthetic plants in bombing attacks.40 From the beginning, Germany would not have the required ef- war planners at ACTS considered attacks fect on the nation’s war effort unless the on morale targets risky, since the accepted Allied forces destroyed the oil refineries at theory held that only massive, sudden, and Ploesti as well. Twenty-six plants produc- unheralded attacks would have any effect ing approximately 70 percent of the Nazis' on civilian morale. “Piecemeal" attacks aviation gas were within Germany. Because would only temporarily dull the enemy’s they were fairly deep within the country morale and, in the long run, might actually and were precise, small targets, they would help build up resistance.41 AWPD-1, there- be hard to destroy.!r However, they seemed fore, never established a specific number of to be essential targets, so their priority targets but stated that the best course of never substantially changed throughout the action would be to wait until the proper bombing offensive. psychological conditions existed and then AWPD-l’s planners had assumed that divert the entire bombing effort to the the oil-producing targets would be difficult purpose.43 to replace, but they were mistaken. The The secondary targets proposed to assist Germans rebuilt oil refineries and put them in accomplishing the main efforts of the back in operation in less time than the six bombing campaign concentrated on neu- months estimated in the war plan, so re- tralizing the German Air Force. Hansel 1 peated attacks were necessary to assure notes that planners considered the German effectiveness.38 Air Force a primary target throughout The effects of the Allied attack on the the entire planning phase, even though petroleum and oil industry were more pro- AWPD-1 officially listed “the German nounced in the latter stages of the war. One fighter force as an intermediate objective instance of the Germans’ suffering notice- carrying 'overriding priority.'”43 This cate- ably from this lack of oil occurred on 3 gory included aircraft factories, aluminum March 1945, when the Germans counterat- plants, magnesium plants, and engine fac- tacked the Soviet forces in western Hun- tories in both AWPD-1 and AWPD-42, but gary. Donald W. Treadgold relates that “the the COA eliminated magnesium and alumi- blow was . . . spearheaded by the German num plants in the list of priorities used to Sixth SS Panzer Army, which had led the develop the combined bomber offensive. thrust into the Ardennes. The Germans Hansell acknowledged that AWPD-l's broke through the Soviet front . . . and drafters based their strategic thinking on came near to reaching the Danube. How- the “growing experience with the fighting ever, as in the Ardennes offensive, the tanks capability and strength of the German Air ran out of gasoline, and by the middle of Force, coupled with knowledge gained March the Nazi salient was eliminated.”39 from covert sources of the expansion pro- 68 AIRPOWER IOURNAL SUMMER 1989 gram being undertaken in the construction AWPD-1 listed diversionary bombing at of German fighters.”44 This type of thinking tacks as secondary missions that could as- led to the emphasis on attacking the enemy sist in accomplishing the main efforts of tin air force. bombing campaign. These alternatives in- The German combat estimate of 1 Sep- cluded attacking such targets as submarine tember 1939 did not present exact figures bases, surface seacraft, and assorted “in on the production capacity of aircraft in- vasion” bases. In the end, however, the- dustries in Germany, but estimates based planners decided that diversionary attacks on the previous year's output established would best be left to other Allied powers that Germany could produce between 9,000 such as Great Britain.49 This decision went and 10,000 military and commercial air- along with doctrine taught at ACTS. In a planes in 1939. Additionally, in case of an speech on “The Principle of Objective,” emergency, aircraft factories could produce Hanscll stated that the selected targets an additional 1.500 complete aircraft and should make the maximum contribution attain a monthly production rate of 5,000 toward the purpose of the offensive. The per month six months after the emergency, advantage of using an offensive doctrine and 6,000 per month after a year.4-1 These was that it kept an offensive force from estimates clearly indicated the Allied need wasting time on targets that did not contrib- to concentrate on aircraft factories within ute directly to the war effort. It also ensured the German homeland. Although most of against neglecting more fruitful targets be- the known assembly plants were well dis- cause of a hasty conclusion or inference persed, some of the older plants used to suggesting that a particular mission could assemble aircraft were well known and not be accomplished. Offensive doctrine located only 500 to 700 miles from Great also supported a conclusion made by the Britain. The total number of targets was not COA during the war, which stated that readily available, but AWPD-1 designated optimal results could be obtained by caus- 18 of the principal known assembly plants ing a high degree of destruction in a few as prime targets.46 really essential industries or services rather Overall, the German Air Force did not than causing a small degree of destruction present a very promising target at the in many industries.50 outbreak of hostilities. Nevertheless, its A good portion of the theory that went elimination was essential to achieve nu- into the development of AWPD-1 came merous other objectives, such as clearing from observation of industries deemed im- the way for an eventual land invasion. portant in time of war. Hansell's descrip- AWPD-1 estimated that there were approx- tion of how observations on the home front imately 500 bases in west Germany and during peacetime helped set the pattern for the occupied territories that were pro- US strategic doctrine throughout the war vided with “exceptionally strong light flak shows this factor clearly: defenses."4. The plan assumed that the Germans had dispersed the aircraft— We discovered one day that we were taking generally about a mile from the landing delivery on new airplanes, flying them to areas for the bombers—and provided each their points of reception, removing the pro airplane with individual protection in the pellers back to the factories, and ferrying out form of a revetment and concrete taxiwavs, additional airplanes. The delivery of con- trollable pitch propellers had fallen down with the entire system carefully camou- Inquiries showed that the propeller manufat flaged. Regardless, air-war planners consis- turer was not behind schedule. Actually, it tently considered the German Air Force a was a relatively simple, but highly special primary target, and they recommended it as ized spring that was lacking, and we found a primary target of opportunity whenever that all the springs made for all the controlla possible.48 ble pitch propellers of that variety in the U.S TARGLT/NC I-'OH VICTORY f>9

came from one plant and that that plant in circumstances of World War II, but it can Pittsburgh had suffered from a flood.51 also be gauged in terms of the effects that it This observation led Hansell and the other had on current Air Force doctrine. Trans- posing the effects of conventional strategy planners to conclude that the loss of one air warfare against Nazi Germany into to- specialized item, such as the spring, could day’s environment is not easy, but modern have a tremendous effect on industrial out- strategists can learn a number of lessons put in time of war and could ground air- from such a comparison.5,1 Today’s envi- planes just as effectively as if enemy forces ronment is, of course, highlighted by the had shot them up or if enemy bombs had presence of advanced nuclear weapons, destroyed the factories. and the Air Force has modified its strategic Hansell notes that, “by the end of the bombing plans to accommodate this fact. war. the U.S. Air Forces had flown 755,000 However, if the United States were faced bomber sorties and dropped some with selecting a new set of targets to be 1,410,000 tons of bombs.” Almost half of destroyed by conventional means, the doc- this tonnage fell “on the selected targets of trine used in AWPD-1 would be extremely the combined bomber offensive.”’" This useful in determining the requirements for total was greater than the estimates in such a modern air-war plan. And, with AWPD-1 for a number of reasons. For one, the presence of such factors as the the developers of AWPD-1 overestimated Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) the effect of bomb damage and underesti- Treaty and the growing pressure for mutual mated the Germans' ability to repair dam- nuclear disarmament between the United aged targets. German fighters, antiaircraft States and the Soviet Union, such a com- artillery, and weather complications im- parison might prove more than just an item paired bombing accuracy as well.53 Craven of passing interest. and Cate report, however, that "the selec- The supporting structure of the Soviet tion of target objectives was almost identi- Union is by no means identical to that of cal with that suggested by the postwar Nazi Germany, but its reliance upon major analysis of the United States Strategic industrial systems—such as electric power, Bombing Survey—which is to say that, if transportation, fuel sources, and certain the analysis was well founded, the program arsenals and factories—is at least similar.' suggested in 1941 was more realistic than So it is conceivable that, by using current that which was later followed.'” 4 aircraft and contemporary bombs, modern Hindsight shows clearly that several air-war planners could develop a conven- other flaws existed in the plan. Actual tional strategic bombing campaign against experience proved that the forces allocated the Soviet Union that would closely resem- for strategic defense in the Pacific were ble AWPD-1 in its basic structure. The inadequate and those for hemispheric de- difference of most significance, of course, fense too abundant. The assumed ability of would be the massive Soviet air defense. ’'’ air power alone to defeat Germany proved But, putting aside the numerous details and unfounded as well. However, when view- statistics that separate the two scenarios, ing AWPD-1 solely as a guide for the stra- one must acknowledge the basic fact that tegic bombing of Germany, one must eliminating the enemy’s will to light is the concede that it is a remarkable document. key to winning any war.59 And AWPD-l s And, if the planners had more accurately basic doctrine rests on that principle. predicted the Allies’ future ability to de- The Army Air Forces’ official historians, velop escort fighters, the document could in discussing the genesis of AWPD-1. have been even more successful.55 noted that “it was not an American tradi- AWPD-1's success is often gauged in tion to enter a war with a carefully con- terms of how well it worked under the ceived strategic concept. For once, in this 70 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

respect, the nation was prepared.”60 And, search and the establishment of sound doc- even though AYVPD-1 was never intended trine by men such as Harold George, Ken- to be put to the test as early as it was. the neth Walker, Haywood Hansell, and unpredicted attack on Pearl Harbor forced Laurence Kuter provided the basis that the plan into a position where its viability was essential for a successful air war in was soon proven. Fortunately, years of re- Europe. Ƞ

Notes I Haywood S Mansell. |r.. The Strategic Air War against targets. Haywood S. Hansell. Jr.. "Comments and Criticisms Germany and Japan. A Memoir (Washington, D.C.: Office of Pertaining to the American Strategic Air Plans and Applica- Air Force History. 1986), 30. tions in the Air Offensive against the European Axis Powers." 2. Wesley F. Craven and lames L. Cate, eds.. The Army Air Hansell Collection, Addendum 1. USAF Academy Library. Forces in World War II. vot. 14. Plans and Parly Operations: 748. January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago: University of Chicago 25. Hansell. Air Plan, 148. Press. 19481. 146 26. Ibid.. 161. 3. Ibid. 27. Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell. |r., USAF. Retired, inter- 4. Barry D Watts. The Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine: view with author at LInited States Air Force Academv. 6 April The Problem of Friction in War (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air 1988. University Press, December 1984), 22. 28. Hansell. Air Plan. 161. 5 Donald Wilson. "Origin of a Theory for Air Strategy." 29. Hansell. "Development of U.S. Concept." Aerospace Historian 18 (March 19711: 19. 30. George. "Principles of War.” 6. Haywood S. Hansell. Jr., "The Effectiveness of Strategic 31. AWPD-1. vol. 2. tab no. 1. 4. Bombing." collection of lectures at the Air Corps Tactical 32. Ibid. School. Maxwell Field. Alabama, 1942-1945, Hansell Collec- 33. Ibid.. 5-6. tion. United States Air Force Academy Library. 34. Ibid.. 6. 7. Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell. |r.. USAF, Retired, The Air 35. Hansell. "Development of U.S. Concept." Plan that Defeated Hitler (Atlanta. Ga.: Higgins-McArthur 36. AWPD-1. vol. 2. tab no. 1. 7. Longino & Porter. Inc.. 1972). 2. 37. Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell. Jr.. USAF. Retired. United 8. Ibid.. 2-3. States Air Force Academy oral history no. 89, by Maj James 9. Ibid.. 3—4. Boyles. 19 April 1967, 17, Special Collections, United States 10. Haywood S. Hansell. "The Development of the U.S. Air Force Academy Library. Concept of Bombardment Operations." lecture at the Air War 38. Ibid.. 18. College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 16 February 1951. Hansell 39. Donald W. Treadgold. Twentieth Century Russia. 6th ed. Collection. United States Air Force Academy Library. (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press. 1987). 371. 11. Hansell. Air Plan. 4. 40. Hansell interview with author. 12. James C. Gaston. Planning the American Air War: Four 41 Hansell. "Comments and Criticisms." 36g. Men and Mine Days in 1941 IFort Lesley J McNair. Washing- 42. AWPD-1. vol. 2. tab no. 1. 7. ton. D.C.: National Defense University Press. 19821. 30. 43. Hansell. Air Plan, 159. 13. Ibid.. 39. 44. Ibid., 163-64. 14 Hansell. Strategic Air War. 31. 45. German combat estimate. 1 September 1939. Hansell 15. Thomas H Greer. The Development of Air Doctrine in Collection. United States Air Force Academy Library. the Army Air Arm, 1.917-1941 (1955; reprint, Washington. 46. AWPD-1. vol. 2, tab no. 1. 9. D.C.: Office of Air Force History. 1985). 123. 47. Ibid., 8. 16. Hansell, Air Plan. 113. 48. Hansell, Air Plan. 162. 17. Air War Plans Division—Plan 1, vol. 2. tab no. 1. 1-2, 49. AWPD-1, vol. 2. tab no. 1. 10. Special Collections. 1 !nited States Air Force Academy Library 50. Hansell. "Development of U.S. Concept." (hereafter cited as AWPD-1). 51. Ibid. 18. Harold L. George. "The Principles of War," lecture at the 52. Hansell. Air Plan. 201. Air Corps Tactical School. Maxwell Field. Alabama. 1934 53. Ibid. 1935. Hansell Collection. United States Air Force Academy 54. Craven and Cate. 150. Library. 55. Hansell. oral history interview. 23. 19. AWPD-1, vol. 4. tab no. 2. 4. 56. Papers of Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell. |r.. USAF. 20. Ibid., vol. 2. tab no. 1. 3. Retired, and Col Haywood S. Hansell III. USAF. Retired. 21. George. "Principles of War." Special Collections, United States Air Force Academy Library. 22. AWPD-1. vol. 2. tab no. 1. 3. 31. 23. Robert M. Webster, lecture at the Air Corps Tactical 57. Ibid. School. Maxwell Field. Alabama, 1936- 1937. Hansell Collec- 58. Ibid.. 36. tion, United States Air Force Academy Library. 59. General Hansell and his son analyze how today's bomb- 24. Estimates at the time predicted that 20 percent of ers might do against modern industrial networks by "refight- German electricity was produced at Leipzig. 20 percent in the ing" the air war against Germany in a set of papers kept in the Ruhr, and 20 percent in southwest Germany. Two-thirds of the Hansell Collection. LInited States Air Force Academy Library entire output was located somewhere in the range of 45 60. Craven and Cate. 150. SPRING 1989 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

Capt Joseph F. Udemi, USAF

for his article Modified To Meet the Need: British Aircraft in the Falklands

Congratulations to Capt Joseph F. Udemi on his If you would like to compete for the Ira C. Eaker selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award winner for Award, submit an article of feature length to the the best eligible article from the Spring 1989 Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB, issue of the Airpower Journal. Captain Udemi AL 36112-5532. The award is for the best eligi- receives a $500 cash award for his contribution ble article in each issue and is open to all US to the Air Force's professional dialogue. The military personnel below the rank of colonel or award honors Gen Ira C. Eaker and is made equivalent and all US Government civilian em- possible through the support of the Arthur G. B. ployees below GS-15 or equivalent. Metcalf Foundation of Winchester, Massachu- setts.

THE RIGHT REACTION A Consideration of Three Revisionists

M ai Earl H. Til f o r d , J r ., USAF

EARLY 15 years have passed the peaceful and peace-loving people of since helicopters hauled the rem- Vietnam to benefit a corrupt industrial nants of America's military and complex and to edify military bureaucra- embassy staffs from Saigon in ig- cies. As the war continued and the frustra- Nnominious defeat. During that time, histo-tions increased, the arguments moved from rians, political scientists, sociologists, and the middle toward the fringes, but the Left’s soldiers have debated the war and its les- radicals never dominated the scholastic sons. The debate has, with time, become community or its interpretations, even at less acrimonious but no less indicative of the height of the antiwar movement. the divisions that split the nation during In the late 1970s, a conservative point of the war. view began to emerge, eventually to be Then, as now, that cleavage tends to be dubbed “revisionist” by many leftist schol- along politically ideological lines, dividing ars. Guenter Lewv, University of Massa- into liberal (or dovish) and conservative chusetts professor of political science, (hawkish) points of view. From the mid- published America in Vietnam in 1978.' 19b0s until the early eighties, the more He held that, while American policy in dovish interpretations favored by the polit- Vietnam might have been misguided, it was ical Left dominated Vietnam scholarship. not evil and that the American military While the Left has never been unanimous fought honorably and well, given the con- on any issue, it generally held that the straints of a flawed strategy. It became re- Vietnam War was either a mistake or mis- spectable to interpret Vietnam from other erably run. Toward the center, mainstream than the antiwar perspective, and since liberals argued that the war resulted from 1978 what is now called the revisionist misguided but noble aspirations gone movement blossomed. Like the earlier left- astray. Toward the Left fringes, the radicals ist interpretations, the revisionists are di- held that Vietnam issued from the degener- verse and often polemical, but they cannot ation of a capitalist society grasping at be tarred with a single brush. neo-imperialism and that a cruel technol- Conservative revisionists, like their dov- ogy of destruction had been unleashed on ish counterparts, run the gamut from a

73 heavy concentration of centrists to the re- actionary fringe, where one finds writers like Adm Ulysses S. Grant Sharp who, in 1978, published Strategy for Defeat,2 which blamed policies devised by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara for America’s defeat in Vietnam. Though extreme, men like Admiral Sharp and other retired senior officers set the tone for the right-wing revi- sionists to follow. The bellwether of the revisionist school, however, is Col Harry G. Summers, Jr., who published On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War in 1982.3 At first glance, Summers’ appraisal of the war seems critical, but on closer examination the Army’s brass decided that it reinforced traditional concepts of warfare and ought to be read by every officer over the rank of captain. Furthermore, On Strategy has be- come the bible of the revisionist movement, and Summers has emerged as a leading prophet. Summers’ central thesis was that a lack of understanding of the fundamentals of military theory and strategy, and a major disjunction in the relationship between military strategy and national policy fos- tered a flawed approach that ultimately led to America’s defeat in Vietnam. He pre- sented w'hat has become the classic para- dox of the Vietnam War: that the American forces won all the battles but still lost the war. Summers concluded that defeat was unnecessary and that if civilian as well as military leaders understood traditional concepts of military strategy, the United States would not have squandered its might and spilled the blood of its young men in a misguided effort against a secondary guer- rilla force in South Vietnam. By indicting generals along with civilian leaders, Sum- mers moved away from the simplistics of U.S. Grant Sharp and, coincidentally, stim- ulated a revival in the study of military Strikes by F-105 aircraft, such as this one on a militaiy history and strategy at the Army War Col- barracks northeast ofDien Bien Phu. ivere controlled by lege and Army Command and General Staff higher headquarters personnel who didn't understand the environment in Vietnam. A s a result, numerous aircraft College. were lost, according to Col lack Broughton, the author of Summers became the US Army’s version Going Downtown. of Yevgeny Yevtushenko, the Soviet house

74 dissident whose critiques are institution- ally acceptable if occasionally painful. In effect. Summers’ thesis was welcomed, for it vindicated the Army’s traditional ap- proach to conventional war. Furthermore, it provided the revisionists with a group of shared assumptions. First among these as- sumptions w'as the conceDt that North Viet- nam was behind the insurgency in South Vietnam and the war was. therefore, more conventional than revolutionary. Second, because the war (as they saw it) was con- ventional. it could have been won by doing what the Army along with the rest of the

In his book on Vietnam. Norman Hannah contends that the United States failed to understand the conventional nature of the ivar, thereby allowing North Vietnam to "invade" South Vietnam via the H o C hi M inh Trail I right/. Harmah maintains that the truil w as the tactical linchpin in North Vietnam's strategy. Lt Gen Phillip Davidson sugú gests that North Vietnam's General Ciap was a military genius, but Giap’s strategy for a major defeat at Khe Sanh /below), creating a n American Dien Bien Phu. was a failure. 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

American military establishment does their forces. Hannah makes the point that, best—employ massive firepower to take while most American advisers and military and hold landmasses or specific geograph- personnel assigned to Laos (over 650) left, ical points as steps toward gaining the thousands of North Vietnamese troops re- victory that they believed would accrue mained in eastern Laos to develop and when the enemy’s army is engaged and maintain the Ho Chi Minh Trail. By not destroyed. After all, if you grab them by the objecting, Washington tacitly agreed to this ears, their hearts and minds must follow. violation, and covert operations—which Summers’ formula enforces the territorial from 1962 until 1965 dominated the United perspective. The revisionists generally be- States’ tactical approach to the trail— lieve that the war could have been won amounted to little more than harassment. militarily if an Army thrust across the Ho In effect, the Geneva agreements of 1962 Chi Minh Trail had been coupled with a provided Hanoi with a free hand to develop Marine amphibious hook into North Viet- a valuable logistical pipeline to the South nam at Vinh. An “unleashed" Air Force, while putting Washington at a strategic meanwhile, would have closed Haiphong disadvantage, in that South Vietnam was Harbor and the rail and highway routes laid open, as Hannah states, “to a slow leading into China and. perhaps, destroyed invasion masked as an insurrection.”5 the dike system along the Red River. If Like Summers, Hannah contends that these things had been done, many conser- American forces should have been sent into vatives and revisionists maintain that vic- Laos to close down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. tory was possible. But, according to Hannah, fear of escalating Invasions of Laos and North Vietnam, the war prevented Washington from em- bombing the dikes . . . this would have barking on such an adventure. The Ameri- meant war. Bingo! Third, the United States can military, for its part, was dominated by needed a declaration of war to focus the generals and admirals who adhered to the energies and reinforce the commitment of “no more Koreas” syndrome, holding that its people. Additionally, a declaration of the United States should not become in- war would have cleared the way for wider volved in a major land war in Asia. Some military action to conclude the conflict argued against the invasion of Laos, con- quickly. With a formal declaration of hos- tending that it would take seven to eight tilities. the press could have been censored, divisions to close the trail. What Hannah the draft law rewritten and made fairer, and does not recognize is that many generals, the shenanigans of some peace activists, like their civilian superiors, never really like trips to North Vietnam, would have believed that closing the Ho Chi Minh Trail been legally treasonous. with a blocking force was necessary. Led by Three recent books argue variations of the US Air Force, they turned to high these themes. Norman B. Hannah, a retired technology in search of that silver bullet foreign service officer, develops the territo- capable of working strategic and tactical rial theme in The Key to Failure: Laos and magic. The Igloo White sensor system, the Vietnam War.4 Hannah argues that the which the Air Force started deploying Ho Chi Minh Trail was the tactical linchpin throughout the trail complex in 1967, was in North Vietnam’s strategy and that when used to monitor traffic so that gunships the United States signed the Declaration could be directed against trucks as they and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos on made their way southward. Furthermore, 23 July 1962, it foreclosed on its chances during the three years of Rolling Thunder— for victory in South Vietnam by predestin- the aerial campaign directed against North ing itself to strategic failure. Laos was sup- Vietnam from March 1965 through October posed to be neutralized by these accords, 1968—Laos took a backseat in sortie alloca- and all outside parties were to withdraw tion. But, when President Johnson cur- THE MIGHT REACTION 77

tailed the bombing on 31 March and then and PAVN positioned themselves for the ended it on 31 October 1968. additional Tet offensive. Davidson claims that this is planes became available for use in Laos. nonsense. Giap was too good a general to Two weeks later, the Air Force began Op- tie down two or three divisions, numbering eration Commando Hunt, a series of aerial upward of 40,000 men, to divert four bat- campaigns to interdict the flow of men and talions of US Marines. Furthermore, he supplies to the People’s Army of Vietnam paid too high a price in casualties from the (PAVN) and Vietcong units fighting in pounding those divisions took while dug South Vietnam. This argument, focusing as into static positions around Khe Sanh. Da- it does on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, is funda- vidson holds that the siege at Khe Sanh was mental to the revisionists’ "territorial phase one in a three-part plan. The initial approach" in that the trail was a physical phase diverted attention from preparations and geographical conduit through which for an attack on the cities. This attack was South Vietnam was invaded by the North’s supposed to be a prelude to phase two: the armies. As such, this argument works disintegration of the Army of the Republic against the liberal contention that the war of Vietnam (ARVN) due to the ferocious, in South Vietnam was a revolutionary or concerted Vietcong and PAVN offensive. civil war and the United States therefore When the ARVN collapsed. Giap reasoned had no business intervening. Furthermore, (being a good Communist) that the people because it focuses on geography as the key would rise up against the Nguyen Van to a conventional invasion, the argument Thieu government and its American pup- implies that more or less traditional forms pet masters. Then, according to this logic, of force application would have been rele- the United States would have no alterna- vant. tive other than negotiate its way out of its Lt Gen Phillip B. Davidson’s Vietnam coastal enclaves. During those negotiations, at War: The History. 1946-1975 is a com- phase three would be consummated when prehensive. well-constructed history.6 Da- the PAVN overran Khe Sanh. Hopefully, the vidson was chief intelligence officer for capture of 5,000 US Marines would have Gen William C. Westmoreland and Gen the same demoralizing effect that the fall of Creighton W. Abrams. A sophisticated Dien Bien Phu had had on the eve of the scholar-soldier with a grasp of the complex Geneva Conference of 1954. relationships between strategy and national The Tet offensive failed, however, be- policy, Davidson is a far cry from U.S. cause Giap was wrong in his major assump- Gr.'nt Sharp with his simplistic bombast tions. The ARVN did not disintegrate but aimed at Robert McNamara and other civil- fought better than it ever had—better. Da- ians perceived as interfering in military vidson claims, than it would ever fight affairs. again. The people did not join their would- Davidson focuses on Gen Vo Nguyen be liberators but fled from the Communists Giap through three decades of war. That to the safety of government-he Id areas. Fi- makes sense because Giap was, after all. nally, American firepower devastated the there at the founding of the Vietminh in Vietcong in and around the cities as well as 1941, the defeat of the French in 1954, and the PAVN units laying siege to Khe Sanh. was still serving as minister of defense But, according to Davidson, the real irony when the final victory came in 1975. While is that Giap hated this plan. He had inher- Davidson contends that Giap is a giant ited it from Gen Nguyen Chi Thanh, a among history’s greatest captains, he also long-time rival who was killed in a 13-52 challenges conventional wisdom on several strike in South Vietnam in July 1967. Da- issues. Many have argued, for instance, that vidson argues that Giap considered the Tet the siege at Khe Sanh was a feint on Giap’s offensive a diversion from the true course part to divert attention while the Vietcong of revolutionary warfare based on a pro- 78 AIRPUWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

traded war using guerrilla tactics. Here noi and Haiphong in his F-105 Thunder- Davidson departs from the mainstream of chief fighter-bomber. revisionism, but he does not go far enough. Going Downtown, like Thud Ridge— He ought to consider the arguments of Broughton’s first book published two de- those people who hold that it was the cades ago—reflects the bitterness of one protracted guerrilla war that ultimately de- who feels very keenly that he and his feated the United States by sapping the comrades were betrayed. The sense or con- national will while bleeding the nation’s cept of betrayal is not unusual in literature youth in a seemingly endless and pointless about the Vietnam War, but in the revision- conflict. ist genre, it is almost exclusively focused Unlike many revisionists, Davidson on civilian officials, antiwar activists, and holds that “the strategy of revolutionary selected members of the press. While war was the key [Davidson’s emphasis] in- Broughton probably would not disagree gredient of the Communist victory.”7 Like a with most revisionists on this particular revisionist, however, he contends that the pantheon of villains, he focuses much of use of overwhelming military force would his vituperation on senior Air Force officers have brought a quick victory. Then, within and their courtiers who “would not listen three paragraphs, Davidson argues that to those who were doing the fighting.”10 America’s greatest failing was that soldiers According to Broughton, the problem was and statesmen alike failed to understand not only that the strategy behind Rolling the kind of war on which the United States Thunder was flawed but also that Air Force had embarked and that “the American lead- leadership, dominated as it was during the ership grasped only vaguely the broad prin- Vietnam War by bomber pilots whose ciples of revolutionary war and never thinking had not advanced beyond World understood its nuances.”8 Rather than la- War 11 and massive bomber raids over the beling Davidson an ideological schizo- Ruhr Valley, was out of touch with the war phrenic. it might be better to consider him at hand. Broughton subjects Gens John D. intellectually eclectic and mentally nimble Ryan. James Wilson, and John Vogt to the enough to reach conclusions outside the kind of criticism usually reserved for Sec- parameters of neatly defined ideological retary McNamara. biases that too often skew scholarly inter- Broughton felt betrayed by Air Force pretations. leaders who did not speak out forcefully Hannah's Key to Failure and Davidson’s enough against the needless slaughter of Vietnam at War are generally convincing, aircrews who flew into North Vietnam on but the authors do not address why the the wings of a prosaically conventional American generals and their civilian lead- doctrine devised to bomb Nazi Germany. ers failed so completely when it came to He faults the Air Force’s leadership for devising an appropriate strategy. Retired stifling creativity and innovation: "It was Air Force Col Jack Broughton, author of awful enough to have all those operation- Coing Downtown: The War against Hanoi ally uneducated folks in Washington telling and Washington, is not as sophisticated as us which way to turn, but then we, our own Hannah and Davidson in presenting his air force, went and did it to ourselves by arguments, but—perhaps more perspica- discouraging new ideas.”11 ciously than either of them—he gets to the Of the three authors, Broughton may heart of the matter: “The objective of our have the best understanding of what went effort in Southeast Asia was to hurt Ho Chi on and what went wrong in Vietnam. The Minh, and thus make him . . . do the problem with people who argue from either things we considered to be in our national the liberal or conservative perspective is in terest.A n d Broughton was at the tip of that they too often become polarized the lance, "going downtown” to bomb Ha- around polemics. Each of these authors THE EIGHT REACTION 79

goes beyond that and reminds us that the well to consider the works reviewed here Right, like the Left, is hardly monolithic. because they offer insights into a thinking That is as it should be. given the enormous process that not only applied during the complexity of the issues attendant to the Vietnam War but also continues to domi- Vietnam War. Nevertheless, the revisionists nate certain segments of policy and strategy and the liberals could learn a great deal if formulation. Scholars, both from the Right and the Left, need to move toward an they would modulate the rhetoric and con- approach to the Vietnam War that will sider alternative points of view outside the contribute to a better understanding of confines of preconceived ideological no- what went on and what went wrong during tions. Revisionists, for instance, could that terribly divisive era. Only an objective learn from Professor Loren Baritz. who—in appraisal of the many facets of that war will his cultural history of the Vietnam era. lead to a better understanding of the dy- Backfire12—makes the point that an over- namics of that conflict; and to arrive at that whelming sense of hubris led Americans, point, scholars ought to abandon the rhet- including members of the military, to the oric of the 1960s, from whatever quarter, as notion that as a nation we were both righ- they search for truth and understanding in teous and invincible. The Left would do the late eighties and nineties. Ƞ

Notes 1 Guenter Lewy. America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford 6. U Gen Phillip B Davidson. Vietnam at War; The History. University Press. 1978). 1946-1975 (Novato. Calif.: Presidio Press. 1988). 2. Adm Ulysses S. Grant Sharp. Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam 7. Ibid.. 799. in Retrospect (San Rafael. Calif.: Presidio Press. 1978). 8. Ibid. 3. Col Harry G. Summers. |r. On Strategy A Critical 9. lack Broughton. Going Downtown: The War against Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato. Calif.: Presidio Press. Hanoi and Washington (New York: Orion Books. 1988). xiv. 19821. 10. Ibid., xvi. 4. Norman B Hannah. The Key to Failure: Laos and the 11. Ibid.. 105. Vietnam IV'ar (Lanham. Md.: Madison Books. 1987). 12. Loren Baritz. Backfire: A History of How American 5. Ibid.. 199 Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did (New York: W. Morrow, 1985). 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

Ricochets superiors to be either supportive of or at least continued from page 3 tolerantly indifferent to my attempts at writing. You cannot realistically ask for much more than can muster in support of independent opera- that, especially out in the trenches. Nor has the tions. Air Force part of the review process generally Since World War II vve have steadily backed been unduly severe. As a rule, when Air Force away from the crusading zeal and visionary reviewers have had an objection, they have insights of Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and generally been willing to be specific about why George Kenney. We have produced two genera- they objected. It was generally related to factual/ tions of air officers who somehow believe that security matters, and we could work out a mu- strategic air power was disproved during the tually acceptable compromise (there is at least European campaign. These same officers fail to one advantage to being in Washington. D.C.). 1 appreciate the decisive role of air power in the have found that the true intellectual constipa- Pacific theater. Even among the shadows of tion really takes place at the Office of the Secre- gloom that pervade our Vietnam experience, tary of Defense (OSD) review level. There they Linebacker 11 stands out as a brilliant vindi- do indeed seem to have a dismal tendency to cation of air power, and— most recently—Eldo- believe they have an unlimited right to censor rado Canyon achieved strategic results against anything you say, especially if it has something terrorism. Yet many seem to find bizarre comfort to do with policy or is controversial. Unfortu- in accepting the support role, and in so doing nately, there isn’t much the Air Force can do they deprive the nation of its most responsive about that. capability. In conclusion, I suggest that the situation is It is time for us to reaffirm and reassert the both less bad and worse than Colonel Donovan truths that underlie our charter. These truths suggested. The reason more people don’t write cannot be found in follow-on aircraft or Program for publication has much less to do with their Objective Memorandum (POM) cycles. Neither being intimidated or frustrated by the gauntlet of are they tied to controversies like follow-on security and policy review than it has to do with forces attack (FOFA), close air support (CAS), or their simply not having inclinations in the di- battlefield air interdiction (BAI). Rather, they rections of serious scholarship. 1 for one am not exist in the combat experiences where air power optimistic about the Air Force being able to was employed with—and often without—suc- change that. cess. They exist to be learned from and to be Capt Thomas R. McCabe, USAFR developed into a cohesive strategy that can Lortori, Virginia accommodate the world as it is and as it will become. It is time that we had an air power strategy. Lt Col G. Murphy Donovan’s recent essay, “Stra- Lt Col Thomas M. Kearney, USAF tegic Literacy” (Winter 1988), presents an Or- Headquarters USAF, Washington, D.C. wellian interpretation of the Air Force security (to include policy) review process and a novel approach to a serious issue. The author's com- SPEAKING OUT ON STRATEGIC LITERACY ments lack a definite understanding of what, in fact, security review is all about. I read Colonel Donovan's “Strategic Literacy” While AFR 190-1, Public Affairs Policies and (Winter 1988) with keen interest. As an aspir- Procedures, directs that information cleared for ing strategist author, I too have endured the public release be consistent with security and security/policy review process. My experiences policy requirements, it also includes a mandate and related frustrations in that process have to clear as much information as possible, as differed from those observed by Colonel Dono- quickly as possible. With this goal in mind, our van, and 1 have come to suspect that the primary reviewing officials approach each case with the problem regarding "thought control" does not belief that all or as much as possible of the necessarily lie with the Air Force part of the information submitted will be cleared. system. Apparently, the experts with whom our re- As both a junior officer and then as a civilian viewing staff consults during the review process employee of the Air Force, 1 have found my make up Colonel Donovan's “legions of thought RICOCHETS 81

police."' In developing the Air Force position policies can never be contested. When the au- on a case, vve must call on any number of experts thor expresses disagreement, the reader should for comments and advice. Resolving problems is be able to distinguish policy from the author's our job; therefore, out of courtesy to reviewing opinion. experts, we don’t offhandedly release their names. If authors don’t understand the reasons Some publications carry an overall disclaimer for security or policy changes to their material, stating that the views expressed are those of the we ask those who made the amendments/ author(s) and are not necessarily representative recommendations for permission to release their of the official policy of the Air Force. Although names or ask them to contact the authors. To my acceptable in some instances, it’s not always the knowledge, no Air Force member—military or answer. Why not? civilian—has ever refused to discuss a decision It’s virtually impossible to separate the iden- with an author. tity of the author from his or her official posi- Inadvertent release of classified material is far tion. The higher the rank and position, the less from the "minor issue" Colonel Donovan be- credible the disclaimer. Our allies and adversar- lieves it to be. It is a serious issue. People who ies are inclined to accept the statements and inadvertently use classified material in their writings of armed forces members as signifying proposed speeches and writings are far from the some body of belief within that organization. So. "fools" Colonel Donovan labels them: often they while disclaimers are occasionally made a con- are leaders at the highest levels. In many cases, dition of clearance, such a gesture often means it is difficult to divorce classified material from little in a practical sense. unclassified. Combining two pieces of unclas- Authors who take exception to security or sified information can sometimes add up to policy amendments have recourse to an appeal classified. In other cases, projections and pre- process that often can be lengthy, but we encour- dictions are right on the money and must be age all who disagree with amendments to pur- amended or deleted to avoid a security compro- sue an appeal. mise. There is no police function involved with Let's look now at the other side of the security security review. Regulations require the submis- review coin—policy. The Department of Defense sion of material for review, and authors who directive that governs the function (DODD choose not to do so are on their own. When the 5230.9) states that material submitted “shall be cleared for public release only after it has been rules are followed, the Air Force, while not reviewed and necessary amendments made to always endorsing authors’ works, will back up ensure that it does not compromise classi- their right to present cleared material in public fied . . . information, and that it is consistent forums. Keep in mind that official “clearance for with established DOD and other U.S. Govern- public release” means only that the submitted ment policies and programs." document has no security or policy discrepan- Policy amendments are hard to swallow, even cies. Actual release of the material is a matter for us in security review. Sometimes even the that must be determined by the author, perhaps very reason for the policy amendment is classi- in coordination with his or her chain of com- fied. Many of the policy amendments to cases mand. submitted for review are based on the following Finally, we’re on your side. We understand considerations: that publishing and speaking are expected Accuracy—information cleared for public re- means of building credentials, and we do all we lease must be accurate. can to obtain clearance for your work. Out of Balance—when writers treat topics about 2,444 cases reviewed in 1988. 43 were totally which other services or agencies may hold dif- denied clearance—more than 98 percent of our fering views, it helps to make presentations as cases were cleared. This figure indicates that the balanced as possible. supposedly stringent security review require- US policy—the most troublesome areas are ments are hardly a convincing argument for not those usually referred to as foreign policy or pursuing creative endeavors. foreign affairs. Air Force material must conform )une F. Forte to the approved policies of the president. De- Deputy Chief, Office for Security Review partment of State, Department of Defense, and Office of Public Affairs the Air Force. This is not to say that such Washington, U.C. 82 AIRPOW'ER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

I had stopped reading the Air University jour- entiating between the capabilities of space nals some time ago because the quality of argu- forces and air forces, they lift the debate to a new ment hardly made it worth the effort. Yet, the level of realism. For this reason I am reluctant to other day I ran across a reprint of one of your criticize their work, but it appears to me they essays (“Strategic Literacy," Winter 1988) in the have significantly understated the vulnerabili- Current News Supplement. I was astonished! ties of our space assets. Such passages as “they Colonel Donovan's lucid treatment of the prob- can capture the high ground and elude the lem of strategic literacy is perhaps the best enemy” and "facilitate application of precise, treatment of the subject that I have seen to date. unimpeded force on enemy targets” may be The writing is crisp, direct, and wry. If you can theoretically possible but seem to assume a bring the rest of your authors up to this stan- passive enemy who makes no efforts to neutral- dard, you might bridge some of the literacy gaps ize our vehicles. To say, as the authors do, “they that Donovan describes so well. can . . . penetrate geopolitical boundaries with R. Huschke impunity" may be true in peacetime, but will Washington, D.C. space be a sanctuary in wartime? The authors go on to assert that "space assets can provide se- cure, reliable communications.” Can they under wartime conditions? Terrific article! Now take it one step further Later in the article the authors do suggest that by printing articles on thinking war—air base “space control" is vital, but then they go on to ground defense, air defense, and so on. Concen- say that "effective space control requires a global trate on what the airmen (generically) left on the space surveillance capability." It does, indeed, ground will be doing while the fliers are fighting but what of the other dimensions of control? the AirLand Battle. It's time to supplement phi- Specifically, what assets will be required to losophizing with applications. defend our vehicles in space and neutralize Capt Murry B. Moskowitz those of an enemy? A later paragraph says, Brooklyn. New York "Once control of the space environment is es- tablished, the commander in chief (CINC) can employ all the characteristics and capabilities of Colonel Donovan hit the nail on the head in his satellites to favorably influence the outcome of expose on the military's censorship of freethink- hostilities.” Quite true, but what is lacking is ing in its officer corps. In 1982 my research any discussion of just how control of space is to project at Air Command and Staff College was be achieved. Without such discussion, we are an article for publication on the US Air Force’s not going to perfect well-rounded space doc- "up-or-out" promotion philosophy. The article trine. Treaty limitations and national policy was sponsored by the editor of Air University may curb the development of offensive and Review and was an objective evaluation of the defensive hardware, but these should be no system. It was, however, not released for publi- inhibition to our professional thinking about cation by the “gods” in the Pentagon because it space doctrine. I hope Myers and Tockston, was “too critical of the Air Force promotion along with others no less well-informed than system.” Another notch in the handle of the they, will turn their attention to the pressing military censorship pistol! Donovan’s article problem of how we may best defend our vehi- made it through, which is a healthy sign that the cles in space. situation has improved. Maj Gen I. B. Holley, USAFR. Retired Durham. North Carolina Lt Col Milton W. Price, |r., USAF Canberra, Australia

Colonels Myers and Tockston make some acute ON SPACE DOCTRINE and important observations in "Real Tenets of Military Space Doctrine” in your Winter 1988 Colonels Myers and Tockston’s article “Real issue. They point out that the “speed, range, and Tenets of Military Space Doctrine" (Winter flexibility” we attribute to air power are not the 1988) makes an important contribution to the important characteristics of space forces, that ongoing discussion of space doctrine. By differ- despite the lack of a distinct physical boundary RICOCHETS 83

between air and space there is a sharp opera- support the terrestrial forces as well as it could. tional boundary between them, and that the Even if we had a US ASAT. its use would be term aerospace confounds things that are essen- determined by the needs of the terrestrial com- tially different. 1 think they make clear funda- manders in chief (CINCs). not by a space CINC's mental points about space doctrine. However, assessment of a space battle. This rather dull some aspects of their doctrinal development support role for space forces is very different strike me as not fitting the realities of current from the centrally managed space battle that military space operations. Colonels Myers and Tockston envision. Of The authors seem to be writing about a vision course this could change with future technology of what space operations may one day be. They but not necessarily in the vision's direction. For list the ability to apply unimpeded force as a instance, if ground-to-space weapons turn out to capability of space forces, but no spacecraft be relatively economical and effective, satellites exists that can do such a thing. In fact, the may survive in a war only by hiding in remote "combat" mission areas that they discuss are orbits. currently represented only by the Soviet antisat- The vision of space operations that Colonels ellite (ASAT). Now and probably for the next Mvers and Tockston offer is exciting and grip- few decades, the lion's share of military space ping. but I don't think it's real (at least not yet). effort will be put in the “combat support" areas: 1 wish it were. In the meantime, we in the space force enhancement, meaning various kinds of business should come to grips with the doctrinal support for terrestrial military forces, and space implications of our community being united not support, meaning operating the spacecraft that by common operations or by a common mission, do the force enhancement. Currently, the space but only by a common operating environment mission is a support mission. and similar technology. The writers put more stress on the interdepen- dence of space systems than is justified by Capt Roger C. Burk. USAF actual experience. It is true that some linkages Los Angeles AFS. California exist—navigation satellites getting environmen- tal data from weather satellites and so forth—but in mv experience they do not have a major effect Concerning the authors’ claim that “real space on space operations. The linkages are no stron- doctrine remains unrecognized, undocumented, ger than those that exist between space and and unaccepted," the case is quite to the con- terrestrial forces or among terrestrial forces, for trary. Real space doctrine is alive and well in the that matter. Space systems are probably better Organization of the joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), characterized as being more independent of Headquarters USAF. and the Office of the Sec- each other than terrestrial forces. retary of the Air Force (OSAF). They need only I think there’s a tendency for space systems to contact |CS/)-3 (Space Operations and Strategic operate separately if they can. The writers make Defense Division). Secretary of the Air Force/ much of the need for interoperable command Office of the Secretary of the Navy (OSN) and/or and control, but this is more vision than reality. Headquarters USAF/XOXFD for the “current Some satellites share a common network of word." Having spent eight years over two tours tracking stations, but this type of interoperabil- in Colorado Springs, Colorado, space organiza- ity is pretty superficial. In day-to-day opera- tions. I can understand the reluctance to admit tions. each spacecraft has its own unique that the Pentagon understands space. mission and method of operation, and there is little need to coordinate anything more than Lt Col Frederick P. Lawrence, USAF who gets to use the tracking station when. True Headquarters USAF, Washington, U.C. interoperability could be useful in some circum- stances. but it would lead to more scheduling difficulties, require compromises in design be- I am concerned about a letter from Major Blow tween spacecraft with different missions, and be in the Spring 1989 edition and its criticism of a seldom used. thoughtful article on space doctrine. What this means is that in a war today there Both Airpower Journal and Air University would be no separate space campaign and no Review have been excellent sources on issues of separate space strategy. Instead, each space sys- doctrine. Articles by Maj Gen 1. B. Holley, Col tem would try pretty much independently to Dennis M. Drew, and others have framed what 84 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989 constitutes doctrine at various levels. They ex- the way, but the Air Force has been woefully plain that doctrine is “an accumulation of remiss in not issuing an official doctrine. It knowledge which is gained primarily from the makes one wonder at the utility of doctrine in study and analysis of experience." Also, “doc- the modern Air Force, if that service can have a trine is officially approved prescriptions of the major command for space and the nation a best way to do a job. Doctrine is, or should be, unified command for space, and yet not print the product of experience. Doctrine is what the first word about doctrine. experience has shown usually works best.” The real criticism should have been, “Why are The essay "Real Tenets of Military Space we debating each other's essays instead of a real, official Air Force doctrine on space?” Doctrine" (Winter 1988) came close to capturing a doctrine based on experience. This is nothing Lt Col L. Parker Tem ple III. USAF really new, as Air University Review's March- Headquarters LtSAF. Washington. D.C. April 1986 issue contained a detailed criticism of AFM 1—1 ’s (Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United Stales Air Force) handling of space doc- TO FLY AND FIGHT trine, entitled "How Dare They Tamper with the Sacred Functions of the Horse Cavalry?” along In the article “To Fly and Fight at the Opera- the same lines. tional Level" (Winter 1988), Colonel Possehl There were two points that Major Blow describes why too many (most?) officers don't “think war” on a daily basis. His essential rea- missed. First, the focus of doctrine must be on son is that in peacetime, war is "not immediate" experience. The difficulty is not describing cur- and that we concentrate on the immediate rent practice but setting a historical basis for things. His solution is to think war and study doctrine so the reader can understand why ex- history but admits this may be hard to do. perience has led to the current state of affairs. Similarly, in a letter to the editor. Colonel This understanding allows a prudent extension Stroud also states that "interest in and the study of doctrine to guide actions based on situations of the profession of arms has to be a reason for not previously encountered. Such historical ex- joining the Air Force. If it is not, we're attracting planations and consequent understanding let the wrong people.” our leadership examine the reasons that things Let me recommend an activity that serves as are the way they are and see what underlying an excellent first course to motivating the study considerations must be changed in order to take of war, introduces the individual to the termi- new directions. Thus, since our experience nology of war, gives the individual an intuitive leads us to understand that testing weapons on feel for the concepts of war, and teaches one the far side of the moon would be physically about current weapon platforms with their rela- very demanding, technically well beyond the tive strengths and weaknesses. The activity? ability of any nation on earth to adequately Wargaming. No, not the war games conducted at control and monitor (much less get away with), Squadron Officer School or the Warrior Prepa- and certainly contrary to any existing doctrine ration Center in West Germany. Not even the of testing we know of. it is difficult to say this traditional war games that have hundreds of must be allowed for in doctrine. Such wild-eyed pieces to move and dozens of tables to resolve ideas are neither based in, nor reasonable ex- the effects of each bullet fired. Instead, look at trapolations of experience. “Doctrinal extension the personal computer (PC) based war games does not have to be lunacy," if you will pardon (not the arcade games). The basic element is that the pun. the games are playable and interesting. The The second problem is that the letter criticizes competitive nature of most officers is engaged by- the essay as though there were an official doc- taking on the computer or fellow officers. trine on space. There is none worth the paper it The second element is that the computer is printed on, but the essay in question takes an handles the mechanics while you concentrate important step toward such a doctrine. We can on the essentials. You direct your forces using debate meaningfully about doctrine, its con- the concepts of war (e.g.. surprise, maneuver, tents. and its provision for the future only after concentration, and so on). You learn quickly the our service steps up to its responsibility in space strengths and purposes of a weapon system (an and promulgates an adequate space doctrine. A-10 is great against armor but lousy as an "Horse Cavalry” and "Real Tenets" both point interceptor). What you see of the enemy forces RICOCHETS 85

and the results of your strategy and tactics are should exist (but often do not) between doctrine, mediated by the computer. weapons advocacy, and the military engineer/ A third element is that many war games are scientist. As a sermon, it was quite good. As historically based. The individual learns the aviation or technological history, it was abys- forces, geography, strategy, and tactics in use mally bad and could easily lead young officers during a particular period. This learning is to misinterpret many of the personalities and brought about through the necessity to win the developments of that period. battle, not through the iron-willed discipline Getting specific, let’s first consider the two needed to read Clausewitz (as implied by Cap- glaring faults of autogyros mentioned by Colonel tain Davison in his article on misreading Clause- Temple. These were inadequate payloads and witz. same issue). poor/unstable handling qualities. The fact is that While I have not sampled all the computer- these were the two primary faults of virtually all based games. I will recommend three. The the military helicopters deployed operationally prices are cheap, most units have PCs. and a few prior to about 1958 (i.e.. 15 to 20 years into the dozen "war training" days a year is time well growth cycle of the practical helicopter). If one next asks what were the three largest problems spent: inherent in the helicopters prior to World War II. 1. Empire, by Interstel Corporation, POB one finds that two of the three were actually 57825, Webster TX 77598, $50. Generic war solved during autogyro research and develop- game combining air. land, and sea power. Up to ment (R&D), while the third was not solved until three players (human or computer). the fifties. These problems deserve description. 2. The Ancient Art of War, Broderbund Soft- The most important major problem of the ware. POB 12947. San Rafael CA 94913-2947. early helicopter had to do with blade/hub me- $45. Good, solid emphasis on strategy and tac- chanical instabilities, which ripped blades right tics in the era of forts, swords, and bows. The off the vehicle. Losing a blade in flight is guar- manual and game teach the fundamental princi- anteed to achieve pilot attention at least for the ples found in the The Art of War by Sun Tzu. final seconds of his life. The Cierva work in 3. Gulf Strike, Avalon Hill Game Company. blade articulation—providing hinges at the 4517 Harford Road, Baltimore MD 21214. $30. blade roots—was central to all later rotary- Present-day simulation of what a USSR-versus- winged development, whether autogyro or heli- United States showdown in the Persian Gulf copter. (It was also the field that paid my rent may look like. from the fifties to the seventies and is still a Capt Bruce Benson major field for fertile R&D today.) BirkenfeId. West Germany The second problem concerned finding a practical means of transferring pilot commands into the rotor (i.e.. achieving basic rotor control). All modern helicopters achieve this via station- To Fly and Fight" (Winter 1988) is an excellent ary and rotating swash plates. Autogyros were article on the importance of knowing your en- instrumental in developing swash plate technol- emy before waging war and the necessity of ogy (although a few early helicopters had prim- having a well-defined objective. "Clausewitz itive swash plates). and the Indirect Approach" (same issue) is also The third major problem of early helicopters well researched and written. More conceptual was that they were inherently underpowered. and less digital thinking will strengthen our This last problem was solved by the introduc- nation's defense. tion of turbine engines in the fifties. However, in Col (Brig Gen selectee) Gerald R. Chancellor, USAF the thirties, the autogyro (by never really hover- Dallas. Texas ing) appeared to avoid this problem. The wise Air Corps R&D procurement officer of the twenties and thirties should have at- DEBATE ON AUTOGYROS tempted to fund both concepts because there was no clear way to see then which would be 1 read with great interest Colonel Temple's re- successful, and the technological and engineer- cent article "Of Autogyros and Dinosaurs” (Fall ing limitations of both concepts overlapped. 1988). There was much food for thought there This is in fact what did happen, and there was and many valid points on the relationships that much cross-pollination between helicopter and 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

autogyro. There was also much acrimonious and sorry he did not discern the practical applica- bitter competition, which the American Heli- tion. copter Society indirectly acknowledges today by The autogyro struck me as a paradigm of many naming various awards after autogyro pioneers. of the dysfunctions in systems acquisition to- As for military doctrine, despite the articles day. The central theme was overselling a con- cited by Colonel Temple as trying to establish cept even after it fails to demonstrate itself. The autogyro doctrine, the fact is that no US military approach was to relate flaw's with the ways in service paid adequate attention to vertical-lift which Cierva in particular and others went vehicle doctrinal implications until after the about their advocacy of the autogyro. Cierva was Korean War. As late as Vietnam. I commented on certainly a visionary and innovator, but he let glaring discrepancies in the US Air Force posi- his vision interfere w'ith his impartiality, much tion on this in a letter to the editor of a service to his discredit as a true aviation pioneer. Cierva publication, only to have an older officer glossed over significant deficiencies and sold threaten my career for daring to do so. (I was what he hoped the autogyro might become, then a young captain; clearly when one is on overlooking what it actually was. firm ground, one can ignore crank letters threat- The essay included a sampling of the capabil- ening that "you’ll never see another promo- ities and missions postulated to be satisfied by tion!”) autogyros, derived from a variety of sources In summary, the autogyro should be properly beginning u'ith Cierva in 1928, the later Air remembered as a configuration that provided Corps Advanced Flying School evaluation, and combat testing by the Marines in Nicaragua in much impetus to technological innovation and the mid-1930s. Yet before demonstrating that early research but that was supplanted by a the autogyro could fulfill one mission ade- better vehicle (the helicopter). The attempts in quately or live up to any claimed capability, the later autogyros to power the rotor for "jump Cierva and others continued to add to the long takeoffs" were really the admission that helicop- list in an attempt to build a committed constit- ters were a later generation of practical rotary- uency of people w'ho believed they needed the winged development. Remember that it is autogyro. Many w'ere caught up in an aviation primarily in the question of whether the rotor in environment of heady proportions u'here new cruise windmilled or was powered that differ- achievements came quickly, and potential entiated the autogyro and the helicopter. seemed unlimited. Stories were enthusiastically Col H. Lawrence Elman, USAFR repeated until people began to identify potential Port Jefferson, New York with existing autogyros, building a house of cards based on false assertions. For example, the fact Cierva crashed tudce in production autogy- Colonel Temple Responds ros of his own design should be sufficient evi- dence that he knew' the falsity of his claim that It is clear from Colonel Elman's considered autogyros provided the ultimate answer to air- remarks that he has largely missed the intended plane safety. Also, he repeatedly understated message of my essay. The purpose of the essay costs, overstated payload capacity, and exagger- was to illustrate the pitfalls of overselling pro- ated every other metric used to evaluate the grams and to examine the role of doctrine. autogyro. Consequently, to say that both autogy- The colonel praises the essay as a good ser- ros and helicopters had poor handling until the mon; the problem is that the choir has not even early 1950s completely misses the point that in come to practice, much less to learn. The essay spite of demonstrated poor handling and load used a compact historical example to suggest a carrying, Cierva and others claimed just the way in which weapons acquisition can use opposite was true. doctrine to avoid the problems caused by over- The upbeat salesmanship was sufficient to selling. Themes such as the contention of heli- outweigh the objective review' of doctrinal copters versus autogyros or late development of impacts and result in the loss of funding to vertical-lift doctrine might have been interesting Brennan, de Bothezat. and other helicopter de- if space had permitted. Others may want to velopers. Whether these other efforts w'ould contribute to one or more of these issues. They, have succeeded in producing a helicopter any however, were not the subject of my essay. If the earlier is problematical; it is demonstrable that colonel feels it was merely a sermon, then I am funding was shifted from ongoing efforts to a RICOCHETS 87

jrogram that promised more than it could rea- I must challenge the assertion that the essay sonably achieve. The essay was not meant to was not accurate aviation history. That it does denigrate the pioneering efforts of any of the not agree with Colonel Elman’s understanding autogyro developers. Cierva should be remem- of the development of the autogyro I have no bered as a pioneer whose contributions are un- doubt; it did not fit my preconceived notions deniable. if overblown. The best testimonial to either. However. I followed accepted historical this is the admission by U S. Air Service (a research procedure and based the essay on sev- magazine ardent in its early support of Cierva eral years of research, using primary sources. In and anything aeronautical) in its eulogy to researching every available source on autogyros. Cierva that the autogyro was not living up to 1 saw that we later generations may have failed expectations. to appreciate the mind-set and conditions under The essay suggests that doctrine, as the distil- which autogyros were sold. In fact, primary lation of lessons learned from experience, has a sources paint a very different picture than do role in reducing the dysfunctions of overselling. modern sources. While initially enthusiastic, all Numerous articles on the role of doctrine in of these primary sources became pessimistic weapons acquisition in both Airpoiver Journal about autogyros by the mid-1930s. The general and Air University Review have had a similar trends depicted are true to the views of the message. Pinpointing the time when doctrine for sources of the 1920s and 1930s. If this is not helicopter employment was promulgated is ir- sufficient, my research is documented in the relevant to the essay; the point was that some essay and is available for others to examine. military personnel attempted to use whatever they believed doctrine to be in the debate. They Lt Col L. Parker Temple III, USAF were debating doctrinallv on an aspect of aerial Headquarters USAF. Washington. D C. warfare with which no one had experience, which by definition precluded the establish- ment of an adequate doctrine. To that extent, 1 applaud the attempts of Merlin. D.IOI, and Ma- jor Hilton to use doctrine in evaluating a pro- SPETSNAZ—ROUND TWO posed superior weapon. I cited the doctrinal debate not as an example of promulgating good I read with interest the exchange of views on doctrine but to show that Merlin and D.IOI were Soviet Spetsnaz by Captains Campbell and arguing improperly about doctrine. Their dis- Hitchens. In my opinion they are both partially cussion should have been more historically correct and partially incorrect. As is often the based, as in the case of Major Hilton, who case, the major problem stems from faulty defi- presaged the current nap-of-the-earth tactics nitions and misunderstanding of the terms. with his precis on a besieged R.E.8. As Captain Hitchens notes. Spelsnaz means I can find one point of agreement with Colonel “special designation." However, the Spetsnaz Elman regarding the late arrival of vertical-lift troops are by no means all subordinate to the doctrine. The same is often true today, as when main intelligence directorate (GRU). There are I alluded to the lack of a space doctrine despite actually various types, including, for instance, our having operated space systems in peace, engineer Spetsnaz, signal Spetsnaz, naval Spets- crisis, and war for over 30 years. Less time naz. and so on. There are also other “special elapsed between the first flight of the autogyro designation” troops called osoboi naznachenie (1923) and the development of the vertical-lift (OSNAZ). Even the reconnaissance Spetsnaz in doctrine (1953) than we have operated in space, the combined arms formations and units below and we have been far more successful in space front are not directly subordinate to the GRU but operations than the autogyro ever was. I submit are more like long-range reconnaissance patrol that the promulgation of a vertical-lift doctrine units for the parent division and army. Captain actually took place comparatively soon after the Hitchens is correct that these troops are not very development of practical helicopters in the elite, are mainly devoted to reconnaissance, and 1940s. The essential point remains that much are not to be squandered on risky covert opera- can be learned from the history of the autogyro tions. On the other hand, he neglects to mention about how doctrine can be used to help acquire that the army and front reconnaissance director- the superior weaponry on which our modern ates also have "apparat” departments that con- armed forces depend. trol agents who are in the covert operations 88 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

business. Nor does he mention that the deep MORE ON CAREERISM espionage-type activities that Captain Campbell discusses are run by strategic units subordinated I must take strong exception to Colonel Rigsbee’s directly to the commander of the theater of letter on careerism and the impact of "cultural strategic military activity (TVD) and general assumptions" on the professionalism of the of- staff. Thus, while Spetsnaz units are doing many ficer corps. To identify cultural assumptions—a activities not related to espionage and sabotage, series of attitudes and feelings ostensibly im- there are non-Spetsnaz folks who certainly are printed on one’s character over the years—as the devoted to this. 1 certainly agree with him also major cause of increased careerism (and de- that no Soviet officer having the length and type creased professionalism) is to offer a convenient of service Suvorov claims can possibly know excuse for the failure of leaders to lead and half of what he claims to know about virtually followers to follow. every arm and service of the Soviet armed Few would argue with Colonel Rigsbee’s basic forces. thesis that young officers come to us today with At the same time, Captain Campbell is cer- different values than such individuals had 20 tainly correct in citing the various incidents and years ago. But I submit that the differences are activities she does. Her information on Afghan- only in degree, not in kind. To state that our istan is right, failing to mention only that the young officers are more careerist (and less pro- Soviet assault group was flown into the airport fessional) because they want “to do their own inside personnel carriers (BMPs), which were thing" or to blame “individualism” or “self- assertion” for increased careerism is simply ri- delivered by air under the cover story of military diculous. I'm 43 years old, and I’ve “done my assistance equipment to an ally, and in which own thing” many times during an exciting Air they remained hidden until ready to be used. Force career. And who of us hasn’t tried to be an Yet. in her entire paragraph of detailed descrip- individual to some degree or to be a self- tion, she notes what kinds of military elements assertive leader or follower? These are negative these people (and the forces in Czechoslovakia) aspects of careerism? I think not. were (not Spetsnaz) and then turns around in If we assume, as is the current trend, that the final sentence and writes that "the Spetsnaz professionalism of the officer corps—and for forces apparently were successful on all some reason we always seem to center on the counts." You can't just call anyone engaged in young officers—is indeed in a state of decline, these kinds of attacks Spetsnaz. The Soviets what do we do about it? Well we don’t offer up certainly don’t. pseudopsychological excuses, wring our collec- Thus, I tend to agree with Captain Campbell tive hands, and cry that the problem is too tough that the threat to the NATO rear area is very real, to tackle. What do we do? We lead the young but that is because it is coming from forces in officers. Over the years I’ve had the privilege to addition to the Spetsnaz units Captain Hitchens command four aircraft/missile maintenance correctly identifies. Actually, in my opinion, the squadrons and to speak in seminars to hundreds most insidious threat to NATO forces is not even of young officers, and I can assure you that the direct-action groups but the massive intelli- intelligent, involved, enthusiastic leadership gence capability this kind of deep-collection will do wonders to overcome “cultural assump- apparatus gives the Warsaw Pact. They don’t tions." When our young officers are exposed to need to waste time firing bullets when by report- seniors who are concerned about them, who ing and directing really sizable firepower from train them, who demand excellence, who do air. artillery, and rocket forces, they can do far everything possible to make that young lieuten- more damage— not to mention the intelligence ant or captain the best officer he or she can be. they have already acquired during peacetime on those young officers do respond, and they re- every idiosyncrasy of our forces. Surely the net spond beyond vour wildest expectations. They effect of all these "eyes and ears" is greater than will water your bloody eyes! I’ve seen it! Our the advantage we had in World War II with young officers are ready and willing to learn, to ULTRA. The confusion of roles and missions grow, to become more professional. All they might even be a part of the Soviet "reflexive need is a little help. Our young officers are a control" campaign. special group of people whose basic values are John Sloan as appropriate today as they were 20 years ago. Springfield, Virginia Let's not apologize for them; let’s lead them. RICOCHETS 89

Finally, Colonel Rigsbee refers to "lieutenant assumptions" as an excuse for weak profession- colonels striving for colonel and the colonels alism? “Bravo Sierra!" say 1—stronger message with stars in their eyes who thrash their troops to follow. 18 hours a day" for the most base, careerist Col Stephen C. Hall. IJSAF reasons. This assertion is insulting to a large Norfolk. Virginia portion of the officer corps and fails sadly in two respects. First, while there may well be lieutenant colo- nels and colonels who drive (but hardly ever Maj Michael Mosier's article “Getting a Grip on "thrash!") their people for purely selfish, career- Careerism" in the Summer 1988 issue of Air- ist reasons, the vast majority of officers push power fourncil was interesting indeed. Even their people because it best serves both the unit more disturbing was Colonel Rigsbee's response mission and. believe it or not. the people them- in the Winter issue. selves. Ours is a tough profession, one that often Interchangeability of the words duty and demands more than we readily want to give, and obligation is the first problem glaring out of it is the job of the commander leader to get this Colonel Rigsbee's letter. An obligation is a com- needed effort out of his or her troops. In almost mitment taken freely by choice, while duty is every instance, strong positive leadership is all required by the very nature of existence. Both that is needed. But accomplishing the mission is writers seem to mix these words up, leaving what we’re here for, and sometimes the officer in them with erroneous assumptions. Both men charge must make unpopular demands on sub- profess that in order for men and women to ordinates. To imply that such actions stem from commit themselves to a course of action, they ulterior motives of self-advancement shows a must place duty over self, when, in fact, it is childlike understanding of leadership and com- simply a matter of obligation. Your word is your mand. Further. 1 have vet to see individuals who bond. We all take an oath of office in which we did not grow personally and professionally commit ourselves to a course of action. We are when they were pressed to do more than they not born with some sort of natural state of fealty. thought they could. That went out with monarchies. On what does The second fallacy is the author’s none-too- Colonel Rigsbee blame the loss of direction in veiled suggestion that to seek or (dare I say it?) today’s officer corps? Incorrect values? achieve personal success is a mortal sin. The Colonel Rigsbee identified "bad" societal con- author asserts that we should divorce from our cepts that he felt the major had left out. The hard-charging future leaders "their natural de- colonel lists the concepts "do your own thing, sire for a successful work experience (career).” be your own man or woman, individualism, Why? 1 don't know. The commissioning oath self-assertion, what’s in it for me?” Unbeliev- does not require us to become totally self- able! Next they will want to pursue their own effacing. hair-shirt martyrs. Hopefully, the Air happiness! 1 won't profess to comment on the Force is a profession so structured and managed rightness or wrongness of the youth movements that when excellent work is performed, benefits of the 1960s and 1970s—only on Colonel Rigs- accrue both to the service and to the individual. bee’s definition of the problem. We all want to achieve some degree of personal Our country was founded on the concept of success, and as long as the desire is a by-product individualism. Self-assertion and self-protec- of our efforts and not an end in itself, the desire tion are ingrained in our Bill of Rights. These to personally succeed is healthy and helpful— rights are not given up with military oaths of both to the Air Force as an organization and to office. Obviously, these individualistic tenden- individual Air Force members. Show me some- cies that the colonel identifies are not the prob- one who doesn't enjoy the sweet smell of suc- lem; neither are they bad. cess. and I’ll show you someone who won’t Colonel Rigsbee feels that we must steer our succeed—and neither will his or her organiza- children away from these values of individual- tion. ism and that they must not place their views Our officers—both junior and senior—are over those of their peers. Alienation of self is bright, dedicated, concerned, and eager to learn nothing new; it is straight out of the confused and lead. "Cultural assumptions” may indeed be minds of Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and Karl a problem, but a problem easily solved by any- Marx. one with the genuine desire to do so. "Cultural Colonel Rigsbee is, like all of us, a product of 90 /URPOIVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

American society and its corresponding educa- I do not find it clear that our strategic bom- tional institutions. We have been under the bardment of Germany was a decisive factor in influence of Rawls and Kant for many years the Allied victory. We saw that quite the con- now. and it has resulted in numerous changes to trary was true after the war, when the condition our society. Phrases like common good, com- of Germany’s industry proved to be at nearly full mon needs, and economic rights abound today production. It would have been more decisive to in both society and politics. The colonel's state- use Allied assets more directly in conjunction ments are just one example of the confusion that with the ground forces. Too frequently, the air can occur when philosophy allows for the mix- forces had to be begged or forced to provide the ing of words like duty and obligation. But laying air support that the ground forces conceded was all this aside, what is the reason behind career- necessary for the successful completion of their ism? It isn’t a matter of duty over self. It is campaign. All the strategic bombing of Germany simply a system, like most others, I might add, did was to kill a lot of civilians, demolish that encourages a network of associations. The housing, and anger the civilian population. I do more people you know, the better assignment concede that strategic bombing was helpful but you get. and the more people you know. The Air not as important as many would suggest. This Force does not discourage this or ask anything bombing did nothing to stop the German ground different of us. It is not a loss of sense of duty, forces. What did have direct impact was the use because there is none. It is not even a failure to of tactical aviation by the Allies. And when it was not available, the results on the ground meet obligations, because we don’t promise not were noticeable. to employ the system. Careerism simply exists Let me take the Normandy invasion as an because the system, like all others, encourages example. The successful implementation of the it. The question is, will the absence of many top Zuckerman Plan by now-retired Lt Gen Elwood slots keep the creme from rising? Quesada had a direct impact on our forces by lLt Michael K. Donaldson, USAF not allowing the German reinforcements to RAF Lakenheath. England move past a line of rail bridges running north and northwest through France and Belgium. This gave our forces plenty of time to deal with ON JOINT OPERATIONS the local opposition. Furthermore, the Allies' air forces dominated the skies over the battle, a With regard to Col Dennis M. Drew's excellent well-known fact. Had the follow-on forces been article on joint operations in the Fall 1988 allowed to move to the beaches and had the Airpovver Journal, I feel a few comments are German fighters been more of a force, we might necessary. He did a great job in describing the now be reading about a complete disaster on the historical differences between the services, and 1 beaches of Normandy. urge members of all services to read this. Under- With regard to Colonel Drew’s recommenda- standing these differences is the key to making tion to devise new programs of military history, joint operations work for all of us. I think what I feel that this should be expanded to include he pointed out was that no one service can stand the noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps at the alone, as much as our egos would like to think senior NCO level. True, the officers require these so. Quite the contrary, we are a tripod that must programs the most, but normally the NCOs per- depend on the other two legs to stand. If we lose sonally lead our people. An understanding of one leg, we have lost the war. the past will help NCOs lead their people in the Most important, I fully agree with his asser- future. tion that the answer to making this thing we call We at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers “joint ops" work is to study history. While many Europe (SHAPE) have recently formed the understand this, much is still to be done at all SHAPE Military History Society exactly for the levels of the defense community. And while we reasons put forth by Colonel Drew. Our program study the histories of past conflicts, let us re- is prepared to ensure the study of all aspects of member that the lessons learned by one person military warfare on land, in air, and at sea. Our are not the same lessons learned by someone members are from all the services, officer and else. The interpretations vary. What I learned enlisted, and from most of the 16 nations of from studying World War II is not the same as NATO, which can make for some pretty interest- what Colonel Drew learned, for instance. ing discussions. Our big events of 1988 were a RICOCHETS 91

symposium on the Normandy invasion and dis- in the air but can be destroyed on the ground by I covering what lessons we can learn with regard a weapon costing only a few thousand dollars. If to our current plans for attacking follow-on attacking commandos know what they are do- forces (FOFA). Yes. there are many things to ing, they will attack at night, targeting simul- learn from this study. To reemphasize Colonel taneously or successively the following key Drew's comment on "great captains" being stu- objectives; (1) aircrews and groundcrews; (2) dents of military history. Gen John Galvin, su- aircraft on the ground; (3) command posts; am- preme allied commander Europe (SACEUR), munition dumps; petroleum, oil and lubricants spent the entire day at our Normandy sympo- (POL): and antiaircraft defenses; and (4) radars, sium and is the society’s patron. Enough said. communications, and navigation aids. Again. I salute Colonel Drew for an excellent Main operating bases tend to become ‘‘country article and suggest to all wrho missed it to dig it clubs." and this increases their vulnerability. out and plan for the future by following his Even in the United States, an air base could suggestions. be successfully attacked by commandos in the following manner. "Fully Americanized" com- CPO |. L. Anderson, USN mandos of both sexes might rendezvous at SHAPE. Belgium sites where weapons—principally grenade launchers—have been previously cached. Dressed in plain overalls adorned with only the FROM THE LATIN AMERICAN EDITION national insignia to provide protection under the Geneva Convention, they could strike their Editor's Note: The following letter is translated blow and then melt back into the civilian pop- from Spanish. The comments are on two articles ulation. that appeared in the Summer 1987 issue of How do we defend ourselves against any of Airpower Journal, which were subsequently the threats identified above? Above all, we must translated and published in the Spanish lanú have organic defense forces because the army, guage edition of Airpower Journal. unfortunately, will send its best units to the front since our defense is only a secondary task Through the kindness of your Air Force repre- for them. With respect to the organization of sentative here. I received a copy of your March these defense forces, consider that the standard 1988 Spanish issue. I have closely read the mechanized infantry or marine battalion is a articles by Col Clifford R. Krieger ("Fighting the "general-purpose" force with a myriad of com- Air War: A Wing Commander’s Perspective") bat missions, while we need a strongly defen- and Lt Col Price T. Bingham ("Fighting From the sive element. The base-defense mission should Air Base”). I have been involved in air base be accomplished through mobile defensive ma- ground defense for 25 years and would like to neuvers and aggressive patrolling. Our defense offer some comments pertinent to both articles. force should be capable of operating up to 4U or In general, air bases are threatened by the 50 kilometers from the air base in all weather following: attack by commandos from the air or conditions and should be equipped with heavy on the ground; attack by heliborne or airborne antitank and antiaircraft weapons (relying on infantry, armored groups, or artillery; attack by shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles—SAMs— saboteurs or spies; and attack by other means, for self-defense), and target-detection and track- such as missiles, remotely piloted vehicles ing equipment. For self-protection from ground iRPVs), or special weapons. attack, the defense force should rely on mobility, I agree with both authors that the Spetsnaz firepower, and security. The ground defense threat in Europe is significant, given the fire- personnel must be well prepared for combat and power of a Spetsnaz group of 27 troops constantly vigilant. squipped with three Hind attack helicopters and The use of combat helicopters for base defense the possibility of at least a brigade of Spetsnaz needs a few words. They can be effective in forces stationed in East Germany configured for defending the air base, but they are costly ($8— airfield attack. $10 million apiece) and highly vulnerable. The air base is fixed, and its key facilities are Given that an armored fighting vehicle (AFV) sasily identified during peacetime for future costs only $.5 million, I feel we could more targeting. We must also consider that aircraft, effectively use AFVs in base defense, substitut- -a' h worth millions of dollars, may be fearsome ing them for the helicopter’s capabilities on a 92 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1989

ratio of 2 to 1 or 4 to 1, respectively. keeping it concentrated to cover his line of One final thought. I believe we should assume communications, as Clausewitz would have that if our own front is broken, the air base done, he split it into three or more widely cannot be successfully defended and the base spaced columns." Fuller noted, “That Clause- commander must always be prepared for the witz, who took part in the Jena campaign—its evacuation of personnel and the destruction of most notable example— was completely igno- its facilities. rant of this flexible method of concentration, as opposed to his own rigid method, is proved.” Comodoro Francisco Lopez Sandivares In his article, Davidson claims that Clausewitz Cordoba, Argentina was influenced by his experiences in Napole- onic warfare. Since Clausewitz's appreciation and understanding of Napoleonic warfare were MISREADING CLAUSEWITZ? seriously defective, obviously his military thinking should be regarded with skepticism In his Winter 1988 Airpovver Journal article rather than as unquestionable gospel. “Clausewitz and the Indirect Approach: Mis- Napoleonic warfare demonstrated that frontal reading the Master," Capt Kenneth L. Davidson pressure was rarely decisive. Yet Clausewitz reflects the widely held attitude that Clausewitz, stressed direct frontal attacks and disparaged whom he calls “the Master,” was the inerrant flank and rear attacks as detracting from the authority on military affairs—the ultimate, un- effectiveness of the frontal attacks, and best challengeable fount of military wisdom. Hold- used only in following up a decision already ing such high regard for Clausewitz (who, by the achieved by frontal attack. wav, never himself made any claims of infalli- When he claims that Clausewitz was actually bility), Davidson assumes that any alleged short- an advocate of the concept of indirect approach comings or flaws in Clausewitz’s thinking must propounded by Liddell Hart, Davidson demon- be illusory, more than the result of misunder- strates that he (1) doesn’t understand what Lid- standings. Davidson hits B. H. Liddell Hart for dell Hart meant by indirect approach and (2) 'misreading” Clausewitz and claims that Lid- doesn’t understand Clausewitz’s ideas about dell Hart actually agreed with Clausewitz but how to fight. didn’t know it and—what I find astonishing— By indirect approach, Liddell Hart meant at- that Clausewitz was actually an advocate of the tacking at points of least expectation and least indirect approach to war that Liddell Hart advo- resistance—quite different from the simple, di- cated. rect frontal attacks advocated by Clausewitz. To Davidson and others who regard Clause- Liddell Hart also advocated lines of operations witz as the unassailable military guru, I offer the that offer alternative objectives. He called this observations of the renowned British military putting the opponent on the “horns of a di- authority Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller. In chapter 4 of lemma" by forcing him to spread his forces to his book The Conduct of War: 1789-1961, Fuller defend more than one area or spot. Liddell Hart noted. “In spite of his twenty years' experience regarded it as unwise to threaten more than one of Napoleonic warfare, Clausewitz had but a objective since once the enemy is certain of your vague understanding of it,” and "When it is aim, he can concentrate to thwart you. borne in mind that Clausewitz not only lived Davidson insists that in advocating attacking throughout the Napoleonic Wars but also took what he called the enemy's center of gravity part in the campaigns of 1806, 1812, 1813 and (centra gravitatis), Clausewitz was essentially 1815, it is astonishing that he paid so little advocating Liddell Hart’s technique of indirect attention to Napoleon’s generalship." Fuller re- approach. But we find Davidson is incorrect if marked that Clausewitz did not comprehend we examine what Clausewitz actually said about Napoleon's reason for securing his rear, that his center of gravity concept in On War, volume Napoleon in practice did not follow Clause- 2, book 6, chapter 27. section 7. Therein, Clause- witz's maxim, “There is no more imperative and witz said. "Centers of gravity are situated where no simpler law for strategy than to keep (he the greatest bodies of troops are assembled." and forces concentrated. No portion is to be sepa- asserted, "The blow which, if successful, will rated from the main body.” Instead, as Fuller produce the greatest effect, must be made observed, "Napoleon frequently sought to trap against that part of the country where the great his enemy by dividing his army. Instead of est number of the enemy’s forces are collected HICOCHETS 93

together." This advocacy of attacking where the familiarity with the writings of both Clausewitz enemy's power of resistance is greatest is quite and Liddell Hart. the opposite of Liddell Hart's advocacy of at- loseph Forbes tacking the enemy where he has the least power Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania of resistance. Clausewitz asserted that the enemy's military ON A MAGNIFICENT STAFF force was to be regarded as "a unity which may be reduced to one center of gravity. At this Your editorial ("A Magnificent Staff.” Spring center of gravity the decision must take place.” 1989) really hit home. Having worked the past This concept is quite different from Liddell two years as an administrator in the wing com- Hart's advocacy of alternative objectives. mand section, 1 find that it is very easy to get The Clausewitzian concept of center of gravity tunnel vision. I sense that I speak for countless is very seriously defective, and it is quite differ- other "staffers.” Hopefully, commanders with ent from Liddell Hart's indirect approach. Cap- your insight will incorporate innovative ideas to tain Davidson evidently has only a superficial show the "big picture." SSgt Tharmon K. Wynn, IJSAF Little Rock APB. Arkansas QHWDVVHVVPHQW

Low-Intensity Conflict in the Third World by Dr that insurgency would have with an insurgency Lewis B. Ware et al. Maxwell AFB. Alabama in another region. They address case studies 36112: Air University Press. 1988. 178 pages. from Central Asia, the Middle East. Southeast S7.50. Asia. Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa to The term low-intensity conflict (LIC) has gone support this thesis. from avant-garde to buzzword and now ap- Using situations as diverse as the 1929 Bas- proaches cliche yet still lacks a concise defini- machi insurgency and the ongoing dispute be- tion that encompasses the phenomenon. To tween Angola and South Africa, they argue that view it as a "limited struggle,” which is the "the bilateral relationship between the United underlying premise of the Department of De- States and the Soviet Union continues to domi- fense definition, is to ignore the "unlimited” nate American foreign and regional policies." nature of most movements. Defining it as some- On the surface, this thesis appears to be borne thing less than war. however, discounts the out, as is the premise of culturally based deter- potential political outcomes of the process. minants. However, the support for these conten- Therefore, any work that attempts to explain the tions is generally limited to between two to five subject without first establishing an operational pages of greatly condensed political, economic, construct will itself lack focus. and ideological history of the LIC for each of the The authors, members of the Political-Military 19 case studies. The complex interrelationships Affairs Division of the Airpower Research Insti- of the variables involved are not well served by tute. provide such a focus in their premise that such brevity. LIC is a culturally shaped reaction to an existing Readers unfamiliar with LIC will find the political situation. Although the spectrum of book a helpful overview in that it provides a LIC response has identifiable categories like well-ordered explanation of the political and terrorism and insurgency, they posit that re- cultural factors that influence LIC. However, sponses should be keyed to regions rather than experienced individuals will find it less useful levels. That is. terrorism and insurgency in a because of the emphasis on breadth at the ex- particular region have more in common than pense of depth. Lt Col Thomas M. Kearney, USAF Headquarters USAF. Washington. D.C. QRWDPV

Notices of upcoming conferences, seminars, and individuals should contact Capt Robert Angwin, other professional notices of a noncommercial Headquarters US Air Force Academy. Colorado nature should be sent to: Editor, Airpower Jour- 80840-5421. AUTOVON 259-3257/3248. nal, Walker Hall. Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit material for length Historical Research Center Grants and editorial content. The United States Air Force Historical Research Center (USAFHRC) has announced the avail- School for Advanced Airpower Studies ability of research grants to encourage scholars Air University is preparing final recommenda- to study the history of air power through the use tions for the Air Staff on the formation of the of the US Air Force historical document collec- School for Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) tion at the Historical Research Center, located at at Maxwell AFB. Alabama. The objective of the M axwell AFB, Alabama. Grants of up to $2,500 school is to develop strategists for the US Air are available for qualified applicants who will Force. The emphasis will be on the aerial as- visit the center for research during fiscal year pects of the operational art of war. Course con- 1990. Applicants must have either a graduate tent includes military theory, deterrence and degree in history or related fields or equiva- national policy, strategic operations, arms con- lent scholarly accomplishments. Their spe- trol, and strategic defense. Other topics include cialty should be in aeronautics, astronautics, or air campaigns and joint campaigns, technology other military-related areas. A wide variety of and innovation in air power, wargaming and military-related topics may be covered in the exercises. Approximately 25 students from a proposed research. Preference will be given to wide variety of career fields will be competi- those proposals that involve the use of primary tively selected each year to attend the one-year sources held at the center. Applicants may re- school after completion of Air Command and quest an application from the commander, US Staff College (ACSC). Details on how to apply for Air Force Historical Research Center. Maxwell the SAAS will be sent to each ACSC selectee AFB AL 361 12-6678. The deadline for submis- following notification of selection for in- sion of applications is 31 December 1989. residence attendance. Follow-on assignments will be mainly to joint and unified commands. Medical Career Headquarters USAF, and major air command Opportunities in the Military headquarters. Inquiries, comments, and sugges- The Uniformed Services University of the tions for the program should be directed to Health Sciences in Bethesda, Maryland, is seek- CADRE/AS, Building 1400, Maxwell AFB AL ing qualified applicants to attend the medical 36112-5532. school and graduate programs in health sci- ences. Medical students are commissioned as USAFA Instructor Opportunities second lieutenants on active duty reserve status The Military Studies Division at the United while in school and receive full pay and bene- States Air Force Academy is seeking highly fits. Upon graduation they are promoted to the qualified officers for instructor duty in the sum- rank of captain. There are no fees or tuition for mer of 1990 and beyond. This duty involves the school. Upon graduation, students serve a teaching and motivating cadets in university- seven-year commitment for the training they level courses stressing air power heritage, the art receive. Anyone, civilian or military, with a of war, military theory, doctrine, and force em- bachelor's degree may apply for the program. ployment. Officers holding bachelor’s and/or The graduate programs lead to both master’s master's degrees in history, military history, po- degrees and PhDs in basic sciences. Civilian litical science, international relations, or Soviet applicants serve as teaching and research assis- studies are encouraged to apply. The division tants to the faculty in exchange for their tuition- can sponsor a few highly qualified applicants free education. For more information contact the with the appropriate background for a master's Office of Admissions. Attn: PAC, Uniformed degree through the Air Force Institute of Tech- Services University, 4301 Jones Bridge Road, nology (AFIT) program, with a follow-on assign- Bethesda MD 20814-4799, or call (202) 295- ment to the Military Studies Division. Interested 3103.

94 FRQWULEXWRUV

doctrine. He has held command posi- tions. has worked with the US Air Force in the Joint Defence Space Communications Station at Nurrun- gar. Australia, and has flown several tours on maritime aircraft, including the P-3 Orion. Wing Commander Ka- vanugh is a graduate of the USAF Air War College and the Royal Australian Navy Staff College.

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Maj Gen Perry M. Smith, USAF. Re- Wing Comdr David J. Schubert (BSc. tired (USMA: PhD. Columbia Univer- Melbourne University) is on special sity). is general editor for Pergamon- assignment from the chief of the Air Brassey's series on future warfare. Staff of the Royal Australian Air During his 30-year service in the US Force (RAAF) to write air poiver doc- Air Force, he commanded the F-15 trine. He has had flying tours as a wing at Bitburg. West Germany; was navigator on P-3 Orion aircraft and the director of plans on the Air Staff: was an instructor navigator and oper- and served as commandant of the ations officer at navigation school National War College, of which he is Wing Commander Schubert is a grad- a graduate. General Smith is the au- uate of the USAF Air War College and thor of Creating Strategic Vision: the RAAF Academy. Long Range Planning for National Security. Taking Charge: Making the Right Choices, and Assignment Pen- tagon: The Insider’s Guide to the Po- tomac Puzzle Palace.

Maj Earl H. Tilford. Jr. (BA and MA University of Alabama; PhD. George Washington University), is a research fellow at the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, 'X X and Education (AUCADRE). Maxwell AFB. Alabama. Previous assignments Cadet First Class Steven A. Parker is have included the Office of Air Force a member of the class of 1989 of the History and editor. Air University Re- United States Air Force Academy, view. He is the author of A History of assigned to Cadet Squadron 20. Prior Air Force Search and Rescue in to entering the Academy, he served as Wing Comdr Brian L. Kavanagh is on Southeast Asia, 1961-1975 and is a precision measurement equipment special assignment from the chief of currently working on a book tenta- specialist at Laughlin AFB. Texas, the Air Staff of the Royal Australian tively titled "Setup: What the Air and attended the US Air Force Acad- Air Force (RAAFI to write air power Force Did in Vietnam, and Why." emy Preparatory School.

95 Brig Gen Billv M. Knowles, Sr.. Maj Franklin |. Hillson |BA. Virginia USAK. Retired (Texas A&M. Univer- Military Institute; MA. College of sit\ ol Houston. University of South- William and Mary) is on a joint-duty ern California), is a command pilot assignment with the |oint Tactical with over 8.000 flyiny* hours span- Command. Control and Communica- ning 38 years. His assignments in- tions Agency at Fort Monmouth. New i.lulled chief of flight operations. C- Jersey. He is an air weapons control- 130 combat crew training school; ler. having served tours in Canada. director of operations. Headquarters West Germany, and the United States. Air Force Reserve; and wing com- Major Hillson is a graduate of Squad- mander. General Knowles is a previ- ron Officer School and Air Command ous contributor to the Airpower and Staff College. Journal.

Maj Michael W. Cannon. USA (USMA: VIA. University of Iowa) is a student at the School for Advanced Military Studies. Fort Leavenworth. Kansas. He has served with the 11th and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiments in West Germany and Texas, respec- tively. and most recently was assis- tant professor ol history at the United States Military Academy. Major Can- non is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College. BOARD OF ADVISERS

Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF, Retired, Kupos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom, USAF, Office of Air Force History Col James L. Cole, Jr., USAF, Assistant for Joint Matters, ODJS Col Raymond A. Hamilton. Jr., USAF, AFROTC, University of Alabama Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR, Retired. Duke University Dr Richard H. Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History

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